https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2312-1.htmlChinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's reported order to the Chinese military to be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027 and China's ongoing nuclear buildup have raised U.S. concerns over the prospect of a U.S.-China conflict. A conflict with China would be distinct from the wars the United States has fought in the post–Cold War period against regional powers without nuclear weapons. This report summarizes a series of reports on how U.S. joint long-range strike, especially the U.S. Air Force's bomber force, could adapt to better balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve desired military and political objectives without triggering catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear first use.
This report is the product of a mixed-methods research approach that combined regional studies, analytic strategic theory, and historical case studies, all informed by operational analysis. The authors (1) conducted original Chinese-language research leveraging open-source Chinese military writings; (2) supplemented the limited information available from open-source Chinese military writings with historical case studies and a broad review of analytic strategic theory dating back to early RAND work in the 1950s, along with a literature review of Western scholarship on China; (3) reviewed publicly available U.S. Department of Defense documents and recent non-U.S. government wargames; and (4) developed an analytic framework that linked China’s nuclear escalation with specific technical or employment characteristics of U.S. joint long-range strike.
Key Findings
If fully committed to fighting and winning a war with China, the United States must be prepared for nuclear escalation and place more emphasis on managing these risks.
China's nuclear threshold is unclear but also likely movable, meaning that the United States has an opportunity to make the threshold better (but also risks making it worse).
There will likely be trade-offs among military operational utility, force survivability, and escalation management.
The single most influential factor under U.S. military control for managing escalation is target selection.
Munitions can have a direct impact on the U.S. military's ability to manage escalation.
Recommendations
Prioritize development of a robust denial capability to minimize the need for kinetic strikes on mainland China and to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation.
Build a portfolio of U.S. joint long-range strike force structures, postures, and capabilities to execute war plans across various possible mainland strike authorizations.
Ensure the ability to prosecute a variety of targeting plans that can help balance operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management.
Manage Chinese perceptions of long-range strike before and during a war.
Incorporate considerations of escalation risk into the acquisition process, especially for systems that are likely to appear highly escalatory to Chinese leadership.
Establish an Escalation Management Center of Excellence at the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command both to train senior and junior personnel and to have a dedicated organizational structure through which escalation risks can be weighed during peacetime force development.
Avoid making U.S. long-range strike capabilities an attractive target for a limited Chinese nuclear strike.
Avoid long-range strike missions that could accidentally or inadvertently engage a nuclear armed third-party, such as Russia or North Korea.
Avoid extemporaneous responses to dangerous moments by preparing communication strategies and responses to Chinese nuclear signaling or use ahead of time.
Avoid peacetime training of conventional missions that appear most likely to trigger Chinese nuclear use, such as large-scale cost-imposition, leadership decapitation, or counterforce.