

OXFORD

# Philosophy of Mind

TRANSLATED BY W. WALLACE & A. V. MILLER

*Revised with introduction and commentary by*

MICHAEL INWOOD



G. W. F. HEGEL

## HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

G. W. F. Hegel is an immensely important yet difficult philosopher. *Philosophy of Mind* is the third part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, in which he summarizes his philosophical system. It is one of the main pillars of his thought. Michael Inwood presents this central work to the modern reader in an intelligible and accurate new translation—the first into English since 1894—that loses nothing of the style of Hegel's thought. In his editorial introduction Inwood offers a philosophically sophisticated evaluation of Hegel's ideas which includes a survey of the whole of Hegel's thought and detailed analysis of the terminology he used. This translation is issued simultaneously with a companion volume in which Inwood offers a full commentary on the work.

**Michael Inwood** is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Trinity College, Oxford.



# Hegel's Philosophy of Mind

Translated from the 1830 Edition, together with the *Zusätze* by  
W. WALLACE AND A. V. MILLER

Revised with an Introduction by  
M. J. INWOOD

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## Abbreviations

- DGS *Dictionary of German Synonyms*, by R. B. Farrell (3rd edn.: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)
- Enc. Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*. The three parts are usually published separately. The first part ('Enc. I') is translated by William Wallace as *The Logic of Hegel* (2nd edn.: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892) and by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris as *The Encyclopaedia Logic* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991). The second part ('Enc. II') is translated by A. V. Miller as *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) and by M. Petry as *Philosophy of Nature* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970). The third part ('Enc. III') is translated by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller as *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) and in part by M. Petry as *The Berlin Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981). These works translate the third (1830) edition of Enc., but also translate the *Zusätze*. In my quotations from Enc. I, I have usually followed Wallace's translation
- HP *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols., trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1892–6; repr. London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995)
- ILA *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*, trans. B. Bosanquet, ed. M. Inwood (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993). This is Hegel's introduction to his lectures. The complete text is translated by T. M. Knox as *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)
- LPR *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 3 vols., trans. E. Speirs and J. Sanderson (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1895)
- PH *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956). This is the only complete translation of Hegel's lectures on 'world history'
- PR *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957). Also translated by H. Nisbet as *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Hegel's major work on ethics and politics. As in the case of the *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel's posthumous editor added *Zusätze* or 'additions' from lectures
- PS *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)
- SL *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969)





## *Editor's Introduction*

This book is concerned with *Geist*. *Geist* is both 'mind' and 'spirit'. It is the 'mind' of an individual. It is the 'spirit' of a people. It is art, religion, and philosophy. It is the Holy Spirit. *Geist* is the dominant concept in Hegel's philosophy. It propels his thought onward and upward. *Geist* itself, in Hegel's view, propels humanity onward and upward. If there is any 'secret of Hegel', that secret is *Geist*.<sup>1</sup> But what is *Geist*? Can it bear all the meanings Hegel assigns to it? Can it perform the multitude of tasks that Hegel requires of it? Such are the questions that this Introduction attempts to answer.

### HEGEL

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart in 1770. After leaving the local high school, he enrolled in the philosophy faculty of Tübingen university in 1788, but later transferred to the theological faculty with the aim of becoming a Lutheran pastor. On graduating in 1793, he followed the common practice of serving as a private tutor to the children of a wealthy family, first in Berne and later in Frankfurt. During this period he wrote some essays on Christianity, which in general regret, and attempt to explain, its degeneration into a 'positive' religion, a religion of prescribed dogmas, rules, and rituals, in contrast to the 'folk-religion' of ancient Greece that it supplanted. The most important of these essays, 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate', argued that Jesus originally preached a religion of love, but that it had to become a religion of law, a positive religion, in order to convert mankind. Despite the occurrence of the word 'spirit' (*Geist*) in its title, as yet spirit plays only a subordinate role in Hegel's thought. He invests more hope in 'love' as a means of overcoming the alienating oppositions—between simple faith and ecclesiastical authority, between reason and the heart—that he so deplored. As yet, Hegel doubts the capacity of conceptual thought to do justice to the insights of Christianity.<sup>2</sup>

Early in 1801 Hegel moved to Jena to lecture at the university where his younger, but more precocious friend Friedrich Schelling already held a professorship. It was here that *Geist*, along with conceptual thought, secured a more prominent place in Hegel's thought. The upshot of his Jena period was his first major work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, that he published in 1807. In this work

<sup>1</sup> *The Secret of Hegel* (London: Longman, 1865), by James Hutchison Stirling, was the first book about Hegel in the English language.

<sup>2</sup> These essays were not published until 1907. Most of them are translated by T. M. Knox in *Hegel's Early Theological Writings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

*Geist* has many of the meanings that it is given in the *Encyclopaedia*. (But not all the meanings, since the *Phenomenology* does not contain anything corresponding to the section on ‘anthropology’ in the *Encyclopaedia* or to the section on ‘psychology’.) In a brief advertisement for his book Hegel said that it

conceives the various forms of the spirit as stations on its way into itself, the way by which it becomes pure knowledge or absolute spirit. Thus the main sections of the science . . . consider: consciousness, self-consciousness, observing reason and active reason, spirit itself as ethical spirit, cultured and moral spirit, and finally spirit as religious spirit in its different forms. The wealth of appearances of spirit, which at first sight seems chaotic, is presented in its necessity: imperfect appearances dissolve and pass into higher ones that are their proximate truth. They reach the ultimate truth initially in religion, and then in science, the result of the whole.<sup>3</sup>

By the time the book was published, Hegel had left Jena, because the university was closed after Napoleon’s victory at the battle of Jena in 1806. For about a year he edited a Napoleonic newspaper in Bamberg in Bavaria. Then, in 1808, he was appointed headmaster of a gymnasium in Nuremberg. There he gave lectures on various philosophical themes, including phenomenology of spirit and ‘philosophical encyclopaedia’.<sup>4</sup> He married Marie von Tucher in 1811 and, between 1812 and 1816, published the *Science of Logic*. This work won him a professorship at Heidelberg, where in 1817 he published his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* as a textbook to accompany his lectures. It consisted of three parts: logic (a shorter and modified version of the *Science of Logic*), philosophy of nature, and philosophy of *Geist*. It was divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs, often brief and obscure, but to be expanded and explained in his lectures. To some paragraphs he added ‘Remarks’, which illustrate the theme of the paragraph in a less formal, less cryptic way and were intended to appeal to a wider readership.

In 1818 he took up a professorship in Berlin, which he held until his death in 1831. In 1821 he published the *Philosophy of Right*, covering roughly the same ground, in greater detail, as the section ‘Objective Mind’ in the *Encyclopaedia*. In 1827 he published the *Encyclopaedia* in a second edition that was nearly twice as long as the first, mainly as a result of increasing and expanding the Remarks. He published a slightly longer third edition in 1830. The work reached its present form in the 1840s, when it was edited for the collected edition of Hegel’s works published by his pupils and friends. The three parts were produced separately, the Logic in 1840 by Leopold von Henning, the Philosophy of Nature in 1842 by

<sup>3</sup> ‘Science’, in Hegel, often means ‘philosophy’. Here it refers, in its first occurrence, to what is presented in the *Phenomenology* itself, and, in its second occurrence, to the philosophy proper (logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of mind) to which the *Phenomenology* was originally intended as an introduction.

<sup>4</sup> Hegel’s notes for these lectures were published by Karl Rosenkranz in 1844. They are translated by A. V. Miller in *Philosophical Propaedeutic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

Karl Ludwig Michelet, and the *Philosophy of Mind* in 1845 by Ludwig Boumann. It was these editors who added the *Zusätze*, 'Additions', from Hegel's lectures on these subjects. Some of his lectures were also published separately: on aesthetics, on the history of philosophy, on philosophy of history, and on philosophy of religion. These too shed light on the corresponding sections of the *Encyclopaedia*, especially on the *Philosophy of Mind*.<sup>5</sup>

### THE *ENCYCLOPAEDIA*

The 1830 edition of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* has the following overall structure. It begins with the Prefaces to all three editions. The most interesting of these is the second, which discusses the relationship between religion and philosophy and the question whether philosophy is pantheistic.<sup>6</sup> There follows a long introduction, discussing the general nature of philosophy and of logic in particular. Then Hegel supplies a critique of his predecessors—primarily Leibniz and his followers, Kant and F. H. Jacobi<sup>7</sup>—which, he suggests, may be a better introduction to his system than the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was (Enc. I, §25). After a brisk account of the three aspects of the logical method—'intellect', 'dialectic' or 'negative reason', and 'speculation' or 'positive reason'<sup>8</sup>—the Logic proper begins at §84.

Like the *Encyclopaedia* as a whole, the Logic is divided into three parts. The first is the 'Doctrine of Being'. It begins with 'pure being', the simplest of all concepts, without which we cannot begin to conceive the world. But *pure* being, being with no specifications, is equivalent to 'nothing' and passes over into nothing. 'Nothing', however, is equivalent to being, so it passes back into being. This

<sup>5</sup> Hegel's posthumous editors published only his lectures on subjects that were not dealt with at length in his published works. More recently his lectures on other subjects, such as logic, nature, and right have been published. Attempts have also been made to distinguish the courses that Hegel gave in different years—his original editors stitched together materials from different years. Especially relevant to *Encyclopaedia* III are his Jena lectures on *Geist*, translated by L. Rauch as *Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805–6) with Commentary* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983).

<sup>6</sup> In Wallace's translation of the first part of the *Encyclopaedia*, *The Logic of Hegel* (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892), the Prefaces are summarized, but not translated. They are now translated in a more recent version, *The Encyclopaedia Logic* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), trans. T. Geraets, H. Harris and W. Suchting.

<sup>7</sup> Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) argued that immediate feeling and faith are the basis of all our beliefs, including in particular religious beliefs.

<sup>8</sup> 'Reason' translates *Vernunft*, which contrasts with the more rigid and static *Verstand*.

Translators of Kant and Hegel usually render *Verstand* as 'understanding'. I depart from tradition, preferring 'intellect' for three reasons: (1) 'Intellect' generates an adjective, 'intellectual' (*verständlich*)—and also others from the same stem such as 'intelligent' and 'intelligible'—that is not easily confused with the noun. (2) 'Intellect' conveys the ideas of separation and clarity, which Hegel associates with *Verstand*, better than 'understanding' does. An intellect may be 'sharp', 'penetrating', or 'piercing', whereas 'understanding' suggests agreement and sympathy. (3) The medieval ancestor of Hegel's (and Kant's) distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* was the distinction between *intellectus* and *ratio*.

oscillation between the two amounts to 'becoming'. But becoming subsides and congeals into *Dasein*, 'determinate being', a fusion of being and nothing.<sup>9</sup> An entity has a definite nature or quality (its 'being') that excludes a range of other natures or qualities (its non-being or 'nothing'). From the categories of quality we proceed to those of quantity (magnitude, number, etc.), and finally to 'measure', where quality and quantity intertwine. (A human being, for example, necessarily changes its shape as it increases in size.)

The second division of Logic is the 'Doctrine of Essence'. It considers concepts that capture, more obviously than those in the first division, the relationships between entities, and the inner nature underlying their outer appearance. Thus these concepts come in correlated pairs, such as essence—appearance, identity—difference, thing—properties, substance—accidents, and cause—effect.

The third and final division of the Logic is the 'Doctrine of the Concept'.<sup>10</sup> Like the preceding divisions, this contains three sections. The first deals with the 'subjective concept'. It considers the subject matter of traditional logic, the varieties of concepts, judgements, and inferences or syllogisms. (Despite his use of the word 'subjective' Hegel tends to regard concepts, judgements, and syllogisms as objective in a way that traditional logic does not. A concept is, for him, not simply a mental or a linguistic entity, but is embedded in things and determines their structure and their growth. Judgements and syllogisms are similarly implanted in the nature of things and not simply our ways of representing the nature of things.) The second section deals with the 'object'. There are three main types of object. The lowest type is mechanical. An example of this is the solar system, though higher types of entity, such as the mind, are often regarded as mechanical—in Hegel's view, inappropriately. Next comes the chemical object—for example, the compounding of an acid and an alkali to form a salt. Finally, there is 'teleology', in which an agent exploits the mechanical and chemical properties of an object to impose its purpose on it. With this unification of a purpose (i.e. the agent's concept) and an object, we reach the third section: the 'Idea', the unity of the concept and the object.<sup>11</sup> The first case of this is life or the living organism, which cannot, in Hegel's view, be explained mechanically or chemically, but

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger has since adopted the word '*Dasein*' to refer specifically to human being(s) and sometimes stresses its literal meaning: 'being [*sein*] there [*da*]'. Hegel's use of the word is different. He applies it to anything that has a definite character. In Enc. III, it usually contrasts with the 'concept' of something, and I have generally translated it as 'reality' or 'embodiment'.

<sup>10</sup> Hegel's word for 'concept', *Begriff*, is often translated (by, for example, Wallace and A. V. Miller) as 'Notion', in part because Kant used '*notio*' as its Latin equivalent. I prefer to translate it as 'concept', a word that has a more secure position in English philosophical discourse.

<sup>11</sup> The initial capital in 'Idea' is intended to distinguish Hegel's word *Idee* from the word *Vorstellung*, which I usually translate as 'representation', but, when this becomes unbearable, as 'idea'. A *Vorstellung* is roughly an idea in the ordinary sense of the word 'idea', whereas an *Idee* is more like a Platonic idea. In Hegel's usage an *Idee* is the unity of a *Begriff* and its *Objekt*, though he often uses other words, such as *Realität* ('reality') or *Dasein* ('reality, embodiment') in place of *Objekt*.

only in terms of the concept that it embodies. A more advanced case is 'cognition' and the 'will', which, in their different ways, unify a concept or concepts with objects. The final case, and the climax of the Logic as a whole, is the 'absolute Idea'. This represents Hegel's own Logic, which, as thought about thought, is a perfect match between the object, the thought that is thought about, and the concept, the thought that thinks about it. The Logic thus in a way returns to its beginning, to pure being.

There is another way in which the Logic returns to its beginning. The absolute Idea represents not only the Logic itself, but also the way in which logical categories or thoughts inform and structure the world. The convergence, within logic, between the concept and the object prefigures and explains the convergence between logic (or the 'logical Idea') and the world outside logic. Thus at the end of the Logic we turn to Philosophy of Nature and this begins with an account of space, which embodies (though only approximately) the first category of logic, pure being. In this part of the *Encyclopaedia* Hegel ranges through the science of his day, considering such topics as time, motion, the solar system, crystals, electricity, plants, and animals. He concludes with the death of an animal and this provides him with a (somewhat fanciful) transition to *Geist*, the theme of the third part of the *Encyclopaedia*.

Mind, like nature, embodies the logical Idea and is structured by it. In particular, the Philosophy of Mind follows the path prescribed in the third division of the Logic. It begins with the *concept* of mind: the mind is essentially something that strives to know itself. This essential characteristic of mind generates (Hegel assures us) its whole development: its emergence from its 'soulful' state in the womb and in infancy, its drive to comprehend the world, its capacity for perception, thought, and will, its conquest of the natural world and its formation of families, societies, and states. Eventually, it rises above the secular world to find itself as 'mind as such', mind freed from the confines of nature. It does this in religion, especially the Christian religion, which displays in a pictorial form the tripartite structure of reality that Hegel's philosophy presents in a prosaic form. So finally mind turns to philosophy. Now mind not only becomes fully aware of the concept of *mind*. It also gains knowledge of the concept as such, of the logical Idea that underlies both nature and mind. For philosophy begins with logic, and this takes us right back to the beginning of the *Encyclopaedia*. The *Encyclopaedia* circles back on itself, and in doing this (Hegel believes) it reflects the circular structure of reality.

## SUBJECTIVE MIND

The *Encyclopaedia* presents, then, an ordered system that returns to its own beginning, a circular system. The driving force behind this movement is the mind itself. For mind (Hegel believes) is implicit even in nature and accounts for its hierarchical structure. In nature, however, mind is only implicit. Nature is not

conscious. The mind in it is no more than the thoughts or categories embedded in it. Mind emerges explicitly only in human beings. And this is the theme of the third part of the *Encyclopaedia*.

But what is the mind? Hegel's word is *Geist*, which does not exactly correspond to the English word 'mind', which has in fact no single equivalent in the English language. The most common translations are 'mind' and 'spirit', one or other of which is usually appropriate for Hegel's use of the term. But within this broad range *Geist* takes on a bewildering variety of apparently distinct senses. In its most general sense, 'mind' contrasts with 'nature' and with such terms as 'matter'. Nature and matter are the concern of the Philosophy of Nature. This deals with space, time, plants, animals, and so on. (Animals do not, in Hegel's view, have minds nor are they in his sense 'conscious'. But this does not imply that they do not, for example, feel pain.) Philosophy of Mind, by contrast, deals with what is specifically human, including for example the state, art, and religion—topics that do not usually fall within the range of what we call 'philosophy of mind'. 'Mind' also contrasts with 'logic'. It does so in at least two respects. First, logic is 'abstract'. It deals with concepts of great generality, the concept of 'substance' for example, which apply equally readily to both nature and mind. Secondly, although logic governs our thought and is something that we think about, Hegel's Logic is not, officially at least, concerned with our *thinking* about, or in terms of, logic. It is concerned only with logical concepts and forms themselves, and these do not fall within the scope of the human or therefore of the philosophy of mind.

There is, secondly, a more restricted sense of *Geist* in which it contrasts with *Seele*, 'soul'. Philosophers before Hegel often regarded the 'soul' as a spiritual substance distinct from, though temporarily lodged in, the human body. In Hegel's preferred sense, '*Seele*' is closer in meaning to Aristotle's word '*psyche*', which is what makes something *alive*. Aristotle concluded that plants and animals, as well as men, have souls simply because they are alive, though he did not believe that their souls were immortal. Hegel discusses plants and animals in his Philosophy of Nature, but he hardly raises the question whether they have souls or not. In fact, Hegel is less inclined than Aristotle is to regard human beings as 'rational animals', that is, as similar to animals, only with reason added to them. For him men differ from animals all the way down. Nevertheless for Hegel 'soul' refers primarily to those aspects of human beings in which, though they differ from animals and a fortiori from plants, they are still closely connected to nature. Thus 'Anthropology', literally the 'study of man', but for Hegel the study of the soul, deals with such themes as the foetus, racial differences, the course of a human life, sleep and waking, and sexuality. *Geist*, by contrast, refers to the more intellectual or rational features of humanity. One important difference between *Seele* and *Geist* is this. *Geist*, the mind, differentiates itself more or less sharply both from other minds and from the external world of which it is conscious. A properly working mind knows that the objects of which it is conscious—trees, houses,

rivers—are distinct from itself. It knows that they exist even when it is not conscious of them. It knows that they have aspects which it does not currently, and perhaps never will, perceive. It distinguishes between the hot fire and the pain it receives from it, locating the heat in the external world and the pain in itself. It also knows that other people are similar to, yet distinct from, itself. They perceive roughly the same objects as it itself does, but perceive them from a different perspective. Other people, I come to realize, do not know everything I know. That is why I can lie to them. They know things that I do not know. That is why they can lie to me.

The soul, by contrast, does not draw a boundary between itself and other things or between itself and other people. This is especially true of the foetus, and to a lesser extent of the infant. It is the job of the mind, not the soul, to mark these boundaries. It begins to do this in the section that Hegel calls the ‘Phenomenology of Mind’.<sup>12</sup> ‘Phenomenology’ is literally the ‘study of appearance(s)’. Characteristically, Hegel probably has in play several different senses of the word ‘appearance’. Among other things, it means the ‘emergence’ of mind. The mind appears on the scene. It emerges from the self-enclosed, self-absorbed soul-state of infancy to make contact with a world distinct from itself and with people other than itself. It both differentiates itself from its ‘other’ and enters into relationship with it. When the mind has fully emerged, it retreats (Hegel implies) back into itself. In the section called ‘Psychology, the Mind’ Hegel gives an account of the powers and development of the mind that makes only occasional reference to the external world on which these powers are exercised. The relationship of ‘psychology’ to ‘phenomenology’ differs radically from the relationship of ‘anthropology’ to either. The soul constitutes, and anthropology describes, a stage or level of the human being distinct from and prior to the fully developed mind. A human being, a foetus for example, might be a soul without yet being a mind. Conversely, in a fully developed mind, the soul plays only a subsidiary and subdued role. But ‘phenomenology’ and ‘psychology’

<sup>12</sup> The relationship between this section of the *Encyclopaedia* and Hegel’s 1807 book of the same title is a vexed problem. The book was originally intended as an introduction to the ‘system of science’, which was to consist of logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of mind. But Hegel did not complete this plan. In a ‘Remark’ to the *Encyclopaedia* added to the 1827 edition (§25) he says that the book expanded beyond his original design and came to incorporate much of the material intended for inclusion in the philosophies of nature and mind. This explains why he abandoned the idea of making his book the introduction to his system. But why did he then include a truncated version of the book in his encyclopaedia? The answer is this. The book, roughly speaking, describes the ascent of mind from innocence to philosophy. This is clearly an appropriate introduction to philosophy: an account of how philosophy emerges is one way of leading Hegel’s pupils to philosophy from their relative innocence. But it is also an appropriate, perhaps indispensable, part of the story of mind. Mind does, after all, ascend from innocence to philosophy. So when the *Phenomenology* drops out as an introduction to philosophy, it naturally finds a place in the *Philosophy of Mind*. It might even occupy both positions, serving both as an introduction to philosophy as a whole and as a strand in the philosophy of mind. But since Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia* is circular, it implicitly occupies both positions anyway. Nevertheless, Hegel still remained attached to the book. He began to revise it for a second edition shortly before his death.



do not describe different stages or levels of the mind. They simply describe the mind from different points of view. No one could have the powers that Hegel includes under the heading of psychology without also being conscious of objects and other people, without being self-conscious. Conversely, no one could be conscious and self-conscious without having those powers.

## OBJECTIVE MIND

Nevertheless, Hegel regards 'psychology' as a distinct stage of mind, a stage in which the mind withdraws into itself, in order to examine itself without regard to the external world. This withdrawal of the mind is the culmination of what Hegel calls the 'subjective mind', which is (roughly speaking) the individual mind. The soul, consciousness (the subject matter of 'Phenomenology') and the 'free' mind (the subject matter of 'Psychology') all fall under the general heading 'Subjective Mind'. It is within the sphere of 'subjective mind' that the soul is distinguished from the mind proper. Now we come to *objective* mind. In a typically Hegelian transition the withdrawal of the mind into itself is succeeded by the mind's return to the external world. The mind has already ventured into the external world, in the form of 'consciousness'. But now it is the external world with a difference. The world of which the mind was 'conscious' was initially a strange and alien world, a world of natural entities and of uncivilized, hostile people. Even when the mind came to understand this world it remained the natural rather than the social world. Its relations with other people were relations of dominance and subjection. Such understanding, dominance and subjection are essential steps on the way to objective mind. But they are not the same as objective mind. When mind is objective it has completed its task of taming and permeating the world. The world is no longer a world of merely natural entities and antagonistic people. Such natural entities as figure in it are the raw materials from which we produce goods for consumption and exchange. They are transformed in the houses we dwell in, the parks in which we stroll, and the buildings in which we conduct our public affairs. The people we primarily encounter are not our enemies, but the members of family: our parents, spouse, and children. They are, again, in 'civil society', our employers or employees, our business partners or rivals, our fellow guild-members, and so on. And finally we encounter or are at any rate affected by the various officials who manage the affairs of state. All this is the work of objective mind.

Objective mind is closely related to the *Volksgeist*, the 'mind of a people' or 'national mind'. The social and political order that Hegel describes under the heading 'Objective Mind' does not embrace the whole of humanity. Human beings are divided into 'peoples', the Germans, the French, the Italians, the English, and so on, each of them united by their shared customs, sentiments, language, and history. Some of these peoples are organized into societies of roughly the type that Hegel describes. (What Hegel actually describes is probably

no existing society, but an idealized version of the Prussian constitution.<sup>13</sup> A people's society—its family arrangements, its laws, and so on—is informed and permeated by the 'mind' or 'spirit' of that people, by its general way of looking at things and doing things. It is, in Hegel's view, neither desirable nor possible for the whole of humanity to unite in a single society governed by a single world-state. If humanity were to retain their present diversity of cultures, religions, languages, etc., the bonds between them would be too loose for them to form a single cohesive society. If humanity were to adopt a single language, culture, and perhaps religion, then the bonds between them would also be loosened, since there would be no significant conflicts to weld them together. In either case, Hegel might argue, this all-embracing world-state would share the fate of the Roman Empire, disintegrating into a collection of self-engrossed individuals. The unity of the state, he believes, depends on its being one among several such states, whose occasional bouts of warfare wrest their citizens from absorption in their private affairs out into the public realm. There are, then, a diversity of 'national minds' and Hegel sees no prospect of their homogenisation into a single mind with the same degree of coherence and unity as a national mind.

There is, however, a single mind at work in all this. Hegel calls it the *Weltgeist*, the 'world-mind'. It embraces not so much the variety of national minds in existence at any given time, but the national minds that have emerged over the course of history. A national mind does not, in Hegel's view, last for ever. It arises, flourishes, and declines, summoned for judgement before the court of the world. At any given period of world-history, one national mind is dominant, representing the cutting edge of the advance of humanity. First it was China, then India, then Persia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and finally the 'Germanic peoples', the Christian civilization of Western Europe. One might object that these supposedly successive civilizations are for the most part too disparate, too disconnected, to constitute the work of a single mind or spirit in the way in which a single civilization could be regarded, with some plausibility, as the work of a single national mind. This objection may be intensified into the doubt whether there has been, until quite recently, such a thing as 'world-history'. Until some way into the nineteenth century, events in, say, China had little if any effect on events in, say, England. Events in China could not become known in England until several months after their occurrence, if they ever became known at all. So, we might say, there was Chinese history, Indian history, English history, perhaps even European history, but hardly any world-history. And without world-history it makes little sense to speak of a 'world-mind'. A mind must have more coherence than we can plausibly attribute to most of humanity's history. But Hegel has

<sup>13</sup> Allan W. Wood argues, in his *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 13, that the state that Hegel describes in his *Philosophy of Right* 'bears a striking resemblance' not to the actual Prussian state, but to the plan for a new constitution drafted by Wilhelm von Humboldt and K. A. von Hardenberg in 1819, but never put into practice.

given an answer to this. It is the dominant culture of each epoch that is the main focus of the world-mind's spotlight. Other civilizations, even if they have been dominant in the past, recede into the background. It does not matter if Western Europe, in the period of its dominance, knows little of what is happening in China. Nothing of great significance is happening in China, and China has descended into what we might call the subconscious of world-mind. What matters, therefore, is not primarily the coherence of cultures contemporary with each other, but the coherence of the historical sequence of dominant cultures: China, India, Persia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, Western Europe.

#### ABSOLUTE MIND

Hegel associates this world-mind with 'divine providence'. Sure enough God makes his final appearance shortly afterwards in 'Absolute Mind'. Absolute mind comprises art, religion, and philosophy, though religion, Hegel says, is the dominant term of the triad. (In Hegel's view, art, especially pre-Christian art, has a more or less close connection with religion.) Why is this mind 'absolute'? It is the final term of a triad: subjective mind—objective mind—absolute mind. So we might expect, from our acquaintance with Hegel's other triads, that absolute mind will be a combination of subjective and objective minds or, what may amount to the same thing, a restoration of subjective mind on a higher level. One obvious difference between subjective and objective mind is this. Subjective mind is the same for everyone. Every normal human being, whether in China, India, Persia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, or modern Europe has more or less the characteristics outlined under the heading 'Subjective Mind'. What Hegel describes may in fact be a peculiarly European mind, and a nineteenth-century mind at that. But that is surely not his intention. His intention is to describe the individual mind as such. With objective mind it is otherwise. More or less every individual mind, at least in the period of recorded history, belongs to a community that is an objectification of mind. But individuals do not all belong to the same community nor do they all occupy the same role in their community. Human beings are divided up into groups—'peoples'—with distinctive cultures. They are divided up into historical epochs. Within their society individuals are divided up into nobles and commoners, traders and farmers, and so on. Worst of all, in some societies, in fact in practically all pre-Christian societies and in some Christian ones too, people are divided up into slave and free. Now the aim of mind, Hegel insists, is to know itself, to know mind as such. This is what Hegel claims to have done in his *Philosophy of Mind*. But how can we know mind as such if mind is divided in this way? Surely all that we can know is some particular type of mind, the Roman mind, the mind of the free man, the mind of the worker, the mind of the nobleman, and so on. We have already seen that Hegel despairs of uniting everyone in a single society. Nor would this help much unless everyone had the same role. Even then,

if mind was to know itself, everyone would have to reflect on themselves, reflect, that is, on mind as such.

At this point absolute mind resolves our dilemma. Here the mind attempts to rise above its historical and social setting to consider mind as such. At first it is not very successful in this. It cannot easily extricate mind from its entanglement in nature, let alone its social context. The Greeks achieved a rounded, realistic portrayal of human beings, but they presented their surface appearance, not their inner depths. The man they presented was Greek man, Greek mind, not mind as such. But Christianity is different. Christianity reveals the inner depth of man. It also reveals the breadth of mind. It appeals to all men, Greek and Jew, male and female, slave and free. It presents, or at least begins to present, mind as such, mind purified of nature and of local peculiarities. Philosophy, the highest term of the triad, completes this process. A philosopher inevitably belongs to a nation. Philosophers are Chinese, Indian, Greek, Roman, German, or French. But the philosophy they produce does not appeal essentially only to members of their own nation. Greek religion is specifically Greek. It makes little sense for a Jew or a Persian, embedded in Jewish or Persian culture, to worship the gods of Greece. But Greek philosophy, Platonism for example, is not specifically Greek. It is presented as true for everyone. Anyone, whether Jew or Greek, male or female, slave or free, can become a Platonist. If someone converts from Platonism to, say, Cartesianism, they do not need to change their nationality from Greek to French. A philosophy may of course consider the differences and affinities between Greek minds, Chinese minds, and German minds. It may also argue, as Hegel does, that its capacity to do this adequately and its capacity to consider mind as such, stem from the objective mind of Western Europe and its Christian religion. But in doing so, philosophy is not identifying itself with, or appealing to, any particular type of mind, not even Western European mind. It presents its findings as true for anyone and everyone, true for mind as such.

There is therefore a peculiar affinity between Christianity and philosophy. Both are concerned with mind as such and are presented to mind as such, to everyone. But there is a difference. Christianity tells a story about God, who is himself a mind distinct from any human mind. He then generates a son, who is again a mind. And when, after his death and resurrection, the son has returned to God, another mind descends on humanity, the holy 'spirit'. Philosophy is grateful for this story, but does not take it literally. It interprets God the father as the 'logical Idea', which underlies 'nature'—the philosophical counterpart of God the son<sup>14</sup>—and then the development of the human mind (the Holy Spirit, as it were), whose highest phase is philosophy, which comprehends the logical Idea, nature, and mind itself.

<sup>14</sup> For Hegel, Christ or the 'son' represents both nature and man. See Enc. III, §381.

## HEGEL'S MYTH?

Hegel, we might protest, has reworked the Christian story into another story, which though less pictorial is no less fanciful. It is a story of mind's endeavour to disentangle itself from the natural world and from the local peculiarities of the social world in order to know itself in its purity, to achieve, as Hegel puts it, its 'freedom' and 'truth'. Why should we accept this story? Does it have any objective status? Or is it just Hegel's way of arranging the multifarious facts about humanity into a satisfying narrative? Even as a narrative, it has conspicuous defects. In the first place, it does not follow a single time-sequence. It begins with the soul, and this (apart from its anomalous resurgence in deranged adults) precedes in time the 'appearance' of mind, described in the 'Phenomenology'. Then the powers of the mind are considered in 'Psychology', but these do not, very obviously, temporally follow the 'appearance' of mind. Objective mind comes next. Within objective mind there is a temporal sequence driven by the world-spirit, one culture giving way to the next. But objective mind as such does not follow subjective mind in time. There was no time that Hegel knew of when human beings with the powers considered by 'Psychology' did not form social groups. (Objective mind may temporally follow the state of nature described in the early part of the 'Phenomenology', but Hegel does not regard that as serious history.). Next comes absolute mind: art, religion, and philosophy. Art does not emerge later than objective mind, let alone the specific institutions that Hegel describes under the heading 'Objective Mind'. Art has been around as long as anything Hegel could recognize as humanity. The same is true of religion. But Hegel avoids this difficulty by speaking here primarily of 'revealed religion', that is Christianity, and by merging earlier religions into his account of art. Finally we come to philosophy. This emerged later than art and religion. Its beginnings in Europe are generally located in Greece in the sixth century BC. But it pre-dates revealed religion by at least 500 years. Even the first indisputably great philosopher, Plato, was born 427 years before the supposed birth of Christ. Perhaps Plato did not get to the bottom of mind as such. But Hegel had a high esteem for the philosophy of mind of his pupil, Aristotle.

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind does not follow a single temporal sequence. Suppose we accept, nevertheless, that Hegel presents a single narrative of a journey from the natural soul to mind's full self-knowledge. Is there a single subject of this narrative? What is that subject? It is *Geist*, Hegel says. But '*Geist*', as Hegel uses it, seems to be applied too liberally to denote a single subject. Subjective mind, objective mind, national mind, world-mind, absolute mind, the holy spirit: what links these together to form a single developing mind? Perhaps they bear a family-resemblance to each other, But that is surely not enough for them to constitute a single subject. In any case, it easy to doubt whether there is such a thing as objective mind, national mind, or world-mind, let alone the holy

spirit. This doubt operates at two levels. First, one might question the ontological status of societies, nations, world-history, even of philosophy. Do they amount to anything more than arrangements of individuals—citizens, historical agents, philosophers, and their audience? Secondly, one might resist the suggestion that such entities, whatever their ontological status, are ‘minds’ in a sense sufficiently close to that of an individual ‘mind’ to constitute a prolongation of the individual mind. Yet this is what Hegel requires. It is mind, a single mind, that makes the journey from nature to self-knowledge. It begins as soul, and here it is more or less continuous throughout humanity, in fact (Hegel suggests) throughout nature as a whole. There are no clear boundaries between one soul and another soul, or between the soul and its natural environment. With the ‘appearance’ of mind (in contrast to ‘soul’) boundaries are established, between one mind and another mind, and between a mind and the world. Mind ‘as such’, considered in ‘Psychology’, withdraws into itself as a distinct, individual mind. Then, as objective mind, it re-establishes its connections with other individual minds and with the surrounding world. But now the individual mind retains its individuality. It is not lost in other minds and in the world. Its relations with other minds are intelligibly structured, and the world it inhabits is permeated and ordered by mind. But this objective mind is localized in space and time. It is not mind as such, not even the objectification of mind as such. The closest that we come to mind as such in this sphere is the temporal sequence of dominant national minds presented by the world-mind. However, the peoples whose minds are thus objectified are not content to remain within the confines of their secular social and political life. They try to make sense of the cosmos and of their own place in it. They express their attempt and its outcome in their religion and their art, which in its early stages is closely intertwined with religion. They worship gods who represent their conception of mind as such. But their religion is not entirely separate from their secular life. It informs and sustains their political and social institutions. Religion is a sort of bridge between localized objective mind and mind as such. Pre-Christian religions, as we have seen, tend to project their localized objective mind onto the divine plane. But Christianity purports to avoid this. It presents mind as such for all human beings. Philosophy does this too, only purged of the pictorial elements of Christianity. Mind has returned to the unity from which it began, but now on a higher level. Mind now knows itself inside and out. It can compose a philosophy of mind, something of which it is not capable at any lower stage of itself. Mind has thus become ‘true’ mind. It has become its own object.

#### IN DEFENCE OF HEGEL

In the hope of avoiding these criticisms of Hegel’s procedure, we might consider the stages of mind not as temporally successive stages but as aspects of an individual person. The person begins life as a soul. Here he is not clearly

differentiated from other persons and their souls or from the external world. A person's soul-life persists into adult life. But then, except in cases of derangement, the soul is subordinate to the person's objective consciousness. The emergence of objective consciousness is described in the 'Phenomenology of Mind'. Here a person becomes aware of himself as one person among other persons distinct from, though similar to, himself, inhabiting an orderly world to which they are cognitively and practically related. Such objective consciousness depends on the mental powers considered in 'Psychology'. Hegel presents this section as a sort of withdrawal of mind into itself. But there is, at this stage, really no such withdrawal. The person we are considering does not yet describe his own mental powers and activities. He can only do this properly when he becomes a philosopher.

So far we have focused more or less on the single individual, albeit an individual whose self-consciousness requires an awareness of other individuals. Now we turn to 'Objective Mind' and consider the person as a property owner, as a family member, a participant in civil society, and a citizen of a state. All this does not leave the individual unchanged. The social and political structure permeates the individual mind. Even non-Hegelians acknowledge this:

The whole process of choosing has itself an influence on one's identifications, therefore on the self, and therefore on the goals one seeks to maximize. On the whole, the process of making market choices tends to narrow one's identifications to the individual or, at the most, to the family. The process of voting, on the other hand, with all that it presupposes in the way of discussion and techniques of reciprocity, tends to broaden one's identifications beyond the individual and the family.<sup>15</sup>

We need not insist, then, that a social order is itself a 'mind' larger than the minds of the individuals composing it. We need only refer to the enlargement of the individual mind stemming from its relationships to other individual minds. We can, if need be, individualize the 'world-mind' in a similar way. An individual in a society, say a German individual in nineteenth-century Prussia, not only absorbs the culture of his own society. He also contains within him, more or less implicitly, the cultures or mentalities of the societies that preceded it. The German mentality has developed out of the Greek mentality, in such a way that although it is more complex than the Greek mentality it is intelligibly related to it and retains the Greek mentality as a subordinate part or element of itself. And similarly with other historic cultures. Scratch a modern German and you will find a Roman, a Greek, and even an Egyptian buried within him. This is why he can understand them. At this stage the individual is of course only dimly aware of the history that lies behind him and which, in a way, lies buried within him. It takes a historian to unearth and clarify the details. But he is likely to be aware that his

<sup>15</sup> Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Transaction Books, 1953), 422, quoted from Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge, 1965), 299.

social order has not been around from eternity and also that it will not endure everlastingly.

## RELIGION

Germans of the early nineteenth century were religious. Humans throughout history have for the most part been religious. They believed in a supernatural, supersocial realm inhabited by one or more gods and they engaged in rituals directed towards these gods. Such beliefs and conduct seem to come as naturally to human beings as does their association with their own kind. Human beings are religious almost as inevitably as they are gregarious. (Not everyone is religious, of course. But nor is everyone gregarious.<sup>16</sup>) Why this should be so is far from clear. No religious beliefs are obviously true, and religious conduct does not provide any obvious benefits comparable to those we derive from cooperation with others. The crucial factor, Hegel believes, is man himself. Man is a finite creature. He lives at a particular time in a particular place. He has a particular position in a society, a society that is, moreover, only one of the very many societies that there are and have been. For the most part man views the world from the particular position he occupies in it, from what we might call the 'worm's-eye view'. But man is also 'infinite'. He can, in thought and imagination, survey the world from a perspective independent of his particular location in the world, adopting the bird's-eye view or, as we might call it, the 'God's-eye view'. That humans are able to adopt such a perspective is one of their main differences from other animals. Non-human animals, we might plausibly suppose, are aware only of their immediate surroundings in the more or less immediate present. They do not reflect on the past or the future. They do not consider how things look from the viewpoint of their prey or their predator. Humans are different. They range in imagination over remote times and places. They enter sympathetically into the viewpoints of others, of other people, other tribes, even other species, and even the gods. Naturally their attempts to do this are only sporadic and generally imperfect. When they ascribe such a viewpoint to a god or gods, the gods they concoct are too similar to themselves to be properly godlike. Their gods are too Egyptian, too Greek, or even too human. (The mythical transformations of gods into animals are, in part, an attempt to overcome such limitations.) But at least they tried. They were attempting, Hegel would say, to rise to the standpoint of 'mind as such', mind unhampered by local peculiarities and limitations. And this attempt, he would add, is not simply an agreeable addition to their everyday worm's-eye view of things. Their worm's-eye view could not be what it is if it were not for their ability to adopt the God's-eye view. Even in their everyday, unreflective life, men do not see things and conduct themselves in the way that other animals do. And this

<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless: 'As a gregarious animal, man is excited both by the absence and by the presence of his kind' (William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1950), ii. 430.)



is because of their ability to rise above their everyday, unreflective life. We can, for example, critically assess our everyday desires and also our everyday beliefs. What I, as a worm, desire may not be worthy, and what I believe may not be true, when surveyed from a higher standpoint. In doing this, we need not, of course, ascend, or even purport to ascend, all the way up to the God's-eye view—as, say, Descartes claimed to do. We can go some way up the ladder, without going right to the top. But Hegel would say that our ability and readiness to advance up the ladder at all presupposes that we have some conception, however vague or fanciful, of what can be seen from the top of the ladder.

But why, it might be asked, should we ascribe the bird's-eye view to gods? And even if we do, why should we worship them? Some scientists and philosophers seem eminently capable of adopting the 'infinite' viewpoint, without assigning it to any god except perhaps metaphorically. The infinite viewpoint seems a distinct matter from God. One can adopt the viewpoint without the god, though one cannot, conversely, adopt the god without something of the viewpoint. Hegel's response is this. Religious believers often regard a god as a mind, and a mind quite distinct from any human mind. The Christian God, for example, is regarded as an infinite mind, very different and quite distinct from the finite human mind. But this is a mistake, albeit an entirely intelligible mistake. Gods may be minds, but they are not distinct from the human mind. This is because the human mind is not exclusively finite. It is *both* finite *and* infinite. So in a way man is not exclusively *man*. He is *both* man *and* God. This becomes more or less explicit in Christianity. Christ is both man and God. And Christ represents, in Hegel's view, man in general. In pre-Christian religions man's divinity is only implicit, obscured, for example, by the representation of gods in animal forms. In fact, for most of human history man's essential divinity is only implicit. Divinity is not, for Hegel, an all or nothing matter. Man *ascends* to God over the course of history. And this means not simply that man becomes aware of God or of his own divinity, but that he gradually becomes God.

This might be taken as atheism in disguise. If God or gods are simply an aspect of man, then God and gods do not really exist. They are on a par with other human fictions such as Sherlock Holmes, flying saucers, and pink rats. But Hegel would deny this. Sherlock Holmes, flying saucers, and pink rats are not essential creations of the human mind. It may be essential to us that we create fictions, but not these particular fictions. Our ability to adopt the 'infinite' viewpoint is, by contrast, essential to us. We would not be recognizably human if we lacked it altogether. It is then natural enough to ascribe this viewpoint to a superhuman mind or minds, conceived in accordance with the level of our culture. To deny flatly the existence of gods or God is to underrate the reach and depth of the human mind. The human mind is expansive and effervescent. It does not remain lodged within our skulls. It ranges out to coalesce with the minds of other human beings, and it ascends to the infinity of mind as such. So Hegel does not deny the existence of these gods. He regards belief in them as a 'representation',

a pictorial version of the truths attained by the pure thinking of the philosopher, especially the Hegelian philosopher, who is perhaps more godlike than the rest of humanity.

## CHRISTIANITY

What is so special about Christianity? One of its merits is that Christianity establishes what Hegel regards as a proper relationship between the finite and the infinite, between the secular world and the world beyond. There are two main ways in which we can go wrong about this. First, we may view them as separated by an unbridgeable gulf. Then we might respond to this in various ways. We might focus exclusively on the secular world, more or less ignoring the world beyond as unknowable and/or irrelevant. We might focus primarily on the world beyond, regarding this secular world as valueless or evil, to be redeemed, if at all, only if it is thoroughly subordinated to the world beyond. (In the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel had called this attitude the ‘unhappy consciousness’.) Or we might oscillate between these two worlds, without discerning or establishing any significant relation between them. The second way in which we may go wrong about the relation between the finite and the infinite is by failing to distinguish them sufficiently from each other, by making their relationship too close. Then we shall not regard the secular world as a properly independent world. We shall see the hand of gods or God everywhere, and neglect the scientific exploration of the natural world and the secular development of the world of mind. In contrast to each of these errors, Christianity—especially, in Hegel’s view, Lutheran Christianity—distinguishes the two realms, but establishes an intelligible rational relationship between them. It inspires us to explore the world of nature for its own sake, guided by our religious beliefs but not overwhelmed by them. It encourages us to establish secular, constitutional regimes, keeping the church (and religious spirituality) in its proper place and giving adherents of other religions, or of none, a share in public life.

That non-Christians as well as Christians are granted a share in public life and, more generally, that Christianity does not ultimately tolerate the exclusion of any human being from the community is a crucial step on the way to the discovery of mind as such.<sup>17</sup> But what is a human being? Non-Christians or ‘humanists’ tend to take human beings for granted, as a sheer biological fact. Whatever fundamental equality is ascribed to them is to be established by empirical inquiry. Even when such equality is denied it is generally assumed at least that no human being

<sup>17</sup> In Hegel’s Germany women did not have civic or citizen rights, though they had human rights and were not seen as slaves. However, the exclusion of women from the affairs of state and, more or less, from civil society is not an essential feature of Christianity. Genesis 2: 27 seems to imply that women are as godlike as men: ‘So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them’. (I owe this reference to the Revd Canon Trevor Williams.)

should be enslaved by another human being or, presumably, by any other sort of being. 'Slavery is not natural', we say. 'There are no natural slaves', not, at any rate, *human* natural slaves. Hegel disagrees. Slavery, he thinks, is natural. What could be more natural than enslaving one's defeated foe—except perhaps killing and eating him? No matter whether the slave is a natural slave in Aristotle's sense, deficient in rationality.<sup>18</sup> Whether or not there are natural slaves, there are at any rate natural enslavers. It comes naturally to us to enslave our opponents. But the naturalness of slavery, Hegel insists, is not a point in its favour. It is precisely its naturalness that is wrong with it. In opposing slavery Christianity appeals not to nature, but to supernature. It postulates a God-man, a sort of Platonic paradigm of humanity as such, who marks out the boundaries of humankind by recognizing them and preaching to them. What this means is that mind is extricated from its natural integument, so that mind alone can decide what belongs to it. Of course neither Christ nor mind can dispense altogether with the natural and the biological. How does Christ decide to preach to men but to ride on a donkey, to cast the demons into swine and not the swine fever into men? Only by empirical observation of the differences between men, donkeys and swine. But on this basis Christ extends and sharpens the boundaries of humanity, overriding the superficial variations, gradations, and borderline cases that empirical inquiry might find. Man is then elevated to God's right hand, while the donkey is left with nothing but a cross on its back.

#### PHILOSOPHY

Hegel was a profoundly religious philosopher. Philosophy, he believes, has the same 'content' as religion, though it presents it in a different 'form'. This does not mean, however, that Hegel is ensnared in religious dogmas or subservient to ecclesiastical authority. For according to Hegel's interpretation of Christianity, Christianity sets man free: free to engage in worldly intellectual and scientific inquiry, free to set up secular states, free to produce non-religious, even irreligious art, free to be enlightened. It is a mistake to think that Christianity enslaves us to God and his arbitrary requirements. Previous religions may have done that, but Christianity, properly interpreted, does not. It sets us free. Freedom is not our natural condition. Our natural condition is oppression—oppression by nature, by our rulers, by our community, even by the gods. Freedom has to be striven for, and religion is, in Hegel's view, the central arena in which the battle is fought. The outcome of the battle is the liberation granted us by Lutheran Christianity.

This liberation extends to philosophy too. Besides being a religious philosopher, Hegel is also a profoundly secular philosopher. His study of nature follows,

<sup>18</sup> Hegel avoids a head-on confrontation with Aristotle's definition of a natural slave by assuming (incorrectly) that a slave was always the offspring of slaves and that, conversely, the offspring of slaves was always a slave. He therefore inferred that it was parentage, rather than defective capacity for rational deliberation, that made someone a natural slave. See Enc. III, §433.

by and large, the science of his day. The state that he describes, and endorses, in his *Encyclopaedia* and in the *Philosophy of Right*, is a thoroughly secular state. He is alive to the historic importance of technology, though (unlike Karl Marx) he regards it as an instrument of humanity's spiritual advance rather than as the force that drives it on.<sup>19</sup> His interpretation of Christianity (a conventional Christian might well say) all but obliterates the distinction between God and man; it makes man too much a God and God too much a man; and ultimately the object of Hegel's worship is not God, but man.

It is the liberation bestowed by Christianity that enables Hegel to be both religious and secular. For the beneficiaries of this liberation need not leave the orbit of Christianity. The Christian God, in Hegel's view, embraces what is other than himself. For example, what seems to us secular art (such as Shakespeare's plays) is for Hegel a sort of religious art: in presenting the deeds and thoughts of men it reveals an aspect of God. What seems to us a thoroughly secular state (such as that described by Hegel) is a state nurtured and sustained by Christianity. Even the atheist or agnostic discloses an aspect of God whose expression is generally stifled or prohibited by other religions.<sup>20</sup> Hegel did not profess atheism or agnosticism. But he did excuse his frequent failure to engage in public worship by saying: *Das Denken ist auch Gottesdienst*, 'Thinking too is service to God'.

<sup>19</sup> 'Another invention also tended to deprive the nobility of the ascendancy which they owed to their accoutrements—that of *gunpowder*. Humanity needed it and it made its appearance forthwith' (PH, p. 402). 'These novel ideas met with a principal organ of diffusion in the newly discovered *art of printing*, which, like the use of gunpowder, corresponds with modern character, and supplied the desideratum of the age in which it was invented, by tending to enable men to stand in an ideal connection with each other' (PH, p. 410).

<sup>20</sup> 'What strikes the mind so forcibly and so painfully is His [God's] absence . . . from His own world. It is a silence that speaks' (J. H. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (2nd edn. London: Longman, 1892), 396–7).



ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES

PART III  
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

## INTRODUCTION

### §377

The knowledge of mind is the most concrete knowledge, and thus the highest and most difficult.<sup>1</sup> *Know thyself*. The meaning of this absolute command—whether in itself or in the historical circumstances of its first pronouncement—is not only *self-knowledge* in respect of the *particular* capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the individual.<sup>2</sup> The knowledge it commands is knowledge of man's genuine reality, as well as of genuine reality in and for itself—of the very *essence* as mind. Equally, the philosophy of mind too does not have the meaning of so-called *understanding of human nature*, an understanding that likewise endeavours to explore the *particularities*, passions, and foibles of other men, those so-called recesses of the human heart. For one thing, understanding of this sort makes sense only if we presuppose knowledge of the *universal*, man *as such* and thus essentially mind. And for another, it concerns itself with contingent, insignificant, and *untrue* existences of the mental, but does not penetrate to what is *substantial*, the mind itself.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz*. The difficulty of the philosophical cognition of mind consists in the fact that here we are no longer dealing with the comparatively abstract, simple logical Idea, but with the most concrete, most developed form achieved by the Idea in its self-actualization. Even finite or subjective mind, not only absolute mind, must be grasped as an actualization of the Idea. The treatment of mind is only truly philosophical when it cognizes the concept of mind in its living development and actualization, i.e. just when it comprehends the mind as a copy of the eternal Idea.<sup>4</sup> But it belongs to the nature of mind to cognize its concept. Consequently, the summons to self-knowledge, issued to the Greeks by the Delphic Apollo, does not have the sense of a command externally addressed to the human mind by an alien power; on the contrary, the god who impels to self-knowledge is none other than the mind's own absolute law. All activity of the mind is, therefore, only an apprehension of itself, and the aim of all genuine science is just this, that mind shall recognize itself in everything in heaven and on earth. There is simply no out-and-out Other for the mind.<sup>5</sup> Even the oriental does not wholly lose himself in the object of his worship. But the Greeks were the first to grasp expressly as mind that which they opposed to themselves as the Divine, though even they did not attain, either in philosophy or in religion, to knowledge of the absolute infinity of mind; therefore with the Greeks the relationship of the human mind to the Divine is still not one of absolute freedom. It was Christianity, by the doctrine of the incarnation of God and the presence of the Holy Spirit in the community of believers, that first gave to human consciousness a perfectly free relation to the infinite and thereby made possible the conceptual knowledge of mind in its absolute infinity.<sup>6</sup>

Henceforth, such a knowledge alone merits the name of a philosophical treatment. *Self-knowledge* in the usual trivial sense of an inquiry into the individual's own foibles and faults has interest and importance only for the individual, not for philosophy; but even in relation to the individual, the less it deals with knowledge of the universal intellectual and moral nature of man, and the more it degenerates—disregarding duties, the genuine content of the will—into a self-satisfied absorption of the individual in the idiosyncrasies dear to him, the less value that self-knowledge has. The same is true of the so-called *understanding of human nature* which is likewise directed to the peculiarities of individual minds. For life this understanding is, of course, useful and necessary, especially in bad political conditions where the obstinacy, caprice and wilfulness of individuals reign, not right and ethics,—in the field of intrigues where characters do not rely on the nature of the cause but hold their own by smartly exploiting the peculiarity of others and seek by this means to attain their contingent ends. For philosophy, however, this understanding of human nature is a matter of indifference to the extent that it is incapable of rising above the consideration of contingent details to the apprehension of great human characters, by which the genuine nature of man is presented to our vision in undimmed purity. But this understanding of human nature can even become harmful for science if, as happened in the so-called pragmatic treatment of history, through failure to appreciate the substantial character of world-historical individuals and to see that great things can only be accomplished through great characters, it makes the supposedly ingenious attempt to derive the greatest events of history from the contingent peculiarity of those heroes, from their presumed petty intentions, inclinations and passions. In such a procedure history, which is ruled by divine Providence, is reduced to a play of pointless activity and contingent occurrences.<sup>7</sup>

### §378

*Pneumatology* or the so-called *rational psychology* has already been mentioned in the Introduction as an abstract metaphysic of the intellect.<sup>1</sup> *Empirical psychology* has as its object the *concrete* mind and, after the revival of the sciences, when observation and experience had become the principal foundation for knowledge of concrete reality, such psychology was pursued in the same way. Consequently the metaphysical element was kept outside this empirical science, and so prevented from getting any concrete determination or content, while the empirical science clung to the conventional intellectual metaphysics of forces, various activities, etc., and banished the speculative approach.<sup>2</sup>

*Aristotle's* books *on the soul*, along with his essays on particular aspects and states of the soul, are for this reason still the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of speculative interest on this topic.<sup>3</sup> The essential aim of a philosophy



of mind can only be to introduce the concept again into the knowledge of mind, and so also to disclose once more the sense of those Aristotelian books.<sup>4</sup>

*Zusatz.* Genuinely speculative philosophy,<sup>5</sup> which excludes the approach discussed in the previous Paragraph which is directed to the unessential, individual, empirical appearances of mind, also excludes the directly opposite approach of so-called *rational psychology* or pneumatology, which deals only with abstractly universal determinations, with the essence supposedly beneath appearances, the in-itself of mind.<sup>6</sup> For speculative philosophy may not take its objects, as something given, from representation,<sup>7</sup> nor may it determine its objects by mere categories of the intellect, as rational psychology did when it posed the question whether the mind or the soul is simple, immaterial, a substance. In these questions mind was treated as a thing; for these categories were here regarded, in the general manner of the intellect, as inert, fixed; thus they are incapable of expressing the nature of mind. Mind is not an inert entity but is rather what is absolutely restless, pure activity, the negating or the ideality of every fixed determination of the intellect,—not abstractly simple but, in its simplicity, at the same time a distinguishing-of-itself-from-itself,—not an essence that is already complete before its appearing, keeping to itself behind the mountain of appearances, but truly actual only through the determinate forms of its necessary self-revelation,—and not (as that psychology supposed) a soul-thing only externally related to the body, but inwardly bound to the body through the unity of the concept.<sup>8</sup>

In the middle, between observation directed to the contingent individuality of mind and pneumatology concerned only with mind's essence behind appearances, stands *empirical psychology* intent on the observation and description of the particular faculties of mind. But this too does not get to the genuine unification of the individual and the universal, to knowledge of the concretely universal nature or the concept of mind, and therefore it, too, has no claim to the name of genuinely speculative philosophy. Empirical psychology takes not only the mind in general, but also the particular faculties into which it analyses it, from representation as givens, without deriving these particularities from the concept of mind and so proving the necessity that in mind there are just these faculties and no others.<sup>9</sup>—With this defect of form there is necessarily linked the despiritualization of the content.<sup>10</sup> If in the two modes of treatment already described, the individual on the one hand, and the universal on the other, was taken as something fixed by itself, empirical psychology too holds the particular forms into which it dissects the mind to be fixed in their limitation, so that the mind becomes a mere aggregate of independent forces, each of which only interacts with the others, hence is only externally related to them.<sup>11</sup> For though this psychology also demands the production of a harmonious interconnexion between the various mental forces—an oft-recurring catch-phrase on this topic, but one

which is just as indefinite as 'perfection' used to be—this expresses only a unity of mind which ought to be, not the original unity of mind, and still less does it recognize the particularization to which the concept of mind, the unity of mind that is in itself, progresses, as a necessary and rational particularization. This harmonious interconnexion remains, therefore, a vacuous idea which expresses itself in high-sounding but empty phrases and remains powerless in face of the mental forces presupposed as independent.<sup>12</sup>

### §379

The self-feeling of the mind's *living* unity spontaneously resists the fragmentation of the mind into different *faculties, forces*, or, what comes to the same thing, *activities*, represented as independent of each other.<sup>1</sup> But the need for *comprehension* here is stimulated even more by the oppositions, which at once present themselves, between the mind's *freedom* and the mind's *determinism*, of the free agency of the soul in contrast to the bodiliness external to it, and again the intimate connection between the two.<sup>2</sup> In experience too the phenomena of *animal magnetism* in particular have given, in recent times, a visible illustration of the *substantial unity* of the soul, and of the power of its ideality. Before these phenomena, the rigid distinctions of the intellect are thrown into disarray; and the necessity of a speculative examination for the dissolution of the contradictions is displayed more directly.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* All those finite conceptions of mind outlined in the two previous Paragraphs have been ousted, partly by the vast transformation undergone by philosophy in general in recent years, and partly, from the empirical side itself, by the phenomena of animal magnetism which are a stumbling-block to finite thinking.<sup>4</sup> As regards the former, philosophy has left behind the finite viewpoint of merely reflective thinking which, since Wolff, had become universal, and also the Fichtean standstill at the so-called facts of consciousness,<sup>5</sup> and risen to the conception of mind as the self-knowing, actual Idea, to the concept of the living mind which, in a necessary manner, differentiates itself within itself and returns out of its differences to unity with itself. But in doing this, philosophy has not only overcome the abstractions prevalent in those finite conceptions of mind, the merely individual, merely particular, and merely universal, reducing them to moments of the concept which is their truth; it has also, instead of externally describing the material it finds, vindicated as the only scientific method the rigorous form of the necessary self-development of the content. In contrast to the empirical sciences, where the material as given by experience is taken up from outside and ordered by an already established universal rule and brought into external interconnexion, speculative thinking has to demonstrate each of its objects and the development of them in their absolute necessity. This happens when each particular concept is derived from the self-producing and self-actualizing universal concept or the logical Idea. Philosophy must therefore

comprehend mind as a necessary development of the eternal Idea and must let what constitutes the particular parts of the science of mind evolve purely from the concept of mind. Just as in the living creature generally, everything is already contained, in an ideal manner, in the germ and is brought forth by the germ itself, not by an alien power, so too must all particular forms of the living mind grow out of its concept as from their germ. Our thinking, which is propelled by the concept, here remains entirely immanent in the object, which is likewise propelled by the concept; we merely look on, as it were, at the object's own development, not altering it by importing our subjective ideas and notions. The concept needs no external stimulus for its actualization; its own nature involves the contradiction of simplicity and difference, and therefore restlessly impels it to actualize itself, to unfold into actuality the difference which, in the concept itself, is present only in an ideal manner, i.e., in the contradictory form of undifferentiatedness, and by this sublation of its simplicity as a defect, a one-sidedness, to make itself actually the whole, of which initially it contains only the possibility.<sup>6</sup>

But the concept is just as independent of our wilfulness in the conclusion of its development as it is in the beginning and in the course of it. In a merely ratiocinative approach the conclusion certainly appears more or less arbitrary; in philosophical science, by contrast, the concept itself sets a limit to its self-development by giving itself an actuality that completely corresponds to it. Even in the living thing we see this self-limitation of the concept. The germ of the plant, this sensuously present concept, closes its development with an actuality like itself, with production of the seed. The same is true of mind; its development, too, has achieved its goal when the concept of mind has completely actualized itself or, what is the same thing, when mind has attained to complete consciousness of its concept. But this self-contraction-into-one of the beginning with the end, this coming-to-itself of the concept in its actualization, appears in mind in a still more complete form than in the merely living thing; for whereas in the latter the seed produced is not identical with the seed that produced it, in self-knowing mind the product is one and the same as that which produces it.<sup>7</sup>

Only when we consider mind in this process of the self-actualization of its concept, do we know it in its truth (for truth just means agreement of the concept with its actuality). In its immediacy, mind is not yet true, has not yet made its concept an object for itself, has not yet transformed what is present in it in an immediate way, into something posited by itself, has not yet converted its actuality into an actuality appropriate to its concept.<sup>8</sup> The entire development of mind is nothing but its self-elevation to its truth, and the so-called soul-forces have no other meaning than to be the stages of this elevation. By this self-differentiation, by this self-transformation, and by the restoration of its differences to the unity of its concept, mind, as it is something true, is also something living, organic, systematic; and only by knowing this its nature is the science of mind likewise true, living, organic, systematic, — predicates that cannot be awarded either

to rational or to empirical psychology, for the former makes mind into a dead essence divorced from its actualization, while the latter kills the living mind by tearing it asunder into a manifold of independent forces which is neither produced by the concept nor held together by it.

As already remarked, animal magnetism has played a part in ousting the untrue, finite, merely intellectual conception of mind. That remarkable state has had this effect especially with regard to the treatment of the natural aspect of the mind. If the other states and natural determinations of mind, as well as its conscious activities, can be understood, at least externally, by the intellect, and if the intellect is able to grasp the external connection of cause and effect obtaining both within itself and in finite things, the so-called natural course of things, yet, on the other hand, intellect shows itself incapable of even just believing in the phenomena of animal magnetism, because in these the bondage of mind to place and time—which in the opinion of the intellect is thoroughly fixed—and to the intellectual interconnexion of cause and effect, loses its meaning, and the elevation of mind above asunderness and above its external connexions, which to the intellect remains an unbelievable miracle, comes to light within sensory reality itself. Now although it would be very foolish to see in the phenomena of animal magnetism an elevation of mind above even its conceptual reason, and to expect from this state higher disclosures about the eternal than those granted by philosophy, although the magnetic state must be declared a disease and a decline of mind itself below ordinary consciousness, in so far as in that state the mind surrenders its thinking, the thinking that proceeds in determinate distinctions and contrasts itself with nature, yet, on the other hand, in the visible liberation of mind in those magnetic phenomena from the limitations of space and time and from all finite connexions, there is something that has an affinity to philosophy, something that, with all the brutality of an established fact, defies the scepticism of the intellect and so necessitates the advance from ordinary psychology to the conceptual cognition of speculative philosophy, for which alone animal magnetism is not an incomprehensible miracle.<sup>9</sup>

### §380

The *concrete* nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficulty that the particular stages and determinations of the development of its concept do not also remain behind as particular existences in contrast to its deeper formations. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and movement have a free existence of their own in the solar system; the determinations of the *senses* also have a retrospective existence as properties of *bodies*, and still more freely as the elements, etc. The determinations and stages of the mind, by contrast, are essentially only moments, states, determinations in the higher stages of development.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract determination of the mind reveals the presence in it, even empirically, of a higher phase. In sensation, for

example, we can find all the higher phases of the mind as its content or determinacy. And so sensation, which is just an abstract form, may to the superficial glance seem to be the essential seat and even the root of that higher content, the religious, the ethical, and so on; and it may seem necessary to consider the determinations of this content as particular species of sensation. But all the same, when lower stages are under consideration, it becomes necessary, in order to draw attention to them in their empirical existence, to refer to higher stages in which they are present only as forms. In this way we need at times to introduce, by anticipation, a content which presents itself only later in the development (e.g. in dealing with natural waking from sleep we speak, by anticipation, of consciousness, in dealing with mental derangement we speak of intellect, etc.).<sup>2</sup>

## Concept of Mind

### §381

*For us* mind has *nature* as its *presupposition*, though mind is the *truth* of nature, and is thus *absolutely first* with respect to it.<sup>1</sup> In this truth nature has vanished, and mind has emerged as the Idea that has reached its being-for-self. The *object* of the Idea as well as the *subject is the concept*. This identity is *absolute negativity*, since in nature the concept has its complete, external objectivity, but this externalization of the concept has been sublated and the concept has, in this externalization, become identical with itself. And so the concept is this identity only so far as it is at the same time a return out of nature.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* We have already indicated, in the *Zusatz* to §379, the concept of mind, saying that the mind is the self-knowing, actual Idea. Philosophy has to demonstrate the necessity of this concept, as of all its other concepts, which means that philosophy has to cognize it as the result of the development of the universal concept or of the logical Idea. But in this development, mind is preceded not only by the logical Idea but also by external nature. For the *cognition* already contained in the simple *logical* Idea is only the concept of cognition thought by us, not cognition existing for itself, not actual mind but merely its possibility. Actual mind, which in the science of mind is our only object, has external nature for its immediate presupposition and the logical Idea as its first presupposition. Philosophy of nature, and indirectly logic, must therefore have as its final result the proof of the necessity of the concept of mind. The science of mind, on its part, has to authenticate this concept by developing and actualizing it. Accordingly, what we say here assertively about mind at the beginning of our treatment of it, can only be scientifically proved by philosophy in its entirety. All we can do initially is to elucidate the concept of mind for representation.<sup>3</sup>

In order to establish what this concept is, we must indicate the determinacy by which the Idea takes the form of mind. But every determinacy is a determinacy only in contrast to another determinacy; the determinacy of mind in general

stands in contrast initially to the determinacy of nature; the former is, therefore, to be grasped only together with the latter. As the distinguishing determinacy of the concept of mind we must designate *ideality*, that is, the sublation of the otherness of the Idea, the Idea's returning, and its having returned, into itself from its Other; whereas the distinctive feature of the logical Idea is immediate, *simple being-within-itself*, while for nature it is the *self-externality* of the Idea.<sup>4</sup> A more detailed development of what was said in passing in the *Zusatz* to §379 about the logical Idea, would involve too wide a digression here; more necessary at this point is an elucidation of what has been indicated as the characteristic of external nature, for it is to nature, as already remarked, that mind has its immediate relation.

External nature too, like mind, is rational, divine, a presentation of the Idea. But in nature the Idea appears in the element of asunderness, is external not only to mind but also to itself, precisely because it is external to the inwardness that is in and for itself and which constitutes the essence of mind. This concept of nature, already enunciated by the Greeks and entirely familiar to them, is in complete agreement with our ordinary idea of nature.<sup>5</sup> We know that what is natural is spatial and temporal, that in nature this stands next to that, this follows after that, in brief, that everything natural is mutually external, ad infinitum; further, that matter, this universal foundation of all formations to be found in nature, not only offers resistance to us, subsists outside our mind, but holds itself asunder against its own self, divides itself into concrete points, into material atoms, of which it is composed. The differences into which the concept of nature unfolds are more or less mutually independent existences; of course, through their original unity they stand in mutual relation, so that none can be comprehended without the others; but this relation is in a greater or less degree external to them. We rightly say, therefore, that not freedom but necessity reigns in nature; for necessity in its strictest meaning is precisely the merely internal, and for that reason also merely external, relation of mutually independent existences. Thus, for example, light and the elements appear as mutually independent; similarly the planets, though attracted by the sun and despite this relationship to their centre, have the semblance of independence with respect to it and to one another, this contradiction is displayed by the motion of the planet round the sun.<sup>6</sup>—In the living creature, of course, there emerges a higher necessity than that which holds sway in lifeless things. Even in the plant, we see a centre which has overflowed into the periphery, a concentration of the differences, a self-development-from-within-outwards, a unity that differentiates itself and from its differences produces itself in the bud, something, therefore, to which we attribute an urge; but this unity remains incomplete because the plant's process of articulating itself is a coming-forth-from-self of the vegetable subject, each part is the whole plant, a repetition of it, and consequently the members are not held in complete subjection to the unity of the subject.<sup>7</sup>—An even more complete overcoming of externality is exhibited in the animal organism; in this not only does each member generate the other, is its cause and effect, means and end,

so that it is at the same time its Other, but the whole is so pervaded by its unity that nothing in it appears as independent, every determinacy is at once an ideal determinacy, the animal remaining in every determinacy the same single universal, so that in the animal body the complete untruth of asunderness is exposed. Through this being-together-with-itself in the determinacy, through this immediate reflectedness into itself in and out of its externality, the animal is subjectivity that is for itself and has sensation; sensation is just this omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all its members, which immediately communicate every impression to the single whole which, in the animal, is beginning to become for itself. It is because of this subjective inwardness, that the animal is determined through itself, from within outwards, not merely from outside, that is to say, it has urge and instinct.<sup>8</sup> The subjectivity of the animal contains a contradiction and the urge to preserve itself by sublating this contradiction; this self-preservation is the privilege of the living thing and, in a still higher degree, of mind. The sentient creature is determinate, has a content, and thus a differentiation within itself; this difference is initially still a wholly ideal difference, simple, sublated in the unity of sensation; the sublated difference subsisting in the unity is a contradiction which is sublated by the fact that the difference posits itself *as* difference. The animal is, therefore, driven out of its simple self-relation into opposition to external nature.<sup>9</sup> By this opposition the animal falls into a new contradiction, for the difference is now posited in a way that contradicts the unity of the concept; accordingly this difference too must be sublated, like the initial undifferentiated unity. This sublation of the difference comes about owing to the animal's consuming what is determined for it in external nature and preserving itself by what it consumes.<sup>10</sup> Thus by the annihilation of the Other confronting the animal, the original simple relation to itself and the contradiction contained in it is posited once more. For a genuine resolution of this contradiction the Other, with which the animal enters into relationship, needs to be similar to the animal. This occurs in the *sexual relationship*; here, each of the two sexes senses in the Other not an alien externality but its own self, or the genus common to them both. The sexual relationship is, therefore, the highest point of living nature; at this stage, nature is exempt in the fullest measure from external necessity, since the distinct existences related to each other are no longer external to each other but have the sensation of their unity.<sup>11</sup> Yet the animal soul is still not free, for it always appears as one with the determinacy of the sensation or excitation, as bound to *one* determinacy; it is only in the form of individuality that the genus is for the animal. The animal only senses the genus, it is not aware of it; in the animal, the soul is not yet for the soul, the universal as such is not for the universal. By the sublation of the particularity of the sexes which occurs in the genus-process, the animal does not attain to the production of the genus; what is produced by this process is again only an individual. Thus nature, even at the highest point of its elevation above finitude, always falls back into it again and in this way exhibits a perpetual cycle.<sup>12</sup> *Death*

necessarily results from the contradiction between individuality and the genus, but since it is not the preserving sublation of individuality, only the empty, annihilating negation of it, itself appearing in the form of immediate individuality, death likewise does not produce the universality that is in and for itself, or the individuality that is universal in and for itself, the subjectivity that has itself as its object.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, even in the most perfect form to which nature raises itself, in animal life, the concept does not attain to an actuality resembling its soulful essence, to the complete overcoming of the externality and finitude of its embodied reality. This first happens in the *mind*, which, precisely by this overcoming accomplished in it, distinguishes itself from nature, so that this distinguishing is not merely the doing of an external reflection on the essence of mind.

This sublation of externality belonging to the concept of mind, is what we have called the *ideality* of mind. All activities of mind are nothing but various ways of reducing what is external to the inwardness which mind itself is, and it is only by this reduction, by this idealization or assimilation of the external that mind becomes and is mind.<sup>14</sup>—If we consider mind more closely, we find that the first and simplest determination of it is that it is I. I is something perfectly simple, universal. When we say *I*, we indeed mean an individual; but since everyone is I, we thereby say only something entirely universal. The universality of the I enables it to abstract from everything, even from its life. But the mind is not merely this abstractly simple counterpart to light, which is how it was regarded when they talked about the simplicity of the soul in contrast to the complexity of the body; on the contrary, in spite of its simplicity the mind is differentiated within itself, for I posits itself over against itself, makes itself its own object and returns from this difference, which is, of course, at first abstract, not yet concrete difference, to unity with itself. This being-together-with-itself of the I in its differentiation is the infinity or ideality of the I. But this ideality authenticates itself only in the relation of the I to the infinitely manifold material confronting it. When the I grasps it, this material is at once poisoned and transfigured by the universality of the I, loses its individualized, independent subsistence and receives a spiritual reality. The mind is therefore far from being forced out of its simplicity, its being-together-with-itself, by the infinite multiplicity of its representations, into a spatial asunderness; on the contrary, its simple self, in undimmed clarity, pervades this multiplicity through and through and does not let it reach an independent subsistence.<sup>15</sup>

But mind is not content to remain *finite* mind, transposing things by its representational activity into the space of its inwardness and thus stripping them of their externality in a manner that is itself still external;<sup>16</sup> on the contrary, as *religious* consciousness, it pierces through the seemingly absolute independence of things to the one, infinite power of God at work in their interior and holding everything together; and as *philosophical* thinking, it completes this idealization of things by cognizing the determinate way in which the eternal Idea forming



their common principle displays itself in them. Through this cognition, the idealistic nature of mind which is already operative in finite mind, attains its completed, most concrete shape, mind makes itself into the actual Idea that perfectly apprehends itself and hence into absolute mind.<sup>17</sup> Already in finite mind, ideality has the meaning of a movement returning to its beginning; by this movement the mind, advancing from its undifferentiatedness, as the first position, to an Other, to the negation of that position, and by means of the negation of this negation returning to itself, proves to be absolute negativity, infinite self-affirmation; and we have to consider finite mind, conformably to this its nature, first, in its immediate unity with nature, then in its opposition to nature, and lastly, in its unity with nature, a unity which contains within itself that opposition as a sublated opposition and is mediated by it. Thus conceived, finite mind is recognised as totality, as Idea, and in fact as the actual Idea which is for itself, which returns to itself out of that opposition. But in finite mind there is only the beginning of this return; it is completed only in absolute mind; for only in absolute mind does the Idea apprehend itself, not merely in the one-sided form of the concept or subjectivity, nor merely in the equally one-sided form of objectivity or actuality, but in the perfect unity of these its distinct moments, that is, in its absolute truth.<sup>18</sup>

What we have said above about the nature of mind is something which philosophy alone can and does demonstrate; it does not need to be confirmed by our ordinary consciousness. But in so far as our non-philosophical thinking, on its part, needs the developed concept of mind to be made accessible to representation, we can point out that Christian theology, too, conceives God, i.e. the truth, as mind and regards mind not as something quiescent, remaining in empty uniformity, but as something which necessarily enters into the process of distinguishing itself from itself, of positing its Other, and which comes to itself only through this Other, and by the preserving sublation of this Other—not by abandoning it. Theology, as we know, expresses this process in the manner of representation by saying that God the Father (this simple universal, being-within-itself), giving up his solitude, creates nature (the self-external, being-outside-itself), begets a son (his other I), but by virtue of his infinite love beholds himself in this Other, recognizes his image therein and in it returns to unity with himself; this unity is no longer abstract, immediate unity, but a concrete unity mediated by difference; it is the Holy Spirit which proceeds from the Father and from the Son, reaching its complete actuality and truth in the Christian community; God must be known as the Holy Spirit if he is to be conceived in his absolute truth, conceived as the Idea that is actual in and for itself, and not just in the form of the mere concept, of abstract being-within-self, nor in the equally untrue form of an individual actuality in disagreement with the universality of its concept, but in the full agreement of his concept and his actuality.<sup>19</sup>

So much for the distinctive determinacies of external nature and of mind in general. The development of the difference has at the same time indicated the relation in which nature and mind stand to each other. Since this relation is often

misunderstood, this is the appropriate place for an elucidation of it. We have said that mind negates the externality of nature, assimilates nature to itself and thereby idealizes it. In finite mind, which posits nature outside itself, this idealization has a one-sided form; here the activity of our willing, as of our thinking, is confronted by an external material which is indifferent to the alteration we carry out on it and undergoes the idealization conferred on it with complete passivity.<sup>20</sup> But a different relationship obtains in the case of the mind that produces world-history. Here, there no longer stands, on the one side, an activity external to the object, and on the other side, a merely passive object; the spiritual activity is directed towards an object which is active within itself, an object that has itself worked its way up to the result to be brought about by that activity, so that in the activity and in the object one and the same content is present. Thus, for example, the people and the time on which the activity of Alexander and Caesar operated as their object, had by their own efforts become capable of the work to be accomplished by those individuals; the time created these men for itself just as much as it was created by them; they were as much the instruments of the spirit of their time and their people, as conversely their people served these heroes as an instrument for the accomplishment of their deeds.<sup>21</sup> — Similar to the relationship just outlined is the way in which the philosophizing mind approaches external nature. That is to say, philosophical thinking knows that nature is idealized not merely by us, that nature's asunderness is not an entirely insuperable limitation for nature itself, for its concept, but that the eternal Idea immanent in nature or, what is the same thing, the implicit mind at work in the interior of nature itself effects the idealization, the sublation of asunderness, because this form of mind's realization stands in contradiction with the inwardness of its essence. Therefore philosophy has, as it were, only to watch and see how nature itself sublates its externality, how it takes back what is self-external into the centre of the Idea, or lets this centre emerge in the external, how it liberates the concept concealed in nature from the covering of externality and thereby overcomes external necessity. This transition from necessity to freedom is not a simple transition but a gradual progression of many moments, whose exposition constitutes the philosophy of nature. At the highest stage of this sublation of asunderness, in sensation, the implicit mind held captive in nature reaches the beginning of being-for-self and thus of freedom. By this being-for-self which is itself still burdened with the form of individuality and externality, consequently also with unfreedom, nature is driven onwards beyond itself to mind as such, that is, to the mind which, by thinking, is for itself in the form of universality and actually free.<sup>22</sup>

But it is already evident from our discussion so far that the emergence of mind from nature must not be conceived as if nature were the absolutely immediate, the first, the original positing agent, while mind, by contrast, were only something posited by nature; it is rather nature that is posited by mind, and mind is what is absolutely first. Mind that is in and for itself is not the mere result of nature, but is in truth its own result; it brings itself forth from the presuppositions

that it makes for itself, from the logical Idea and external nature, and is the truth of the logical Idea as well as of nature, i.e. the true shape of the mind that is only within itself, and of the mind that is only outside itself. The semblance of mind's being mediated by an Other is sublated by mind itself, since mind has, so to speak, the sovereign ingratitude of sublating, of mediatizing, that by which it seems to be mediated, of reducing it to something subsisting only through mind and in this way making itself completely independent.<sup>23</sup>—What we have said already implies that the transition of nature to mind is not a transition to an out-and-out Other, but is only a coming-to-itself of the mind that is outside itself in nature. But equally, the determinate difference of nature and mind is not sublated by this transition; for mind does not emerge in a natural manner from nature. When we said in §222 that the death of the merely immediate, individual form of life is the emergence of mind, this emergence is not in the flesh but spiritual, it is not to be understood as a natural emergence but as a development of the concept, the concept that sublates the one-sidedness of the genus which does not reach adequate actualization, proving in death to be rather the negative power opposed to that actuality, and also sublates the opposite one-sidedness of the animal reality bound to individuality; both one-sidednesses are sublated in the individuality which is in and for itself universal or, what is the same thing, in the universal which is for itself in a universal manner, the universal that is mind.<sup>24</sup>

Nature as such in its self-internalizing does not attain to this being-for-self, to the consciousness of itself; the animal, the most complete form of this internalization, exhibits only the spiritless dialectic of transition from one individual sensation filling up its whole soul to another individual sensation which equally exclusively dominates it; it is man who first raises himself above the individuality of sensation to the universality of thought, to awareness of himself, to the grasp of his subjectivity, of his I—in a word, it is only man who is thinking mind and by this, and by this alone, is essentially distinguished from nature. What belongs to nature as such lies behind the mind; it is true that mind has within itself the entire content of nature, but the determinations of nature are in the mind in a radically different way from that in which they are in external nature.<sup>25</sup>

### §382

For this reason formally the *essence* of mind is *freedom*, the concept's absolute negativity as identity with itself. In accordance with this formal determination, the mind *can* abstract from everything external and from its own externality, from its very life; it can endure the negation of its individual immediacy, infinite *pain*, i.e. it can maintain itself affirmatively in this negativity and be identical for itself. This possibility is its intrinsic abstract universality, a universality that is for itself.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The substance of mind is freedom, i.e. not being dependent on an Other, the relating of itself to itself. Mind is the actualized concept which is for itself

and has itself for its object. Its truth and its freedom alike consist in this unity of concept and objectivity present in it. The truth, as Christ has already said, makes mind free; freedom makes it true.<sup>2</sup> But the freedom of mind is not merely an independence of the Other won outside the Other, but won within the Other; it attains actuality not by fleeing from the Other but by overcoming it. Mind can step out of its abstract universality, a universality that is for itself, out of its simple self-relation, can posit within itself a determinate, actual difference, something other than the simple I, and hence a negative; and this relation to the Other is, for mind, not merely possible but necessary, because it is through the Other and by sublation of it, that mind comes to authenticate itself as, and in fact comes to be, what it ought to be according to its concept, namely, the ideality of the external, the Idea that returns to itself out of its otherness, or, expressed more abstractly, the self-differentiating universal which in its difference is together with itself and for itself.<sup>3</sup> The Other, the negative, contradiction, rupture, thus belongs to the nature of mind. In this rupture lies the possibility of *pain*. Pain has therefore not come to the mind from outside, as people imagined when they posed the question about the way in which pain came into the world.<sup>4</sup> Nor does *evil*, the negative of the infinite mind that is in and for itself, come to the mind from outside, any more than pain does; on the contrary, evil is nothing other than the mind taking its stand at the summit of its individuality. Therefore, even in this its extreme rupture, in this breaking loose from the root of its implicitly ethical nature, in this uttermost contradiction with itself, the mind yet remains identical with itself and therefore free.<sup>5</sup> What belongs to external nature is destroyed by contradiction; if, for example, gold were given a different specific gravity from what it has, it would have to perish as gold. But mind has the power to preserve itself in contradiction and, therefore, in pain (pain aroused by evil, as well as by the disagreeable). Ordinary logic is, therefore, in error in supposing that mind is something that completely excludes contradiction from itself. On the contrary, all consciousness contains a unity and a separation, hence a contradiction. Thus, for example, the representation of house is something completely contradictory to my I and yet endured by it. But contradiction is endured by mind, because mind contains no determination that it does not recognize as a determination posited by itself and consequently as a determination that it can also sublimate again. This power over all the content present in it forms the basis of the freedom of mind.<sup>6</sup> But in its immediacy, mind is free only implicitly, in concept or possibility, not yet in actuality; actual freedom is thus not something that is immediately in the mind but something to be produced by mind's activity. So in science we have to regard mind as the producer of its freedom. The entire development of the concept of mind displays only mind's freeing of itself from all the forms of its reality which do not correspond to its concept: a liberation which comes about by the transformation of these forms into an actuality perfectly adequate to the concept of mind.<sup>7</sup>

## §383

This universality is also its *reality*. As it is for itself, the universal is self-particularizing, while still remaining self-identity.<sup>1</sup> Therefore the determinacy of mind is *manifestation*. The mind is not some one determinacy or content whose expression or externality is only a form distinct from the mind itself. Hence it does not reveal *something*; its determinacy and content is this very revelation. Its possibility is therefore immediately infinite, absolute *actuality*.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* Earlier, we posited the distinctive determinacy of mind in *ideality*, in sublation of the otherness of the Idea. If now, in §383 above, ‘manifestation’ is given as the determinacy of mind, this is not a new, not a second, determination of mind, but only a development of the determination discussed earlier. For by sublation of its otherness, the logical Idea, or the mind that is in itself, becomes for itself, in other words, revealed to itself.<sup>3</sup> Mind which is for itself, or mind as such—in contrast to mind which is in itself, unknown to itself, revealed only to us, poured out into the asunderness of nature—is, therefore, that which reveals itself not merely to an Other but to itself, or, what amounts to the same thing, that which accomplishes its revelation in its own element, not in an alien material. This determination pertains to mind as such; it holds true therefore of mind not only in so far as mind relates itself simply to itself, is an I having itself as object, but also in so far as mind steps out of its abstract universality, the universality that is for itself, and posits within itself a determinate distinction, something other than itself; for the mind does not lose itself in this Other, but, on the contrary, preserves and actualizes itself in it, impresses on it the mind’s own interior, makes the Other into a reality corresponding to mind, and so by this sublation of the Other, of the determinate, actual difference, comes to concrete being-for-self, to determinate revelation to itself.<sup>4</sup> In the Other, therefore, mind reveals only itself, its own nature; but its nature consists in self-revelation. The revelation of itself to itself is therefore the very content of mind and not, as it were, only a form externally added to its content; consequently mind, by its revelation, does not reveal a content different from its form, but reveals its form, the form expressing the entire content of mind, namely, its self-revelation. In mind, therefore, form and content are identical with each other.<sup>5</sup> Of course, revelation is usually represented as an empty form which still requires the addition a content from outside; and by content is understood a being-within-itself, something keeping-within-itself, and by form, on the other hand, the external manner of the relation of the content to an Other. But in speculative logic it is demonstrated that, in truth, the content is not merely a being-within-itself, but something which spontaneously enters into relation with an Other; just as, conversely, in truth, the form must be grasped not merely as something dependent, external to the content, but rather as that which makes the content into the content, into a being-within-itself, into something distinct from

an Other. The genuine content contains, therefore, form within itself, and the genuine form is its own content. But we have to get to know mind as this genuine content and as this genuine form.<sup>6</sup>—In order to explain for representation this unity of form and content present in mind, the unity of revelation and what is revealed, we can refer to the teaching of the Christian religion. Christianity says: God has revealed himself through Christ, his only begotten Son. Representation initially takes this statement to mean that Christ is only the instrument of this revelation, that what is revealed in this manner is something other than what reveals it. But, in truth, the statement rather has *this* sense: God has revealed that his nature consists in having a Son, i.e. in differentiating himself, making himself finite, but in his difference remaining together with himself, beholding himself and revealing himself in the Son, and by this unity with the Son, by this being-for-himself in the Other, he is absolute mind, so that the Son is not the mere instrument of the revelation but is himself the content of the revelation.<sup>7</sup>

Just as mind displays the unity of form and content, it is also the unity of possibility and actuality. By the possible in general we understand what is still inward, what has not yet come to expression, to revelation. But now we have seen that mind as such only is, in so far as it reveals itself to itself. Actuality, which consists just in mind's revelation, therefore belongs to its concept. In finite mind the concept of mind does not, of course, yet reach its absolute actualization; but absolute mind is the absolute unity of the actuality of mind and the concept or possibility of mind.<sup>8</sup>

### §384

*Revelation*, as the revelation of the *abstract* Idea, is the unmediated transition, the *becoming*, of nature.<sup>1</sup> As the revelation of mind, which is free, it is the *positing* of nature as *its* world; but because this positing is reflection, it is at the same time the *presupposition* of the world as independent nature.<sup>2</sup> Revelation in the concept is creation of nature as its being, in which the mind procures the *affirmation* and *truth* of its freedom.<sup>3</sup>

[Remark] *The absolute is mind*. This is the highest definition of the absolute. To find this definition and to comprehend its meaning and content was, we may say, the absolute tendency of all culture and philosophy; it was the point towards which all religion and science pressed on; only this impetus enables us to comprehend the history of the world.—The word 'mind', and the *representation* of mind, were found early on, and the content of the Christian religion is to make God known as mind. It is the task of philosophy to grasp in its own element, the concept, what is here *given* to representation and what is *in itself* the essence. That problem is not genuinely and immanently solved until freedom and the concept become the object and the soul of philosophy.<sup>4</sup>

*Zusatz*. Self-revelation is a determination pertaining to mind in general; but it has *three* distinct forms. The *first* way in which mind that is in itself, or the logical

Idea, reveals itself, consists in the transformation of the Idea into the immediacy of external and individualized reality. This transformation is the coming-to-be of nature. Nature, too, is something posited; but its positedness has the form of immediacy, of being outside the Idea. This form contradicts the inwardness of the self-positing Idea which brings itself forth from its presuppositions. The Idea, or mind that is in itself, slumbering in nature, sublates, therefore, the externality, individualization, and immediacy of nature, creates for itself a reality conformable to its inwardness and universality and thereby becomes mind that is reflected into itself and is for itself, self-conscious and awakened mind or mind as such.<sup>5</sup>—This gives the *second* form of mind's revelation. At this stage mind, no longer poured out into the asunderness of nature, sets itself, as what is for itself, revealed to itself, in opposition to unconscious nature, which conceals mind as much as reveals it. Mind makes nature into its object, reflects on it, takes back the externality of nature into its own inwardness, idealizes nature and thus in its object becomes for itself. But this first being-for-self of mind is itself still an immediate, abstract, not an absolute being-for-self; the self-externality of mind is not absolutely sublated by it. The awakening mind does not yet recognize here its unity with the mind that is in itself, hidden in nature, it stands, therefore, in external relation to nature, it does not appear as all in all, but only as one side of the relationship; it is true that in its relationship to the Other it is also reflected into itself and so is self-consciousness, but it lets this unity of consciousness and self-consciousness still subsist as a unity that is so external, empty and superficial that at the same time self-consciousness and consciousness still fall asunder, and mind, despite its being-together-with-itself, is at the same time together not with itself but with an Other, and its unity with the mind that is in itself and active within the Other does not as yet become for mind. Here, mind posits nature as something reflected-into-itself, as its world, strips nature of its form of an Other confronting it and makes the Other opposing it into something posited by mind itself; but, at the same time, this Other still remains independent of mind, something immediately present, not posited but only presupposed by mind, something, therefore, the positing of which precedes reflective thinking. Hence at this standpoint the positedness of nature by mind is not yet absolute but comes about only in reflective consciousness; nature is, therefore, not yet comprehended as subsisting only through infinite mind, as its creation. Here, consequently, mind still has in nature a limitation and by this very limitation is finite mind.<sup>6</sup>—Now this limitation is sublated by absolute knowledge, which is the *third* and highest revelation of mind. At this stage the dualism disappears, of, on the one hand, a self-subsistent nature or mind poured out into asunderness, and, on the other hand, the mind that is first beginning to become for itself but does not yet comprehend its unity with the mind in nature. Absolute mind recognises itself as positing being itself, as itself producing its Other, nature and finite mind, so that this Other loses all semblance of independence in face of mind, ceases altogether to be a limitation for mind and appears only as the means by

which mind attains to absolute being-for-itself, to the absolute unity of its being-in-itself and its being-for-itself, of its concept and its actuality.<sup>7</sup>

The highest definition of the Absolute is this: it is not merely mind in general, it is mind absolutely revealed to itself, self-conscious, infinitely creative mind, which we have just characterized as the third form of its revelation.<sup>8</sup> Just as in science we progress from the imperfect forms of mind's revelation delineated above to the highest form of its revelation, so, too, world-history exhibits a series of conceptions of the eternal, only at the conclusion of which does the concept of absolute mind emerge. Oriental religions, and the judaic religion too, stop short at the still abstract concept of God and of mind, as is done even by the Enlightenment which wants to know only of God the Father; for God the Father, by himself, is the self-enclosed, the abstract, therefore not yet the spiritual God, not yet the genuine God. In Greek religion God did, of course, begin to be revealed in a determinate manner. The portrayal of the Greek gods had beauty for its law, nature raised to the level of mind. The beautiful does not remain something abstractly ideal, but in its ideality it is at once perfectly determinate, individualized. The Greek gods are, however, initially only displayed for sensory intuition or for representation, they are not yet grasped in thought. But the sensory medium can only exhibit the totality of mind as an asunderness, as a circle of individual spiritual shapes; the unity embracing all these shapes remains, therefore, a wholly indeterminate, alien power over against the gods. The one nature of God, differentiated within itself, the totality of the divine mind in the form of unity, has first been revealed by the Christian religion. This content, given in the mode of representation, has to be raised by philosophy into the form of the concept or of absolute knowledge, which, as we have said, is the highest revelation of that content.<sup>9</sup>

### Subdivision

#### §385

The development of mind is as follows:

- I. In the form of *relation to its own self*: it has the *ideal* totality of the Idea arise within it, i.e. what its concept is comes before it and its being is to be together with itself, i.e. free. This is *subjective mind*.
- II. In the form of *reality*, as a *world* produced and to be produced by it; in this world freedom is present as necessity. This is *objective mind*.
- III. In the *unity* of the objectivity of mind and of its ideality or concept, a unity that *is in and for itself* and eternally produces itself, mind in its absolute truth. This is *absolute mind*.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* Mind is always Idea; but initially it is only the *concept* of the Idea, or the Idea in its indeterminacy, in the most abstract mode of reality, i.e. in the mode of being. In the beginning we have only the wholly universal, undeveloped determination of mind, not yet its particularity; this we obtain only when we pass from



one thing to something else, for the particular contains a One and an Other; but it is just at the beginning that we have not yet made this transition. The reality of mind is, therefore, initially still a wholly universal, not particularized reality; the development of this reality will be completed only by the entire philosophy of mind.<sup>2</sup> The still entirely abstract, immediate reality is, however, the natural, the unspiritual. For this reason the child is still caught up in naturalness, has only natural urges, is a spiritual human being not yet in actuality but only in potentiality or the concept.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, we must characterize the first reality of the concept of mind as the most inappropriate for mind, simply because it is still an abstract, immediate reality belonging to naturalness; but the genuine reality must be determined as the totality of the developed moments of the concept, the concept that remains the soul, the unity of these moments. The concept of mind necessarily advances to this development of its reality, for the form of immediacy, of indeterminacy, which its reality initially has, is a form in contradiction with the concept; what seems to be immediately present in the mind is not anything genuinely immediate, but is in itself something posited, mediated. Mind is impelled by this contradiction to sublimate the immediate, the Other, the form, that is, in which it presupposes itself. By this sublation it first comes to itself, first emerges *as* mind. Consequently, we cannot begin with mind as such, but must start from its most inappropriate reality.<sup>4</sup> Mind, it is true, *is* already mind at the beginning, but it does not yet know that it is. It is not mind itself that, at the beginning, has already grasped its concept: it is only we, we who contemplate it, who know its concept. That mind comes to a knowledge of what it is, this constitutes its realization. Mind is essentially only what it knows itself to be. Initially, it is only mind in itself; its becoming-for-itself forms its actualization. But it becomes for itself only by particularizing, determining itself, or making itself into its presupposition, into the Other of itself, initially relating itself to this Other as to its immediacy, but sublating it as Other.<sup>5</sup> As long as mind stands in relation to itself as to an Other, it is only *subjective* mind, coming from nature and itself initially natural mind. But the entire activity of subjective mind is directed to grasping itself as itself, to proving itself to be the ideality of its immediate reality. When it has attained to being-for-itself, then it is no longer merely subjective, but *objective* mind. Whereas subjective mind, owing its relation to an Other, is still unfree or, what is the same thing, is free only *in itself*; in objective mind freedom, mind's knowledge of itself as free, comes to realization.<sup>6</sup> Objective mind is a person, and as such has a reality of its freedom in property; for in property the thing is posited as what it is, namely, as something lacking independence and as something that essentially has only the meaning of being the reality of the free will of a person and, for that reason, of being for any other person something inviolable. Here we see a subjective entity that is aware of itself as free, and, at the same time, an external reality of this freedom; here, therefore, mind attains to being-for-itself, the objectivity of mind receives its due. Thus mind has emerged from the form of mere subjectivity. But the full actualization of this freedom

which in property is still incomplete, still formal, the completion of the realization of the concept of objective mind is achieved only in the political state, in which mind develops its freedom into a world posited by mind, into the ethical world.<sup>7</sup> Yet mind must pass beyond this stage too. The defect of this objectivity of mind consists in its being only a posited objectivity. Mind must again freely let go the world, what mind has posited must at the same time be grasped as having an immediate being. This happens at the *third* stage of mind, at the standpoint of *absolute* mind, i.e. of art, religion, and philosophy.<sup>8</sup>

### §386

The first two parts of the *doctrine of mind* deal with the *finite* mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concept and the reality—but with the qualification that it is the semblance within the mind,—a semblance which the mind *implicitly* sets up as a limitation to itself, in order, by sublating the limitation, *explicitly* to have and be aware of freedom as *its* essence, i.e. to be fully *manifested*.<sup>1</sup> The various stages of this activity, which, with their semblance, it is the destiny of the finite mind to linger on and to pass through, are stages in its liberation. In the absolute truth of this liberation the three stages—*finding* a world *before* it as a presupposed world, *generating* a world as posited by itself, and gaining freedom from it and in it—are one and the same. To the infinite form of this truth the semblance purifies itself to become knowledge of it.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] The determination of *finitude* is applied with especial rigidity by the *intellect* in relation to mind and *reason*: it is held not just a matter of the intellect, but also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the *standpoint* of finitude as *ultimate*, and the wish to go beyond it counts as audacity, even as derangement, of thought. Whereas in fact such a *modesty* of thought, which treats the finite as something altogether fixed and *absolute*, is the worst of virtues; and to stick to what does not have its ground in itself is the shallowest sort of knowledge.<sup>3</sup> The determination of *finitude* was a long way back elucidated and explained in its place, in the *Logic*. *Logic* then goes on to show in the case of the more determinate though still simple thought-forms of finitude, what the rest of philosophy shows for the concrete forms of finitude, just this: that the finite *is* not, i.e. is not what is true, but *is* simply a *transition* and a *passage beyond itself*. This finitude of the previous spheres is the dialectic in which it meets its end at the hands of an *Other* and in an *Other*; but mind, the concept and what is *in itself* eternal, is itself the accomplishment within itself of the nullification of the null and the reduction of the vain to vanity. The above-mentioned modesty is attachment to this vanity, the finite, in opposition to the true; it is itself therefore vanity. This vanity will emerge in the development of the mind itself as the mind's extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its innermost contradiction and thus its turning point, as *evil*.<sup>4</sup>

*Zusatz.* Subjective and objective mind are still finite. But it is necessary to know what sense the finitude of mind has. This is usually represented as an absolute limitation, as a fixed quality, by the removal of which the mind would cease to be mind; just as the essence of natural things is tied to a determinate quality, as, for example, gold cannot be separated from its specific gravity, this or that animal cannot be without claws, incisors, etc.<sup>5</sup> But in truth, the finitude of mind must not be regarded as a fixed determination, but must be recognized as a mere moment; for as we have already said, mind is essentially the Idea in the form of ideality, i.e. in the form of the negatedness of the finite. In mind, therefore, the finite has only the meaning of something sublated, not of a being. Accordingly, the authentic quality of the mind is rather genuine infinity, that is, the infinity which does not one-sidedly stand over against the finite but contains the finite within itself as a moment. It is, therefore, an empty expression, if one says: 'There are finite minds.' Mind as mind *is* not finite, it *has* finitude within itself, but only as a finitude which is to be, and has been, sublated.<sup>6</sup> The genuine definition of finitude—this is not the place for a more detailed discussion of it—must be stated thus: the finite is a reality that is not adequate to its concept. Thus the sun is a finite entity, for it cannot be thought without an Other, since the reality of its concept comprises not merely the sun itself but the entire solar system. Indeed, the whole solar system is a finite entity, because every heavenly body in it has the semblance of independence of the others; consequently this whole reality does not as yet correspond to its concept, does not yet exhibit the same ideality which is the essence of the concept. It is only the reality of *mind* that is itself ideality, only in mind therefore does absolute unity of concept and reality occur, and hence genuine infinity.<sup>7</sup> The very fact that we are aware of a limitation is proof that we are beyond it, proof of our unlimitedness. Natural things are finite simply because their limitation is not present for the things themselves, but only for us who compare them with one another. We make ourselves into a finite entity by receiving an Other into our consciousness. But by our very awareness of this Other we are beyond this limitation. Only he who does not know is limited, for he is not aware of his limitation; whereas he who knows the limitation is aware of it not as a limitation of his knowing, but as something known, as something belonging to his knowledge. Only the unknown would be a limitation of knowledge; the known limitation, on the contrary, is no limitation of it; therefore to know of one's limitation means knowing of one's unlimitedness. But when we pronounce mind to be unlimited, genuinely infinite, we do not mean to say that there is no limitation whatsoever in the mind; on the contrary, we have to recognize that mind must determine itself and so make itself finite, limit itself. But the intellect is wrong to treat this finitude as a rigid finitude,—to regard the distinction between the limitation and infinity as an absolutely fixed distinction, and accordingly to maintain that mind is *either* limited *or* unlimited. Finitude, properly conceived, is, as we have said, contained in infinity, limitation in the unlimited. Mind is therefore *both* infinite *and* finite, and *neither* only the

one *nor* only the other; in making itself finite it remains infinite, for it sublates finitude within itself; nothing in the mind is a fixture, a being, rather everything is only something ideal, only appearing.<sup>8</sup> Thus God, because he is mind, must determine himself, posit finitude within himself (otherwise he would be only a dead, empty abstraction); but since the reality he assumes by his self-determining is a reality perfectly conformable to him, God does not thereby become a finite entity.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, limitation *is* not in God and in mind: it is only posited by mind in order to be sublated. Only momentarily can mind seem to remain in a finitude; by its ideality it is raised above it, it knows that the limitation is not a fixed limitation. It therefore transcends it, frees itself from it, and this is not, as the intellect supposes, a liberation never completed, only ever striven for endlessly; on the contrary, mind wrests itself out of this progression to infinity, frees itself absolutely from the limitation, from its Other, and so attains to absolute being-for-itself, makes itself genuinely infinite.<sup>10</sup>

# SECTION I

## SUBJECTIVE MIND

§387

Mind, developing in its ideality, is mind as *cognitive*. Cognition, however, is conceived here not merely as a determinacy of the logical Idea (§223), but in the way in which the *concrete* mind determines itself to cognition.<sup>1</sup>

Subjective mind is:

- (A) *In itself* or *immediate*: a *soul* or *natural mind*—the theme of *Anthropology*.
- (B) *For itself* or *mediated*: still as identical reflection into itself and into the other: mind in *relationship* or particularization: *consciousness*—the theme of the *Phenomenology of Mind*.
- (C) *Mind determining itself in itself*, as a subject for itself—the theme of *Psychology*.

In the *soul consciousness* awakes: consciousness *posits itself as reason*, which has immediately awoken to become self-knowing reason; and by its activity reason emancipates itself to objectivity, to consciousness of its concept.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] In the concept in general the *determinacy* occurring in it is an *advance of development*; and so in mind too every *determinacy* in which it presents itself is a moment of the development and, in its continuing determination, a step forward towards its *goal*, namely, to make itself into, and to become *for itself*, what it is *in itself*. The same process takes place within each stage, and its product is that what the mind was *in itself*, or consequently only *for us*, at the beginning of the stage, is now *for the mind itself*—i.e. for the mind in the form which it has at that stage.<sup>3</sup> The ordinary method of psychology is to state, in a narrative fashion, what the mind or the soul *is*, what *happens* to it, what it *does*. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made subject, in which such determinations come to light only as *expressions*, from which we are supposed to learn what it *is*, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses—entirely unconscious of the fact that the *expression* of what the soul *is* posits in its concept this very thing *for the soul itself*; and thereby the soul has acquired a higher determination.<sup>4</sup> We must, however, distinguish and exclude from the progression to be studied here what is in fact cultivation and education. The sphere of education is concerned *only* with *individual* subjects as such: its aim is to bring the universal mind to existence in them. In the philosophical view of the mind as such, the mind itself is regarded as educating and

instructing itself in accordance with its concept; and its expressions are seen as moments of its bringing-itself-forth-to-itself, of its joining-together-with-itself, whereby it first becomes actual mind.<sup>5</sup>

*Zusatz.* In §385 we distinguished the three main forms of mind: subjective, objective, and absolute mind, and also indicated the necessity of the advance from the first to the second and from this to the third. We called the first form of mind we have to consider *subjective* mind, because here mind is still in its undeveloped concept, has not as yet made its concept an object for itself. But in this its subjectivity mind is at the same time objective, has an immediate reality by the sublation of which it first becomes for itself, attains to itself, to a grasp of its concept, of its subjectivity. We could therefore just as well say that mind is, to begin with, objective and has to become subjective, as conversely, that it is first subjective and has to make itself objective. Consequently, we must not regard the distinction between subjective and objective mind as a rigid distinction. Even at the beginning, we have to grasp mind not as mere concept, as something merely subjective, but as Idea, as a unity of the subjective and the objective, and every advance from this beginning is a movement beyond the first simple subjectivity of mind, a progress in the development of its reality or objectivity.<sup>6</sup> This development brings forth a series of formations; these, it is true, must be indicated by empirical research, but in philosophical inquiry they cannot remain externally juxtaposed, but are to be recognized as the appropriate expression of a necessary series of determinate concepts, and they are of interest to philosophical thinking only in so far as they express such a series of concepts. However, initially we can only indicate dogmatically the different formations of subjective mind; their necessity will emerge only from the determinate development of subjective mind.<sup>7</sup>

The three main forms of subjective mind are: (1) *soul*, (2) *consciousness*, and (3) *mind as such*. As *soul*, mind has the form of abstract *universality*; as *consciousness*, that of *particularization*; and as *mind that is for itself*, that of *individuality*. This is how subjective mind in its development exhibits the development of the concept.<sup>8</sup> The reason why, in the above Paragraph, the names *anthropology*, *phenomenology*, and *psychology* have been given to the parts of science corresponding to these three forms of subjective mind, will become evident from a more detailed, preliminary statement of the content of the science of subjective mind.

We must begin our treatment with immediate mind; but this is *natural mind*, *soul*. To suppose that we should begin with the mere concept of mind would be a mistake; for as we have already said, mind is always Idea, therefore actualized concept. But at the beginning, the concept of mind cannot as yet have the mediated reality which it acquires in abstract thinking; of course, even at the beginning its reality must already be an abstract reality—only in this way does it correspond to the ideality of mind; but it is necessarily a reality that is still unmediated, not yet posited, consequently a reality that just *is*, external to mind, a reality given

by nature. We must begin, therefore, with the mind still in the grip of nature, related to its bodiliness, mind that is not as yet together with itself, not yet free.<sup>9</sup> This foundation of man (if we may so express it) is the theme of anthropology. In this part of the science of subjective mind, the concept of mind, as conceived by *thought*, is only in us, the inquirers, not as yet in the object itself; what forms the object of our inquiry here is the concept of mind that at first merely *is*, the mind that has not yet grasped its concept and is still external to itself.<sup>10</sup>

The first stage in *anthropology* is the qualitatively determined soul tied to its natural determinations (racial differences, for example, belong here). Out of this immediate oneness with its naturalness, soul enters into opposition and conflict with it (the states of derangement and somnambulism belong here). The outcome of this conflict is the triumph of the soul over its bodiliness, the process of reducing, and the accomplished reduction, of this bodiliness to a sign, to the portrayal of the soul. The ideality of the soul thus emerges in its bodiliness and this reality of the mind is posited ideally, but still in a bodily manner.<sup>11</sup>

In *phenomenology*, the soul, by the negation of its bodiliness, raises itself to pure ideal self-identity, becomes consciousness, becomes I, is for itself over against its Other. But this first being-for-self of mind is still conditioned by the Other from which the mind originates. The I is still completely empty, an entirely abstract subjectivity; it posits all the content of immediate mind outside itself and relates to it as to a world it finds before it. Thus what was initially only our object, does indeed become an object for mind itself, but the I does not yet know that what confronts it is the natural mind itself. Therefore, the I, in spite of its being-for-self, is at the same time not for itself, for it is only in relation to an Other, to something given. The freedom of the I is consequently only an abstract, conditioned, relative freedom.<sup>12</sup> True, mind here is no longer immersed in nature but reflected into itself and related to nature, but it only *appears*, stands only in relation to actuality, is not yet *actual* mind. Therefore, we call the part of the science in which this form of mind is treated, *phenomenology*.<sup>13</sup> But now the I, in reflecting itself into itself out of its relation to Other, becomes self-consciousness. In this form, the I initially knows itself only as the unfulfilled I, and all concrete content as an Other. Here the activity of the I consists in filling the void of its abstract subjectivity, in building the objective into itself but, on the other hand, in making the subjective objective. In this way, self-consciousness sublates the one-sidedness of its subjectivity, emerges from its particularity, from its opposition to the objective, into the universality embracing both sides, and displays within itself the unity of itself with consciousness; for the content of mind here becomes an objective content, as in consciousness, and at the same time, as in self-consciousness, a subjective content.<sup>14</sup> This universal self-consciousness is, in itself or for us, *reason*; but it is only in the third part of the science of subjective mind that reason becomes an object to itself.<sup>15</sup>

This *third* part, *psychology*, treats of mind as such, the mind as it relates itself, in the object, only to itself, has to do therein only with its own determinations,

grasps its own concept. Thus mind comes to truth; for the unity of the subjective and the objective which, in mere soul, is still immediate, still abstract, is now, by sublation of the opposition arising in consciousness between these determinations, restored as a mediated unity; thus the Idea of mind emerges from its contradictory form of simple concept, and from the equally contradictory separation of its moments, to mediated unity and accordingly to true actuality.<sup>16</sup> In this shape, mind is *reason that is for itself*. Mind and reason stand in the same relationship to each other as body and heaviness, as will and freedom. Reason forms the substantial nature of mind; it is only another expression for truth or the Idea, which constitutes the essence of mind; but it is only mind as such that knows that its nature is reason and truth.<sup>17</sup> The mind that embraces both sides, subjectivity and objectivity, now posits itself firstly in the form of subjectivity, and then it is *intelligence*; secondly, in the form of objectivity, and then it is *will*. Intelligence, which is itself initially still unfulfilled, sublates its form of subjectivity, which does not conform to the concept of mind, in the following way: it measures the objective content confronting it, still burdened with the form of givenness and individuality, by the absolute standard of reason, it imposes rationality on this content, informs it with the Idea, transforms it into a concrete universal, and thus receives it into itself. Intelligence thereby reaches the point where what it knows is not an abstraction but the objective concept, and where, on the other hand, the object loses the form of a given and acquires the shape of a content pertaining to mind itself.<sup>18</sup> But intelligence, in attaining consciousness that it takes the content from itself, becomes practical mind which posits only itself for its goal, becomes will, which, unlike intelligence, does not begin with an individual given from outside, but with the sort of individual that it knows to be its own. Then, reflecting itself into itself out of this content, out of urges, inclinations, it relates the content to a universal; and finally it raises itself to the willing of the universal in and for itself, of freedom, of its concept. Having reached this goal, mind has returned to its beginning, to unity with itself, but equally it has progressed to absolute unity with itself, a unity genuinely determined within itself, a unity in which the determinations are determinations not of nature but of the concept.<sup>19</sup>



## A. Anthropology, The Soul

§388

Mind has *come into being* as the truth of nature. In the Idea in general this result has the meaning of the truth and of what is prior, rather than posterior, as compared with what precedes it. But, besides this, becoming or transition has, in the concept, the more determinate meaning of *free judgement*. The mind that has come into being means, therefore, that nature in its own self sublates itself as what is untrue, and mind thus presupposes itself as this universality that is no longer *self-externalized* in bodily individuality, but *simple* in its concretion and totality. In this universality it is not yet mind, but *soul*.<sup>1</sup>

§389

The soul is not only immaterial for itself. It is the universal immateriality of nature, its simple ideal life.<sup>1</sup> Soul is the *substance*, the absolute foundation of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind, so that it is in the soul that *mind* finds all the stuff of its determination, and the soul remains the pervading, identical ideality of this determination. But in this still abstract determination, the soul is only the *sleep* of mind—the passive *voûs* of Aristotle, which is *potentially* all things.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] The question of the immateriality of the soul is no longer of interest, unless matter, on the one hand, is represented as something *true*, and mind, on the other, is represented as a *thing*. But in modern times even the physicists have found matter grown thinner in their hands; they have hit upon *imponderable* matters, such as heat, light, etc., to which they could easily add space and time as well. These imponderables, which have lost the property (characteristic of matter) of weight and, in a sense, even the capacity of offering resistance, have still, however, a sensory reality, a self-externality; whereas the *vital matter*, which may also be found counted among them, not only lacks weight, but even every other reality which would lead us to count it as *material*. The fact is that in the Idea of life the self-externality of nature is already sublated *in itself*, and the concept, the substance of life takes the form of subjectivity, but only in such a way that its existence or objectivity is at the same time still under the sway of self-externality. But mind is the concept whose existence is not immediate individuality, but absolute negativity, freedom, so that the object or the reality of the concept is

the concept itself. So in mind self-externality, which constitutes the fundamental determination of matter, has completely evaporated into the subjective ideality of the concept, into universality. Mind is the existent truth of matter—the truth that matter itself has no truth.<sup>3</sup>

A related question is that of the *communion of the soul and the physical body*. This communion was accepted as a *fact*, and the only problem was how to *comprehend* it. What can be regarded as the usual answer, was that it is an *incomprehensible* mystery. For, in fact, if we presuppose them to be *absolutely independent* of each other, they are as impenetrable to each other as any piece of matter is to another, each being assumed to be found only in their reciprocal non-being, in the pores of the other. Hence Epicurus, when assigning the gods a residence in the pores, was consistent in not imposing on them any communion with the world. An answer that cannot be regarded as equivalent to this one has been given by all philosophers ever since this relationship came up for discussion. *Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz* have all specified *God* as this relation. They did so in the sense that matter and the finitude of the soul are only ideal determinations in respect of each other and have no truth; and so for these philosophers God is not, as is often the case, merely another word for this incomprehensibility, but rather is conceived as the sole true *identity* of soul and matter. However, this *identity* is either too abstract, as Spinoza's identity is, or it is, like Leibniz's monad of monads, *creative* as well, but is so only by a *judgement*. In the latter case, we get as far as a distinction between the soul and the bodily (or material), but the identity is only like the *copula* of a judgement and does not proceed to the development and system of the absolute syllogism.<sup>4</sup>

*Zusatz.* In the introduction to the philosophy of mind, we noted how nature itself sublates its externality and individualization, its materiality, as an untruth which is inadequate to the concept dwelling in it, and by thus acquiring immateriality it passes over into mind. That is why, in the above Paragraph, immediate mind, the soul, is determined not merely as immaterial for itself, but as the universal immateriality of nature, and also as substance, as unity of thinking and being. This unity constitutes the fundamental intuition even in orientalism. Light, which in the Persian religion was regarded as the absolute, had the meaning of a spiritual entity just as much as a physical entity.<sup>5</sup> Spinoza conceived this unity more determinately as the absolute foundation of everything. Even though mind may withdraw into itself, may take its stand at the extreme point of its subjectivity, yet it is *implicitly* in that unity. But it cannot stop there; it attains to absolute being-for-itself, to a perfectly adequate form, only by developing in an immanent manner the difference, which in substance is still simple, into an actual difference, and by bringing this difference back into unity; only by doing this does it break free of the state of sleep, which belongs to it as soul. For in soul, the difference is still shrouded in the form of undifferentiatedness and therefore of unconsciousness. The defect of Spinoza's philosophy

consists, therefore, just in this: in it substance does not advance to its immanent development, the manifold is added to substance only in an external manner.<sup>6</sup> The same unity of thought and being is contained in the *voûs* of Anaxagoras; but this *voûs* failed even more than Spinoza's substance to achieve a development of its own.<sup>7</sup> Pantheism fails altogether to advance to an organization and systematization. Where pantheism appears in the form of representation, it is a reeling life, an intuitive bacchanalian vision, which does not let the individual shapes of the universe emerge in their articulation but perpetually submerges them in the universal again and inflates them into the sublime and the monstrous. This intuition, however, forms a natural starting-point for every stout heart. In youth especially, we feel a kinship and sympathy with the whole of nature through a life which ensouls ourselves and everything around us and so we have a sensation of the world-soul, of the unity of mind and nature, of the immateriality of the latter.<sup>8</sup>

But when we leave *feeling* behind and go on to *reflection*, then the opposition of soul and matter, of my subjective I and its bodiliness, becomes for us a fixed opposition, and the reciprocal relation of body and soul becomes an interaction of independent entities. The usual physiological and psychological treatment does not know how to overcome the rigidity of this opposition. In that treatment, the I as thoroughly simple and unitary, this abyss of all representations, and matter as the many, the composite, confront each other in absolute abruptness, and the answer to the question, how this many is united with that abstract one, is naturally declared to be impossible.<sup>9</sup>

The immateriality of one side of this opposition, namely, of the soul, is readily conceded; but the other side of it, the material, remains standing for us, at the standpoint of merely reflective thinking, as a fixture, as something that we accept along with the immateriality of the soul; so we ascribe to the material the same being as to the immaterial and hold both to be equally substantial and absolute. This mode of treatment also prevailed in former metaphysics. This metaphysics, however, though firmly holding the opposition between the material and the immaterial to be insuperable, yet, on the other hand, unwittingly sublated the opposition again by making the soul into a *thing*, consequently into something which, though entirely abstract, was nonetheless straight away determined by sensory relationships. This metaphysics achieved this effect by its question about the seat of the soul—it thereby placed the soul in *space*; similarly by its question about the origin and decease of the soul—it was thereby placed in *time*; and thirdly, by its question about the properties of the soul, for the soul is thereby regarded as something static, fixed, as the focal point of these determinations.<sup>10</sup> Even Leibniz treated soul as a thing, in making it, like everything else, into a monad; the monad is just as static as a thing, and the entire difference between the soul and the material, according to Leibniz, consists only in soul's being a somewhat more distinct, more developed, monad than the rest of matter—a

representation by which the material is doubtless exalted, but soul is reduced to, rather than distinguished from, a material entity.<sup>11</sup>

*Speculative* logic lifts us above the whole of this merely reflective way of looking at things simply by showing that all these determinations applied to the soul—such as thing, simplicity, indivisibility, one—are, when conceived in an abstract way, untrue and veer round into their opposites. But the philosophy of mind continues this proof of the untruth of such categories of the intellect by demonstrating how all fixed determinations are sublated in the mind by its ideality.<sup>12</sup>

Now as regards the other side of the opposition in question, namely matter, we have already remarked that externality, individualization, multiplicity are regarded as its fixed determination, and the unity of this multiplicity is therefore declared to be only a superficial bond, a composition, and accordingly everything material to be separable. We must, of course, admit that whereas with mind, the concrete unity is the essential and the multiplicity is a semblance, with matter the reverse is the case; the old metaphysics already showed an awareness of this when it asked whether, in the case of the mind, the one or the many has priority.<sup>13</sup> That the externality and multiplicity of matter cannot be overcome by nature is a presupposition which, at our standpoint, at the standpoint of speculative philosophy, we have here long since left behind us as invalid. The philosophy of nature teaches us how nature sublates its externality by stages, how matter already refutes the independence of the individual, of the many, by *gravity*, and how this refutation begun by gravity, and still more by simple, indivisible *light*, is completed by animal life, by the sentient creature, since this reveals to us the omnipresence of the one soul at every point of its bodiliness, and so the sublatedness of the asunderness of matter. Since, then, everything material is sublated by the mind that is in itself and at work within nature, and this sublation is consummated in the substance of *soul*, the soul emerges as the ideality of *everything* material, as *all* immateriality, so that everything called matter, however much it simulates independence to representation, is known to have no independence in the face of mind.<sup>14</sup>

The opposition of soul and body must, of course, be made. Just as the indeterminate universal soul determines itself, individualizes itself, just as mind thereby becomes consciousness—and it necessarily advances to consciousness—so the mind places itself at the standpoint of opposition between itself and its Other, its Other appears to it as something real, something external to mind and to itself, something material.<sup>15</sup> At this standpoint, the question about the possibility of the communion of the soul and the physical body is an entirely natural one. If soul and body are absolutely opposed to each other, as intellectual consciousness maintains, then there is no possibility of any communion between them. Now this communion was recognized by the old metaphysics as an undeniable fact. Therefore, the question arose as to how the contradiction,

that entities that are absolutely independent, for themselves, are yet in unity with each other, could be solved. When the question was posed in this way, it was impossible to answer. But it is just this way of posing it that must be recognized as inadmissible; for in truth the immaterial is not related to the material as a particular is to a particular, but as the genuine universal which overarches particularity is related to the particular; the material in its particularization has no truth, no independence in face of the immaterial. Consequently, the standpoint of separation is not to be regarded as final, as absolutely true. On the contrary, the separation of the material and the immaterial can be explained only on the basis of the original unity of both. Therefore, in the philosophies of Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza, a return is made to such a unity of thinking and being, of mind and matter, and this unity is placed in God. Malebranche said: We see everything in God. He treated God as the mediation, as the positive medium, between what thinks and what does not think, and, indeed, as the immanent, pervasive essence in which both sides are sublated,—consequently, not as a third term over against two extremes which themselves have an actuality; for in that case the question would again arise as to how that third term comes together with these two extremes. But in placing the unity of the material and the immaterial in God, who is to be conceived essentially as mind, the philosophers mentioned wished to convey that this unity must not be taken as something neutral in which two extremes of equal significance and independence come together, since the material has no meaning at all beyond that of a negative over against mind and over against itself, or must be described—as Plato and other ancient philosophers expressed it—as the ‘Other of itself’, whereas we must recognize the nature of mind as the positive, as the speculative, because the mind freely pervades the material, which lacks independence in face of it, mind overarches this its Other, does not accept it as something genuinely real but idealizes it and reduces it to something mediated.<sup>16</sup>

Confronting this speculative conception of the opposition between mind and matter stands *materialism*, which portrays thinking as a result of the material, derives the simplicity of thinking from the manifold. There is nothing more unsatisfactory than the discussions conducted in materialistic writings of the various relationships and combinations by which a result such as thinking is supposed to be produced. Such discussions entirely overlook the fact that, just as the cause is sublated in the effect, and the means in the accomplished end, so too that from which thinking is supposed to result is conversely sublated in thinking, and that mind as such is not produced by an Other, but raises itself from its being-in-itself to being-for-itself, from its concept to actuality, and makes that by which mind is supposed to be posited into something posited by mind. All the same, we must recognize in materialism the enthusiastic endeavour to transcend the dualism which assumes two different worlds as equally substantial and true, to sublimate this dismemberment of what is originally one.<sup>17</sup>

## §390

The soul is at first:

- (a) in its immediate *natural determinacy*—the *natural* soul, which only *is*;
- (b) as *individual*, it enters into relationship with its immediate being, and, in the determinacies of that being, is abstractly *for itself*—*feeling* soul;
- (c) its immediate being, as its bodiliness, is moulded into it, and the soul is thus *actual* soul.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The *first part* of Anthropology indicated in this Paragraph, which comprises the natural soul, the soul that simply is, in turn splits up into *three sections*. In the *first* section we have initially to deal with the still entirely universal, immediate substance of mind, with the simple pulsation, the mere inward stirring, of soul. In this first mental life no distinction is yet posited, either of individuality in contrast to universality or of soul in contrast to the natural. This simple life has its explication in nature and in mind; it itself as such just *is*, it has as yet no reality, no determinate being, no particularization, no actuality. But just as, in logic, being must pass over into determinate being, so soul too necessarily progresses from its indeterminacy to determinacy. This determinacy initially has, as already noted earlier, the form of naturalness. But the natural determinacy of soul is to be conceived as a totality, as a copy of the concept. The *first* stage here is therefore the entirely *universal, qualitative* determinations of soul. Here belong especially the *racial differences*, both physical and mental, of humanity and also the differences of national mentality.<sup>2</sup>

These divergent *universal* particularizations or varieties are then—and this forms the transition to the *second* section—taken back into the unity of soul or, what is the same thing, promoted to individualization. Just as light splinters into an infinite host of stars, so too the universal natural soul splinters into an infinite host of individual souls, only with the difference, that whereas light has the semblance of a subsistence independent of the stars, the universal natural soul attains actuality only in the individual souls.<sup>3</sup> Now since the diverging universal qualities considered in the first section, are taken back, as we said above, into the unity of the individual human soul, instead of the form of externality they acquire the shape of natural *alterations* of the individual subject who persists in them. These alterations, which are also both mental and physical, emerge in the course of the *stages of life*. Here the difference ceases to be an external one. But it is in the *sexual relationship* that the difference becomes *actual particularization, real opposition* of the individual to itself. From this point on, the soul in general enters into opposition to its natural qualities, to its universal being, which, by this very fact, is reduced to the Other of the soul, to a mere aspect, to a transitory state, namely, to the *state of sleep*. Thus originates *natural waking*, the opening out of the soul. But here in Anthropology we have not yet to consider the fulfilment that accrues to waking consciousness but waking only in so far as it is a natural state.<sup>3</sup>

From this relationship of *opposition*, or of *real particularization*, soul now returns, in the *third* section, to unity with itself, by removing from its Other too the fixity of a state, and dissolving the Other in the soul's ideality. Soul has thus progressed from merely *universal individuality*, which is only *in itself*; to *actual individuality* that is *for itself*; and in doing this it has progressed to *sensation*. Initially, we have to deal here only with the *form* of sensing. *What* the soul senses is to be specified only in the *second* part of Anthropology. The *transition* to this part is formed by the expansion of sensation within itself to the *boding* soul.<sup>5</sup>

(a) THE NATURAL SOUL

§391

The *universal* soul must not be fixed, in the form of a *world-soul*, as a sort of subject; for the universal soul is only the universal *substance*, which has its actual truth only as *individuality*, subjectivity. Thus it presents itself as an individual soul, but immediately only as a soul which just *is*, with natural determinacies in it. These determinacies have, so to speak, *behind* their ideality a *free* existence: i.e. they are natural objects for consciousness, though the soul as such does not respond to them as external objects. Rather, these determinations are *natural qualities* which it has in itself.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The soul, when contrasted with the macrocosm of nature as a whole, can be described as the microcosm into which the macrocosm compresses itself and thereby sublates its asunderness. Accordingly the same determinations which in outer nature appear as freely disengaged spheres, as a series of independent shapes, are in the soul demoted to mere qualities. The soul stands midway between the nature which lies behind it, on the one hand, and the world of ethical freedom which extricates itself from natural mind, on the other hand. The simple determinations of soul-life have their dispersed counterpart in the universal life of nature; similarly, that which in the individual man has the form of subjectivity, of a particular urge, and is within him unconsciously, as simply something he *is*, unfolds in the political state into a system of distinct spheres of freedom, into a world created by self-conscious human reason.<sup>2</sup>

(α) Natural Qualities

§392

(1) In its substance, in the natural soul, the mind takes part in the universal planetary life, feels the difference of climates, the changes of the seasons, the periods of the day, etc. In the mind this life of nature emerges only in occasional dark moods.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] In recent times a good deal has been said of the *cosmic*, *sidereal*, and *telluric* life of man.<sup>2</sup> Animals essentially live in such a sympathy with nature:

their specific characters and the particular ways in which they develop are connected with it, in many cases completely, and always to some extent. In the case of man, the more cultivated he is and the more his whole condition rests on a free, spiritual foundation, the less the significance that such connections have. World-history is not connected with revolutions in the solar system, any more than the destinies of individuals are tied to the positions of the planets.<sup>3</sup> Differences of climate involve a more solid and vigorous determinacy. But the response to changes of the seasons and hours of the day is found only in feeble moods, which can become especially prominent only in illnesses (including derangement) and in the depression of self-conscious life.<sup>4</sup> Alongside popular superstitions and the aberrations of the feeble intellect, there are also to be found, among peoples less advanced in spiritual freedom and therefore living more in unison with nature, *some* actual cases of such connections, and, based on them, what seem to be marvellous prophetic visions of states of affairs and of events linked to them. But as freedom of mind gets a deeper grasp of itself, even these few and slight dispositions, based on participation in the life of nature, disappear.<sup>5</sup> Animals and plants, by contrast, remain subject to such influences.

*Zusatz.* It is clear from §391 and its *Zusatz* that the universal life of nature is also the life of the soul, that the soul lives in sympathy with that universal life. But it would be a complete mistake to make this participation of the soul in the life of the whole universe into the highest object of the science of mind. For the activity of mind essentially consists just in raising itself above this entanglement in merely natural life, in grasping itself in its independence, subjecting the world to its thinking and creating it from the concept. In mind, therefore, the universal life of nature is only an entirely subordinate moment; the cosmic and telluric powers are dominated by mind, they can produce in it only an insignificant mood.

Now the universal life of nature is first, the life of the solar system generally, and secondly, the life of the earth, in which the life of the solar system acquires a more individual form.

As regards the relation of the soul to the solar system, we may note that astrology links the destinies of humanity and of individuals with the configurations and positions of the planets (as, in modern times, the world in general has been considered as a mirror of mind in the sense that the the mind can be explained from the world).<sup>6</sup> The content of astrology is to be rejected as superstition; but science is under an obligation to indicate the determinate ground for this rejection. This ground must not be located merely in the fact that the planets are bodies and remote from us, but more specifically in the fact that the planetary life of the solar system is only a life of *motion*, in other words, is a life in which space and time constitute the determining factor; for space and time are the moments of motion. The laws of the motion of the planets are determined solely by the concept of space and of time; it is, therefore, in the planets that absolutely free motion has its actuality. But even in what is physically individual this abstract



motion is something completely subordinate; the individual in general makes its own space and time; its alteration is determined by its concrete nature. The animal body attains to even greater independence than the merely physical individual; the course of its development is quite independent of the motion of the planets, the measure of its lifespan is not determined by them; its health and the course of its disease do not depend on the planets; periodic fevers, for example, have their own determinate measure; in fevers the determinant is not time as time, but the animal organism. But for mind the abstract determinations of space and time, the free mechanism, have no significance and no power whatsoever; the determinations of self-conscious mind are infinitely more substantial, more concrete, than the abstract determinations of juxtaposition and succession. Mind, as embodied, is indeed in a definite place and in a definite time; but it is nevertheless elevated above space and time. Of course, the life of man is conditioned by a determinate measure of the distance of the earth from the sun; he could not live at either a greater or a lesser distance from the sun; but the influence of the position of the earth on mankind does not extend any further.<sup>7</sup>

Even the strictly terrestrial relationships—the annual revolution of the earth round the sun, the daily axial rotation of the earth, the inclination of the earth's axis to the course of its movement round the sun—all these determinations belonging to the earth's individuality, though not without influence on mankind, are unimportant for the mind as such. The Church itself has therefore rightly rejected as superstitious and unethical the belief in a power exercised over the human spirit by these terrestrial and cosmic relationships. Man should regard himself as free from such relationships of nature; but in that superstition he regards himself as a natural entity. Accordingly, we must also brand as worthless the undertaking of those who have endeavoured to bring the evolutionary epochs of the earth into connection with the epochs of human history, to discover the origin of religions and their images in the realm of astronomy and then too in the physical realm, and have there hit upon the groundless and baseless notion that just as the equinox moved forward from the Bull to the Ram, Apis worship had necessarily to be followed by Christianity, by the worship of the Lamb.<sup>8</sup>

But as regards the influence actually exerted by terrestrial relationships on man, here we can only mention the main factors, since the details belong to the natural history of man and the earth. In the seasons and the times of the day, the process of the motion of the earth acquires a physical significance. These alternations do, of course, affect man; the merely natural mind, the soul, lives in sympathy with the mood of the season and of the time of day. But whereas plants are completely bound to the alternation of the seasons and even animals are unconsciously dominated by it, being instinctively impelled to mate and some to migration, in the human soul this alternation does not produce any excitations to which man is involuntarily subjected. The disposition of winter is the disposition of withdrawal into oneself, of composing oneself, of family life, of the worship of the penates. In the summer, on the other hand, we feel particularly

inclined to travel, we feel drawn into the open air, and the common people go off in a crowd on pilgrimages. Yet there is nothing merely instinctive about either this more intimate family life or these pilgrimages and journeys. The Christian festivals are linked with the alternation of the seasons; the festival of the birth of Christ is celebrated at the time when the sun seems to go forth again; the resurrection of Christ is placed at the beginning of spring, in the period of nature's awakening. But similarly this association of the religious with the natural is one made consciously, not instinctively.

As regards the phases of the moon, these have only a limited influence even on the physical nature of man. Such an influence has been observed on lunatics; but in them also the power of nature is dominant, not the free mind.<sup>9</sup> Moreover the times of day, of course, bring with them a characteristic disposition of the soul. We are in different moods in the morning and evening. In the morning seriousness prevails, the mind is still more in identity with itself and with nature. The day belongs to opposition, to work. In the evening, reflection and fancy predominate. At midnight, mind retires into itself from the distractions of the day, is alone with itself and inclined to contemplation. Most people die after midnight; human nature is there unable to start yet another day. There is also a certain relation between the times of day and the public life of peoples. The ancients, who were more drawn to nature than we are, held their public assemblies in the morning; in England, on the contrary, in keeping with the introverted character of the English, parliamentary proceedings are started in the evening and sometimes continued far into the night. But these moods produced by the times of the day are modified by climate; in hot countries, for example, one feels at midday more disposed to rest than to activity.

With respect to the influence of meteorological changes we can mention the following. Sensitivity to these phenomena is distinctly noticeable in plants and animals. Thus animals have presentiments of thunderstorms and earthquakes, i.e. they feel atmospheric changes which have not yet become apparent to us. Human beings, too, sense in wounds changes in the weather not yet indicated by the barometer; the weak spot formed by the wound allows the power of nature to become more noticeable. What is thus determining for the organism has also a significance for weak minds and is sensed as an effect. Indeed whole peoples, the Greeks and Romans, made their decisions depend on natural phenomena which to them seemed to be connected with meteorological changes. As we know, they consulted not only the priests, but also the entrails and feed of animals, for advice on affairs of state. On the day of the battle of Plataea, for example, when the freedom of Greece, perhaps of the whole of Europe, the repulse of oriental despotism, was at stake, Pausanias tortured himself the whole morning about good signs from sacrificial animals.<sup>10</sup> This seems to stand in complete contradiction with the mindfulness of the Greeks in art, religion, and science, but it can be very well explained from the standpoint of the Greek mind. It is characteristic of moderns, in everything which prudence declares advisable in such and such circumstances,

to make a decision for themselves; private persons as well as princes take their decisions for themselves; with us the subjective will cuts off all grounds of deliberation and determines itself to the deed. The ancients, by contrast, who had not yet attained to this power of subjectivity, to this strength of self-certainty, let their affairs be determined by oracles, by external phenomena, in which they sought confirmation and verification of their plans and intentions.<sup>11</sup> Now as regards the case of battle in particular, it depends not merely on the ethical disposition but also on the mood of buoyancy, on the feeling of physical strength. But with the ancients, this disposition was of far greater importance than it is with the moderns, with whom the main thing is the discipline of the army and the talent of the commander, whereas with the ancients, who still lived more in unity with nature, the bravery of individuals, the courage that always has something physical as its source, made the largest contribution to the decision of the battle. Now the mood of courage is connected with other physical dispositions, e.g. with the disposition of the region, of the atmosphere, of the season, of the climate. But the sympathetic moods of ensouled life become more visibly apparent in animals than in human beings, since animals live in an even closer unity with nature. For this reason the Greek commander only went into battle when he believed he had found in the animals healthy dispositions, which seemed to permit an inference to good dispositions of men.<sup>12</sup> Thus Xenophon, who conducts himself so shrewdly in his famous retreat, sacrifices daily and determines his military measures in accordance with the result of the sacrifice.<sup>13</sup> But the ancients took this search for a connection between the natural and the spiritual too far. Their superstition saw more in the animals' entrails than is there to be seen. In this, the I surrendered its independence, subjected itself to the circumstances and determinations of externality, made them into determinations of mind.

### §393

(2) The universal planetary life of the natural mind particularizes itself into the concrete differences of the earth and breaks up into the *particular natural minds* which, on the whole, express the nature of the geographical regions of the world and constitute the diversities of *race*.

[Remark] The opposition of terrestrial polarity, in virtue of which the land towards the north is more concentrated and predominates over the sea, whereas in the southern hemisphere it tapers off into separate sharp points, introduces into the differences of world-regions a further modification which *Treviranus* (*Biology*, Vol. II) has demonstrated in the case of the flora and fauna.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* With respect to the diversity of races of mankind it must be noticed first of all that the merely historical question, whether all human races sprang from *one* couple or from several, is of no concern whatever to us in philosophy.<sup>2</sup> Importance was attached to this question because it was believed that by assuming descent from several couples, the mental superiority of one human stock over

another could be explained, indeed, it was hoped to prove that human beings are by nature so diverse in their mental capacities that some may be dominated like animals. But descent affords no ground for the entitlement or non-entitlement of human beings to freedom and to dominion. Man is implicitly rational; herein lies the possibility of equality of right for all men,—the futility of a rigid distinction between races that have rights and those that have none.<sup>3</sup>—The difference between the races of mankind is still a natural difference, that is, a difference that initially concerns the natural soul. As such, the difference is connected with the geographical differences of the territory where human beings congregate in large masses. These differences of territory are what we call world-regions. In these subdivisions of the earth-individual something necessary prevails, the detailed discussion of which belongs to geography. The basic division of the earth is into the *Old* and the *New* World. Initially, this distinction relates to the earlier or later knowledge of the continents in world history. Here, this meaning is for us a matter of indifference. What concerns us here is the determinacy which constitutes the distinctive character of the world-regions. In this respect, it must be said that *America* has a younger aspect than the Old World and lags behind it in its historical formation. America exhibits only the general difference of north and south with a quite narrow middle between the two extremes. The indigenous peoples of this world-region are dying out; the Old World is refashioning itself in the New. The Old World differs from America in that it presents itself as sundered into determinate differences, divides into three continents, of which one, *Africa*, taken as a whole, appears as a mass belonging to compact unity, as a lofty mountain range shutting off the coast; the second, *Asia*, succumbs to the opposition of highlands and great valleys irrigated by broad rivers; while the third, *Europe*, reveals the unity of the undifferentiated unity of Africa and the unmediated opposition of Asia, since here mountain and valley are not juxtaposed as two great halves of the continent as in Asia, but constantly penetrate each other. These three continents lie around the Mediterranean, but they are linked together by it, not separated. North Africa up to the boundary of the sandy desert already by its character belongs to Europe; the inhabitants of this part of Africa are not yet strictly Africans, that is, negroes, but are akin to Europeans. Similarly the whole of Western Asia is European in character; the Asiatic race proper, the Mongols, inhabit the Far East.<sup>4</sup>

After having thus attempted to show that the differences between the continents are not contingent but necessary,<sup>5</sup> we wish to determine, in a physical and spiritual respect, the racial diversities of humanity connected with these geographical differences. In the physical respect, physiology distinguishes the Caucasian, Ethiopian, and Mongolian races, and there are also the race of Malaya and of America, though these form an aggregate of infinitely various particularities rather than a sharply distinct race. Now the physical difference between all these races is shown mainly in the formation of the skull and the

face. The formation of the skull is to be determined by a horizontal and a vertical line, the former running from the outside of the auditory canal to the root of the nose, the latter from the frontal bone to the upper jaw. It is by the angle formed by these two lines that the head of the animal is distinguished from the human head; in animals this angle is extremely acute. Another important factor in establishing racial differences, noted by Blumenbach, concerns the greater or lesser prominence of the cheek-bones. The arching and width of the forehead is also a determining factor here.<sup>6</sup>

Now in the *Caucasian* race the aforesaid angle is almost or entirely a right angle. This applies particularly to the Italian, Georgian, and Circassian physiognomy. In this race the skull is spherical on top, the forehead gently arched, the cheek-bones pushed back, the front teeth in both jaws perpendicular, the skin white with red cheeks and the hair long and soft.

The characteristic of the *Mongolian* race is shown in the prominence of the cheek-bones, in the eyes which are not round but narrow-slit, in the compressed nose, in the yellow colour of the skin and in the short stiff black hair.

*Negroes* have narrower skulls than Mongols and Caucasians, their foreheads are arched but bulging, their jaw-bones are prominent and the teeth slope, their lower jaw juts well out, their skin is more or less black, their hair is woolly and black.

The *Malayan* and *American* race are less sharply distinguished in their physical formation than the races just described; the skin of the Malayan race is brown and that of the American race copper-coloured.

In a *spiritual* respect the races referred to differ in the following way.

*Negroes* are to be regarded as a nation of children who remain immersed in their uninterested and indifferent naïveté. They are sold, and let themselves be sold, without any reflection on whether this is right or not. Their religion has something childlike about it. They sense a higher being, but they do not keep a firm hold on it; it passes only fleetingly through their heads. This higher being they transfer to the first stone they come across, thus making it their fetish and they discard this fetish if it fails to help them. Entirely good-natured and harmless when in a state of calm, they can become suddenly agitated and then commit the most frightful cruelties. They cannot be denied a capacity for education; not only have they, here and there, adopted Christianity with the greatest gratitude and spoken with emotion of the freedom they have acquired through Christianity after a long spiritual servitude, but in Haiti they have even formed a state on Christian principles. But they do not show an inner impulse towards culture. In their native country the most shocking despotism prevails. There they do not attain to the feeling of man's personality, — their mind is entirely dormant, it remains sunk within itself, it makes no progress, and thus corresponds to the compact, *undifferentiated* mass of the African land.<sup>7</sup> The *Mongols*, on the other hand, rise above this childish naïveté; they reveal as their characteristic

feature a restless mobility which comes to no fixed result and impels them to spread like monstrous locust swarms over other nations and then gives way to the thoughtless indifference and dull inertia which preceded this outburst. Similarly, the Mongols display in themselves an acute contrast between the sublime and immense, on the one hand, and the most petty pedantry, on the other. Their religion already contains the representation of a universal which they venerate as God. But this God is not yet endured as an invisible God; he is present in human shape, or at least announces himself through some human being or other. This occurs with the Tibetans, where often a child is chosen as the present god, and when such a god dies, the monks seek another god among mankind; but all these gods enjoy the profoundest veneration one after the other. The essentials of this religion reach as far as the Indians, among whom a human being, the Brahman, is likewise regarded as God, and the withdrawal of the human mind into its indeterminate universality is held to be the divine, to be the immediate identity with God. So in the Asiatic race mind is certainly already beginning to awake, to separate itself from naturalness. But this separation is not yet clear-cut, not yet absolute. Mind does not yet grasp itself in its absolute freedom, does not yet know itself as the concrete universal that is for itself, has not yet made its concept into its object in the form of thought. For this reason mind still exists in the form of immediate individuality, a form in contradiction with mind. God does indeed become an object for them, but not in the form of the absolutely free thought, but in that of an immediately existent finite mind. With this is connected the worship of the dead that occurs here. This involves an elevation above naturalness, for in the dead naturalness has perished; the remembrance of them holds fast only to the universal that appeared in them and thus rises above the individuality of the appearance. But the universal is always, on the one hand, held fast only as an entirely abstract universal, and on the other hand, is viewed only in a thoroughly contingent, immediate existence. The Indians, for example, regard the universal God as present in the whole of nature, in rivers and mountains just as in men. Asia displays then, both in a physical and a spiritual respect, the moment of *opposition*, unmediated opposition, the mediationless collision of opposed determinations. Here, on the one hand, mind separates itself from nature, and yet on the other hand, falls back again into the naturalness, since it does not yet attain actuality within itself but only in nature. In this identity of mind with nature true freedom is impossible. Here man cannot yet attain to consciousness of his personality, in his individuality he still has no value and no entitlement, neither with the Indians nor the Chinese; the latter have no compunction in exposing or simply destroying their children.<sup>8</sup>

It is in the *Caucasian* race that mind first attains to absolute unity with itself; here for the first time mind enters into complete opposition to naturalness, apprehends itself in its absolute independence, breaks free from the oscillation between one extreme and the other, achieves self-determination, self-development, and thereby produces world-history. The Mongols, as we have already mentioned,

have for their character only the outwards-storming activity of an inundation, which dies away as quickly as it came, acts only destructively, constructs nothing, produces no advance in world-history. This advance comes about only through the Caucasian race.

In the Caucasian race, however, we have to distinguish two sides, the *Western Asiatics* and the *Europeans*; this distinction now coincides with the distinction of Mohammedans and Christians.

In *Mohammedanism* the narrow principle of the Jews is expanded into universality and thereby overcome. Here, God is no longer, as in the Far East, regarded as existent in an immediately sensory way but is conceived as the *one* infinite power elevated above all the multiplicity of the world. Mohammedanism is, therefore, in the strictest sense of the word, the religion of sublimity. The character of the western Asiatics, particularly the Arabs, is completely in accord with this religion. This people is, in its aspiration to the *one* God, indifferent to everything finite, to all misery, and gives generously of its life and its goods; even today its courage and charity earns our recognition. But the western Asiatic mind which clings to the abstract One does not get as far as the determination, the particularization, of the universal nor, consequently, to a concrete formation. By this mind, it is true, the caste system that dominates everything in the Far East is here annihilated, each individual among the mohammedan West Asiatics is free; despotism proper does not occur among them. Political life, however, does not here yet attain to an articulated organism, to the differentiation into particular state powers. And as regards individuals they do, on the one hand, keep sublimely aloof from subjective, finite purposes, but again, on the other hand, they also hurl themselves with unbridled impulse into the pursuit of such purposes, which, with them, lack all trace of the universal because here the universal does not yet attain to an immanent particularization. So here, alongside the most sublime sentiments, there occur the greatest vindictiveness and guile.<sup>9</sup>

*Europeans*, on the contrary, have for their principle and character the concrete universal, the self-determining thought. The Christian God is not merely the undifferentiated One, but the triune God who contains difference within himself, who has become man, who reveals himself. In this religious representation the opposition of universal and particular, of thought and reality, has supreme intensity and is nevertheless brought back to unity. Here, then, the particular is not left so quiescent in its immediacy as in Mohammedanism; on the contrary, it is determined by thought, just as, conversely, the universal here develops itself to particularization. The principle of the European mind is, therefore, self-conscious reason, which has the confidence in itself that for it nothing can be an insuperable barrier, and which therefore invades everything in order to become present to itself therein. The European mind opposes the world to itself, makes itself free of it, but again sublates this opposition, takes its Other, the manifold, back into itself, into its simplicity. Here, therefore, there prevails this infinite thirst for knowledge, which is alien to the other races. The European is interested

in the world, he wants to know it, to make this Other confronting him his own, to bring into his view the genus, the law, the universal, the thought, the inner rationality, in the particularizations of the world.—As in the theoretical, so too in the practical sphere, the European mind strives after the unity to be produced between itself and the external world. It subjects the external world to its ends with an energy which has secured for it the mastery of the world. In his particular actions the individual here proceeds from firm universal principles; and in Europe the political state exhibits more or less the unfolding and actualization of freedom through rational institutions, exempted from the wilfulness of a despot.<sup>10</sup>

But finally, with regard to the original *Americans*, we have to remark that they are a vanishing, feeble breed. It is true that in some parts of America at the time of its discovery, a considerable culture was to be found; this, however, was not comparable with European culture and has disappeared with the original inhabitants. In addition, the dullest savages dwell there, e.g. the Pecherais and Eskimos. The Caribs of earlier times are almost completely extinct. When made familiar with brandy and fire-arms, these savages become extinct. In South America, it is the Creoles who have made themselves independent of Spain; the Indians proper would have been incapable of it. In Paraguay, they were just like small children and were even treated as such by the Jesuits. The Americans are, therefore, clearly not in a position to hold their own against the Europeans. The Europeans will begin a new culture there on the soil they have conquered from the natives.

### §394

This differentiation descends into particularities, which may be termed *local minds*, shown in the outward modes of life, occupation, bodily structure and disposition, but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and ethical character of the several peoples.

[Remark] As far back as the history of peoples extends, we see the particular nations each possessing a persistent type of its own.

*Zusatz.* The racial variations depicted in the *Zusatz* to §393 are the essential differences, the differences, determined by the concept, of the universal natural mind. But the natural mind does not stop at this universal differentiation of itself; the naturalness of mind does not have the power to assert itself as the pure copy of the determinations of the concept; it proceeds to a further particularization of these universal differences and so descends into the plurality of local or national minds. The detailed characterization of these minds belongs partly to the natural history of man and partly to the philosophy of world-history. The former science depicts the disposition of national character as affected by natural conditions, the bodily formation, the mode of life, occupation, and also the particular directions taken by the intelligence and the will of nations. Philosophy of history, by contrast, has as its object the world-historical significance of peoples, that



is—if we take world-history in the most comprehensive sense of the word—the highest development to which the original disposition of the national character attains, the most spiritual form to which the natural mind dwelling in the nations ascends. Here in philosophical anthropology we cannot go into the details, the consideration of which is the responsibility of the two sciences just mentioned. We have here to consider national character only in so far as it contains the germ from which the history of nations develops.<sup>1</sup>

First and foremost it can be remarked that national differences are just as fixed as the racial diversity of mankind,—that the Arabs, for example, still everywhere exhibit the same characteristics as are related of them in the remotest times. The unchangeableness of climate, of the whole character of the country in which a nation has its permanent abode, contributes to the unchangeableness of the national character. A desert, proximity to the sea or remoteness from it,—all these circumstances can have an influence on the national character. Particularly important in this context is the connection with the sea. In the interior of Africa proper, surrounded by high mountains in the coastal regions and in this way cut off from this free element of the sea, the mind of the natives remains closed, feels no urge to freedom and endures without resistance universal slavery. Proximity to the sea cannot, however, of itself alone make the mind free. This is proved by the Indians, who have slavishly submitted to the ban obtaining among them from earliest times on sailing the sea that nature has opened to them, and so, separated by despotism from this wide, free element, from this natural embodiment of universality, they reveal no power to free themselves from the freedom-destroying ossification of the class divisions, which obtain in the caste system and which would be intolerable to a nation sailing the sea on its own initiative.<sup>2</sup>

But now as regards the determinate difference of the national minds, in the African race this is insignificant in the highest degree and even in the Asiatic race proper it stands out much less than in Europeans, in whom the mind first emerges from its abstract universality to the unfolded fullness of particularization. For this reason, we propose to speak here only of the varied character of the European nations and, among them, we will not characterize in their mutual relations those peoples that are principally distinguished from each other by their world-historical role, namely, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Germanic peoples; this task we have to leave to the philosophy of history. We can however indicate here the differences that have come into prominence within the Greek nation and among the Christian peoples of Europe more or less permeated by Germanic elements.<sup>3</sup>

As regards the *Greeks*, the particularly outstanding peoples among them in the period of their full world-historical development—the Lacedemonians, the Thebans, and the Athenians—are distinguished from each other as follows. With the Lacedemonians, the upright undifferentiated life in the ethical substance predominates: with them, therefore, property and the family relationship do not

receive their due.<sup>4</sup> With the Thebans, on the other hand, the opposite principle emerges; with them the subjective, sentimentality, so far as the Greeks can yet be credited with this at all, preponderates. The finest lyrical poet of the Greeks, Pindar, belongs to the Thebans. The friendship-league of youths, bound to each other in life and in death, which developed among the Thebans, also affords evidence of the withdrawal into the inwardness of sentiment which prevailed among this people.<sup>5</sup> The Athenian people, however, display the unity of these opposites; in them, mind has emerged from the Theban subjectivity without losing itself in the Spartan objectivity of ethical life; with the Athenians the rights of the state and of the individual found as perfect a unification as was possible at all at the standpoint of the Greeks. But just as Athens, through this mediation of the Spartan and Theban minds forms the unity of northern and southern Greece, so also we see in that state the union of the eastern and western Greeks, in so far as Plato in Athens defined the absolute as the Idea, in which both the natural element made into the absolute in Ionian philosophy, and the wholly abstract thought forming the principle of Italic philosophy, are reduced to moments. With these intimations regarding the character of the principal peoples of Greece we must be content here; to develop further what has been intimated would encroach on the territory of world-history and especially of the history of philosophy too.<sup>6</sup>

An even greater diversity of national character is to be seen in the *Christian* peoples of Europe. The fundamental determination in the nature of these peoples is the predominant inwardness, the subjectivity firm within itself. This is modified mainly according to the southern or northern situation of the countries inhabited by these peoples. In the south, individuality uninhibitedly emerges in its idiosyncrasy. This is especially true of the *Italians*; with them the individual character will not be other than just what it is; universal purposes do not disturb its uninhibitedness.<sup>7</sup> Such a character is more appropriate to the feminine nature than to the masculine. Italian individuality has, therefore, flowered into its finest beauty in feminine individuality; not infrequently Italian women and maidens, who were unhappy in love, have died of grief in a *single* instant; so much had their whole nature entered into the individual relationship, whose breaking-off annihilated them. Connected with this uninhibitedness of individuality is also the strong gesticulation of the Italians; their mind spills over without reserve into its bodiliness. The charm of their behaviour has the same ground. The same predominance of idiosyncrasy, of the individual also shows itself in the political life of the Italians. Even before the Roman domination as well as after its disappearance, we see Italy disintegrated into a collection of small states. In the Middle Ages we see there the many individual communities everywhere so torn by factions that half of the citizens of such states almost always lived in exile. The general interest of the state could not prevail over the predominant party spirit. The individuals who set themselves up as the sole representatives of the commonweal, themselves pursued mainly their own ends, and sometimes in the most tyrannical, cruel manner. Neither in these autocracies nor in the republics torn

by party conflict could political right develop into a firm, rational structure. Only Roman civil law was studied and set up as a makeshift barrier against the tyranny alike of individuals and of the many.

With the *Spaniards* similarly we find the predominance of individuality; but this does not have the Italian uninhibitedness but is already associated more with reflection. The individual content which is here asserted already bears the form of universality. That is why we see honour in particular to be the driving principle with *Spaniards*. Here the individual demands recognition, not in his immediate idiosyncrasy, but on account of the agreement of his actions and conduct with certain fixed principles which, according to the conception of the nation, must be law for every man of honour. But since the *Spaniard* is guided in all his activity by these principles which transcend the whims of the individual and have not yet been undermined by the sophistry of the intellect, he attains to greater steadfastness than the Italian, who obeys more the inspirations of the moment and lives more in sentiment than in firm representations. This difference between the two peoples is specially prominent in connection with religion. The Italian does not let religious scruples especially interfere with his cheerful enjoyment of life. The *Spaniard*, on the other hand, has hitherto adhered with fanatical zeal to the letter of Catholic doctrine and for centuries, through the Inquisition, has persecuted with African inhumanity those suspected of deviating from this letter.<sup>8</sup> In a political connection too the two peoples differ in a manner that accords with the character attributed to them. Italian national unity, which Petrarch already ardently wished for, is today still a dream; this land is still split up into a collection of states which trouble themselves very little about each other. In Spain, on the contrary, where as we have said, the universal attains to some degree of mastery over the individual, the individual states which formerly subsisted in that country have already been welded into a single state, though the provinces indeed still seek to assert too great a measure of independence.

Now whereas with the Italians mobility of sentiment predominates, and in *Spaniards* firmness of representative thinking, the *French* display both firmness of intellect and mobility of wit. The French have always been reproached with frivolity, also with vanity, the desire to please. But through striving to please, they have brought social culture to an extreme of refinement and by virtue of just this have raised themselves in a remarkable way above the crude selfishness of the natural man; for this culture consists precisely in not forgetting the others, with whom one is dealing, in favour of oneself, but in taking them into account and showing oneself well disposed towards them. Both to the individual and to the public, the French—be they statesmen, artists, or scholars—accord the most respectful attention in all their actions and works. Yet occasionally this deference to the opinion of others has of course degenerated into the effort to please at all costs, even at the expense of truth. This striving has also given rise to ideal chatterboxes. But what the French regard as the surest means of giving universal pleasure is what they call *esprit*. This *esprit* is restricted in superficial

natures to associating ideas only remotely connected, but in intelligent men, such as Montesquieu and Voltaire for example, *esprit* becomes, by bringing together what the intellect has separated, a brilliant form of the rational; for the essential feature of the rational is just to bring together what is separated. But this form of the rational is still not that of conceptual cognition; the profound, clever thoughts which are to be found in abundance in men like those we have mentioned, are not developed from *one* universal thought, from the concept of the subject-matter, but are thrown out like flashes of lightning.<sup>9</sup> The acuteness of the French intellect is revealed in the clarity and determinacy of expression, in speech and writings alike. Their rigorously rule-governed language corresponds to the orderliness and conciseness of their thoughts. The French have thereby become models of political and juristic exposition. But in their political dealings, too, one cannot fail to detect the acuteness of their intellect. In the midst of the storm of revolutionary passion, their intellect showed itself in the decisiveness with which they succeeded in producing the new ethical world-order in face of the powerful alliance of the numerous adherents of the old order, actualizing one after another all moments of the new political life to be developed, in their most extreme determinacy and opposition. Just because they pushed these moments to the limit of one-sidedness, pursued each one-sided political principle to its ultimate consequences, they have been brought by the dialectic of world-historical reason to a political condition in which all the previous one-sidednesses in the life of the state appear sublated.<sup>10</sup>

The *English* could be called the people of intellectual intuition. They recognize the rational less in the form of universality than in that of individuality. Thus their poets rank far higher than their philosophers. Originality of personality is a very prominent feature with the English. But their originality is not naïve and natural, but stems from thought, from the will. In this the individual wills to be self-dependent in every respect, to relate to the universal only by way of his idiosyncrasy. For this reason, political freedom with the English mainly takes the form of privileges, of rights which are traditional, not derived from universal thoughts. The sending of deputies to Parliament by the individual English municipalities and counties is everywhere based on particular privileges, not on universal principles consistently carried out. Certainly the Englishman is proud of the honour and freedom of his whole nation, but his national pride is founded mainly on the consciousness that in England the individual can retain and exercise his particularity. Associated with this tenacity of individuality, which, though pursuing the universal, in its relation with the universal holds fast to itself, is the conspicuous aptitude of the English for trade.<sup>11</sup>

The *Germans* usually think of the Germans last, either from modesty or because one saves the best till the end. We have the reputation of being profound, though not infrequently obscure, thinkers; we aim at comprehending the innermost nature of things and their necessary connection; therefore, we go

extremely systematically to work in science, only in doing so we occasionally lapse into the formalism of an external, arbitrary construction. Our mind, more than that of any other European nation, is in general turned inwards. We prefer to live in the inwardness of emotion and of thinking. In this still life, in this hermit-like solitude of spirit, we first busy ourselves before we act with carefully determining the principles on which we propose to act. That is why we are somewhat slow in proceeding to action, occasionally, in cases which demand a quick decision, remain undecided and with the sincere wish to do the thing really well, often fail to achieve anything at all. The French proverb, *le meilleur tue le bien*, can therefore rightly be applied to the Germans. Everything that is supposed to be done must, with the Germans, be justified by grounds. But since grounds can be found for everything, this justification often becomes mere formalism, in which the universal thought of right does not reach its immanent development but remains an abstraction into which the particular arbitrarily intrudes from outside.<sup>12</sup> This formalism has also shown itself in the Germans in the circumstance that they have sometimes been content for centuries to preserve certain political rights merely by protestations.<sup>13</sup> But while in this way the subjects accomplished very little for themselves, on the other hand they often did extremely little for the government. Living in the inwardness of emotion, the Germans have indeed always liked to speak of their loyalty and integrity; often, however, this substantial disposition of theirs could not be put to the test; on the contrary, they have, without misgivings and regardless of their excellent opinion of their loyalty and integrity, used the general statutory codes against prince and emperor, merely to conceal their disinclination to do something for the state. But although their political spirit, their patriotism, was mostly not very lively, yet from early times they have been animated by an inordinate desire for the honour of an official post and have been of the opinion that office and title make the man, that the importance of persons and the respect due to them could in almost every case be measured with perfect certainty by the difference of title. This has made the Germans so ridiculous that the only parallel to be found in Europe is the Spaniard's mania for a long string of names.

### §395

(3) The soul is differentiated into the *individual subject*. But this subjectivity comes into consideration here only as an individualization of *natural determinacy*. This determinacy becomes the *mode* of the varying temperament, talent, character, physiognomy, and other dispositions and idiosyncrasies, in families or in single individuals.

*Zusatz.* As we have seen, the natural mind first divides up into the *universal* differences of the races of mankind, and reaches, in the minds of peoples, a difference that has the form of *particularization*. The third stage is that the natural mind

proceeds to its *individualization*, and as individual soul opposes itself to itself. But the opposition arising here is not yet the opposition which belongs to the essence of consciousness. Here in anthropology the singularity or individuality of the soul comes into account only as a natural determinacy.<sup>1</sup>

Now first of all we must remark that it is in the individual soul that the sphere of the contingent begins, for only the universal is the necessary. Individual souls are distinguished from each other by an infinite number of contingent modifications. But this infinity belongs to the bad kind of infinite. One should not therefore rate the peculiarity of people too highly. On the contrary, the assertion that the teacher should carefully adjust himself to the individuality of each of his pupils, studying and developing it, must be proclaimed to be a piece of idle prattle that leads up the garden path. The teacher has simply no time for this. The peculiarity of children is tolerated within the family circle; but at school begins a life subject to universal regulations, to a rule common to all; at school the mind must be induced to lay aside its idiosyncrasies, to know and to will the universal, to accept the current universal culture. This reshaping of the soul, this alone is what education means. The more cultivated a man is, the less his behaviour exhibits anything peculiar only to him, anything therefore contingent.<sup>2</sup>

Now the peculiarity of the individual has various aspects. These are distinguished as the determinations of *predisposition*, *temperament*, and *character*.

By predisposition is understood the natural aptitudes of a man in contrast to what he has become by his own activity.<sup>3</sup> These aptitudes include *talent* and *genius*. Both words express a definite direction which the individual mind has been given by nature. Genius, however, is wider in scope than talent; talent produces novelty only in the province of the particular, whereas genius creates a new genre. But since talent and genius are initially mere aptitudes, they must be developed—if they are not to go to waste, to decay, to degenerate into bad originality—by universally valid procedures. Only by such development do these aptitudes demonstrate their presence, their power and their range. Before such development one can be deceived about the reality of a talent; an early occupation with painting, for example, may seem to betray talent for this art and yet this hobby may come to nothing. Mere talent is, therefore, not to be valued more highly than reason which by its own activity has come to knowledge of its concept,—than absolutely free thinking and willing. In philosophy, mere genius does not get one very far; here it must submit to the strict discipline of logical thinking; it is only by this submission that genius there achieves its complete freedom.<sup>4</sup> As regards the will, however, one cannot say that there is a genius for virtue; for virtue is something universal, to be required of all men and nothing innate but something to be produced in the individual by his own activity. Differences in predisposition have, therefore, no importance whatever for the theory of virtue; they would come into consideration, if we may so express ourselves, only in a natural history of mind.<sup>5</sup>

The various kinds of talent and genius are distinguished from each other by the different realms of mind in which they operate. Difference of *temperaments*, by contrast, has no such relation outwards. It is difficult to say what is meant by temperament. Temperament does not relate to the ethical nature of action, nor to the talent revealed in the action, nor finally to passion, which always has a determinate content. It is therefore best to define temperament as the entirely universal mode and manner in which the individual is active, objectifies himself, maintains himself in actuality.<sup>6</sup> From this definition it emerges that for the free mind, temperament is not so important as was formerly supposed. In a time of greater cultivation, the various contingent mannerisms of conduct and action disappear, and with them the varieties of temperament, in just the same way that, in such a time, the restricted characters in comedies of a less cultivated epoch—the completely frivolous, the ridiculously absent-minded, the stingy misers—become much rarer. The attempts to distinguish between temperaments involve such indeterminacy that one hardly knows how to apply them to individuals, since the temperaments portrayed separately are, in individuals, found more or less combined with each other. Just as virtue was distinguished into four cardinal virtues, so too, as we know, four temperaments were assumed: the *choleric*, the *sanguine*, the *phlegmatic*, and the *melancholic*. Kant has a great deal to say about them. The main difference between these temperaments is based on whether someone devotes himself to the matter in hand or whether he is more concerned with his own individuality. The former case occurs with the sanguine and phlegmatic, the latter with the choleric and melancholic. The sanguine individual forgets himself in what he is doing, and more specifically in such way that by virtue of his superficial versatility, he gets involved in a variety of concerns; the phlegmatic individual, on the contrary, steadfastly applies himself to *one* concern. But in the choleric and the melancholic, as we have already indicated, close attachment to subjectivity is predominant; however, these two temperaments are in turn distinguished from each other by the fact that in the choleric, versatility predominates, and in the melancholic, inertia; so that in this connection the choleric temperament corresponds to the sanguine and the melancholic to the phlegmatic.<sup>7</sup>

We have already remarked that difference of temperament loses its importance in a period when the mode and manner of conduct and of the activity of individuals is established by the universal culture. *Character*, on the other hand, remains something which always differentiates people. Only by character does the individual attain his stable determinacy. Character requires, firstly, a formal element, the energy with which a man, without letting himself be diverted, pursues his aims and interests and in all his actions preserves his harmony with himself. Without character a man does not emerge from his indeterminacy or he slides from one direction to the opposite. Every human being should therefore be required to show character. A man with character impresses others because they

know the kind of man they are dealing with. But besides formal energy character requires, secondly, a substantial, universal content of the will. Only by carrying out great aims does a man reveal a great character, making him a beacon for others; and his aims must be inwardly justified if his character is to exhibit the absolute unity of the content and the formal activity of the will and thus to have complete truth. If, on the contrary, the will clings to mere details, to the insubstantial, then it becomes *obstinacy*. Obstinacy has only the form, not the content, of character. Through obstinacy, this parody of character, the individuality of a man is accentuated to a point where it spoils companionship with others.<sup>8</sup>

Of a still more individual kind are the so-called *idiosyncrasies*, which occur both in the physical and in the mental nature of man. Some people, for example, scent the presence of cats near them. Others are quite peculiarly affected by certain diseases. King James I of England fainted if he saw a rapier. Mental idiosyncrasies are displayed especially in youth, e.g. in the incredible rapidity of mental arithmetic in particular children. Incidentally, it is not merely individuals who are distinguished from each other by the forms of mind's natural determinacy discussed above, but to some extent families too, especially when they have intermarried among themselves and not with outsiders, as has been the case, for example, in Bern and in quite a few of the free German cities.<sup>9</sup>

Now that we have depicted the three forms of the qualitative natural determinacy of the individual soul—predisposition, temperament, and character—we have still to indicate the rational necessity for the fact that this natural determinacy has just these three forms and no others, and for the fact that these forms are to be considered in the order we have followed. We began with predisposition, more specifically with talent and genius, because in the predisposition the qualitative natural determinacy of the individual soul has predominantly the form of something that merely is, something immediately fixed and of such a sort that its differentiation within itself is related to a difference present outside it. In temperament, on the other hand, this natural determinacy loses the shape of something so fixed; for whereas either one talent prevails exclusively in the individual, or several talents subsist alongside each other in him quiescently and without passing into each other, one and the same individual can pass over from any temperamental mood into another, so that no temperamental mood has a fixed being in him. At the same time in temperaments the difference of the natural determinacy in question is reflected out of the relation to something present outside the individual soul into the interior of the soul. But in character we see the fixity of the predisposition united with the changeableness of the temperamental moods, the predominant relation to the outside in the predisposition, united with the reflectedness-into-self of the soul prevailing in the temperamental moods. The fixity of character is not so immediate, not so innate, as the fixity of predisposition, but has to be developed by the will. Character consists in something more than an even blending of the various temperaments. All the same, it



cannot be denied that it has a *natural* foundation, that some people are more naturally prone to a strong character than others. For this reason, we had the right to speak of character here in Anthropology, although it is only in the sphere of free mind that it obtains its full unfolding.<sup>10</sup>

### (β) *Natural Alterations*

#### §396

In the soul determined as an *individual*, the differences take the form of *alterations* in it, in the *single* subject persisting in the alterations, and of *moments* in its development. As they are at once physical and mental differences, a concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the cultivated mind.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] (1) The first type of alteration is the natural *course of the ages of life*. It begins with the *child*, the mind wrapped up in itself. The next step is the developed opposition, the tension between a universality which is still subjective (ideals, imaginings, moral demands, hopes, etc.) and immediate individuality, i.e. both the existing world, which fails to meet the ideals, and the position in it of the individual himself, who, in his current state, still lacks independence and intrinsic maturity (the *youth*). Next there is the genuine relationship: *recognition* of the *objective* necessity and rationality of the world as we find it, a world no longer incomplete, but able, in the work which it accomplishes in and for itself, to afford the individual a share and a confirmation for his activity. This makes the individual *somebody*, with actual presence and objective value (the *man*). Last of all comes the completion of the unity with this objectivity: a unity which, while in its reality it passes into the inertia of deadening habit, in its ideality gains freedom from the limited interests and entanglements of the external present (*old age*).<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* When the soul, which at first is completely universal, particularizes itself in the way we have indicated and finally determines itself to singularity, to individuality, it enters into opposition to its inner universality, to its substance. This contradiction between the immediate individuality and the substantial universality implicitly present in it, establishes the life-process of the individual soul, a process by which the immediate individuality of the soul is brought into conformity with the universal, the universal is actualized in the soul and thus the initial, simple unity of the soul with itself is raised to a unity mediated by the opposition, and the initially abstract universality of the soul is developed to concrete universality.<sup>3</sup> This process of development is education. Even merely animal life in its way exhibits this process implicitly. But, as we saw earlier, it does not have the power genuinely to actualize the genus within itself; its immediate, abstract individuality, an individuality that simply *is*, always remains in contradiction

with its genus, both excluding it from itself and including it within itself. By this inability to exhibit the genus perfectly, the mere living creature perishes. In the animal, the genus proves to be a power in face of which the animal must pass away. Therefore, in the death of the individual, the genus attains an actualization which is just as abstract as the individuality of merely animal life and excludes that individuality just as much as the genus remains excluded from the living individuality.<sup>4</sup>—The genus genuinely actualizes itself, on the other hand, in mind, in thinking, in this element which is homogeneous with the genus. But in the anthropological sphere this actualization, since it takes place in the natural individual mind, still has the mode of naturalness. Consequently it falls into time. Thus arises a series of distinct states through which the individual as such passes, a sequence of differences which no longer have the fixity of the immediate differences of the universal natural mind which prevail in the various races of mankind and in the national minds, but appear in one and the same individual as transient forms, passing into each other.<sup>5</sup>

This sequence of distinct states is the series of the *ages of life*.

It begins with the immediate, still undifferentiated unity of the genus and the individuality, with the abstract emergence of the immediate individuality, with the birth of the individual, and ends with the impression of the genus into the individuality, or of the individuality into the genus, with the victory of the genus over the individuality, with the abstract negation of the individuality,—with death.<sup>6</sup>

What the *genus* is in life as such, *rationality* is in the realm of mind; for the genus already has inner universality, the determination pertaining to the rational. This unity of the genus and the rational explains why the mental phenomena appearing in the course of the ages of life correspond to the physical alterations that also develop in the course of the individual's life. The agreement of the mental and the physical is here more determinate than in the case of racial differences, where we have to do only with the universal fixed differences of the natural mind and with the equally fixed physical differences of men, whereas here the determinate alterations of the individual soul and of its bodiliness are under consideration. But, on the other hand, we must not go so far as to look for the marked counterpart of the individual's mental unfolding in his physiological development; for in the former, the opposition emerging in it and the unity to be engendered from that opposition, have a far higher significance than in the physiological sphere. Mind here reveals its independence of its bodiliness in the fact that it can develop earlier than the body. Children have often shown a mental development far in advance of their physical maturity. This has mainly occurred with outstanding artistic talents, especially musical geniuses. Such precocity is not infrequently shown too in connection with an easy assimilation of various kinds of information, especially in the field of mathematics, and also in connection with intellectual argumentation, even on ethical and religious themes. In general, however, it must be admitted that the intellect does not come before its

time. It is almost solely in the case of artistic talents that their premature appearance has indicated excellence. On the other hand, the premature development of intelligence generally observed in several children has not, as a rule, been the inception of a mind attaining great distinction in manhood.<sup>7</sup>

Now the process of development of the natural human individual splits up into a series of processes whose difference rests on the different relationship of the individual to the genus and establishes the difference between the *child*, the *man*, and the *elderly*. These differences are presentations of the differences of the concept. *Childhood* is, therefore, the time of natural harmony, of the peace of the individual with himself and with the world,—the oppositionless beginning, just as old age is the oppositionless end. The oppositions which may emerge in childhood remain without deeper interest. The child lives in innocence, without lasting pain, in the love it has for its parents and in the feeling of being loved by them. This immediate and therefore unspiritual, purely natural unity of the individual with its genus and with the world generally, must be sublated; the individual must advance to the point where he opposes himself to the universal as the finished and subsisting substance that is in and for itself, to the point where he apprehends himself in his independence. But this independence, this opposition, at first appears in just as one-sided a shape as does the unity of the subjective and the objective in the child. The *youth* dissects the Idea actualized in the world, in the following manner: to himself he ascribes the true and the good, the determination of the substantial which belongs to the nature of the Idea; to the world, by contrast, he ascribes the determination of the contingent, accidental. We cannot come to a standstill at this untrue opposition; the youth must rise above it to the insight that, on the contrary, the world is to be viewed as the substantial, and the individual by contrast only as an accident,—that therefore man can find his essential activity and satisfaction only in the world that pursues its steady course independently in face of him, and that for this reason he must acquire the skill necessary for the substance.—Reaching this standpoint, the youth has become a *man*. Complete within himself, the man views the ethical world-order too as an order that does not first need to be produced by him, but as essentially complete. Thus he is active for, not against, the substance, he has an interest for the substance, not against it, he has thus risen above the one-sided subjectivity of youth to the standpoint of objective mindfulness.—*Old age*, by contrast, is the return to a lack of interest in things; the old man has lived his way into things and just because of this unity with things, in which the opposition is lost, he abandons active interest in things.<sup>8</sup>—We now propose to determine in more detail the differences of the ages of man that we have thus indicated in general.

*Childhood* we can differentiate again into *three* stages, or if we wish to include in the sphere of our treatment the unborn child which is identical with its mother, into *four* stages.

The unborn child has as yet no proper individuality, no individuality to enter into relationship with particular objects in a particular manner or to draw in an

external thing at a determinate point of its organism. The life of the unborn child resembles the life of a plant. Just as a plant has no interrupted intussusception but a continuous stream of nutriment, so too the child feeds at first by a continual sucking and as yet possesses no interrupted respiration.

When the child is brought into the world out of this vegetative state in which it resides in the womb, it passes into the animal mode of life. Birth is, therefore, a tremendous leap. By it the child emerges from the state of a completely oppositionless life into the state of separation,—into the relationship to light and air and into a continually developing relationship to individualized objects in general and especially to individualized nourishment. The first way in which the child establishes its independence is *breathing*, the inhalation and exhalation of air at an individual point of its body, a process that interrupts the elemental flow. Immediately after the birth of the child, its body already shows itself as almost fully organized; only single details alter in it. Thus, for example, the so-called *foramen ovale* closes up only later. The main alteration in the child's body consists in *growth*. In connection with this alteration it is hardly necessary to recall that in animal life generally, in contrast to vegetable life, growth is not a coming-out-of-itself, not an extrusion beyond itself, not a production of new structures, but is only a development of the organism and produces merely quantitative, formal difference, which relates both to the degree of strength and to the extension. Nor do we need here (what has already been done in the appropriate place in the philosophy of nature) to explain at length that the completeness of bodily structure which is lacking in the plant and first comes about in the animal organism, this leading back of all the members to the negative, simple unity of life, is the basis of the self-feeling that arises in the animal, and therefore also in the child.<sup>9</sup> We must emphasize here however that in man the animal organism reaches its most perfect form. Even the most complete animal is unable to exhibit this delicately organized, infinitely pliable body which we already discern in the newly born child. At first, however, the child appears in a far greater dependency and need than animals. Yet in this, too, its higher nature already reveals itself. At once need announces itself in unruly, stormy, and preemptory fashion. Whereas the animal is silent or expresses its pain only by groaning, the child expresses the feeling of its needs by *screaming*. By this ideal activity the child shows that it is straightaway imbued with the certainty that it has a right to demand from the external world the satisfaction of its needs,—that the independence of the external world in face of man is void.<sup>10</sup>

Now as regards the mental development of the child in this first stage of its life, it can be said that man never learns more than in this period. Here the child makes itself gradually familiar with all specifications of the sensory. The external world now becomes an actuality for it. It progresses from sensation to intuition. Initially the child has only a sensation of light by which things are manifest to it. This mere sensation misleads the child into reaching out for something distant as if it were near. But through the sense of feeling the child orientates itself in regard

to distances. Thus it gains an eye for distance, in general it casts the external out of itself. In this period, too, the child learns that external things offer resistance.<sup>11</sup>

The transition from childhood to *boyhood* is to be located in the development of the child's activity towards the external world; the child, in gaining a feeling of the actuality of the external world, begins to become an actual human being itself and to feel itself as such; but in doing so it passes on to the practical tendency to put itself to the test in this actuality. The child is equipped for this practical response by growing *teeth*, by learning to *stand*, to *walk*, and to *speak*. The first thing to be learnt here is to stand upright. This is peculiar to man and can only be effected by his will; a man stands only in so far as he wills to stand; as soon as we no longer will to stand, we collapse; standing is, therefore, the habit of the will to stand. Man acquires an even freer relationship to the external world by walking; by this he sublates the asunderness of space and gives himself his own place. But speech enables man to apprehend things as universal, to attain to the consciousness of his own universality, to the enunciation of the I. This apprehension of its I-hood is a supremely important point in the mental development of the child; at this point it begins to reflect itself into itself out of its immersion in the external world. Initially this incipient independence expresses itself in the child's learning to *play* with sensory things. But the most rational thing that children can do with their toys is to break them.<sup>12</sup>

In passing from play to the serious business of *learning*, the child becomes a boy. At this stage children start to become inquisitive, especially for stories; what they have to deal with is ideas that do not present themselves to them in an immediate way. But here the main thing is the awakening feeling in them that they *are* not yet what they *ought* to be, —and the lively wish to become as the adults are, in whose environment they are living. This wish gives rise to the imitateness of children. Whereas the feeling of immediate unity with the parents is the spiritual mother's milk on which children thrive, the children's own need to grow up is what makes them grow up. This striving after education on the part of children themselves is the immanent moment of all education. But since the boy is still at the standpoint of immediacy, the higher level to which he is to ascend appears to him, not in the form of universality or of the substance, but in the shape of a given, of an individual, an authority. It is this or that man who forms the ideal which the boy strives to know and to imitate; at this standpoint the child intuits its own essence only in this concrete manner. What the boy has to learn must therefore be given to him on and with authority; he has the feeling that what is thus given to him is higher than himself. This feeling must be carefully fostered in education. Thus we must brand as a complete perversion the playful pedagogy, which wants to see serious matters delivered to children as play and demands that the educator should lower himself to the childish mentality of the pupils instead of raising them to the seriousness of the substance. This playful education can have the consequence that for his whole life the boy treats everything with a disdainful attitude. Such a regrettable result can also be introduced by constantly

inciting children to argumentation, as intellectually deficient pedagogues recommend; by this children easily acquire a bit of impudence. The children's own thinking must, of course, be aroused; but the dignity of the substance should not be put at the mercy of their immature, vain intellect.<sup>13</sup>

With regard to one of the two aspects of education, *discipline*, the boy should not be allowed to follow his own inclination; he must obey in order to learn to command. Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom; for through obedience the will that does not yet know the true, the objective, that does not make this its goal and therefore far from being genuinely independent and free is still immature, accepts within itself the rational will coming to it from outside and gradually makes this its own will. On the other hand, if one allows children to do as they please, if one commits the additional folly of handing over to them reasons for their whims, then one falls into the worst mode of education, children develop a deplorable absorption in particular likes and dislikes, in peculiar cleverness, in self-centred interest,—the root of all evil. By nature, the child is neither evil nor good, since it starts without any knowledge either of good or of evil. To regard this unknowing innocence as an ideal and to yearn to return to it would be silly; it is without value and of short duration. Self-will and evil soon emerge in the child. This self-will must be broken by discipline, this seed of evil must be annihilated by it.<sup>14</sup>

With regard to the other side of education, *instruction*, it is to be noted that this rationally begins with the most abstract thing that the child's mind can grasp. This is the alphabet. This presupposes an abstraction to which entire races, for example, even the Chinese, have not attained. Language in general is this airy element, this sensory-unsensory, by increasing knowledge of which the child's mind rises more and more above the sensory, the individual, to the universal, to thinking. This growing capacity for thinking is the greatest benefit of primary education. But the child only gets as far as *representational* thinking; the world is only for his representation; he learns the qualities of things, becomes acquainted with the circumstances of the worlds of nature and mind, develops an interest in things, but does not yet cognize the world in its inner connectedness. This knowledge comes only with manhood. But it cannot be denied that the boy has an imperfect understanding of the natural and the mental. One must therefore describe as an error the claim that a boy as yet understands nothing whatever of religion and right, that therefore he must not be bothered with these matters, that on no account must ideas be forced on him, but on the contrary he must be provided with experiences of his own and one must be content to let him be stimulated by what is sensorily present. Even the ancients did not allow children to dwell for long on the sensory. But the modern mind involves a wholly different elevation above the sensory, a much deeper absorption in its own inwardness, than the ancient mind. Therefore, the supersensory world should now be presented to the boy's imagination at an early age. This happens in a much higher degree through the *school* than in the family. In the family the child is accepted

in its immediate individuality, is loved whether its behaviour is good or bad. In school, on the other hand, the immediacy of the child no longer counts; here it is esteemed only according to its worth, according to its achievements; here it is no longer merely loved but criticized and guided in accordance with universal determinations, moulded by the objects of instruction according to fixed rules, in general, subjected to a universal order which forbids much that is innocent in itself, because it cannot be permitted that everyone does it. The school thus forms the transition from the family into civil society. But to civil society the boy has at first only an indeterminate relationship; his interest is still divided between learning and playing.<sup>15</sup>

The boy matures into a *youth*, when with the onset of puberty the life of the *genus* begins to stir in him and to seek satisfaction. The youth turns, in general, to the substantial universal; his ideal no longer appears to him, as it does to the boy, in the person of a man, but is conceived by him as a universal, independent of such individuality. But in the youth this ideal still has a more or less subjective shape, whether it lives in him as an ideal of love and friendship or as an ideal of a universal state of the world. In this subjectivity of the substantial content of such an ideal lies not only its opposition to the current world, but also the urge to sublimate this opposition by actualizing the ideal. The content of the ideal instills into the youth the feeling of energy; he therefore fancies himself called and qualified to transform the world, or at least to readjust the world that seems to him to be out of joint. That the substantial universal contained in his ideal has, in keeping with its essence, already attained to development and actualization in the world, is not discerned by the zealous mind of the youth. To him the actualization of that universal seems a lapse from it. Therefore he feels that both his ideal and his own personality are not recognized by the world. Thus the peace in which the child lives with the world is broken by the youth. Because of this direction towards the ideal, youth has the semblance of a nobler sense and greater selflessness than is seen in the man, who attends to his particular, temporal interests. As against this, it must be pointed out that the man is no longer wrapped up in his particular impulses and subjective views and occupied only with his personal development; on the contrary, he has plunged into the reason of actuality and proves himself active for the world. The youth necessarily arrives at this goal. His immediate aim is to cultivate himself in order to equip himself for the actualization of his ideals. In attempting this actualization he becomes a *man*.<sup>16</sup>

At first, the transition from his ideal life into civil society can appear to the youth as a painful transition into the life of the philistine. The youth, who hitherto has been occupied only with universal objects and has worked only for himself, now that he is growing into manhood and entering into practical life, must be active for others and attend to individual details. Now, however much this lies in the nature of things—since if one is to act, one must get down to the *individual* case—, the occupation with details can at first be very distressing to a human being, and the impossibility of an immediate actualization of his

ideals can make him hypochondriac. This hypochondria, however inconspicuous it may be in many cases, is not easy for anyone to escape. The later the age at which it attacks a man, the more serious are its symptoms. In weak natures it can persist throughout the entire lifetime. In this diseased mood the man will not give up his subjectivity, is unable to overcome his aversion to actuality, and by this very fact resides in a state of relative incapacity which easily becomes an actual incapacity. If, therefore, the man does not want to perish, then he must recognize the world as an independent, essentially *complete* world, accept the conditions set for him by it and wrest from its obduracy what he wills to have for himself. As a rule, the man believes that he must agree to this compliance only from *necessity*. But, in truth, this unity with the world must be recognized not as a relationship of necessity, but as the rational relationship. The rational, the divine, possesses the absolute power to actualize itself and has, right from the beginning, fulfilled itself; it is not so impotent that it would have to wait for the beginning of its actualization. The world is this actualization of divine reason; it is only on its surface that the play of contingencies prevails. The world can lay claim, therefore, with at least as much right as the individual becoming a man, indeed with even greater right, to be regarded as complete and independent; and therefore the *man* acts entirely rationally in abandoning his plan for a complete transformation of the world and in striving to actualize his personal aims, passions, and interests only in his connection to the world. Even so, this leaves him scope for an honourable, far-reaching and creative activity. For although the world must be recognized as essentially complete, yet it is not a dead, absolutely inert world but, like the life-process, a world that perpetually produces itself anew, a world that, in simply preserving itself, at the same time progresses. It is in this preserving production and continuance of the world that the man's work consists. Therefore, on the one hand we can say that the man only produces what is already there. Yet on the other hand, his activity must also bring about an advance. But the world's progress occurs only on the large scale and is only noticeable in a great sum total of what has been produced. If the man after a labour of fifty years looks back on his past, he will already recognize the progress. This knowledge, as well as insight into the rationality of the world, liberates him from sorrow over the destruction of his ideals. What is *true* in these ideals is preserved in the practical activity; what the man must work out of his system is only what is untrue, the empty abstractions. The scope and type of his business can vary considerably; but the substantial element in all human occupations is the same, namely, the lawful, the ethical, and the religious. Therefore, people can find satisfaction and honour in all spheres of their practical activity if they accomplish all that is rightly required of them in the particular sphere to which they belong by chance, external necessity, or free choice. For this it is necessary above all things that the education of the youth coming to manhood be completed, that he has finished his studies, and secondly, that he resolve to provide for his own subsistence by beginning to become active



on behalf of others. Education alone does not make him a completely mature man; he becomes this only through his own intelligent concern for his temporal interests; just as peoples only come of age when they have reached the point where they are not excluded by a so-called paternal government from looking after their material and spiritual interests.<sup>17</sup>

When the man now passes into practical life, he may well be vexed and morose about the state of the world and lose hope of any improvement; but in spite of this he finds his place in objective conditions and becomes habituated to them and to his occupation. The objects with which he has to occupy himself are, it is true, individual, changeable, in their peculiarity more or less new. But at the same time, these individual details contain a universal, a rule, something lawful. The longer the man is now active in his occupation, the more this universal emerges out of all the particularities. In this way he gets to be completely at home in his field, to immerse himself thoroughly in his destiny. The essential element in all the objects of his occupation is then entirely familiar to him and only the individual, the inessential can occasionally present him with something new. By the very fact, however, that his activity has become so completely *appropriate* to his business, that his activity no longer meets with any resistance in its objects, precisely by this completed cultivation of his activity, the vitality of the activity *expires*, for the interest of the subject in the object disappears together with the opposition between the subject and the object. Thus by the habit of mental life, as well as by the dulling of the activity of his physical organism, the man becomes an *old man*.<sup>18</sup>

The *old man* lives without any definite interest, for he has abandoned the hope of actualizing the ideals he cherished earlier and the future seems to promise him nothing new at all; on the contrary, he believes that he already knows the universal, the essential in anything he may still encounter. The mind of the old man is thus turned only towards this universal and to the past to which he owes the knowledge of this universal. But in thus living in recollection of the past and of the substantial, he loses his memory for details of the present and for what is arbitrary, names for example, in the same measure that, conversely, he firmly retains in his mind the wise teachings of experience and feels obliged to preach to those younger than himself. But this wisdom, this lifeless, complete coincidence of subjective activity with its world, leads back to oppositionless childhood, in the same way that the growth of the activity of his physical organism into a static habit leads on to the abstract negation of the living individuality, to *death*.<sup>19</sup>

The course of the ages of man's life thus rounds itself off into a concept-determined totality of alterations which are produced by the interaction of the genus with the individuality.

As in the description of the racial varieties of mankind and in the characterization of the national mind, here too, in order to speak in a determinate way about the course of the ages of life of the human individual, we have had to anticipate a knowledge of what is not yet to be considered in anthropology, a knowledge of

concrete mind (since this enters into that process of development), and to make use of this knowledge for distinguishing the different stages of that process.

### §397

(2) The moment of real opposition of the individual to itself, so that it seeks and finds *itself* in *another* individual. This is the *sexual relationship*, a natural distinction between, on the one hand, subjectivity remaining harmonious with itself in the sentiment of ethical life, love, etc. and not advancing to the other extreme, of universal purposes, political, scientific, or artistic; and *on the other hand*, the activity tensing itself for the opposition of universal, objective interests to the existing condition both of itself and of the external world, and actualizing universal principles in the existing conditions to form a unity that is now produced for the first time. The sexual relationship acquires its spiritual and ethical significance and determination in the *family*.<sup>1</sup>

### §398

(3) When individuality distinguishes, by immediate *judgement*, its *being for itself* from its mere *being*, this is the *awakening* of the soul, which initially confronts its self-absorbed natural life as one natural determinacy and *state* confronts another state, *sleep*.<sup>1</sup>—It is not merely *for us* or externally that waking is distinguished from sleep; waking is itself the *judgement* of the individual soul, whose being-for-self is for the soul itself the relation of this determination of it, its being-for-self, to its mere being, its distinguishing of itself from its still undifferentiated universality. The waking state includes generally all self-conscious and rational *activity* of the mind's distinguishing, a distinguishing that is for itself.<sup>2</sup>—Sleep is an invigoration of this activity, not as a merely negative rest from it, but as a return from the world of *determinacies*, from dispersion and solidification in individual details, into the universal essence of subjectivity, which is the substance of those determinacies and the absolute power over them.<sup>3</sup>

[Remark] The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those teasers, as they may be called, which are often addressed to philosophy. Even *Napoleon*, on a visit to the University of Pavia, put this question to the class on ideology.<sup>4</sup> The determinacy given in the Paragraph is abstract; it primarily treats waking as a natural state, in which the mind is of course involved implicitly, but is not yet posited in its embodied *reality*. If we were to speak more concretely of this distinction (which in its fundamental determination remains the same), the being-for-self of the individual soul would already have to be determined as the I of consciousness and taken as intelligent mind. The difficulty raised by the distinction of the two states only really arises, in so far as we also take into account dreaming in sleep and then determine the representations of sober waking consciousness only as *representations*, which is what dreams are too. In this superficial

determination of *representations* the two states of course agree, because we have thereby overlooked the difference between them; and in the case of any proposed differentiation of waking consciousness, we can always return to the trivial observation that after all this too involves only representations. —But the *being-for-self* of the waking soul, *concretely* conceived, is *consciousness* and *intellect*, and the world of intellectual consciousness is something quite different from a pictorial composition of mere representations and images. The latter, as such, are in the main only externally connected, in an unintelligent way, by the so-called laws of the so-called *association of Ideas*; though here and there of course categories may also be at work. But in waking we essentially comport ourselves as a concrete *I*, as intellect; and in virtue of the intellect intuition stands before us as a concrete totality of determinations in which each member, each point, occupies its place, a place determined by, and also with, all the others. So the content gets its confirmation, not by just subjectively representing the content and distinguishing it from the person as something external to him, but from the concrete interconnection in which each part of this complex stands with all the other parts. Waking is the concrete consciousness of this reciprocal corroboration of each individual moment of its content by all the others in the pictorial composition of intuition. This consciousness here need not be clearly developed, but this comprehensive determinacy is involved and present in concrete self-feeling.<sup>5</sup> —In order to recognize the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between *objectivity* of representation (its determination by categories) and *subjectivity* of representation; but we must also realize, as we noted just now, that what is actually present in the mind need not be therefore posited in its consciousness in an explicit way, any more than, say, the ascent of the feeling mind to God need stand before consciousness in the form of proofs of God's reality, although, as we explained earlier, these proofs do no more than express the kernel and content of that feeling.<sup>6</sup>

*Zusatz.* Through *waking*, the natural soul of the human individual enters into a relationship to its substance which must be regarded as the truth, as the unity, of the two relations established between the individuality of man and his substantial universality or genus, one of them in the development that produces the course of the *ages of life*, and the other in the *sexual relationship*. For whereas in the course of life the soul appears as the single persisting subject, the differences emerging in it being only alterations, hence only *transient*, not lasting differences, and whereas in the sexual relationship by contrast the individual reaches a *fixed* difference, real opposition to itself, and the relation of the individual to the genus active in it develops into a relation to an individual of the opposite sex, —whereas therefore in the first case *simple unity* predominates, and in the second *fixed opposition*, in the waking soul we see a relation of the soul to itself that is not merely simple, but mediated by opposition; but in this being-for-self of the soul the difference is seen to be neither so transient as in the course of the ages of life nor so fixed

as in the sexual relationship, but the self-producing *enduring* alternation of the states of sleep and waking in one and the same individual. The necessity of the dialectical progression from the sexual relationship to the waking of the soul lies, however, more exactly in the fact that since each of the individuals standing in a sexual relation to each other finds, in virtue of their implicit unity, itself again in the other, the soul emerges from its being-in-itself to being-for-itself, that is, precisely from its sleep to waking. What in the sexual relationship is divided between two individuals, namely, a subjectivity remaining in immediate unity with its substance and a subjectivity entering into opposition to this substance, is, in the waking soul, unified, and so has lost the fixity of its opposition and acquired that fluidity of the difference by which it becomes mere *states*.<sup>7</sup> *Sleep* is the state of the soul's immersion in its undifferentiated unity, *waking* by contrast is the state of the soul's having entered into opposition to this simple unity. Here the natural life of mind still has its subsistence; for although the first immediacy of the soul is already sublated and is now reduced to a mere state, yet the soul's being-for-self resulting from the negation of that immediacy likewise still appears in the shape of a mere state. The being-for-self, the soul's subjectivity, is not yet combined with its implicit substantiality; the two determinations still appear as mutually exclusive, alternating states. Of course, genuinely mental activity—will and intelligence—is comprised in the waking state. Here however we have not yet to consider waking in this concrete meaning but only as a state, consequently, as something essentially distinct from will and intelligence. But that the mind which, in its truth, is to be grasped as pure activity has in itself the states of sleep and waking stems from the fact that mind is also soul and, as *soul*, descends to the form of a natural, an immediate, a passive entity. In this shape, mind only *suffers* its becoming-for-itself. We can say, therefore, that awaking is brought about by the fact that the lightning of subjectivity pierces through the form of mind's immediacy. The free mind can indeed also determine itself to awaking; but here in anthropology we consider awaking only in so far as it is a happening and in fact this still entirely indeterminate happening: the mind simply finds itself and a world in general confronting it,—a *self-finding* that initially only gets as far as sensation, and still remains far removed from the concrete determination of intelligence and will. It is just in this fact, that the soul on awaking merely *finds* itself and the world—this duality, this opposition—, that the naturalness of mind here consists.<sup>8</sup>

Now the distinguishing carried out by the soul, on awaking, between itself and the world is, owing to the soul's naturalness, connected with a physical distinction, namely with the alternation of day and night. It is natural for man to wake by day and sleep by night; for as sleep is the state of the soul's undifferentiatedness, so night obscures the difference between things; and as awaking displays the soul's distinguishing-itself-from-itself, so the light of day lets the differences of things emerge.<sup>9</sup>

But not only in physical nature but also in the human organism a distinction is to be found which corresponds to the distinction between the sleeping and the waking of the soul. In the animal organism it is essential to distinguish the side of its remaining-within-itself from the side of its other-directedness. *Bichat* has called the former side *organic* life, the latter *animal* life. As organic life he counts the reproductive system: digestion, blood-circulation, perspiration, breathing. This life continues in sleep; it ends only with death. Animal life by contrast, which according to *Bichat* comprises the system of sensibility and of irritability, nervous and muscular activity, — this theoretical and practical outward-directedness ceases in sleep, which is why even the ancients portrayed sleep and death as brothers. The only way in which the animal organism in sleep is still related to the external world is breathing, this wholly abstract relationship to the undifferentiated element of air. With particularized externality by contrast the healthy human organism in sleep no longer stands in any relation. If, therefore, a man in sleep becomes active outwardly, then he is ill. This occurs with sleep-walkers. They move about with the utmost confidence; some have written letters and sealed them. Yet in sleep-walking the sense of sight is paralysed, the eye in a cataleptic state.

In what *Bichat* calls *animal* life, then, an *alternation* of rest and activity prevails, hence, as in waking, an *opposition*, while the *organic* life that does not participate in that alternation corresponds to the *undifferentiatedness* of the soul present in sleep.<sup>10</sup>

But besides this difference in the organism's activity, we must also note a difference in the *structure* of the organs of the internal and the outward-directed life, a difference corresponding to the difference between sleeping and waking. The *outer* organs, the eyes, the ears, as well as the extremities, the hands and feet, are symmetrically *doubled*, and we may remark in passing that this symmetry renders them capable of becoming a theme of art. The *internal* organs, by contrast, display either no doubling at all or only an unsymmetrical doubling. We have only *one* stomach. The lung, it is true, has two lobes, as the heart has two ventricles; but both heart and lungs already involve the relation of the organism to an opposite, to the external world. Besides, neither the lobes of the lung nor the cardiac ventricles are as symmetrical as the outer organs.<sup>11</sup>

As regards the *mental* difference of waking from sleeping we may also add the following remarks to what has been said about it in the above Paragraph. We have defined sleep as the state in which the soul distinguishes itself neither within itself nor from the external world. This definition, which is necessary in and for itself, is confirmed by experience. For when our soul goes on sensing or representing only one and the same thing, it becomes sleepy. Thus the uniform motion of rocking, monotonous singing, the murmuring of a brook, can induce somnolence in us. The same effect is produced by drivel, by disconnected pointless stories. Our mind only feels fully awake when it is presented with

something interesting, something both new and meaningful, something intelligently differentiated and coherent within itself; for in such an object it finds itself again. The vitality of wakefulness requires, therefore, the opposition and the unity of mind with the object. If, on the contrary, the mind does not find again in the Other the internally differentiated totality which it is itself, then it withdraws from this objectivity into its undifferentiated unity with itself, gets bored, and falls asleep. But it is already implied in the foregoing remark that it is not mind *in general*, but more specifically intellectual and rational thinking that must be stimulated by the object, if wakefulness is to be present in all the sharpness of its distinctness from sleep and from dreaming. In waking, if we take the word in its abstract sense, we can be very bored; and, conversely, it is possible for us to have a lively interest in something in a dream. But in a dream it is only our representational thinking, not our intellectual thinking, whose interest is aroused.<sup>12</sup>

But if the indeterminate idea of being interested in objects is insufficient for distinguishing waking from dreaming, neither can the determination of *clarity* appear any more adequate for this distinction. For firstly this determination is only a quantitative one; it expresses only the immediacy of intuition and consequently not the genuine core. We only have that before us when we convince ourselves that what is intuited is a rational totality within itself. And secondly, we know quite well that dreaming is not even invariably distinguished from waking by inferior clarity, but on the contrary is often clearer than waking, especially in diseases and in visionaries.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, no satisfactory distinction would be given by the entirely indeterminate claim that it is only in waking that man *thinks*. For thinking *in general* is so much inherent in the nature of man that he always thinks, even in sleep. In all forms of mind, in feeling, in intuition, as well as representation, thinking remains the foundation. In so far, therefore, as thinking is this indeterminate foundation, it is unaffected by the alternation of sleep and waking; it does not constitute exclusively one side of the alteration here, but is the wholly universal activity that stands above both sides of this alternation.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, the position is different as regards thinking in so far as thinking *contrasts* with other forms of the mind as a distinct form of mental activity. In this sense, thinking ceases in sleep and dreaming. Intellect and reason, the modes of thinking *proper*, are active only in waking. Only in the intellect does the abstract determination, pertaining to the awaking soul, of self-distinguishing from the natural, from its undifferentiated substance and from the external world, have its *intensive*, concrete meaning; since intellect is the infinite being-within-itself which has developed into totality, and has in just this way freed itself from the individuality of the external world. But when the I is free within itself, it also makes the objects independent of its subjectivity, considers them likewise as totalities and as members of a totality embracing them all. Now in what is external, the totality takes the form not of free Idea, but of an interconnection of *necessity*.

It is this objective interconnection that essentially distinguishes the representations we have in waking from those that occur in dreams. If, therefore, in waking I encounter something whose connection with the general state of the external world I am not yet able to discover, then I can ask: Am I awake or dreaming? In dreams our attitude is only representational; there our representations are not governed by the categories of the intellect. But mere representation wrests things completely out of their concrete interconnection, individualizes them. Hence in dreams everything drifts apart, criss-crosses in wild disorder, objects lose all necessary, objective, intellectual, rational interconnection and only enter into an entirely superficial, contingent and subjective combination. Thus it happens that we bring something we hear in sleep into an entirely different context from what it has in actuality. One hears, for example, a door slam, believes a shot has been fired, and now pictures a story of robbers. Or while asleep, one senses a pressure on one's chest and explains it to oneself by the incubus. The occurrence of such false representations in sleep is possible because in this state the mind is not the totality for itself, with which, in waking, it compares all its sensations, intuitions, and representations, in order to ascertain, from the agreement or non-agreement of the individual sensations, intuitions, and representations with its totality, a totality that is for itself, the objectivity or non-objectivity of that content. It is true that when awake a man can give himself up to the nonsense of quite empty, subjective representations; but if he has not taken leave of his senses, he knows at the same time that these representations are *only* representations because they stand in contradiction with his present totality.<sup>15</sup>

Only occasionally does something occur in a dream that has a significant connection with actuality. This is especially so with dreams before midnight; in these the representations can still to some extent be held in an orderly connection with the actuality with which we have occupied ourselves in the daytime. At midnight, as thieves very well know, we sleep soundest; the soul has then withdrawn into itself away from all tension with the external world. After midnight, dreams become even more arbitrary than before. Occasionally, however, we feel in dreams a presentiment of something which in the distraction of waking consciousness we do not notice. Thus sluggish blood can evoke in a man the definite feeling of an illness of which, in waking, he has not yet had an inkling. Similarly in a dream the smell of something smouldering can in sleep provoke dreams of conflagrations which do not break out until several days later and whose signs we have not noticed in waking.<sup>16</sup>

Finally we must add that waking, as a natural state, as a natural tension between the individual soul and the external world, has a *limit*, a measure, that therefore the activity of the waking mind gets tired and so induces sleep which, on its side, likewise has a limit and must progress to its opposite. This double *transition* is the way in which, in this sphere, the unity of the soul's substantiality, which is in itself, with its individuality, which is for itself, makes its appearance.

## (γ) Sensation

## §399

Sleep and waking are initially, in fact, not mere alterations, but *alternating* states (a progression to infinity). This is their formal, negative relationship; but in it the *affirmative* relationship is also present. Being is contained as an ideal moment in the being-for-self of the waking soul; the determinacies of the content of its sleeping nature, where they are *implicitly* as in their substance, are thus *found* by the waking soul *within its own self* and, indeed, for itself. This particular material, since it is determinacy, is distinct from the self-identity of being-for-self, and at the same time simply contained in its simplicity: *sensation*.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* As regards the dialectical progress from the *awaking* soul to *sensation* we have to make the following remarks. The sleep that follows waking is the *natural* mode of the soul's return from difference to distinctionless unity with itself. In so far as mind remains entangled in the bonds of naturalness, this return exhibits nothing but the empty *repetition* of the beginning—a boring cycle. But *in itself*, or according to the concept, this return at the same time involves an *advance*. For the transition of sleep into waking and of waking into sleep, has for us a result which is no less positive than negative: both the undifferentiated substantial being of the soul present in sleep and the still quite abstract, still quite empty being-for-self of the soul achieved in awaking prove to be, in their separateness, one-sided, untrue determinations and let their concrete *unity* emerge as their truth. In the repeated alternation of sleep and waking, these determinations are always only striving towards their concrete unity without ever reaching it; in this alternation each of the determinations always only falls from its own one-sidedness into the one-sidedness of the opposite determination. But this unity always only striven for in that alternation comes to *actuality* in the *sentient* soul. When the soul senses, it deals with an immediate determination that just *is*, a determination only found by the soul, not yet produced by it, internally or externally given and so not dependent on it. But *at the same time* this determination is immersed in the soul's universality and is thereby negated in its immediacy and so posited ideally. Consequently the sentient soul claims this Other of itself as its own, returns to itself in it, and in the immediacy, the being, that it senses, is together with itself. Thus the *abstract* being-for-self present in awaking obtains its first fulfilment through the determinations which are implicitly contained in the soul's sleeping nature, in the soul's substantial being. Actualized, assured, by this fulfilment, the soul proves to itself its being-for-self, its awokenness: it not merely *is* for itself, it also *posits* itself as for itself, as subjectivity, as negativity of its immediate determinations. Thus the soul has first attained its *genuine* individuality. This subjective point of the soul now no longer stands isolated, confronting the immediacy of the soul, but asserts itself in the manifold which is contained, in potentiality, in that immediacy. The sentient soul



posits the manifold in its inwardness and thus sublates the opposition between its being-for-self or its subjectivity, and its immediacy or its substantial being-in-itself; not, however, in *such* a manner that, as in the return of awaking into sleep, its being-for-self makes room for its opposite, that mere being-in-itself, but so that its being-for-self preserves itself in the alteration, in the Other, develops and proves itself, and the soul's immediacy is reduced from the form of a state present *alongside* that being-for-self to a determination subsisting only *in* that being-for-self, reduced, consequently, to a *semblance*.<sup>2</sup> By sensation, therefore, the soul has reached the stage where the universal constituting its nature becomes for the soul in an immediate determinacy. Only by this becoming-for-itself is the soul sentient. The non-animal does not sense precisely because in it the universal remains immersed in the determinacy, does not become for itself in the determinacy. Coloured water, for example, is distinct from its colouredness and from its uncolouredness only *for us*. If one and the same water were at the same time universal and coloured water, then this distinguishing determinacy would be for the water itself, which therefore, would have sensation; for something has sensation by maintaining itself as a universal in its determinacy.<sup>3</sup>

In the above discussion of the essence of sensation it is already implied that if, in §398, awaking could be called a *judgement* of the individual soul—because this state produces a *division* of the soul into a soul which is for itself and a soul which merely *is*, and at the same time an *immediate* relation of the soul's *subjectivity* to an *Other*—we can assert the presence in sensation of a *syllogism*, and from that derive the assurance of wakefulness achieved by means of sensation. On awaking, we find ourselves initially in an entirely indeterminate distinguishedness from the external world generally. Only when we start to sense does this distinction become a *determinate* distinction. In order, therefore, to attain to full wakefulness and certainty of it, we open our eyes, take hold of ourselves, in a word, examine whether some determinate Other, something determinately distinct from ourselves, is for us. In this examination we no longer relate ourselves directly to the Other, but *mediately*. Thus, for example, *contact* is the mediation between myself and the Other, since though it is different from these two sides of the opposition, yet at the same time it unites them both. So here, as in sensation generally, the soul by the mediation of something standing between itself and the Other, joins together with itself in the sensed content, reflects itself out of the Other into itself, separates itself from the Other and thereby confirms to itself its being-for-self. This joining of the soul together with itself is the advance that the soul, after dividing itself in awaking, makes by its transition to sensation.<sup>4</sup>

#### §400

Sensation is the form in which the mind weaves its sombre web in its unconscious and unintellectual individuality, where *every* determinacy is still *immediate*, posited in an undeveloped way both in its content and as an objective counterpart to

the subject, belonging as it does to the subject's own *most particular*, natural *peculiarity*. The content of sensation is, by this very fact, *restricted* and transient, since it belongs to natural, immediate being, thus to what is qualitative and finite.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] *Everything is in sensation*, and, if you like, everything that emerges in the conscious mind and in reason has its *source* and *origin* in sensation; for source and origin just mean the first, most immediate manner in which something appears. It is not enough, they say, to have principles, religion, etc. only in the head: they must also be in the heart, in *sentiment*. In fact, what we thus have in the head is in consciousness in general and the content is an *object* of consciousness. So that although the content is posited in me, in the abstract I, it can equally be kept at a distance from me, from my concrete subjectivity. In sentiment, by contrast, such a content is determinacy of my entire being-for-self, dull as it is in such a form; it is thus posited as something of my *very own*. What is my own is something unseparated from the actual concrete I, and this immediate unity of the soul with its substance and with the determinate content of the substance is just this unseparatedness, in so far as it is not determined as far as the I of consciousness, still less to the freedom of the mind's rationality. It is, by the way, a commonly held view that will, conscience, and character possess an entirely different intensity and steadfastness of *being-my-own*, than sentiment in general and the aggregate of sentiment, *heart*. Of course it is correct to say that above all the *heart* must be *good*. But sentiment and heart is not the form by which anything is *justified* as religious, ethical, true, just, etc., and an appeal to heart and sentiment either means nothing or means something bad. We should hardly need to be reminded of this. There can be nothing more commonplace than the experience that at least there are also bad, evil, godless, mean, etc. sentiments and hearts. In fact, that the heart is the source only of this type of content is expressed in the words: 'For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, false witness, blasphemies, etc.' In times when scientific theology and philosophy make heart and sentiment the criterion of what is good, ethical, and religious, it becomes necessary to recall this commonplace experience; just as it is nowadays necessary to remind ourselves that *thinking* is what is our *very own*, is what distinguishes man from animals, and that man has sensibility in common with them.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* Although the peculiarly human content belonging to free mind also assumes the form of sensibility, yet this form as such is a form common to the animal soul and the human soul and not, therefore, appropriate to that content. The contradiction between *mental* content and sentiment consists in the fact that the content is a universal in and for itself, necessary, genuinely objective, whereas sentiment is individualized, contingent, one-sidedly subjective. We propose to explain briefly here to what extent the above-mentioned determinations must be predicated of sentiment. As we have already remarked, what is sensed has essentially the form of immediacy, of a mere being, no matter whether it stems

from the free mind or from the sensory world. The idealization that the things of *external* nature undergo in being sensed is a still entirely superficial idealization, far removed from the complete sublation of the immediacy of this content. But the *mental* material, in itself opposed to this content that just *is*, becomes in the sentient soul an existent in the mode of immediacy. Now since what is unmediated is an individualized item, everything sensed has the form of *individualization*. This is readily admitted of sensations of the external, but it must also be asserted of the sensations of the internal. When the spiritual, the rational, the lawful, ethical, and religious assume the form of sentiment, it gets the shape of a sensory item, of something disconnected, lying asunder, and thus acquires a similarity to what is externally sensed, which, though of course sensed only in individualities, e.g. in individual colours, yet, like the spiritual, *in itself* involves a universal, e.g. colour in general. The more comprehensive, higher nature of the spiritual does not therefore emerge in sentiment, only in conceptual thinking. But in the individualization of the sensed content, its *contingency* and its one-sided subjective form are also grounded. The *subjectivity* of sentiment must not be sought in an indeterminate way in the fact that by sentiment man posits something *within himself*—for in thinking, too, he posits something within himself—but more determinately in the fact that he posits something in his natural, immediate, individual subjectivity, not in his free, spiritual, universal subjectivity. This *natural* subjectivity is not yet a self-determining subjectivity following its own law and acting in a necessary manner, but a subjectivity determined from outside, tied to *this* space and to *this* time, dependent on contingent circumstances. Therefore, by transposition into this subjectivity every content becomes a contingent content and acquires determinations belonging only to this individual subject. It is thus quite inadmissible to appeal to one's mere sentiments. Whoever does this withdraws from the realm, common to all, of grounds, of thinking, and of objectivity, into his individual subjectivity, into which, since it is essentially passive, the most unintelligent and bad content can work its way, as well as the intelligent and the good. It is evident from all this that sentiment is the worst form for the mental and that it can spoil the best content.<sup>3</sup>—At the same time, it is already implied in the above that the opposition between a senser and a sensed, a subjective and an objective, still remains foreign to mere sensation. The subjectivity of the sentient soul is such an immediate subjectivity, so undeveloped, so little self-determining and self-differentiating, that the soul, in so far as it *only* senses, does not yet apprehend itself as a subjective confronting an objective. This distinction belongs only to *consciousness*, only emerges when the soul has attained to the abstract thought of its I, of its infinite being-for-self. Of this distinction therefore we have first to speak in the Phenomenology. Here in Anthropology we have only to consider the distinction given by the *content* of sensation. This we shall do in the following Paragraph.<sup>4</sup>

## §401

What the sentient soul finds within itself is, on the one hand, the natural and immediate, as within the soul ideally and made its own. On the other hand, and conversely, what originally belongs to being-for-self (i.e. to what is, when further deepened and absorbed in itself, free mind and the I of consciousness) is determined to natural *bodiliness*, and is thus sensed.<sup>1</sup> In this way two distinct spheres of sensation emerge. One type of sensation is at first a determination of bodiliness (e.g. of the eye or of any physical part whatever), which becomes sensation by being driven *inward, recollected* in the soul's being-for-self. The other is the sphere of determinacies originating in the mind and belonging to it, which, in order to be sensed, in order to be as if found, become *embodied*. Thus the determinacy is posited in the subject, namely in the soul. The subdivision into species of the first type of sensation is seen in the system of the senses. The other, inwardly originated, determinacies of sensation necessarily also form a system; and their embodiment, as posited in the living, concretely developed natural structure, takes place in a *particular* system or organ of the body, corresponding to the *particular* content of the mental determination.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] Sensation in general is the healthy participation of the individual mind in its bodiliness. The senses form the simple system of specific corporeal functions: (1) Physical *ideality* divides into two, because in such immediate and not yet subjective ideality, distinction appears as *diversity*: the senses of determinate *light* (cf. §§317 ff.) and of *sound* (cf. §300). (2) Diffusive reality is for its own part immediately a double reality: the senses of smell and taste (§§321, 322). (3) the sense of solid reality, of heavy matter, of heat (§303), of shape (§310). Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arrange themselves more simply than in the development of natural corporeality.<sup>3</sup>

The *system* of internal sensation in the *particularization* of its self-embodiment would deserve to be treated in detail in a specific science of its own, a *psychical physiology*. Something of a relation of this type is already contained in the sensation of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the sensory *interior* with a determination of its own—the *pleasant* or *unpleasant*; as also in the *determinate* comparison in the use of sensations, e.g. of colours, sounds, smells, as *symbols*. But the most interesting aspect of a psychical physiology would be to study not mere sympathy, but more specifically the *embodiment* assumed by mental determinations, especially as *emotions*. We should have to comprehend the connection by which anger and courage are felt in the breast, in the blood, in the irritable system, just as contemplation and mental pre-occupation are sensed or felt in the head, the centre of the sensitive system. We should require a more thorough understanding than hitherto of the most familiar connections by which tears, and voice in general, namely speech, laughter, sighs, with many other particularizations lying in the direction of pathognomy

and physiognomy, are formed from out of the soul. In physiology the viscera and the organs are regarded as moments only of the animal organism; but they form at the same time a system of embodiment of the mental, and in this way get an entirely different interpretation.<sup>4</sup>

*Zusatz.* The content of sensation is either a content stemming from the external world or one belonging to the interior of the soul; a sensation is thus either an *external* or an *internal* sensation. Here we have to consider the second type of sensations only in so far as they become *embodied*; on the side of their inwardness they belong to the sphere of psychology. The external sensations, by contrast, are an object of Anthropology exclusively.<sup>5</sup>

The first thing to be said about the last-named type of sensations is that we obtain them through the various *senses*. The senser is here determined from outside, i.e., his bodiliness is determined by something external. The various modes of this determination constitute the various external sensations. Each of these various modes is a universal possibility of being determined, a circle of individual sensations. Seeing, for example, contains the indeterminate possibility of a multiplicity of visual sensations. The universal nature of the ensouled individual is also displayed in the fact that in the determinate modes of sensing the individual is not tied to some single item but embraces a circle of individualities. If, on the contrary, I could see only what was blue, this limitation would be a quality of mine. But since, in contrast to natural things, I am the universal that is together with itself in the determinacy, I see the coloured in general, or rather all the varieties of the coloured.<sup>6</sup>

The general modes of sensing are related to the various physical and chemical determinacies of the natural, the necessity of which is to be demonstrated in philosophy of nature, and these modes are mediated by the various sense-organs. The fact that in general sensation of the external divides up into such diverse, mutually indifferent modes of sensing, lies in the nature of its content, since this is a sensory content, and the sensory is so closely synonymous with the self-external that even internal sensations by their mutual externality become something sensory.<sup>7</sup>

Now why we have just the familiar *five* senses—no more and no fewer, and differing in the way they do—, the rational necessity of this must, in a philosophical treatment, be demonstrated. This happens when we conceive the senses as presentations of the concept's moments. These moments are, as we know, only *three*. But the quintet of senses reduces quite naturally to three classes of senses. The first is formed by the senses of physical *ideality*, the second by those of *real difference*; in the third class falls the sense of *earthly totality*.<sup>8</sup>

As presentations of the concept's moments, each of these three classes must form a *totality* within itself. But now the first class contains the sense of the abstractly universal, of the abstractly ideal, and therefore of what is not genuinely total. Here, therefore, the totality cannot be present as a concrete totality, only

as a sundered totality, a totality divided within itself, distributed to *two abstract* moments. Hence the first class embraces two senses—*seeing* and *hearing*. For seeing, the ideal takes the form of simply relating to itself, for hearing it takes the form of producing itself by the negation of the material. — The second class, being the class of difference, exhibits the sphere of *process*, of the decomposition and dissolution of concrete corporeality. But from the determination of difference, a doubling of the senses of this class at once follows. The second class contains, therefore, the senses of *smell* and *taste*. The first is the sense of the abstract process, the second the sense of the concrete process. Lastly the third class includes only *one* sense, *feeling*, because feeling is the sense of the *concrete* totality.<sup>9</sup>

Let us now consider more closely the individual senses.

*Sight* is the sense of the physical ideal that we call *light*. We can say of light that it is, as it were, *space* become physical. For light, like space, is indivisible, a limpid ideality, absolutely determinationless extension, without any reflection-into-self, and consequently without inwardness. Light manifests its Other and this manifesting constitutes its essence; but within itself it is abstract self-identity, the opposite of nature's asunderness emerging within nature itself, and therefore immaterial matter. Hence light offers no resistance, has no limitation within itself, expands on all sides into the immeasurable distance, is absolutely weightless, imponderable. Sight has to do only with this ideal element and with its obscuration by the *dark*, i.e. with *colour*. Colour is what is seen, light is the medium of seeing. The strictly material aspect of corporeality, by contrast, does not yet concern us in seeing. Therefore the objects we see can be far from us. In seeing we have, as it were, a merely theoretical, not yet a practical, relationship to things; for in seeing we let things subsist calmly as beings and relate ourselves only to their ideal side. Owing to this independence of sight of corporeality proper, it can be called the noblest sense. On the other hand, sight is a very imperfect sense because by it a body does not come to us immediately as a spatial totality, as *body*, always only as surface, only according to the two dimensions of width and height, and we only get to see a body successively in all its dimensions, in its total shape by adopting various points of view towards it. The most distant objects originally appear to sight, as we can observe in children, on one and the same surface as those nearest to us, just because sight does not immediately see *depth*. Only when we notice that to the depth perceived by feeling there corresponds something dark, a *shadow*, do we come to believe that where a shadow becomes visible to us we see a depth. Connected with this is the fact that we do not immediately perceive by sight the measure of the distance of bodies but can only infer it from the smaller or greater appearance of objects.<sup>10</sup>

In contrast to sight, which is the sense of ideality devoid of inwardness, *hearing* is the sense of the pure inwardness of the corporeal. Just as sight is related to space become physical, to light, so hearing is related to *time* become physical, to *sound*. For sound is the temporal positedness of corporeality, the movement, the vibration of a body within itself, a trembling, a mechanical tremor in which

the body, without having to alter its relative place as a whole body, moves only its parts, posits its inner spatiality temporally, thus sublates its indifferent asunderness and by this sublation lets its pure inwardness emerge, but immediately restores itself from the superficial alteration it has undergone from the mechanical tremor. But the medium through which sound reaches our hearing is not merely the element of air but in still greater measure the concrete corporeality located between us and the sounding object, for example the earth: when held to the earth the ear has occasionally heard cannonades which could not be heard through the mere mediation of air.<sup>11</sup>

The senses of the *second* class enter into relation with *real* corporeality. But they do not yet have to do with it in so far as it is for itself, offers resistance, but only in so far as it is in the course of dissolution, enters into its *process*. This process is something necessary. Bodies are, of course, destroyed partly by external, contingent causes; but apart from this contingent downfall bodies perish by their own nature, consume themselves, but in such a manner that their ruin has the semblance of coming to them from outside. Thus it is the air whose action gives rise to the process of the silent, imperceptible dissipation of all bodies, the evaporation of vegetable and animal formations. Now although both *smell* and *taste* stand in relation to self-dissolving corporeality, yet these two senses are distinguished from each other by the fact that smell receives a body in the *abstract*, simple, indeterminate process of dissipation or evaporation; whereas taste is related to the *real*, concrete process of the body and to the chemical determinacies emerging in this process: the sweet, the bitter, the alkaline, the acidic, and the salty. With taste, a direct contact with the object is necessary, whereas even the sense of smell does not yet need such contact. In hearing, such contact is even less necessary and in seeing it does not occur at all.<sup>12</sup>

As already remarked, the *third* class contains only the one sense of *feeling*. In so far as this resides primarily in the fingers it is also called the sense of touch. Feeling is the most concrete of all the senses. For its distinctive essentiality consists in its relation, not to the physical as abstractly universal or ideal, nor to the determinacies of the corporeal as they separate out from it, but to the solid reality of the corporeal. Only for feeling, therefore, is there strictly an Other subsisting for itself, an individual entity for itself, confronting the senser as a similarly individual entity for itself. Hence feeling includes the impression of *heaviness*, i.e. of the unity sought by bodies as they persist for themselves and do not enter into the process of dissolution but offer resistance. In general, it is material being-for-self that is for feeling. But to the various modes of this being-for-self belong not only weight but also the type of *cohesion*: the hard, the soft, the rigid, the brittle, the rough, the smooth. However, along with persisting, firm corporeality, the negativity of the material as subsisting for itself—namely, *heat*—is also for feeling. By heat, the specific gravity and the cohesion of bodies are altered. Hence, this alteration affects that by which the body is essentially a body. To that extent we can therefore say that even in the impression of heat, *solid* corporeality is for

feeling. Finally, *shape* in its three dimensions falls in the province of feeling; for the mechanical determinacy in general pertains entirely to feeling.<sup>13</sup>

Besides the indicated *qualitative* differences, the senses have also a *quantitative* determination of sensation, its strength or weakness. Here quantity necessarily appears as *intensive* magnitude because the sensation is a simple entity. Thus, for example, the sensation of pressure exerted by a determinate mass on the sense of feeling is something intensive, although this intensity also exists extensively, measured in pounds, etc. But the quantitative side of sensation affords no interest for philosophical treatment in so far as this quantitative determination becomes also qualitative and thereby forms a *measure*, beyond which the sensation becomes too strong and therefore painful, and below which it becomes imperceptible.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, the relation of outer sensations to the interior of the sentient subject becomes important for philosophical anthropology. This interior is not something entirely indeterminate, undifferentiated. The very fact that the magnitude of the sensation is an intensive magnitude and must have a certain measure, involves a relation of the impression to the subject's determinedness-in-and-for-itself, a certain determinacy of the subject's sensitivity,—a reaction of subjectivity to externality, and so the germ or beginning of inner sensation. Already by this internal determinacy of the subject, man's outer sensing is distinguished more or less from that of animals. Some animals can, in certain circumstances, have sensations of something external that is not yet present for human sensation. Camels, for example, can even scent springs and streams miles away.<sup>15</sup>

But it is more by its relation to the *mental* interior than by this peculiar measure of sensitivity that outer sensation becomes something peculiarly anthropological. Now this relation has manifold aspects, though not all of them pertain to our consideration here yet. In particular, the determination of a sensation as a pleasant or unpleasant one remains excluded from consideration here—this comparison, more or less interwoven with reflection, of outer sensation with our nature determined in and for itself, whose satisfaction or non-satisfaction by an impression makes the impression in the first case a *pleasant*, in the second case an *unpleasant*, sensation. Just as little can the arousal of *urges* by impressions be drawn into the field of our inquiry. This arousal belongs to the realm of practical mind which still lies far ahead. What we have to consider at this stage is simply and solely the *unconscious* relatedness of outer sensation to the mental interior. Through this relation there arises in us what we call *mood*,—an appearance of the mind of which, admittedly, we find an analogue in animals (just as we find an analogue of the sensation of the pleasant or unpleasant and of the arousal of urges by impressions), but which (like the above-named other mental appearances) at the same time has a peculiarly human character and which moreover becomes something anthropological, in the narrower sense we have indicated, by being something not yet known with full consciousness by the subject. Even when we were considering the natural soul not yet advanced to individuality,



we had to talk about its moods, which correspond to an external factor. At that stage, this external factor was still entirely universal circumstances, of which one really cannot say, precisely owing to their indeterminate universality, that they are sensed. By contrast, at the standpoint to which we have so far brought the development of the soul, external sensation itself is what arouses the mood. But this effect is produced by outer sensation in so far as an inner meaning is immediately, i.e. without conscious intelligence needing to intervene, associated with it. By this meaning, the external sensation becomes something *symbolic*. We must note, however, that what we have here is not yet a symbol in the proper meaning of the word; for strictly speaking a symbol requires an external object distinct from us in which we become conscious of an internal determinacy, or which we generally relate to such a determinacy. But in a mood aroused by an external sensation we are not yet in relationship to an external object distinct from us, we are not yet consciousness. Consequently, as we have said, the symbolic does not yet appear here in its proper shape.<sup>16</sup>

Now the mental sympathies aroused by the symbolic nature of impressions are something entirely familiar. We get that sort of thing from colours, sounds, smells, tastes, and also from what is for the sense of feeling.—As regards *colours*, there are grave, gay, fiery, cold, sad, and soothing colours. Definite colours are therefore chosen as signs of our present mood. Thus for the expression of grief, of inner gloom, of the nightfall of the mind, we take the colour of night, of the darkness not brightened by light, colourless *black*. Solemnity and dignity are also denoted by black, because in it the play of contingency, of manifoldness and mutability finds no place. Pure, luminous, serene *white*, on the other hand, corresponds to the simplicity and serenity of innocence. The proper colours have, so to speak, a more concrete meaning than black and white. Thus *purple* has ranked from time immemorial as the royal colour; for this is the most powerful colour, the most striking to the eye,—the interpenetration of bright and dark in the full strength of their unity and their opposition. *Blue*, by contrast, as the simple unity of bright and dark inclining towards the passive dark, is the symbol of gentleness, of femininity, of love and fidelity, and that is why painters, too, have almost always painted the queen of heaven in a blue garment. *Yellow* is not merely the symbol of ordinary gaiety but also of jaundiced envy. Of course, the choice of colour for clothing can be very much a matter of convention; though at the same time, as we have observed, a rational sense reveals itself in that choice. There is also something symbolic in the *lustre* and dullness of colour; lustre corresponds to the usually cheerful mood of people in dazzling situations,—*dullness* of colour, on the other hand, to the splendour-scorning simplicity and tranquillity of character. In white itself there is a difference of lustre and dullness depending on whether it appears, for example, on linen, on cotton, or on silk; and one finds in many peoples a definite feeling for the symbolism of this distinction.<sup>17</sup>

Besides colours, it is particularly *sounds* which produce in us a corresponding mood. This is especially true of the human *voice*; for this is the principal way in

which a human being discloses his interior; what he is, he puts into his voice. In the melodious-sounding voice, therefore, we believe we can safely recognize the beauty of soul of the speaker, and in the harshness of his voice, a coarse feeling. In the first case, the sound evokes our sympathy, in the latter case our antipathy. Blind people are particularly attentive to the symbolism of the human voice. It is even affirmed that they claim to detect someone's physical beauty in the melodious sound of the voice,—that they even think they hear pockmarks in faint speaking through the nose.

So much for the relation of *external* sensations to the mental interior. We have already seen in considering this relation that the interior of the senser is not a complete void, not entirely indeterminate, but on the contrary that it is determined in and for itself. This is true even of the animal soul, but it is true in incomparably higher measure of the human interior. The human interior therefore contains a content that is for itself an *internal*, not an external content. But for this content to be sensed two things are necessary, first an external occasion and secondly an *embodiment* of the internal content, thus a transformation or a relation of it that constitutes the opposite of the relation into which the content given by the external senses is placed by its symbolic nature. Just as *outer* sensations make themselves into symbols, i.e. are related to the mental *interior*, so *inner* sensations necessarily *externalize*, embody, themselves because they belong to the natural soul, consequently are simply in being, and so must acquire an immediate reality in which the soul becomes for itself. When we speak of the inner determination of the sentient subject, without reference to the embodiment of this determination, we consider this subject in *the* way in which it is only *for us*, but not yet how it is for itself together with itself in its determination, how it senses itself in it. Only by the embodiment of inner determinations does the subject get to the stage of sensing them; for before they can be sensed it is necessary that they be posited both as distinct from the subject and as identical with it; but this happens only by the externalization, by the embodiment of the inner determinations of the senser. The embodying of these manifold inner determinations presupposes a realm of bodiliness in which this takes place. This realm, this restricted sphere, is my corporeal body. This thus determines itself as a sphere of sensation, both for the inner and for the outer determinations of the soul. The vitality of this corporeal body of mine consists in this, that its materiality is unable to be for itself, can offer no resistance to me, but is subordinate to me, is pervaded through and through by my soul for which it is an ideality. Since this is the nature of my corporeal body the embodiment of my sensations thereby becomes possible and necessary,—the movements of my soul immediately become movements of my corporeality.<sup>18</sup>

Now inner sensations are of *two* kinds:

First, those which concern my immediate *individuality* situated in some particular relationship or state; here, for example, belong anger, revenge, envy, shame, remorse.

Secondly, those which are related to a *universal* in and for itself, to right, ethics, religion, to the beautiful and true.

Both kinds of inner sensation, as we have already remarked, have this in common, that they are determinations which my immediately individual, my natural mind finds within itself. On the one hand, the two kinds can come close to each other either when the sensed content of right, ethics, and religion acquires more and more the form of individualization, or when, conversely, sensations that initially concern the individual subject get a stronger addition of universal content. On the other hand, the difference between the two kinds of inner sensation becomes more and more pronounced the more the feelings of right, ethics, and religion are freed from the admixture of the subject's particularity and are thereby raised to pure forms of the universal in and for itself. But in the same measure that the individuality in inner sensations yields to the universal, these sensations are spiritualized and their expression thus loses some of the bodiliness of its appearance.<sup>19</sup>

We have already stated above that the *more precise* content of internal sensation cannot yet be an object of our discussion here in Anthropology. Just as we accepted the content of *outer* sensations from the philosophy of nature now behind us, where the rational necessity of that content had been demonstrated, so here we must anticipate as far as it is necessary the content of *inner* sensations, which finds its proper place only in the third part of the theory of subjective mind. Our object for now is only the *embodiment* of inner sensations, and more specifically only the embodiment occurring involuntarily, not the will-dependent embodiment of my sensations by means of *gesture*. This second kind of embodiment does not yet belong here because it presupposes that mind has already become master of its bodiliness, has consciously made it into an expression of its internal sensations—something which has here not yet taken place. At this point, as we have said, we have only to consider the immediate transition of internal sensation into the bodily mode of reality, an embodiment that can indeed also become visible to *others*, can develop into a *sign* of the inner sensation, but does not necessarily become such a sign—and does so, at any rate, without the will of the senser.<sup>20</sup>

Now just as mind employs the members of its *outward*-directed life, of its animal life (as *Bichat* expresses it), the face, the hands, and the feet, for the display, occurring with regard to others, of its interior by means of *gesture*, so, on the other hand, it is especially the members of the *inward*-turned life, the so-called 'precious viscera', that must be designated as the organs in which the inner sensations of the sentient subject are embodied for *himself*, but not necessarily for others, in an immediate, involuntary manner.<sup>21</sup>

The main phenomena of this embodiment are already familiar to everyone through language, which contains a good deal bearing on this topic which cannot very well be explained away as an age-old error. In general, it may be noted that inner sensations can be either beneficial or harmful and even ruinous, both to soul and to the whole body. Cheerfulness preserves health, grief undermines it.

An impediment arising in the soul from grief and pain and bringing itself to existence in a bodily mode can, if it occurs suddenly and exceeds a certain limit, lead to death or the loss of intellect. Equally dangerous is sudden excessive joy; like overwhelming pain, this gives rise for representation to such a stark contradiction between the preceding and the present circumstances of the sentient subject, to such a rupture of the interior, that its embodiment can result in the fracture of the organism, death, or derangement. A man of character, however, is much less exposed than others to such effects, since his mind has made itself much freer of his bodiliness and has acquired a much firmer composure than a natural man, poor in representations and thoughts, who does not possess the power to endure the negativity of a sudden invasion of violent pain.<sup>22</sup>

But even if this embodiment does not have a stimulating or depressing effect to a devastating degree, yet it will assail more or less immediately the *whole* organism, since in this all organs and all systems are in a living unity with each other. All the same, it is not to be denied that inner sensations, in accordance with the diversity of their content, also have a *particular* organ in which they are initially and principally embodied. This connection between a determinate sensation and its particular bodily mode of appearance cannot be refuted by individual cases running counter to the rule. Such exceptions, chargeable to the impotence of nature, do not justify ascribing this connection to pure contingency and supposing perhaps that anger could equally well be felt in the belly or the head as in the heart. Even language has sufficient understanding to employ *heart* for courage, *head* for intelligence, and not heart, say, for intelligence. But science is bound to show the necessary relation prevailing between a determinate inner sensation and the physiological significance of the organ in which it is embodied. We propose here to touch briefly on the most universal phenomena concerning this point. It is one of the most undeniable experiences that *grief*, this impotent burying of the soul within itself, embodies itself mainly as an abdominal illness, hence in the reproductive system, consequently in that system which displays the negative return of the animal subject to itself. *Courage* and *anger*, by contrast, this negative directedness-outwards against an alien force, against an injury which enrages us, has its immediate seat in the breast, in the heart, the focal point of irritability, of negative expulsion. In anger the heart throbs, the blood gets hotter and mounts to the face, and the muscles get tense. Here, particularly in annoyance, where the anger remains internal rather than discharging itself violently, the *bile* already belonging to the reproductive system can of course overflow, and indeed to such a degree that jaundice occurs. But we must remark on this that bile is, as it were, the fiery stuff, by emission of which the reproductive system, so to say, vents its anger, its irritability, on food, dissolving and consuming it with the aid of the animal *water* poured out by the pancreas. — *Shame*, which is closely akin to anger, is likewise embodied in the blood system. Shame is an incipient, a subdued anger of a man about himself; for it involves a reaction to the contradiction between my appearance and what I ought and will to be, — thus a defence of my

interior against my incongruous appearance. This mental outward-directedness is embodied by the blood being driven into the face, so that one blushes and in this way alters one's appearance. In contrast to shame, terror, this shrinking into itself of the soul in face of a seemingly insurmountable negative, expresses itself by the blood receding from the cheeks, by blanching, as well as by trembling. If, however, nature is perverse enough to create some people who blanch from shame and blush from fear, science must not let such inconsistencies of nature deter it from recognizing the opposite of these irregularities as law.—Finally, *thinking*, too, in so far as it is a temporal occurrence and belongs to the immediate individuality, has a bodily appearance, is sensed, and indeed particularly in the head, in the brain, in general in the system of sensibility, of the simple universal being-within-itself of the sentient subject.<sup>23</sup>

In all the embodiments of the mental just considered, only that externalization of soul-motions occurs which is necessary for them to be sensed or can serve to show the interior. But this externalization is only complete when it becomes an *elimination*, an expulsion of internal sensations. Such an alienating embodiment of the interior is shown in *laughter*, even more so in *weeping*, in sighing and sobbing, in general in the *voice*, even before this is articulated, even before it becomes *speech*.<sup>24</sup>

To comprehend the connection between these physiological phenomena and the motions of the soul corresponding to them is a matter of no little difficulty.

As regards the mental side of these phenomena, we know with regard to *laughter* that it is generated by an immediately obvious contradiction, by something turning at once into its opposite, hence by something immediately self-annihilating,—assuming that we are not involved in this null content, do not regard it as our own; for if we felt ourselves injured by the destruction of this content, then we should *weep*. If, for example, someone proudly striding along falls over, this can give rise to laughter over it, because he experiences in his person the simple dialectic that what happens to him is the opposite of what he intended. Hence what provokes laughter in genuine *comedies* also essentially lies in the immediate veering round of a purpose in itself null into its opposite; whereas in *tragedy* it is substantial purposes which destroy themselves in their mutual opposition. With the dialectic befalling the object of comedy, the subjectivity of the spectator or listener attains to a serene and untroubled enjoyment of itself, since it is the absolute ideality, the infinite power over every limited content, consequently the pure dialectic by which, in fact, the comic object is annihilated. Herein lies the ground of the gaiety into which we are transported by the comic. But the *physiological* appearance of this gaiety, which particularly interests us here, is in harmony with this ground. For in laughter, the subjectivity attaining to untroubled enjoyment of itself, this pure self, this spiritual light, embodies itself as a glow spreading over the countenance, and at the same time the spiritual act by which the soul repels the ridiculous from itself finds a bodily expression in the forcibly interrupted expulsion of

the breath.—Incidentally, though laughter pertains to the natural soul, hence is anthropological, it ranges from the vulgar peals of side-splitting guffaw of someone empty or coarse to the gentle smile of the noble soul, smiling through tears, a series of gradations in which laughter frees itself more and more from its naturalness until in smiling it becomes a *gesture*, thus something originating in free will. The various modes of laughter indicate, therefore, the cultural level of individuals in a very characteristic manner. A man of reflection never, or only rarely, abandons himself to peals of laughter; *Pericles*, for example, is supposed not to have laughed any more after he had dedicated himself to public affairs. Excessive laughter is rightly held to be evidence of dullness, of a foolish mentality that is insensitive to all great, genuinely substantial interests and regards them as external and alien to it.<sup>25</sup>

*Weeping*, as we know, is the opposite of laughter. Just as the harmony of the subject with itself, sensed at the expense of the comic object, reaches its embodiment in laughter, so the internal *conflict* of the senser, produced by a negative—*pain*—expresses itself in weeping. Tears are the critical outburst,—so not merely the expression but also the elimination of pain; accordingly, they have just as beneficial an effect on health in the presence of significant tribulations of the soul, as pain that does not dissolve in tears can be harmful to health and life.<sup>26</sup> In tears, pain, the feeling of the rending opposition that has penetrated the heart, becomes water, a neutral, indifferent stuff, and this neutral material itself into which pain is transformed is discharged by the soul from its bodiliness. In this discharge, as in that embodiment, lies the cause of the therapeutic effect of weeping.—But that precisely the *eyes* should be the organ from which the pain pouring out in tears surges forth, this lies the fact that the eye has a twofold determination: on the one hand, it is the organ of sight, thus of the sensation of external objects; and secondly it is the place where the soul reveals itself in the *simplest* manner, since the eye's expression displays the fleeting, as it were exhaled, portrait of the soul,—and that is why people, in order to know each other, start by looking each other in the eye. Now the negativity which someone senses in pain inhibits his activity, reduces him to passivity, clouds the ideality, the *light* of his soul, and more or less dissolves the soul's firm unity with itself; accordingly, this state of soul embodies itself by a dimming of the eyes, and still more by a moistening of them which can act so obstructively on the function of sight, on this ideal activity of the eye, that the eye can no longer stand looking out.

A still more perfect embodiment and also expulsion of internal sensations than occurs in laughing and in crying is produced by the *voice*. For in voice it is not that, as in laughing, something present externally is merely formed, nor that, as in crying, a real material is extruded, but that an ideal, a, so to say, incorporeal bodiliness, is generated, thus the sort of material in which the inwardness of the subject thoroughly retains the character of inwardness, the soul's ideality that is for itself receives an external reality fully corresponding to it—a reality which is immediately sublated in its arising, since the propagation of sound is just as

much its disappearance. By the voice therefore sensation obtains an embodiment in which it dies away just as fast as it expresses itself. This is the ground of the higher power present in the voice of eliminating what is sensed internally. That is why the *Romans*, who were well acquainted with this power, intentionally let women wail at funerals in order to make the pain that had emerged in them into something alien to them.<sup>27</sup>

Now the abstract bodiliness of the voice can of course become a sign for others, who recognize it as such; but here, at the standpoint of the natural soul, the voice is not yet a sign produced by the free will, not yet speech articulated by the energy of intelligence and of will, but only a sounding immediately produced by sensation, which, though lacking articulation, still already shows itself capable of various modifications. Animals, in the expression of their sensations, only get as far as the inarticulate voice, as far as the cry of pain or pleasure, and many animals even achieve this ideal expression of their inwardness only in extreme need. Man, however, does not stop short at this animal mode of expressing himself; he creates *articulate* speech by which internal sensations get a *word* in, are expressed in their entire determinacy, become an object to the subject, and at the same time external and alien to him. Articulate speech is thus the highest mode in which man eliminates from himself his internal sensations. It is, therefore, with good reason that on the occasion of someone's death funeral hymns are sung and condolences conveyed; and even though occasionally these may seem or be burdensome, yet they have the advantage, that by the repeated talk about the loss that has occurred they lift the grief over it out of its cramped lodging in the heart into representation and so make it into an object, into something confronting the grief-stricken subject. But poetic composition in particular has the power to liberate from oppressive feelings. *Goethe*, for instance, more than once restored his spiritual freedom by pouring out his pain in a poem.<sup>28</sup>

Here, however, in Anthropology we can speak only in anticipation of the expression and the externalization of internal sensations by articulate speech.

What remains to be mentioned in this place is the physiological aspect of voice. Regarding this point, we know that the voice, this simple vibration of the animal organism, commences in the diaphragm, but then also stands in close connection with the respiratory organs and receives its final formation from the mouth, which has a dual function, first of initiating the immediate conversion of food into structures of the living animal organism and on the other hand, in contrast to this internalizing of the external, of completing the objectification of subjectivity occurring in the voice.

#### §402

Because they are immediate and just *found*, sensations are *individual* and *transient* determinations, alterations in the substantiality of the soul, posited in the soul's being-for-self, which is identical to its substantiality. But this being-for-self

is not merely a formal moment of sensation; the soul is implicitly a reflected totality of sensation—sensation *within itself* of the total substantiality which it is *in itself*;—*feeling* soul.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] In ordinary linguistic usage, sensation and feeling are not sharply distinguished. Still we do not speak of the sensation of right, self-sensation, etc. but of the feeling of right, self-feeling. Sensation is connected with sensitivity; it seems plausible therefore that sensation emphasizes more the aspect of passivity, of *finding*, i.e. the immediacy of the determinacy in feeling, whereas feeling looks more to the selfishness involved in it.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* With what we have said in the preceding Paragraph, we have completed the first part of Anthropology. In that part, we had at first to do with the wholly *qualitatively* determined soul, or with soul in its immediate determinacy. By the immanent advance of the development of our object we have finally arrived at the soul which posits its determinacy *ideally* and in this returns to itself and becomes for itself, i.e. the *sentient* individual soul. This gives us the transition to the second part of Anthropology, a part as difficult as it is interesting and in which the soul opposes its substantiality, confronts itself, and in its determinate sensations at the same time attains to the feeling of itself or to the not yet objective, but only subjective consciousness of its *totality*, and thus, since sensation is tied to the individual, ceases to be merely sentient. In this part, because the soul here appears at the standpoint of its rupture with itself, we have to consider it in its *diseased* state. In this sphere, there prevails a contradiction between the freedom and unfreedom of the soul; for, on the one hand, soul is still fettered to its substantiality, conditioned by its naturalness, while, on the other hand, it is already beginning to separate itself from its substance, from its naturalness, and thus rises to the intermediate stage between its immediate natural life and objective, free consciousness. How far the soul now enters this intermediate stage we propose to elucidate briefly here.<sup>3</sup>

*Mere sensation*, as we have just remarked, has to do only with what is *individual* and *contingent*, with what is *immediately given* and *present*; and this content appears to the sentient soul as its *own* concrete actuality.—When by contrast I rise to the standpoint of *consciousness*, I enter into relationship with a world *outside* me, with an *objective totality*, with an internally *interconnected sphere* of manifold and complex objects confronting me. As objective consciousness I certainly have initially an immediate sensation, but at the same time what is thus sensed is for me a point in the *universal interconnection* of things, something, therefore, which *points out beyond* its *sensory individuality* and immediate presence. So little is objective consciousness tied to the sensory presence of things that I can also be aware of something that is not sensibly present to me, as for example a distant country familiar to me only through books. But consciousness activates its independence from the material of sensation by raising it from the form of *individuality* into the form of *universality*, omitting what is purely



contingent and indifferent in it and holding on to the *essential*; by this transformation, what is sensed becomes something *represented*. This alteration effected by abstract consciousness is something *subjective*, which can go as far as *wilfulness* and *unreality*, can generate representations with no actuality corresponding to them.<sup>4</sup>—Now the soul that *feels* or *glimpses* itself in its *totality* and *universality* and which we have now to consider in the second part of Anthropology, stands in the *middle* between *representing consciousness* on the one hand, and *immediate sensation* on the other. That the universal is *sensed* seems a contradiction; for sensation as such has, as we know, only what is individual for its content. But this contradiction does not affect what we call the *feeling* soul; for this is neither involved in *immediate sensory sensation* and dependent on *immediate, sensory presence*, nor, conversely, is it related to the *pure universal* which is to be grasped only through the mediation of pure *thinking*, but rather has a content that has not yet developed as far as the separation of the universal and the individual, the subjective and the objective. At this standpoint, what I sense, I *am*, and what I am, I sense. I am here *immediately present* in the content, which only subsequently, when I become objective *consciousness*, appears to me as a *self-dependent* world confronting me. This content is still related to the feeling soul as accidents to substance; the soul still appears as the subject and centre of all determinations of content, as the power which in an immediate way reigns over the world of feeling.<sup>5</sup>

Now the transition to the second part of Anthropology makes itself more determinate in the following way. First of all, we must note that the distinction between external and internal sensations considered by us in the preceding Paragraph is only for *us*, i.e., is for the reflecting consciousness, and is definitely not for the soul itself. The *simple unity* of the soul, its serene ideality, does not yet grasp itself in its distinction from an external reality. But though the soul has not yet any consciousness of this its ideal nature, it is none the less the *ideality* or *negativity* of all the various kinds of sensations, each of which in the soul seems to be for itself and indifferent to the others. Just as objectivity displays itself to our *intuition* not as something *separated out* into *different aspects*, but as a *concrete* divided into distinct objects, each of which is in turn for itself a *concrete*, a complex of the most diverse determinations, so the soul itself is a *totality* of infinitely many distinct determinacies which in the soul unite into *one*, so that in them the soul remains, *in itself*, infinite *being-for-itself*. In this totality or ideality, in the timeless, undifferentiated interior of the soul, the sensations which crowd each other out do not, however, vanish absolutely without trace, but remain in the soul as *sublated*, obtain in it their subsistence, as an initially merely *possible* content, which only advances from its *possibility* to *actuality* by becoming *for* the soul or by the soul's becoming *for itself* in it. Thus the soul retains the content of sensation, even if not *for itself*, yet *within itself*. This *preservation*, relating only to a content *internal for itself*, to an affection of myself, to mere sensation, is still remote from *recollection proper*, since this sets out from the intuition of an *externally* posited

object which is to be made internal, and here such an object, as already noted, does not yet exist for the soul.<sup>6</sup>

But there is yet *another* side to the soul's fulfilment besides the content that already *has been* in sensation and of which we spoke initially. Besides this material we are, as actual individuality, *in ourselves* also a *world* of concrete content with an infinite periphery,—we have within us a countless host of relations and connections which are always within us even if they do not enter into our sensation and representation, and which, no matter how much these relations can alter, even without our knowledge, none the less belong to the concrete content of the human soul; so that the soul, in virtue of the infinite wealth of its content, may be described as the soul of a world, as an *individually* determined *world-soul*. Because the human soul is an *individual* soul, a soul determined on all sides and therefore *limited*, it also stands in relationship to a universe determined in accordance with the soul's *individual* standpoint. This counterpart of the soul is not something external to it. On the contrary, the totality of relationships in which the individual human soul stands, constitutes its actual vitality and subjectivity and accordingly has grown together with it just as firmly as, to use an image, the leaves grow with the tree; the leaves, though distinct from the tree, yet belong to it so essentially that the tree dies if they are repeatedly torn off. Of course, more self-dependent human natures that have attained to a life rich in deeds and experience, are far better able to endure the loss of a part of what constitutes their world than people who have grown up in simple circumstances and are incapable of continual striving; in people of this second type the feeling of being alive is sometimes so firmly bound up with their native habitat that in foreign parts they are stricken by home-sickness and resemble a plant which can thrive only in a definite soil. All the same, the concrete self-feeling of even the strongest natures requires a certain range of external relationships, an adequate piece, so to speak, of universe; for without such an individual world the human soul, as we have said, would have no actuality at all, would not attain to a determinately distinct individuality.<sup>7</sup> But the human soul does not merely have *natural differences*, it *differentiates itself within itself*, separates its *substantial totality*, its individual world, from itself, sets this over against itself as the subjective. Its aim here is that what the mind is *in itself* should become *for the soul* or for the mind,—that the cosmos contained, *in itself*, within the mind should enter into mind's *consciousness*. But as we have likewise already noted, at the standpoint of soul, of the not yet free mind, there is no place for *objective* consciousness, for awareness of the world as a world *actually projected out of myself*. The *feeling* soul communes merely with its *internal* determinations. The opposition between itself and that which is for it, remains still enclosed within it. Only when the soul has negatively posited the manifold, immediate content of its individual world, made it into a simple entity, into an *abstract universal*, hence only when a *pure universal* is for the *universality* of the soul and the soul has in this way developed into the *I that is for itself*, its *own object*, into this self-related perfect universal (a development which the soul

as such still lacks), only then, after reaching this goal, does the soul emerge from its *subjective feeling* to genuinely *objective consciousness*, for it is only the I that is for itself, liberated, at least in an abstract way initially, from immediate material, that also allows the material the freedom of subsistence *outside* the I. What we have therefore to consider up to the attainment of this goal, is the struggle for liberation which the soul has to wage against the immediacy of its substantial content in order to become completely in control of itself and corresponding to its concept, — to make itself into what it is *in itself* or by its *concept*, namely, into that self-related, *simple subjectivity* existing in the I.<sup>8</sup> The elevation to this level of development displays a sequence of three stages which can here be indicated schematically in advance.

At the *first* stage we see the soul involved in the *dreaming away* and *intimation* of its *concrete natural life*. In order to comprehend the wonder of this soul-form, which in recent times has received universal attention, we must bear in mind that here the soul still lies in *immediate, undifferentiated unity* with its objectivity.

The *second* stage is the standpoint of *derangement*, i.e. of the soul *divided against itself*, on the one hand already in control of itself, on the other hand not yet in control of itself, but held fast in an *individual particularity* in which it has its actuality.

At the *third* stage finally, the soul becomes master of its *natural individuality*, of its *bodiliness*, reduces this to a subservient *means*, and projects *out* of itself as an *objective world* that content of its substantial totality which does *not* belong to its bodiliness. Reaching this goal, the soul emerges in the abstract freedom of the I and thus becomes *consciousness*.

But about all these stages we have to remark, as we already had to remark in the case of the earlier stages of the soul's development, that here too activities of mind which can only later be considered in their free shape, must be mentioned in advance, since they are already at work in the feeling soul.<sup>9</sup>

### (b) THE FEELING SOUL

#### §403

The feeling individual is the *simple ideality*, subjectivity, of sensation. What it has to do is to *posit* its substantiality, its merely *implicit* fulfilment, as subjectivity, to take possession of itself, and to become for itself as the power over itself. As feeling, the soul is no longer a merely natural, but an inward, individuality; its *being-for-self*, which in the merely substantial totality is only formal, is to be liberated and made independent.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Nowhere else is it of such essential importance for our understanding to keep hold of the determination of *ideality* as it is in the case of the soul and still more of the mind. Ideality is the *negation* of the real, but the real is also

*stored up*, virtually retained, although it does not *exist*. It is this determination that we have before us in respect of representations, memory. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensation-determinations, representations, information, thoughts, etc.; yet *I* am for all that an entirely *simple* entity,—a cavern without determinations, in which all this is stored up, without existing. It is only when *I* recall *one* representation, that I bring it out of that interior to existence, before consciousness. Sometimes, in sickness, representations or information, supposed to have been forgotten years ago, because for all that time they have not been brought into consciousness, once more come to light. They were not in our possession, nor perhaps by such reproduction as occurs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession; and yet they were in us and remain in us from now on. Thus a person can never know how much information he really *has in him*, even if he has forgotten it. It belongs not to his actuality, not to his subjectivity as such, but only to his implicit being. The individuality is and remains this *simple inwardness*, amidst all the determinacy and mediation of consciousness that is later installed in it.<sup>2</sup> Here we must keep in mind that the soul to which this *simplicity* belongs is at first the feeling soul, in which bodiliness is contained, and we must resist the idea suggested by consciousness and the intellect, that this bodiliness is a materiality outside the soul and with its parts external to each other. Just as the number and *variety* of *representations* does not establish an asunderness and real plurality in the *I*, so the real apartness of bodiliness has no truth for the feeling soul. As sentient, the soul is determined *immediately*, and so in a natural and bodily way, but this asunderness and sensory multiplicity of the bodily does not count for the soul, any more than it does for the concept, as anything real, or therefore as a barrier. The soul is the *existent* concept, the existence of the speculative. Thus in the bodily the soul is simple, *omnipresent* unity. For representation the body is *one* representation, and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization has won through to the *simplicity* of a determinate concept; similarly in the feeling soul, bodiliness, and all the asunderness that belongs to its sphere, is reduced to *ideality*, to the *truth* of the natural multiplicity. The soul is *in itself* the totality of nature, as an individual soul it is a monad; it is itself the posited totality of its *particular* world, so that this world is included in it, its fulfilment; in relating to this world it relates only to itself.<sup>3</sup>

#### §404

As *individual*, the soul is altogether *exclusive* and it posits difference *within itself*. What is differentiated from it is not yet an external object, as in consciousness, but only the determinations of its sentient totality. In this judgement, the soul is the subject in general; its object is its *substance*, which is at the same time its predicate. This substance is not the content of its natural life, but becomes the content of the individual sensation-packed soul; but since the soul is in that

content at the same time *particular*, the content is its particular world, in so far as that world is, in an implicit way, included in the ideality of the subject.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] For itself, this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its determinations do not develop to conscious and intelligent content; in this respect it is altogether formal. It acquires a peculiar interest in so far as it becomes a *form* and thus a *state* (§380), to which the soul that has already advanced to consciousness and intellect, may again sink down. The more genuine form of the mind, existing in a more subordinate and abstract form, involves a discrepancy, which is *disease*. In this sphere we must consider, first, the abstract formations of the soul for themselves, and then consider them as diseased states of mind, since the latter can only be understood in terms of the former.<sup>2</sup>

### (α) *The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy*

#### §405

(1) Initially the feeling individuality is indeed a monadic individual, but, being *immediate*, it is not yet *Itself*, not a subject reflected into itself, and is therefore *passive*. Hence its *selfish* individuality is a subject different from it, a subject that may even be another individual. In relation to this subject it takes the form of a substance, which is only a dependent predicate; the subject's selfishness sets it in vibration and determines it without the least resistance. This subject may be called its *genius*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] In immediate existence this is the relationship of the child in its mother's womb, a relationship neither merely bodily nor merely mental, but *psychical*—a relationship of the soul. Here are two individuals, yet still in undivided soul-unity: the one is still no *self*, not yet impenetrable, incapable of resistance; the other is its subject, the *single* self of both.—The mother is the *genius* of the child; for by *genius* we commonly mean the selfish totality of the mind, in so far as it exists *for itself*, and constitutes the subjective substantiality of another, which is only externally posited as an individual; the latter has only a formal being-for-self. The substance of the *genius* is the whole totality of reality, of life, and of character, not as a mere possibility, or capacity, or in-itself, but as activity and activation, as concrete subjectivity.<sup>2</sup>

If we look only at the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its particular integuments, etc. and of its connection with the mother by means of umbilical cord, placenta, etc., all that is presented to the senses and reflection is its external anatomical and physiological existence; for the essential matter, the psychical relationship, these sensory and material externalities and mediations have no truth. What ought to be noted about this connection is not merely the remarkable way in which determinations are communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions, injuries, etc., of the mother, but the whole psychical *judgement* of the substance, by which the female nature can (like

the monocotyledons in the vegetable kingdom) within itself break in two and in which the child does not merely get by *communication*, but originally receives in itself, susceptibility to illnesses as well as other predispositions of form, temperament, character, talent, idiosyncrasies, etc.<sup>3</sup>

Sporadic examples and traces of this *magic* relationship appear elsewhere in the area of sober conscious life, say between friends, especially female friends with delicate nerves (a relationship which may develop into magnetic phenomena), between husband and wife and between members of the same family.<sup>4</sup>

The totality of feeling has for its self a different subjectivity, which, in the aforementioned form of immediate existence of this life of feeling, is also another individual confronting it. But the totality of feeling is destined to elevate its being-for-self out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same individuality; this subjectivity is then its indwelling consciousness, sober, intelligent, and rational. For such a consciousness the life of feeling is the substantial and merely implicit material, whose rational, self-conscious, determining genius has become sober subjectivity. But this nucleus, this being of feeling, contains not only the intrinsically unconscious predisposition, temperament, etc. but it also receives into its enveloping simplicity (in habit, see below) all further ties and essential relationships, fortunes, principles—in general everything belonging to the character, and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has played its most important part. The being of feeling is thus intrinsically a completely determinate soul. The totality of the individual in this compressed form is distinct from the existing unfolding of its consciousness, its view of the world, developed interests, inclinations, etc. In contrast to this mediated asunderness this intensive form of individuality has been called the *genius*, which has the final determination in the show of mediations, intentions, reasons, in which the developed consciousness indulges. This concentrated individuality also makes an appearance in the form of what is called the *heart* or *breast*. A man is said to be heartless when he thinks and acts with sober consciousness in accordance with his determinate purposes, whether they be great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests; a good-hearted man means rather one who gives free rein to the individuality of his feeling, even if it is restricted in scope, and throws himself with his whole individuality into its particularities and is completely fulfilled by them. But of such a good nature it may be said that it is not so much the genius itself as the policy of *indulgere genio*.<sup>5</sup>

*Zusatz.* What we described in the *Zusatz* to §402 as the soul involved in the *dreaming away* and *intimation* of its individual world, has been called in the heading of the above Paragraph 'the feeling soul in its immediacy'. We propose to portray this developmental form of the human soul more determinately than we did in the above Remark. Already in the Remark to §404 it was said that the stage of dreaming and intimation also constitutes a form to which, as a state of disease, even the mind that has already developed into consciousness and intellect can again relapse. Both modes of mind—healthy, intellectual consciousness

on the one hand, dreaming and intimation on the other—can now, in the *first* developmental stage of the feeling soul here under discussion, exist as more or less *mutually interpenetrating*, since the peculiarity of this stage consists precisely in the fact that here the dull, subjective or glimpsing consciousness is not yet posited in *direct opposition* to the free, objective or intellectual consciousness, as it is at the *second* stage of feeling soul, at the standpoint of *derangement*, but has rather only the relationship to it of something *different*, of something therefore that *can be mixed* with intellectual consciousness. Mind at this stage therefore does not yet exist as the *contradiction within its own self*; the two sides which, in derangement, fall into contradiction with each other still stand here in an *unconstrained* relation to each other. This standpoint can be called the *magical* relationship of the feeling soul, for with this expression one denotes a mediation-free relationship of the inner to an outer or to an other in general. A magical force is one whose effect is not determined by the interconnection, the conditions and mediations of objective relationships; and ‘the feeling soul in its immediacy’ is such a force working without mediation.<sup>6</sup>

For an understanding of this stage in the soul’s development it will not be superfluous to explain in more detail the concept of *magic*. *Absolute* magic would be the magic of *mind as such*. This, too, exerts a magical infection on objects, acts magically on another mind. But in this relationship immediacy is only one *moment*; mediation effected by thinking and intuition, as well as by speech and gesture, forms the other moment in it. The child is, of course, infected in a predominantly *immediate* way by the mind of the adults it sees around it; at the same time, however, this relationship is *mediated* by consciousness and by the incipient independence of the child. Among adults, a superior mind exerts a magical force over the weaker mind; thus, for example, *Lear* over *Kent*, who felt himself irresistibly drawn to the unhappy monarch because the king seemed to him to have something in his countenance which he, as he puts it, ‘would fain call master’. A similar answer, too, was given by a queen of France who, when accused of having practised sorcery on her husband, replied that she had used no other magical force against him than that which nature bestows on the stronger mind over the weaker. In the cases cited, the magic consists in an immediate influence of one mind on another mind, and generally in magic or sorcery, even when it related to merely natural objects like the sun and moon, the idea has always been in play that sorcery occurs essentially by the immediate operation of the force of the mind, and in fact by the power of the *diabolical* mind, not the *divine* mind, so in the very same measure that someone possesses the power of sorcery, he is subservient to the devil.<sup>7</sup>

Now the most mediation-free magic is more exactly that which the individual mind exerts over its *own* bodiliness, when it makes this a subservient, unresisting executant of its will. But also over *animals* man exerts an extremely mediation-free magical force, for these cannot endure the gaze of man.<sup>8</sup>

Besides the magical modes of mind's activity just cited, which *actually* occur, people have by contrast *falsely* ascribed to humankind a *primitive magical state* in which the mind of man, without developed consciousness, gained knowledge quite immediately of the laws of external nature and of its own genuine essence, and also of the nature of God, in a much more perfect manner than now. This whole idea is quite as contrary to the *Bible* as to reason; for in the myth of the Fall, the Bible expressly declares that knowledge of the truth was granted to man only through the *disruption* of that original paradisiac unity of man with nature. The fabled mass of primitive men's knowledge of astronomy and other matters dwindles to nothing on closer examination. It can, of course, be said of the *mysteries* that they contain the remnants of an earlier knowledge; traces of reason instinctively at work are found in the earliest and rudest times. But such instinctive productions of human reason, lacking the form of thought, must not be taken as proofs of a *primitive scientific knowledge*; on the contrary, they are necessarily something thoroughly *unscientific*, belonging merely to sensation and intuition, since science cannot be the *alpha*, only the *omega*.<sup>9</sup>

So much for the *essence* of the magical *in general*. But as regards the precise way in which it appears in the sphere of *Anthropology*, we here have to distinguish *two different* forms of the magical relationship of the soul.

The first of these forms can be designated as the *formal subjectivity of life*. This subjectivity is *formal*, because far from laying a claim to what belongs to objective consciousness, this subjectivity itself constitutes a *moment* of objective life. For this reason it is no more something that *ought not to be*, something *diseased*, than, for example, cutting one's teeth; on the contrary, it is only to be expected in a healthy human being. But the formal nature, the undifferentiated simplicity, of this subjectivity, at the same time implies that there can be no question here even of a relationship of two *self-subsistent personalities* to each other, let alone the *direct opposition* of subjective consciousness to objective consciousness, which is only prevalent in derangement and is completely excluded here; such a relationship will only present itself to us with the second form of the magical state of the soul.

The first form of this state to be discussed next contains, on its part, *three different* states:

- αα) *natural dreaming*;
- ββ) *the life of the child in the womb*; and
- γγ) *the relationship of our conscious life to our secret inner life*, to our determinate mental nature, or to what has been called the *genius* of man.<sup>10</sup>

αα) *Dreaming*. In dealing with the *awaking* of the individual soul in §398 and more precisely in establishing the determinate distinction between *sleep* and *waking*, we already had to speak of *natural dreaming* in anticipation, because this is a moment of sleep, and on a superficial inspection can be regarded as proof of the identical nature of sleep and waking; against this superficiality we had to insist on the essential distinction between these two states even with regard to dreaming.



But the proper place to consider the last-named soul-activity is with the beginning made in §405 of the development of the soul involved in the dreaming away and intimation of its concrete natural life. Now since we refer here to what has already been said in the Remark and *Zusatz* to §398 about the thoroughly *subjective* nature of dreams, bereft of intellectual objectivity, the only thing we have to add is that in the state of dreaming the human soul is filled not merely with *individualized* impressions but it attains, more than is usually the case in the distractions of the waking soul, to a profound, powerful feeling of its *whole individual* nature, of the *entire compass* of its past, present, and future; and that the fact that the *individual totality* of the soul is sensed in this way is precisely the reason why dreaming must be mentioned in our consideration of the soul that feels itself.<sup>11</sup>

ββ) *The child in the womb*. Whereas in dreaming the individual attaining to the feeling of itself is involved in a *simple, immediate relation to itself* and this, its being-for-itself, has entirely the form of subjectivity, the child in the womb by contrast shows us a soul that is actually for itself not in the child, but only in the mother, and cannot yet support itself but is supported only by the mother's soul; so that here, instead of that *simple relation* of the soul *to itself* present in dreaming, there exists an equally simple, immediate relation to *another* individual in whom the still selfless soul of the foetus finds its self. For the intellect, with its inability to comprehend the unity of what is distinct, there is something marvellous in this relationship, for here we see an immediate merging of two lives, an undivided soul-unity of two individuals, one of which is an *actual* self that is for its own self, while the other has at least a *formal* being-for-self and comes ever closer to actual being-for-self. But for philosophical thinking this undivided soul-unity contains nothing incomprehensible, especially as the self of the child cannot yet put up any resistance to the self of the mother, but is completely open to the immediate influence of the mother's soul. This influence reveals itself in those phenomena called *birthmarks*. Much of what is classed under this heading may of course have a *purely organic* cause. But as regards many physiological phenomena there can be no doubt that these are posited by the mother's sensation and that, therefore, a *psychical* cause underlies them. There are, for example, reports of children coming into the world with an injured arm because the mother either had actually broken an arm or at least had knocked it so severely that she feared it was broken, or, finally, because she had been scared by the sight of someone else's broken arm. Similar examples are too familiar for many of them to need to be cited here. Such an embodiment of the mother's inner impressions can be explained on the one hand by the unresisting weakness of the foetus, and on the other by the fact that in the mother enfeebled by pregnancy and no longer having a completely independent life for itself but imparting her life to the child, sensations acquire an unusual degree of vitality and strength, overpowering the mother herself. To this power of the mother's sensation even the infant is still very much subjected; unpleasant emotions can, as we know, spoil the mother's

milk and thus adversely affect the child suckled by her. On the other hand, in the relationship of parents to their grown-up children something magical has in fact shown itself whenever children and parents who had long been separated and did not know each other, unconsciously felt a mutual attraction; we cannot say, however, that this feeling is anything universal and necessary, for there are examples of fathers killing their sons in battle and sons their fathers, in circumstances where they would have been able to avoid this killing, if they had had any suspicion of their natural connection.<sup>12</sup>

γγ) *The relationship of the individual to its genius.* The third way in which the human soul arrives at the feeling of its totality is the relationship of the individual to its *genius*. By genius, we are to understand the *particularity* of the individual, which in all situations and relationships decides its conduct and fate. That is to say, I am a *twofold* entity within myself: on the one hand, what I am aware of myself as being in my *external* life and in my *universal* representations, and on the other hand, what I am in my *interior*, determined in a *particular* way. This particularity of my interior constitutes my *destiny*, for it is the oracle on whose pronouncement all resolutions of the individual depend; it forms the objectivity which asserts itself from out of the *interior* of the individual's character. That the circumstances and relationships in which the individual is situated turn his fate in just *this* direction, and no other—this lies not merely in the circumstances and relationships, in their peculiarity, nor even merely in the *universal* nature of the individual, but also in his particularity. This determinate individual reacts differently to the same circumstances from a hundred other individuals; certain circumstances can have a magical effect on one individual, while another individual will not be forced by them off his usual path. Circumstances, therefore, blend with the interior of individuals in a contingent, particular manner; so that individuals become what becomes of them partly by circumstances and by what is universally valid, and partly by their own particular inner determination. Of course, the particularity of the individual provides *grounds*, thus *universally valid* determinations, for its acts and omissions; but it always does this only in a *particular* way, since its attitude here essentially involves *feeling*. Consequently, even wide-awake, intellectual consciousness operating in universal determinations is determined by its genius in such an overpowering manner that the individual here appears in a relationship of dependency, a relationship that can be compared to the dependence of the foetus on the mother's soul, or to the passive way in which the soul, in dreams, attains to the representation of its individual world. But on the other hand, the relationship of the individual to his genius is distinguished from the two relationships of the feeling soul considered earlier, by the fact that it is their *unity*, that it unites into *one* the moment of the *simple unity* of the soul with itself contained in *natural dreaming*, and the moment of the *duality* of soul-life present in the relationship of the *foetus* to the mother, since the genius, on the one hand, is a *selfish other* confronting the individual, like the mother's soul in relation to the foetus, and, on the other hand, forms a *unity* with

the individual just as *inseparable*, as the unity of the soul with the world of its dreams.<sup>13</sup>

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(2) The life of feeling, when it becomes a *form*, a *state*, of the self-conscious, educated, sober human being, is a disease, in which the individual stands in *unmediated* relationship with the concrete content of its own self and has its sober consciousness of itself and of the intelligibly ordered world as a state distinct from its feeling-life. This is seen in *magnetic somnambulism* and related states.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] In this summary encyclopaedic exposition it is impossible to supply what would need to be supplied for a proof of the determination we have given of the remarkable state aroused chiefly by animal magnetism, to show, in other words, that the experiences correspond to it. For this the phenomena, intrinsically so complex and so very different one from another, would have first of all to be brought under their universal points of view. The facts, it might seem, are above all in need of verification. But such a verification would, after all, be superfluous for those on whose behalf it was needed; for they make the inquiry extremely easy for themselves by flatly declaring the accounts—ininitely numerous though they be and authenticated by the education, character, etc., of the witnesses—to be mere deception and imposture. They are so fixed in their *a priori* intellect that no authentication can make any headway against it, and they have even denied what they have seen with their own eyes. In order to believe in this area even what one sees with one's own eyes, and still more to comprehend it, the first requisite is not to be in bondage to the categories of the intellect.<sup>2</sup> The main points of importance may be given here:

αα) To the *concrete* being of an individual belongs the entirety of his fundamental interests, the essential and the particular empirical relationships in which he stands to other men and to the world at large. This totality constitutes *his* actuality, in the sense that it is *immanent* in him; just now we called it his *genius*. This genius is not the free mind that wills and thinks; the form of feeling, in which the individual under consideration here is immersed, is, on the contrary, a surrender of his existence as mental self-possession. The first conclusion to be drawn from the account we have given bears on the *content*: in somnambulism only the sphere of the individually determined world, of particular interests and restricted relationships, enter into consciousness. Scientific discoveries or philosophical concepts and universal truths require a different terrain, thinking that has developed out of the haze of feeling life to free consciousness. It is foolish to expect revelations about Ideas from the somnambulist state.<sup>3</sup>

ββ) The man of sound sense and intellect is aware in a self-conscious, intelligent way of this actuality of his which makes up the concrete fulfilment of his individuality; he has an alert awareness of it in the form of the interconnection between himself and the determinations of that actuality as an external world

distinct from himself, and he is similarly aware of this world as a *network of intelligible interconnections*. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also before his eyes these intelligible interconnexions of his world and the *mediation* of his ideas and purposes with the objective existences, which are thoroughly mediated among themselves (cf. §398 Remark). At the same time, this world outside him has its threads in him in such a way that what he actually is *for himself*, consists of *these threads*; so that he too would die away internally together with the disappearance of these externalities, unless religion, subjective reason, and character make him more expressly self-supporting and independent of them. In this case he is less susceptible to the form of the state of which here we speak. For the phenomenon of that identity we can recall the effect that the death of beloved relatives, friends, etc. can have on those left behind, so that the one dies or fades away with the loss of the other. (Thus *Cato*, after the downfall of the Roman republic, could live no longer: his inner actuality was neither wider nor higher than it.) Compare home-sickness, and the like.<sup>4</sup>

yy) But when the fulfilment of consciousness, its external world and its relationship to that world, is under a veil, and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep, catalepsy, and other diseases, for example, those connected with female development, or at the approach of death, etc.), then that *immanent actuality* of the individual remains the same substantial totality in the form of a *life of feeling*, which is inwardly seeing, inwardly aware. Because it is the developed, adult, educated consciousness which is reduced to this state of feeling, it does retain along with its content the formality of its being-for-self, a *formal* intuition and awareness, which, however, does not get as far as the judgement of consciousness by which the content of consciousness, when it is healthy and awake, presents itself to it as outer objectivity. The individual is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality, the self-intuition of the genius. Thus the characteristic feature in such awareness is that the individual can be *immediately* aware of, *intuit*, the content in this immanence—the very same content which is objective for healthy consciousness as intelligible actuality, and to be aware of which consciousness in its sober state needs intelligible *mediation* in the whole of its real expansion. This intuition is a sort of *clairvoyance*; for it is awareness in the unseparated substantiality of the genius, and is situated in the *essential core* of the interconnexion, and so is not subject to the series of mediating conditions, external one to another, which sober consciousness has to go through and in view of which it is restricted in its own external individuality. But such clairvoyance, because, in its hazy obscurity, the content is not set out in an intelligible interconnection, is *at the mercy* of all its own *contingency* of feeling, of imagining, etc., not to mention that ideas of *others* (see below) intrude into its vision. It is thus impossible to make out whether clairvoyants see correctly more than they get wrong, or vice versa.—But it is absurd to regard this visionary state as an

elevation of the mind and as a more genuine state, inherently capable of discovering *universal* truths.\*<sup>5</sup>

δδ) An essential determination in this life of feeling, which lacks the intellect and will of a person, is this: it is a *state of passivity*, like that of the child in the womb. The diseased subject accordingly falls into, and after the state continues in, *the power of another*, the magnetizer; so that when the two are in this psychical connexion, the selfless individual, not actually a person, has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the self-possessed individual, that this other individual is its current subjective soul, its genius, which can even fill it with content. That the somnambulist individual senses in himself tastes and smells which are present in the individual with whom he is in rapport, that he is aware of his other current intuitions and inner ideas, but as if they were his own, shows the *substantial identity* with another, which the soul (which even in its concreteness is genuinely immaterial) is capable of. In this substantial identity there is only one subjectivity of consciousness, and the individuality of the patient is indeed a being-for-self, but it is an empty being-for-self, not present to itself, not actual; this formal self accordingly has its fulfilments in the sensations and ideas of the other, it sees, smells, tastes, reads, and hears also in the other. It is further to be noted on this point that the somnambulist in this way comes to stand in a relationship with two genii and a twofold content, his own and that of the magnetizer. Which sensations or visions he, in this formal perception, receives, intuits, and brings to awareness from his own interior, and which from the representation of the individual with whom he stands in rapport, is indeterminate. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions, and accounts among other things for the diversity that has inevitably come to light among somnambulists from different countries and in rapport with persons of different education, as regards their views on diseased states and ways of curing them, on medicines, as well as on scientific and intellectual categories, etc.<sup>7</sup>

εε) In this feeling substantiality the contrast to external objectivity is absent. Similarly *within* itself the subject has a unity, in which the particularities of feeling have disappeared, so that, when the activity of the sense-organs is asleep, the

\* Plato had a better understanding of the relationship of prophecy in general to sober conscious awareness than do many moderns, who were quick to suppose that in Platonic conceptions of *enthusiasm* they had found an authority for their belief in the sublimity of the revelations of somnambulist vision. In the *Timaeus* (Stephanus edition, III, pp. 71 f.) *Plato* says that to give the irrational part of the soul also some degree of participation in the truth, God created the *liver* and gave it *manteia*, the capacity for having apparitions. Of God's having given this power of prophecy to *human irrationality*, there is, he adds, this sufficient proof: no man in his right mind is blessed with a genuine apparition, unless his intellect is fettered in sleep or distracted by *illness* or an enthusiasm. 'What was said long ago is correct: to play one's own part and to know oneself is the privilege of sobriety'. *Plato* notes quite correctly the bodily aspect of such vision and awareness, and also the possibility of the truth of apparitions—but also their subordination to rational consciousness.<sup>6</sup>

common feeling adapts itself to the particular functions; one sees, hears, etc. with the fingers, and especially with the pit of the stomach.<sup>8</sup>

To *comprehend* means, for intellectual reflexion, to recognize the series of *mediations* between a phenomenon and another reality with which it is connected, to discern what is called the course of nature, i.e. in accordance with the laws and relationships of the intellect, for example, causality, grounds, etc. The life of feeling, even when it still retains a merely formal awareness, as in the diseased states mentioned, is just that form of *immediacy*, in which the distinctions of the subjective and objective, of intelligent personality in contrast to an external world, and those relationships of finitude between them, are absent. The comprehension of this interconnexion, devoid of relationships and yet completely fulfilled, is made intrinsically impossible by the presupposition of independent personalities, contrasting with each other and with the content in the form of an objective world, and by the presupposition of the absoluteness of spatial and material asunderness in general.<sup>9</sup>

*Zusatz.* In the *Zusatz* to §405 we said that *two* different forms of the *magical* relationship of the *feeling* soul are to be distinguished and that the *first* of these forms can be called the *formal* subjectivity of life. Consideration of this first form was concluded in the *Zusatz* just mentioned. We therefore now have to consider the *second* form of that magical relationship, namely the *real* subjectivity of the feeling soul. We call this subjectivity *real* because here, instead of the *inseparable, substantial soul-unity* dominant in dreaming and also in the state of the foetus and in the relationship of the individual to his genius, there emerges an *actually twofold* soul-life, which releases its *two sides to a peculiar reality of their own*. The first of these two sides is the unmediated relationship of the feeling soul to its individual world and substantial actuality; the second side, by contrast, is the mediated relation of the soul to its objectively interconnected world. When these two sides *diverge* and break *loose* from their *reliance on each other*, this must be designated an *illness*, since this divergence, in contrast to the modes of formal subjectivity considered in the *Zusatz* to §405, does not constitute a moment of objective life itself. Just as *bodily* illness consists in the fixation of an organ or system in opposition to the universal harmony of the individual life and such obstruction and separation sometimes advances so far that the particular activity of a system makes itself into a centre concentrating into itself the rest of the organism's activity, into a rampant growth, so too in the *soul-life* illness results if the merely *soulful* side of the organism, becoming independent of the power of *mental* consciousness, usurps the latter's function and the mind, in losing control of the soulful component belonging to it, no longer remains in command of itself but itself sinks to the form of the soulful and in this way surrenders the objective relationship to the actual world essential to the sound mind, i.e., the relationship mediated by sublation of what is externally posited. That it is possible for the soulful side to become independent in relation to the mind and even to usurp its

function lies in the fact that the soulful is both *distinct* from the mind and in itself *identical* with it. When it separates from the mind and posits itself for itself, the soulful gives itself the semblance of being what the mind in truth is, namely, the soul that is for itself in the form of *universality*. But the *illness of soul* arising from that separation is not merely to be *compared* with *bodily* illness, but is more or less *bound up* with it, because when the soulful breaks loose from the mind, the bodiliness necessary for the empirical existence of the mind as well as of the soulful, is divided between these two diverging sides and accordingly itself becomes something separated within itself and therefore diseased.<sup>10</sup>

Now the diseased states in which such a separation of the soulful from mental consciousness emerges are very varied in kind; almost any illness can advance to the point of this separation. But here in the philosophical treatment of our subject we do not have to pursue this indeterminate multiplicity of diseased states but only to establish the *main forms* of the *universal* which shapes itself in them in various ways. Among the illnesses in which this universal can appear are *sleep-walking*, *cataplexy*, the *onset of puberty* in young women, the state of *pregnancy*, also *St Vitus's dance*, and the moment of approaching *death* as well, if death brings about the relevant splitting of life into a weakening healthy, mediated consciousness and a soulful awareness approaching ever closer to complete ascendancy; but especially we must examine here the state which has been called *animal magnetism*, both when it develops *by itself* in an individual and when it is produced in a particular manner in the individual by *another* individual. *Mental* causes, particularly religious and political exaltation, can also bring about the relevant separation of soul-life. In the war of the Cevennes, for example, the free emergence of the soulful showed up as a prophetic gift present to a high degree in children, in girls and especially in old people. But the most remarkable example of such exaltation is the famous *Jeanne d'Arc*, in whom we can see, on the one hand, the patriotic enthusiasm of a quite pure, simple soul and, on the other, a kind of magnetic state.<sup>11</sup>

After these preliminary remarks we propose to consider here the main individual forms in which a divergence of the soulful and objective consciousness shows up. We hardly need recall here what we have already said about the difference between these two modes of man's response to his world: namely, that *objective consciousness* is aware of the world as an objectivity *external* to it, infinitely *manifold*, but at all its points *necessarily interconnected*, containing *nothing unmediated* within it; and it responds to the world in a corresponding way, i.e., in an equally *manifold*, *determinate*, *mediated*, and *necessary* way, and is therefore able to enter into relation with a *determinate* form of external objectivity only by a *determinate* sense organ, for example, is able to see only with the *eyes*; whereas *feeling*, or the *subjective* mode of awareness, can dispense wholly, or at least in part, with the mediations and conditions indispensable to objective awareness, can, for example, perceive visible things without the aid of the eyes and without the mediation of light.

αα) This immediate awareness appears first and foremost in so-called *metal- and water-diviners*. By this we understand people who in a fully waking state, without the mediation of the sense of sight, detect metal or water lying under the ground. The not infrequent occurrence of such people is beyond any doubt. *Amoretti* has, he assures us, discovered this peculiarity of feeling in more than four hundred individuals, some of them entirely healthy.<sup>12</sup> Besides metal and water, salt is also sensed by some people with no mediation at all, since salt, if it is present in a large quantity, arouses nausea and uneasiness in them. In looking for hidden water and metals, and salt too, individuals of the type we have in mind also employ a divining-rod. This is a hazel twig shaped like a fork, the two prongs being held in both hands and the other end bending down towards the objects just mentioned. It goes without saying that this movement of the wood does not somehow have its ground in the wood itself but is determined solely by the sensation of the individual; just as, in what is called pendulation too—although here, in case of the application of several metals, a certain reciprocal action between them can take place—the sensation of the individual is always the main determinant; for if, for example, one holds a gold ring over a glass of water and the ring strikes the rim of the glass as many times as the clock shows hours, this stems solely from the fact that if, for example, eleven o'clock strikes and I know that it is eleven o'clock, my knowing this is sufficient to stop the pendulum.—But feeling, armed with the divining-rod, is supposed to have occasionally extended beyond the discovery of dead natural things and especially to have served for detecting thieves and murderers. However much charlatanism there may after all be in the stories available about this point, some of the cases mentioned in them seem worthy of credence, particularly, for example, the case in which a French farmer living in the seventeenth century was suspected of murder, and when taken into the cellar where the murder had been committed, there broke out in a cold sweat and got a feeling of the murderers in virtue of which he detected the route they had taken on their flight and the places they had stayed at. He discovered one of the murderers in a prison in southern France and pursued the second up to the Spanish frontier where he was forced to turn back. Such an individual has a sensation as sharp as a dog which follows its master's trail for miles.

ββ) The *second* phenomenon to be considered here of immediate or feeling awareness, has this in common with the first just discussed: in both an object is sensed without the mediation of the *specific* sense to which the object is mainly related. But at the same time, this second phenomenon is distinguished from the first by the fact that in it a response takes place that is not so entirely unmediated as in the first, since the specific sense in question is replaced either by the *common sense* active mainly in the *pit of the stomach*, or by the *sense of touch*. Such feeling is displayed both in *cataplexy* in general, a state in which the organs are paralysed, and especially in sleep-walking, a kind of cataleptic state in which dreaming expresses itself not merely in speech but also in walking about and gives rise to other actions, underlying which there is an often accurate feeling of the



relationships of surrounding objects. As regards the emergence of this state, it can be produced, when there is a determinate disposition to it, by purely external things, for example, by certain foods eaten in the evening. After the emergence of this state, the soul remains just as dependent on external things; for example, the sound of music near sleep-walkers has induced them to recite whole novels in their sleep. But with regard to the activity of the senses in this state, it must be noted that proper sleep-walkers may well *hear* and *feel*, but that their *eye* by contrast, whether it is open or shut, is fixed, that therefore the sense for which, in particular, objects recede to the *distance* from me necessary for the genuine relationship of consciousness, ceases to be active in this state, where the *separation* of the subjective and objective is *not present*. As already noted, in sleep-walking *sight* is extinguished and replaced by the sense of *feeling*—a replacement that also occurs in really blind people, only to a lesser extent, and, incidentally, in both cases must not be understood to mean that by the dulling of one sense an intensification accrues to the other sense in a purely physical way, since this intensification rather arises merely from the soul's throwing itself into the sense of feeling with undivided force. However, the sense of feeling by no means always guides sleep-walkers correctly; their complex actions are a contingent matter. Such persons do occasionally write letters in their sleep-walking; often however they are deceived by their feeling, when they believe for example that they are mounted on a horse when in fact they are on a roof. But besides the marvellous intensification of the sense of feeling, in cataleptic states, as also already noted, the *common sense* too, mainly in the *pit of the stomach*, reaches such a degree of heightened activity that it takes the place of *sight*, *hearing*, or even *taste*. Thus at a time when animal magnetism was not yet well-known, a French doctor in Lyons treated a sick person who could hear and read only in the pit of his stomach and who could read a book held by someone in another room who was put in contact with the individual standing by the pit of the sick person's stomach by a chain of persons standing in between, as arranged by the doctor. Such seeing at a distance has, incidentally, been described in various ways by those in whom it occurred. They often say that they see the objects *internally*, or they assert that it seems to them as if the objects emitted rays. But as regards the above-mentioned replacement of *taste* by the *common sense*, there are instances of persons' tasting food placed on their stomachs.<sup>13</sup>

γγ) The *third* phenomenon of immediate awareness is this. Without the involvement of any *specific* sense and without the *common sense* becoming active in an individual part of the body, an *indeterminate sensation* gives rise to an *intimation* or *clairvoyance*, a *vision* of something not *sensibly near* but *distant* in space or in time, of something *future* or *past*. Now though it is often difficult to distinguish *merely subjective* visions relating to *non-existent* objects from those visions which have something actual for their content, yet this distinction must be maintained here. The first kind of vision too does occur in somnambulism, but mostly in a predominantly physical state of illness, for example in the heat of

a fever, even in waking consciousness. An example of such a subjective vision is Friedrich Nicolai, who, in a waking state, saw with perfectly clarity other houses in the street than those actually present there, and yet knew that this was an illusion. The predominantly physical ground of the poetic illusion of this otherwise thoroughly prosaic individual revealed itself when the illusion was dispelled by the application of leeches to the rectum.<sup>14</sup>

But in our anthropological consideration we have to keep in view mainly the second kind of visions, those which relate to actually existent objects. In order to comprehend the wonder of the phenomena belonging here it is important to bear in mind the following points regarding our view of the soul.

The soul is the *all-pervading*, not existing merely in a particular individual; for as we have already said earlier, the soul must be conceived as the truth, as the ideality, of *everything material*, as the *entirely universal* in which all differences are only *ideal* and which does *not one-sidedly confront the Other*, but *overarches the Other*.<sup>15</sup> But the soul is, at the same time, an *individual* soul, determined in a *particular* way; it has therefore various determinations or particularizations within itself; these appear, for example, as urges and inclinations. These determinations, though distinct from each other, are nevertheless for themselves only something *universal*. Only in me as a *determinate* individual do they first acquire a *determinate* content. Thus, for example, love for parents, relatives, friends, etc. becomes individualized in me; for I cannot be a friend, etc. *in general*, I am necessarily *this* friend living with *these* friends in *this* place at *this* time and in *this* situation. All the universal soul-determinations individualized in me and experienced by me constitute my actuality, are therefore not left to my discretion but rather form the powers of my life and belong to my actual being just as much as my head or my breast belong to my living embodiment. I *am* this whole circle of determinations: they have coalesced with my individuality; each individual point in this circle—for example, the fact that I am now sitting here—shows itself exempt from the wilfulness of my representation by the fact that it is placed in the totality of my self-feeling as a link in a chain of determinations or, in other words, is embraced by the feeling of the totality of my actuality. But in so far as I am at first only a feeling soul, not yet waking, free self-consciousness, I am aware of this actuality of mine, of this world of mine, in a *wholly immediate*, quite *abstractly positive* manner, since, as already noted, at this standpoint I have not yet detached the world from myself, not yet posited it as an external entity, and my awareness of it is therefore not yet *mediated* by the opposition of the subjective and objective and by sublation of this opposition.<sup>16</sup>

The *content* of this clairvoyant awareness, we must now determine in more detail.

(1) First, there are states in which the soul is aware of a content it had long since *forgotten* and which, in waking, it is no longer able to bring into consciousness. This phenomenon occurs in various illnesses. The most striking phenomenon of this kind is when, in illnesses, people talk in a language which, though they

have studied it in early youth, they can no longer speak in their waking state. It also happens that common folk, who normally are used to speaking only Low German with ease, in the magnetic state speak in High German without effort. An equally indisputable case is where people in such a state recite with perfect facility something they had read a considerable time before, which they have never learned by rote and which has vanished from their waking consciousness. For instance, someone recited from Young's *Night Thoughts* a long passage of which he no longer knew anything when awake.<sup>17</sup> A particularly remarkable instance too is a boy who, while quite young, was operated on for a brain injury caused by a fall and gradually lost his memory until he no longer knew what he had done an hour earlier; when put into a magnetic state, however, he regained his memory so completely that he could state the cause of his illness, the instruments used in the operation he had undergone, and the persons who had participated in it.

(2) But what can seem even more wonderful than the awareness, just considered, of a content already deposited in the *interior* of the soul, is the *unmediated* awareness of events which are still *external* to the feeling subject. For with respect to this second content of the clairvoyant soul, we know that the existence of the external is tied to *space* and *time*, and our *ordinary consciousness* is mediated by these two forms of asunderness.

First, as regards what is *spatially* distant from us, we can be aware of it in so far as we are waking consciousness only on condition that we sublimate the distance in a *mediated* way. But this condition does not obtain for the clairvoyant soul. Space pertains not to the *soul* but to *external nature*; and this externality, in being apprehended by the soul, ceases to be *spatial*, since, transformed by the soul's ideality, it remains external neither to itself nor to us. Consequently, when free intellectual consciousness sinks to the form of the merely feeling soul, the subject is no longer tied to space. Instances of this independence of the soul from space have occurred in great number. Here we must distinguish two cases. Either the events are *absolutely external* to the clairvoyant subject who is aware of them without any mediation; or, on the contrary, they have already begun to acquire for the subject the form of something *internal*, therefore of something *non-alien* to it, of something mediated, through being known in an entirely *objective* manner by *another* subject, between whom and the clairvoyant individual there subsists such a complete unity of souls that what is in the objective consciousness of the former also penetrates the soul of the latter. We have to consider the form of clairvoyance mediated by the consciousness of *another* subject only later, with the magnetic state *proper*. Here, however, we must deal with the first-mentioned case, that of thoroughly *unmediated* awareness of spatially remote, external events.<sup>18</sup>

Instances of this kind of clairvoyance occurred more frequently in earlier times, in times of a more soulful life, than in the modern period in which the independence of the intellectual consciousness has developed much further. The old chronicles, which are not to be too hastily charged with error and falsehood, relate many a case coming under this heading. In the intimation of the spatially

distant the consciousness can, by the way, be at one time more obscure, at another more lucid. This fluctuation in the clarity of clairvoyance was shown, for example, in a girl who had a brother in Spain but in her waking consciousness did not know this; in her clairvoyance she saw this brother in a hospital, at first only indistinctly, but then clearly; after that she believed she saw him dead and opened up, but subsequently alive again; and, as emerged later, she had seen correctly, in that at the time of her vision her brother had actually been in a hospital at Valladolid, but that she was mistaken in thinking she saw him dead, since it was not this brother who had died but another person next to him at the time. In Spain and Italy, where the natural life of man is more universal than with us, visions such as the one just mentioned, especially visions had by women and friends relating to distant friends and husbands, are not a rarity.

But, secondly, the clairvoyant soul also rises above the condition of *time*, just as it rises above the condition of *space*. We have already seen above that the soul in the state of clairvoyance can make present to itself again something completely removed from its waking consciousness by time *gone by*. A more interesting question, however, for representation is whether people are also able to be lucidly aware of what is separated from them by *future* time. To this question we have the following reply. First and foremost we can say that, just as representational consciousness errs when it holds the above-discussed clairvoyant vision of an individuality entirely removed by its *spatial* distance from the bodily eye, to be something better than the awareness of truths of reason, so representation is involved in a similar error when it imagines that a perfectly certain and intellectual awareness of the *future* would be something very sublime, and that we have to look around for grounds to console ourselves for our lack of such an awareness. On the contrary, it must be said that it would drive one to despair with boredom to be aware in advance of one's fortunes with complete determinacy and then to live through them in each and every detail in succession. But a foreknowledge of *this* kind belongs among the impossibilities; for what is still only in the *future* and therefore something that is merely *in itself*, simply cannot become an object of *perceptual, intellectual consciousness*, since only what *exists*, only what has attained to the *individuality of sensory presence*, is perceived. The human mind is, of course, able to rise above an awareness concerned exclusively with sensibly present individuality; but the *absolute* elevation over it only takes place in the *conceptual cognition of the eternal*; for the eternal, unlike the sensory individual, is not affected by the alternation of coming-to-be and passing-away and is, therefore, neither *past* nor *future*, but the *absolutely* present, raised above time and containing sublated within itself all distinctions of time. In the magnetic state, by contrast, only a *conditioned* elevation above the awareness of what is immediately present can occur; the foreknowledge revealed in this state always relates only to the *individual* sphere of clairvoyant's existence, particularly to his individual disposition to disease, and does not have, as regards form, the *necessary interconnection* and *determinate certainty* of objective, intellectual consciousness. The

clairvoyant is in a *concentrated* state and intuits this veiled, pregnant life of his in a *concentrated* way. In the *determinacy* of this concentration, the determinations of *space* and *time* are also contained under a *veil*. However, these forms of asunderness are not apprehended for themselves by the clairvoyant's soul immersed in its inwardness; this happens only on the part of objective consciousness setting its actuality over against itself as an external world. But since the clairvoyant is *at the same time* a *representer* he must also *display* these determinations *veiled* in his concentrated life or, what is the same, *cast out* his state into the forms of *space* and *time*, in general lay it out in the manner of waking consciousness. It is evident from this in what sense the clairvoyant foreboding has within itself a mediation of time, while, on the other hand, it does not need this mediation and is for that very reason able to penetrate into the future. But the *quantum* of future time involved in the intuited state is not something fixed for itself, but a *mode and manner* of the *quality* of the glimpsed content,—something belonging to this quality, just as, for example, the period of three or four days belongs to the determinacy of the nature of fever. Displaying this time-quantum consists, therefore, in entering and developing the intensity of what is clairvoyantly seen. Now in this development endless deception is possible. The time is never indicated exactly by clairvoyants; on the contrary, for the most part the statements of such people relating to the future come to nothing, especially if these visions have for their content happenings dependent on the free will of other persons. That clairvoyants are so often deceived on the point in question is quite natural; for they intuit a future event only according to their quite indeterminate, contingent sensation, which in these circumstances is determined *in one way*, but in other circumstances is determined in another way, and then expound the intuited content in an equally indeterminate and contingent manner. On the other hand, however, the occurrence of extremely marvellous forebodings and visions of this kind which have actually been confirmed can of course by no means be denied. Thus persons have been awakened and impelled to leave a room or a house by a foreboding of the collapse of a house or a ceiling, which afterwards actually occurred. Sailors, too, are said sometimes to be gripped by a non-deceptive presentiment of a storm of which the intellectual consciousness does not yet notice the slightest sign. It is also asserted that many people have predicted the hour of their death. Abundant instances of premonitions of the future are found especially in the Scottish Highlands, in Holland, and in Westphalia. Particularly among the Scottish mountain-dwellers the faculty of so-called *second sight* is even now not uncommon. Persons endowed with this faculty see themselves *double*, catch sight of themselves in conditions and circumstances in which they will find themselves only subsequently. In explanation of this marvellous phenomenon the following may be said. As has been remarked, in Scotland 'second sight' used to be much more common than it is now. For its emergence therefore a peculiar stage of mental development seems to be necessary, in fact a stage equally distant from a state of savagery and from a state of advanced

culture, where people do not pursue any *universal* aims but are interested only in their *individual* circumstances, carry out their *contingent, particular* aims in indolent imitation of inherited tradition without deep insight into the nature of the circumstances to be dealt with, hence, unconcerned about knowledge of the universal and necessary, they attend only to the *individual* and *contingent*. Just because of this immersion of mind in what is individual and contingent people often seem to become competent in seeing an *individual* event still hidden in the future, particularly if the event is not a matter of indifference to them. However, it goes without saying, for these as for similar phenomena, that philosophy cannot set out to try to explain all the individual circumstances, which often are not properly authenticated but, on the contrary, extremely doubtful; we must rather restrict ourselves in a philosophical treatment, as we have done in the above, to bringing out the main points to bear in mind when looking at the phenomena in question.<sup>19</sup>

(3) Now whereas in the intuition considered under (1), the soul enclosed in its inwardness only makes present to itself again a content *already belonging* to it, and whereas by contrast in the material discussed under (2) the soul is immersed in the vision of an individual *external* circumstance, in the third case the soul, in clairvoyant awareness of its *own interior*, of its state of soul and physical body, returns from this relation to something external back to itself. This side of clairvoyance has a very wide range and can also attain to a considerable clarity and determinacy. However, clairvoyants will be able to give any perfectly determinate and correct information about their corporeal state only when they are medically trained, hence possess in their waking consciousness an exact knowledge of the nature of the human organism. From medically untrained clairvoyants, by contrast, one cannot expect any completely accurate anatomical and physiological information; such persons have, on the contrary, extreme difficulty in translating the concentrated intuition which they have of their corporeal state into the form of intellectual thinking, and they can always elevate what they see only into the form of *their* waking consciousness, i.e. of a more or less vague and ignorant consciousness. But just as in different clairvoyant individuals the immediate awareness of their *corporeal state* is very different, so a great difference also obtains in the intuitive knowledge of their *mental* interior, both as regards the form and in respect of the content. In clairvoyance—since this is a state in which the substantiality of the soul emerges—to *noble* natures a fullness of noble sensation, their true self, man's better mind is disclosed, and often appears to them as a particular protecting spirit. *Base* people, by contrast, reveal in this state their baseness and abandon themselves to it unreservedly. Finally, individuals of *middling worth* often go through an ethical struggle with themselves during clairvoyance, since in this new life, in this serene inner vision, the more important and nobler aspect of a character emerges and turns destructively on its defects.

(4) In addition to the intuitive awareness of one's *own* mental and corporeal state, there is a *fourth* phenomenon: clairvoyant knowledge of the state of

someone else's soul and corporeal body. This case occurs particularly in magnetic somnambulism when, through the rapport set up between the subject in this state and another subject, their two spheres of life have become, as it were, a single life-sphere.

(5) Finally, when this rapport attains the highest degree of intimacy and strength, there occurs, *fifthly*, the phenomenon in which the clairvoyant subject knows, sees, and feels, not merely *about*, but *in* another subject and, without directly attending to the other individual, *immediately shares his sensations* of everything that happens to him, has within himself the sensations of the other's individuality as his *own*. There are the most striking examples of this phenomenon. A French doctor, for instance, treated two women who had a deep affection for each other and who, although a considerable distance apart, sensed each other's states of illness inside each other. We can also include here the case of the soldier whose mother had been tied up by thieves; although he was some distance away from her, he shared her sensation of anguish with such intensity that he felt an irresistible impulse to hasten to her without delay.

The five phenomena discussed above are the *principal moments* of clairvoyant awareness. They all have in common the determination of always relating to the *individual* world of the feeling soul. This relation does not, however, establish such an inseparable connection among them that they must always all emerge in one and the same subject. Secondly, another feature common to these phenomena is that they can arise both as a result of physical illness and also, in otherwise healthy persons, in virtue of a certain particular disposition. In both cases these phenomena are *immediate* natural states; it is only as such that we have so far considered them. But they can also be evoked *intentionally*. When this happens they constitute *animal magnetism pro per*, with which we now have to concern ourselves.

In the first place, as regards the name 'animal magnetism', it originally arose from the fact that *Mesmer* began by using *magnets* to arouse the magnetic state. This name was subsequently retained because in *animal magnetism* too, as in *inorganic* magnetism, an immediate reciprocal relation of two existences occurs. In addition, the state in question has here and there been called *mesmerism*, *solarism*, and *tellurism*. However, the first of these three appellations tells us, for itself, nothing about the phenomenon, and the other two relate to an entirely *different* sphere from that of animal magnetism; the mental nature, to which animal magnetism lays claim, also contains within itself something entirely different from merely *solar* and *telluric* moments, from these *entirely abstract* determinations which we have already considered in §392 in the natural soul that has not yet developed into an individual subject.<sup>20</sup>

It was animal magnetism *pro per* that first drew universal interest to magnetic states, for it gave us the power to elicit and develop all possible forms of these states. However, the phenomena intentionally produced in this way do not differ from the states already discussed, occurring without the participation of animal

magnetism proper; this just *posits* what is otherwise present as an *immediate* natural state.

1. Now first of all, in order to comprehend the *possibility* of intentionally producing the magnetic state, we need only recall what we have indicated as the fundamental concept of this entire stage of the soul. The magnetic state is an *illness*; for if *in general* the essence of disease must be posited in the separation of a particular system of the organism from the universal physiological life, and if, in virtue of this *alienation* of a particular system from the universal life, the animal organism exhibits its finitude, impotence and dependence on an *alien* power, then this *universal* concept of disease determines itself more specifically in relation to the *magnetic* state in the following way: in this peculiar illness a *rupture* occurs between my *soulful* being and my *waking* being, between my *natural vitality* with its *feeling*, and my *mediated, intellectual consciousness*, a rupture which, since everyone includes these two sides in himself, is of course contained in *potentiality* in even the healthiest people, but does not come into existence in all individuals, only in those who have a *particular* disposition to it, and it becomes an illness only when it emerges from its potentiality into actuality. But if my soulful life separates from my intellectual consciousness and takes over its business, I forfeit my freedom rooted in intellectual consciousness, I lose the capacity to shut myself off from an *alien* power, I become subservient to it. Now just as the *spontaneously arising* magnetic state *ends up* as dependence on an alien power, so, conversely, an *external power* can also form the starting-point and—by catching hold of me at the separation, present *in itself* within me, between my feeling life and my thinking consciousness—bring this rupture within me into *existence*, and so the magnetic state can be produced *artificially*. However, as already indicated, only those individuals, in whom a particular disposition to this state is already present, can easily and regularly become epopts; whereas people who fall into this state only from a particular illness are never perfect epopts. The alien power that generates magnetic somnambulism in a subject is mainly *another subject*; there are, however, also medicines, especially henbane, also water or metal, able to exercise this power. Consequently, the subject with a disposition to magnetic somnambulism is able to put himself in that state by making himself dependent on such inorganic or vegetable substances.\* —Among the means for producing the magnetic state, particular mention must be made of the *baquet*. This consists of a vessel with iron rods which are touched by the persons to be magnetized, and forms the middle term between the magnetizer and these persons. Whereas in general metals serve to intensify the magnetic state, glass and silk conversely

\* The *shamans of the Mongols* are already familiar with this; when they are going to prophesy they put themselves in the magnetic state by certain drinks. This happens even now among the Indians for the same purpose. Something similar probably took place with the oracle at Delphi where the priestess, sitting on a tripod over a cave, fell into an ecstasy, often gentle but sometimes very agitated, and in this state emitted more or less articulate sounds which were interpreted by the priests who lived in the intuition of the substantial conditions of the life of the Greek people.<sup>22</sup>



produce an insulating effect. Incidentally, the power of the magnetizer acts not only on people but also on animals, for example, on dogs, cats, and monkeys; for it is *quite universally* the *soulful* life, and *only the soulful* life, that can be put into the magnetic state, no matter whether that life belongs to a *mind* or not.<sup>21</sup>

2. As regards, *secondly*, the *mode and manner* of magnetising, this varies. Usually the magnetizer works by contact. Just as in galvanism the metals act on each other by immediate contact, so the magnetizer too acts immediately on the person to be magnetized. However, the magnetizing subject, being a self-contained subject capable of controlling his will, can only operate successfully on condition that he has the uncompromising will to communicate his power to the subject to be brought into the magnetic state, to put by the act of magnetizing the two animal spheres here confronting each other, as it were, into *one* sphere.<sup>23</sup>

More exactly, the magnetizer operates mainly by *stroking*, though this need not involve actual contact and can occur with the hand of the magnetizer remaining about an inch away from the corporeal body of the magnetic person. The hand is moved from the head towards the pit of the stomach and from there towards the extremities; care must here be taken to avoid stroking backwards because this very easily gives rise to cramp. Sometimes this hand-movement can be successful when made at a greater distance from the body than that indicated, that is, at a distance of several paces, particularly when rapport has already been established; in which case the power of the magnetizer close by would often be too great and would produce harmful effects. The magnetizer can tell whether he is still effective at a definite distance by feeling a certain warmth in his hand. But stroking at a greater or less distance is not necessary in every case; the magnetic rapport can rather be induced merely by laying on the hand, especially on the head, on the stomach or the pit of the stomach; often only a pressure of the hand is needed for it. (That is why people have rightly related those miraculous cures, which are said to have been accomplished at very different times by priests and other individuals by laying on of hands, to animal magnetism.) Occasionally even a single glance and the magnetizer's invitation to magnetic sleep is sufficient to induce it. Indeed, faith and will alone are said sometimes to have produced this effect at a great distance. In this magical relationship, the main point is that a subject acts on an individual *subordinate* to him in freedom and independence of will. Therefore, very powerful organizations exert over weak natures the greatest power, a power often so irresistible that the latter can be put into a magnetic sleep by the former whether they wish it or not. For this same reason, strong men are particularly qualified to magnetize female persons.

3. The *third* point to be discussed here concerns the *effects* produced by magnetizing. As for these, after many various experiences of them, the matter is now so thoroughly cleared up that the occurrence of essentially new phenomena here is no longer to be expected. If one wishes to consider the phenomena of animal magnetism in their naïveté then one must mainly stick to the older magnetizers.

Among the French, men of the noblest sentiments and highest culture have concerned themselves with animal magnetism and have studied it with an open mind. Among these men, Lieutenant-General *Puységur* especially deserves mention. If the Germans often make fun of the faulty theories of the French, it can be asserted, at least as regards animal magnetism, that the naïve metaphysics employed by the French in considering it is much more satisfactory than the not uncommon dream-fantasies and the lame as well as distorted theorizing of German scholars. A serviceable, superficial classification of the phenomena of animal magnetism has been given by *Kluge. Van Ghert*, a reliable man rich in ideas and well versed in recent philosophy, has described magnetic cures in the form of a diary. *Karl Schelling*, a brother of the philosopher, has also published a part of his magnetic experiences. So much for the relevant literature of animal magnetism and the scope of our knowledge of the subject.<sup>24</sup>

After these preliminaries let us now turn to a brief consideration of the magnetic phenomena themselves. The proximate universal *effect* of magnetizing is the *sinking* of the magnetic person into the state of his shrouded, undifferentiated natural life, i.e., into *sleep*. The onset of sleep indicates the beginning of the magnetic state. However, sleep is not entirely necessary; magnetic cures can be carried out without it. What must necessarily take place here is only the sentient soul's *becoming independent*, its *separation* from the mediated, intellectual consciousness. The second point we have to consider here concerns the *physiological* side or basis of the magnetic state. About this it must be said that in this state the activity of the *outward* directed organs passes over to the *inner* organs, that the activity exercised by the *brain* in the waking and intellectual consciousness devolves upon the *reproductive system* during magnetic somnambulism, because in this state consciousness is demoted to the *simple, internally undifferentiated naturalness of soul-life*; but this *simple naturalness*, this *shrouded* life, is contradicted by the *sensibility directed outwards*; whereas the *inward* turned reproductive system, which is dominant in the simplest animal organisms and forms animality in *general*, is absolutely *inseparable* from this shrouded soul-life. This then is the reason why, during magnetic somnambulism, the soul's activity descends into the *brain of the reproductive system*, namely, into the ganglia, these variously nodulated nerves in the abdomen. That this is the case, was sensed by *van Helmont* after he had rubbed himself with henbane ointment and taken the juice of this herb. According to his description he felt as if his thinking consciousness was going from his head into his abdomen, especially into his stomach, and it seemed to him that with this transference his thinking became more acute and was associated with a particularly pleasant feeling. This concentration of the soul-life in the abdomen is considered by a famous French magnetizer to depend on the fact that during magnetic somnambulism the blood in the region of the pit of the stomach remains very fluid, even when in the other parts it is extremely thick. But the unusual arousal of the reproductive system occurring in the magnetic

state is seen not only in the *mental* form of *clairvoyance* but also in the more *sensory* shape of the sex-drive awakening with greater or lesser vitality, especially in female persons.<sup>25</sup>

After this mainly *physiological* consideration of animal magnetism we have to determine more precisely the nature of this state with respect to the *soul*. As in the spontaneously occurring magnetic states previously considered, so too, in intentionally induced animal magnetism, the soul immersed in its inwardness intuits its individual world not *outside itself*, but *within itself*. This sinking of the soul into its inwardness can, as already remarked, come to a halt half-way, so to speak; then *sleep* does not occur. But the further stage is that life is completely cut off from the outside by sleep. With this rupture, too, the course of the magnetic phenomena can come to a standstill. But the transition from magnetic sleep to *clairvoyance* is equally possible. Most magnetic persons will be in this clairvoyant state without recalling it. The presence of clairvoyance has often been shown only by chance; it mostly comes to light when the magnetic person is spoken to by the magnetizer; if he had not spoken, the person would perhaps only have gone on sleeping. Now though the answers of clairvoyants seem to come out of another world, yet these individuals can be aware of what they, as objective consciousness, are. Often, however, they speak of their intellectual consciousness too as if it were *another* person. When clairvoyance develops more determinately, magnetic persons give accounts of their bodily state and of their mental interior. But their sensations are as vague as the representations that the blind man, knowing nothing about the difference between light and dark, has of external things. What is seen in clairvoyance often only becomes clearer some days later, but is never so plain that it does not need interpretation. Sometimes, however, the magnetic person's own interpretation fails completely and, often, at least turns out to be so symbolical and bizarre that it in its turn renders necessary a further interpretation by the intellectual consciousness of the magnetizer, so that the final result of the magnetic clairvoyance mostly consists of a varied mixture of falsehood and correctness. Yet, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that clairvoyants sometimes give very determinate accounts of the nature and course of their illness, that they usually know very accurately when their paroxysms will occur, when and how long they need magnetic sleep, how long their treatment will last, and that, finally, they sometimes discover a connection between a remedy and an ailment to be removed by it, a connection perhaps still unknown to intellectual consciousness, thus making easy a cure otherwise difficult for the doctor. In this respect clairvoyants can be compared to animals, for they are instructed by their instinct which things will cure them. But as regards the further content of intentionally induced clairvoyance we need hardly remark that in this, as in natural clairvoyance, the soul is able to read and hear with the pit of the stomach. Here we want to emphasize only two more points; first, that what lies outside the context of the magnetic person's *substantial* life is not contacted through the somnambulistic state, that consequently clairvoyance does not, for example,

extend to foreseeing the winning numbers in a lottery, and in general cannot be used for selfish ends. Great world-events are by contrast in a different position from such contingent things. For instance it is recorded that a somnambulist on the eve of the battle at Belle-Alliance cried out in great exaltation: 'Tomorrow, he who has done us so much harm will perish either by lightning or the sword.' The second point still to be mentioned here is that since in clairvoyance the soul leads a life *cut off* from its intellectual consciousness, clairvoyants on awaking initially no longer have any awareness of what they have seen in the magnetic somnambulism, that they can however gain an awareness of it in aroundabout way, namely by dreaming about what they saw and then recalling the dreams on waking. Also partial recollection of what was seen can be deliberately produced, and, to be more precise, in the following way: the doctor sets the sick during their waking state the task of firmly resolving to retain what they have sensed in the magnetic state.<sup>26</sup>

4. *Fourthly*, as regards the *close connection* and the *dependence* of the magnetic person on the magnetizer, there remains to be added to what was said in the Remark to §406 under δδ) with regard to the *bodily* side of this connection, that the clairvoyant person can at first hear only the magnetizer, and he can hear other individuals only when they stand in rapport with the magnetizer, though at times he loses hearing as well as sight entirely; further, in this exclusive connection of the life of the magnetic person with his magnetizer, being touched by a *third* person can become extremely dangerous, producing convulsions and catalepsy.—But with respect to the *mental* connection between the magnetizer and the magnetic person, we may also mention that clairvoyants, if the magnetizer's awareness becomes their own, often acquire the capacity to know something that is not immediately seen by themselves internally. Thus they can, for example, say what time it is without any direct sensation of their own, provided that the magnetizer has certainty on this point. Knowledge of the intimate community in question protects us from the folly of astonishment at the wisdom sometimes unearthed by clairvoyants; this wisdom very often properly belongs not to the magnetic persons but to the individual in rapport with them.—Besides this community of *awareness* the magnetic person can, particularly with the lengthy continuation of clairvoyance, also enter into other mental relations with the magnetizer, into relations involving manner, passion, and character. In particular the *vanity* of clairvoyants can be easily aroused if one makes the mistake of letting them believe that one attaches great importance to their words. Somnambulists are then overcome by a craze to speak about anything and everything, even if they have no corresponding intuitions of them whatsoever. In this case, clairvoyance is completely useless and, in fact, becomes something suspect. Therefore the question has often been discussed among magnetizers whether clairvoyance should be cultivated and preserved when it has arisen spontaneously, and, in the converse case, intentionally induced, or whether, on the contrary, efforts should be made to prevent it. As already mentioned, clairvoyance comes to light and

to development as a result of repeated questioning of the magnetic person. Now if the questioning concerns very diverse objects, the magnetic person can easily become distracted, more or less lose the concentration on himself, and so become less able to describe his illness and to indicate the remedy to be employed, thereby considerably delaying the cure. For this reason the magnetizer must, in his questions, take the greatest care to avoid arousing the vanity and the distraction of the magnetic person. But in particular the magnetizer must not let himself on his part fall into a relationship of dependence on the magnetic person. This mishap occurred more frequently earlier, when magnetizers drew more on their own strength than since the time when they have used the baquet. With the use of this instrument, the magnetizer is less entangled in the state of the magnetic person. Even so, a great deal depends on the strength of the mind, the character and the physical body of the magnetizers. If they give in to the whims of the magnetic person, which is particularly the case with non-doctors, if they have not the courage to contradict and stand up to him and in this way the magnetic person gets the feeling of a strong influence on his part on the magnetizer, then like a spoilt child he gives himself up to every whim, gets the strangest notions, and unconsciously pulls the magnetizer's leg, thus hindering his own cure.—However, it is not merely in this bad sense that the magnetic person can acquire a certain independence; if he normally possesses an ethical character, he retains even in the magnetic state a firmness of ethical feeling on which any impure intentions of the magnetizer founder. For instance, a magnetized woman declared that she need not obey the magnetizer's request to undress in front of him.

5. The *fifth* and last point that we have to touch on in animal magnetism concerns the real aim of magnetic treatment, *cure*. Undoubtedly many cures that happened in earlier times and were regarded as miracles must be viewed as nothing other than effects of animal magnetism. But we do not need to appeal to such stories of miracles wrapped in the obscurity of the distant past; for in recent times men of unimpeachable integrity have performed so many cures by magnetic treatment that anyone forming an unbiased judgement can no longer doubt the fact of the curative power of animal magnetism. Consequently, all that we have to do now is to show the mode and manner in which magnetism effects a cure. To this end we can recall that even the ordinary medical cure consists in removing the interference with the identity of animal life that constitutes the disease, in restoring the fluid-being-within-itself of the organism. Now in magnetic treatment this goal is achieved by producing either sleep and clairvoyance or just a general immersion of the individual life within itself, its return to its simple universality. Just as *natural* sleep brings about a strengthening of healthy life, since it withdraws the entire man from the enfeebling fragmentation of activity directed towards the external world into the substantial totality and harmony of life, so too, the *sleeping magnetic* state, since by it the internally disrupted organism attains to unity with itself, is the basis of health to be restored. However, on the other hand we must not leave out of consideration here the way in which this

*concentration* of sentient life present in the magnetic state can, in its turn, become such a *one-sided* condition that it pathologically *entrenches* itself in opposition to the *rest of organic life* and to *normal consciousness*. It is this possibility which raises doubts about the intentional production of this concentration. If duplication of the personality is carried too far, then one acts in a way that contradicts the purpose, healing, since a separation is produced which is greater than that which the magnetic treatment is meant to remove. In such careless treatment lurks the danger that severe crises, frightful convulsions, will occur and that the opposition generating these phenomena will remain not merely corporeal but in various ways become an opposition within the somnambulistic consciousness itself. If, by contrast, one sets to work cautiously enough not to take too far the concentration of sentient life occurring in the magnetic state, then in this concentration one has, as already remarked, the foundation for a restoration of health, and one is in a position to complete the cure by *gradually* guiding the rest of the organism, which though still involved in *separation* is *powerless* against its concentrated life, back into its substantial unity, into its simple harmony with itself, and thereby to enable it, *without detriment to its inner unity*, to involve itself once more in *separation* and *opposition*.<sup>27</sup>

### (β) Self-feeling

#### §407

(1) The feeling totality, as individuality, is essentially this: distinguishing itself within itself, and awakening to the *judgement within itself*, in virtue of which it has *particular* feelings and stands as a *subject* in respect of these determinations of itself. The subject as such posits them *within itself* as *its* feelings. It is immersed in this *particularity* of sensations, and at the same time, through the ideality of the particular, in them it joins together with itself as a subjective unit. In this way it is *self-feeling*, — and yet it is this only in the *particular feeling*.<sup>1</sup>

#### §408

(2) Owing to the *immediacy* in which self-feeling is still determined, i.e. owing to the moment of bodiliness which in self-feeling is still undetached from the mind, and since too the feeling itself is a particular feeling, thus a particular embodiment, the subject, though educated to intellectual consciousness, is still susceptible to the *disease* of remaining fast in a *particularity* of its self-feeling, unable to refine it to ideality and overcome it. The fully furnished *self* of intellectual consciousness is the subject as an internally consistent consciousness, which orders and conducts itself in accordance with its individual position and its connection with the likewise internally ordered external world. But when it remains ensnared in a particular determinacy, it fails to assign that content the intelligible place and the subordinate position belonging to it in the individual world-system

which a subject is. In this way the subject finds itself in the *contradiction* between its totality systematized in its consciousness, and the particular determinacy in that consciousness, which is not pliable and integrated into an overarching order. This is *derangement*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] In considering derangement we must likewise anticipate the cultivated, intellectual consciousness, the subject which is at the same time the *natural* self of *self-feeling*. In this determination it is capable of falling into the contradiction between its subjectivity, free for itself, and a particularity which does not become ideal in subjectivity and remains fixed in self-feeling. Mind is free, and therefore not susceptible for itself to this disease. But in earlier metaphysics it was regarded as *soul*, as a *thing*; and only as a thing, i.e. as something *natural* and *in being*, is it liable to derangement, to the finitude lodged in it. Derangement is therefore a psychical disease, i.e. a disease of body and mind alike; the commencement may seem to proceed from one more than the other, and so may the cure.<sup>2</sup>

The sober and healthy subject has an alert consciousness of the ordered totality of its individual world, into the system of which it *subsumes* each particular content of sensation, idea, desire, inclination, etc., as it arises, and inserts in its intelligible place in the system. It is the *dominant genius* over these particularities. The difference is like that between waking and dreaming, but here the dream falls within waking life itself, so that it belongs to actual self-feeling. Error and the like is a content consistently admitted into this objective interconnection. In the concrete, however, it is often difficult to say where error begins to become madness. Thus an intense passion of hatred, etc., based on trivial reasons, may, in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability, seem like going out of one's mind with madness. But madness essentially involves the *contradiction* in which a feeling that has come into *being* in a bodily form *confronts* the totality of mediations that is the concrete consciousness. The mind that is determined as merely *being*, in so far as such being is undissolved in its consciousness, is diseased.—The content which is set free into its natural state is the self-seeking determinations of the heart, vanity, pride, and the subject's other passions and imaginings, hopes, love and hatred. This earthly throng gets free, when self-possession and the universal, theoretical or moral principles, lose their power over the natural forces that they usually suppress and keep concealed; for this evil is implicitly present within the heart, because the heart, being immediate, is natural and selfish. It is the evil genius of man that becomes dominant in derangement, but in opposition and in contradiction to the better and more intellectual side, which is also in man. Hence this state is a breakdown and distress within the mind itself.—The genuine *psychical* treatment therefore keeps firmly in view the fact that derangement is not an abstract *loss* of reason, whether in respect of intelligence or of the will and its responsibility, but only derangement, only a contradiction within the reason that is still present, just as physical disease is not an abstract, i.e. complete, loss of health (that would be death), but a

contradiction within health. This humane treatment, i.e. a treatment that is both benevolent and rational (the services of *Pinel* towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement), presupposes the patient's rationality, and makes that a firm basis for dealing with him on his rational side, just as in the case of bodily disease the doctor bases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* What follows may serve to elucidate the above Paragraph:

Already in the *Zusatz* to §402, we interpreted *derangement* as the second of the three developmental stages passed through by the *feeling soul* in its struggle with the immediacy of its substantial content in order to rise to the *simple subjectivity, relating itself to itself*, present in the *I*, and thereby become completely *conscious and in control* of itself. This conception of derangement as a *necessarily* emerging form or stage in the development of the soul is naturally not to be understood as if we were asserting that *every* mind, *every* soul, must go through this stage of extreme disruption. Such an assertion would be as absurd as to assume that because *crime* is considered in the *Philosophy of Right* as a *necessary* appearance of the human will, therefore the commission of crime is supposed to be made an inevitable necessity for *every* individual. Crime and derangement are *extremes* which the human mind *in general* has to overcome in the course of its development, but which do not appear as *extremes* in *every* individual but only in the shape of *limitations, errors, follies*, and of *non-criminal wrongdoing*. This is sufficient to justify our consideration of derangement as an essential stage in the development of the soul.<sup>4</sup>

But as regards the determination of the *concept* of derangement, we have already indicated in the *Zusatz* to §405 the peculiarity of this state—in contrast to *magnetic somnambulism*, the first of the three stages in the development of the feeling soul we considered—to the effect that in derangement the relationship of the *soulful to objective* consciousness is no longer one of *mere difference*, but of *direct opposition*, and therefore the soulful no longer *mixes* with objective consciousness. We will demonstrate here the truth of this statement by a further discussion and thereby also prove the *rational necessity* of the progression of our exposition from *magnetic states to derangement*. The necessity of this progression lies in the fact that the soul is already *in itself* the *contradiction* of being an *individual*, a *single* entity, and yet at the same time immediately *identical* with the *universal* natural soul, with its *substance*. This *opposition* existing in the *contradictory* form of *identity*, must be *posited* as *opposition*, as *contradiction*. This first happens in derangement; for in derangement the *subjectivity* of the soul first *separates* from its *substance*, which in somnambulism is still immediately identical with it, and not only that: it comes into *direct opposition* to it, into complete *contradiction* with the *objective*, thereby becoming a purely *formal, empty, abstract* subjectivity, and in this its *one-sidedness* claims for itself the significance of a veritable unity of the *subjective and objective*. Therefore, the unity and separation, present in derangement, of the opposed sides just mentioned is still an *imperfect*



unity. This unity and this separation only reach their perfect shape in *rational*, in *actually objective* consciousness. When I have risen to *rational* thinking I am not only *for myself*, an *object to myself*, and therefore a *subjective* identity of the subjective and objective, but I have, secondly, *disconnected* this identity from myself, placed it over against myself as an actually *objective* identity. In order to achieve this complete separation, the *feeling soul* must overcome its *immediacy*, its *naturalness*, *bodiliness*, must posit them ideally, make them its own, thereby transforming them into an *objective* unity of the subjective and objective and thus discharging its Other from its immediate identity with the feeling soul as well as at the same time freeing itself from this Other. But the soul has not yet reached this goal at the standpoint at which we are now considering it. In so far as it is deranged, it clings to a *merely subjective* identity of the subjective and objective, rather than to an *objective* unity of these two sides; and only in so far as, with all its folly and all its madness, it is still at the same time *rational* and stands therefore on *another* level than the one now to be considered, does the soul attain to an *objective* unity of the subjective and objective. For in the state of derangement proper *both* modes of finite mind—on the one hand *rational consciousness developed* within itself, with its *objective* world, on the other hand *inner sensation* clinging to itself and having its *objectivity within itself*—are cultivated, each for itself, into the *totality*, into a *personality*. The *objective* consciousness of the deranged shows itself in the most diverse ways: they are aware, e.g., that they are in a lunatic asylum; they know their attendants; are also aware with regard to others that they are fools; make fun of each other's folly; are employed on all kinds of tasks, sometimes even appointed overseers. But at the same time they are *dreaming while awake* and are *captivated* by a *particular* idea that cannot be unified with their objective consciousness. This waking dreaming of theirs has an affinity with somnambulism; but the two states are also distinct from each other. In somnambulism the *two personalities* present in one individual *make no contact with each other*, the *somnambulist* consciousness, on the contrary, is so *separated* from the *waking* consciousness that neither of them is aware of the other, and the *duality of personalities* also appears as a *duality of states*. In *derangement proper*, by contrast, the *two different personalities* are *not two different* states but are in *one* and the *same* state; so that these reciprocally *negative* personalities—soulful consciousness and intellectual consciousness—have *mutual contact* and are aware of *each other*. The deranged subject is therefore *together with itself* in the *negative of itself*; i.e., in its consciousness the negative of that consciousness is immediately present. This negative is not overcome by the deranged individual, the *duality* into which he splits up is not brought to *unity*. Consequently, though the deranged individual is *in himself* one and the same subject, yet, as an object for himself, he is not an internally undivided subject, concordant with itself, but a subject diverging into *two different personalities*.<sup>5</sup>

The *determinate* sense of this disruption, of this *being-together-with-itself* of the mind in the *negative* of itself, needs still further development. In derangement

this *negative* acquires a more concrete meaning than the negative of the soul has had in our exposition so far, just as the mind's *being-together-with-itself* must be taken here in a more replete sense than the being-for-itself of the soul that has so far been achieved.<sup>6</sup>

In the first place, therefore, we must distinguish this *negative* characteristic of derangement from other sorts of negative of the soul. To this end we can note that when we endure, e.g., hardships we are also together with ourselves in a negative, but we need not therefore be fools. We become fools only if we endure hardships when we have no rational aim to be attained only in this way. A journey, e.g., to the Holy Sepulchre undertaken for the purpose of fortifying one's soul may be regarded as a madness, because such a journey is quite useless for the end in view and is therefore not a necessary means for procuring it. For the same reason, the journeys across whole countries made by Indians crawling on their stomachs can be pronounced a derangement. The negative endured in derangement is, therefore, one in which only the *sentient* consciousness, not the *intellectual* and *rational* consciousness, finds itself again.<sup>7</sup>

But in the deranged state the *negative* constitutes, as we have just said, a determination which befalls both the *soulful* consciousness and the *intellectual* consciousness in their mutual relation. This relation of these two opposed modes of the mind's *being-together-with-itself* likewise needs a more precise characterization to prevent its being confused with the relationship in which *mere error* and *folly* stand to the *objective, rational* consciousness.<sup>8</sup>

To clarify this point, let us recall that when the soul becomes *consciousness*, there arises for it, by the separation of what in the natural soul is unified in an immediate way, the opposition of a *subjective thinking* and *externality*;—*two worlds* which are in *truth identical* with one another ('ordo rerum atque idearum idem est', says Spinoza), but which to the merely *reflective* consciousness, to *finite* thinking, appear as *essentially different* and *independent* of one another. Consequently, the soul, as *consciousness*, enters the sphere of *finitude* and *contingency*, of the *self-external*, hence *individualized*. What I am aware of at this level, I am aware of *initially* as something individualized, unmediated, consequently as something contingent, as something given, found. What is found and sensed, I transform into *representations*, at the same time making it into an *external object*. But at the same time I then recognize this content, in so far as the activity of my *intellect* and *reason* are directed on it, as not merely individualized and contingent but a *moment* of a great interconnection, as standing in infinite *mediation* with other contents, and by this mediation becoming something *necessary*. Only if I proceed in the way just indicated am I using my *intellect*, while the content with which I am filled gains on its part the form of *objectivity*. Just as this objectivity is the goal of my *theoretical* striving, it also forms the norm of my *practical* conduct. If, therefore, I want to transfer my *aims* and *interests*, thus representations proceeding *from me*, out of their *subjectivity* into *objectivity*, then I must, if I am to apply my intellect, represent to myself the *material*, the *reality confronting me*

in which I intend to actualize this content, in the way that it is in truth. But just as I must have a correct representation of the objectivity confronting me if I am to behave intelligently, so too must I have a correct representation of myself, i.e., a representation that harmonizes with the *totality* of my actuality, with my infinitely determined individuality as distinct from my substantial being.<sup>9</sup>

Now, of course, I can be *mistaken*, both about the external world and about myself. *Unintelligent* people have *empty, subjective* representations, *unrealizable* wishes, which all the same they hope to actualize in the future. They confine themselves to entirely *individualized* aims and interests, cling to *one-sided* principles and thereby come into *conflict* with actuality. But this *narrow-mindedness* and those *mistakes* are still not in the least *deranged* if the unintelligent are at the same time aware that their *subjectivity* does *not yet* exist *objectively*. Error and folly only become derangement in the case where someone believes he has his *merely subjective* representation *objectively present* to him and *clings* to it *in face of* the *actual objectivity* standing in *contradiction* with it. To the deranged, their mere subjectivity is quite as certain as objectivity is; in their merely subjective representation,—for example in the illusion that they are someone who, in fact, they are not—they have the *certainty of themselves*, their *being* hangs on it. Therefore when someone's speaks in a deranged way, the first thing is always to remind him of the *whole range of his circumstances*, of his *concrete actuality*. Then if he nevertheless sticks to his false representation, even though that objective interconnection has been presented to his representation and he has been made aware of it, the derangement of such a person is not open to any doubt.<sup>10</sup>

It follows from what has just been said that the *deranged* representation can be called an *empty abstraction* and *mere possibility* regarded by the deranged as something *concrete* and *actual*; for as we have seen, this representation precisely involves *abstraction* from the *concrete actuality* of the deranged. If, e.g., I, who am very far from being a king, nonetheless take myself to be a king, this representation, which contradicts the totality of my actuality and is therefore deranged, has no other ground and content whatever than the *indeterminate universal possibility* that since a man, in general, can be a king, I myself, this determinate man, am a king.<sup>11</sup>

But the reason why such a fixation on a particular representation, irreconcilable with my concrete actuality, *can* arise in me lies in the fact that I am initially a *wholly abstract*, completely *indeterminate I*, an I thus *standing open* to *any* content *whatever*. In so far as I am such an I, I can frame for myself the emptiest representations, take myself, e.g., to be a dog (in fairy-tales men have indeed been turned into dogs), or imagine that I am able to fly, because there is enough room to do this and other living creatures are able to fly. As soon as I become a *concrete I*, by contrast, and acquire *determinate* thoughts of actuality, as soon as, e.g., in the last-mentioned case I think of my *heaviness*, then I see the impossibility of my flying. Only *man* gets as far as grasping himself in this complete *abstraction of the I*. This is why he has, so to speak, the *privilege* of folly and madness. But this illness

only develops in the *concrete, sober* self-consciousness in so far as this *descends* to the *impotent, passive, abstract I* of which we have just spoken. By this descent the concrete I loses its absolute power over the entire system of its determinations, forfeits the ability to put everything coming to the soul in the right place, to remain *perfectly present to itself* in each of its representations; and by letting itself be captivated by a *particular*, merely subjective representation, is *driven* out of *its wits*, is *shifted out* from the *centre* of its *actuality* and, since it also still retains a consciousness of its actuality, acquires *two centres*, one in the *remnants* of its *intellectual* consciousness, the other in its *deranged* representation.<sup>12</sup>

In the deranged consciousness the *abstract universality* of the immediate I, the I that just *is*, stands in *unresolved* contradiction with a representation torn off from the totality of actuality, and consequently *individualized*. This consciousness is, therefore, not genuine being-together-with-itself but being-together-with-itself stuck fast in the negative of the I. An equally unresolved contradiction prevails here between, on the one hand, this *individualized* representation and the *abstract universality of the I* and, on the other hand, the internally harmonious *total actuality*. It is clear from this that the proposition, 'What I think is true', which is rightly defended by *conceptual reason*, acquires in the *deranged* a *deranged* sense and becomes something just as *untrue* as the assertion pitted against that proposition by the *unintelligence* of the *intellect*, the assertion of the *absolute divorce* between the subjective and objective. Over this unintelligence, as well as over derangement, even the mere *sensation* of the *healthy* soul has the advantage of rationality, in so far as the *actual* unity of the subjective and objective is present in it. As we have already said above, however, this unity only acquires its perfect form in *conceptual reason*; for only what is thought by conceptual reason is something true in regard both to its form and its content,—a *perfect* unity of what is *thought* and what *is*. In derangement, by contrast, the unity and the difference of the subjective and objective are still something merely *formal*, excluding the concrete content of actuality.<sup>13</sup>

Because of the context and also for even greater clarification, we want at this point to repeat in a more condensed and, if possible, more determinate form, something which has already been touched on several times in the above Paragraph and in the Remark to it. We mean the point that derangement must be conceived essentially as an *illness at once mental and bodily*, and for this reason: the unity of the subjective and objective prevailing in derangement is still wholly *immediate* and has not yet gone through infinite mediation, the I affected by derangement, no matter how acute this tip of self-feeling may be, is still *natural, immediate, a being*, and consequently what is *distinct* from it can take root in it as a *being*; or, still more determinately, in derangement a particular feeling contradicting the objective consciousness of the deranged is *held fast* as something objective in the face of that consciousness, is *not* posited *ideally*, this feeling consequently having the form of a *being*, hence of a *bodily* entity, and in this way a *duality of being* emerges in the deranged which is not overcome by his objective

consciousness, a divergence which just *is* and which becomes for the deranged soul a fixed barrier.<sup>14</sup>

Further, as regards the other question which likewise has already been raised in the above Paragraph, 'How does mind come to be deranged?', we may supplement the answer given there by remarking that this question already presupposes the firm, objective consciousness not yet attained by the soul at its present stage of development; and that, at the point we have now reached in our inquiry, it is rather the *converse* question that should be answered, namely the question: 'How does the soul that is *enclosed* in its *inwardness* and is immediately identical with its individual world, emerge from the merely *formal*, empty difference of the subjective and objective and attain to the *actual* difference of these two sides, and thus to the *genuinely objective*, intellectual and rational consciousness?' The answer to this will be given in the last four Paragraphs of the first part of the theory of subjective mind.<sup>15</sup>

From what was said at the beginning of this Anthropology about the necessity of starting the philosophical consideration of subjective mind with the *natural* mind, and from the *concept of derangement* developed above in all its aspects, it will incidentally be sufficiently clear why derangement must be dealt with *before* the *healthy, intellectual* consciousness, although it has the intellect for its *pre-supposition* and is nothing other than the *extremity of the diseased condition* into which the intellect can descend. We had to settle the discussion of this condition already in Anthropology because in derangement the *soulful*, the *natural self*, the *abstract, formal subjectivity*, gains the upper hand over the *objective, rational, concrete* consciousness, and consideration of the *abstract, natural self* must *precede* the exposition of *concrete, free* mind. However, in order that this progression from something abstract to the concrete that contains it in potentiality may not have the look of an isolated and therefore suspect phenomenon, we can recall that in the *Philosophy of Right* a similar progression has to take place. In this science too, we begin with something *abstract*, namely with the *concept of the will*; we then proceed to the ensuing actualization of the still *abstract* will in an *external* reality, to the sphere of *formal right*; from there we go on to the will *reflected into itself* out of external reality, to the realm of *morality*; and thirdly and lastly we come to the will that *unites* within itself *these two abstract* moments and is therefore *concrete*, ethical will. In the sphere of *ethics* itself we then begin again from an *immediacy*, from the *natural, undeveloped* shape that the ethical mind has in the *family*; then we come to the *rupture* of the ethical substance in *civil society*; and finally we reach the *unity and truth*, present in the political *state*, of those two one-sided forms of the ethical mind. However, from this course taken by our inquiry it does not follow in the least that we wanted to make *ethical life* something *later* in time than right and morality, or to explain the family and civil society as something *preceding* the state in actuality. We are well aware that ethical life is the *foundation* of right and morality, as also that the family and civil society with their well-ordered differentiations already *presuppose* the presence of the state. In the *philosophical*

*development* of the ethical, however, we cannot begin with the state, since in the state the ethical has unfolded into its *most concrete* form, whereas the *beginning* is necessarily something *abstract*. For this reason too morality must be considered *before* ethics, although morality in a way emerges in ethics only as a sickness. And for the same reason too we have had, in the realm of Anthropology, to discuss *derangement before* the *concrete*, objective consciousness, since derangement, as we have seen, consists in an *abstraction* held on to in opposition to the concrete objective consciousness of the deranged.<sup>16</sup>—This concludes the remarks we had to make here about the concept of derangement in general.

As regards the *particular varieties* of the deranged condition, people usually differentiate them not so much by an inner determinacy as by the *outward expressions* of this illness. This is not adequate for philosophical inquiry. We have to recognize even derangement as something *differentiated within itself* in a *necessary* and in that respect rational manner. But a necessary differentiation of this condition of the soul cannot be derived from the *particular content* of the formal unity of the subjective and objective present in derangement; for this content is something infinitely *manifold* and therefore *contingent*. On the contrary, therefore, we must keep our eye on the entirely *universal differences of form* emerging in derangement. For this purpose we must refer back to our previous description of derangement as a *closure of the mind*, as a *submergence within itself*, whose *peculiarity*, in contrast to the being-within-itself of mind present in somnambulism, consists in its being no longer in *immediate connection* with actuality but in having *decidedly cut itself off* from it.<sup>17</sup>

Now this submergence within itself is, on the one hand, the *universal* in every variety of derangement; on the other hand, when it remains in its *indeterminacy*, in its *emptiness*, it forms a *particular* variety of the deranged state. It is with this that we have to begin our consideration of the various kinds of derangement.<sup>18</sup>

But if this quite indeterminate being-within-itself acquires a *determinate* content, binds itself to a merely subjective, *particular* representation and takes this to be something objective, then we see the second form of derangement.<sup>19</sup>

The third and last main form of this illness emerges when that which *confronts* the soul's delusion is *likewise for the soul*, when the deranged *compares* his merely subjective representation with his objective consciousness, discovers the *acute opposition* obtaining between the two, and thus arrives at the unhappy feeling of his contradiction with himself. Here we see the soul in the more or less despairing endeavour to escape from the *discord*, already present in the second form of derangement but there *felt only slightly or not at all*, and to regain *concrete identity* with itself, the inner *harmony* of the self-consciousness persisting imperturbably in the *one* centre of its actuality.<sup>20</sup>

Let us now consider in somewhat more detail these three main forms of derangement.

αα) *Imbecility, absent-mindedness, rambling*. The *first* of these three main forms, the quite indeterminate submergence in oneself, appears at first as

*imbecility*. This takes different forms. There is *natural* imbecility. This is incurable. Particularly what is called *cretinism* belongs here, a state that is partly sporadic in its occurrence and partly endemic in certain regions, especially in narrow valleys and marshy places. Cretins are misshapen, deformed people, often afflicted with goitre; conspicuous by a completely stupid facial expression; their undeveloped soul often cannot go beyond entirely inarticulate sounds.—But besides this natural imbecility we also find an imbecility into which someone descends by undeserved misfortune or by his own fault. With regard to the former case, *Pinel* cites the example of a congenital imbecile whose dull-wittedness was believed to be the result of an extremely severe fright which her mother had had when she was pregnant with her. Imbecility is often a consequence of *frenzy*, in which case cure becomes highly improbable; *epilepsy*, too, often terminates in the state of imbecility. But the same state is no less frequently brought on by excess of dissipation.—With regard to the appearance of imbecility we can also mention that it occasionally reveals itself as *cataplexy*, as a complete paralysis of both corporeal and mental activity.—Incidentally, imbecility occurs not merely as a permanent state, but also as a transitory state. An Englishman, e.g., sank into indifference to all things, first to politics and then to his own affairs and to his family. He would sit quietly, looking straight in front of him and for years did not speak a word, and showed an insensitivity that made it doubtful whether he knew his wife and children or not. He was cured when someone else, dressed exactly like him, sat opposite him and imitated him in everything he did. This threw the patient into a violent frenzy which forced him to attend to things outside of him and drove him permanently out of his self-absorption.<sup>21</sup>

A further modification of the first main form of the deranged state under discussion is *absent-mindedness*. This consists in a *non-awareness* of the *immediate present*. This non-awareness often forms the beginning of madness; yet there is also a lofty absent-mindedness far removed from madness. This can occur when the mind is withdrawn by profound meditations from attention to everything relatively unimportant. Thus *Archimedes* was once so absorbed in a geometrical problem that for several days he seemed to have forgotten all other things and had to be wrenched by force out of this concentration of his mind on a single point. But absent-mindedness proper is a submergence into *entirely abstract self-feeling*, into a suspension of sober, objective consciousness, into an unaware non-presence of the mind at things at which it should be present. The subject in this state confuses his true situation in the individual case with a false one, and conceives outer circumstances in a one-sided manner, not in the totality of their relations. Among many other examples, a delightful example of this state of soul is a French count who, when his wig got caught on a chandelier, laughed heartily over it with the others present and looked around to discover whose wig had been pulled off, who was left with a bald pate. Another instance of this kind is supplied by *Newton*. This scholar is supposed once to have taken hold of a lady's

finger in order to use it as a tobacco-stopper for his pipe. Such absent-mindedness can be the result of excessive study; it is found quite often in scholars, especially in those of an earlier time. However, absent-mindedness often arises also, when people want to be held in high esteem everywhere, and consequently keep their subjectivity in view constantly, which makes them forget objectivity.<sup>22</sup>

Absent-mindedness stands in *contrast* to the *rambling* that takes an interest in *everything*. Rambling springs from inability to *fix* attention on anything *determinate*, and consists in the illness of *stumbling* from one object to another. This ailment is mostly incurable. Fools of this kind are the most troublesome. *Pinel* tells of such a subject who was a perfect image of chaos. He says: 'This subject approaches me and overwhelms me with his chatter. Straight afterwards he does the same to someone else. When this individual comes into a room he turns everything in it upside down, shakes chairs and tables and moves them about without any apparent particular purpose. You only have to take your eyes off him for a second and this subject is already out on the adjoining promenade, busying himself there just as aimlessly as in the room, chattering, throwing stones, pulling off foliage, going on further, turning round again, without knowing why.' — Rambling always stems from a weakness of the power of intellectual consciousness to hold together the entirety of its representations. But rambles often already suffer from *delirium*—therefore, not merely from *non-awareness* of what is immediately present but from an unconscious *reversal* of it. So much for the first main form of the deranged state.<sup>23</sup>

ββ) The *second* main form of it, *madness proper*, arises when the *closure-within-itself* of the natural mind, whose various modifications we considered above, acquires a *determinate* content and this content becomes a *fixed idea*, because the mind not yet in complete control of itself becomes just as absorbed in it as, in imbecility, it is absorbed in its own self, in the abyss of its *indeterminacy*. It is hard to say with precision where madness proper begins. For example, in small towns one finds people, especially women, who are so absorbed in an extremely limited circle of particular interests and who feel so comfortable in this parochialism of theirs that we rightly call such individuals *crazy* people. But madness in the *narrower* sense of the word implies that the mind sticks fast in an *individual, merely subjective* representation and regards it as something *objective*. This state of soul mostly comes about when someone shuts himself up in his subjectivity out of dissatisfaction with actuality. The passion of *vanity* and *pride* is the chief cause of this self-cocooning of the soul within itself. Then the mind thus nestled in its inwardness easily loses its understanding of actuality and finds its way around only in its subjective representations. This conduct can soon give rise to *complete madness*. For if there is still any *vitality* present in it, this eremitic consciousness easily takes the step of creating some content or other from its own resources and regarding this purely subjective item as something objective and *fixing* it in place. That is, whereas, as we have seen, in imbecility and in rambling as well, the soul does not possess the power to hold on to



anything determinate, madness proper by contrast displays this ability and by this very fact demonstrates that it is still *consciousness*, that in madness, therefore, a *differentiation* of the soul from its firmly entrenched content still takes place. Therefore, although on the one hand the madman's consciousness has coalesced with that content, yet, on the other hand, in virtue of its *universal* nature consciousness transcends the *particular* content of the deranged representation. Therefore the mad have, alongside their craziness in relation to one point, at the same time a good, coherent consciousness, a correct conception of things and the capacity for intelligent action. This, in addition to the mistrustful reserve of the mad, makes it possible that sometimes a madman is not at once recognized as such and, in particular, that there are doubts about whether the cure of the madness has succeeded, hence about whether the discharge of the mental patient can take place.<sup>24</sup>

The differences between the mad are mainly determined by the variety of the representations that become entrenched in them.

*Weariness with life* can be reckoned as the *most indeterminate* madness when it is not occasioned by the loss of loved and worthy persons and of ethical relationships. An *indeterminate*, groundless disgust with life is not *indifference* to it, for in indifference life is endured; rather it is the *inability* to endure it, a fluctuation to and fro between inclination and aversion towards everything pertaining to actuality, a captivation by the fixed idea of the loathsomeness of life and at the same time a striving to overcome this idea. It is mostly the English who succumb to this disgust with actuality, arising without any rational ground, as well as to other modes of madness; perhaps because with this nation induration into subjective particularity is so prevalent. In the English, this weariness with life appears mainly as *melancholy*, the mind's constant brooding over its unhappy representation, never rising to the vitality of thought and action. Not infrequently this state of soul gives rise to an irrepressible impulse to suicide; on occasions this impulse could only be eradicated by violently wrenching the despairing individual out of himself. For instance, the story is told of an Englishman who was on the point of drowning himself in the Thames when he was attacked by robbers; he offered the fiercest resistance and by the suddenly awakening feeling of the value of life, he lost all suicidal thoughts. Another Englishman who had hanged himself, on being cut down by his servant not only regained the desire to live but also the disease of avarice; for when discharging the servant, he deducted twopence from his wages because the man had acted without instructions in cutting the rope in question.<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to the *indeterminate* form of deranged soul-state just described, *killing off all vitality*, stands an endless throng, coupled with *lively interests* and even with *passion*, of madnesses having an *individualized* content. This content depends in part on the *particular passion* from which the madness sprang; but it can also be determined contingently by something else. The first case will have to be assumed with those madmen who, for example, have taken themselves to be *God*, or *Christ*, or a *king*. The second case, by contrast, will occur

when, for example, madmen suppose themselves to be a *barleycorn*, or a *dog*, or to have a *carriage* in their body. But in both cases the madman *as such* has no *determinate consciousness* of the contradiction obtaining between his fixed idea and objectivity. Only *we* are aware of this contradiction; such a madman *himself* is not tormented by the feeling of his inner disruption.

γγ) Only when the *third* main form of the deranged state is present, *mania* or *insanity*, do we have the phenomenon that the deranged subject *himself* is aware of being torn apart into two mutually contradictory modes of consciousness, that the mental patient *himself* has a vivid feeling of the contradiction between his merely subjective representation and objectivity, and yet cannot give up this representation but insists on making it an actuality or annihilating what is actual. It is implied in the concept of mania just indicated that it need not spring from an *empty illusion*, but can be brought about particularly by a stroke of *great misfortune*, by a *derangement* of someone's individual world, or by the violent *upheaval* and coming out-of-joint of the universal state of the world if the individual lives with his heart exclusively in the *past* and thus becomes unable to reconcile himself to the *present* by which he feels himself at once rejected and bound. In the French revolution, for example, many people became insane by the collapse of almost all civic relationships. The same effect is often produced by religious causes in the most frightful manner, when the individual is plunged into absolute uncertainty whether he has been accepted by God into grace.

But in the insane the feeling of their inner disruption may be a *tranquil* pain, but equally it can also advance to a *rage of reason* against *unreason* and of *unreason* against reason, and thus become *frenzy*. For this unhappy feeling is very easily accompanied in the insane not only by a *hypochondriacal* mood tormented by *fancies* and *whims*, but also by a suspicious, jealous, mischievous, and malicious disposition, a *fury* over its hindrance by the surrounding actuality, over those from whom it suffers a limitation of its will; just as, conversely, in *spoilt* people, individuals who are accustomed to getting their own way in everything, their *rambling obstinacy* easily turns to insanity when the rational will that wills the universal erects against them a dam, which their rearing subjectivity is unable to jump over or to break through. Traces of malice occur in everyone; however, ethical or at least prudent people know how to suppress them. But in insanity, where a *particular representation* usurps power over the rational mind, then *in general* the *particularity* of the subject emerges without restraint, and so then the *impulses* belonging to this particularity, *natural* impulses and those developed by reflection, throw off the yoke of the *ethical* laws rooted in the *genuinely universal* will,—then consequently the dark, subterranean powers of the heart get free. The fury of the insane often becomes a positive *mania* for *injuring* others, in fact even a suddenly awakening *desire to kill*, which with irresistible force compels those in its grip, despite the abhorrence of murder perhaps present in them, to kill even those whom otherwise they love tenderly. As we have just indicated, however, the malice of the insane does not exclude moral and ethical feelings;

on the contrary, just because of the distress of the insane, because of the *unmediated opposition* dominant in them, these feelings can have an increased intensity. *Pinel* expressly says that nowhere has he seen more affectionate spouses and fathers than in the lunatic asylum.<sup>26</sup>

As regards the *physical* side of insanity, its appearance often shows a connection with general changes in nature, especially with the course of the sun. Very hot and very cold seasons exert particular influence in this regard. It has also been noticed that the approach of storms and great changes in the weather produce temporary disturbances and outbursts of the insane. With regard to phases of life, it has been observed that insanity does not usually occur before the fifteenth year. As for other corporeal differences, we are aware that in strong muscular people with black hair, fits of rage are usually more violent than in blond persons. But to what extent derangement is connected with an unhealthy nervous system, is a point which eludes the eye of the doctor considering it from outside, as well as that of the anatomist.

*The cure of derangement.* The last point we have to discuss in connection with insanity and derangement relates to the *course of treatment* to be applied to both diseased states. The treatment is partly *physical* and partly *psychological*. At times the former by itself alone is sufficient; mostly however it is necessary to supplement this by psychological treatment which, likewise, can sometimes be sufficient by itself alone. No universally applicable prescription for the physical side of cure can be indicated. The medical remedies employed are, on the contrary, very much an empirical matter and therefore unreliable. But this much is certain, that the worst procedure of all is the one formerly practised at Bedlam which was limited to a thorough purging of the insane every three months. Sometimes, incidentally, the mentally ill have been cured in a physical way by the very thing that is liable to cause derangement in those not afflicted, namely, by falling heavily on their heads. The celebrated *Montfaucon*, e.g., is supposed to have been freed of his listlessness in this way in his youth.

But *psychological* treatment always remains the main thing. While this can have no effect on imbecility, it can often be successful in the treatment of madness proper and insanity because in these soul-states a vitality of consciousness is still present, and alongside derangement related to a *particular* representation, in its *other* representations a rational consciousness still subsists, which a skillful psychiatrist can develop into a *power* over that particularity. (It is the merit of *Pinel* in particular to have conceived this residue of rationality present in the mad and the insane as the foundation of cure and to have conducted his treatment of the mentally ill in accordance with this conception. His publication on this subject must be declared the best that exists in this field.)

In the psychological course of treatment, what matters above all things is to gain the *confidence* of the mad. This can be won because the deranged are still ethical beings. But the surest way to get possession of their confidence is to observe an open demeanour towards them without however letting this

openness degenerate into a *direct* attack on the deranged representation. Pinel relates an example of this method of treatment and its successful outcome. A hitherto amiable man became deranged, and since he did crazy stuff, possibly harmful to others, he had to be locked up. This put him in a rage and he was therefore tied up, but then fell into a higher degree of fury. He was therefore taken to a lunatic asylum. Here the warden entered into a calm conversation with the new arrival and gave in to his perverse utterances and thus calmed him down. He then ordered his bonds to be untied, led him into his new apartment and by continuing this procedure cured this mental patient in next to no time.—After winning the confidence of the insane, one must try to gain a just *authority* over them and to awaken in them the feeling that there is, in general, something of importance and worth. The deranged feel their mental weakness, their dependence on rational people. This makes it possible for the latter to win their respect. In learning to respect the one who is treating him, the deranged individual acquires the capacity to apply force to his subjectivity standing in contradiction with objectivity. So long as he is unable to do this himself others have to exert force against him. Therefore if, for example, someone deranged refuses to eat anything, or if he even destroys things around him, then it goes without saying that such things cannot be tolerated. It is particularly necessary—and this is often very difficult in the case of persons of rank, such as George III—to humble the self-conceit of the *arrogant insane* by making them feel their dependence. Of this case and the procedure to be observed here the following noteworthy example is found in Pinel. Someone who took himself to be Mahomet arrived at the lunatic asylum proud and self-important, demanded homage, issued daily a mass of banishment- and death-sentences and raved in royal fashion. Now although his delusion was not contradicted, he was forbidden to give way to raving as this was unseemly, and when he did not obey they locked him up and made representations to him about his conduct. He promised to improve, was discharged, but again flew into a maniacal rage. Now they took this Mahomet forcibly in hand, locked him up once more, and announced to him that he must no longer hope for mercy. However, the warden's wife by an agreed arrangement let herself be moved by his earnest entreaties for liberty and asked him to promise faithfully not to abuse his freedom with outbursts of rage because by this he would get her into trouble. She released him after he had made that promise. From this moment on he behaved well. If he still got an attack of rage, a glance from the warden's wife was enough to send him to his room to hide his rage there. The respect he had for this woman and his will to conquer his fits of rage restored him to sanity in six months.

As happened in the case just cited, we must always remember that, for all the severity that occasionally becomes necessary towards the deranged, *in general* they deserve considerate treatment owing to their rationality which is not yet entirely destroyed. For this reason, the force to be applied to these unfortunates should always be of such a kind as to have the moral significance of a *just punishment*.

Lunatics still have a feeling of what is right and good; they are aware, e.g., that one should not harm others. Consequently the wrong they have committed can be represented to them, *imputed* to them and *punished* in them, and the justice of the punishment imposed made comprehensible to them. Thereby their better self is encouraged and when this happens they gain confidence in their *own* ethical power. Having reached this point, they become capable of fully recuperating by associating with good people. On the other hand, the moral self-feeling of the deranged can easily be so severely wounded by harsh, arrogant, contemptuous treatment that they fly into the most furious rage and frenzy. Also one should not be so imprudent as to let anything come close to the deranged, especially religious maniacs, which could serve to strengthen their craziness. On the contrary, one should endeavour to turn the deranged to other thoughts and so make them forget their fancies. A particularly effective way of dispelling the fixed representation is to compel the mad to occupy themselves mentally and especially physically; by *work* they are forced out of their diseased subjectivity and impelled towards the actual. Thus the case occurred of a tenant in Scotland who became noted for curing the insane, although his procedure consisted simply and solely in harnessing them, half a dozen at a time, to a plough and making them work until they were completely tired out. Of the remedies acting initially on the *body*, the *swing* especially has proved efficacious with the deranged, especially with raving lunatics. The seesaw movement on the swing makes the lunatic giddy and unsettles his fixed representation. But a great deal can also be achieved for the recovery of the deranged by *sudden* and powerful action on their fixed *representation*. It is true that the mad are extremely distrustful when they notice people trying to wean them away from their fixed representation. Yet at the same time they are stupid and are easily taken by surprise. They can therefore often be cured by someone pretending to enter into their delusion and then suddenly doing something in which the deranged individual glimpses a liberation from his imagined ailment. There is a well-known case of a deranged Englishman who believed he had a haycart with four horses in his stomach and who was freed from his delusion by a doctor who, having assured him that he could feel the cart and horses and so gained his confidence, persuaded him that he possessed a remedy for reducing the size of the things supposedly lodged in his stomach. Finally, he gave the mental patient an emetic and made him vomit out of the window just as, with the doctor's connivance, a haycart was passing by outside which the lunatic believed he had vomited. Another way of effecting a cure of derangement consists in getting madmen to perform actions which immediately refute the *peculiar* madness that torments them. Thus, e.g., someone who imagined he had glass feet was cured by a feigned attack by robbers, when he found his feet extremely useful for running away. Another who took himself to be dead, remained motionless and would not eat anything, came to his senses again when someone pretended to enter into his madness. The lunatic was put in a coffin and laid in a vault in which there was another coffin occupied by a man who at first pretended to be dead but who,

soon after he was left alone with the lunatic, sat up, expressed his pleasure at now having company in death, and finally got up, ate some of the food there and told the astonished lunatic that he had already been dead a long time and therefore knew how the dead go about things. The lunatic was pacified by the assurance, likewise ate and drank and was cured. Sometimes lunacy can also be cured by a *word*, by a *joke* acting immediately on the representation. For instance, a lunatic who believed he was the Holy Ghost recovered when another lunatic said to him: How can *you* be the Holy Ghost, when it's me? An equally interesting instance is a watch-maker who imagined he had been guillotined although innocent. The remorseful judge ordered that his head be given back to him, but through an unfortunate confusion a different, much worse, thoroughly useless head had been put back on him. As this lunatic was once defending the legend according to which St Dionysius had kissed his own severed head, another lunatic retorted: 'You arrant fool, what is St Dionysius supposed to have kissed his head with, with his heel perhaps?' This question so shook the deranged watch-maker that he completely recovered from his quirk. A joke of this kind will, however, completely dispel the madness only if this disease has already abated in intensity.<sup>27</sup>

### (γ) *Habit*

#### §409

Self-feeling, immersed in the particularity of the feelings (of simple sensations, and also desires, urges, passions, and their gratifications), is not distinguished from them. But the self is implicitly a simple relation of ideality to itself, formal universality, and this is the truth of the particular; in this life of feeling the self is to be posited as this universality; thus it is the *universality* that distinguishes itself from particularity, the universality that *is for itself*. This universality is not the content-packed truth of the determinate sensations, desires, etc., for their content does not yet come into consideration here. Particularity is, in this determination, just as formal; it is only the *particular being* or immediacy of the soul in contrast to its equally formal, abstract being-for-self. This particular being of the soul is the moment of its *bodiliness*; here it breaks with this bodiliness, distinguishing from it itself as its *simple* being and becomes the ideal, subjective substantiality of this bodiliness, just as in its implicit concept (§389) it was the only the unqualified substance of bodiliness.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] This abstract being-for-self of the soul in its bodiliness is not yet I, not the existence of the universal that is for the universal. It is bodiliness reduced to its pure *ideality*, and bodiliness thus pertains to the soul as such. That is, just as space and time as abstract asunderness, as, therefore, empty space and empty time, are only subjective forms, pure intuition; so that pure *being*, which, owing to the sublation in it of the particularity of bodiliness, i.e. of immediate bodiliness as such, is being-for-self, is the entirely pure intuition, unconscious, but the foundation

of consciousness. It proceeds within itself to consciousness, since it has sublated within itself the bodiliness, of which it is the subjective substance, and which is still for it and constitutes a barrier. And thus it is posited as a subject for itself.<sup>2</sup>

### §410

That the soul thus makes itself into abstract universal being, and reduces the particularity of feelings (of consciousness too) to a determination in it that just *is*, is *habit*. In this way the soul has the content *in possession*, and contains it in such a way that in such determinations it is not actually sentient, it does not stand in relationship to them by distinguishing itself from them, nor is it absorbed in them, but it has them in itself and moves in them, without sensation or consciousness. The soul is *free* of them, in so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them; while it exists in these forms as its possessions, it is at the same time open to other activity and occupations, in the sphere of sensation and the mind's consciousness in general.<sup>1</sup>

This self-incorporation of the particularity or bodiliness of the determinations of feeling into the *being* of the soul appears as a *repetition* of them, and the production of habit appears as *practice*. For, since this being is, in relation to the natural-particular material that is put into this form, abstract universality, it is universality of reflexion (§175): one and the same item, as an external plurality of sensation, is reduced to its unity, and this abstract unity is *posited*.<sup>2</sup>

[*Remark*] Habit, like memory, is a hard point in organization of the mind; habit is the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The *natural* qualities and alterations of age, of sleeping and waking, are immediately natural; habit is the determinacy of feeling (as well as of intelligence, will, etc., in so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into something that is natural, mechanical. Habit has rightly been called a second nature: *nature*, because it is an immediate being of the soul, a *second* nature, because it is an immediacy *posited* by the soul, incorporating and moulding the bodiliness that pertains to the determinations of feeling as such and to the determinacies of representation and of the will in so far as they are embodied (§401).<sup>3</sup>

In habit man's mode of existence is natural, and for that reason he is unfree in it; but he is free in so far as the natural determinacy of sensation is by habit reduced to *his* mere being, he is no longer different from it, is indifferent to it, and so no longer interested, engaged, or dependent with respect to it. The unfreedom in habit is partly just *formal*, pertaining only to the being of the soul; partly only *relative*, in so far as it really arises only in the case of *bad* habits, or in so far as a habit is opposed by another purpose; the habit of right in general, of the ethical, has the content of freedom.<sup>4</sup> The essential determination is the *liberation* from sensations that man gains through habit, when he is affected by them. The different forms of habit may be determined as follows:

(a) The *immediate* sensation is posited as negated, as indifferent. *Hardening* against external sensations (frost, heat, weariness of the limbs, etc., pleasant tastes, etc.), as well as hardening of the heart against distress, is a strength by which affection by such things as frost, etc. and distress, though it is of course sensed by man, is just reduced to an externality and immediacy; the soul's *universal* being maintains its *abstract* being-for-self in it, and self-feeling as such, consciousness, reflection, and other purposes and activity, are no longer involved in it.<sup>5</sup>

(b) Indifference towards *satisfaction*; desires, urges are dulled by the *habit* of their satisfaction. This is the rational liberation from them; monkish renunciation and forcible repression do not free us from them, nor are they rational in content. It goes without saying here that urges are kept in their natural place as finite determinacies, and that they, like their satisfaction, are subordinated to the rationality of the will as moments in it.<sup>6</sup>

(c) In habit as *dexterity*, the abstract being of the soul is supposed not only to be held on to for itself, but to be imposed as a subjective purpose *within* bodiliness, which is to become subjugated and entirely pervious to it. In contrast to such internal determination of the subjective soul, bodiliness is determined as *immediate external* being and a *barrier*—the more determinate breach of the soul, as simple being-for-self within itself, with its initial naturalness and immediacy; the soul is thus no longer in its initial immediate identity and, now that it is external, must first be reduced to such identity. The embodiment of determinate sensations is, moreover, itself a determinate embodiment (§401), and the immediate bodiliness is a *particular possibility* (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure, a particular organ of its organic system) for a determinate purpose. The incorporation of such a purpose in the body means that the *implicit* ideality of the material in general, and of the determinate bodiliness, has been *posited* as ideality, so that the soul *exists* as substance in its bodiliness in accordance with the determinacy of its representing and willing. In dexterity bodiliness is then rendered pervious, made into an instrument, in such a way that as soon as the representation (e.g. a sequence of musical notes) is in me, the physical body too, unresistingly and fluently, has expressed it correctly.<sup>7</sup>

Habit is a form that embraces all kinds and stages of mind's activity. The most external of them, the individual's spatial determination, his *upright* stance, is made by his will into a habit, an *immediate, unconscious* posture which always remains a matter of his continuing will; man stands only because and in so far as he wills it, and only so long as he unconsciously wills it. Similarly *seeing*, and so on, is the concrete habit which *immediately* unites in one simple act the many determinations of sensation, consciousness, intuition, intellect, etc. *Thinking*, too, though wholly free, and active in the pure element of itself, likewise requires habit and familiarity, this form of *immediacy*, by which it is the unimpeded, pervaded possession of my *individual self*. Only through this habit do I *exist* for myself as thinking. Even this immediacy of thinking



togetherness-with-oneself involves bodiliness (deficient habituation and long continuation of thinking cause headaches); habit diminishes this sensation, by making the natural determination into an immediacy of the soul. — But when developed, and at work in the mind as such, habit is *recollection* and *memory*, and is to be considered further below.<sup>8</sup>

Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and taken to be a lifeless, contingent and particular thing. Entirely contingent content can of course, like every other content, take the form of habit, and it is the habit of living which brings on death, or, albeit in a wholly abstract way, is death itself. Yet at the same time habit is the most essential feature of the *existence* of all mental life in the individual subject, enabling the subject to be *concrete* immediacy, to be *soulful* ideality, enabling the content, religious content, moral content, etc., to *belong* to it as *this self*, as *this* soul, not in it merely *implicitly* (as predisposition), nor as a transient sensation or representation, nor as abstract inwardness, cut off from action and actuality, but in its very being. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind, habit is usually passed over, either as something contemptible or rather also because it is one of the most difficult determinations.<sup>9</sup>

*Zusatz.* We are habituated to the *representation* of habit; nevertheless to determine the *concept* of habit is difficult. For this reason we wish to give here some further elucidations of this concept.

First of all, the *necessity* of the *dialectical progression* from *derangement* (considered in §408) to *habit* (treated in §§409 and 410) must be shown. To this end we recall that in *mania* the soul endeavours to restore itself to perfect inner harmony of mind out of the contradiction present between its objective consciousness and its fixed representation. This restoration can just as well fail as succeed. For the *individual* soul, therefore, the attainment of free, internally harmonious self-feeling appears as something *contingent*. But *in itself* the absolute liberation of self-feeling, the soul's untroubled being-together-with-itself in all the particularity of its content, is something thoroughly necessary; for *in itself* the soul is absolute ideality, that which overarches all its determinacies; and it lies in the *concept* of the soul that by sublation of the particularities which have become entrenched in it, it proves to be the unlimited power over them, that it reduces what is still *immediate*, what is in it as a *being*, to a mere *property*, to a mere *moment*, in order by this absolute negation to become *for its own self* as a *free individuality*. Now we have in fact already had to consider a being-for-self of the self in the relationship of the human soul to its *genius*. There however this being-for-self still had the form of *externality*, of separation into two individualities, into a dominating and a dominated self; and between these two sides there was as yet no decided *opposition*, no *contradiction*, so that the genius, this determinate inwardness, made its appearance in the human individual *unhindered*. By contrast, at the stage we have now reached in the development of subjective mind, we come to a being-for-self of the soul that has been brought about by

the concept of the soul through *overcoming* of the mind's inner contradiction present in derangement, through *sublation* of the *complete disruption* of the self. This being-together-with-one's-own-self we call *habit*. In habit, the soul is no longer captivated by a merely subjective particular representation and evicted by it from the centre of its concrete actuality; it has so completely received into its ideality the immediate and individualized content presented to it, has made itself so at home in the content, that it moves about in it with *freedom*. That is, whereas in mere sensation I am contingently affected now by this and now by that, and in sensation the soul is immersed in its content, *loses* itself in it, does not sense its concrete self—as also happens with other mental activities as long as they are something to which the subject is still unaccustomed—in habit, by contrast, one enters a relationship not to a *contingent individual* sensation, representation, desire, etc., but to *one's own self*, to a *universal mode* of action which constitutes one's individuality, which is posited by oneself and has become one's *own*, and just because of that one appears as *free*. The universal to which the soul relates itself in habit is, however—in contrast to the self-determining *concrete universal* which is present only for pure thinking—only the *abstract universality* produced by *reflection* from the *repetition of many individualities*. It is only to *this* form of universal that the natural soul, dealing with the immediate and therefore with the individual, can attain. But the universal related to mutually external individualities is the *necessary*. Therefore although, on the one hand, by habit a man becomes free, yet, on the other hand, habit makes him its *slave*. Habit is not an *immediate, first* nature, dominated by the individuality of sensations. It is rather a *second* nature *posited* by soul. But all the same it is still a *nature*, something *posited* that assumes the shape of *immediacy*, an *ideality* of beings that is itself still burdened with the form of *being*, consequently something not corresponding to free mind, something merely *anthropological*.<sup>10</sup>

In that the soul has become self-relating ideality in the manner indicated above, namely, by overcoming its disruption, its inner contradiction, it has extruded from itself the bodiliness with which it was previously immediately identical, and at the same time exerts the power of its ideality on the bodily element thus released to immediacy. At this standpoint, therefore, we have to consider not the indeterminate separation of an interior in general from a world it finds before it, but the subjection of this bodiliness to the dominion of the soul. This subjugation of bodiliness forms the condition of the soul's liberation, of its attaining objective consciousness. Of course, *in itself* the individual soul is already corporeally enclosed; being alive, I have an organic physical body and this is not something *alien* to me; on the contrary, it belongs to my *Idea*, is the immediate, external reality of my *concept*, constitutes my individual natural life. Therefore, in passing, one must pronounce to be completely empty the idea of those who suppose that strictly man should not have an organic body because this compels him to take care of the satisfaction of his physical needs and thus diverts him from his purely spiritual life and incapacitates him for true freedom. Even the

unsophisticated religious man is far removed from this shallow view, since he holds the satisfaction of his bodily needs worthy of being the object of his petition to God, to the *eternal* spirit. But philosophy has to recognize that mind is only *for its own self* by opposing to itself *materiality*, both as its *own* bodiliness and as an external world in general, and by bringing back what is thus differentiated into unity with itself, a unity mediated by the opposition and by sublation of it. Between the mind and its *own* body there is naturally an even more intimate association than between the rest of the external world and mind. Just because of this necessary connection of my body with my soul, the activity immediately exerted by the soul on the body is not a *finite*, not a merely *negative*, activity. First of all, then, I have to maintain myself in this *immediate* harmony of my soul and my body; true, I do not have to make my body an end in itself as athletes and tightrope walkers do, but I must give my body its due, must take care of it, keep it healthy and strong, and must not therefore treat it with contempt or hostility. It is just by disregard or even maltreatment of my physical body that I would make my relationship to it one of dependence and of externally necessary connection; for in this way I would make it into something—despite its identity with me—*negative* towards me and consequently *hostile*, and would compel it to rise up against me, to take revenge on my mind. If, by contrast, I conduct myself in accordance with the laws of my bodily organism, then my soul is free in its physical body.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, the soul cannot remain in this *immediate* unity with its body. The form of *immediacy* of this harmony contradicts the concept of the soul, its determination of being *ideality relating to its own self*. In order to come into correspondence to this its concept, the soul must do what at our standpoint it has not yet done, it must make its identity with its body into an identity *posited* or mediated by the mind, take *possession* of its body, form it into a *pliant* and *skillful instrument* of its activity, so transform it that in it soul relates to *its own self* and and that the body becomes an accident brought into accord with its substance, freedom. The body is the *middle term* by which I come together with the external world in general. So, if I want to actualize my aims, then I must make my physical body capable of carrying over this subjectivity into external objectivity. My body is not by nature fitted for this; on the contrary, it immediately does only what is appropriate to animal life. But the purely organic functions are not yet functions performed at the instigation of my mind. For this service my body must first be trained. Whereas in animals the body, in obedience to their instinct, immediately accomplishes everything made necessary by the Idea of the animal, man, by contrast, has first to make himself master of his body by his own activity. At the beginning, the human soul pervades its physical body only in a quite *indeterminately universal* way. For this pervasion to become a *determinate* pervasion, *training* is required. Initially the physical body here shows itself unsubmitive to the soul, its movements are unsure and are given a strength that is now too great, now too small for the purpose in hand. The correct measure of this force can only

be achieved when one directs a particular reflection on all the manifold circumstances of the externality in which one wants to actualize one's aims and measures each individual movement of one's physical body in accordance with these circumstances. Therefore, even a decided talent can get it right straightaway every time only in so far as he is technically trained.<sup>12</sup>

If the activities of the body to be performed in the service of mind are often *repeated*, they acquire an ever higher degree of adequacy, for the soul gains an ever greater familiarity with all the circumstances to be considered, hence becomes more and more *at home* in its *expressions* and consequently achieves a continually growing capacity for immediately embodying its inner determinations and accordingly transforms the body more and more into its own property, into its serviceable instrument; there thus arises a *magical* relationship, an immediate operation of mind on body.<sup>13</sup>

But since the individual activities of man acquire by repeated practice the character of *habit*, the form of something received into *recollection*, into the *universality* of the mental interior, the soul brings into its expressions a *universal* mode of acting to be handed on to others too, a *rule*. This universal is internally so concentrated to *simplicity* that in it I am no longer conscious of the *particular* differences between my individual activities. That this is so we see, for example, in writing. When we are learning to write we must direct our attention on every individual detail, on a vast number of mediations. By contrast, once the activity of writing has become a habit with us, then our self has so completely mastered all relevant individual details, has so infected them with its universality, that they are no longer present to us *as individual* details and we keep in view only their *universal* aspect. Thus we see, consequently, that in *habit* our consciousness is at the same time *present* in the matter-in-hand, *interested* in it, yet conversely *absent* from it, *indifferent* towards it; that our self just as much *appropriates* the matter-in-hand as, on the contrary, it *withdraws* from it, that the soul on the one hand completely *penetrates* into its expressions and on the other hand deserts them, thus giving them the shape of something *mechanical*, of a merely *natural effect*.<sup>14</sup>

### (c) THE ACTUAL SOUL

#### §411

The soul, when its bodiliness has been thoroughly trained and made its own, becomes an *individual* subject for itself; and bodiliness is thus the *externality* as a predicate, in which the subject is related only to itself. This externality represents not itself, but the soul, of which it is the *sign*. As this identity of the inner with the outer, the outer being subjugated to the inner, the soul is *actual*; in its bodiliness it has its free shape, in which it feels *itself* and makes *itself* felt, and which, as the soul's work of art, has *human*, pathognomic and physiognomic, expression.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Human expression includes, e.g., the upright figure in general, the formation especially of the hand, as the absolute tool, of the mouth, laughter, weeping, etc., and the spiritual tone diffused over the whole, which at once announces the physical body as the externality of a higher nature. This tone is such a slight, indeterminate, and indescribable modification, because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural, and can therefore only be an indeterminate and quite imperfect *sign* for the mind, unable to represent it in its *universality* for itself. For the animal, the human figure is the highest form in which the mind appears to it. But for the mind it is only its *first* appearance, and *speech* is straight away its more perfect expression. The figure is indeed the mind's proximate existence, but in its physiognomic and pathognomic determinacy it is at the same time a *contingency* for the mind. To want to raise physiognomy and especially craniology to the rank of *sciences*, was therefore one of the most vacuous notions, even more vacuous than a *signatura rerum*, which supposed that we could recognize the healing power of a plant from its shape.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* As we have already baldly asserted in §390 in anticipation, the *actual* soul forms the third and last main section of Anthropology. We began our consideration of anthropology with the soul that just *is*, still *unseparated* from its natural determinacy; then, in the second main section, we passed on to the soul that *cuts off* from itself its *immediate* being and in the determinacies of this being *is for itself* in an *abstract* way, i.e., *feeling* soul; and now, in the third main section, we come, as already indicated, to the soul that has developed out of that *separation* into *mediated unity* with its naturalness, that in its bodiliness is for itself in a *concrete* way, hence *actual* soul. The *transition* to this stage of development is made by the concept of *habit* considered in the previous Paragraph. For as we have seen, in habit the *ideal* determinations of the soul acquire the form of a *being*, of something *external to its own self*, and conversely, bodiliness on its side becomes something unresistingly pervaded by the soul, something subjected to the liberated power of the soul's ideality. Thus there arises a unity of this *inner* and this *outer*, a unity mediated by the separation of the soul from its bodiliness and by the sublation of this separation. This unity, which from being a produced unity becomes an immediate unity, we call the *actuality* of the soul.

At the standpoint we have now reached, the body no longer comes into consideration with respect to its *organic process*, but only in so far as it is an externality posited *ideally* even in its reality and in so far as in it the soul, no longer restricted to the *involuntary* embodiment of its inner sensations, makes its appearance with *as much freedom* as it has won *so far* by overcoming what contradicts its ideality.

The *involuntary* embodiment of inner sensations considered at the close of the first main section of Anthropology (§401) is, in part, something that man has in common with animals. By contrast, the embodiments occurring with *freedom* and now to be discussed, impart to the human body a peculiar mental stamp, by which man is distinguished from animals far more than by any mere natural

determinacy. On his purely bodily side, man is not greatly different from the ape; but by the mind-pervaded aspect of his body he is distinguished from that animal to such a degree that a smaller difference obtains between the appearance of an ape and that of a bird than between the body of a man and that of an ape.

But the mental expression is concentrated mainly in the *face*, because the head is the real seat of the mental. In the *rest* of the body, which belongs more or less to naturalness as such and, therefore, among civilized peoples is clothed out of shame, the mental reveals itself particularly in the *posture* of the physical body. Thus the artists of antiquity, incidentally, paid very particular attention to posture in their portrayals, when they gave intuitional expression to the mind above all in its effusion into bodiliness. — So far as mental expression is produced by the facial muscles, it is called, as we know, the play of features; *gestures* in the narrower sense of the word proceed from the rest of the physical body. — Man's *absolute* gesture is his *upright position*; only *man* shows himself capable of this, whereas even the orang-outang can stand upright only with a stick. Man is not erect by nature, originally; he makes himself stand upright by the energy of his will; and although his stance, after it has become a habit, requires no further intense activity of will, yet it must always remain pervaded by our will if we are not to collapse instantly. — The human arm and especially the *hand* are likewise peculiar to man; no animal has such a flexible tool for external activity. The human hand, this *tool of tools*, is suited to serve an endless multitude of expressions of the will. As a rule we initially make gestures with the hand, then with the whole arm and the rest of the physical body.<sup>3</sup>

Expression by looks and gestures presents an interesting object of consideration. However, it is sometimes not altogether easy to discover the ground of the determinate *symbolic nature* of certain looks and gestures, the connection of their *meaning* with what they are *in themselves*. We do not wish to discuss here all the relevant phenomena but only the commonest of them. *Nodding*, for a start, means an *affirmation*, for by this we indicate a kind of submission. *Bowing* as a *mark of respect* is in every case done only with the upper part of the body by us Europeans, since in doing it we do not wish to surrender our independence. Orientals, by contrast, express reverence for their master by throwing themselves on the ground before him; they may not look him in the eye, for by doing so they would be asserting their being-for-self, and only the master has the right freely to survey the servant and slave. *Shaking the head* is a *denial*; for by this we indicate making something wobble, knocking it over. *Tossing the head* expresses *contempt*, elevating oneself above someone. *Screwing up the nose* denotes *disgust* as of something evil-smelling. *Frowning* proclaims *anger*, a concentration of oneself into oneself against an Other. We pull a *long face* when we see ourselves disappointed in our expectation; for in that case we feel, as it were, let down. The most expressive gestures have their seat in the mouth and in its surroundings, since it is from the mouth that the expression of speech proceeds, involving many and varied modifications of the lips. As for the *hands*, expressing *astonishment* by *clapping*

them *over one's head* is in a way an attempt to pull oneself together over one's own self. But *shaking hands* on a promise indicates, as is easy to see, *unanimity*. The movement of the *lower* extremities, *gait*, is also very significant. Above all things, gait must be cultivated; in it the soul must betray its mastery over the physical body. But not merely cultivation and the lack of it, but also slackness, an affected manner, vanity, hypocrisy, etc., on the one hand, and orderliness, modesty, good sense, candour, etc., on the other, express themselves in the peculiar style of walking; so that it is easy to distinguish people from one another by their gait.<sup>4</sup>

Incidentally, the cultivated man has a less animated play of looks and gestures than the uncultivated. Just as the former bids the inward storm of his passions to be calm, so he also observes outwardly a calm demeanour and imparts to the voluntary embodiment of his sensations a certain measure of moderation; whereas the uncultivated, lacking power over his interior, believes that he can make himself intelligible only by a luxuriance of looks and gestures, but is thereby sometimes seduced into grimacing and in this way acquires a comical air, because in a *grimace* the interior at once completely externalizes itself and one thereby lets each individual sensation pass over into one's entire reality, with the consequence that, almost like an animal, one sinks exclusively into this determinate sensation. The cultured individual does not need to be lavish with looks and gestures; he possesses in *talk* the worthiest and most suitable means of expressing himself; for *speech* is able immediately to receive and reproduce every modification of representation, which is why the ancients even went to the extreme of making their actors appear with masks on their faces, and so, content with this immobile physiognomy of character, dispensing altogether with the lively play of the actors' looks.<sup>5</sup>

Now just as the *voluntary* embodiments of the mental discussed here become through habit something *mechanical*, something requiring no particular effort of will, so too, conversely, some of the *involuntary* embodiments of what is sensed by the soul considered in §401 can also take place with *consciousness* and *freedom*. Above all the human *voice* belongs here; when the voice becomes *speech*, it ceases to be an *involuntary* expression of the soul. Similarly *laughing*, in the form of *laughing at*, becomes something produced with *freedom*. *Sighing*, too, is not so much something uncontrollable as something wilful. Herein lies the justification for discussing the soul-expressions just mentioned in *two* places,—with the *merely sentient* soul and also with the *actual* soul. This is also why we pointed out as far back as §401 that among the involuntary embodiments of the mental there are many 'lying in the direction of pathognomy and physiognomy'—which were to be treated in their turn in §411 above. The difference between these two determinations is that the *pathognomic* expression relates more to *transient* passions, whereas the *physiognomic* expression concerns the *character*, hence something *permanent*. However, the pathognomic becomes physiognomic when the passions in a man hold sway not merely temporarily but permanently. The lasting passion of anger, for example, firmly ingrains itself in the face; and so too

a sanctimonious nature gradually impresses itself in an indelible way on the face and on the whole bearing of the body.

Every man has a physiognomic aspect, appears at first sight as a pleasant or unpleasant, strong or weak, personality. According to this semblance one passes, from a certain instinct, a first universal judgement on others. However, it is easy to be mistaken in this, since this exterior, encumbered predominantly with the character of immediacy, does not perfectly correspond to the mind but only in a greater or lesser degree. Consequently, an unfavourable, like a favourable, exterior can have behind it something different from what that exterior initially leads one to suspect. The biblical saying: 'Beware of him whom God hath marked', is, therefore, often misused; and a judgement based on physiognomic expression has accordingly only the value of an *immediate* judgement, which can just as well be untrue as true. For this reason, people have rightly retreated from the exaggerated respect they formerly harboured for physiognomy, when *Lavater* created such a stir about it and when people had high hopes of a massive contribution from it to the highly regarded knowledge of human nature. Man is known much less by his outward appearance than by his *actions*. Even *language* is exposed to the fate of serving just as much to conceal as to reveal human thoughts.<sup>6</sup>

#### §412

*In itself* matter has no truth within the soul; the soul, since it is for itself, cuts itself off from its immediate being, and places this being over against itself as bodiliness, which can offer no resistance to the soul's incorporation into it. The soul, which has set its being in opposition to itself, sublated it and determined it as its own, has lost the meaning of *soul*, of the *immediacy* of mind. The actual soul in the *habit* of sensation and of its *concrete* self-feeling is in itself the *ideality* of its determinacies, an ideality that is for itself; in its externality it is *recollected* into itself, and is infinite relation to itself. This being-for-self of free universality is the soul's higher awakening to the *I*, to abstract universality in so far as it is for abstract universality, which is thus *thinking* and *subject* for itself, and in fact determinately subject of its judgement in which the I excludes from itself the natural totality of its determinations as an object, as a world *external to it*, and relates itself to that world so that in it it is immediately reflected into itself: *consciousness*.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz*. The soul's pervasion of its bodiliness considered in the two previous Paragraphs is not *absolute*, does not completely sublimate the difference of soul and body. On the contrary, the nature of the logical Idea, developing everything from itself, requires that this difference still be given its due. Something of bodiliness remains, therefore, purely organic and consequently withdrawn from the power of the soul, so that the soul's pervasion of its body is only one side of the body. The soul, when it comes to feel this limitation of its power, reflects itself into itself and expels bodiliness from itself as something *alien* to it. By this *reflection-into-self* the mind completes its liberation from the form of *being*, gives itself the form of



*essence* and becomes the *I*.<sup>2</sup> It is true that the soul, in so far as it is subjectivity or selfishness, is already *in itself* I. But the *actuality* of the I involves more than the soul's *immediate, natural* subjectivity; for the I is this universal, this simple entity that in truth exists only when it has itself as object, when it has become the *being-for-self* of the *simple* in the *simple*, the *relation* of the *universal* to the *universal*. The universal relating to itself exists nowhere save in the I. In *external nature*, as we have already said in the introduction to the theory of subjective mind, the universal only attains the highest activation of its power by *annihilation* of the individual reality, hence does not attain to *actual being-for-self*. The *natural* soul too is initially only the *real possibility* of this being-for-self. Only in the I does this possibility become actuality. Therefore, in the I an *awakening* ensues of a *higher kind* than the *natural awakening* confined to the mere *sensation* of what is *individual*; for the I is the *lightning* piercing through the natural soul and consuming its naturalness; in the I, therefore, the *ideality* of naturalness, and so the *essence* of the soul, becomes *for* the soul.<sup>3</sup>

The whole anthropological development of the mind presses on to this goal. As we here look back on this development, we recall how the *human* soul, in contrast to the *animal* soul which remains sunk in the individuality and limitation of sensation, has raised itself above the limited content of what is sensed, a content that contradicts its implicitly infinite nature, has posited this content ideally, and particularly in *habit* has made it into something *universal, recollected, total*, into a being. But we also recall how just in this way it has filled the initially empty space of its inwardness with a content appropriate to it because of its universality, has posited *being* within itself, just as, on the other hand, it has transformed its body into the image of its ideality, of its freedom, and thus has reached the point of being the *self-related, individually determined universal* present in the I, an *abstract totality* that *is for itself* and *freed* from *bodiliness*. Whereas in the sphere of the *merely sentient* soul the self appears, in the shape of the *genius*, as a power acting on the embodied individuality *only from outside* and at the same time *only from within*, at the stage of the soul's development now reached, by contrast, the self has, as we showed earlier, *actualized* itself in the soul's *reality*, in its *bodiliness*, and, conversely, has posited being within itself; so that now the self or the I *intuits its own self* in its *Other* and is *this self-intuiting*.<sup>4</sup>

## B. Phenomenology of Mind

### CONSCIOUSNESS

#### §413

*Consciousness* constitutes the stage of the mind's reflexion or *relationship*, of mind as *appearance*. I is the infinite relation of mind to itself, but as *subjective* relation, as *certainty of itself*; the immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure ideal self-identity; the content of the natural soul is *object* for this reflection that is for itself. Pure abstract freedom for itself discharges from itself its determinacy, the soul's natural life, to an equal freedom as an *independent object*. It is of this object, as *external to it*, that I is initially aware, and is thus consciousness. I, as this absolute negativity, is implicitly identity in otherness; I is itself and extends over the object as an object *implicitly* sublated, I is *one* side of the relationship and the *whole* relationship—the *light*, that manifests itself and an Other too.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz*. As we remarked in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph, the I must be conceived as the individually determined universal which, in its determinacy, in its difference, relates itself to itself alone. This already implies that the I is immediately *negative* relation to itself, consequently the unmediated opposite of its *universality* abstracted from all determinacy, and thus *is* equally *abstract, simple individuality*.<sup>2</sup> It is not only *we*, the onlookers, who thus differentiate the I into its opposed moments; the *I itself*, in virtue of its individuality which is universal within itself and thus differentiated from itself, is this *distinguishing-itself-from-itself*; for as relating itself to itself, its exclusive individuality excludes itself from itself, i.e. from individuality, and thereby posits itself as the opposite of itself immediately joined together with individuality, as universality.<sup>3</sup> But the determination of abstractly universal individuality essential to the I constitutes its *being*. I and my being are therefore inseparably combined with each other; the difference of my being from me is a difference that is no difference. On the one hand, being, as the *absolutely immediate, indeterminate, undifferentiated*, must of course be distinguished from *thinking*, which *differentiates itself* and by sublation of difference *mediates itself with itself*, must be distinguished from the *I*; yet, on the other hand, being is identical with thinking, since thinking returns from all mediation to immediacy, from all its self-differentiation to unperturbed unity with itself. The I is, therefore, being or has being as a moment within it. When I posit

this being as an *Other* confronting me and at the same time as *identical* with me, I am *awareness* and have the absolute *certainty* of my being.<sup>4</sup> This certainty must not be regarded—as happens on the part of mere *representation*—as a kind of *property* of the I, as a determination *in* its nature; it is to be conceived as the *very nature* of the I, for the I cannot exist without distinguishing itself from itself and being together with itself in what is distinguished from it, which simply means, without being aware of itself, without having and being the certainty of itself. Therefore, *certainty* is related to the I as *freedom* is to the *will*. Just as certainty constitutes the nature of the I, so freedom constitutes the nature of the will. Initially, however, certainty is to be compared only with *subjective* freedom, with *wilfulness*; only *objective* certainty, *truth*, corresponds to *genuine* freedom of will.<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, the I certain of itself is, initially, still *wholly simple subjectivity*, the *quite abstractly free*, the *completely indeterminate ideality* or negativity of all limitation. Repelling itself from itself, the I attains, therefore, at first only to something that is *formally*, not *actually*, distinct from it. But as is shown in Logic, the difference that *is in itself* must also be *posited*, must be developed into an *actual* difference. This development regarding the I proceeds in this way: the I does not fall to the *anthropological* level, to the unconscious unity of the mental and the natural, but remains certain of itself and maintains itself in its freedom; it lets its Other unfold into a *totality* like the totality of the I, and just in this way makes it change from something bodily *belonging to the soul* into something *independently confronting* it, into an *object* in the strict sense of this word.<sup>6</sup> The I is at first only wholly abstract subjectivity, the merely formal, contentless distinguishing-itself-from itself, and so the *actual* difference, the *determinate content*, is found outside the I and belongs to *objects* alone. But since *in itself* the I already has difference within itself or, in other words, since it is in itself the unity of itself and its Other, it is necessarily *related* to the difference existing in the object and *immediately reflected* out of this its Other *into itself*. The I thus overarches what is actually distinguished from it, is together with itself in this its Other, and remains, in all intuition, certain of itself. Only when I come to apprehend myself as I, does the Other become an object to me, confront me, and at the same time get posited ideally in me, and hence brought back to unity with me. That is why in the above Paragraph the I was compared to *light*. Just as light is the manifestation of itself and its Other, *darkness*, and can reveal itself only by revealing that Other, so too the I is revealed to itself only in so far as its Other becomes revealed to it in the shape of something independent of it.<sup>7</sup>

From this general discussion of the nature of the I it is already sufficiently evident that since the I enters into conflict with external objects, it is something higher than the impotent natural soul caught up in, so to speak, a childlike unity with the world, than the soul in which, just because of its impotence, fall the states of mental disease we considered earlier.

## §414

The identity of the mind with itself, as it is first posited as I, is only its abstract formal ideality. As *soul* in the form of *substantial* universality, mind is now subjective reflection-into-itself, related to this substantiality as to the negative of itself, something dark and beyond it. Hence consciousness, like relationship in general, is the *contradiction* between the independence of the two sides and their identity, in which they are sublated. The mind as I is *essence*; but since reality, in the sphere of essence, is posited as in immediate being and at the same time as ideal, mind as consciousness is only the *appearance* of mind.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The negativity which the wholly *abstract* I, or *mere consciousness*, exerts on its Other is a still thoroughly indeterminate, superficial, not an absolute negativity. Consequently, at this standpoint there arises the *contradiction* that the object is, on the one hand, *within me*, and on the other hand, has an independent status *outside me*, like the *darkness* outside the *light*. To consciousness the object appears not as an object *posited* by the I, but as an *immediate, given* object that just *is*; for consciousness does not yet know that the object is *in itself* identical with the mind and is released to seemingly complete independence only by a self-division of the mind. That this is so, only *we* know, we who have got as far as the *Idea* of mind and have therefore risen above the abstract, formal identity of the I.<sup>2</sup>

## §415

Since I is *for itself* only as formal identity, the *dialectical* movement of the concept, the progressive determination of consciousness, does not look to it like its *own* activity, but is *in itself* and for the I an alteration of the object. Consciousness therefore appears differently determined according to the difference of the object given, and its progressive formation appears as an alteration of the determinations of its object. I, the subject of consciousness, is thinking; the progressive logical determination of the object is *what is identical in subject and object*, their absolute interconnexion, that in virtue of which the object is the subject's own.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Kantian philosophy may be most determinately considered as having conceived the mind as consciousness, and as involving determinations only of phenomenology, not of philosophy of mind. It considers *I* as relation to something lying beyond, which in its abstract determination is called the thing-in-itself; and it conceives both the intelligence and the will solely according to this finitude. If, in the concept of the faculty of *reflective* judgement, it does get to the *Idea* of mind, subjectivity-objectivity, an *intuitive intellect*, etc., and even the *Idea* of nature, still this *Idea* itself is again demoted to an appearance, namely to a subjective maxim (see §58, Intro.). Therefore *Reinhold* had what is to be regarded as a correct sense of this philosophy when he conceived it as a theory of *conscious-*

ness, under the name *faculty of representation*. Fichte's philosophy takes the same standpoint, and Non-I is determined only as *object* of the I, only in *consciousness*; it remains an infinite impetus, i.e. a *thing-in-itself*. Both philosophies therefore show that they have not reached the *concept* and not reached the *mind as it is in and for itself*; but only as it is in relation to an Other.<sup>2</sup>

As regards *Spinozism*, it is to be noted against it that in the judgement by which the mind constitutes itself as *I*, as free subjectivity in contrast to determinacy, the mind emerges from substance, and philosophy, when it makes this judgement the absolute determination of mind, emerges from Spinozism.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* (1) Although the progressive determination of consciousness proceeds from its *own* interior and is also directed towards the object in a *negative* way, and the object is thus *altered* by consciousness, yet this alteration appears to consciousness as an alteration that comes about without its subjective activity, and the determinations that it posits in the object count for it as belonging only to the object, as determinations that just *are*.

(2) With *Fichte* there is always the difficulty of how the *I* is to cope with the *Non-I*. He does not get to any *genuine* unity of these two sides; this unity always remains only a unity that *ought to be*, because at the outset the false presupposition is made that I and Non-I in their *separateness*, in their *finitude*, are something *absolute*.<sup>4</sup>

## §416

The goal of mind as consciousness is to make its appearance identical with its essence, to raise *the certainty of itself to truth*. The *existence* that mind has in consciousness, has its finitude in the fact that it is the formal relation to itself, only certainty; since the object is only abstractly determined as *its own*, or in the object the mind is only reflected into itself as abstract I, this existence still has a content that does not present itself as the mind's own content.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* Mere *representation* does not distinguish between *certainty* and *truth*. What is *certain* for it, what it regards as a subjective state agreeing with the object, it calls *true*, no matter how trivial and bad the content of this subjective state may be. Philosophy, by contrast, must distinguish the concept of *truth* essentially from *mere certainty*; for the certainty which the mind has of itself at the standpoint of mere consciousness is still something *untrue*, *self-contradictory*, since here, along with the abstract certainty of being *together with itself*, mind has the directly opposite certainty of its relationship to something essentially *other* than itself. This contradiction must be sublated; the urge to resolve itself lies in the contradiction itself.<sup>2</sup> Subjective certainty must not retain any barrier in the

object, it must acquire genuine objectivity; and, conversely, the object, on its side, must become *mine* not merely in an *abstract* manner but in every aspect of its *concrete* nature. This goal is already glimpsed by reason that *believes* in itself, but is attained only by the *reason's knowledge*, by *conceptual cognition*.<sup>3</sup>

#### §417

The stages of this elevation of certainty to truth are mind as (a) *consciousness* in general, which has an object as such, (b) *self-consciousness*, for which *I* is the object, (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, where the mind intuits the content of the object as itself and intuits itself as determined in and for itself; — *reason, the concept of mind*.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The three stages of the rise of *consciousness* to *reason* indicated in the above Paragraph are determined by the power of the *concept*, active in the *subject* and in the *object* alike, and can therefore be considered as three *judgements*.<sup>2</sup> But as we already remarked earlier, the *abstract I, mere consciousness*, as yet knows nothing of this. Consequently when the *non-I*, which initially counts for consciousness as independent, is sublated by the power of the concept at work in it, when the object is given the form of a *universal*, of an *internality*, instead of the form of *immediacy, externality, and individuality*, and when consciousness receives this *recollection* into itself, then the *I's own* internalization, which comes about in just this way, appears to it as an internalization of the *object*.<sup>3</sup> Only when the object has been internalized into the *I* and when *consciousness* has in this way developed into *self-consciousness*, does mind know the power of its own internality as a power present and active in the object. Thus what in the sphere of mere consciousness is only for *us*, the onlookers, in the sphere of self-consciousness becomes for the mind itself. Self-consciousness has consciousness for its *object*, hence *confronts* it. But at the same time consciousness is also preserved as a *moment* in self-consciousness itself. Self-consciousness necessarily goes on, therefore, to confront itself with *another* self-consciousness by repulsion of itself from itself and in this to give itself an object which is identical with it and yet at the same time independent. This object is initially an *immediate, individual I*. But when it is freed from the form of *one-sided* subjectivity still clinging to it and conceived as a *reality* pervaded by the *subjectivity* of the *concept*, consequently as *Idea*, then *self-consciousness* abandons its *opposition to consciousness* and advances to a *mediated unity* with it and thereby becomes the *concrete being-for-self* of the *I*, the *absolutely free reason* that *recognizes* in the *objective world its own self*.<sup>4</sup>

It hardly needs to be noted that reason, which in our exposition appears as the *third* and *last* term, is not *merely* a *last* term, a result emerging from something alien to it, but is, on the contrary, the *foundation* of consciousness and self-consciousness, therefore the *first* term, and by sublation of these two one-sided forms it proves to be their *original unity* and *truth*.<sup>5</sup>

## (a) CONSCIOUSNESS AS SUCH

*(α) Sensory Consciousness*

## §418

Consciousness is initially *immediate* consciousness, its relation to the object accordingly the simple, unmediated certainty of it; the object itself is therefore similarly determined as immediate, as *being* and reflected into itself, further as immediately *individual*;—*sensory* consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Consciousness as relationship involves only the categories belonging to the abstract I or to formal thinking; and these are, for it, determinations of the object (§415). Sensory consciousness is therefore aware of the object only as a *being*, a *something*, an *existing thing*, an *individual*, and so on. It appears as the richest in content, but it is the poorest in thoughts. That wealth of filling is constituted by determinations of feeling; they are the *material* of consciousness (§414), the substantial and qualitative element, that the soul, in the anthropological sphere, *is* and finds *within itself*. The reflection of the soul into itself, I, separates this material from itself, and gives it initially the determination of *being*.<sup>2</sup>—Spatial and temporal individuality, the *here* and the *now*, as I have determined the object of sensory consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, pp. 25 ff., strictly belongs to intuition. Here the object is initially to be taken only in accordance with the relationship which it has to *consciousness*, namely something *external* to consciousness, and is not yet to be determined as external within itself, or as being outside itself.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* The first of the three developmental stages of the *phenomenological* mind mentioned in the previous Paragraph, namely *consciousness*, itself has within itself three stages: α) *sensory* consciousness, β) *perceiving* consciousness, and γ) *intellectual* consciousness. In this sequence there is revealed a logical progression:

- α) At first, the object is a wholly *immediate* object, which just *is*; it appears thus to *sensory* consciousness. But this *immediacy* has no truth; we must advance from it to the *essential* being of the object.<sup>4</sup>
- β) When the *essence* of things becomes consciousness's object, it is no longer *sensory* consciousness but *perceiving* consciousness. At this standpoint, *individual* things are related to a *universal*, but only *related* to it; what occurs here is, therefore, is not yet a *genuine unity* of individual and universal, but only a *mixture* of these two sides. Herein lies a contradiction which leads on to the third stage of consciousness,<sup>5</sup>
- γ) to *intellectual* consciousness, where it finds its solution in so far as there the object is reduced or elevated to the *appearance* of an *interior* that *is* for *itself*. Such an appearance is the *living* creature. In the contemplation of this, self-consciousness is ignited; for in the living creature the *object* turns into the

*subjective*; there consciousness discovers its own self as the *essential* of the object, it reflects itself out of the object into itself, becomes an object to itself.<sup>6</sup>

After this general survey of the three developmental stages of consciousness, we now turn first of all to *sensory* consciousness in more detail. This differs from the other modes of consciousness, not by the fact that in it alone the object comes to me through the *senses*, but rather by the fact that at the standpoint of sensory consciousness the object, whether it be an interior or an outer object, has no other *thought-determination* than firstly, that of *being* in general, and secondly, of being an *independent Other confronting me*, something *reflected into itself*, an *individual* confronting me as an *individual*, an *immediate* individual. The *particular content* of the sensory, for example, smell, taste, colour, etc., belongs, as we saw in §401, to *sensation*. But the *form* peculiar to the sensory, *being-external-to-its-own-self*, dispersion into *space* and *time*, is (as we shall see in §448) the determination of the object apprehended by *intuition*, in such a way that for *sensory* consciousness as such there remains only the above-mentioned thought-determination, in virtue of which the manifold particular content of sensations concentrates itself into a unit that is outside me, a unit that, at this standpoint, is known by me in an immediate, individualized manner, contingently now enters my consciousness and then disappears from it again; in general a unit that is, both in its existence and in its constitution, a given for me, something, therefore, of which I know neither why it is nor why it has this determinate nature, nor whether it is something true.<sup>7</sup>

It is clear from this brief account of the nature of *immediate* or *sensory* consciousness that it is a thoroughly inadequate form for the in and for itself *universal* content of *right*, of the *ethical* and of *religion*, a form that spoils such content, since in this consciousness what is absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite, and internal is given a finite, individualized, self-external shape. So when people have been willing to concede only an *immediate* knowledge of God, they have limited themselves to a knowledge which can assert of God that he *is*, that he exists *outside* us, and that he seems to sensation to possess such and such properties. Such a consciousness with its contingent assurances regarding the nature of the divine, which for it lies in the beyond, gets no further than supposedly religious tub-thumping and swanking.<sup>8</sup>

#### §419

The *sensory* as something becomes an *other*; the reflection of the *something* into itself, the *thing*, has *many* properties, and as an individual in its immediacy has *various predicates*. The *multiple individual* of sensoriness thus acquires *breadth*—a variety of *relations*, *determinations of reflexion*, and *universalities*.<sup>1</sup>—These are logical determinations posited by the thinker, i.e. here by the I. But for *the I*, as



appearing, the object has undergone this change.<sup>2</sup> When the object is determined in this way sensory consciousness is *perception*.

*Zusatz.* The content of sensory consciousness is in its own self *dialectical*. The content is supposed to be *the* individual; but by this very fact it is not *an* individual but every individual, and just by *excluding* from itself the Other, the individual content relates to another, shows that it *goes beyond itself*, that it is dependent on another, is mediated by it and has another within itself. The *proximate* truth of the *immediately individual* is therefore its *relatedness* to another. The determinations of this relation are what are called *determinations of reflection*, and the consciousness apprehending these determinations is *perception*.<sup>3</sup>

### (β) Perception

#### §420

Consciousness, having passed beyond sensoriness, wants to *take* the object in its *truth*, not as merely immediate, but as mediated, reflected into itself, and universal.<sup>1</sup> The object is thus a combination of sensory determinations and extended thought-determinations of concrete relationships and connections. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object is no longer the abstract identity of *certainty*, but *determinate* identity, an *awareness*.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] The more specific stage of consciousness at which *Kantian philosophy* conceives the mind is *perception*, which is in general the standpoint of our *ordinary consciousness* and more or less of the *sciences*. The sensory certainties of individual apperceptions or observations form the starting-point; these are supposed to be elevated to truth, by being considered in their relation, reflected upon, generally by becoming, in accordance with determinate categories, at the same time something necessary and universal, *experiences*.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* Although *perception* starts from *observation* of sensory material, nevertheless it does not stop there, does not confine itself to smelling, tasting, seeing, hearing, and feeling, but necessarily goes on to relate the sensory to a not immediately observable *universal*, to cognize each individualized entity as an internally coherent whole—in *force*, for example, to unify all the expressions of force—and to seek out the relations and mediations obtaining between individual things. While therefore *merely sensory consciousness* only *shows* things, i.e., merely exhibits them in their immediacy, *perception* by contrast apprehends the interconnection of things, demonstrates that when such and such circumstances are present such and such follows from them, and thus begins to *demonstrate* things as *true*.<sup>4</sup> This *demonstration* is, however, still a defective, not a final demonstration. For that by which something is here supposed to be demonstrated is itself a *presupposition*, consequently in need of demonstration; so that in this sphere one goes from *presuppositions* to *presuppositions* and lapses into the *progression to infinity*. This is the

standpoint occupied by *experience*. Everything must be *experienced*. But if we are supposed to be talking about *philosophy*, then we must rise above the demonstration that remains tied to presuppositions, above empiricism's demonstration, to the proof of the *absolute necessity* of things.<sup>5</sup>

Already in §415 it was said in passing that the progressive cultivation of consciousness appears as an alteration of the determinations of its object. With reference to this point, it can be added here that while perceiving consciousness sublates the *individuality* of things, posits them *ideally* and thereby negates the *externality* of the relation of the object to the I, the I withdraws into itself and itself gains in *inwardness*, but consciousness regards this withdrawal into itself as falling in the object.<sup>6</sup>

#### §421

This connection of the individual and universal is a mixture, since the individual remains the being that lies at the *foundation* and remains firm in the face of the universal, to which it is nevertheless related. The connection is therefore a many-sided contradiction—in general between the *individual* things of sensory apperception, which are supposed to constitute *the foundation* of universal experience, and the *universality* which is supposed rather to be the essence and the foundation,—between *individuality*, which constitutes *independence*, taken in its concrete content, and the various *properties* which are on the contrary free from this negative bond and from one another, and are independent *universal matters* (see §§123 ff.), and so on. This really comprises the contradiction of the finite running through all forms of the logical spheres, most concretely in so far as the something is determined as *object* (§§194 ff.).<sup>1</sup>

### (γ) Intellect

#### §422

The proximate *truth* of perception is that the object is rather *appearance*, and its reflection-into-itself is by contrast an *interior* and universal that is for itself. The consciousness of this object is *intellect*.<sup>1</sup>—This *interior* is, on the one hand, the *sublated multiplicity* of the sensory and is in this way abstract identity; but on the other hand, because of that, it contains the multiplicity too, but as *inner simple difference*, which remains self-identical in the change of appearances. This simple difference is the realm of *the laws* of appearance—a tranquil, universal copy of it.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* The contradiction indicated in the previous Paragraph gets its first resolution by the fact that the manifold determinations of the sensory, which are independent relatively both to one another and to the inner unity of each individual thing, are reduced to the *appearance* of an *interior* that is for itself, and the development of the object thus progresses from the contradiction of its

*reflection-into-self* and its *reflection-into-other* to the essential relationship of it to its *own* self. But when consciousness ascends from the *observation* of *immediate individuality* and from the *mixture* of the *individual* and the *universal*, to the conception of the *interior* of the object, and thus determines the object in a manner similar to the *I*, then the *I* becomes *intellectual* consciousness. Only in this non-sensory interior does the intellect believe it has what is genuinely real.<sup>3</sup> At first, however, this interior is something *abstractly identical, undifferentiated within itself*; an interior of this kind is presented to us in the categories of *force* and of *cause*. The *genuine* interior, by contrast, must be described as *concrete*, as *differentiated within itself*. Conceived in this way, it is what we call law. For the essence of law, whether this relates to external nature or the ethical world order, consists in an *inseparable unity*, in a *necessary interior connection*, of *distinct* determinations. Thus through law *punishment* is necessarily linked with *crime*; to the criminal, punishment can indeed appear as something alien to him, but the concept of crime essentially involves its opposite, punishment. Similarly, as regards external nature, for example the law of planetary motion (according to which, as we know, the squares of the periods of revolution vary as the cubes of the distances) must be conceived as an inner necessary unity of distinct determinations.<sup>4</sup> This unity is, of course, only comprehended by the speculative thinking of *reason*, but it is already discovered by the *intellectual* consciousness in the multiplicity of phenomena. Laws are the determinations of the intellect inherent in the world itself; therefore, the intellectual consciousness finds in laws its own nature again and thus becomes an object to itself.<sup>5</sup>

### §423

The law, initially the relationship of universal, permanent determinations, has, in so far as its difference is the inner difference, its necessity within itself; each of the determinations, since it is not externally distinguished from the other, itself lies immediately in the other.<sup>1</sup> But in this way the inner distinction is what it is in truth, the distinction within itself, or *the distinction which is no distinction*.<sup>2</sup>—When the form is determined in this general way, consciousness has *implicitly* disappeared; for consciousness as such involves the *independence* of the subject and object relatively to each other. The *I* in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it—*itself*;—*self-consciousness*.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* What has been said in the above Paragraph about the *inner difference* constituting the essence of *law*, namely, that this difference is a *difference* which is *no* difference, holds good equally of the difference that exists in the *I* as an object to itself. Just as law is something differentiated *within itself* and not merely relatively to something *else*, is something identical with itself in its difference, so, too, is the *I* that has itself for object, that is aware of itself. Therefore, when consciousness, as *intellect*, is aware of *laws*, it is in relationship to an object in

which the I finds again the counterpart of its own self and is thus on the point of developing into *self-consciousness as such*.<sup>4</sup> But since, as we remarked in the *Zusatz* to §422, the *merely intellectual* consciousness does not as yet get as far as *comprehending* the unity of distinct determinations present in law, i.e. dialectically developing from one of these determinations its opposite, this unity still remains for this consciousness something dead, something, consequently, *not in agreement* with the *activity* of the I. In the living creature, by contrast, consciousness beholds the very *process* of positing and sublating the distinct determinations, perceives that the difference is *no* difference, i.e., no absolutely fixed difference. For life is that interior which does not remain an *abstract* interior but enters wholly into its *expression*; it is something *mediated* by the negation of the immediate, of the external, but sublates this very mediation into *immediacy*,—a *sensory, external*, and at the same time simply *internal*, existence, a *material* entity in which the *asunderness* of the parts appears *sublated* and the individual appears reduced to something *ideal*, to a *moment*, to a *member* of the whole; in short, life must be conceived as an *end in itself*, as an end which has its means within itself, as a totality in which each distinct moment is alike end and means.<sup>5</sup> It is, therefore, in the consciousness of this *dialectical*, this *living* unity of what is distinct that *self-consciousness* is kindled, the consciousness of the simple *ideal* entity that is its own object and is thus differentiated within itself,—awareness of the *truth of the natural*, of the *I*.<sup>6</sup>

### (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

#### §424

The truth of consciousness is *self-consciousness* and the latter is the ground of the former, so that in existence all consciousness of another object is self-consciousness; I am aware of the object as mine (it is my representation), thus in it I am aware of me.<sup>1</sup>—The expression of self-consciousness is  $I = I$ ;—*abstract freedom*, pure ideality.—In this way it is without reality, for the I itself, which is the *object* of itself, is not such an object, because there is no distinction between itself and the object.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* In the expression,  $I = I$ , is enunciated the principle of absolute *reason* and *freedom*. Freedom and reason consist in this: I raise myself to the form of  $I = I$ , I recognize everything as *mine*, as *I*, I grasp every object as a member in the system of what I myself am,—in short, they consist in this: I have in *one and the same* consciousness *I* and the *world*, in the world I find myself again and, conversely, in my consciousness I have what *is*, what has *objectivity*.<sup>3</sup> This unity of the I and the object constituting the principle of mind is, however, at first only present in an *abstract* way in *immediate* self-consciousness, and is known only by *us*, the onlookers, not yet by self-consciousness itself. Immediate self-consciousness does not yet have for its object the  $I = I$ , but only the I; therefore, it is free only for

us, not *for itself*, is not yet aware of its freedom, and has only the *basis* of freedom within itself, but not yet genuinely *actual* freedom.<sup>4</sup>

#### §425

Abstract self-consciousness is the *first* negation of consciousness, therefore also burdened with an external object, formally with the negation of itself; thus it is at the same time the preceding stage, consciousness, and is the contradiction between itself as self-consciousness and itself as consciousness.<sup>1</sup> Consciousness and the negation in general are already implicitly sublated in the  $I = I$ ; so as this certainty of itself in contrast to the object, it is the *urge* to posit what it is implicitly, — i.e. to give content and objectivity to the abstract awareness of itself, and conversely to free itself from its sensoriness, to sublimate the objectivity that is given and to posit it as identical to itself. The two things are one and the same, the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* The defect of *abstract self-consciousness* lies in this: it and consciousness are still *two different things* confronting each other, they have not yet achieved a reciprocal equilibrium. In consciousness, we see the tremendous *difference*, on the one side, of the *I*, this wholly *simple* entity, and on the other side, of the infinite *variety of the world*. This opposition of the *I* and the world, which does not yet come to genuine mediation here, constitutes the *finitude* of consciousness. *Self-consciousness*, by contrast, has its finitude in its still wholly *abstract identity with its own self*. What is present in the  $I = I$  of immediate self-consciousness is only a difference that *ought to be*, not yet a *posited*, not yet an *actual* difference.<sup>3</sup>

This rift between self-consciousness and consciousness forms an *inner* contradiction of *self-consciousness* with itself, because self-consciousness is also the stage directly preceding it, *consciousness*, and consequently is the opposite of itself. That is to say, since abstract self-consciousness is only the *first*, hence still *conditioned*, negation of the immediacy of consciousness, and not already *absolute* negativity, i.e., the negation of that negation, *infinite affirmation*, it has itself still the form of a *being*, of an *immediate*, of something that, in spite of, or rather just because of, its *differenceless inwardness*, is still filled by *externality*. Therefore, it contains negation not merely *within itself* but also *outside itself*, as an *external* object, as a *non-I*, and it is just this that makes it *consciousness*.<sup>4</sup>

The contradiction here outlined must be resolved, and the way in which this happens is that self-consciousness, which has itself as consciousness, as *I*, for its object, develops the *simple ideality* of the *I* into a *real difference*, and thus by sublating its *one-sided subjectivity* gives itself *objectivity*; this process is identical with the converse, by which the *object* is at the same time posited *subjectively* by the *I*, is immersed in the inwardness of the self, and thus the dependence, present in consciousness, of the *I* on an external reality is annihilated. Self-consciousness thus gets to the point where it does not have consciousness *alongside* it, is not *externally*

combined with consciousness, but genuinely pervades it and contains it dissolved within its own self.<sup>5</sup>

To reach this goal, self-consciousness has to traverse three developmental stages.

- α) The first of these stages displays to us the *individual self-consciousness* that is immediate, simply identical with itself, and at the same time, in contradiction with this, related to an external object. Thus determined, self-consciousness is the certainty of itself as the being in face of which the object has the determination of something only seemingly independent, but is in fact a nullity. This is *desiring self-consciousness*.<sup>6</sup>
- β) At the second stage, the objective I acquires the determination of *another I*, and hence arises the relationship of *one self-consciousness* to *another self-consciousness*, and between these two the *process of recognition*. Here, self-consciousness is no longer merely *individual* self-consciousness, but in it there already begins a unification of *individuality* and *universality*.<sup>7</sup>
- γ) Furthermore, when the *otherness* of the selves confronting each other sublates itself and these, in their independence, nevertheless become identical with each other, the third stage emerges,—*universal self-consciousness*.<sup>8</sup>

### (α) Desire

#### §426

Self-consciousness, in its immediacy, is an *individual* and *desire*—the contradiction of its abstraction which is supposed to be objective, or of its immediacy, which has the shape of an external object and is supposed to be subjective. For the certainty of itself that has emerged from the sublation of consciousness, the object is determined as a nullity, and for the relation of self-consciousness to the object its abstract ideality is likewise determined as a nullity.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* As we have already remarked in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph, *desire* is the form in which self-consciousness appears at the first stage of its development. Here in the second main part of the theory of subjective mind, desire has as yet no further determination than that of *urge*, in so far as *urge*, without being determined by *thinking*, is directed on an *external* object in which it seeks to satisfy itself. But the necessity for the *urge* so determined to exist in self-consciousness, lies in this: self-consciousness (as we likewise already brought to notice in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph) is also the stage immediately preceding it, namely consciousness, and is aware of this inner contradiction. Where something identical with itself bears within itself a contradiction and is filled with the feeling of its implicit identity with itself as well as with the opposite feeling of its inner contradiction, then there necessarily emerges the *urge* to sublimate this contradiction.<sup>2</sup> The non-living entity has no *urge* because it is incapable of enduring contradiction; it perishes when the Other of itself forces its way

into it. By contrast, the ensouled creature and the mind necessarily have urge, since neither the soul nor the mind can be, without having contradiction within themselves and either feeling it or being aware of it.<sup>3</sup> But, as indicated above, in the *immediate* and therefore *natural, individual, exclusive* self-consciousness, the shape assumed by contradiction is that self-consciousness (whose concept consists in being in relationship *to its own self*, in being I = I) still enters, on the contrary, into relationship to an *immediate* Other not posited ideally, to an *external* object, to a *non-I*, and is *external to its own self*, since although *in itself* it is a totality, a unity of the subjective and the objective, it nevertheless exists initially as a one-sided, as a merely subjective thing, which only gets to be a totality *in and for itself* by the satisfaction of desire. Despite this inner contradiction, however, self-consciousness remains absolutely certain of itself because it is aware that the immediate, external object has no genuine reality but is, on the contrary, a nullity in comparison to the subject, with merely seeming independence, and is, in fact, something that does not deserve and is not able to subsist for itself, but must perish by the real power of the subject.<sup>4</sup>

#### §427

Self-consciousness, therefore, is aware of itself *implicitly* in the object, which in this relation is conformable to the urge. In the negation of the two one-sided moments as the I's own activity, this identity comes to be *for* the I. To this activity the object, which in itself and for self-consciousness is the selfless, can offer no resistance; the dialectic of self-sublation, which is the object's nature, exists here as this activity of the I. In this process the given object is posited subjectively, just as subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and becomes objective to itself.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The self-conscious subject is aware of itself as *in itself identical* with the external object, aware that the object contains the *possibility* of satisfying the desire, that the object is, therefore, *conformable* to the desire and that just for this reason desire is aroused by the object. Relation to the object is therefore necessary to the subject. In the object, the subject beholds its *own lack*, its own one-sidedness, sees in the object something belonging to its own essence and yet missing from it. Self-consciousness is in a position to sublimate this contradiction since it is not just being, but absolute activity; and it sublimes the contradiction by taking possession of the object whose independence is, so to speak, only a pretence, satisfies itself by consuming it and, since it is an end in itself, maintains itself in this process.<sup>2</sup> Here the object must perish; for here both of them, the subject and the object, are immediate, and the only way in which they can be in a unity is by the negation of the immediacy, and *first of all*, of the immediacy of the selfless object.<sup>3</sup> By the satisfaction of desire, the implicit identity of the subject and the object is posited, the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the seeming independence of the object are sublated. But in being annihilated by the desiring self-consciousness the object may seem to succumb to a completely alien power.

This is, however, only a semblance. For the immediate object must, by its *own* nature, by its *concept*, sublimate itself. since in its *individuality* it does not correspond to the *universality* of its concept. Self-consciousness is the *appearing* concept of the object itself. In the annihilation of the object by self-consciousness, the object perishes, therefore, by the power of its own concept which is *only internal* to it and, just because of that, seems to come to it *only from outside*.<sup>4</sup> The object is thus posited subjectively. But by this sublation of the object the subject, as we have already remarked, sublimes its own lack, its disintegration into a distinctionless I = I and an I related to an external object, and it gives its subjectivity objectivity just as much as it makes its object subjective.

#### §428

The product of this process is that I joins together with itself, and is thereby satisfied *for itself*, actualized. On the external side it remains, in this return, determined initially as an *individual*, and has maintained itself as such, because its relation to the selfless object is only negative, hence the object is only consumed. So desire in its satisfaction is in general *destructive*, as it is in its content *self-centred*, and since the satisfaction has only happened in the individual case, and this is transitory, the desire reproduces itself again in the satisfaction.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The relationship of desire to the object is still completely one of self-centred *destruction*, not one of *fashioning*. In so far as self-consciousness relates as *fashioning* activity to the object, the object gets only the *form* of the subjective, a form acquiring a *subsistence* in it, while in its matter the object is preserved. By contrast, the satisfaction of self-consciousness caught up in desire, since this self-consciousness does not yet possess the power to endure the Other as an independent entity, destroys the independence of the object, so that the form of the subjective does not attain any subsistence in the object.<sup>2</sup>

Like the object of desire and desire itself, the *satisfaction* of desire, too, is necessarily something *individual*, *transient*, yielding to the incessant renewal of desire. It is an objectification constantly remaining in contradiction with the *universality* of the subject, and yet all the same stimulated again and again by the felt deficiency of immediate subjectivity, an objectification which *never* absolutely attains its goal but only gives rise to the *progression ad infinitum*.<sup>3</sup>

#### §429

But the self-feeling which the I gets in the satisfaction does not, on the inner side or *in itself*, remain in abstract *being-for-self* or in its *individuality*; as the negation of *immediacy* and of individuality the result involves the determination of *universality* and of the *identity* of self-consciousness with its object. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is the consciousness of a *free* object, in which I has awareness of itself as I, but which is also still outside it.



*Zusatz.* On the *external* side, as we remarked in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph, immediate self-consciousness remains caught up in the tedious alternation, continuing to infinity, of desire and its satisfaction, in subjectivity relapsing into itself again and again from its objectification. On the *inner* side, by contrast, or in accordance with the *concept*, self-consciousness has, by sublation of its subjectivity and of the external object, negated its own immediacy, the standpoint of desire, has posited itself with the determination of otherness towards its own self, has filled the *Other* with the *I*, has changed it from something *selfless* into a *free*, into a *selfish* object, into *another I*. It has in this way brought itself as a *distinct I* face to face with its own self, but in doing so has raised itself above the self-centredness of merely destructive desire.<sup>1</sup>

### (β) Recognizant Self-consciousness

#### §430

There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at first *immediately*, as one thing for *another*. In the other as *I*, *I* immediately behold my own self, but *I* also behold in it an immediately real object, another *I* absolutely independent in face of myself. The sublation of the *individuality* of self-consciousness was the *first* sublation; self-consciousness is thereby determined only as *particular*.<sup>1</sup>—This contradiction supplies the urge to *show* itself as a free self, and to be *there* as a free self for the other,—the process of *recognition*.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* The second stage in the development of self-consciousness, indicated in the heading of the above Paragraph, initially still has the determination of *immediacy* in common with the self-consciousness of the first stage of development, which is caught up in *desire*. In this determination lies the massive contradiction that, since the *I* is what is wholly *universal*, absolutely *pervasive*, *interrupted* by *no limit*, the *essence common* to *all men*, the two selves here relating to each other constitute *one* identity, so to speak *one* light, and yet they are also *two* selves, which subsist in complete *rigidity* and *inflexibility* towards each other, each as a *reflection-into-self*, absolutely *distinct* from and *impenetrable* by the other.<sup>3</sup>

#### §431

The process is a *combat*; for *I* cannot be aware of myself as myself in the other, in so far as the other is an immediate other reality for me; *I* am consequently bent on the sublation of this immediacy of his. Equally *I* cannot be recognized as an immediate entity, but only in so far as *I* sublimate the immediacy in myself, and thereby give reality to my freedom. But this immediacy is at the same time the bodiliness of self-consciousness, in which, as in its sign and tool, self-consciousness has its own *self-feeling*, as well as its being *for others* and its relation that mediates between itself and them.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The more precise shape of the contradiction indicated in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph is this. The two self-conscious subjects in relationship to each other, since they have an immediate reality, are *natural, bodily*, thus exist in the manner of a *thing* subjected to *alien power*, and they approach each other as such; yet at the same time they are quite *free* and may not be treated by each other as only *immediate realities*, as merely *natural* entities. To overcome this contradiction, it is necessary that the two selves opposing each other should, in their *reality*, in their *being-for-another*, posit themselves as and recognize themselves as what they are *in themselves* or by their concept, namely, not merely natural but free beings.<sup>2</sup> Only in this does *true* freedom come about; for since this consists in the identity of myself with the other, I am only genuinely free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free.<sup>3</sup> This freedom of the *one* in the *other* unites men in an internal manner, whereas *need* and *necessity* bring them together only externally.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, men must will to find themselves again in one another. But this cannot happen as long as they are caught up in their immediacy, in their naturalness; for it is just this that excludes them from one another and prevents them from being free for one another. Freedom demands, therefore, that the self-conscious subject neither let his own naturalness persist nor tolerate the naturalness of others; on the contrary, indifferent towards reality, he should in individual, immediate contest put his own and the other's life at stake to win freedom. Only through *combat*, therefore, can freedom be won; the assurance of being free is not enough for that; at this standpoint man demonstrates his capacity for freedom only by exposing himself, and others, to the *danger of death*.<sup>5</sup>

### §432

The combat of recognition is thus a life and death struggle; each of the two self-consciousnesses puts the other's life in *danger*, and exposes itself to it—but only *in danger*, for each is equally bent on maintaining his life, since it is the embodiment of his freedom. The death of one, which dissolves the contradiction in one respect by the abstract, therefore crude, negation of immediacy, is thus in the essential respect, the reality of recognition which is sublated together with the death, a new contradiction and a higher one than the first.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The *absolute* proof of freedom in the fight for recognition is *death*. The combatants, even by exposing themselves to the risk of death, posit the natural being of both of them as a negative, they prove that they regard it as a nullity. But by death, naturalness is negated in fact and in this way its contradiction with the spiritual, with the I, is at the same time resolved. This resolution is, however, only quite *abstract*, only of a *negative*, not a *positive* kind. For even if only one of two combatants fighting for mutual recognition perishes, then no recognition comes about, for the survivor exists with recognition no more than the dead. Consequently, death gives rise to the new and greater contradiction, that those

who by fighting have proved their inner freedom, have nevertheless not attained to a recognized reality of their freedom.

To prevent possible misunderstandings with regard to the standpoint just outlined, we must here add the remark that the fight for recognition in the extreme form here indicated can only occur in the *state of nature*, where men live only as *individuals*; by contrast it is absent from civil society and the political state because what constitutes the result of this combat, namely recognition, is already present there. For although the state may *arise by force*, it does not rest on force; force, in producing the state, has brought into existence only what is justified in and for itself, the laws, the constitution. What predominates in the state is the spirit of the people, custom, and law. There man is recognized and treated as a *rational* being, as *free*, as a person; and the individual, on his side, makes himself worthy of this recognition by overcoming the naturalness of his self-consciousness and obeying a *universal*, the *will that is in and for itself*, the *law*; he thus behaves towards others in a manner that is *universally valid*, recognizing them—as he wishes others to regard him—as free, as persons. In the state, the citizen derives his honour from the post he fills, from the trade he follows, and from his working activity of any other kind. In this way his honour has a content that is substantial, universal, objective, and no longer dependent on empty subjectivity; honour of this kind is still lacking in the state of nature where individuals, whatever they may be and whatever they may do, want to compel others to recognize them.<sup>2</sup>

But it is clear from what has just been said that *duelling* must definitely not be confused with the fight for recognition that constitutes a necessary moment in the development of the human mind. Unlike this fight, duelling does not belong to the natural state of men, but to a more or less developed form of civil society and the state. Duelling has its strictly world-historical place in the feudal system which was supposed to be a lawful condition, but was so only to a very small degree. There the knight, no matter what he might have done, wanted to be esteemed as not having lost face, as being completely spotless. This is what the duel was supposed to prove. Although the law of the jungle was elaborated into certain forms, yet its absolute basis was egotism. Consequently, its practice was not a proof of rational freedom and genuinely civic honour, but rather a proof of brutality and often of the shamelessness of a mentality claiming outward honour, despite its depravity. Duelling is not met with among the peoples of antiquity, for the formalism of empty subjectivity, the subject's wish to be esteemed in his immediate individuality, was completely alien to them. They had their honour only in their solid unity with that ethical relationship which is the state. But in our modern states duelling can hardly be said to be anything else but a *contrived* return to the brutality of the Middle Ages. At best, duelling in the former military was able to have a tolerably rational sense, namely, that the individual wished to prove that he had another and higher aim than to get himself killed for a pittance.<sup>3</sup>

## §433

Because life is as essential as freedom, the combat ends initially as *one-sided* negation with an asymmetry: one of the combatants prefers life, maintains himself as individual self-consciousness, but surrenders his chance of recognition, while the other holds fast to his relation to himself and is recognized by the first in his subjugation: the *relationship of mastery and bondage*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] The combat of recognition and the subjugation under a master is the *appearance* in which man's social life, the beginning of *states*, emerged. *Force*, which is the basis in this appearance, is not on that account the basis of *right*, though it is the *necessary* and *legitimate* moment in the passage of the *condition* of self-consciousness engrossed in desire and individuality into the condition of universal self-consciousness. This moment is the external beginning of states, their *beginning as it appears*, not their *substantial principle*.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* The relationship of master and bondsman contains only a *relative* sublation of the contradiction between the *particularity reflected into itself* of the distinct self-conscious subjects and their *mutual identity*. For in this relationship the immediacy of particular self-consciousness is, initially, sublated only on the side of the bondsman, but on the master's side it is preserved. While the naturalness of life on both these sides persists, the self-will of the bondsman surrenders itself to the will of the master, receives for its content the purpose of the lord who, on his part, receives into his self-consciousness, not the bondsman's will, but only care for the support of the bondsman's natural vitality; in such a manner that in this relationship the *posited* identity of the self-consciousness of the subjects related to each other comes about only in a *one-sided* way.<sup>3</sup>

As regards the historicity of the relationship under discussion, it can be remarked that the ancient peoples, the Greeks and Romans, had not yet risen to the concept of *absolute* freedom, since they did not know that *man as such*, as this *universal I*, as *rational* self-consciousness, is entitled to freedom. On the contrary, with them man was held to be free only if he was *born* as a free man. With them, therefore, freedom still had the determination of *naturalness*. That is why there was slavery in their free states and bloody wars arose among the Romans in which the slaves tried to free themselves, to obtain recognition of their eternal human rights.<sup>4</sup>

## §434

On the one hand, this relationship is a *community* of need and of care for its satisfaction, since the means of mastery, the bondsman, must likewise be maintained in his life. In place of the brute destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition, preservation, and formation of it, as the intermediary in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence join together; — the form

of universality in satisfaction of need is a *permanent* means and a provision that takes care of and secures the future.<sup>1</sup>

### §435

Secondly, in line with the distinction between them, the master has in the bondsman and his service the intuition of the validity of his *individual* being-for-self; and he has it by means of the sublation of immediate being-for-self, a sublation, however, which occurs in another. — But this other, the bondsman, works off his individual will and self-will in the service of the master, sublates the inner immediacy of desire and in this alienation and in the fear of the master he makes a beginning of wisdom—the transition to *universal self-consciousness*.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* Since the bondsman works for the master and therefore not in the exclusive interest of his own individuality, his desire acquires the *breadth* of being not only the desire of a *particular* individual but containing within itself the desire of *another*. Accordingly, the bondsman rises above the selfish individuality of his natural will, and to that extent stands higher, as regards his worth, than the master who, caught up in his egotism, beholds in the bondsman only his immediate will and is recognized by an unfree consciousness in a formal way.<sup>2</sup> This subjugation of the bondsman's egotism forms the *beginning* of genuine human freedom. This quaking of the individuality of the will, the feeling of the nullity of egotism, the habit of obedience, is a necessary moment in the education of every man. Without having experienced the discipline that breaks self-will, no one becomes free, rational, and capable of command.<sup>3</sup> To become free, to acquire the capacity for self-government, all peoples must therefore undergo the severe discipline of subjection to a master. It was necessary, for example, that after *Solon* had given the Athenians democratic free laws, *Pisistratus* gained a power by which he compelled the Athenians to obey those laws. Only when this obedience had taken root did the mastery of the Pisistratids become superfluous. Thus *Rome*, too, had to live through the strict government of the kings before, by the breaking of natural egotism, that marvellous Roman virtue could arise, a patriotism ready for any sacrifice. Bondage and tyranny are, therefore, in the history of peoples a necessary stage and hence something *relatively* justified. Those who remain bondsmen suffer no absolute injustice; for he who has not the courage to risk his life to win freedom, deserves to be a slave; and if by contrast a people does not merely imagine that it wants to be free but actually has the vigorous will to freedom, then no human power will be able hold it back in the bondage of merely being governed passively.<sup>4</sup>

As we have said, this servile obedience forms only the *beginning* of freedom, because that to which the natural individuality of self-consciousness submits is not the genuinely *universal*, rational will that *is in and for itself*, but the *individual*, *contingent* will of *another* subject. Here, then, only *one* moment of freedom

emerges, the *negativity* of egotistic individuality; whereas the *positive* side of freedom attains actuality only when, on the one hand, the servile self-consciousness, liberating itself both from the individuality of the master and from its own individuality, grasps what is *in and for itself rational* in its *universality*, independent of the particularity of the subjects; and when, on the other hand, the master's self-consciousness is brought, by the *community* of need and the concern for its satisfaction obtaining between him and the bondsman, and also by beholding the sublation of the immediate individual will objectified for him in the bondsman, to recognize this sublation as the truth in regard to himself too, and therefore to submit his own selfish will to the law of the will that is in and for itself.<sup>5</sup>

### (γ) Universal Self-consciousness

#### §436

*Universal self-consciousness* is the affirmative awareness of oneself in the other self.<sup>1</sup> Each self as free individuality has *absolute independence*, but in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or desire it does not distinguish itself from the other; it is universal and objective; and it has real universality in the form of reciprocity, in that it is aware of its recognition in the free other, and is aware of this in so far as it recognizes the other and is aware that it is free.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] This universal mirroring of self-consciousness, the concept that is aware of itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself and therefore universal, is the form of consciousness of the *substance* of every essential spirituality—of the family, the fatherland, the state, as well as of all virtues, of love, friendship, courage, of honour, of fame. But this *appearance* of the substantial may also be separated from the substantial, and be maintained for itself in baseless honour, hollow fame, etc.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* The result of the struggle for recognition, brought about by the concept of mind, is *universal self-consciousness*, which forms the third stage in this sphere, i.e. that free self-consciousness for which its object, the other self-consciousness, is no longer, as in the second stage, an *unfree* but an *equally independent* self-consciousness. At this standpoint, therefore, the mutually related self-conscious subjects, by sublation of their *unequal particular individuality*, have risen to the consciousness of their *real universality*, of their *freedom* befitting *all*, and hence to the intuition of their *determinate identity with each other*. The master confronting the bondsman was not yet genuinely free, for he was still far from intuiting his own self in the other. Consequently, it is only by the liberation of the bondsman that the master, too, becomes completely free.<sup>4</sup> In this condition of universal freedom, in being reflected into *myself*, I am immediately reflected into the *other*, and, conversely, in relating myself to the *other* I immediately relate to *my own self*. Here, therefore, we have the tremendous diremption of mind into different selves which are, both in and for themselves and for one another, completely free,

independent, absolutely obdurate, resistant, and yet at the same time identical with one another, hence not self-subsistent, not impenetrable, but, as it were, merged together. This relationship is thoroughly *speculative* in kind; and if one supposes that the speculative is something remote and inconceivable, one need only consider the content of this relationship to convince oneself of the groundlessness of this opinion. The speculative, or rational, and true consists in the unity of the concept, or the subjective, and the objective. This unity is obviously present at the standpoint in question. It forms the substance of ethical life, especially of the family, of sexual love (there the unity has the form of particularity), of patriotism, this willing of the universal aims and interests of the state, of love towards God, of bravery too, when this is staking one's life on a universal cause, and lastly, also of honour, provided that this has for its content not the indifferent singularity of the individual but something substantial, genuinely universal.<sup>5</sup>

### §437

This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness involves in the first place the individuals as shining into each other. But in this identity the distinction between them is a wholly indeterminate diversity or rather a distinction which is no distinction. Hence their truth is the universality and objectivity of self-consciousness which are in and for themselves — *reason*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Reason as the *Idea* (§213) appears here in the following determination: the general opposition between concept and reality, which are unified in the *Idea*, has here taken the specific form of the concept existing for itself, of consciousness and, confronting it, the externally present object.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* What we have called in the previous Paragraph *universal self-consciousness*, is in its truth the concept of *reason*, the *concept* in so far as it exists not merely as the logical *Idea*, but as the *Idea* developed into self-consciousness. For as we know from the *Logic*, the *Idea* consists in the unity of the subjective, or the concept, and objectivity. But universal self-consciousness has shown itself to us as such a unity, for we have seen that, in its absolute difference from its Other, it is yet at the same time absolutely identical with its Other. It is precisely this identity of subjectivity and objectivity that constitutes the *universality* now attained by self-consciousness, a universality which overarches these two sides or *particularities* and into which they dissolve. But self-consciousness, in attaining this universality, ceases to be self-consciousness in the strict or narrower sense of the word, since it is just this adherence to the particularity of the self that belongs to self-consciousness as such. By relinquishing this particularity, self-consciousness becomes reason.<sup>3</sup> In this context the name 'reason' only has the sense of the initially still *abstract* or *formal* unity of self-consciousness with its object. This unity establishes what must be called, in determinate contrast to the *truthful*, the merely *correct*. My representation is *correct* by mere *agreement* with the object, even when the object only remotely corresponds to its concept

and thus has hardly any truth at all. Only when the *truthful* content becomes an object for me does my intelligence acquire the significance of *reason* in a *concrete* sense. Reason in this sense will have to be considered at the close of the development of theoretical mind (§467), where, emerging from an opposition of the subjective and objective developed further than it has been so far, we shall cognize reason as the *contentful* unity of this opposition.<sup>4</sup>

(c) *REASON*

§438

Reason is the truth that is in and for itself, and this is the simple *identity* of the *subjectivity* of the concept with its *objectivity* and universality. The universality of reason, therefore, signifies the *object*, which in consciousness qua consciousness was only given, but is now itself *universal*, permeating and encompassing the I. Equally it signifies the pure *I*, the pure form overarching the object and encompassing it within itself.<sup>1</sup>

§439

Self-consciousness is thus the certainty that its determinations are objective, are determinations of the essence of things, just as much as they are its own thoughts. Hence it is reason, which, since it is this identity, is not only the absolute *substance*, but the *truth* as awareness. For truth here has, as its peculiar *determinacy*, as its immanent form, the pure concept existing for itself, I, the certainty of itself as infinite universality. This truth that is aware is the *mind*.<sup>1</sup>



## C. Psychology, The Mind

§440

The *mind* has determined itself into the truth of soul and of consciousness, of that simple immediate totality and of this knowledge, which is now an infinite form and thus not restricted by the content derived from the soul, does not stand in relationship to it as object, but is knowledge of the substantial totality that is neither subjective nor objective. Mind, therefore, sets out only from its own being and is in relationship only with its own determinations.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] *Psychology* accordingly studies the faculties or universal modes of activity of the *mind as such*, intuition, representing, recollecting, etc., desires, etc., disregarding *both* the content, which in *appearance* is found in empirical representation, in thinking also and in desire and will, *and* the forms in which the content occurs, in the soul as a natural determination, and in consciousness itself as an object of consciousness that is present for itself.<sup>2</sup> This, however, is not an arbitrary abstraction. Mind itself is this elevation above nature and natural determinacy, and above the involvement with an external object, i.e. above the material element in general; this is what its concept has turned out to be. All it has to do now is to realize this concept of its freedom, i.e. sublimate the *form* of immediacy with which it once more begins. The content that is elevated to intuitions is *its* sensations; similarly it is *its* intuitions that are transformed into representations, and its representations that are transformed again into thoughts, etc.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* Free mind, or mind *as such*, is reason as it divides into, on the one hand, pure infinite form, boundless knowledge, and, on the other hand, the object identical with this knowledge. Here, this knowledge still has no other content than its own self, with the determination that the knowledge embraces within itself all objectivity, that consequently the object is not something coming to the mind from outside and incomprehensible to it.<sup>4</sup> Mind is thus the *absolutely universal certainty of itself, free of any opposition whatever*. Therefore, it possesses the confidence that in the world it will find its own self, that the world must be friendly to it, that, just as Adam said of Eve that she was flesh of his flesh, so mind has to seek in the world reason of its own reason. We have found reason to be the unity of the subjective and objective, the unity of the concept existing for its own self and of reality. Since therefore mind is the absolute certainty of itself, is knowledge of reason, it is knowledge of the unity of the subjective and

objective, knowledge that its *object* is the *concept* and the *concept* is *objective*.<sup>5</sup> Free mind thereby shows itself to be the unity of the two universal stages of development considered in the first and second main parts of the theory of subjective mind, namely, of the *soul*, this *simple spiritual substance* or *immediate mind*, and of *consciousness* or *appearing mind*, the *self-separation* of this substance. For the determinations of free mind have *subjectivity* in common with those of the *soul*, and *objectivity* in common with those of *consciousness*. The principle of free mind is to posit the *beings* of consciousness as something *soulful*, and conversely to make the soulful into something objective. Free mind stands, like *consciousness*, as *one side* confronting the object, and is at the same time *both sides* and therefore, like the *soul*, a *totality*. Accordingly, whereas the soul was the truth only as an *immediate unconscious totality*, and whereas in consciousness, by contrast, this totality was divided into the *I* and the *object external* to it, so that there knowledge still had no truth, the *free mind* is *to be cognized* as the *self-knowing truth*.<sup>6</sup>

However, knowledge of truth does not itself initially have the form of truth, for at the stage of development now reached, the knowledge is still something abstract, the formal identity of the subjective and objective. Only when this identity has developed into an *actual* difference and has made itself into the identity of itself and its difference, when mind thus emerges as a totality differentiated within itself *determinately*, only then has that certainty achieved its *verification*.<sup>8</sup>

#### §441

The soul is *finite*, in so far as it is determined immediately or by nature. Consciousness is finite, in so far as it has an object. Mind is finite, in so far as, though it no longer has an object, it has a determinacy in its knowledge, it is finite, that

\* Therefore, when people assert that we cannot know the truth, this is the extreme of blasphemy. People are not aware of what they are saying here. If they were aware of it they would deserve to have the truth withdrawn from them. The modern despair of the knowability of truth is alien to all speculative philosophy as well as to all genuine religiosity. A poet no less religious than thoughtful, *Dante*, expressed in such a pregnant fashion his belief in the knowability of truth, that we permit ourselves to convey his words here. He says in the Fourth Canto of the *Paradiso*, verses 124–30:

Io veggio ben, che giammai non si sazia  
 Nostro intelletto, se'l Ver no lo illustra  
 Di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia.  
 Posasi in esso, come fera in lustra,  
 Tosto che giunto l'ha; e giunger puollo;—  
 Se non, ciascun desio sarebbe frustra.

[I see that nought can fill the mind's vast space,  
 Unless Truth's light dwell there as denizen,  
 Beyond which nothing true can find a place.  
 In that it rests, like wild beast in its den,  
 When it attains it; and it can attain,  
 Else frustrate would be all desires of men.

Dean Plumptre's translation]<sup>7</sup>

is, in virtue of its immediacy, and, what is the same thing, in virtue of being subjective or as the concept. And it makes no difference, what is determined as its concept, and what as its reality. If utterly infinite objective *reason* is posited as its *concept*, then the reality is *knowledge* or *intelligence*; or if *knowledge* is taken as the concept, then its reality is this *reason* and the realization of the knowledge, making reason its own. Hence the finitude of mind consists in the fact that knowledge does not grasp the being-in-and-for-itself of its reason, or, equally, in the fact that reason has not attained to full manifestation in knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Reason at the same time is only infinite reason in so far as it is absolute freedom, hence *presupposes* itself in advance of its knowledge and thereby makes itself finite and is the eternal movement of sublating this immediacy, of comprehending its own self and being knowledge of reason.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* As we have seen, free mind is by its *concept* perfect unity of the subjective and objective, of form and content, consequently *absolute totality* and therefore *infinite, eternal*. We have cognized it as knowledge of reason. Because free mind is this, because it has the rational for its object, it must be described as the infinite being-for-self of subjectivity. Therefore it belongs to the *concept* of mind that within it the absolute unity of the subjective and objective be not merely *in itself*, but also *for itself*, and therefore object of knowledge.<sup>3</sup> On account of this conscious harmony prevailing between knowledge and its object, between form and content, a harmony that excludes all *separation* and so all *alteration*, one can call the mind, in accordance with its *truth*, the *eternal*, as well as the perfectly *blessed* and *holy*. For only that may be called *holy* which is *rational* and *knows* of the *rational*. Therefore, neither external nature nor mere sensation has a right to that name. Immediate sensation which has not been purified by rational knowing is burdened with the determinacy of the natural, the contingent, of being-external-to-its-own-self, of falling asunder. Therefore, in the content of sensation and of natural things infinity consists only in something *formal, abstract*. By contrast, mind is, by its *concept* or its *truth*, infinite or eternal in this *concrete* and *real* sense: that it remains absolutely self-identical in its difference. That is why we must declare mind to be the image of God, to be the divinity of man.<sup>4</sup>

But in its *immediacy*—for even mind as such assumes initially the form of immediacy—mind is not yet *truly* mind; on the contrary, its existence does not here stand in absolute agreement with its concept, with the divine prototype, the divine in it is here only the *essence* which has yet to develop into complete appearance. Immediately, therefore, mind has not yet grasped its concept, it only *is* rational knowledge, but does not yet *know* itself as such. Thus mind, as was already said in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph, is initially only the indeterminate certainty of reason, of the unity of the subjective and objective. Therefore here it still lacks *determinate* cognition of the rationality of the object. To attain this, mind must liberate the implicitly rational object from the form of contingency, individuality and externality which at first clings to it, and thereby free

itself from its relation to an Other. The *finitude* of the mind gets in the way of this liberation. For so long as mind has not yet reached its goal, it does not yet know itself as absolutely identical with its object, but finds itself *limited* by it.<sup>5</sup>

The finitude of mind must not, however, be taken for something *absolutely fixed*, but must be recognized as a mode of the appearance of mind, which is nevertheless infinite by its essence. This implies that the *finite* mind is immediately a contradiction, an untruth, and at the same time is the process of sublating this untruth. This struggling with the finite, the overcoming of the limit, constitutes the stamp of the divine in the human mind and forms a necessary stage of the eternal mind. Therefore, if one speaks of the limits of reason, this is worse than it would be to speak of wooden iron. It is infinite mind itself that *presupposes* its own self as *soul*, as well as consciousness, thereby *making* itself *finite*, but equally posits as sublated this home-made presupposition, this finitude, the implicitly sublated opposition of consciousness to the soul on the one hand, and on the other hand to an external object.<sup>6</sup> This sublation has a different form in *free mind* than in *consciousness*. For consciousness the progressive determination of the I assumes the semblance of an alteration of the object independent of the activity of the I, with the consequence that in the case of consciousness the logical consideration of this alteration fell only in *us*, whereas it is *for* the free mind that the mind itself produces from itself the developing and altering determinations of the object, that the mind itself makes objectivity subjective and subjectivity objective. The determinations of which it is aware are of course inherent in the object, but at the same time posited by mind. In free mind there is nothing *only immediate*. Therefore, when people speak of 'facts of consciousness' which for the mind are what is primary and must remain an unmediated given for it, it is to be noted on this that of course at the standpoint of *consciousness* a great deal of such given material is found, but the free *mind* has to demonstrate and so explain these facts as *deeds* of the mind, as a content *posited* by *it*, not leave them as independent *things* given to it.<sup>7</sup>

#### §442

The progression of mind is *development*, in so far as its existence, *knowledge*, has within itself, as its kernel and purpose, determinedness in and for itself, i.e. the rational, and so the activity of translation is purely only a formal transition into manifestation and therein a return into itself. In so far as knowledge is encumbered with its initial determinacy, is at first only *abstract* or *formal*, the goal of mind is to *produce* objective fulfilment, thus at the same time producing the freedom of its knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Here one must not think of the development of the individual associated with *anthropological* development, where the faculties and powers are regarded as successively emerging and presenting themselves in existence. For a long time knowledge of this progression was highly valued (by the philosophy

of Condillac), as if such a supposed *natural* emergence could display the *genesis* of these faculties and *explain* them. In this procedure there is an unmistakable tendency to make the *various* modes of the mind's activity comprehensible in the context of a *unitary* mind, and to display an interconnection of necessity. But the categories employed in doing so are in general of an impoverished sort. In particular the governing principle is that the sensory is taken, no doubt rightly, as primary, as the initial foundation, but that from this starting-point the subsequent determinations appear as emerging only in an *affirmative* manner, and the *negative* aspect of mind's activity, by which this material is spiritualized and sublated in its sensoriness, is misconceived and overlooked. In this approach, the sensory is not merely what is empirically primary, but continues to serve as the genuinely substantial foundation.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, if the activities of mind are regarded only as *expressions*, as forces in general, perhaps with a specification of their *utility*, i.e. as serving some other interest of the intelligence or the heart, then no *ultimate purpose* is available. The ultimate purpose can only be the concept itself, and the activity of the concept can only have the concept itself as its purpose, viz. to sublimate the form of immediacy or of subjectivity, to reach and to grasp itself, to liberate itself *to its own self*. In this way the so-called faculties of mind in their distinctness from each other are to be seen only as stages of this liberation. And this alone is to be regarded as the *rational* way of considering the mind and its various activities.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* The existence of mind, namely *knowledge*, is the *absolute* form, i.e. the form having the content within itself, or the concept that exists *as concept* and gives itself its own reality. That the content or object is for knowledge a *given* content or object, coming to it *from outside*, is therefore only a *semblance*, by sublation of which the mind proves to be what it is *in itself*, namely, absolute *self-determination*, the infinite negativity of what is external to mind and to itself, the *ideality* that produces all reality *from itself*. The *advance* of mind has, therefore, only this meaning: that this *semblance* be sublated, that knowledge prove itself to be the form that develops all content from itself. Thus the activity of mind, far from being restricted to a *mere acceptance* of the given, must, on the contrary, be called a *creative* activity, though the productions of the mind, in so far as it is only the *subjective* mind, do not yet acquire the form of immediate actuality but remain more or less *ideal*.<sup>4</sup>

### §443

As consciousness has as its object the preceding stage, the natural soul (§413), so mind has consciousness as its object or rather makes it its object; i.e. whereas consciousness is only *in itself* the identity of the I with its other (§415), the mind posits this identity *for itself*, so that *mind* is now aware of it, of this *concrete* unity. Its productions conform to the determination of reason, that the content be both the content that *is in itself*, and the mind's *own* content, in accordance

with freedom. Thus, when in its initial stage the mind is *determined*, this determinacy is twofold, a determinacy of *what is* and a determinacy of *what is its own*; by the former, the mind finds within itself something that *is*, by the latter it posits it only as *its own*.<sup>1</sup> The way of mind is therefore

- (a) to be *theoretical*, dealing with the rational as its immediate determinacy and now positing it as *its own*; or to liberate knowledge from presupposition and therefore from its abstractness, and to make the determinacy subjective. When knowledge is thus posited as determined in and for itself *within itself*, and the determinacy posited as its *own* determinacy, and thereby knowledge as *free intelligence*,<sup>2</sup> it is
- (b) will, *practical mind*, which is initially likewise formal, has a content as *only its own* content, immediately wills it and now liberates the determination of its will from its subjectivity, from the one-sided form of its content, so that it
- (c) becomes objective to itself as *free mind*, in which this double one-sidedness is sublated.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* Whereas one cannot very well say of *consciousness* that it has an *urge*, since it has the object *immediately*, *mind*, by contrast, must be conceived as urge because it is essentially activity, and is in fact initially:

(a) the activity by which the seemingly *alien* object acquires—instead of the shape of something given, individualized and contingent—the form of something recollected, subjective, universal, necessary, and rational. By undertaking this alteration of the object, mind reacts against the one-sidedness of *consciousness* which relates to objects as *immediate beings* and does not know them as subjective. As such it is *theoretical* mind. In theoretical mind the urge to *know* is dominant, the craving for *information*. Of the content of this information I know that it *is*, has objectivity, and at the same time that it is in *me* and thus *subjective*. Here, therefore, the object no longer has, as at the standpoint of consciousness, the determination of a *negative* towards the I.<sup>4</sup>

(b) *Practical* mind sets out from the opposite end. Unlike theoretical mind, it does not start from the seemingly independent object, but from its own *aims* and *interests*, thus from *subjective* determinations, and first proceeds to make these into something objective. In doing this it reacts against the one-sided subjectivity of *self-consciousness* enclosed within itself, just as theoretical mind reacts against *consciousness* that is dependent on a given object.<sup>5</sup>

Theoretical and practical mind reciprocally complement each other precisely because they are distinct from one another in the manner indicated. This distinction is, however, not absolute; for *theoretical* mind, too, deals with *its own* determinations, with thoughts, and, conversely, the aims of the *rational will* are not something pertaining to the particular *subject* but something that *is in*

*and for itself.* Both modes of mind are forms of reason; for both in theoretical and in practical mind what is produced, albeit by different routes, is that in which reason consists: a unity of the subjective and objective.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, however, these twin forms of subjective mind have this defect in common: in both of them the starting-point is the seeming *separateness* of the subjective and objective, and the unity of these opposed determinations is supposed to be first produced. This is a defect lying in the nature of mind, since mind is not a being, immediately complete, but is rather that which produces its own self, the pure activity, sublation of the presupposition of the opposition of the subjective and objective, a presupposition which, in itself, was made by the mind itself.<sup>7</sup>

#### §444

Both the theoretical and the practical mind are still in the sphere of the *subjective mind* in general. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. Subjective mind is productive; but its productions are formal. *Inwards*, the theoretical mind's production is only its ideal world and the attainment of abstract self-determination within itself. Practical mind deals, it is true, only with self-determinations, with its own material, but a material that is likewise still formal, and thus with a restricted content, for which it gains the form of universality.<sup>1</sup> *Outwards*, since the subjective mind is a unity of soul and consciousness, and is thus also a reality *in being*, a reality at once anthropological and conformable to consciousness, its products, in the theoretical mind, are the *word*, and in the practical mind (not yet deed and action, but) *enjoyment*.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] Psychology, like logic, is one of those sciences which in recent times have still derived least profit from the more general cultivation of the mind and the deeper concept of reason. It is still in an extremely poor condition. The turn effected by Kantian philosophy has indeed attached greater importance to it, even claiming that it *should* (and that in its *empirical* condition) *constitute* the foundation of metaphysics, a science which is to consist of nothing but the *empirical* apprehension and analysis of the *facts* of human *consciousness*, merely as *facts*, just as they are *given*. Assigning psychology this position, in which it is mixed with forms from the standpoint of consciousness and with anthropology, has not altered its own condition at all, but it has added one new factor: the abandonment, both for the mind as such, and for metaphysics and philosophy generally, of *knowledge of the necessity of that which is in and for itself*, the abandonment of the *concept* and the *truth*.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* Only *soul* is *passive*, the *free mind* is essentially *active*, *productive*. It is therefore a mistake when theoretical mind is sometimes distinguished from practical mind by describing the former as the *passive* and the latter as the *active*. In appearance this distinction is of course right enough. Theoretical mind seems

only to accept what is present, whereas practical mind is supposed to produce something not yet externally present. In truth, however, as we already indicated in the *Zusatz* to §442, theoretical mind is not a merely passive acceptance of an Other, of a given object, but shows itself as active by raising the implicitly rational content of the object out of the form of externality and individuality into the form of reason. But, conversely, practical mind too has a passive side, since initially its content is *given* to it, though it is given *internally*, not *from outside*, and so it is an immediate content, not posited by the activity of the rational will and it first has to be made such a posited content by means of *thinking knowledge*, thus by means of theoretical mind.<sup>4</sup>

No less than the distinction just discussed between the theoretical and practical, the distinction must be pronounced untrue, according to which intelligence is supposed to be the *limited*, and the will, by contrast, the *unlimited*. Quite the reverse: the will can be declared to be the more limited, since it engages in struggle with external, recalcitrant matter, with the exclusive individuality of the actual, and at the same time is confronted by other human wills; whereas intelligence as such only advances, in its expression, as far as the *word*, this fleeting, vanishing, wholly *ideal* realization emerging in an unresisting element, so that in its expression intelligence remains completely together with itself, satisfies itself within itself, proves to be an end in itself, the divine, and, in the form of *conceptual cognition*, brings about the unlimited freedom and reconciliation of mind with itself.<sup>5</sup>

Both modes of subjective mind, intelligence as well as will, initially have, however, only *formal* truth. For in both the content does not immediately correspond to the infinite form of knowledge, so that this form is thus still not *genuinely fulfilled*.

In the theoretical sphere the object does become, on the one hand, subjective but, on the other hand, a content of the object initially still remains behind outside the unity with subjectivity. And so the subjective here constitutes only a form that does not absolutely pervade the object and the object is, therefore, not something posited through and through by mind. In the practical sphere, by contrast, the subjective does not yet have immediately any genuine objectivity, since in its immediacy the subjective is not something absolutely universal, a being in and for itself, but something pertaining to the singularity of the individual.

When mind has overcome the defect just described, thus when its *content* no longer stands in conflict with its *form*, when the certainty of reason, of the unity of the subjective and objective, is no longer *formal* but rather *fulfilled*, when, therefore, the *Idea* forms the sole content of mind, then *subjective* mind has reached its *goal* and passes over into *objective* mind. Objective mind knows its freedom, recognizes that its *subjectivity*, in its truth, constitutes *absolute objectivity* itself, and it apprehends itself not merely *within itself* as *Idea* but brings itself forth as an externally *present world* of freedom.<sup>6</sup>



## (a) THEORETICAL MIND

## §445

The intelligence *finds* itself *determined*; this is its semblance from which in its immediacy it sets out; but as *knowledge*, intelligence consists in positing what is found as its own. Its activity deals with the empty form of *finding* reason, and its aim is that its concept should be *for the intelligence*, i.e. to be reason *for itself*, whereby the *content* also becomes rational for the intelligence. This activity is *cognition*. The formal knowledge of certainty elevates itself, since reason is concrete, to determinate and conceptual knowledge. The course of this elevation is itself rational, and consists in a necessary transition, determined by the concept, of one determination of intelligent activity (a so-called *faculty* of mind) into another. The refutation, involved in cognition, of the semblance of finding the rational, sets out from the certainty, i.e. the faith of intelligence in its capacity for rational knowledge, in the possibility of being able to appropriate reason, which intelligence and the content implicitly are.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] The differentiation of *intelligence* from *will* is often taken in the incorrect sense that each has a fixed and separate existence of its own, so that volition could be without intelligence, or the activity of intelligence could be without will. The possibility of what is called educating the *intellect* without the *heart*, and the *heart* without the *intellect*, the possibility too that there are one-sidedly intellectless hearts and heartless intellects, only indicates at most that bad, intrinsically untrue existences occur; but it is not philosophy's business to take such untruths of contingent reality and of representation for the truth, to take what is bad for the nature of the matter.—A host of other forms used of the intelligence, that it receives *impressions* from outside, *admits* them, that representations arise through *influences* of external things as the causes, etc., belong to a categorial standpoint which is not the standpoint of the mind or of philosophical inquiry.<sup>2</sup>

A favorite reflexion-form is that of *powers* and *faculties* of *soul*, intelligence, or mind. The *faculty*, like the *power*, is the *fixed determinacy of a content*, represented as reflexion-into-itself. The *power* (§136) is indeed the *infinity* of form, of the inner and the outer, but its essential *finitude* involves the *indifference* of *content* to form (*ibid.*, Remark). In this lies the irrationality which is introduced into the mind, as well as into nature, by this reflexion-form and by regarding the mind as an assemblage of *powers*. Whatever can be *distinguished* in the mind's activity is stereotyped as an *independent determinacy* and the mind is in this way made an ossified mechanical *collection*. It here makes no difference whatsoever if we substitute the expression *activities* for faculties and powers. *Isolating* the activities similarly makes the mind just an aggregative entity and regards their relationship as an external, contingent relation.<sup>3</sup>

The operation of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called *cognition*, though not in the sense that intelligence cognises *among other things* but in addition also intuits, represents, recollects, imagines, etc. Such a position is in the first place connected with the isolating of mental activities just criticised; but it is in addition also connected with the great question of recent times, whether genuine cognising, i.e. cognition of truth, is possible, with the implication that, if we see that it is not possible, we have to abandon this endeavour. The numerous aspects, arguments and categories with which an external reflection swells the scope of this question get cleared up in their place; the more external the approach of the intellect to the question, the more confused it finds a simple object. This is where the simple concept of cognition finds its place. It confronts the entirely universal viewpoint of that question, namely its tendency to put in question the *possibility* of genuine cognition in general and to present it as a possibility and option whether we pursue cognition or neglect it. The concept of cognition has turned out to be the intelligence itself, the certainty of reason; the actuality of intelligence is now cognition itself. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligence and yet at the same time of the possibility or option of cognition. Cognition is genuine, just in so far as the intelligence actualizes it, i.e. posits the concept of cognition *for itself*. This formal determination has its concrete sense in the same thing as cognition does. The moments of cognition's realising activity are intuition, representation, recollection, etc; these activities have no other immanent sense; their purpose is just the concept of cognition (see §445 *Remark*). Only if they are isolated, is it then imagined firstly that they are useful for something other than cognition, and secondly that by themselves they provide cognitive satisfaction, leading to a glorification of the delights of intuition, recollection, fantasy, etc. Of course even isolated, i.e. mindless intuition, fantasy, etc. can provide satisfaction; what is in physical nature the fundamental determinacy—self-externality, exhibiting the moments of immanent reason external to each other—can occur in the intelligence, either wilfully, or spontaneously, in so far as the intelligence is itself only natural, uncultivated. But *true satisfaction*, one admits, is provided only by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind, by rational representation, by productions of fantasy permeated by reason and exhibiting Ideas, etc., i.e. by *cognitive* intuition, representation, etc. The *truth* that is ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this: intuition, representation, etc. are not isolated, and are present only as moments of the totality, of cognition itself.<sup>4</sup>

*Zusatz.* As we have already remarked in the *Zusatz* to §441, even the mind mediated by the negation of *soul* and of *consciousness* has itself, initially, still the form of *immediacy* and consequently the *semblance* of being *external to itself*, of relating, like consciousness, to the rational as to a *being outside it*, only *found*, not *mediated* by mind. But by sublation of these two antecedent main stages of development, of these presuppositions made by the mind itself, mind has already shown itself

to us as that which *mediates itself with itself*, as that which withdraws from its Other into itself, as *unity* of the *subjective* and the *objective*. Consequently, the activity of mind that *has come to itself*, that implicitly already contains the object within itself as a sublated object, necessarily proceeds also to sublata that *semblance* of the immediacy of itself and of its object, the form of merely *finding* the object.—Accordingly intelligence's activity initially certainly appears as a *formal, unfulfilled* activity, and the mind consequently appears as *unknowing*; and the very first thing to be done is to remove this unknowingness. To this end intelligence fills itself with the object immediately given to it, which, precisely on account of its immediacy, is burdened with all the contingency, nullity and untruth of external reality. But intelligence, far from confining itself to merely accepting the immediately presented content of objects, purifies the object of that in it which shows itself to be purely external, to be contingent and null. Thus whereas, as we have seen, it seems to *consciousness* that its continuing cultivation starts from the alteration, occurring for itself, of the determinations of its object, intelligence, by contrast, is posited as that form of mind in which the mind itself alters the object and by the development of it also develops itself to truth. Intelligence, in altering the object from *external* to *internal*, internalizes itself. These two, the internalizing of the object and the recollection of the mind, are one and the same thing. That of which the mind has a rational knowledge becomes a rational content just in virtue of its being known in a rational way. Thus intelligence removes the form of contingency from the object, grasps its rational nature and so posits it as subjective; and, conversely, in this way it at the same time cultivates subjectivity into the form of objective rationality. Thus what is at first *abstract, formal* knowledge becomes *concrete* knowledge, *filled with genuine content*, hence *objective* knowledge. When intelligence attains this goal set for it by its concept, it is in truth what initially it only *ought to be*, namely, *cognition*.<sup>5</sup> Cognition must surely be distinguished from *mere knowledge*. For even *consciousness* is knowledge. But free mind does not content itself with simple knowledge; it wants to *cognize*, i.e., it wants not only to know *that* an object *is*, and what it is both *overall* and in its *contingent, external* determinations; it wants to know what the object's *determinate, substantial nature* consists in. This distinction between knowing and cognition is something entirely familiar to educated thinking. Thus it is said, for example, that though we *know* that God is, *cognition* of him is beyond us. The sense of this assertion is that while we surely have an indeterminate representation of the *abstract* essence of God, we are supposed, by contrast, to be incapable of comprehending his *determinate, concrete* nature. Those who speak in this way may, as regards their own person, be perfectly right. For although even that theology which declares God to be uncognizable goes to a great deal of trouble—exegetically, critically, and historically—over God and in this way swells up into a capacious science, yet it only gets as far as a knowledge of externals, and by contrast it excretes the substantial content of its object as something indigestible for its feeble mind and accordingly forgoes *cognition* of God, since,

as we have said, knowledge of *external* determinacies does not suffice for cognition, for which a grasp of the *substantial* determinacy of the object is necessary. Such a science as the one just mentioned occupies the standpoint of *consciousness*, not of *genuine intelligence*, which used to be called, rightly, the *cognitive faculty* as well, although the expression *faculty* has the inappropriate meaning of a mere possibility.<sup>6</sup>

To give a clear view of the terrain, we now schematically indicate in advance the formal course of the development of intelligence to cognition. This is as follows. First, intelligence has an *immediate* object, then, secondly, a *recollected* material *reflected into itself*, thirdly and finally, an object *subjective* and *objective* alike.

This gives rise to three stages:

- α) knowledge related to an immediately *individual* object, *material* knowledge, or *intuition*;
  - β) intelligence withdrawing *into itself* from the relationship to the *individuality* of the object and relating the object to a *universal*, or *representation*;
  - γ) intelligence *comprehending* the *concrete universal* of objects, or *thinking*, in the *determinate* sense that what we *think* also *is*, also has *objectivity*.
- α) The stage of *intuition*, of *immediate* cognition, or of *consciousness* posited with the determination of *rationality* and pervaded by the *certainty of mind*, again falls into *three* subdivisions:
- 1. Intelligence here starts from *sensation* of the immediate material;
  - 2. then it develops into *attention*, which both *fixes on* the object and *detaches* it from itself; and
  - 3. becomes in this way *intuition* proper, which posits the object as something *external to its own self*.
- β) The second main stage of intelligence, *representation*, comprises three stages:
- 1. Recollection
  - 2. Imagination
  - 3. Memory
- γ) Finally, the third main stage in this sphere, thinking, has as content:
- 1. *Intellect*
  - 2. *Judgement*, and
  - 3. *Reason*.<sup>7</sup>

### (α) *Intuition*

#### §446

The mind as *soul* is *naturally* determined; the mind as *consciousness* stands in relationship to this determinacy as to an *external* object; but as intelligence mind

(1) *finds itself* determined in this way, is its sombre weaving within *itself*, in which it is to itself a sort of *fabric* and has the whole *material* of its knowledge. Owing to the *immediacy* in which the mind thus initially occurs, it here takes only the simple form of an *individual* and *ordinary subjective* mind, and thus appears as *feeling* mind.

[Remark] When *feeling* occurred earlier (§399 ff.) as a mode of the soul's existence, there the *finding* or the immediacy has essentially the determination of natural being or of bodiliness; but here it has just *abstractly* the determination of immediacy in general.

*Zusatz.* We have already had on two occasions to speak of *feeling*, but on each occasion in a different respect. First, we had to consider it in the case of the *soul*, and more precisely at the point where the soul, awaking from its self-enclosed natural life, finds within itself the determinations of the content of its sleeping nature and is for that very reason sentient. But by sublating the restrictedness of sensation it attains to the *feeling* of its *self*, of its *totality*, and finally, apprehending itself as *I*, awakens to *consciousness*. At the standpoint of consciousness, we spoke of feeling for the second time. But there the determinations of feeling were the material of consciousness, *separated* from the soul and appearing in the shape of an *independent object*. Now, thirdly and lastly, feeling has the significance of being the form which mind *as such*, constituting the unity and truth of *soul* and *consciousness*, initially assumes. In the mind the content of feeling is liberated from the twofold one-sidedness which it had, on the one hand, at the standpoint of soul and, on the other hand, at the standpoint of consciousness. For this content now has the determination of being in itself both *subjective* and *objective*; and mind's activity now aims only at positing the content as a unity of the subjective and the objective.<sup>1</sup>

#### §447

The *form* of feeling is this: a feeling is indeed a *determinate* affection, but this *determinacy* is simple. Hence a feeling, however pure and true its content may be, has the form of contingent particularity, besides the fact that its content can equally well be thoroughly meagre and untrue.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] It is a very general presupposition that the mind has in its feeling the *material* of its representations, but this statement is more usually understood in the opposite sense to that which it has here. In contrast to the simplicity of the feeling it is usual rather to presuppose that the *judgement* in general, the differentiation of consciousness into a subject and object, is the original source; then the determinacy of sentiment is derived from an *independent* external or internal *object*. Here, in the truth of mind, this standpoint of consciousness, the opposite of the mind's idealism, has passed away, and the material of feeling has rather been already posited as immanent in the mind.<sup>2</sup> With regard to content it is a

common prejudice *that there is more in feeling than in thinking*; this is especially affirmed in the case of moral and religious feelings. The material, which the mind is to itself in so far as it feels, has here too proved to be the determinedness of reason in and for itself; hence all rational content and more precisely all mental content too enters into feeling. But the form of selfish individuality, which the mind has in feeling, is the lowest and worst form; in this form mind does not attain its freedom, its infinite universality; its substance and content remain in a state of contingency, subjectivity, particularity. Genuine, *cultivated* sentiment is the sentiment of a cultivated mind which has acquired the consciousness of determinate distinctions, essential relationships, genuine determinations, etc; in such a mind it is this amended material that enters into its feeling, i.e. obtains this form. Feeling is the immediate, as it were the closest, form in which the subject relates to a given content; the subject reacts to the content first of all with its particular self-feeling, which may well be more solid and comprehensive than a one-sided intellectual viewpoint, but may just as easily be restricted and bad; in any case feeling is the form of the particular and subjective. If a man on any topic *appeals* not to the nature and concept of the subject-matter, or at least to reasons, to intellectual universality, but to his *feeling*, the only thing to do is to let him alone, because he thereby spurns the community of rationality, withdraws into his isolated subjectivity, into *particularity*.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* In *sentiment* the *whole of reason* is present, the *entire material* of *mind*. All our representations, thoughts, and concepts of external nature, of lawfulness, of the ethical, and of the content of religion develop out of our sentient intelligence; and conversely, after they have received their complete explication, they are concentrated in the simple form of sentiment. It was, therefore, rightly said by an ancient that men have formed their gods out of their sentiments and passions. But the way in which this development of mind from sentiment is usually understood, implies that intelligence is originally thoroughly *empty* and therefore receives all content, as entirely *alien* to it, *from outside*. This is an error. For what the intelligence seems to receive from outside is, in truth, none other than the *rational* and is consequently *identical* with the mind and *immanent* in it. The activity of mind has, therefore, no other aim than, by sublation of the ostensible *being-external-to-its-own-self* of the implicitly rational object, to refute even the semblance of the object's externality to *mind*.<sup>4</sup>

#### §448

(2) One of the two moments in the diremption of this immediate finding is the abstract *identical* direction of the mind in feeling, as in all its other subsequent determinations: *attention*, without which nothing is for the mind;—active *recollection*, the moment of *its own possession*, but as the still *formal* self-determination of the intelligence. The other moment is this: contrary to its own inwardness, the intelligence posits the determinacy of feeling as a *being*, but as a *negative*, as the

abstract otherness of its own self. Intelligence hereby determines the content of sensation as a *being* that is *outside itself*, casts it out *into space and time*, which are the *forms* in which intelligence is intuitive. According to consciousness the material is only an object of consciousness, a relative other; from mind it receives the rational determination of being the *other of itself* (cf. §§247, 254).<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* The *immediate* and thus *undeveloped* unity, present in sensation and feeling, of mind with the object is still mindless. Therefore, intelligence sublates the simplicity of sensation, determines what is sensed as a negative in relation to intelligence, and thus *detaches* it from itself, yet at the same time posits it in its *detachment* as *its own*. Only by this dual activity of *sublating* and *restoring* the unity between myself and the other do I get to *grasp* the content of sensation. This happens initially in *attention*. Without attention, therefore, no apprehension of the object is possible; only by attention does mind become present in the subject-matter and obtain *cognizance* of it, though not as yet *cognition* of the subject-matter, for this requires a further development of mind.<sup>2</sup> Attention constitutes, therefore, the beginning of education. But attending must be conceived more exactly as a way of filling oneself with a content that has the determination of being both *objective* and *subjective*, or, in other words, of not only being *for me*, but also having *independent* being. Therefore, in attention there necessarily occurs a *separation* and a *unity* of the subjective and the objective, a *self-reflection-into-itself* of free mind and at the same time an *identical direction* of mind to the *object*.<sup>3</sup> This already implies that attention is something dependent on my *willfulness*, therefore, that I am only attentive when I *will* to be so.<sup>4</sup> But it does not follow that attention is an easy matter. On the contrary, it demands an effort, since if a man wants to apprehend one specific object, he must abstract from everything else, from all the thousand and one things going round in his head, from his other interests, even from his own person; he must suppress his own vanity which would rashly pass judgement on the subject-matter before it had a chance to speak for itself, must doggedly absorb himself in the subject-matter, must let it prevail in himself or focus on it, without obtruding his own reflections. Attention involves, therefore, the *negation of one's own self-assertion* and *devoting oneself* to the *subject-matter*—two moments necessary for proficiency of mind, though they are usually held to be unnecessary for so-called refined culture, since this is supposed to imply precisely that one is finished and done with everything, that one has got beyond everything. This aloofness leads back, in a way, to the state of savagery. The savage attends to practically nothing; he lets everything pass him by without focusing on it. Only by cultivation of the mind does attention acquire strength and fulfilment. The botanist, for example, notices incomparably more in a plant than one ignorant of botany does in the same time. The same is naturally true in regard to all other objects of knowledge. A man of great discernment and education has at once a complete intuition of what is at issue; with him sensation has the character of recollection throughout.<sup>5</sup>

As we have seen in the above, in attention a separation and a unity of the subjective and the objective takes place. However, in so far as attention initially emerges in *feeling*, the *unity* of the subjective and the objective is predominant in it, and accordingly the difference between these two sides is still something *indeterminate*. But intelligence necessarily goes on to develop this difference, to distinguish the object from the subject in a *determinate* way. The first form in which it does this is *intuition*. In intuition the *difference* between the subjective and objective predominates, just as much as the *unity* of these opposed determinations predominates in formal attention.<sup>6</sup>

We have now to examine here more closely the objectification of what is sensed that occurs in intuition. In this regard we have to discuss both *inner* and *outer* sensations.<sup>7</sup>

As regards inner sensations, it is especially true of them that in sensation man is subject to the power of his affections, but that he eludes that power if he is able to bring them to *intuition*. Thus we know, for example, that if someone is able to convey to his intuition, say in a poem, the feelings of joy or sorrow overwhelming him he detaches what is oppressing his mind from himself and thereby procures relief or complete freedom. For although by contemplating the many aspects of his sensations he seems to increase their power, yet he does in fact diminish this power by making his sensations into something *confronting* him, something *becoming external* to him. *Goethe*, for instance, particularly by his *Werther*, brought himself relief, whereas he subjected the readers of this novel to the power of sentiment. The cultivated man, because he contemplates what is sensed in all the aspects that present themselves, feels more deeply than the uncultivated, but is at the same time superior in his mastery over feeling because he moves especially in the element of rational thinking elevated above the narrow confines of sensation.<sup>8</sup>

Inner sensations then are, as just indicated, more or less separable from us according to the degree of intensity of reflective and rational thinking.

In the case of the *external* sensations, by contrast, the variation in their separability depends on the circumstance whether the object to which they are related is one that *persists* or *disappears*. In accordance with this determination the five senses range themselves in such a manner that *smell* and *taste* take their place on the one side, while *sight* and *feeling* take up a position on the other side, with *hearing* standing in the middle. Smell has to do with the *volatilization* or *evaporation* of the object, taste with its *consumption*. Thus the object presents itself to these two senses in its complete lack of independence, only in its *material disappearance*. Here, therefore, intuition falls into time, and the transposition of what is sensed from the subject into the object, is not so easy as with the sense of *feeling* which is related mainly to the *resistance* of the object, and also with the sense *proper* to intuition, with *sight*, which is concerned with the object as a predominantly *independent* entity, as *persisting ideally* and *materially* and which has only an *ideal* relation to it, senses only its *ideal* side, *colour*, by means of *light*, but leaves the



*material* side of the object untouched. Lastly, for hearing, the object is one that *subsists materially* but *vanishes ideally*; in sound, the ear perceives the vibration, i.e., the merely *ideal, not real*, negation of the object's independence. Therefore, in hearing, the separability of sensation shows itself to be indeed less than in sight, but greater than in taste and smell. We *must* hear sound, because sound, detaching itself from the object, forces itself on us and we refer it without great difficulty to this or that object because the object maintains its independence in its vibration.<sup>9</sup>

Accordingly, the activity of intuition initially produces in general a shifting of sensation away from us, a transformation of what is sensed into an object present outside us. The *content* of sensation is not altered by this alteration; on the contrary, it is here still one and the same content in the mind and in the external object, so that mind here still has no content peculiar to itself which it could compare with the content of intuition. Consequently, what comes about by intuition is merely the transformation of the form of *internality* into the form of *externality*. This constitutes the first way, itself still *formal*, in which intelligence becomes *determining*.<sup>10</sup> About the significance of this externality two remarks must be made: first, that what is sensed, in becoming an object external to the *inwardness of the mind*, receives the form of something *external-to-itself*, since the mental or rational constitutes the objects' *own* nature. Secondly, we must remark that since this transformation of what is sensed proceeds from the *mind as such*, what is sensed thereby acquires a *mental*, i.e. an *abstract* externality and by this acquires that universality which can *immediately* belong to the external, namely, a still quite *formal, contentless universality*. But the form of the concept itself falls apart in this abstract externality. The latter therefore has the dual form of *space* and of *time*. (Cf. §§254–259.) Sensations are thus posited spatially and temporally by intuition. The *spatial* presents itself as the form of *indifferent juxtaposition* and *quiescent subsistence*; the *temporal*, by contrast, presents itself as the form of *unrest*, of the *internally negative*, of *successiveness*, of *arising* and *vanishing*, so that the temporal *is*, in that it *is not*, and *is not*, in that it *is*. But the two forms of abstract externality are identical with one another in the sense that each is utterly discrete *within itself* and at the same time utterly continuous. Their continuity, containing within itself absolute discreteness, consists precisely in the abstract *universality* of the external, a universality coming from the mind and not yet developed to any *actual* individualization.<sup>11</sup>

But when we said that what is sensed receives from the *intuiting mind* the form of the spatial and temporal, this statement must not be understood to mean that space and time are *only subjective* forms. This is what *Kant* wanted to make space and time. However, things are in truth *themselves* spatial and temporal; this double form of asunderness is not one-sidedly imposed on them by our intuition, it has already been originally imparted to them by the infinite mind that is in itself, by the creative eternal Idea. When, therefore, our intuitive mind does the determinations of sensation the honour of giving them the abstract form of

space and time, thereby making them into proper objects as well as assimilating them to itself, what happens here is by no means what happens in the opinion of subjective idealism, namely, that we receive only the *subjective* manner of our determining and not the determinations belonging to the object itself.<sup>12</sup> Incidentally, we must answer those whose mental limitations lead them to attach a quite extraordinary importance to the question of the *reality* of space and time: space and time are extremely meagre and superficial determinations, therefore things get very little from these forms, and by the loss of them, were this in fact possible, they would thus lose very little. *Cognitive* thinking does not dwell on these forms; it apprehends things in their concept, which contains space and time within itself as something sublated. Just as in outer nature space and time, by the dialectic of the concept immanent in them, sublimate themselves into *matter* (§261) as their truth, so free intelligence is the dialectic of these forms of immediate asunderness, the dialectic that is for itself.<sup>13</sup>

#### §449

(3) When intelligence is this concrete unity of the two moments, and is in fact to be immediately recollected into itself in the external being of this material and in its recollection-into-itself immersed in self-externality, it is *intuition*.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* *Intuition* must not be confused either with *representation* proper, to be dealt with later, or with the merely *phenomenological consciousness* already discussed.

First of all, as regards the relationship of intuition to *representation*, intuition has only this in common with representation: in both forms of mind the object is both detached from me and at the same time my own. But that the object has the character of what is mine is present in intuition only in itself and is first posited in representation. In intuition, the objecthood of the content predominates. Only when I make the reflexion that it is I who have the intuition, only then do I occupy the standpoint of representation.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to the relationship of intuition to *consciousness*, the following remark must be made. In the broadest sense of the word, one could of course give the name of intuition to the immediate or *sensory consciousness* considered in §418. But if this name is to be taken in its *proper* significance, as rationally it must, then between this consciousness and intuition an essential distinction must be drawn: the former, in *unmediated, entirely abstract* certainty of itself, relates itself to the *immediate individuality* of the object, an individuality *disintegrating* into a multiplicity of aspects; whereas intuition is a consciousness *filled* by the certainty of *reason*, whose object has the determination of being something *rational*, consequently not an *individual* torn asunder into various aspects but a *totality*, a *cohesive fullness* of determinations.<sup>3</sup> It was in this sense that *Schelling* formerly spoke of *intellectual intuition*.<sup>4</sup> Mindless intuition is merely sensory

consciousness, remaining external to the object. Mindful, genuine intuition, by contrast, apprehends the *solid substance* of the object. A talented historian, for example, has before him in vivid intuition the *whole* of the conditions and events he is to describe; by contrast, one who possesses no talent for the portrayal of history confines himself to individual details and overlooks the substantial. It is, therefore, rightly insisted that in all branches of knowledge, and especially in philosophy too, one should speak from intuition of the subject-matter. This requires that a man enter into relationship with the subject-matter with mind, with heart and soul, briefly in his entirety, that he stand in the centre of it and give it free play. Only when thinking is firmly grounded in intuition of the substance of the object can one, without deserting the truth, go on to consider the particular which is rooted in that substance, but becomes worthless straw when detached from it. If, however, a solid intuition of the object is lacking from the outset or if it disappears again, then reflective thinking loses itself in the consideration of the manifold, individualized determinations and relationships occurring in the object, then the separating intellect tears the object apart, even when it is a living creature, a plant or an animal, by its one-sided finite categories of cause and effect, external end and means, etc., and in this manner, despite all its clever ruses, fails to comprehend the concrete nature of the object, to recognize the spiritual bond holding together all the individual details.<sup>5</sup>

But we must *abandon* mere intuition and the necessity for that lies in the fact that intelligence is, by its concept, *cognition*, whereas intuition is not yet cognitive knowledge, since intuition *as such* does not attain to the *immanent development* of the substance of the object but confines itself rather to apprehending the *not yet unfolded* substance still wrapped up in the *inessentials* of the *external* and *contingent*. Intuition is, therefore, only the *beginning* of cognition. It is to this position of intuition that Aristotle's saying refers, that all knowledge starts from *wonder*. For since subjective reason, as intuition, has the certainty, though only the *indeterminate certainty*, of finding its own self again in the object initially burdened with the form of unreason, the subject-matter instils into it wonder and awe. But *philosophical* thinking must rise above the standpoint of wonder. It is quite erroneous to suppose that one already genuinely knows the subject-matter when one has an *immediate* intuition of it. *Complete* cognition belongs only to the *pure thinking of conceptual reason*, and only someone who has risen to this thinking possesses a perfectly determinate, genuine intuition. With him intuition constitutes only the solid form into which his completely developed cognition is concentrated again. In immediate intuition, I do indeed have the entire matter before me; but only in the cognition that is unfolded in all its aspects and returns to the form of simple intuition does the matter stand before my mind as an *internally articulated, systematic* totality. In general, only the educated man has an intuition freed from the mass of contingencies and equipped with a wealth of rationality. A sensible, educated man can, even though he does not philosophize,

grasp the essentials, the core, of the matter in simple determinacy. *Contemplative thinking* is, however, always necessary for this. People often imagine that the *poet*, like the artist in general, must operate *purely intuitively*. This is not the case at all. On the contrary, a genuine poet, before and during the execution of his work, must *meditate* and *think contemplatively*; only in this way can he hope to extricate the *heart* or the *soul* of the matter from all the externalities in which it is shrouded and by so doing, develop his intuition *organically*.<sup>6</sup>

#### §450

Just as essentially, intelligence directs its attention at and against its own self-externality, and in its immediacy it is the awakening to itself, its *recollection into itself* in this immediacy. Thus intuition is this concretion of the material and the intelligence, the intelligence's *own* possession, so that it no longer needs this immediacy and the finding of the content.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* At the standpoint of mere *intuition* we are *outside ourselves*, in *spatiality* and *temporality*, these two forms of *asunderness*. Here intelligence is *immersed* in the external material, is one with it, and has no other content than that of the intuited object. Therefore, in intuition we can become extremely *unfree*. But, as we already remarked in the *Zusatz* to §448, intelligence is the *dialectic* of this immediate asunderness, a dialectic that *is for itself*. Accordingly, mind posits the intuition as *its own*, pervades it, makes it into something *internal*, *recollects itself in it*, becomes present to itself in it, and hence *free*. By this withdrawal into itself, intelligence raises itself to the stage of *representation*.<sup>2</sup> Representational mind *has* intuition; intuition is *sublated* in mind, not *vanished*, not *merely passed away*. Therefore, when we talk about an intuition sublated to representation, language too is quite correct in saying: *I have* seen this. By this is expressed no mere past, but presence as well; here the past is a merely *relative* past, —it resides only in the *comparison of immediate* intuition with what we now have in representation. But the word 'have', used in the perfect tense, has quite literally the meaning of presence: what I have seen is something that I not merely *had*, but still *have*, —thus something present in me. In this use of the word 'have' can be seen a *universal sign* of the inwardness of the modern mind, which does not merely reflect on the fact that the past in its immediacy has passed away, but also on the fact that in the mind the past is still preserved.<sup>3</sup>

### (β) Representation

#### §451

Representation is the recollected intuition and, as such, is the mean between intelligence's immediate finding-itself-determined and intelligence in its freedom, thinking. The representation is intelligence's *own* possession still

with one-sided subjectivity, since this possession is not self-contained *being*, but still conditioned by immediacy.<sup>1</sup> The path of intelligence in representations is to make the immediacy inward, to posit *itself intuitively within itself*, just as it is to sublimate the subjectivity of the inwardness, and within inwardness itself to divest itself of it and *to be within itself in its own externality*.<sup>2</sup> But as representing begins from the intuition and the *ready-found* material of intuition, this activity is still burdened with this difference, and its concrete productions within it are still *syntheses*, which become the concrete immanence of the concept only in thinking.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* The various forms of the mind as it occupies the standpoint of *representation* tend to be regarded, even more than is the case with the preceding stage of intelligence, as individualized, mutually independent powers or faculties. *Besides* the faculty of representation in general, one speaks of power of imagination and of power of memory, treating the mutual independence of these forms of mind as a foregone conclusion. But the genuinely philosophical conception of these forms just consists in comprehending the rational connection obtaining between them, in recognizing the organic development of intelligence occurring in them.<sup>4</sup>

To facilitate a survey of the stages of this development, we now propose to indicate them here in advance in a general way.

(1) The first of these stages we call *recollection* in the *peculiar* sense of the word according to which it consists in the involuntary arousal of a content that is already *ours*. Recollection forms the most *abstract* stage of the intelligence at work in representations. Here the *represented* content is still *the same* as in *intuition*; in intuition it receives its *verification*, just as, conversely, the content of intuition proves its worth in my representation. We have, consequently, at this stage a content which is not only intuited as it just *is*, but at the same time *recollected*, posited as *mine*. Determined in this way, the content is what we call an *image*.<sup>5</sup>

(2) The second stage in this sphere is the *imagination*. Here there enters the *opposition* between my *subjective* or *represented* content and the *intuited* content of the *subject-matter*. The imagination fashions for itself a content *peculiar to it* by reacting to the intuited object thinkingly, by bringing out what is *universal* in it, and giving it determinations that pertain to the I. In this way the imagination ceases to be merely *formal* recollection and becomes the recollection that affects the *content*, *universalizes* it, thus creating *universal* representations. Since at this stage the opposition of the subjective and objective prevails, the unity of these determinations here cannot be an *immediate* unity, as at the stage of mere recollection, but only a *restored* unity. The manner in which this restoration takes place is this: the *intuited external* content is subjugated to the *represented* content which has been raised to *universality*, is reduced to a *sign* of the represented content, while the represented content is in this way made *objective, external*, is rendered imageable.<sup>6</sup>

(3) *Memory* is the third stage of representation. Here, on the one hand, the *sign* is recollected, taken up into the intelligence; on the other hand, the intelligence is thereby given the form of something *external, mechanical*, and in this way a unity of the subjective and objective is produced which forms the transition to *thinking as such*.<sup>7</sup>

### (1) Recollection

#### §452

Intelligence, in first recollecting the intuition, puts the *content of feeling* in its inwardness, in its *own space* and its *own time*. In this way the content is ( $\alpha\alpha$ ) an *image*, liberated from its initial immediacy and abstract individuality in contrast to other things, as received into the universality of the I in general. The image no longer has the complete determinacy that the intuition has, and is wilful or contingent, in general isolated from the external place, the time, and the immediate context in which the intuition stood.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* Since intelligence is, by its concept, the infinite ideality or universality that is for itself, the space and the time of intelligence are *universal space* and *universal time*. Consequently, in placing the content of feeling in the inwardness of intelligence and thereby making it a representation, I lift the content out of the *particularity* of space and time, the particularity to which the content, in its immediacy, is bound and on which I too am dependent in sensation and intuition. From this it follows, first, that whereas the *immediate presence* of the thing is necessary for *sensation* and *intuition*, I can by contrast *represent* something to myself wherever I am, even what is remotest from me in external space and external time.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, it follows from what we said above that everything that happens acquires *duration* for us only when it is taken up into representational intelligence, whereas occurrences not regarded by the intelligence as worth taking up in this way become something entirely past. However, what is represented gains this immortality only at the cost of the *clarity* and *freshness* of the immediate individuality, the all round determinacy, of what is intuited; the intuition is obscured and blurred, when it becomes an image.<sup>3</sup>

As regards time, a further remark can be made concerning the subjective character it acquires in representation. In *intuition* time becomes *short* for us when we have *much* to *intuit*, but *long*, when a deficiency of given material drives us to the contemplation of our empty subjectivity. In *representation* it is the other way round: those times in which we were occupied in *various* ways strike us as *long*, whereas those times in which we had *little* to do seem to be *short*. Here, in *recollection*, we keep our subjectivity, our *inwardness*, in view and determine the measure of the time by the *interest* that we took in it. In the former case, in intuition, we are immersed in contemplation of the *thing*; here time appears short to us when it is filled with an ever *changing* content, but long when nothing interrupts its *uniformity*.<sup>4</sup>

## §453

(ββ) The image for itself is transient, and the intelligence itself, as attention, is its time and also its space, its when and where. But intelligence is not only consciousness and reality, but as intelligence it is the subject and the *in-itself* of its own determinations; *recollected* within intelligence, the image, no longer existing, is *preserved unconsciously*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] To conceive intelligence as this nocturnal pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations, yet without being in consciousness, is on the one hand the universal requirement to conceive the concept as concrete, as we conceive e.g. the seed as *affirmatively* containing, in *virtual* possibility, all the *determinacies* that come into *existence* only in the development of the tree. Inability to conceive this intrinsically concrete and yet steadfastly *simple* universal is what occasioned the talk about the preservation of particular representations in particular *fibres* and *areas*; diverse items are supposed essentially to have only an individualized spatial existence too.<sup>2</sup>—But the seed comes out of the existing determinacies and *returns* to its simplicity, to the existence of being-in-itself again, only in something else, in the seed of the fruit. But intelligence as such is the free *existence* of the *being-in-itself* that recollects itself into itself in its development.<sup>3</sup> Hence intelligence is to be conceived, on the other hand, as this *unconscious* pit, i.e. as the *existing* universal in which what is diverse is not yet posited as discrete. And in fact this *in-itself* is the first form of universality that presents itself in representation.<sup>4</sup>

*Zusatz.* The image is mine, it belongs to me; but initially it has no further homogeneity with me, for it is not yet *thought*, not yet raised to the *form of rationality*. On the contrary, between it and myself there still subsists a relationship not genuinely free, stemming from the standpoint of intuition, a relationship in which I am only *internal*, and the image is what is *external* to me. Therefore initially I do not yet have full power over the images slumbering in the depths of my inwardness, I am not yet able to summon them up again *at will*. No one knows what an infinite host of images of the past slumbers in him; now and then they do indeed awake by chance, but one cannot, as we say, call them to mind. Thus the images are ours only in a *formal* manner.<sup>5</sup>

## §454

(γγ) Such an abstractly stored image needs, for its reality, a real intuition; authentic recollection, as it is called, is the relation of the image to an intuition, in fact the *subsumption* of the immediate individual intuition under what is universal in form, under the *representation* which is the same content. Thus the intelligence is still internal to itself in the determinate sensation and its intuition and *recognizes* them as what is *already its own*, just as at the same time it is now aware of its initially only internal image as also an immediate image of intuition and as *proved*

in intuition.<sup>1</sup>—The image, which in the pit of intelligence was only its property, is now, with the determination of externality, also in its possession. The image is thereby posited both as distinguishable from the intuition and as separable from the simple night in which it is initially submerged. Intelligence is thus the power which can externalize its property and which no longer needs external intuition for the existence of the property in intelligence.<sup>2</sup> This synthesis of the internal image with the recollected reality is *representation* proper, since what is internal now also comprises the determination of being able to be *presented* before the intelligence, of having reality in intelligence.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* The images of the past lying hidden in the dark depths of our interior become our *actual possession* in the following way. They present themselves to the intelligence in the luminous, plastic shape of an *occurrent* intuition of the *same* content, and with the help of this *present* intuition we recognize them as intuitions we have already had. Thus it happens, for example, that we recognize out of hundreds of thousands someone whose image has already become quite dim in our mind, as soon as we catch sight of him again. If, therefore, I am to *retain* something in recollection, I must have *repeated* the intuition of it. To begin with, the image will of course be aroused not so much by myself as by the corresponding immediate intuition. But the image, by being frequently summoned up in this way, acquires such a great vitality and presence in me that I no longer need the external intuition in order to recollect it. In this way children pass from *intuition* to *recollection*. The more cultivated a man is, the more he lives not in immediate intuition, but, in all his intuitions, at the same time in recollections; so that he sees little that is altogether new but, on the contrary, the substantial content of most of what is new is something already familiar to him. Similarly, a cultivated man contents himself for the most part with his images and seldom feels the need of immediate intuition. The inquisitive multitude, by contrast, are always hurrying to where there is something to gaze at.<sup>4</sup>

## (2) Imagination

### §455

(αα) When it is at work in this possession intelligence is the *reproductive imagination*, the *emergence* of images from the I's own inwardness; the I is from now on the power over them. The nearest *relation* of the images is the relation of their external, immediate space and time, which are stored up with them.<sup>1</sup>—But in the subject, in which it is stored up, the image has only the individuality in which the determinations of its content are linked together; its immediate concretion, by contrast, i.e. the initially only spatial and temporal concretion, which it has as a *unit* in intuition, is dissolved.<sup>2</sup> The content reproduced, belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence and sent out from its universal pit, has a *universal* representation for the *associating relation* of the images, of the



representations which, according to former circumstances, are more abstract or more concrete.<sup>3</sup>

[Remark] The so-called *laws of the association of Ideas* have commanded great interest, especially during the blossoming of empirical psychology that coincided with the decline of philosophy.<sup>4</sup> For one thing, it is not *Ideas* that are associated.<sup>5</sup> For another, these modes of relation are not *laws*, just for the reason that there are so *many* laws about the same thing, making way rather for wilfulness and contingency, the opposite of a law; it is a contingent matter whether the connecting link is something pictorial, or an intellectual category, likeness and unlikeness, ground and consequent, etc.<sup>6</sup> Progression through images and representations in the wake of the associative imagination is in general the play of a thoughtless representing, where the determination of intelligence is still formal universality in general, but the content is the content given in the images.<sup>7</sup>—Image and representation, if we ignore the more precise determination we have given in terms of their form, are distinguished in their content by the fact that the image is the more sensorily concrete representation; representation (whether the content be something pictorial or concept and Idea) has in general the character, though belonging to intelligence, of being in respect of its content something given and immediate. The *being*, the *finding-itself-determined*, of intelligence still adheres to representation, and the universality which representing confers on that material is still abstract universality.<sup>8</sup> The representation is the middle term in the syllogism of the ascent of intelligence, the link between the *two meanings of relation-to-self*, namely *being* and *universality*, which in consciousness are determined as object and subject. Intelligence supplements what is *found* with the meaning of universality, and supplements what is its own, the inner, with the meaning of being, but a being posited by itself.<sup>9</sup>—On the distinction between representations and thoughts, cf. Introduction, §20 Remark.

The abstraction that occurs in the representing activity by which *universal representations* are produced (and representations as such already have the form of universality in them), is frequently expressed as a *superimposition* of many *similar* images upon one another and is supposed in this way to become comprehensible. If this *superimposing* is not to be entirely a matter of *chance*, with no trace of a concept, a *force of attraction* between similar images must be assumed, or something of the sort, which at the same time would be the negative power of rubbing off their remaining unlikeness against each other. This force is in fact intelligence itself, the self-identical I which by its recollection immediately gives the images universality, and *subsumes* the individual intuition under the already internalized image (§453).<sup>10</sup>

*Zusatz.* The second stage of development of representation is, as we have already indicated in the *Zusatz* to §451, the *imagination*. The first form of representing, *recollection*, ascends to imagination in this way: emerging from its *abstract being-within-itself* into *determinacy*, the intelligence disperses the nocturnal darkness

enveloping the wealth of its images and dispels it by the luminous clarity of presence.

But imagination, in its turn, contains three forms in which it unfolds. It is, *in general*, the *determinant* of images.

At first, however, it does no more than determine the entry of images into *reality*. Here it is only *reproductive* imagination. This has the character of a merely *formal* activity. But, secondly, imagination does not merely summon up again the images present in it but *relates* them *to each other* and in this way raises them to *universal* representations. Accordingly, at this stage, imagination appears as the activity of *associating* images. The third stage in this sphere is the stage at which intelligence identifies its *universal* representations with the *particularity* of the image and so gives them a *pictorial* reality. This sensory reality has the double form of *symbol* and *sign*, so that this third stage comprises the *symbolising* and the *sign-making* fantasy, the latter of which constitutes the *transition to memory*.<sup>11</sup>

*Reproductive Imagination.* So the first thing is the formal process of reproducing images. It is true that pure thoughts can also be reproduced; imagination has to do not with them, however, but only with images. But the reproduction of images on the part of imagination occurs *voluntarily* and without the help of an immediate intuition. This is what distinguishes this form of representational intelligence from mere *recollection*, which does not operate spontaneously but requires a present intuition and lets the images emerge *involuntarily*.<sup>12</sup>

*Associative Imagination.* A higher activity than mere reproducing is the *relating* of images *to one another*. The content of the images has, on account of its immediacy or sensoriness, the form of *finitude*, of *relation to an Other*. Now since here it is I who determine or posit in general, I also posit this relation. By this relation intelligence gives the images a *subjective* bond instead of their *objective* bond. But this subjective bond still has in part the shape of externality with respect to what is connected by it. For example, I have before me the image of an object; this image is connected quite externally to the image of persons with whom I have spoken about this object, or who possess it, etc. Often the images are linked together only by space and time. Ordinary social conversation mostly weaves its way from one idea to another in a very external and contingent manner. It is only when the discussion has a definite aim that it acquires a firmer coherence.<sup>13</sup> The various emotional moods give all representations a peculiar relation—cheerful moods give a cheerful relation, sad moods a sad relation. This is even more true of passions. The degree of intelligence also produces a difference in the way images are related; clever, witty people are therefore different from ordinary people in this respect too; someone clever seeks out images that contain something solid and profound. *Wit* combines ideas which, although remote from one another, nevertheless have in fact an inner connection. *Punning*, too, is to be included in this sphere; the deepest passion can resort to word-play; for a great mind, even in the

most unfortunate circumstances, knows how to bring everything it encounters into relation with its passion.<sup>14</sup>

### §456

Hence even the association of representations is to be conceived as *subsumption* of the individual representations under a *universal* representation, which forms the connection between them.<sup>1</sup> But intelligence is not only universal form in them; its inwardness is *intrinsically determinate*, *concrete* subjectivity with content of its own, which derives from some interest, some concept or Idea that is in itself, in so far as we may in anticipation speak of such content. Intelligence is the power over the stock of images and representations belonging to it, and thus ( $\beta\beta$ ) freely combines and subsumes this stock under its own peculiar content. Thus in this stock of ideas intelligence is recollected *determinately* into itself and imaginatively impresses the stock on its own content:—*fantasy*, *symbolizing*, *allegorizing* or *creative* imagination. These more or less concrete, individualized structures are still syntheses, in so far as the material, in which the subjective content acquires a reality of representation, derives from what is found in intuition.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* Images are already more universal than *intuitions*; they still have, however, a *sensory-concrete* content whose relation to another such content is I myself. But now when I turn my attention to this relation, I arrive at *universal* representations, or at representations in the *strict* sense of this word. For what enables the individual images to relate to one another consists precisely in what is *common* to them. This common element is either some *particular* aspect of the object raised to the *form of universality*, such as, for example, the *red colour* in the rose, or the *concrete universal*, the *genus*, for example, the *plant* in the rose,—but in each case a representation that comes about through the *dissolution*, proceeding from the intelligence, of the empirical connection of the manifold determinations of the object. In the production of universal representations, the intelligence thus operates *spontaneously*; it is, therefore, an inept mistake to assume that universal representations arose, without any help from the mind, by the superimposition of many similar images, that, for example, the red colour of the rose picked up the red of other images situated in my head, and thus conveyed to me, a mere spectator, the universal representation of red. Of course, the particular element belonging to the image is something given; but the analysis of the concrete individuality of the image and the resultant form of universality come, as remarked, from myself.<sup>3</sup>

*Abstract representations*, to mention these in passing, are often called *concepts*. The philosophy of Fries consists essentially of such representations. When it is asserted that this sort of thing leads one to knowledge of the truth, the rejoinder must be that it does just the opposite, and that therefore someone with any sense holds on to concrete images and rightly rejects such empty scholastic wisdom.

But there is no need here to labour this point.<sup>4</sup> No more are we concerned here with the *precise* nature of the content, whether this comes from the *external* world or from the sphere of *reason*, of *law*, *ethics*, and *religion*. The question at issue here is only the *universality* of the representation *in general*. From this point of view we have the following remark to make.

In the subjective sphere, which we now occupy, the *universal* representation is the *internal*, whereas the image is the *external*. These two mutually opposed determinations initially still fall apart, but in their separation each is one-sided. The representation lacks externality, pictorial vivacity, the image forgoes elevation to the expression of a determinate universal. The truth of these two sides is, therefore, their unity. More exactly, this unity, the *imaging of the universal* and the *universalization of the image*, comes about in the following way. The universal representation does not unite with the image to form a *neutral*, so to speak, *chemical* product. It actively proves itself to be the *substantial power* over the image, subjugating it as an accident of itself, making itself into the soul of the image; in the image it becomes *for itself*, recollects itself, manifests its own self. When the intelligence produces this unity of the *universal* and the *particular*, of the *internal* and the *external*, of *representation* and *intuition*, and in this way *restores the totality* present in intuition as a *proven* totality, the representational activity becomes complete within itself, in so far as it is *productive imagination*. This constitutes the formal aspect of *art*; for art displays the genuine universal or the *Idea* in the form of *sensory reality*, of the *image*.<sup>5</sup>

#### §457

In fantasy intelligence has been perfected to self-intuition within itself, inasmuch as its content, derived from its own self, has pictorial existence. This structure of its self-intuiting is subjective; the moment of *what is* is still lacking. But in the structure's unity of the inner content and the material, intelligence has likewise *implicitly* returned to identical self-relation as immediacy. As reason, intelligence starts by appropriating what is immediately found within itself (§445, cf. §455 Remark), i.e. by determining it as a *universal*; correspondingly its activity as reason (§438) is, from the present point on, to determine as a *being* what within it has been perfected to concrete self-intuition, i.e. to make itself into *being*, into the *thing*. When active in this determination, it is self-*externalising*, *intuition-producing*: ( $\gamma\gamma$ ) *sign-making fantasy*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Fantasy is the midpoint in which the universal and being, one's own and being-found, the inner and outer, are completely welded into one. The preceding syntheses of intuition, recollection, etc., are unifications of the same moments; but they are syntheses; only in fantasy does intelligence present itself not as the indeterminate pit and the universal, but as individuality, i.e. as concrete subjectivity, in which the self-relation is determined to being as well as to universality.<sup>2</sup> The structures of fantasy are everywhere recognized as such

unifications of what is the mind's own or its interior with the *intuitive*; their more determinate content belongs to different departments. Here we are to conceive of this inner workshop only in terms of these abstract moments.<sup>3</sup>—As the activity of this unification, fantasy is reason, but only *formal* reason, in so far as the *content* of fantasy as such is a matter of indifference; whereas reason as such also determines the *content to truth*.<sup>4</sup>

Another point calling for special emphasis is this. Fantasy brings the inner content to the image and to intuition, and this is expressed by saying that it determines the content as *being*. So we must not find this expression surprising either, that intelligence makes itself *be*, makes itself the *thing*; for the content of intelligence is intelligence itself, and so is the determination that it gives to this content.<sup>5</sup> The image produced by fantasy is only subjectively intuitive; in the *sign* it adds intuitability proper; in *mechanical* memory it completes, inside itself, this form of *being*.<sup>6</sup>

*Zusatz.* As we have seen in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph, in fantasy the universal representation constitutes the subjective element which gives itself objectivity in the image and thereby proves itself. This proof is, however, itself immediately still a subjective proof, in so far as intelligence initially still has regard to the given content of the images, is guided by it in imaging its universal representations. This activity of intelligence, which is in this way still *conditioned*, only *relatively free*, we call *symbolizing fantasy*. Symbolizing fantasy selects for the expression of its universal representations only that sensory material whose *independent* meaning *corresponds* to the determinate content of the universal to be imaged. Thus, for example, the strength of Jupiter is displayed by the eagle because this is regarded as being strong.—*Allegory* expresses the subjective element more by an ensemble of individual details.—Finally, *poetic* fantasy does indeed use material more freely than the plastic arts; yet it too may only select such sensory material as is adequate to the content of the Idea to be exhibited.<sup>7</sup>

But intelligence necessarily progresses from the *subjective* proof present in the symbol and *mediated* by the image, to the *objective* proof of the universal representation, a proof that *is in and for itself*. For since the content of the universal representation to be proved *joins together* only *with itself* in the content of the image serving as a symbol, this *mediated* form of the proof, of this unity of the subjective and objective, turns into the form of *immediacy*. By this dialectical movement, the universal representation reaches the point where it no longer needs the content of the image for its proof, but is proved in and for its own self, is, therefore, immediately valid. Now the universal representation, liberated from the content of the image, makes itself into something intuitable in an external material *wilfully* chosen by itself, and thus produces what has to be called, in definite contrast to the symbol, a *sign*. The sign must be proclaimed a great accomplishment. When the intelligence has designated something, then it has finished with the content of intuition and has given the sensory material an *alien*

meaning as its soul. So for example, a cockade or a *flag* or a *tomb-stone* means something entirely different from what it immediately indicates. The wilfulness, emerging here, of the combination of the sensory material with a universal representation has the necessary consequence that the meaning of the sign must first be learned. This is especially true of linguistic signs.<sup>8</sup>

#### §458

In this unity, stemming from intelligence, of an *independent representation* and an *intuition*, the matter of the intuition is of course initially something received, something immediate or given (e.g. the colour of the cockade, etc.). But in this identity the *intuition* does not count as positive or as representing itself, but as representing *something else*. It is an image that has received into itself as its soul an *independent* representation of the intelligence, its *meaning*. This intuition is the *sign*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] The *sign* is some immediate intuition, which represents a wholly different content from the content that it has for itself;—the *pyramid* into which an alien soul is transferred and preserved. The *sign* is different from the *symbol*, from an intuition whose *own* determinacy is, in its essence and concept, more or less the content which it expresses as symbol; in the sign as such, by contrast, the intuition's own content and the content of which it is a sign, have nothing to do with each other. In *signifying* therefore intelligence displays a freer wilfulness and mastery in the use of intuition than in symbolizing.<sup>2</sup>

In psychology or even in logic the *sign* and *language* are usually fitted in somewhere as an *appendix*, with no thought of their necessity and connections in the system of the activity of intelligence. The right place for the sign is the one indicated: intelligence—which in intuiting generates the form of time and of space, but appears as the recipient of the sensory content and as forming its representations out of this material—now gives its independent representations a determinate reality out of itself, *uses* the filled space and time, the intuition, *as its own*, deletes its immediate and peculiar content, and gives it another content as its meaning and soul.<sup>3</sup>—This sign-creating activity may be especially named *productive* memory (the initially abstract mnemosyne); since memory, which in ordinary life is often confused with recollection and used synonymously with it, even with representation and imagination, has in general to do with signs only.<sup>4</sup>

#### §459

The intuition, which in its immediacy is initially something given and spatial, acquires, in so far as it is used as a sign, the essential determination of occurring only as sublated. Intelligence is this intrinsic negativity; thus the more appropriate shape of the intuition that is a sign is a reality in *time*,—a disappearance of the reality as soon as it is, and, in its further external psychical determinacy,

a *positedness* by intelligence, emerging from its own (anthropological) naturalness,—the *sound*, the fulfilled externalization of self-announcing inwardness.<sup>1</sup> Sound articulating itself further for determinate representations, *speech*, and its system, *language*, give to sensations, intuitions, representations a second, higher reality than their immediate one, in general an existence that carries weight in the *realm of representation*.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] Language here comes into consideration only in the specific determinacy of being the product of intelligence for manifesting its representations in an external element. If we were to deal with language a concrete way, we would have to revert to the anthropological, more precisely the psycho-physiological standpoint (§401) for the *material* of language (the lexical element), and to anticipate the standpoint of the intellect for the *form* (grammar). For the *elementary material* of language, the idea of mere contingency has disappeared, while on the other hand the principle of imitation has been restricted to its narrow range, objects that make a sound. Yet one can still hear the German language praised for its wealth on account of the many particular expressions it possesses for particular sounds. (*Rauschen, Sausen, Knarren*, etc.; perhaps more than a hundred of them have been collected; the whim of the moment creates new ones when it pleases.) Such an abundance in the sensory and insignificant contributes nothing to the wealth of a cultivated language. The specifically elementary material itself depends less on a symbolism relating to external objects than on inner symbolism, namely anthropological articulation, as it were a *gesture* of the bodily expression of speech. For each vowel and consonant, as well as for their more abstract elements (gesture of lips, of palate, of tongue) and then for their combinations, people have thus looked for the specific meaning. But these dull subconscious beginnings are modified to inconspicuousness and insignificance, by further external factors or by the needs of civilisation, but essentially by the reduction of what are themselves sensory intuitions to signs, so that their own original meaning atrophies and is extinguished.<sup>3</sup> But the *formal* element of language is the work of the intellect which impresses its categories on language; this logical instinct gives rise to the grammar of language. The study of languages still in their original state, which we have first begun to get to know thoroughly in recent times, has shown on this point that they involve a highly elaborate and detailed grammar and express distinctions which are lacking or have been obliterated in the languages of more civilised peoples. It seems that the language of the most civilised peoples has the less complete grammar, and the same language has a more complete grammar when the people is in a more uncivilised state than in a more highly civilised state. Cf. Mr W. von Humboldt's *On the Dual*, I, 10, 11.<sup>4</sup>

While on the subject of spoken language (which is the original language), we can also mention, but here only in passing, *written language*; this is merely a further development within the *particular* province of language which enlists the help of an externally practical activity.<sup>5</sup> Written language proceeds to the field of

immediate spatial intuition, in which it takes and produces signs (§454). More precisely, *hieroglyphic script* designates *representations* with spatial figures, whereas *alphabetic script* designates *sounds* which are themselves already signs. Alphabetical writing thus consists of signs of signs, and in such a way that it analyses the concrete signs of spoken language, words, into their simple elements and designates these elements.<sup>6</sup>—*Leibniz* allowed himself to be misled by his intellect into believing that a complete written language, formed in a hieroglyphic manner—which occurs in a partial way even in alphabetic writing (as in our signs for numbers, the planets, the chemical substances, etc.)—would be very desirable as a universal written language for the communication of peoples and especially of scholars.<sup>7</sup> But it may be thought that it was rather the communication of peoples (as was probably the case in Phoenicia, and today happens in Canton—see *Macartney's Travels* by Staunton) which occasioned the need of alphabetical writing and led to its emergence.<sup>8</sup> Anyway a comprehensive, *finished* hieroglyphic language is out of the question. Sensory objects no doubt admit of permanent signs, but for signs of spiritual matters the progress in the cultivation of our thoughts, the advance of logical development, lead to altered views of their internal relationships and thus of their nature, so that with this another hieroglyphic determination would also emerge. After all, this already happens with sensory objects: their signs in spoken language, their names, are frequently changed, as e.g. with chemical and mineralogical names. Ever since we have forgotten what names, as such, are, namely intrinsically *senseless externalities* which only have a meaning as *signs*, ever since we require, instead of genuine names, the expression of a sort of definition and in fact frequently also form the definition again according to choice and chance, the denomination, i.e. just the combination of signs of their generic determination or other supposedly characteristic properties, is altered according to the different views we take of the genus or of any other supposedly specific property.<sup>9</sup>—It is only a stationary spiritual culture, like the Chinese, which is suited by the hieroglyphic script of that people; in any case only that lesser portion of a people which remains in exclusive possession of spiritual culture can share in this type of written language.<sup>10</sup>—At the same time, the development of spoken language is very closely connected with the habit of alphabetic writing, which is the only way in which spoken language acquires the determinacy and purity of its articulation. The imperfection of the Chinese spoken language is well-known; a mass of its words have several utterly different meanings, as many as ten, or even twenty, so that, in speaking, the distinction is made noticeable merely by stress and intensity, by speaking more softly or crying out. Europeans beginning to speak Chinese stumble into the most ridiculous misunderstandings before they have mastered these absurd refinements of accentuation. Perfection here consists in the opposite of that *parler sans accent* which in Europe is rightly required for cultivated speech. Owing to hieroglyphic written



language the Chinese spoken language lacks the objective determinacy that is gained in articulation from alphabetic writing.<sup>11</sup>

Alphabetic writing is in and for itself the more intelligent form; in it the *word*, the worthiest mode, peculiar to the intelligence, of expressing its representations, is brought to consciousness and made an object of reflexion. In this preoccupation of intelligence with the word, the word is analysed, i.e. this sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primal gestures of articulation); these are the sensory component of speech, brought to the form of universality, and at the same time acquiring in this elementary manner complete determinacy and purity.<sup>12</sup> Alphabetic writing thereby also retains the advantage of spoken language, that in written as in spoken language representations have genuine names; the name is the simple sign for the genuine, i.e. *simple* representation, not resolved into its determinations and compounded out of them. Hieroglyphic language arises not from the direct analysis of sensory signs, like alphabetic writing, but from the preliminary analysis of representations. This then readily provokes the thought that all representations could be reduced to their elements, to simple logical determinations, so that from the elementary signs chosen for these (as, in the case of the Chinese *kua*, the simple straight stroke, and the stroke broken into two parts) hieroglyphic language would be generated by their composition.<sup>13</sup> This circumstance, the analytical designation of representations in hieroglyphic script, which misled *Leibniz* into regarding it as preferable to alphabetic writing, is rather what contradicts the fundamental need of language in general, the name, to have for the immediate representation (which, whatever riches may be comprehended in its intrinsic content, is for the mind simple in the name) a simple immediate sign as well, which as a being for itself provokes no thought, having only the determination of sensorily representing and meaning the simple representation as such. It is not only the representing intelligence that dwells on the simplicity of representations and also puts them together again from the more abstract moments into which they have been analysed; thinking too reunifies the concrete content into the form of a simple thought after the analysis in which it has become a combination of many determinations. Both intelligence and thinking need to have such signs, simple in respect of their meaning, signs which, though consisting of several letters or syllables and even decomposed into them, yet do not display a combination of several representations.<sup>14</sup>—The foregoing considerations constitute the principle for deciding on the value of written languages. Then too it emerges that in hieroglyphic script the relations of concrete spiritual representations must necessarily become complicated and confused, and in any case the analysis of them (the immediate products of which are also to be analysed in turn) appears to be possible in the most various and divergent ways. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to a different formation of the written name; just as in recent times (as we have already noted) even in the sensory sphere hydrochloric acid has undergone several changes of name. A hieroglyphic

written language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilisation of the Chinese overall.<sup>15</sup>

It also follows from what has been said that learning to read and write an alphabetic script is to be regarded as an inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educational instrument, in that it diverts the mind's attention from the sensorily concrete to the more formal aspect, the spoken word and its abstract elements, and makes an essential contribution to laying and clearing the ground for the subject's inwardness.<sup>16</sup>—Later too, ingrained habit effaces the peculiarity of alphabetic writing, that it appears to take, in the interest of vision, a roundabout route to representations by way of audibility; habit makes it a hieroglyphic script for us, so that in using it we need not have the mediation of the sounds before our consciousness, whereas people who are little accustomed to reading speak aloud what they read in order to understand it in its sound. Besides the fact that with the facility that transforms alphabetic script into hieroglyphics the ability in abstraction gained by the initial practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is for itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing; it is true that the audible or temporal and the visible or spatial each has its own foundation, initially of equal validity with the other; but in the case of alphabetic script there is only *one* foundation, and in fact it stands in the correct relationship: the visible language is related to the audible only as a sign; the intelligence expresses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking.<sup>17</sup>—The mediation of representations by the less sensory element, sounds, also shows its peculiar essentiality for the transition that follows, from representation to thinking,—memory.<sup>18</sup>

### §460

The name, as the connection between the intuition produced by intelligence and its meaning, is initially an *individual* transient production, and the connection of the inner representation with the external intuition is itself *external*. The recollection of this externality is *memory*.<sup>1</sup>

## (3) Memory

### §461

Intelligence, as memory, runs through the same activities of recollection regarding the intuition of the word, that intelligence, as representation in general, runs through regarding the first immediate intuition (§§451 ff.).<sup>1</sup>— $\alpha\alpha$  Intelligence takes the connection, which the sign is, into its possession, and by this recollection elevates the *individual* connection to a *universal*, i.e. permanent, connection, in which name and meaning are for it objectively combined, and makes the intuition, which the name initially is, into a *representation*, so that the content, or meaning, and the sign are identified, are *one* representation, and the representing

in its inwardness is concrete, with the content as its reality: the memory that *retains* names.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* We consider *memory* in three forms: first, *name-retaining* memory; second, *reproductive* memory; third, *mechanical* memory.

The first thing here, then, is this: we retain the meaning of names, we acquire the capacity, in the case of linguistic signs, of recollecting the representations objectively linked with them. Thus when we hear or see a word belonging to a foreign language, its meaning presents itself to us; but it does not follow that the converse is true, that we can yet come up with the corresponding word-signs for our representations in that language. We learn to speak and write a language later than we understand it.<sup>3</sup>

### §462

The *name* is thus the *thing*, as the thing is available and carries weight in the *realm of representation*. ββ) *Reproductive* memory has and recognises the thing in the name, and with the thing it has the name, without intuition and image. The name, as *existence* of the content within the intelligence, is the *externality* of intelligence itself within itself; and the *recollection* of the name as the intuition produced by intelligence is at the same time the *self-externalization* in which intelligence posits itself inside itself.<sup>1</sup> The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the determinations of the sensing, representing, or thinking intelligence; the intelligence traverses series of these determinations within itself as it senses, etc.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] Given the name lion, we need neither the intuition of such an animal, nor even its image; the name, when we *understand* it, is the simple image-less representation. It is in names that we *think*.

The *mnemonics* of the ancients, revived a while ago but appropriately forgotten again, consists in transforming names into images, and thus again reducing memory to imagination. The place of the *power* of memory is taken by a permanent tableau, fixed in the imagination, of a series of images to which is then attached the composition to be learned by heart, the sequence of representations in it. Given the heterogeneity between the content of these representations and those permanent images, and also because of the speed with which the attachment is supposed to occur, the attachment can only occur by way of shallow, silly, and utterly contingent links. Not only is the mind put to the torture of being bothered by insane stuff, but what is learnt by heart in this way is for that very reason quickly forgotten, since in any case the same tableau is used for learning by heart every other series of representations, and so those previously attached to it are obliterated again.<sup>3</sup> Unlike what is retained in memory, what is mnemonically impressed is not produced *by heart*, i.e. strictly from the *inside*, from the deep pit

of the I, and thus recited, but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of the imagination.—Mnemonics is connected with the common prejudices which we have about memory in comparison with imagination; as if imagination were a higher, more spiritual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory no longer has to do with the *image*, which is derived from intuition, from the intelligence when it is determined in an immediate, unspiritual manner; it has rather to do with a reality that is the product of intelligence itself—a reality known *inside out* that remains enclosed in the inside of intelligence and is its outside, its existing side, only *within intelligence itself*.<sup>4</sup>

*Zusatz.* The word as *sounding* vanishes in *time*; and so in the sounding word time proves to be *abstract* negativity, that is to say, merely *annihilating* negativity. The *genuine, concrete* negativity of the linguistic sign is the *intelligence*, since through intelligence the sign is changed from something *external* to something *internal* and is *preserved* in this recast form. Words thus become a reality animated by thought. This reality is absolutely necessary to our thoughts. We are only aware of our thoughts, only have determinate, actual thoughts, when we give them the form of *objectivity*, of *being distinct* from our *inwardness*, and thus the shape of *externality*, and of an externality, too, that at the same time bears the stamp of the highest *inwardness*. Only the *articulated sound*, the *word*, is such an internal externality. To want to think without words, as *Mesmer* once attempted, is, therefore, a manifest absurdity which drove this man, as he himself affirmed, to the brink of insanity. But it is also ridiculous to regard the attachment of thought to word as a defect of thought and a misfortune; for although the common opinion is that it is just the *ineffable* that is the most excellent, yet this opinion, nurtured by vanity, is entirely groundless, since the ineffable is, in truth, only something murky, fermenting; it only gains clarity when it can get into words. Accordingly, the word gives to thoughts their most worthy and genuine reality. Of course, one can also grapple with words, without comprehending the thing. But then what is at fault is not the word, but a defective, indeterminate, superficial thinking.<sup>5</sup> Just as the genuine *thought* is the *thing*, so too is the *word*, when it is employed by genuine thinking. Intelligence therefore, in filling itself with the word, receives into itself the nature of the thing.<sup>6</sup> But this reception has another sense too: intelligence thereby makes itself into something *thingly*, in such a way that subjectivity, in its distinction from the thing, becomes quite empty, a mindless container of words, it becomes *mechanical* memory. In this way the *excess of the recollection* of the word veers round, so to speak, into extreme *alienation* of the intelligence. As I become more familiar with the meaning of the word, as the word thus unites more closely with my inwardness, increasingly the objectivity and hence the determinacy of the meaning of the word can disappear, increasingly, therefore, the memory itself, together with the word, can become something bereft of mind.<sup>7</sup>

## §463

γγ) In so far as the interconnection of names lies in the meaning, the connection of the meaning with their being as names is still a synthesis; and in this its externality the intelligence has not simply returned into itself.<sup>1</sup> But intelligence is the universal; the simple truth of its particular self-externalizations, and the appropriation that it carries out, is the sublation of that distinction between meaning and name. This supreme recollection of representing is the supreme self-externalization of intelligence, in which it posits itself as the *being*, as the universal space of names as such, i.e. of senseless words. Ego, which is this abstract being, is, as subjectivity, at the same time the power over the various names, the empty *bond* which establishes within itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they just *are*, and intelligence within itself is here itself this being of theirs, intelligence is this power as *entirely abstract subjectivity*,—*memory*, which, on account of the complete externality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and which is itself this externality, albeit subjective externality, is called *mechanical* (§195).<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] We obviously do not really know a composition by heart, until we attach no sense to the words; the recitation of what is thus known by heart therefore automatically becomes accentless. If the correct stress is introduced, it aims at the sense; conversely, if the meaning, the representation, is invoked, it disturbs the mechanical sequence and therefore easily messes up the recitation.<sup>3</sup> The capacity for being able to memorise by heart series of words, whose sequence involves no intelligible principle or which are already senseless for themselves (a series of proper names), is so supremely marvellous, because it is the very essence of mind to be *in its right mind*, but here the mind becomes self-externalized *within itself*, and its activity a mechanism. But the mind is only *in its right mind* as *unity of subjectivity* and *objectivity*; and here in memory, after the mind is initially in intuition so external that it *finds* its determinations, and in representation recollects *this find* into itself and makes it its own, as memory it makes itself external within itself, so that what is its own presents itself as something that is found. One of the two moments of thinking, *objectivity*, is here posited within intelligence as a quality of intelligence itself.<sup>4</sup>—It is tempting to conceive memory as a mechanical activity, an activity of the senseless, in which case it is only justified by its use, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and activities of mind. But in so doing we overlook the specific meaning that memory has in the mind.<sup>5</sup>

## §464

The being as *name* needs something *else*, the *meaning* of the representing intelligence, in order to be the thing, the true objectivity.<sup>1</sup> As mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivity itself and the *meaning*. Intelligence is thus *posited* as the *existence* of this identity, i.e. it is *explicitly* active as such an

identity which, as reason, intelligence *implicitly* is.<sup>2</sup> *Memory* is in this way the transition into the activity of the *thought*, which has no *meaning* any more, i.e. the subjective is no longer something different from its objectivity, just as this inwardness is *in being* in its very self.<sup>3</sup>

[Remark] Our language already assigns memory (*Gedächtnis*), of which it has become a prejudice to speak contemptuously, the high position of immediate affinity with thought (*Gedanke*).—It is not a matter of chance that the young have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory exercised only for the sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they do not yet take thought in their conduct, and their memory is exercised intentionally or unintentionally so as to level the terrain of their inwardness to pure being, to the pure space in which the thing, the content that is in itself, can go its own way and unfold itself without the opposition of a subjective inwardness.<sup>4</sup> A solid talent in youth is generally combined with a good memory. But empirical details of this sort give us no help in knowing what memory intrinsically is. To grasp the position and meaning of memory in the systematization of intelligence and to comprehend its organic connection with thinking is one of the hitherto entirely neglected, and in fact one of the most difficult points in the theory of mind. Memory as such is itself the merely external mode, the one-sided moment of thinking's *existence*; the transition is for us or in itself the identity of reason with the mode of existence, an identity which brings it about that reason now exists in the subject, as the activity of the subject. Thus reason is *thinking*.<sup>5</sup>

### (γ) Thinking

#### §465

Intelligence is *recognitive*;—it *cognizes* an intuition, in so far as the intuition is already its own (§454); moreover in the name it cognizes the thing (§462): but now *its* universal is for intelligence in the double meaning of the universal as such and the universal as immediate or as being, hence as the genuine universal which is the overarching unity of itself and its other, being.<sup>1</sup> Thus intelligence is *for itself intrinsically* cognitive; *intrinsically* the *universal*; *its* product, the *thought*, is the thing; simple identity of the subjective and objective. It knows that what is *thought*, *is*; and that what *is*, only *is* in so far as it is a thought (cf. §§5, 21);—*for itself*; the *thinking* of intelligence is *having thoughts*; they serve as the content and object of intelligence.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz.* *Thinking* is the third and last main stage in the development of intelligence; for in thinking the *immediate unity* of the subjective and objective present in *intuition*, a unity *that is in itself*, is restored out of the *opposition* of these two sides arising in *representation* as a unity enriched by this opposition, and so as a unity that *is in and for itself*, the end that is accordingly bent back into the *beginning*. Thus at the standpoint of *representation* the unity of

the subjective and objective is effected partly by imagination and partly by mechanical memory—though with the latter type of unity I do violence to my subjectivity—and the unity still remains something *subjective*. In *thinking*, by contrast, this unity acquires the form of a unity that is both *subjective* and *objective*, since thinking is aware of *its own self* as the nature of the *thing*.<sup>3</sup> Of course, people who have no understanding of philosophy throw up their hands in amazement, when they hear the proposition: *Thinking is being*. Nevertheless, the presupposition of the unity of thinking and being underlies all our activity. It is as rational creatures, as thinking creatures that we make this presupposition. We need to distinguish, however, whether we just *are* thinkers, or whether we are also *aware* of ourselves as thinkers. We *are* thinkers in all circumstances; knowledge of it, by contrast, occurs in a perfect manner only when we have risen to *pure* thinking. Pure thinking knows that it *alone*, and not *sensation* or *representation*, is in a position to grasp the truth of things, and that *Epicurus's* claim that the genuine is what is *sensed*, must therefore be pronounced a complete perversion of the nature of mind.<sup>4</sup> But of course, thinking must not remain *abstract, formal* thinking, for this dismembers the content of truth; it must develop into *concrete* thinking, into *conceptual* cognition.<sup>5</sup>

#### §466

But thinking cognition is likewise initially *formal*; the universality and its being is the simple subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts are thus not yet determined in and for themselves, and the representations recollected to thinking are to that extent still the content given.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz.* Initially, thinking knows the unity of the subjective and objective as an entirely *abstract, indeterminate* unity, a unity that is only *certain, not fulfilled, not proven*. The *determinacy* of the rational content is, therefore, still a *determinacy external* to this unity, consequently a *given* determinacy, and cognition is hence *formal*. But since this determinacy is *implicitly* contained in thinking cognition, this formalism contradicts thinking cognition and is therefore sublated by thinking.<sup>2</sup>

#### §467

In this content, thinking is (1) formally identical *intellect*, which works up the recollected representations into genera, species, laws, forces, etc., in general into the categories, in the sense that the material only has the truth of its being in these thought-forms.<sup>1</sup> As infinite negativity within itself, thinking is (2) essentially *direction*, — *judgement*, which, however, no longer breaks up the concept into the previous opposition of universality and being, but differentiates in accordance with the specific interconnections of the concept,<sup>2</sup> and (3) thinking sublates the form-determination and at the same time posits the identity of the differences:—

*formal reason, concluding intellect.*<sup>3</sup> Intelligence, as thinking, *cognises*; and in fact when (1) the intellect *explains* the individual *by* the intellect's *own* universalities (the categories), then it calls itself *comprehending*;<sup>4</sup> (2) when it *explains* the individual *as* a universal (genus, species), it does so in the judgement.<sup>5</sup> In these forms the *content* appears as given; but (3) in the *inference* the intellect *determines content* from itself, by sublating that form-distinction. In the insight into necessity, the last immediacy still adhering to formal thinking has vanished.<sup>6</sup>

[Remark] In *logic*, thinking appears in its initial *implicit* form and as the unopposing medium in which reason develops. Thinking also occurs as a stage in *consciousness* (see §437 Remark). Here reason becomes the truth of the opposition as it had determined itself within the mind itself. — Thinking emerges again and again in these different parts of science, because these parts differ only in the medium and the form of the opposition; while thinking is this one, selfsame centre, to which, as to their truth, the oppositions return.<sup>7</sup>

*Zusatz.* Before *Kant*, no one among us drew a determinate distinction between *intellect* and *reason*. But if one does not want to sink to the level of the vulgar consciousness which clumsily blurs the distinct forms of pure thinking, the following distinction must be established between intellect and reason: for *reason*, the object is what is *determined in and for itself*, *identity* of the *content* and the *form*, of the *universal* and the *particular*; for *intellect*, by contrast, the object falls apart into the form and the content, into the universal and the particular, into an empty *in-itself* and the *determinacy* accruing to it from outside; thus in *intellectual* thinking, the *content* is *indifferent* to its *form*, while in *rational* or *conceptual* cognition the content *produces* its form *from its own self*.<sup>8</sup>

But though the *intellect* has in itself the defect just indicated, it is nevertheless a necessary moment of rational thinking. Its activity consists, in general, in *abstraction*. Now if it separates off the *contingent* from the *essential* it is entirely within its rights and appears as what in truth it ought to be. Therefore, someone who pursues an essential purpose is called a man of intellect. Without intellect no firmness of character is possible either, for this requires someone to hold firmly to their individual essentiality. However, the intellect can also, conversely, give to a one-sided determination the form of universality and thereby become the opposite of *sound common sense*, endowed with a sense for the essential.<sup>9</sup>

The second moment of pure thinking is *judging*. Intelligence which, as *intellect*, *tears apart* from one another the various *abstract determinations* immediately united in the concrete individuality of the object and *detaches* them from the *object*, necessarily proceeds, first of all, to *relate* the object to these *universal thought-determinations*, and so to consider the object as *relationship*, as an objective interconnection, as a totality. Often this activity of intelligence is even called *comprehension*, but wrongly so. For at this standpoint the object is still conceived as a *given*, as *dependent* on an *Other* and *conditioned* by it. The circumstances which condition a phenomenon still count here as independent existences. Hence



the identity of the interrelated phenomena is still a *merely inner*, and for that very reason *merely external*, identity. Here, therefore, the concept does not yet show itself in its own guise, but in the form of *non-conceptual necessity*.<sup>10</sup>

Only at the third stage of pure thinking is the *concept* recognized *as such*. Thus this stage exhibits *comprehension pro per*. Here the universal is recognised as particularizing its own self, and gathering itself together out of particularization into individuality; or, what is the same thing, the particular is demoted from its independence to a moment of the concept. Accordingly, the universal is here no longer a form external to the content, but the genuine form producing the content from its own self,—the self-developing concept of the thing. Consequently, at this standpoint, thinking has no other content than itself, than its own determinations, which constitute the immanent content of the form; in the object, it seeks and finds only itself. Here, therefore, the object is distinguished from thinking only by having the form of *being*, of *subsisting-for-itself*. Thus thinking stands here in a completely free relationship to the object.<sup>11</sup>

In this thinking, which is identical with its object, intelligence reaches its *consummation*, its *goal*; for now it in fact *is* what in its immediacy it was only *supposed* to be,—*self-knowing truth*, *self-cognizing reason*. *Knowledge* now constitutes the *subjectivity* of reason, and *objective* reason is posited as *knowledge*. This reciprocal interpenetration of thinking subjectivity and objective reason is the final result of the development of theoretical mind through the stages, antecedent to pure thinking, of intuition and representation.<sup>12</sup>

#### §468

Intelligence, which as theoretical appropriates the immediate determinacy, is, now that it has completed *taking possession*, in its own *property*; by the last negation of immediacy it is implicitly posited that *for the intelligence* the content is determined through the intelligence. Thinking, as the free concept, is now also free in the *content*. When intelligence is aware of itself as what determines the content, which is not only determined as being but is also intelligence's own content, it is *will*.<sup>1</sup>

*Zusatz*. Pure thinking is initially a self-effacing attitude, absorbed in the thing. But this activity necessarily becomes *objective to itself* as well. Since conceptual cognition is absolutely *together with itself* in the object, it must recognize that *its* determinations are determinations of the *thing*, and that, conversely, the *objectively* valid determinations, the determinations that are *in being*, are *its* determinations. By this *recollection*, by this *withdrawal-into-itself* of intelligence, intelligence becomes *will*.<sup>2</sup> This transition is not of course present for ordinary consciousness; for representation, thinking and will fall apart. But in truth, as we have just seen, *thinking is what determines itself into will* and thinking remains the *substance* of the will, so that without thinking there can be no will, and even the most uncultured person is will only in so far as he has taken thought;

the animal, by contrast, because it does not think, is also incapable of having a will.<sup>3</sup>

(b) PRACTICAL MIND

§469

As will, the mind is aware of itself as reaching a conclusion within itself and fulfilling itself from out of itself.<sup>1</sup> This fulfilled *being-for-self* or *individuality* constitutes the side of existence or *reality* for the *Idea* of mind; as will, the mind steps into actuality, as knowledge it is on the terrain of the universality of the concept.<sup>2</sup>—In giving itself the content, the will is *together with itself, free* in general; this is its determinate concept.—Its finitude consists in its *formalism*: its self-fulfilment is the *abstract* determinacy, its *own* determinacy in general, and is not identified with developed *reason*.<sup>3</sup> The determination of the will that is *in itself* is to bring freedom in the formal will to existence, and therefore the purpose of the formal will is to fulfill itself with its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content, and purpose, as well as its reality.<sup>4</sup> This concept, freedom, essentially takes the form of thinking; the way of the will by which it makes itself *objective* mind is to rise to the thinking will—to give itself the content that it can only have as a will that thinks itself.<sup>5</sup>

[Remark] *True* freedom is ethical life, where the will has for its purposes a universal content, not subjective, i.e. self-centred content; but such content is only possible in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethics, religion, lawfulness, etc.<sup>6</sup>

*Zusatz.* *Intelligence* has turned out to be mind that *withdraws into itself* from the object, that *recollects itself* in the object and recognizes its *inwardness* as what is *objective*.<sup>7</sup> The *will* now heads in the reverse direction, towards the *objectification* of its inwardness that is still burdened with the form of subjectivity. Here, however, in the sphere of *subjective* mind, we have to pursue this externalization only up to the point where the willing intelligence becomes *objective mind*, i.e. to the point where the product of the will ceases to be merely *enjoyment* and starts to become *deed and action*.<sup>8</sup>

Now in general the course of development of practical mind is as follows.

Initially the will appears in the form of *immediacy*; it has not yet *posited* itself as intelligence freely and objectively determining, but only *finds* itself as such objectively determining. So it is (α) *practical feeling*, has an *individual* content and is itself *immediately individual, subjective* will, which, as we have just said, feels itself as objectively determining, but still lacks a content that is liberated from the form of subjectivity, a content that is *genuinely objective, universal in and for itself*.<sup>9</sup> For this reason, will is initially only free *in itself* or by its *concept*. By contrast, the *Idea* of freedom requires that the will make its *concept, freedom itself*, its content or aim. When the will does this it becomes *objective* mind, constructs for itself

a world of its freedom, and thus gives to its genuine content an independent reality. But the will achieves this aim only by working its way out of its individuality, by developing its universality, which in individuality is only *implicit*, into a content that is universal *in and for itself*.<sup>10</sup>

The next step on this path is taken by the will when  $\beta$ ) as *urge*, it goes on to make the agreement of its inward determinacy with objectivity, which in feeling is only *given*, into an agreement that *ought* first to be *posited* by the will.<sup>11</sup>

The further step consists  $\gamma$ ) in the subordination of *particular* urges to a *universal, happiness*. But since this universal is only a *universality of reflection*, it remains something external to the particularity of urges, and is related to this particularity only by the wholly abstract individual will, by *wilfulness*.<sup>12</sup>

The *indeterminate universal* of happiness as well as the *immediate particularity* of urges and the *abstract individuality* of wilfulness are, in their mutual externality, something untrue, and that is why they come together in the will that wills the *concrete universal*, the concept of freedom. This will, as we have already remarked, forms the goal of practical mind.<sup>13</sup>

#### §470

Practical mind initially involves, as formal or immediate will, a double *ought*: (1) in the opposition of the determinacy posited from out of itself to the *immediate* determinedness that thereby enters again, the opposition to its *reality* and *condition*, what in consciousness develops at the same time into the relationship towards external objects.<sup>1</sup> (2) This first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not initially elevated into the universality of thinking; this universality therefore constitutes *in itself* the *ought* addressed to that self-determination in regard to form, as it can also constitute it in regard to the content;—an opposition that is initially only for us.<sup>2</sup>

### ( $\alpha$ ) Practical Feeling

#### §471

The practical mind at first has its self-determination within itself in an immediate way, and therefore *formally*, so that it *finds itself* as an *individuality* determined in *its* internal *nature*. It is thus *practical feeling*. In this, since the mind is *in itself* a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it does have the content of reason, but as an *immediately individual*, and therefore also *natural, contingent* and *subjective* content which determines itself from the particularity of need, of opinion, etc., and from the subjectivity that posits itself for itself against the universal, just as much as it can be, in itself, in conformity with reason.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Appeal is sometimes made to the *feeling* of right and morality, as well as of religion, that man allegedly has in him, to his benevolent inclinations, etc., to his *heart* in general, i.e. to the subject in so far as the various practical feelings

are all combined in it. This appeal has (1) the correct sense that these determinations are the subject's *own*, *immanent* determinations, (2) and then that in so far as feeling is opposed to the *intellect*, feeling *can* be the *totality*, in contrast to the one-sided abstractions of the intellect. But equally feeling *can* be *one-sided*, unessential, bad. The *rational*, which in the shape of rationality is something thought, is the same content as the *good* practical feeling has, but in its universality and necessity, in its objectivity and truth.

For this reason it is, on the one hand, *foolish* to suppose that in the transition from feeling to right and duty there is any loss of content and excellence; it is this transition that first brings feeling to its truth. It is equally foolish to regard the intelligence as superfluous, let alone harmful to feeling, heart, and will; the truth and, what is the same thing, the actual rationality of the heart and will can only reside in the *universality* of the intelligence, not in the individuality of feeling as such. If feelings are of the right sort, it is because of their determinacy, i.e. their content, and this is right only in so far as it is intrinsically universal, i.e. has its source in the thinking mind. The difficulty for the intellect consists in getting away from the separation that it has first wilfully made itself between the soul-faculties, feeling, the thinking mind, and arriving at the idea that in the human being there is only *one* reason in feeling, volition, and thinking. A difficulty connected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas, which belong only to the thinking mind,—God, right, ethics—can also be *felt*. But feeling is nothing but the form of the immediate, peculiar individuality of the subject, a form into which this content, like any other objective content to which consciousness also ascribes objectivity,<sup>2</sup> can be put.

On the other hand, it is *suspect*, and in fact far worse, to stick to feeling and heart against thought out rationality, right, duty, law, because what *more* there is in feeling than in rationality is only particular subjectivity, vanity and wilfulness.—For the same reason it is inept in the scientific consideration of feelings to deal with anything more than their *form*, and to consider their content, since the content, when it is thought out, rather constitutes the self-determinations of the mind, rights and duties, in their universality and necessity. For the specific consideration of practical feelings and inclinations, only the self-centred, bad, and evil ones would remain; for these alone belong to the individuality which sticks to itself against the universal; their content is the opposite of the content of rights and duties, but for that very reason they maintain their precise determinacy only in opposition to rights and duties.<sup>3</sup>

#### §472

Practical feeling involves the *ought*, its self-determination as being *in itself*, related to an individuality that is *in being* and which is allowed to count only in its adequacy to that self-determination. But as both factors, in this immediacy, still

lack objective determination, this relation of *need* to reality is the utterly subjective and superficial *feeling* of the *pleasant* or *unpleasant*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Delight, joy, grief, etc., shame, remorse, contentment, etc., are in part only modifications of formal practical feeling in general, but they vary in their content, which constitutes the determinacy of the ought.<sup>2</sup>

The celebrated question about *the origin of evil* in the world, at least in so far as evil is understood to mean only the unpleasant and *pain*, comes in here, at the standpoint of formal practicality. Evil is nothing but the inadequacy of *being* to the *ought*. This ought has many meanings and, since contingent *purposes* likewise have the form of the ought, infinitely many. In regard to contingent purposes, evil is only the justice that is imposed on the vanity and nullity of their devising. They themselves are already what is evil.<sup>3</sup>—The finitude of life and mind falls into their *judgement*, in which they have the Other that is separated from them at the same time within them as their negative, and thus they are the contradiction called evil. In a dead thing there is no evil or pain, because in inorganic nature the concept does not confront its reality and does not in the distinction at the same time remain its subject. Already in life, and still more in mind, this immanent differentiation is present and thus an *ought* comes in; and this negativity, subjectivity, I, freedom are the principles of evil and pain.<sup>4</sup>—Jakob *Böhme* viewed *I-hood* as *agony* and *torment*, and as the *source* of nature and of spirit.<sup>5</sup>

*Zusatz.* Although in practical feeling the will has the form of *simple identity* with itself, nevertheless in this identity *difference* is already present; for though practical feeling is aware of itself, on the one hand, as *objectively valid self-determining*, as something *determined in and for itself*, yet, on the other hand, it is also aware of itself as *determined immediately or from outside*, as subject to the *alien* determinacy of *affections*. The *feeling* will is, therefore, the comparing of its immediate determinedness coming from outside, with the determinedness posited in it by its own nature. Since the latter has the meaning of what *ought* to be, the will demands that the affection agree with it. This agreement is the *pleasant*, disagreement is the *unpleasant*.<sup>6</sup>

But since this inner determinacy to which the affection is related is itself still an *immediate* determinacy belonging to my *natural individuality*, is still *subjective*, only *felt*, the *judgement* resulting from this relation can only be an entirely *superficial* and *contingent* judgement. Therefore, in the case of *important* things, the circumstance that something is *pleasant* or *unpleasant* to me appears as supremely indifferent.

Practical feeling receives, however, still further determinations than the superficial ones just discussed.

There are, namely, in the second place, feelings which, since their content derives from *intuition* or from *representation*, surpass in determinacy the feeling of the pleasant or unpleasant. To this class of feelings belong, for example, delight, joy, hope, fear, anguish, pain, etc. Joy consists in the feeling of accordance of

my determinedness-in-and-for-itself with an individual event, a thing, or person. Contentment, by contrast, is more a *lasting, peaceful* harmony without intensity. In merriment we find a more lively harmony. Fear is the feeling of my self, and at the same time of an evil that threatens to destroy my self-feeling. In terror, I sense the *sudden* discordance between something external and my positive self-feeling.<sup>7</sup>

All these feelings have no *content immanent* in them, belonging to their *peculiar* nature; the content enters into them *from outside*.<sup>8</sup>

Lastly, there is a third kind of feelings arising when the substantial content of *right, morality, ethics, and religion*, a content that derives from *thinking*, is also taken up into the feeling will. When this happens, we have to do with feelings that are distinguished from one another by their own *peculiar content* and gain their justification by this content. To this class also belong shame and remorse; for both have, as a rule, an ethical basis. Remorse is the feeling of the discordance between my activity and my *duty*, or even only my *advantage*, in each case, therefore, between my activity and something determined-in-and-for-itself.<sup>9</sup>

But when we said that the feelings just discussed have their own peculiar content, this must not be understood to mean that the content of right, ethics, and religion is *necessarily* in feeling. That this content is not inseparably conjoined with the feeling can be seen in an empirical way from the fact that remorse can be sensed even over a good deed. It is, too, very far from being absolutely necessary that in relating my action to duty, I should succumb to the agitation and heat of feeling; I can also settle the relation in representational consciousness and thus content myself with a calm consideration of the matter.<sup>10</sup>

Just as little need the content enter into feeling in the second kind of feelings discussed above. A sensible person, a great character, can find something in harmony with his will without giving way to the feeling of joy, and, conversely, can suffer misfortune without giving way to the feeling of pain. Anyone who succumbs to such feelings is more or less caught up in the conceit of attaching particular importance to the fact that just he, this particular ego, experiences either good fortune or bad.<sup>11</sup>

### (β) *Urges and Wilfulness*

#### §473

The practical *ought* is a *real* judgement. The *immediate* adequacy, merely *found before* us, of the *current* determinacy to the need is a negation for the *self-determination* of the will and inadequate to it. If the will, i.e. the *implicit* unity of the universality and the determinacy, is to satisfy itself, i.e. be *for itself*, the *adequacy* of its inner determination and the reality *ought* to be posited by it.<sup>1</sup> The will, as regards the form of its content, is initially still *natural* will, immediately identical with its determinacy, *urge* and *inclination*; in so far as the totality of the

practical mind places itself into a single one of the *many restricted* determinations, posited in general with the opposite, it is *passion*.<sup>2</sup>

*Zusatz*. In practical feeling, it is a contingent matter whether the immediate affection agrees with the inner determinacy of the will or not. This *contingency*, this *dependence* on an *external* objectivity, contradicts the will that knows itself to be determined-in-and-for-itself, that is aware of the objectivity contained in its subjectivity. The will cannot, therefore, rest content with *comparing* its immanent determinacy with something external and just *finding* the agreement of these two sides; it must go on to *posit* objectivity as a *moment* of its self-determination, and therefore to *produce* this agreement, its satisfaction, itself. Volitional intelligence thereby develops into the *urge*. This is a subjective will-determination which gives itself its own objectivity.

The urge must be distinguished from mere *desire*. Desire belongs, as we saw in §426, to *self-consciousness* and so occupies the standpoint where the opposition between the subjective and objective is *not yet overcome*. Desire is something *individual*, and seeks only what is *individual* for an *individual*, momentary satisfaction. The *urge*, on the other hand, since it is a form of *volitional intelligence*, starts from the sublated opposition of the subjective and the objective, and involves a *series* of satisfactions, and so is something *whole, universal*. At the same time, however, the urge, coming as it does from the *individuality* of practical feeling and forming only the *first* negation of it, is still something *particular*. That is why the man who is absorbed in urges appears as unfree.<sup>3</sup>

#### §474

Inclinations and passions have the same determinations for their content as practical feelings, and likewise have, on the one hand, the rational nature of the mind as their foundation; but on the other hand, belonging as they do to the still subjective, individual will, they are afflicted with contingency, and seem in their particularity to stand both to the individual and to each other in an external relationship and thus with an unfree necessity.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] *Passion* involves in its determination that it is restricted to a *particularity* of the determination of the will, in which the whole subjectivity of the individual immerses itself, whatever the content of that determination may be. But owing to this formality, passion is neither good nor evil; this form only expresses that a subject has placed the whole vital interest of its mind, talent, character, enjoyment in *one* content. Nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. It is only a dead, too often, indeed, a hypocritical morality which inveighs against the very form of passion.<sup>2</sup>

But with the inclinations, the question is immediately raised, which are *good* and which *evil*, similarly, up to what *point* the good remain good, and, since each is a particular type contrasting with the others and there are many of them, how they must, since they all reside in *one* subject and, to go by experience, can hardly

all be satisfied, at least restrain themselves in the face of each other. Initially it is the same situation with these numerous urges and inclinations as with the powers of the soul, the collection of which is supposed to be the theoretical mind—a collection which is now increased by the *host* of urges.<sup>3</sup> The *formal* rationality of the urge and the inclination consists simply in their universal urge not to be subjective, but to sublimate subjectivity by the activity of the subject itself, to be realized. Their genuine rationality cannot emerge in an examination conducted by *external* reflexion, which presupposes *independent* natural determinations and *immediate* urges, and therefore lacks the single principle and final purpose for them. But it is the immanent reflexion of the mind itself, going beyond their *particularity*, beyond their natural *immediacy*, and giving their content rationality and objectivity, in which they become *necessary* relationships, *rights* and *duties*.<sup>4</sup> It is this objectification then, which displays their content as well as their relationship to each other, in general their truth; thus it was with genuine insight that *Plato* showed that he could explain what *justice* is in and for itself only in the *objective* shape of justice, namely in the construction of the state as the *ethical* life, and also that he included the whole nature of the mind under *the right of the mind*.<sup>5</sup>

So the question which are the *good*, rational inclinations and how they are to be subordinated to each other, turns into a presentation of the relationships that the mind produces when it develops as *objective* mind—a development in which the *content* of self-determination loses its contingency or wilfulness. The treatment of urges, inclinations, and passions in their genuine content is thus essentially the *theory* of legal, moral, and ethical *duties*.

#### §475

The *subject* is the *activity* of satisfying urges, of formal rationality, namely of translating the content, which in this respect is purpose, from subjectivity into objectivity, in which the subject joins together with itself. In so far as the content of the urge is distinguished as the important thing from this activity of the subject, the thing which has come about contains the moment of subjective individuality and its activity: this is *interest*. Nothing comes about therefore without interest.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] An action is both a purpose of the subject and also the subject's activity which carries out this purpose; it is only because the subject is in this way in even the most unselfish action, i.e. because of its interest, that there is an action at all.<sup>2</sup>—Urges and inclinations are sometimes contrasted with, on the one hand, the empty dream of a natural happiness, by which needs are supposed to find their satisfaction without the subject's activity of producing conformity between immediate existence and his inner determinations. They are sometimes contrasted quite generally, on the other hand, with duty for duty's sake, with morality. But urge and passion are nothing but the life-blood of the subject, by which the



subject itself is in his purpose and the execution of it. The ethical concerns the content, which as such is the *universal*, an inactive thing, that has its activating agent in the subject; the immanence of the content in the subject is interest and, if it lays claim to the whole efficacious subjectivity, passion.<sup>3</sup>

*Zusatz.* Even in the purest rightful, ethical, and religious will, which has only its *concept, freedom*, as its content, there also lies the individualization into a *this*, to something *natural*. This moment of *individuality* must obtain its satisfaction even in the execution of the most objective purposes; I, as this individual, do not wish, nor ought I, to perish in the execution of the purpose. This is my *interest*. This must not be confused with *selfishness*; for selfishness prefers its particular content to the objective content.<sup>4</sup>

#### §476

The will, as thinking and implicitly free, distinguishes itself from the *particularity* of the urges, and places itself as simple subjectivity of thinking above their diversified content. It is thus *reflecting* will.<sup>1</sup>

#### §477

Such a particularity of the urge is in this way no longer immediate, but for the first time the will's *own* particularity, because the will joins together with it and thus gives itself determinate individuality and actuality. The will is at the standpoint of *choosing* between inclinations, and is *wilfulness*.<sup>1</sup>

#### §478

Will as wilfulness is *free for itself*, in that it is reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate self-determination.<sup>1</sup> However in so far as the content, in which this formal universality of the will *resolves* itself into actuality, is still just the content of the urges and inclinations, the will is *actual* only as *subjective* and *contingent* will. It is a *contradiction*: it actualizes itself in a particularity, which is at the same time a nullity for it, and has a satisfaction in the particularity which it has at the same time left behind. As this contradiction, it is initially the *process* of distraction and of sublating one inclination or pleasure by another, and of sublating the satisfaction, which is just as much no satisfaction, by another to *infinity*. But the truth of *particular* satisfactions is the *universal* satisfaction, which the thinking will makes its purpose as *happiness*.<sup>2</sup>

### (γ) Happiness

#### §479

In this representation, produced by reflective thinking, of a universal satisfaction, the urges, in respect of their particularity, are posited as *negative*; and they

are supposed to be sacrificed, both sacrificed one to another for the sake of that purpose, and sacrificed to that purpose directly, in whole or in part.<sup>1</sup> Their limitation by each other is, on the one hand, a mixture of qualitative and quantitative determination; on the other hand, as happiness has *affirmative* content in the urges alone, the decision lies with them, and it is subjective feeling and taste which must have the final say in deciding where its happiness lies.<sup>2</sup>

## §480

Happiness is only the represented, abstract *universality* of the content, a universality which only *ought* to be.<sup>1</sup> But the truth of the *particular* determinacy, which just as much *is* as it is *sublated*, and of the *abstract individuality*, the wilfulness which both gives and does not give itself a purpose in happiness, is the *universal* determinacy of the will in the will itself, i.e. its very self-determination, *freedom*. In this way wilfulness is will only as pure subjectivity, which is pure and concrete at once, by having as its content and purpose only that infinite determinacy, freedom itself. In this truth of its self-determination, where concept and object are identical, the will is—*actually free will*.<sup>2</sup>

## (c) FREE MIND

## §481

The actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind; *free will*, which is *for itself as free will*, now that the formalism, the contingency and limitedness of the previous practical content have sublated themselves. By the sublation of the mediation that was involved in all this, the will is the *immediate individuality* posited by itself, but an individuality that is also purified to *universal* determination, to freedom itself.<sup>1</sup> The will has this *universal* determination as its object and purpose, in that it *thinks* itself, is aware of this concept of itself, is *will* as free *intelligence*.<sup>2</sup>

## §482

The mind which is aware of itself as free and wills itself as this object of itself, i.e. has its essence as its determination and purpose, is first of all *in general* the rational will, or *in itself* the Idea, thus only the *concept* of absolute mind. Since it is *abstract* the Idea is again existent only in the *immediate* will, it is the side of reason's *reality*, the *individual* will as knowledge of that determination of itself which constitutes its content and purpose, and of which the will is only the formal activity. The Idea thus appears only in the will that is a finite will, but which is the *activity* of developing the Idea and of positing the Idea's self-unfolding content as reality, which, as reality of the Idea, is *actuality*:—*objective mind*.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] No Idea is so generally recognized as indeterminate, ambiguous, and open to the greatest misconceptions, to which therefore it actually falls prey, as the Idea of *freedom*, and no Idea is in common circulation with so little consciousness of it. Since the free mind is the *actual* mind, misconceptions about it have the most tremendous practical consequences, and when individuals and peoples have once got in their heads the abstract concept of freedom that is for itself, there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength, just because it is the very essence of mind, and is in fact its very actuality.<sup>2</sup> Whole continents, Africa and the East, have never had this Idea, and are without it still; the Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, did not have it; on the contrary, they knew only that man is actually free by birth (as an Athenian, Spartan, etc., citizen), or by strength of character, education, by philosophy (the wise man is free even as a slave and in chains). This Idea came into the world through Christianity, according to which the individual *as such* has an *infinite* value since it is the object and aim of God's love, destined to stand in its absolute relationship with God as mind, and to have this mind dwelling in himself, i.e. man *in himself* is destined to supreme freedom. In religion as such man is aware of the relationship to the absolute mind as his essence, but now he has, in addition, the presence of the divine mind, even when he enters the sphere of *worldly existence*, as the substance of the state, of the family, etc. These relationships are developed through that mind, and are constituted in conformity to it, while by such existence the ethical disposition comes to be indwelling in the individual and then in this sphere of particular existence, of present sensation and volition, he is *actually free*.<sup>3</sup>

If knowledge of the Idea, i.e. of men's knowledge that their essence, purpose, and object is freedom, is speculative, then this Idea itself as such is the actuality of men, not an Idea that they *have* about it, but an Idea that they *are*.<sup>4</sup> In its adherents Christianity has made it their actuality e.g. not to be a slave; if they were made slaves, if the decision on their property were left to someone's discretion, not to laws and law-courts, they would find the substance of their life impaired. This will to freedom is no longer an urge which demands its satisfaction, but the character,—the spiritual consciousness that has become urgeless *being*.<sup>5</sup>—But this freedom, which has the content and purpose of freedom, is itself initially only a concept, a principle of the mind and heart, and destined to develop into objectivity, into legal, ethical, religious actuality, as well as scientific actuality.<sup>6</sup>



## SECTION II

# OBJECTIVE MIND

### §483

The objective mind is the absolute Idea, but it is only so *in itself*; since it is thus on the terrain of finitude, its actual rationality retains in it the aspect of external appearance. The free will initially has these distinctions in it immediately: freedom is its *inner* determination and aim and it enters into relation with an *external* objectivity that it finds before it, an objectivity that splits up into the anthropological factor of particular needs, external things of nature which are for consciousness, and the relationship of individual wills to individual wills, which are a self-consciousness of themselves in their diversity and particularity; this aspect makes up the external material for the embodiment of the will.<sup>1</sup>

### §484

But the purposive activity of this will is to realize its concept, freedom, in the externally objective realm, making it a world determined by the will, so that in it the will is at home with itself, joined together with itself, the concept accordingly completed to the Idea. Freedom, shaped into the actuality of a world, acquires the *form of necessity*, whose substantial interconnexion is the system of the determinations of freedom, and its apparent interconnexion is *power, recognition*, i.e. its validity in consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

### §485

This unity of the rational will with the individual will, with the immediate and peculiar element of the operation of the rational will, constitutes the simple actuality of freedom. Since freedom and its content belong to thinking and are the *universal* in itself, the content has its genuine determinacy only in the form of universality. When *posited* in this form for the consciousness of intelligence with the determination of valid power, the content is *law*,—the content, freed from the impurity and contingency that it has in practical feeling and in the urge, and

likewise impressed on the subjective will, not in the form of feeling and urge, but in its universality, as the will's habit, disposition and character, then it is *custom*.<sup>1</sup>

### §486

This reality in general, as *embodiment* of the free will, is *right*, which is to be taken comprehensively, not only as restricted juridical right, but as the embodiment of *all* determinations of freedom.<sup>1</sup> In relation to *the subjective* will, in which they, being universal, are supposed to have and can only have their embodiment, these determinations are its *duties*, while as habit and disposition in the subjective will they are *custom*. That which is a right is also a duty, and what is a duty is also a right. For an embodiment is a right only on the basis of the free substantial will; the very same content, in relation to the will differentiating itself as subjective and individual, is duty. It is the same content which the subjective consciousness recognizes as duty, and brings to embodiment in individual wills. The finitude of the objective will is in this respect the semblance of a distinction between rights and duties.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] In the field of appearance right and duty are initially correlates: to a right on my part corresponds a duty in *someone else*. But, as to the concept, my right to a thing is not merely possession, but as possession by a *person* it is *property*, lawful possession, and it is a *duty* to possess things as *property*, i.e. to be a person. When this is posited in the relationship of appearance, of relation to another person, it develops into the duty of the *other* to respect *my* right.<sup>3</sup> The *moral* duty in general is, in me as a free subject, at the same time a right of my subjective will, of my disposition. But in morality there arises the divergence between the merely inner determination of the will (disposition, intention), which has its reality only in me and is only subjective duty, and the actuality of that determination, which involves a contingency and imperfection that constitute the one-sidedness of the merely moral standpoint.<sup>4</sup> In ethical life these two sides have reached their truth, their absolute unity; though here too duty and right return to one another and join together, as is the way of necessity, through *mediation*. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them, just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be brought up to be free human beings. The government's penal justice, its rights of administration, etc., are also its duties to punish, to administer, etc., just as the contributions of members of the state in taxes, military service, etc., are duties and equally their right to the protection of their private property and of the general substantial life in which they have their roots; all purposes of society and of the state are the personal purposes of private individuals; but the path of the mediation, by which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of rights, produces the appearance of diversity, added to which is the way in which the *value* assumes various forms in the exchange, though in itself it is the same. But it essentially holds good that whoever has no rights has no duties, and vice versa.<sup>5</sup>

## SUBDIVISION

§487

The free will is:

- (A) itself initially *immediate*, and hence *individual*—the *person*; the embodiment which the person gives to its freedom is *property*. *Right* as such is *formal, abstract* right;<sup>1</sup>
- (B) reflected into itself, so that it has its embodiment inside it, and is thereby at the same time determined as *particular*, the right of the *subjective* will,—*morality*;<sup>2</sup>
- (C) the *substantial* will, as the actuality, conformable to the concept of the will, in the subject and a totality of necessity—*ethical life*, in family, civil society, and state.<sup>3</sup>

[Remark] Since I have set out this part of philosophy in my *Elements of Right* (Berlin, 1821) I can express myself more briefly than I did on the other parts.

## A. Right

### (a) PROPERTY

#### §488

Mind, in the immediacy of its freedom, the freedom that is for itself, is an *individual*, but an individual that is aware of its individuality as absolutely free will; it is a *person*, the self-awareness of this freedom, an intrinsically *abstract* and *empty* self-awareness that does not yet have its particularity and fulfillment in itself, but in an external *thing*. This thing, as an entity devoid of will, has no right against the subjectivity of intelligence and wilfulness, and subjectivity makes it an accident of itself, the external sphere of its freedom—*possession*.<sup>1</sup>

#### §489

The predicate of *mine*, which the thing obtains through the judgement of possession initially in the external appropriation, is for itself merely practical, but here it has the meaning that I put my personal will into the thing. Through this determination the possession is *property*, which as possession is a *means*, but as embodiment of personality is an *end*.<sup>1</sup>

#### §490

In property the person is joined together with himself. But the thing is an abstractly external thing, and the I in it is abstractly external. The concrete return of me into myself in the externality is this: I, the *infinite* relation of me to myself, am as a person the repulsion of me from myself, and have the embodiment of my personality in the *being of other persons*, in my relation to them and in recognition by them, which is thus reciprocal.<sup>1</sup>

#### §491

The thing is the *mean* by which the extremes, the persons who, in the awareness of their identity as free, are at the same time mutually independent, join together. For them my will has its *determinate discernible embodiment* in the thing by the immediate physical seizure of possession, or by my forming the thing or even by the mere designation of it.<sup>1</sup>



## §492

The contingent aspect of property is that I place my will in *this* thing; in this respect my will is *wilfulness*, so that I can as well place my will in it or not, just as well withdraw it or not. But in so far as my will lies in a thing, only I myself can withdraw it, and only with my will can the thing pass to another, whose property it similarly becomes only with his will:—*contract*.<sup>1</sup>

## (b) CONTRACT

## §493

The two wills and their agreement in the contract are an *internal* matter, different from the realization of the contract, the *performance*. The relatively-ideal expression in the *stipulation* involves the *actual* surrender of a property by the one will, the transference and the reception into the other will. The contract is *valid* in and for itself and does not become so only through the performance of one or the other party, which would imply an *infinite regress* or infinite division of the thing, the labour, and the time. The expression in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. The inwardness of the will that surrenders the property and of the will that receives it is in the realm of representation, and in this realm the *word* is *deed* and *thing* (§462), and it is the *fully valid* deed, since here the will does not come into consideration as moral will (whether it is *meant* seriously or as a deception), but only as will over an external thing.<sup>1</sup>

## §494

In the stipulation the *substance* of the contract is distinguished from the real expression in the performance, which is reduced to its consequence. Similarly a distinction is thereby posited in the thing or performance between its immediate specific *constitution* and its *substance* or *value*, in which the qualitative constitution changes into quantitative determinacy; a property thus becomes comparable with another, and can be equated to what is qualitatively wholly heterogeneous. It is thus posited in general as abstract, *universal* thing.<sup>1</sup>

## §495

Contract, as an agreement resulting from wilfulness and concerning a contingent thing, involves at the same time the positedness of the accidental will. This will is just as easily not in conformity with right, and thus produces *wrong*. But this does not sublimate right, which is in and for itself; it only gives rise to a *relationship of right to wrong*.<sup>1</sup>

## (c) RIGHT VERSUS WRONG

## §496

Right, as the *embodiment* of freedom in the *external* sphere, breaks up into a *multiplicity of relations* to this external sphere and to other persons (§§491, 493 ff.). In this way there are (1) several *legal claims*. Since property is exclusively individual in respect both of the person and of the thing, only *one* of these claims is the *right*, but because the claims oppose each other, they are jointly posited as the *semblance* of right, in contrast to which right itself is now determined as *right in itself*.<sup>1</sup>

## §497

Since, in opposition to this semblance, the single *right in itself*, still in immediate unity with the various claims, is posited as affirmative, is willed and *recognized*, the only difference lies in this, that *this* thing is subsumed under the right by the *particular will* of *these* persons: *inadvertent wrong*.—This wrong is a simple *negative judgement*, which expresses the *civil lawsuit*, for the settlement of which a *third judgement* is required, which, as the judgement of *right in itself*, has no interest in the thing, and is the power of giving reality to itself against that semblance.<sup>1</sup>

## §498

But (2) if the semblance of right is willed as such *against* right-in-itself by the particular will, which thus becomes *evil*, then the external *recognition* of right is separated from the *value* of right and only the recognition is respected, while right itself is violated. This gives the wrong of *fraud*:—the infinite judgement as identical (§173),—the formal relation is retained, but the substance is left out.<sup>1</sup>

## §499

(3) Finally, the particular will opposes right-in-itself by negating both right itself and its recognition or semblance. (This is negatively infinite judgement (§173) in which the genus is negated as well as the particular determinacy, in this case the apparent recognition.) Thus the will is violently evil, and commits a *crime*.<sup>1</sup>

## §500

As violation of right, such an action is in and for itself null and void. In the action the agent, as a will and a thinking being, sets up a law, but a formal law recognized by the agent alone, a universal which is valid *for him*, and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. To display the nullity of this action, to implement at a single stroke this formal law and right-in-itself, initially through a *subjective* individual will, is *revenge*. Because revenge starts from

the interest of *immediate, particular* personality, it is at the same time only a new violation, and so on *to infinity*. This progression likewise sublates itself in a third judgement, which is disinterested—*punishment*.<sup>1</sup>

### §501

The self-enforcement of right-in-itself is mediated ( $\alpha$ ) by the fact that a particular will, the judge, is in conformity with right and has an interest in turning against the crime (which initially, in revenge, is contingent),<sup>1</sup> and ( $\beta$ ) by the (likewise initially contingent) power of implementation, the power of negating the negation of right posited by the criminal. This negation of right has its existence in the will of the criminal; consequently revenge or punishment is directed (1) at the *person* or *property* of the criminal and (2) exercises *coercion* against him. Coercion takes place in this sphere of right in general, even against the thing when I seize it and maintain it against another's seizure, since in this sphere the will has its embodiment immediately in an *external thing* (in a thing as such or in bodiliness), and can be seized only at this point.<sup>2</sup>—But coercion is no more than *possible*, in so far as I can withdraw myself, as free, from every existence, even from the range of existence, from life.<sup>3</sup> Coercion is legitimate only as the sublation of a first, immediate coercion.<sup>4</sup>

### §502

A distinction has developed between right and the subjective will. The reality of right, which the personal will initially gives itself in an immediate manner, shows itself to be mediated by the subjective will, by the moment that gives embodiment to right-in-itself or perhaps diverges from it and sets itself against it.<sup>1</sup> Conversely, the subjective will in this abstraction, of being the power over right, is for itself a nullity; it has truth and reality essentially only when within itself it becomes the embodiment of the rational will,—*morality*.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] The expression *natural right*, which has been customary for philosophical jurisprudence, involves ambiguity: it may mean that right is present in an *immediately natural way*, or it may mean that right is determined by the nature of the thing, i.e. by the *concept*. Formerly it was usually meant in the first sense; so that a *state of nature* has also been concocted, in which natural right is supposed to obtain, whereas the state of society and of the political state rather requires and introduces a restriction of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. But in fact right and all its determinations are based on the *free personality* alone, a *self-determination*, which is the very contrary of *determination by nature*. The right of nature is therefore the embodiment of strength and the assertion of force, and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than *that one ought to depart from it*. Society, by contrast, is rather the state in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the state of nature.<sup>3</sup>

## B. Morality

### §503

The free individual, who, in (immediate) right, is only a *person*, is now determined as a *subject*,—will reflected into itself, so that the determinacy of the will in general becomes, as embodiment within the will, the will's *own* determinacy, distinct from the embodiment of freedom in an external thing.<sup>1</sup> Because the determinacy of the will is thus posited *internally*, the will at the same time becomes a *particular* will, and there arise the further particularizations of it and the relations of these to one another.<sup>2</sup> The determinacy of the will is partly the determinacy that is *in itself*; the determinacy of the will's reason, what is lawful (and ethical) in itself; partly it is the embodiment present in the active expression, an embodiment that sets out and comes into relationship with the determinacy. The subjective will is *morally* free, in so far as these determinations are inwardly *posited as its own* and willed by it. Its active expression with this freedom is *action*, in the externality of which the will only recognizes as its own, and allows to be imputed to it, what it has willed within itself in full awareness.<sup>3</sup>

[Remark] It is especially this *subjective* or *moral* freedom that is called freedom in the European sense. In virtue of the right of freedom man must specifically possess a knowledge of the difference between good and evil in general; ethical and religious determinations are supposed not to make a claim on him for his compliance only as external laws and regulations of an authority, but to have their approval, recognition, or even justification in his heart, disposition, insight, etc. The subjectivity of the will within itself is an end in itself, an absolutely essential moment.<sup>4</sup>

*Morality* must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not mean merely the morally *good*. In the French language 'le moral' is contrasted with 'le physique', and means the spiritual, intellectual in general. But here morality has the meaning of a determinacy of the will, in so far as it is in the *interior* of the will in general, and thus includes the purpose and the intention, as well as moral evil.<sup>5</sup>

### (a) PURPOSE

### §504

In so far as the action immediately concerns *reality*, then what is *mine* is formal, in so far as external reality is also *independent* of the subject. This externality can

pervert his action and bring about something different from what was involved in the action. Although all alteration as *such*, which is posited by the activity of the subject, is the subject's *deed*, still the subject does not for that reason recognize it as its *action*; it recognizes as its *own*, as its *responsibility*, only that reality in the deed which lay in its *knowledge* and *will*, which was its *purpose*.<sup>1</sup>

(b) INTENTION AND WELL-BEING

§505

The action has (1) as regards its empirically concrete *content* a variety of *particular* aspects and connections; in respect of form, the subject must have known and willed the action in its *essential* determination, which embraces within itself these individual details: *right of intention*. The purpose concerns only the immediate reality, but the *intention* concerns the substance and the aim of it.<sup>1</sup> (2) The subject likewise has the right that the *particularity* of the content in the action, in respect to the matter, is not a particularity external to him, but the subject's own particularity, that it contain his needs, interests, and aims, which, when similarly concentrated into *one* aim, as in happiness (§479), constitute his *well-being*: the *right of well-being*. Happiness is distinguished from well-being only in this, that happiness is conceived just as an immediate reality, whereas well-being is regarded as justifiable in relation to morality.<sup>2</sup>

§506

But the essentiality of the intention is initially the abstract form of universality, and in the empirically concrete action reflection can put this or that particular aspect into this form and thus make it, as essential, the intention or restrict the intention to it. In this way the supposed essentiality of the intention and the genuine essentiality of the action can be brought into the greatest contradiction (e.g. a good intention in a crime).<sup>1</sup>—Similarly well-being is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as pertaining to *this* subject, it is something altogether particular.<sup>2</sup>

(c) GOOD AND EVIL

§507

The truth of these particularities, and the concreteness of their formalism, is the content of the *universal will that is in and for itself*: the law and the substance of all determinacy, *the good in and for itself*; hence the *absolute final aim of the world*, and the *duty* for the subject who *ought* to have *insight* into the good, make it his *intention* and bring it about by his activity.<sup>1</sup>

## §508

But the *good* is in fact the intrinsically determinate universal of the will and thus contains particularity within itself; yet in so far as this particularity is itself initially still abstract, no principle of determination is available; determining also occurs outside this universality; and since what is determined is the free will that is *for itself*, in contrast to such determining, there arises here the deepest contradiction. α) Because of the indeterminate determining of the good, there are in general *varieties* of good and *several duties*, the diversity of which involves dialectical opposition between them and brings them into *collision*. At the same time, because of the unity of the good, they *ought* to stand in harmony; and yet each of them, though it is a particular duty, is, as duty and as good, absolute. The subject *ought* to be the dialectic which *decisively concludes* a combination of them by excluding the others and thus sublating this absolute validity.<sup>1</sup>

## §509

β) To the subject, who in the reality of his freedom essentially becomes a *particular*, his *interest* and *well-being* ought, because of this reality of his freedom, be an essential aim and therefore a duty. But at the same time in the aim of the *good*, which is not the particular but only the universal of the will, the particular interest *ought* not to be a moment. Because of this independence of the two determinations, it is likewise contingent whether they harmonize. But they *ought* to harmonize, because in general the subject, as individual and universal, is *in itself* one identity.<sup>1</sup>

γ) But the subject is not only in its reality a particular in general; it is also a form of its reality to be *abstract* self-certainty, abstract reflection of freedom into itself. The subject is thus distinct from the reason of the will, and capable of making the universal itself into a particular and thus into a semblance. The good is thus posited as a contingency for the subject, who can therefore resolve on something opposed to the good, can be *evil*.<sup>2</sup>

## §510

δ) External objectivity, in accordance likewise with the distinction that has emerged between it and the subjective will (§503), constitutes the other extreme, independent of the internal determinations of the will, a peculiar world for itself. It is therefore contingent whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims, whether the *good* realizes itself in it, while *evil*, the aim that is in and for itself null, is null in it;—contingent too whether the subject finds in it his well-being, and more precisely whether in it the *good* subject becomes *happy* and the *evil* subject *unhappy*. But at the same time the world *ought* to let what is essential, the good action, be carried out in it, as it *ought* to grant the *good* subject the satisfaction of

his particular interest, but refuse it to the *evil* subject, just as it *ought* to nullify evil itself.<sup>1</sup>

### §511

The all-round contradiction, which this multiple *ought*, the absolute being which yet at the same time is not, expresses, contains the most abstract analysis of the mind within itself, its deepest descent into itself. The relation of the self-contradictory determinations to each other is only the abstract certainty of itself, and for this *infinity* of subjectivity the universal will, the good, right, and duty, both is and is not; it is this subjectivity that is aware of itself as what chooses and decides.<sup>1</sup> This pure self-certainty, rising to its peak, appears in the two forms of *conscience* and *evil*, which immediately pass into each other. Conscience is the will of the *good*, which, however, in this pure subjectivity is the *non-objective*, non-universal, the indescribable, and over which the subject is aware that *he* in his *individuality* has the decision. But *evil* is this very awareness of his individuality as the decision-maker, in so far as his individuality does not remain in this abstraction, but gives itself the content of a subjective interest contrary to the good.<sup>2</sup>

### §512

This highest peak of the *phenomenon* of the will, which evaporates into this absolute vanity—into a non-objective, but merely self-certain goodness, and a certainty of itself in the nullity of the universal—immediately collapses.<sup>1</sup> *Evil*, as the most intimate reflection of subjectivity into itself in opposition to the objective and universal (which is, for subjectivity, only semblance), is the same as the *good disposition* towards the *abstract good*, which leaves the determination of the good up to subjectivity:—the utterly abstract *semblance*, the immediate perversion and annihilation of itself.<sup>2</sup> The result, the truth of this semblance, is, on its negative side, the absolute nullity of this willing, that is supposed to be *for itself* in contrast to the good, and the absolute nullity of the good, that is supposed to be only abstract; on the affirmative side, this semblance, thus collapsing, is, in concept, the same simple universality of the will as the good is.<sup>3</sup> Subjectivity, in this its *identity* with the good, is only the infinite form, the operation and development of the good. In this way the standpoint of the mere *relationship* between the two, and the standpoint of the *ought*, is abandoned, and we have passed over to *ethical life*.<sup>4</sup>

## C. Ethical Life

### §513

*Ethical life* is the completion of objective mind, the truth of subjective and objective mind itself. The one-sidedness of objective mind consists partly in having its freedom *immediately* in reality, therefore in the external, the *thing*, partly in having it in the good as an abstract universal. The one-sidedness of subjective mind consists in its similarly abstract self-determination in its inward individuality against the universal.<sup>1</sup> When these one-sidednesses are sublated, then subjective *freedom* becomes the rational will, *universal* in and for itself, which has its awareness of itself and the disposition in the consciousness of individual subjectivity, and at the same time has its operation and immediate universal *actuality* as *custom*,—self-conscious *freedom* become *nature*.<sup>2</sup>

### §514

The *substance* aware of itself as free, in which the absolute *ought* is *being* as well, has actuality as the spirit of a *people*.<sup>1</sup> The abstract diremption of this spirit is individualization *into persons*, of whose independence the spirit is the inner power and necessity.<sup>2</sup> But the person, as thinking intelligence, is aware of that substance as his own essence, ceases in this disposition to be an accident of substance; he views substance, his absolute final end in actuality, as something already achieved *in the here and now*, yet also *produces* this end by his *activity*, but produces it as something that simply *is*. Thus without reflective choice the person fulfils his duty as *his own* and as something that *is* and in this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom.<sup>3</sup>

### §515

Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and the universality of freedom, the *actuality* and *activity* of each *individual*, *in being for himself* and caring *for himself*, is conditioned by the presupposed whole in the context of which alone it occurs, but is also a transition into a universal product.<sup>1</sup>—The *disposition* of the individuals is *awareness* of the substance and of the identity of all their interests with the whole; and when the other individuals are actual and reciprocally aware of themselves only in this identity, this is *trust*,—the genuine, ethical disposition.<sup>2</sup>



## §516

The relations of the individual in the relationships to which the substance particularizes itself constitute his *ethical duties*. Ethical personality, i.e. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life, is *virtue*.<sup>1</sup> In relation to external immediacy, to a stroke of *fate*, virtue is an attitude to *being* as to something that is not negative, and is thereby calm repose within itself;—in relation to substantial objectivity, to the whole of ethical actuality, virtue, as trust, is deliberate work for this objectivity and the capacity of sacrificing itself for it;—in relation to the contingency of relationships with others, it is first justice and then an inclination of benevolence; in this sphere, and in its attitude to its own reality and bodiliness, the individuality expresses its particular character, temperament, etc. as *virtues*.<sup>2</sup>

## §517

The ethical substance is:

- (a) as immediate or *natural* spirit,—the *family*;
- (b) the relative totality of the relative relations of individuals as independent persons to one another in a formal universality,—*civil society*;<sup>1</sup>
- (c) the self-conscious substance, as the spirit developed to an organic actuality,—the *political constitution*.<sup>2</sup>

## (a) THE FAMILY

## §518

The ethical spirit, when in its *immediacy*, contains the *natural* moment that the individual has its substantial reality in its natural universality, the *genus*,—the sexual relationship, but elevated to a spiritual determination;—the unity of love and the disposition of intimate trust;—spirit as family is sensitive spirit.<sup>1</sup>

## §519

(1) The difference of the natural sexes also appears at the same time as a difference of intellectual and ethical determination.<sup>1</sup> These personalities combine, in accordance with their exclusive individuality, to form *one person*; subjective intimacy determines them to substantial unity, makes this union into an *ethical* relationship—*marriage*.<sup>2</sup> The substantial intimacy makes marriage into an undivided bond of persons—*monogamous* marriage; the physical union is a consequence of the ethically formed bond.<sup>3</sup> The further consequence is community of personal and particular interests.

## §520

(2) The *property* of the family as *one person* acquires, in virtue of the community in which the various individuals constituting the family all stand in relation to

this property, an *ethical* interest, as do also the income, the labour and provision for the future.<sup>1</sup>

### §521

The ethical requirements connected with the natural generation of children and initially posited as primary (§519) in the contracting of marriage, are realized in the second birth of the children, their spiritual birth,—in educating them to be independent persons.<sup>1</sup>

### §522

(3) In virtue of this independence, the children leave the concrete vitality of the family to which they originally belong, they have become *for themselves*, but destined to found another such actual family. Marriage succumbs to dissolution by the *natural* moment contained in it, the death of husband and wife; but the intimacy too, as the merely sensitive substantiality, is in itself subject to chance and transience. By this sort of contingency, the members of the family become persons in their relationship to each other; and in this way there enters for the first time into this bond something in itself foreign to it, *legal* regulations.<sup>1</sup>

## (b) CIVIL SOCIETY

### §523

The substance, as spirit, particularizes itself abstractly into many *persons* (the family is only a *single* person), into families or individuals, which, in independent freedom and as *particulars*, are for themselves. It thus initially loses its ethical determination, since these persons as such have in their consciousness and as their aim not the absolute unity, but their own particularity and their being-for-self,—the system of atomism. In this way the substance becomes only a universal mediating interconnection of independent extremes and their particular interests. The internally developed totality of this interconnection is the state as civil society or as *external state*.<sup>1</sup>

## (α) The System of Needs

### §524

(1) First of all, the particularity of persons comprises their needs. The possibility of satisfying these needs is here situated in the social system, the general *resources* from which all obtain their satisfaction. In the state of affairs in which this standpoint of mediation is realized, *immediate* seizure (§488) of external

objects as means to satisfaction no longer occurs, or very rarely; the objects are property. Their acquisition is, on the one hand, conditioned and mediated by the will of their possessors, which, as particular will, has as its aim the satisfaction of variously determined needs, just as, on the other hand, it is conditioned and mediated by the ever renewed production of exchangeable means by one's *own labour*; this mediation of satisfaction by the labour of all constitutes the general resources.<sup>1</sup>

### §525

(2) Universality shines into the particularity of needs initially in the following way: the intellect draws distinctions among needs and thereby multiplies indefinitely both the needs themselves and the means for these different needs, making the needs and the means ever more abstract; this individualization of the content by abstraction gives rise to *the division of labour*.<sup>1</sup> This habit of abstraction in enjoyment, information, knowledge, and behaviour constitutes *culture* in this sphere,—*formal culture* in general.<sup>2</sup>

### §526

Labour too thus becomes more abstract, and leads on the one hand by its uniformity to ease of labour and to increased production, on the other hand to restriction to *one* skill, and thus to a more unconditional dependence on the social system. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanical, and develops to the point where the machine can take the place of human labour.<sup>1</sup>

### §527

(3) But the concrete division of the general resources, which are also a universal business,<sup>1</sup> among the particular masses determined by the moments of the concept, each of which masses possesses its own basis of subsistence and, in connexion with that, corresponding modes of labour, of needs, and of means for satisfying them, moreover of aims and interests, as well as of spiritual culture and habit, gives rise to the *difference of estates*.<sup>2</sup>—Individuals allocate themselves to estates according to natural talent, according to skill, choice and chance. In belonging to such a determinate, stable sphere, they have their actual existence, which as existence is essentially a particular existence, and in this existence they have their *ethic of integrity*, their recognition and their *honour*.<sup>3</sup>

[Remark] Where there is civil society, and with it the state, there arise estates distinct from each other; for the universal substance, in its vitality, *exists* only so far as it organically *particularizes* itself; the history of constitutions is the history of the development of these estates, of the legal relationships of individuals to them, and of these estates to one another and to their centre.<sup>4</sup>

## §528

The *substantial, natural* estate has a natural and stable wealth in the fruitful *ground and soil*; its activity gets direction and content through determinations of nature, and its ethical life is grounded in faith and trust.<sup>1</sup> The *second, the reflected* estate has to rely on the wealth of society, on the element subject to mediation, representation, and an ensemble of contingencies; the individual has to rely on his subjective skill, talent, intellect, and diligence.<sup>2</sup> The *third, thinking* estate has for its business the universal interests; like the second it has a subsistence mediated by its own skill, and like the first a secure subsistence, but secured by the whole of society.<sup>3</sup>

## (β) Administration of Justice

## §529

When developed to the system mediated by natural need and free choice, to universal relationships of the system and to a process of external necessity, the principle of contingent particularity has within it initially *formal right*, as the determination, stable for itself, of freedom.<sup>1</sup> (1) The actualization appropriate to right in this sphere of intellectual consciousness is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal, that it be *known* and *posited* in its determinacy as what is valid;—the *law*.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] The *positive* aspect of laws concerns only their form, in general the fact that they are *in force* and *known*, which at the same time makes it possible for them to be known by *all* in an ordinary, external way. The content here may be rational in itself or perhaps irrational and so wrong.<sup>3</sup> But when right, in the process of determinate realization, is a developed right and its content analyses itself in order to gain determinacy, then this analysis, because of the finitude of the material, falls into the progression of bad infinity; the *final* determinacy, which is utterly essential and breaks off this progression of unreality, can in this sphere of the finite be attained only in a way involving contingency and discretion; whether three years, ten thalers, etc., or only  $2\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $2\frac{3}{4}$ ,  $2\frac{4}{5}$  years, and so on *ad infinitum*, be the right amount, can by no means be decided from the concept, and yet the higher demand is that it be decided. Hence on the side of external reality, positivity in the form of contingency and discretion automatically enter into right, but of course only when *determining* comes to an *end*. This happens and has always automatically happened in all legislations; all that is needed is to have a determinate consciousness of it, in contrast to the supposed goal and chatter: that law can and should be, at *every* point, determined by reason or legal intellect, by purely rational and intellectual grounds. To have such an expectation and to make such a demand of the sphere of the finite is the empty idea of *perfection*.<sup>4</sup>

There are people for whom *laws* are actually an evil and profanity, and who regard governing and being governed from natural love, hereditary divinity or

nobility, by faith and trust, as the genuine condition, while the reign of laws is a corrupt and unjust condition. They overlook the circumstance that the stars, etc., and cattle as well, are governed, and well governed too, by laws—laws, however, which are only internally in these objects, not *for them*, not laws that are *posited*, whereas what makes man man is *awareness* of his law, and he can therefore genuinely obey only such known law, just as his law can only be a just law, if it is a *known* law; otherwise it will inevitably be contingency and arbitrariness even in its essential content, or at least mixed and polluted with them.<sup>5</sup>

The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for the opposite of the above thesis, namely for the opinion that a legal code is impossible or impracticable. This introduces the additional absurdity of putting the essential and universal regulations in the same class as the particular detail. The finite material is determinable to bad infinity; but this advance is not, as it is represented in e.g. space, a generation of spatial determinations of the same quality as those preceding them, but an advance into greater and ever greater specificity by the acumen of the analysing intellect, inventing new distinctions, which make new decisions necessary. If the determinations of this sort may equally be called either *new* decisions or *new laws*, then the *interest* and *import* of these determinations decreases proportionately as this development proceeds. They fall *within* the substantial, universal laws already in place, as improvements to a floor, a door, etc., fall within the house and are indeed something *new*, but not a house. If the legislation of an uncultured age has begun with *individual* regulations and constantly increased their number in accordance with its nature, then there arises, with the advance in this multiplicity, the contrary need for a *simpler* legal code, i.e. the need to condense that mass of individual rules into their *universal* determinations; to know how to find and express such determinations befits the intellect and culture of a people. Such a gathering of individual rules into general forms, which in fact first deserve the name of laws, has recently been begun in some respects in England by the Minister *Peel*, who has thereby gained the gratitude, even the admiration, of his countrymen.<sup>6</sup>

### §530

(2) The positive form of laws, *being expressed* and *made known* as laws, is a condition of the *external obligation* to obey them, since, being laws of strict right, they concern only the abstract will, which is also in itself external, not the moral or ethical will.<sup>1</sup> The subjectivity to which the will has, in this respect, a right is here only knowledge of the law. This subjective reality, since it is the reality of what is in and for itself in this sphere, the reality of right, is at the same time an externally *objective* reality, as universal validity and necessity.<sup>2</sup>

The legality of property and of private actions concerning it obtains its *universal guarantee* through *formalities*, in accordance with the determination that legality is something posited, recognized, and thereby in force.<sup>3</sup>

## §531

(3) Legality acquires the *necessity*, to which the objective reality determines itself, in the *administration of justice*.<sup>1</sup> Right-in-itself has to present itself to the *court*, to the individualized right, as *proven*. Here a distinction can be drawn between right-in-itself and provable right. The court decides and acts in the interest of right as such, deprives the existence of right of its contingency, and in particular transforms this existence, when it takes the form of revenge, into *punishment*. (§500)<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] The comparison of the two types, or rather two moments, of the persuasion of judges about the facts of an action in relation to the accused, on the basis of the mere circumstances and testimony of others alone or on the basis of the further required addition of the defendant's confession, constitutes the main issue in the question of what are called *jury-courts*. It is an essential determination that the two components of a judicial decision, the judgement about *the facts* and the judgement as *application* of the law to them, are, since they are different aspects in themselves, exercised as *different functions*. By the institution mentioned they are assigned even to bodies differently qualified, from one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excluded. Taking this distinction of functions as far as this separation in the courts rests rather on considerations that are not essential; the main point remains only the separate performance of these intrinsically different functions.<sup>3</sup>—A more important issue is whether the accused's confession to the crime is to be made a condition of a penal sentence or not. The institution of the jury-court abstracts from this condition. The point is that certainty, especially in this area, is inseparable from *truth*; but confession is to be regarded as producing the highest degree of *assurance*, which by its nature is subjective. The final decision therefore lies in the confession. On this point therefore the accused has an absolute right to the conclusiveness of the proof and of the persuasion of the judges. This moment is incomplete, because it is only *one* moment; but if the other moment, proof from mere circumstances and testimony, is taken in the same abstract way, it is still more imperfect; and the jurors are essentially judges and deliver a judgement. In so far as they have to rely on such objective proofs, but at the same time incomplete certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only *in them*) is allowed, the jury-court involves the mixture and confusion (properly belonging to barbaric times) of objective proofs and subjective, so-called moral, certainty.<sup>4</sup>—To declare *extraordinary* punishments an absurdity is easy, or rather too shallow, in taking offence at a mere name. In substance, this determination involves the difference between objective proof with and objective proof without the moment of absolute assurance which lies in confession.<sup>5</sup>

## §532

The administration of justice has the determination of activating to necessity only the abstract side of the freedom of the person in civil society. But this activation rests initially on the particular subjectivity of the judge, since the unity, itself necessary, of this subjectivity with right-in-itself is not yet present here. Conversely, the blind necessity of the system of needs is not yet elevated into consciousness of the universal, and activated from such consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

(γ) *Police and Corporation*

## §533

The administration of justice automatically excludes that part of actions and interests belonging only to particularity, and leaves to contingency not only the occurrence of crimes but also regard for welfare.<sup>1</sup> In civil society the *aim* is the satisfaction of need, and to satisfy it, since it is in fact the satisfaction of the man as well, in a stable, universal way, i.e. the aim is to *secure* this satisfaction.<sup>2</sup> But the mechanism of the necessity of society involves, in a great variety of ways, the contingency of this satisfaction. This is due to the variability of the needs themselves, in which opinion and subjective preference play a great part. It also results from localities, the connections of a people with other peoples, from errors and deceptions which can be introduced into individual parts of the whole clockwork and are capable of throwing it into disorder—as also and in particular from the limited capacity of the individual to acquire for himself a share of those general resources. The operation of this necessity at the same time also sacrifices the particularities by which it is brought about; it does not, for itself, involve the affirmative *aim* of securing the satisfaction of *individuals*. With regard to them, it may be adequate or it may not, and here the individuals are, in their own eyes, the morally justified end.<sup>3</sup>

## §534

Consciousness of the essential aim, knowledge of the way in which the powers and variable ingredients composing this necessity operate, and maintaining that aim in those powers and against them, has, *on the one hand*, the relationship of an *external* universality towards the concreteness of civil society; as an active power, this order is the external state, which, in so far as it is rooted in the higher realm, the substantial state, appears as state *police*.<sup>1</sup> *On the other hand*, in this sphere of particularity the aim of *substantial* universality and its activation remains restricted to the business of particular branches and interests;—the *corporation*, in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the security of his resources, and equally emerges from his individual private interest and has a

conscious activity for a relatively universal end, just as in his legal and professional duties he has his ethical code.<sup>2</sup>

(c) THE STATE

§535

The state is the *self-conscious* ethical substance, —the unification of the principle of the family and the principle of civil society. The same unity, which in the family becomes the feeling of love, is the essence of the state, but this essence at the same time acquires the *form of conscious* universality from the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active willing. Conscious subjectivity has this universality, as well as the determinations of it which develop in knowledge, as its content and absolute aim, i.e. for itself it wills this rationality.<sup>1</sup>

§536

The state is α) initially its internal structure as self-relating development—*internal state-law or the constitution*;<sup>1</sup> it is β) a particular individual, and thus in relationship with other particular individuals—*external state-law*; <sup>2</sup> γ) but these particular spirits are only moments in the development of the universal Idea of spirit in its actuality: *world history*.<sup>3</sup>

(α) Constitutional Law

§537

The essence of the state is the universal in and for itself, the rationality of the will; but, as self-aware and self-activating, it is subjectivity pure and simple and, as actuality, it is *one* individual.<sup>1</sup> Its *work* generally—in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals—consists in a double function. *First* it maintains them as persons, thus making *right* a necessary actuality, then it promotes their well-being, which each initially takes care of for himself, but which has a thoroughly universal side; it protects the family and guides civil society.<sup>2</sup> *Secondly*, it brings back both of them, the family and civil society, and the whole disposition and activity of the individual—whose tendency is to become a centre for himself—into the life of the universal substance and, in this sense, as a free power it curtails those subordinate spheres and maintains them in substantial immanence.<sup>3</sup>

§538

*Laws* express the determinations of the content of objective freedom. First, for the immediate subject, for his independent wilfulness and particular interest, they are restrictions. But *secondly* they are an absolute *final end* and the universal *work*:



hence they are produced by the functions of the various *estates*, which distill themselves more and more out of the universal particularization, and by all the activity and private concerns of *individuals*. Thirdly, laws are the substance of individuals' *free* willing within their bounds and of their disposition and so are displayed as prevailing *custom*.<sup>1</sup>

### §539

As a living spirit pure and simple, the state can only be an organized whole, differentiated into particular agencies, which, proceeding from the *one* concept (though not known as concept) of the rational will, continually produce it as their result.<sup>1</sup> The *constitution* is this overall articulation of *state-power*. It involves the determinations of the way in which the rational will—in so far as in individuals it is only *in itself* the universal will—firstly, comes to consciousness and understanding of itself and is *found*, and is, secondly, posited in actuality, through the agency of the government and its particular branches, and maintained in actuality, and also protected against the contingent subjectivity both of these governmental departments and of individuals. The constitution is existent *justice*, as the actuality of *freedom* in the development of all its rational determinations.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] *Freedom* and *equality* are the simple categories in which what should constitute the fundamental determination and the final goal and result of the constitution is frequently summarized. However true this is, the defect of these determinations is first of all that they are entirely abstract: adhered to in this form of abstraction, they are what prevents the concrete, i.e. an articulation of the state, i.e. a *constitution* and a government, from arising at all, or else destroys them. With the state there enters inequality, the distinction between governing powers and the governed, officials, authorities, directories, etc. The consistent principle of equality rejects all distinctions, and thus allows no sort of political condition to subsist.—The determinations of freedom and equality are in fact the foundations of this sphere, but being the most abstract they are also the most superficial, and for that very reason they are apt to be the most familiar. It is of interest therefore to study them somewhat more closely.<sup>3</sup>

First regarding *equality*, the familiar proposition that *all men are by nature equal*, involves a misunderstanding: it confuses the natural with the concept. We must rather say that by *nature* men are only *unequal*. But the *concept* of freedom, as it initially exists as the concept, without further determination and development, is abstract subjectivity as a *person*, who is capable of property (§488). This single abstract determination of personality constitutes the actual *equality* of human beings. But that this freedom is present, that it is *man* (and not as in Greece, Rome, etc. only *some* men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person, is not by *nature* at all; it is only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle of mind, and of the universality and cultivation of this consciousness.<sup>4</sup>—That the citizens are *equal before the law* contains a great truth,

but a truth that, when expressed in this way, is a tautology; for what it expresses is only the *lawful* condition in general, that the laws rule. But, as regards the concrete, apart from their personality the citizens are equal before the law only in those respects in which they are in any case equal *outside the law*. Only the *equality* that is *otherwise* (in whatever way it may be) *contingently present*, equality in wealth, age, physical strength, talent, skill, etc., or even in crimes, can and should justify equal treatment of them before the law in the concrete—as regards taxation, military service, admission to the civil service, etc., punishment, etc. The laws themselves, except in so far as they concern that narrow sphere of personality, presuppose unequal conditions and determine the unequal legal responsibilities and duties resulting therefrom.<sup>5</sup>

As regards *freedom*, it is most immediately taken partly in a *negative* sense against the wilfulness of others and lawless treatment, partly in the *affirmative* sense of *subjective* freedom; but subjective freedom is given great scope both for one's own wilfulness and activity for one's particular ends, and as regards the claim to one's own insight and to active involvement and participation in public affairs.<sup>6</sup> Formerly the legally determined rights, private as well as public rights, of a nation, town, etc. were called its *freedoms*. In fact every genuine law is a freedom, for it involves a rational determination of objective mind, and so a content of freedom. By contrast, nothing has become more common than the idea that each of us must *restrict* our freedom in relation to the freedom of others, and the *state* is the condition in which this reciprocal restriction occurs, and the laws are the restrictions. In ideas of this sort freedom is conceived only as contingent preference and wilfulness.<sup>7</sup>—Thus it has also been said that modern peoples are capable only of *equality*, or more capable of equality than of *freedom*, and for no other reason than that, with an assumed definition of freedom (chiefly the participation of all in the affairs and actions of the state), it was impossible to find one's way in actuality—which is more rational and at the same time more powerful than abstract presuppositions.<sup>8</sup>—On the contrary, it has to be said that it is just the great development and cultivation of modern states that produces the supreme concrete *inequality* of individuals in actuality, whereas, through the deeper rationality of laws and reinforcement of the lawful condition, it brings about a freedom that is all the greater and more firmly entrenched, a freedom that it can allow and tolerate. Even the superficial distinction involved in the words freedom and equality points to the fact that freedom tends to inequality; but the usual concepts of freedom proceed in the reverse direction, back to equality. But the more we reinforce freedom, as security of property, as the possibility of developing and exercising, etc., one's talents and good qualities, the more it appears *to become a matter of course*; then the consciousness and estimation of freedom especially turns towards the *subjective* sense of freedom. This is the freedom of the activity that ventures in every direction and devotes itself at pleasure to particular and to universal spiritual interests, this is the independence of individual particularity, as well as the inward freedom in which the subject has principles, an

insight and conviction of its own, and thus gains moral independence. But firstly this very freedom involves for itself the supreme cultivation of the particularity of that in which men are unequal and make themselves still more unequal by this education; and, secondly, it only arises under conditions of objective freedom, and has grown, and could grow, to such a height only in modern states. If, with this cultivation of particularity, there is an interminable increase in the number of needs and the difficulty of satisfying them, in quibbling and smart alecks and their insatiable vanity, this belongs to emancipated particularity, which is left to get into all possible complications of its own making in its sphere and to deal with them in its own way. This sphere is of course also the field of restrictions, because freedom is caught up in naturalness, partiality and wilfulness, and thus has to restrict itself; it has to do this too, of course, in view of the naturalness, partiality and wilfulness of others, but it has to do so especially and essentially in view of rational freedom.<sup>9</sup>

But as regards *political* freedom, we take this in the sense of formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and active involvement even of those individuals who otherwise make their chief function the particular aims and dealings of civil society. It has become fairly common to call a constitution only the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individuals in universal affairs, and to regard a state in which this does not formally occur, as a state without a constitution. What we have to say about this meaning is initially just this: by constitution we must understand the determination of rights, i.e. of *freedoms* in general, and the organization of their actualization, and political freedom can in any case only constitute a part of the constitution. The following paragraphs will deal with the constitution.<sup>10</sup>

#### §540

The *guarantee* of a constitution, i.e. the necessity that the laws be rational and their actualization secured, lies in the spirit of the whole people, namely in the determinacy by which the people has the self-consciousness of its reason. (Religion is this consciousness in its absolute substantiality.) And then the guarantee lies at the same time in the *development* of that principle, in an *actual organization* conforming to this self-consciousness. The constitution presupposes this consciousness of the spirit, and conversely the spirit presupposes the constitution; for the actual spirit itself only has a determinate consciousness of its principles, in so far as they are present for it as existent.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] The question: 'To whom, to which authority and how organized, belongs the power *to make a constitution*?' is the same as the question: 'Who has to make the spirit of a people?' If one separates the idea of a constitution from the idea of the spirit, as if the spirit exists or has existed without possessing a constitution conformable to it, such an opinion demonstrates only the superficiality of the thought about the connection between the spirit,

its consciousness about itself and its actuality. What is thus called *making* a constitution, has, owing to this inseparability, never occurred in history, no more than the *making* of a code of laws. A constitution has *only developed* from the spirit identically with that spirit's own development, and has run through, together with the spirit, the conceptually necessary alterations and stages of formation. It is history and the indwelling spirit (and, in fact, history is only the history of *spirit*) by which constitutions have been and are made.<sup>2</sup>

### §541

The living totality, the preservation, i.e. the continual production of the state in general and of its constitution, is the *government*. The naturally necessary organization is the emergence of the *family* and of the *estates* of civil society. The government is the *universal* part of the constitution, i.e. the part that has the preservation of those parts as its intentional aim, but at the same time apprehends and activates the universal aims of the whole which stand above the determination of the family and of civil society. The organization of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers, according to the way in which their peculiar features are determined by the concept but in the subjectivity of the concept interpenetrate so as to form an *actual* unity.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] Since the immediate categories of the concept are those of *universality* and *individuality*, and their relationship is that of *subsumption* of individuality under universality, it has come about that in the state *legislative* and *executive* power have been differentiated, but in such a way that the legislative *exists for itself* as the absolutely supreme power, while the executive is divided again into *governmental* or administrative power and *judicial* power, according as the laws are applied to universal or private affairs. The *division* of these powers has been regarded as the essential relationship, in the sense of their *independence* of each other in existence, but with the above-mentioned connection of subsumption of the powers of the individual under the power of the universal.<sup>2</sup> In these determinations the elements of the concept are unmistakable, but they are combined by the intellect into a relationship of irrationality, instead of into the living spirit's joining-together-with-itself. That the functions of the universal interests of the state should be, in their necessary distinctness, also organized separately from each other—this division is the one absolute moment of the depth and actuality of freedom; for freedom only has depth when it is developed into its differences and has attained to the existence of these differences. But to make the business of legislation an independent power (and especially with the idea that a constitution and the fundamental laws first have to be made at some time—in an environment, which includes an already existing development of differences), and in fact the *first* power, with the specific determination of the participation of everyone in it, and to make the governmental power a power dependent on it and only executive,—this presupposes that the knowledge is lacking that the

true Idea and so the living and spiritual actuality is the concept that joins together with itself and thus the *subjectivity* that contains universality in it as only one of its moments. Individuality is the first and the supreme *pervasive determination* in the organization of the state. Only through the governmental power, and by its comprehending in itself the particular functions (including too the legislative function, which is itself particular, *abstract for itself*), is the state *one*.—Here, as everywhere else, the rational relationship of the logical is essential and exclusively true, in contrast to the external relationship of the intellect, which never gets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. What disorganizes the unity of the logical-rational, equally disorganizes actuality.<sup>3</sup>

### §542

In the government as an organic totality there is (1) *subjectivity* as the *infinite* unity of the concept *with itself* in its development; the all-sustaining, all-resolving will of the state, the highest pinnacle of the state and its all-pervasive unity—the *princely* governmental power. In the perfect form of the state, in which all moments of the concept have reached their free existence, this subjectivity is not a so-called *moral person*, or resolutions *issuing from a majority* (forms in which the unity of the resolving will has no *actual* existence) but, as actual individuality, the will of *one* resolving individual,—*monarchy*. The monarchical constitution is therefore the constitution of *developed* reason: all other constitutions belong to lower stages of the development and realization of reason.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] The unification of all concrete state-powers in *one* existence, as in the patriarchal system or as in a democratic constitution, in the participation of all in all affairs, conflicts for itself with the principle of the *division* of powers, i.e. the developed freedom of the moments of the Idea. But equally the division, the elaboration of the moments advanced to a free totality, must be restored to *ideal unity*, i.e. to *subjectivity*. The cultivated differentiation, the realization, of the Idea essentially involves the growth of this subjectivity, as a *real* moment, to *actual* existence; and this *actuality* can only be the individuality of the monarch—the subjectivity of abstract, final decision present in *one* person. All those forms of *collective* resolving and willing, supposedly to emerge from the atomism of individual wills by counting them up in a democratic or aristocratic way, have the unreality of an *abstraction* clinging to them. Only two determinations matter, the necessity of *a moment of the concept* and the form of its *actuality*. Only the nature of the speculative concept can genuinely settle this question.—This subjectivity, since it is the moment of abstract decision in general, proceeds firstly to the determination that the name of the monarch appears as the external bond and sanction under which anything whatsoever is done in the government, and secondly that, as simple relation to itself, it has within it the determination of

*immediacy*, and thus of *nature*, and with this the determination of individuals for the dignity of the princely power is established by *heredity*.<sup>2</sup>

### §543

(2) In the *particular* governmental power there emerges, first, the *division* of state business into its previously determined branches, the legislative power, the administration of justice or judicial power, the administration and police power, etc., and also the *distribution* of these powers to particular authorities, which, being dependent on the laws for their functions, on this score and for this reason, possess independence of action, while at the same time they stand under higher supervision.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, there arises the participation of *several* in state business, who together constitute the universal estate (§528) in so far as they make the management of universal ends the essential determination of their particular life; the ulterior condition for being able to participate individually in this management is training and aptitude for it.<sup>2</sup>

### §544

The council of the *estates* is concerned with the participation, of everyone who belongs to civil society in general and is in this respect a private person, in the governmental power, and in fact in legislation, namely in the *universality* of those interests which do not (like peace and war) involve the emergence and action of the state as an individual, and therefore do not belong exclusively to the nature of the princely power for itself. By virtue of this participation, subjective freedom and fancy and their universal opinion show themselves in an existent effectiveness and enjoy the satisfaction of counting for something.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] The division of constitutions into *democracy*, *aristocracy* and *monarchy* is still the most determinate statement of their difference in relation to state power. They must at the same time be regarded as necessary formations in the course of development, and thus in the history, of the state. Hence it is superficial and foolish to represent them as an object of *choice*. The pure forms of their necessity are, in so far as they are finite and temporary, connected both with forms of their degeneration, ochlocracy, etc., and with earlier transitional forms. The latter two forms are not to be confused with the genuine formations. Thus, it may be that, because of the similarity that the will of *one* individual stands at the summit of the state, oriental despotism is comprised under the vague name of monarchy,—as also feudal monarchy, to which even the favoured name of constitutional monarchy cannot be denied. The true difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the content of the *prevailing principles of right* which have their actuality and guarantee in the state-power. These principles are those developed in earlier spheres, the principles of freedom of property and also of personal freedom, the principles of civil society, of its industry and of

the communities, and of the regulated performance of the particular authorities subject to the laws.<sup>2</sup>

The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to conceive the participation of *private persons* in state affairs. For the members of the estate-assemblies are initially to be taken as *private persons*, whether they are treated as individuals for themselves or as representatives of a *large group* or of the *people*. The aggregate of private persons is often called the *people*; but as such an aggregate it is *vulgus*, not *populus*; and in this regard it is the sole aim of the state that a people should *not* come to existence, to power and action, *as such an aggregate*. Such a condition of a people is the condition of lawlessness, ethical impoverishment, of general irrationality: in this condition the people would be only a shapeless, wild, blind force, like that of the stormy, elemental sea, which does not, however, destroy itself, as the people—a spiritual element—would do. We have often heard such a condition represented as that of true freedom. If there is to be any sense in engaging in the question of the participation of private persons in public affairs, we must presuppose not the irrational mass, but an already organized people, i.e. a people in which a governmental power is present.<sup>3</sup>—But the advantage of such participation is not to be located in the superiority of particular insight in general that private persons are supposed to possess over state officials—the contrary is necessarily the case—nor in the superiority of good will for the universal benefit: the members of civil society are rather the sort of people who make their particular interest and, especially in feudal society, the interest of their privileged corporation their immediate determination. Take the case of *England* which, because private persons have a predominant participation in state affairs, has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. Experience shows that this country—as compared with the other culturally advanced states of Europe—is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation, in the right and the freedom of property, in arrangements for art and science, etc., and that objective freedom, i.e. rational right, is rather *sacrificed* to formal right and to particular private interest, and this happens even in the institutions and possessions supposedly dedicated to religion.<sup>4</sup>—The advantage of a share for private persons in public affairs is to be located partly in their more concrete, and therefore more urgent, sense of universal needs, but essentially in the right of the communal spirit to make its appearance as an *externally universal* will in an orderly and express activity for public concerns. This satisfaction breathes new life into the communal spirit, and at the same time fresh life flows into the administrative authorities, who thus have it kept present in their consciousness that they not only have to exact duties but just as essentially to pay regard to rights. Private citizens are in the state the incomparably greater number; in fact they are a collection of people who are recognized as persons. Therefore volitional reason displays its existence in them as a multitude of free individuals, or in a universality of reflexion, whose actuality is assured by a share in the state power. But it has already been noted as a moment of civil society (§§527, 534) that the individuals ascend from external

universality to substantial universality, namely as a *particular* kind—the *estates*; and it is not in the inorganic form of individuals as such (in the *democratic* mode of election), but as organic moments, as estates, that they take up that share; a power or activity in the state must never appear and act in a formless, inorganic shape, i.e. on the principle of plurality and number.<sup>5</sup>

Assemblies of estates have been designated as the *legislative power*. This is already mistaken, in this respect: they constitute only one branch of this power, a branch in which the particular government authorities have an essential share, while the princely power has the absolute share of final decision. Anyway, in a culturally advanced state, moreover, legislation can only be a refinement of the laws in force, and so-called new laws can only be extremes of detail and particularities (cf. §529 Remark), the content of which has been already prepared by the practice of the law-courts or even provisionally decided. The so-called *finance law*, in so far as it comes up for the co-determination of the estates, is essentially a *government matter*; it is only improperly called a *law*, in the general sense of comprising a wide, indeed the whole, range of the external means of government. Although the finances concern the aggregate of needs, the needs themselves are by their nature only *particular*, variable needs, ever recurring anew. If the main component of the requirement were regarded as continuing—as it very likely is—the determination of it would have more the nature of a law; but to be a law it would have to be made once and for all, and not made annually, or every few years, from scratch. The portion which varies according to time and circumstances concerns in fact the smaller part of the amount, and the determination of it has proportionately less of the character of a law; and yet it is, and can be, only this slight variable part which is controversial, and can be subject to a variable yearly determination, a determination that thus falsely bears the high-sounding name of the *grant* of the *budget*, i.e. of the *whole* of the finances. The inadequacy of a law to be made each year and for one year is clear even to plain common sense, which distinguishes the universal in and for itself, as content of a genuine law, from a universality of reflexion, which embraces only externally what is by its nature manifold. The name of a *law* for the annual fixing of financial requirements only serves, in the case of the presupposed separation of legislative from governmental power, to sustain the illusion that this separation actually obtains, and to conceal the fact that the legislative power, when it decides about finances, is in fact dealing with what is strictly government business.<sup>6</sup>—But the importance attached to the power of granting the budget again and again anew, namely that the assembly of estates possesses in it a *means of coercion* against the government, and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence—this importance is on the one hand a superficial semblance, in that the financial arrangement necessary for the state's *survival* cannot be made to depend on any other circumstances, nor can the state's survival be put in doubt every year; no more than the government could, e.g., grant and arrange the organization of the administration of justice always for



a limited time only, in order to reserve for itself, in the threat of suspending the activity of this institution and in the fear of the emergence of a state of brigandage, a means of coercing private individuals. But on the other hand ideas of a relationship, in which it could be useful and indispensable to have in one's hands a means of coercion, are partly based on the false idea of a contractual relationship between government and people, and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in spirit between the two as would put constitution and government quite out of the question. If we envisage the emergence into existence of the empty possibility of getting any *relief* by such means of coercion, such relief would rather be the disruption and dissolution of the state: there would no longer be any government, only parties, and the only remedy for it would be the domination and suppression of one party by the other. To represent organization of the state as a mere intellectual constitution, i.e. as the mechanism of a balance of powers external to each other in their interior, goes against the fundamental Idea of what a state is.<sup>7</sup>

#### §545

The final aspect of the state is that it is the immediate actuality of an *individual* and *naturally* determined people.<sup>1</sup> As a single individual the state is *exclusive* against *other* such individuals. In their *relationship* to each other, wilfulness and contingency obtain, because, owing to the autonomous totality of these persons, between them the *universal* of right only *ought* to be, it is not *actual*. This independence makes dispute between them a relationship of violence, a *state of war*, for which the universal estate in the community determines itself to the particular end of maintaining the state's independence against other states, determines itself to the *estate of valour*.<sup>2</sup>

#### §546

Warfare shows the substance of the state in its individuality proceeding to abstract negativity, as the power in which the particular independence of individuals and their condition of absorption in the external reality of possession and in natural life feels itself as a *nullity*, as the power which mediates the maintenance of the universal substance by the sacrifice, taking place in their hearts, of this natural and particular reality, by vanquishing the vanity confronting it.<sup>1</sup>

### (β) *External Public Law*

#### §547

By warfare the independence of states is put at risk, and in one respect the mutual recognition of free national individualities is brought about (§430), and by

*peace-settlements*, supposed to last forever, both this universal recognition and the particular entitlements of peoples with regard to each other, are established.<sup>1</sup> *External public law* is based partly on these positive treaties, but to that extent it contains only rights that lack genuine actuality (§545); and it is based partly on so-called *international law*, the universal principle of which is the presupposed *recognition* of states and therefore restricts their otherwise unrestrained actions against one another in such a way that the possibility of peace remains. It also distinguishes between the state and individuals as private persons, and in general it is based on *customs*.<sup>2</sup>

### (γ) World History

#### §548

The determinate spirit of a people, since it is actual and its freedom is as nature, has on this natural side the moment of geographical and climatic determinacy; it is in *time* and, as regards content, essentially has a *particular* principle and has to go through a development, determined by this principle, of its consciousness and its actuality; it has a *history* within itself.<sup>1</sup> As a limited spirit its independence is a subordinate matter; the spirit passes over into *universal world-history*, the events of which display the dialectic of the particular national spirits, the *judgement of the world*.<sup>2</sup>

#### §549

This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance, the deed by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in the world, by which the spirit that is at first only *in itself* makes its way to consciousness and self-consciousness and thus to the revelation and actuality of its essence, the essence that is in and for itself, and also sees itself become the externally *universal* spirit, the *world-spirit*.<sup>1</sup> As this development is in time and in reality and thus takes the form of history, its individual moments and stages are the national spirits; each spirit, being individual and natural in a qualitative determinacy, is destined to occupy only *one stage*, and accomplish only *one* task in the whole deed.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] That the presupposition is made, in the case of history, of an *aim* that is in and for itself, and of the determinations that develop from that aim according to the concept, is called an *a priori* view of history, and philosophy has been reproached with writing history *a priori*. On this point, and on history-writing in general, we need to go into further detail. That a final aim lies in and for itself at the basis of history, and essentially of world-history, that the aim has actually been and is being realized in it—the plan of providence—, that in general *reason* is in history, must for itself be settled philosophically, and thus as necessary in and for itself.<sup>3</sup> What deserves censure can only be the presupposition of arbitrary representations or thoughts and wanting to find and represent events and deeds

in conformity with them. But nowadays the people who have incurred particular responsibility for this sort of *a priori* procedure are those who profess to want to be pure historians, and who at the same time occasionally declare their opposition expressly to philosophizing, both in general and in history. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour, because it is an enemy of wilfulness and of bright ideas. Such *a priori* history-writing has sometimes sprung up in quarters where one would have least expected it, especially among classical scholars, and in Germany more than in France and England, where historical writing has purified itself to a firmer and maturer character. The construction of fictions, such as that of a primordial condition and its primordial people, which was in possession of the genuine knowledge of God and all sciences,<sup>4</sup> the fiction of sacerdotal peoples,<sup>5</sup> and, more specifically, e.g. the fiction of a Roman epic, which was the source of the supposedly historical reports about the early history of Rome, etc.,<sup>6</sup> has taken the place of the pragmatizing discoveries of psychological motives and connections;<sup>7</sup> and in a wide circle it seems to be considered the prerequisite of *learned* and *ingenious* historical writing, drawing from the sources, to concoct such shallow ideas, and to combine them audaciously from a learned rubbish-dump of remote, superficial circumstances, in defiance of the best-corroborated history.

If we leave this subjective treatment of history aside, then the strictly opposite requirement, that history should not be considered in the light of an *objective aim*, is on the whole equivalent to the seemingly even more justifiable requirement that the historian proceed with *impartiality*. This requirement tends to be made in particular of the *history of philosophy*, which is supposed to show no preference for an idea and opinion, just as a judge should regard both of the contending parties with equal disinterest. In the case of the judge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office foolishly and badly, if he did not have an interest, in fact an exclusive interest in justice, if he did not have that for his aim and his sole aim, and if he abstained from judgement. We can call this requirement on the judge *partiality* for justice, and we know very well here how to distinguish this from a *subjective* partiality.<sup>8</sup> But in the case of the impartiality required of the historian, this distinction disappears in the insipid, self-satisfied chatter and both kinds of interest are rejected, if we require that the historian should bring along no determinate aim and view by which to select, arrange and assess events, but narrate them just in the contingent way in which he finds them, in their unrelated and thoughtless particularity. This much is admitted, that a history must have an *object*, e.g. Rome, its fortunes, or the decline of the grandeur of the Roman empire. Little reflection is needed to see that this is the presupposed aim which lies at the basis both of the events themselves and of the assessment of them to decide which of these events have importance, i.e. a closer or more remote relation to the aim. A history without such an aim and without such an assessment would be only an idiotic effusion of the imagination, not even a fairy tale, for even children expect some interest in their stories, i.e.

at least a hint of an aim and the relation of events and actions to it.<sup>9</sup> In the life of a *people* the substantial aim is to be a state and to maintain itself as a state. A people without state-formation (a *nation* as such) has, strictly speaking, no history, as the peoples existed before their formation of states and others still exist now as savage nations.<sup>10</sup> What happens to a people, and takes place within it, has its essential meaning in relation to the state; the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distance from this object, an object belonging to history. It is true that the universal spirit of an age in general leaves its imprint in the character of the distinguished individuals of a period, and even their particularities are the remoter and duller media in which the spirit still plays in fainter colours. Often, even individual details of a minor occurrence, of a word, express not a subjective particularity, but an age, a people, a culture, in striking vividness and brevity; and to select such details is the task only of a historian of genius. Nevertheless, the mass of other individual details is a superfluous mass, by the faithful accumulation of which the objects worthy of history are overwhelmed and obscured. The essential characterization of the spirit and its age is always contained in the great events. It was an unerring sense that led to the banishment of such portrayals of the particular, and the gleaning of its traits, into the *novel* (such as the celebrated novels of Walter Scott and the like); we must regard it as good taste to combine the portrayal of the inessential, particular side of life with an inessential material, such as the novel takes from private events and subjective passions. But to weave the individual trivia of the age and the persons into the representation of universal interests, in the interest of so-called *truth*, is not only against judgement and taste, but against the concept of *objective truth*. It is involved in the sense of objective truth that what is true for mind is only the substantial, not the triviality of external existences and contingencies, and that it is completely indifferent whether such trifles are formally corroborated, or are, as in the novel, characteristic inventions, ascribed to this or that name and circumstances.<sup>11</sup>—The interest of *Biography*—to say a word on that here—seems directly opposed to a universal aim. But biography too has as its background the historical world, in which the individual is involved; even a subjective idiosyncrasy, a flash of humour, etc. alludes to that substance and thereby increases its interest; but mere sentimentality has another habitat and interest than history.

The requirement of *impartiality* addressed to the *history of philosophy* (and also addressed to the history of *religion*, both in general and also to church history) generally implies an even more explicit exclusion of the presupposition of an objective aim.<sup>12</sup> Just now we designated the state as the point to which in political history judgement has to relate events; so here the *truth* should be the object to which the individual deeds and events of the spirit are to be related.<sup>13</sup> But people make the contrary presupposition, that the history of philosophy and of religion are supposed to have as their content only subjective aims, i.e. only opinions and representations, not the object that is in and for itself, not truth, and this for the simple reason that there is no truth. On this assumption the interest in truth too

appears only as a partiality in the usual sense, a partiality for opinions and representations, which are all of equal insubstantiality and all treated as indifferent. In this way historical truth itself has the sense only of *correctness*, an accurate report of externals, with no judgement except about this correctness itself, so that only qualitative and quantitative judgements are allowed, not judgements of necessity and of the concept (cf. Remarks to §§172 and 178).<sup>14</sup> But in fact, if in political history Rome or the German empire, etc. is an actual and genuine object and the aim to which phenomena are to be related and by which they are to be assessed, then it is even more the case that in universal history the universal spirit itself, the consciousness of it and of its essence, is a genuine and actual object, content, and an aim which all other phenomena serve in and for themselves, so that only through their relationship to it, i.e. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it and it inheres in them, do they have their value and even their existence.<sup>15</sup> That in the course of the spirit (and the spirit is a spirit that does not just hover *over* history as over the waters, but weaves in it and is the sole moving force) freedom, i.e. the development determined by the concept of spirit, is the determinant and only its own concept is the spirit's final aim, i.e. truth, since the spirit is consciousness, or in other words that *reason* is in history, will at least be a plausible belief, but it is also a cognitive insight of philosophy.<sup>16</sup>

### §550

This liberation of spirit, in which it proceeds to come to itself and to actualize its truth, and the task of this liberation, is the supreme and absolute *right*.<sup>1</sup> The self-consciousness of a particular people is the bearer of the current stage of development of the universal spirit in its embodiment and is the objective actuality in which the spirit sets its will. The will of the other particular national spirits has no rights against this absolute will, this people is the world-dominating people; but equally the universal spirit strides beyond its current property, as a particular stage, and then delivers it over to its chance and judgement.<sup>2</sup>

### §551

While this task of actuality appears as an action, and therefore as the work, of *individuals*, these individuals, as regards the substantial content of their labour, are *instruments*, and their subjectivity, which is what is peculiar to them, is the empty form of the activity. What they have gained for themselves therefore through the individual share they have taken in the substantial task, a task prepared and determined independently of them, is a formal universality of subjective representation—the *fame*, which is their reward.<sup>1</sup>

### §552

The spirit of a people involves the necessity of nature, and stands in external reality (§483); the ethical substance is infinite within itself, but for itself a particular

and limited substance (§§549 and 550) and its subjective side is encumbered with contingency, unconscious custom, and consciousness of its content as a temporal asset, standing in relationship to an external nature and world. But it is the spirit *thinking* within the ethical substance that sublates within itself the finitude that it has in virtue of being a national spirit, in its state and the state's temporal interests, in the system of laws and customs. This thinking spirit ascends to awareness of itself in its essentiality, an awareness, however, which itself has the immanent limitation of the national spirit. But the thinking spirit of world history, when it sheds these limitations of the particular national spirits as well as its own worldliness, grasps its concrete universality and ascends to *awareness of the absolute spirit*, as the eternally actual truth in which rational awareness is free for itself, and necessity, nature and history are only servants of its revelation and vessels of its honour.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] We spoke of the formal aspect of mind's elevation to God in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. particularly §51 Remark).—As regards the starting points of this elevation, *Kant* has on the whole adopted the most correct starting point, in so far as he regards belief in God as emerging from *practical reason*. For a starting point implicitly contains the *content* or material which makes up the content of the concept of God. But the genuine concrete material is neither *being* (as in the cosmological proof) nor merely *purposive activity* (as in the physico-theological proof) but the *mind*, whose absolute determination is efficacious reason, i.e. the self-determining and self-realizing concept itself—freedom.<sup>2</sup> That the elevation of subjective mind to God occurring in this determination is in *Kant's* exposition again reduced to a *postulate*, to a mere *ought*, is the perversity discussed earlier, the immediate restoration of finitude's opposition, in whose sublation to truth this elevation itself consists, as true and valid.<sup>3</sup>

As regards the *mediation* in which the elevation to God consists, we have shown earlier (§192; cf. §204 Remark) that the moment of *negation* deserves special attention, since it is through negation that the essential content of the starting point is purged of its finitude and in this way emerges freely. This moment was abstract in its logical form, but it has now acquired its most concrete meaning. The finite, from which we here set out, is the real ethical self-consciousness; the *negation* through which this self-consciousness raises its spirit to its truth, is the purification, *actually* accomplished in the ethical world, of its knowledge from subjective opinion, and the liberation of its will from the selfishness of desire. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity emerge only from ethical life and they are the ethical life at *thought*, i.e. becoming conscious of the free universality of its concrete essence. Only from ethical life and by ethical life is the Idea of God known as free spirit; it is therefore futile to look for genuine religion and religiosity outside the ethical spirit.<sup>4</sup>

But as happens everywhere in the speculative, this emergence itself at the same time acquires the meaning that what is initially set up as consequent and

emergent is rather the absolute antecedent of that by which it is, on its appearance, mediated, and here, in the realm of mind, it is also known as the truth of its mediator.<sup>5</sup>

Here then is the place to go more deeply into the *relationship between the state and religion*, and in doing so to elucidate the categories that are customary on the topic. The immediate consequence of the foregoing is that ethical life is the state drawn back into its substantial interior, while the state is the development and actualization of ethical life, but that the substantiality of ethical life itself and of the state is religion. According to this relationship, the state rests on the ethical disposition, and this rests on the religious disposition. Since religion is the consciousness of *absolute truth*, whatever is supposed to count as right and justice, as duty and law, i.e. as *true* in the world of the free will, can only count in so far as it has a *share* in that truth, is *subsumed* under that truth and follows *from it*. But if genuine ethics is to be a consequence of religion, then this requires that religion have the genuine *content*, i.e. that the Idea of *God* known in it be the genuine one. Ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelling in self-consciousness, in the actual presence of self-consciousness as a people and the individual members of that people; this self-consciousness retreating into itself out of its empirical actuality and bringing its truth to consciousness, has in its *faith* and in its *conscience* only what it has in the *certainty* of itself, in its spiritual actuality. The two are inseparable; there cannot be two sorts of conscience, a religious conscience and an ethical conscience, differing from it in substance and content. But in respect of form, i.e. for thinking and knowing (and religion and ethical life belong to intelligence and are a type of thinking and knowing), the religious content, as the pure truth that is in and for itself and thus supreme, wields a sanction over the ethical life standing in empirical actuality; thus for self-consciousness religion is the basis of ethical life and of the state. It has been the massive error of our times to want to regard these inseparables as separable from one another, in fact even as mutually indifferent. The view taken of the relationship of religion and the state has been that the state already exists for itself in some other way and from some force and power, while religion is the subjective affair of individuals and had to be added, perhaps as something desirable only for strengthening the state, or is even a matter of indifference, since the ethical life of the state, i.e. rational law and constitution, stands firm for itself on its own ground.<sup>6</sup> As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated, it is of interest to note the separation that appears on the side of religion. It initially concerns the *form*, i.e. the relationship of self-consciousness to the content of truth. Since this content is the substance, the indwelling spirit, of self-consciousness in its actuality, self-consciousness has in this content the certainty of itself and is free in the content. But there can emerge, in respect to form, the relationship of unfreedom, even though the *implicit* content of religion is absolute spirit. This great difference (to cite something more determinate) is found within the Christian religion itself, in which it is not the natural element that makes the content of God, nor does anything of the sort

even enter as a moment into the substance of God; no, the content is God who is known in the *spirit* and in the *truth*. And yet in the catholic religion this spirit is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. First of all, in the host God is presented to religious worship as an *external thing*. (In the Lutheran church, by contrast, only and solely in the *enjoyment*, i.e. in the annihilation of the externality of the host, and in the *faith*, i.e. in the spirit that is at the same time free and self-certain, only then is the host first consecrated and exalted to God in his presence.) From that first and supreme relationship of externality flow all the other external, hence unfree, unspiritual and superstitious relationships; especially a *laity*, which receives *knowledge* of divine truth, as well as the direction of *will* and *conscience*, from outside and from another class, a class that itself does not gain possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only, but essentially needs an external consecration for it. And there is more: the style of praying, firstly just moving the lips by themselves, then spiritless in that the subject foregoes the direct approach to God and asks others to pray for him; addressing devotion to miracle-working images, even to bones, and expecting miracles from them; in general, *justification* by external works, a merit which is supposed to be gained by actions, even supposed transferable to others, etc.—all this binds the spirit under a *self-externality*, by which the concept of spirit is misconceived and perverted in its innermost core, and right and justice, ethics and conscience, responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.<sup>7</sup>

Corresponding to such a principle and to this development of spiritual unfreedom in the religious sphere there can only be a legislation and constitution of legal and ethical unfreedom, and a condition of lawlessness and ethical depravity in the actual state. Consistently with this, the Catholic religion has been loudly praised and is still often praised as the only religion which secures the stability of governments,—the sort of governments in fact that are connected with institutions based on the unfreedom of the spirit, the spirit that is supposed to be legally and ethically free, based, that is, on institutions of injustice and on a condition of ethical corruption and barbarism. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power, a power that does not rise in hostility against them only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk under the servitude of injustice and immorality. But in the mind there is still another power available; against this self-externality and disintegration consciousness gathers into its inner free actuality; *worldly wisdom* awakens in the mind of governments and peoples, i.e. wisdom in what in actuality is right and rational in and for itself. The production of thinking and more specifically philosophy has rightly been called *worldly wisdom*, for thinking presents the truth of the mind, introduces the mind into the world, and thus liberates the mind in its actuality and in its own self.<sup>8</sup>

The content thereby assumes an entirely different shape. The unfreedom of the *form*, i.e. of awareness and subjectivity, has the consequence, for the ethical content, that self-consciousness is represented as not immanent in the content, that



the content is represented as remote from self-consciousness, so that the content is supposed to be genuine only as negative towards its actuality. In this untruth the ethical content is called a *holy* thing. But the divine spirit's self-introduction into actuality, the liberation of actuality to spirit, means that what in the world is supposed to be *holiness* is displaced by *ethical life*. Instead of the vow of chastity, only now does *marriage* rank as the ethical, and, therefore, the *family* as the highest condition in this aspect of humanity. Instead of the vow of poverty (corresponding to which, embroiled in contradiction, is the merit of giving away one's goods to the poor, i.e. enriching them) what counts is the *activity* of acquisition by one's own intellect and industry, and *honesty* in this traffic and use of wealth, ethical life in civil society. Instead of the vow of obedience, what matters is *obedience* to the *law* and the legal arrangements of the state—an obedience that is itself genuine freedom, because the state is one's own reason, self-actualizing reason: *ethical life* in the *state*. Only so can right and morality then obtain.<sup>9</sup> It is not enough for religion to command: *Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's*. For the question is precisely to determine what is Caesar's, i.e. what belongs to the worldly authority; and we know well enough everything the worldly authority has wilfully arrogated to itself, just as for its part the spiritual authority has done. The divine spirit must penetrate the worldly sphere immanently, then wisdom is concrete within it, and the justification of worldliness is determined in its own self. But this concrete indwelling is the aforesaid structures of ethical life, the ethic of marriage as against the sanctity of the celibate estate, the ethical activity of wealth and acquisition against the sanctity of poverty and its idleness, the ethic of obedience dedicated to the right of the state as against the sanctity of undutiful and lawless obedience, of the servitude of conscience. With the need for right and ethical life and insight into the free nature of mind, the dispute sets in between them and the religion of unfreedom. It would be no use for the laws and the political order to be transformed into a rational organization of right, if in religion the principle of unfreedom is not given up. The two are incompatible with each other; it is a foolish idea to want to assign separate spheres to them, under the impression that their diversity will keep the peace between them and not flare up into contradiction and conflict. Principles of lawful freedom can only be abstract and superficial, and political institutions derived from them must be for themselves untenable, if the wisdom of those principles misunderstands religion so grossly that it is unaware that the principles of the reason of actuality have their ultimate and supreme verification in the religious conscience, in subsumption under the consciousness of absolute truth. Suppose that, no matter how, a legislation had arisen, so to speak *a priori*, which had the principles of reason as its foundation, but in contradiction with the national religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. Then the operation of the legislation lies in the hands of *individuals*, both in the government as such and at all levels and branches of the administration; it is just an abstract, empty idea,

to delude ourselves with the possibility that the individuals will act only according to the sense or letter of the legislation, and not in the spirit of their religion, where their inmost conscience and supreme obligation lies. In this contrast with what religion pronounces holy, the laws appear as a human artefact; they could, even if they were backed by sanctions and externally introduced, offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and assaults on them of the religious spirit. Such laws, even if they have the genuine content, founder on the conscience, whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and does not sanction them. It is to be considered just a folly of modern times to alter a system of corrupt ethical life, its political constitution and legislation without changing the religion, to have made a revolution without a reformation, to suppose that with the old religion and its sanctities a political constitution opposed to it can have internal peace and harmony, and that stability can be procured for the laws by external guarantees, e.g. so-called chambers, and the power given them to determine the budget (cf. §544 Remark) and the like. To want to separate the rights and laws from religion, when we are powerless to descend into the depths of the religious spirit and to elevate that very spirit to its truth, is to be regarded as no more than a stopgap. Those guarantees are but rotten supports against the *conscience* of the subjects who are supposed to apply the laws—and that includes the guarantees themselves; in fact it is the most profane, the supreme contradiction to want to bind and subject the religious conscience to a worldly legislation that it regards as a profanity.<sup>10</sup>

To take a specific case, the recognition had dawned on *Plato* of the gulf that had opened up in his day between, on the one hand, the established religion and the political constitution and, on the other hand, the deeper requirements made on religion and the political order by a freedom that was now becoming conscious of its inwardness. *Plato* conceives the thought that a genuine constitution and political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea, on the principles, universal and genuine in and for themselves, of eternal justice. To know and recognize these principles is certainly the determination and task of *philosophy*. It is from this point of view that *Plato* sallies forth into the famous or infamous passage where he has *Socrates* declare so very emphatically that *philosophy* and *political power* must coincide, that the Idea must be the sovereign, if the distress of peoples is to come to an end. Here *Plato* had the determinate conception that the Idea, which *in itself* is certainly the free self-determining thought, can come to consciousness only in the form of thought; as a content that, in order to be true, must be drawn out into universality and brought to consciousness in its most abstract form.<sup>11</sup>

In order to compare the Platonic standpoint in complete determinacy with the point of view from which the state is here considered in relation to religion, we need to be reminded of the conceptual differences on which everything essentially depends here. The first consists in the fact that in natural things their substance, the *genus*, is different from their existence, in which the substance is

as *subject*; but in addition this subjective existence of the genus is distinct from the existence that the genus or in general the universal gets, accentuated *as such* for itself, in the *representer*, the thinker. This further individuality, the habitat of the *free* existence of universal substance, is the *self* of the thinking mind. The content of natural things does not acquire the form of universality and essentiality through itself, and their individuality is not itself the *form*; only subjective thinking is the form for itself and in philosophy gives that universal content an existence for itself.<sup>12</sup> The *human content* by contrast is the free mind itself, and it comes to existence in mind's self-consciousness. This absolute content, the intrinsically concrete mind, is just this: to have the form itself, thinking, for its content.<sup>13</sup> Aristotle soared above the Platonic Idea (the *genus*, the *substantial*) to the heights of the thinking consciousness of this determination in his concept of the entelechy of thinking, which is *νόησις τῆς νοήσεως*.<sup>14</sup> But thinking in general involves, just because of the determination indicated, the immediate *being-for-self* of *subjectivity* as well as universality, and the genuine Idea of the intrinsically concrete mind is in the one of its determinations, subjective consciousness, just as essentially as in the other, universality, and is the same substantial content in the one as in the other. But the *first* of these forms involves feeling, intuition, representation, and it is in fact necessary that consciousness of the absolute Idea should be conceived in this shape earlier in time, and stand there in its immediate actuality as religion before it does so as philosophy.<sup>15</sup> Philosophy first develops only from this foundation again, as surely as Greek philosophy is later than Greek religion and attained its completion by conceiving and comprehending in all its determinate essentiality the principle of the mind that first manifests itself in religion. But Greek philosophy could only set itself in opposition to its religion, and the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could only take up a hostile attitude to the polytheism of fantasy, to the cheerful and frivolous jocularly of this poetic invention. The *form* in its infinite truth, the *subjectivity* of mind, burst forth at first only as subjective free *thinking*, which was not yet identical with *substantiality* itself, and so substantiality was not yet conceived as *absolute mind*. Thus religion could first appear purified only through pure thinking that is for itself, through philosophy; but the *form immanent* in the *substantial*, the form combatted by philosophy, was that poetic fantasy.<sup>16</sup> The *state*, which develops in the same way from religion, but earlier than philosophy, exhibits in actuality the *one-sidedness*, involved in its *implicitly* genuine Idea, as *corruption*. Plato, recognising, in common with all his thinking contemporaries, this corruption of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle, accentuated the substantial, but could not work into his Idea of the state the infinite form of subjectivity, which was still hidden from his mind; his state is therefore intrinsically *without subjective freedom* (§503 Remark, §513, etc.). That is why he conceives the truth, which should reside in the state, constitute and control it, only in the form of *thought* truth, of philosophy; and hence he made that announcement that as long as philosophers do not rule in states, or those who are now called kings and rulers

do not philosophize thoroughly and comprehensively, until then neither the state nor the human race will find any liberation from their ailments; until then the Idea of his political constitution can never become a possibility and see the light of day.<sup>17</sup> It was not granted to Plato to advance to the point of saying that as long as the genuine religion does not arise in the world and become dominant in states, then the genuine principle of the state has not yet come into actuality. But until then this principle could not even enter into thought, the genuine Idea of the state could not be conceived by thought,—the Idea of substantial ethical life, with which the freedom of the self-consciousness that is for itself is identical. Only in the principle of the mind that is aware of its essence, is *in itself* absolutely free, and has its actuality in the activity of its liberation, is the absolute possibility and necessity to be found for state power, religion, and the principles of philosophy to coincide, for the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mind, of the state with the religious conscience as well as with philosophical knowledge, to be accomplished. Since subjectivity that is for itself is absolutely identical with substantial universality, both religion as such and the state as such, as forms in which the principle exists, contain in them the absolute truth, so that this truth, when it appears as philosophy, is itself only in one of its forms.<sup>18</sup> But since religion too, in the development of itself, develops the distinctions contained in the Idea (§§566 ff.), the reality can, in fact must, appear in its first immediate, i.e. itself one-sided manner, and religion's existence become corrupted to sensory externality, and so proceed to the suppression of the freedom of spirit and to perversity of political life. But the principle contains the infinite elasticity of the absolute form, so as to overcome this corruption of the determinations of its form, and the consequent degeneration of the content, and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit within itself. So at last, in the Protestant conscience the principle of the religious conscience and of the ethical conscience becomes one and the same,—the free mind aware of itself in its rationality and truth. The constitution and legislation, as well as their operation, have as their content the principle and the development of ethical life, which proceeds, and can only proceed, from the truth of religion, when this truth is established as the original principle of ethical life and thereby first becomes actual as such. The ethical life of the state and the religious spirituality of the state are thus firm reciprocal guarantees.<sup>19</sup>

## SECTION III

### ABSOLUTE MIND

#### §553

The *concept* of mind has its *reality* in the mind. That this reality be *knowledge* of the absolute Idea and thus in identity with the concept, involves the necessary aspect that the *implicitly* free intelligence be in its actuality liberated to its concept, in order to be the *shape* worthy of the concept. The subjective and the objective mind are to be regarded as the way on which this aspect of *reality* or existence develops itself.<sup>1</sup>

#### §554

The absolute mind is *identity*, both an identity that is eternally within itself and an identity that returns and has returned into itself: the one and universal *substance* as spiritual, the judgement discerning itself *into itself* and *an awareness*, an awareness *for which* the substance is as such.<sup>1</sup> *Religion*, as this supreme sphere can in general be designated, is to be regarded as issuing from the subject and situated in the subject, but is equally to be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute spirit, which as spirit is in its community.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] That here, and in general, belief is not opposite to knowledge, but that belief is rather a sort of knowledge, belief being only a particular form of knowledge, has been observed above in the Remark to §63. If nowadays there is so little knowledge of God and so little attention is given to his objective essence, whereas people speak all the more of religion, i.e. of God's indwelling in the subjective sphere, and if religion, not the truth as such, is called for, this at least involves the correct determination that God must be conceived as spirit in his community.<sup>3</sup>

#### §555

The subjective consciousness of the absolute mind is essentially a process within itself, a process whose immediate and substantial unity is *belief* through the

witness of the spirit as *certainty* of the objective truth. Belief—at once this immediate unity and containing this unity as the relationship of these different determinations—has, in *devotion*, in the implicit or explicit *cult*, passed over into the process of sublating the contrast up to spiritual liberation, the process of *verifying* that initial certainty by this mediation, and of gaining the concrete determination of this certainty, namely the reconciliation, the actuality of the spirit.<sup>1</sup>

## A. Art

### §556

As *immediate* (—the moment of the finitude of art),<sup>1</sup> the shape of this knowledge is, on the one hand, a disintegration into a work of external common reality, the subject producing the work, and the intuiting and venerating subject.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, it is the concrete *intuition* and representation of the *implicitly* absolute mind as the *ideal*. In this ideal—the concrete shape born of subjective mind—natural immediacy is only a *sign* of the Idea, it is so transfigured by the informing mind for the expression of the Idea, that nothing else is shown in the shape;—the shape of *beauty*.<sup>3</sup>

### §557

The sensory externality in the beautiful, the *form of immediacy* as such, is at the same time a *determinacy of content*, and along with his spiritual determination the god also has within him at the same time the determination of a natural element or reality.—He contains the so-called *unity* of nature and spirit—i.e. the *immediate* unity, the form of intuition; and so not the spiritual unity, in which the natural is posited only as something ideal, something sublated, and the spiritual content stands in relation only to itself; it is not the absolute mind that enters into this consciousness.<sup>1</sup> On the subjective side the community is of course an ethical community, since it is aware of its essence as spiritual and its self-consciousness and actuality are herein elevated to substantial freedom. But encumbered with immediacy, the freedom of the subject is only custom, without infinite reflection into itself, without the subjective inwardness of *conscience*; in its further development too the devotion and the cult of the religion of beautiful art is determined accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

### §558

Art not only needs, for the intuitions to be produced by it, an external given material, which includes subjective images and representations. It also needs, for the expression of spiritual content, the given forms of nature together with their meaning, which art must discern and appropriate (cf. §411). Among such

formations the human is the supreme and genuine formation, because only in it can the spirit have its bodiliness and thus an expression accessible to intuition.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] This takes care of the principle of the *imitation of nature* in art, about which no agreement is possible when the contrast is so abstract, as long as the natural is taken only in its externality, not as a characteristic, meaningful natural form signifying the spirit.<sup>2</sup>

### §559

In such individuality of shaping the absolute mind cannot be explicated; the spirit of beautiful art is therefore the limited spirit of a people, a spirit whose implicit universality, when advance is made to the further determination of its riches, disintegrates into an indeterminate polytheism.<sup>1</sup> With the essential restrictedness of its content, beauty in general becomes no more than the penetration of the intuition or the image by the spiritual,—becomes something formal, so that the representation or the content of the thought can, just like the material which the content uses for its embodiment, be of the most diverse and even inessential kind, and yet the work can still be something beautiful and a work of art.<sup>2</sup>

### §560

The one-sidedness of *immediacy* in the ideal involves the opposite one-sidedness (§556): it is something *made* by the artist.<sup>1</sup> The subject is the *formality* of activity and the *work of art* is an expression of the god only when there is no sign of subjective *particularity* in it, and the content of the indwelling spirit has conceived and brought itself forth into the world, without admixture and unsullied by its contingency. But as freedom only advances as far as thinking, the activity filled with this indwelling content, the *inspiration* of the artist, is, as an *unfree* passion, like an alien power within the artist; the *producing* has in it the form of *natural* immediacy, it belongs to the *genius* as this *particular subject*—and is at the same time a labour occupied with technical intelligence and mechanical externalities. The work of art therefore is just as much a work of free wilfulness, and the artist is the master of the god.<sup>2</sup>

### §561

In this inspiration, *reconciliation* appears as the beginning in such a way that it is immediately accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness, which is thus secure and cheerful within itself, without the depth and without consciousness of its contrast to the essence that is in and for itself.<sup>1</sup> Beyond the completion of *beauty* in *classical* art attained in such reconciliation lies the art of *sublimity*, *symbolic* art, in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found; the thought, going forth and struggling with the shape, is displayed as a negative



attitude towards it, while at the same time it endeavours to embody itself in the shape. The meaning, the content, thereby shows that it has not yet reached the infinite form, that it is not yet known as free spirit and not yet conscious of itself as free spirit. The content is only the abstract god of pure thinking or a striving towards him, a striving without rest or reconciliation which throws itself into shape after shape, since it cannot find its goal.<sup>2</sup>

### §562

But the other mode of incongruity between the Idea and the figuration is this: the infinite form, subjectivity, is not, as in that first extreme, only superficial personality, but the inmost depth, and the god is known not as merely seeking its shape or satisfying himself in an external shape, but as finding himself only within himself, thus assuming his adequate shape in the spiritual alone. So art, *romantic* art, gives up the task of showing God as such in external shape and by means of beauty; it displays him as only condescending to appearance, and presents the divine as inwardness in the externality from which it disengages itself. This externality can therefore here appear in a contingent relation to its meaning.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] The philosophy of religion has to discern the logical necessity in the progression of the determinations of the essence known as the absolute. It has to ascertain the determinations to which a particular kind of worship primarily corresponds. It has to discover how worldly self-consciousness, consciousness of what is the supreme determination of man, and hence how the nature of a people's ethical life, the principle of its law, of its actual freedom and of its constitution, as well as of its art and science, correspond to the principle that constitutes the substance of a religion. That all these moments of a people's actuality make up *one* systematic totality and that *one* spirit creates and informs them, this insight lies at the basis of the further insight that the history of religions coincides with world-history.<sup>2</sup>

We need to make a more specific remark about the close connection of art with religions: *beautiful* art can belong only to those religions in which the principle is the *concrete spirituality* that has become free within itself, but is not yet absolute.<sup>3</sup> In religions in which the Idea has not yet been revealed and is not yet known in its free determinacy, the need of art does of course make itself felt, in order to bring the representation of the *essence* to consciousness in intuition and fantasy, in fact art is even the only organ in which the abstract, intrinsically unclear content, a mishmash of natural and spiritual elements, can strive to bring itself to consciousness. But this art is defective; because it has such a defective content, the form is defective too; for the content is defective owing to that fact that it does not have the form immanent in it. The portrayal retains a side of tastelessness and spiritlessness, since the very interior is still encumbered with spiritlessness, hence has not the power freely to imbue the external with meaning and shape. *Beautiful* art, by contrast, has for its condition the self-consciousness of the free spirit, hence

the consciousness that the sensory and merely natural lacks independence in the face of spirit, and so makes the sensory and natural into nothing more than the expression of spirit; it is the inner form that expresses itself alone.<sup>4</sup>

Connected with this is a further, higher consideration: the advent of art announces the demise of a religion still bound to sensory externality. At the same time, since it seems to give religion the supreme transfiguration, expression, and splendour, it has elevated religion beyond its limitation. In the sublime divinity whose expression is achieved by the work of art, the artist's genius and the spectator are at home, with their own sense and sensation, satisfied and liberated; the intuition and consciousness of the free spirit are granted and attained. Beautiful art, on its side, has performed the same service as philosophy: purification of the spirit from unfreedom.<sup>5</sup> The religion in which the need of beautiful art first engenders itself, and engenders itself for that very reason, has in its principle a thoughtless and sensory beyond; the images *devoutly* worshiped are the unbeautiful idols, as wonder-working talismans, which point to an unspiritual otherworldly objectivity, and bones perform the same or even better service than such images.<sup>6</sup> But beautiful art is only a stage of liberation, not the supreme liberation itself.—Genuine objectivity, which resides only in the element of *thought*, the element in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit, in which liberation is accompanied with reverence, is also lacking in the sensory beauty of the work of art, still more in that external, unbeautiful sensoriness.<sup>7</sup>

### §563

Beautiful art (like the religion peculiar to it) has its future in genuine religion. The restricted content of the Idea passes over in and for itself into the universality identical with the infinite form,—intuition, immediate knowledge bound to sensoriness, passes over into self-mediating knowledge, into a reality which is itself knowledge, into *revelation*; so that the content of the Idea has as its principle the determination of the free intelligence, and, as absolute *spirit*, is for the spirit.<sup>1</sup>

## B. Revealed Religion

§564

It lies essentially in the concept of genuine religion, i.e. the religion whose content is absolute mind, that it is *revealed*, and in fact revealed *by God*. For since knowledge, the principle by which the substance is mind, is, as the infinite form that is for itself, *self-determining* knowledge, it is *manifestation* pure and simple; the spirit is only spirit in so far as it is *for* the spirit, and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit that no longer manifests abstract moments of itself, but its very self.<sup>1</sup>

[Remark] To the ancient idea of nemesis, according to which the divine and its operation in the world was conceived by the still abstract intellect only as an *equalizing* power, shattering the high and mighty, *Plato* and *Aristotle* retorted that God is not *grudging*.<sup>2</sup> The same retort can be made to recent assertions that man cannot get to know God; these assertions (for these claims are no more than assertions) are all the more inconsistent, when they are made within a religion that is expressly called the *revealed* religion, so that according to these assertions it would rather be the religion in which *nothing* was *revealed* of God, in which he had *not* revealed himself, and these adherents of it would be 'the heathen' 'who know nothing of God'. If the word *God* is taken seriously in religion at all, then the determination too may and must start from him, the content and principle of religion, and if self-revelation is denied to him, then all that would remain of a content of God would be to ascribe *envy* to him. But if the word *mind* is to have a sense at all, then mind involves the revelation of itself.<sup>3</sup>

If we consider the difficulty of systematic knowledge of God as spirit, knowledge that cannot acquiesce in the simple representations of faith but proceeds to thinking, initially to the reflective intellect, but is supposed to proceed to conceptual thinking, it is hardly surprising that so many people, particularly theologians, who are specifically called upon to concern themselves with these Ideas, have lapsed into getting off more lightly with them and have willingly accepted what was offered them for this purpose; the easiest thing of all is the result indicated: that man knows nothing of God. To apprehend correctly and determinately in thought what God as spirit is, requires thorough speculation.<sup>4</sup> For a start, the following propositions are involved in it: God is God only in so far as he knows his own self; his self-knowledge is, moreover, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge *of* God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge *in*

God.<sup>5</sup>—See the thorough elucidation of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: *Aphorisms on Knowing and Not-knowing, etc.*, by C. F. G... 1.: Berlin 1829.<sup>6</sup>

### §565

The absolute spirit in the sublated immediacy and sensoriness of shape and of knowledge is, in content, the spirit that is in and for itself, the spirit of nature and of mind; in form it is initially for the subjective knowledge of *representation*.<sup>1</sup> On the one hand, representation gives independence to the moments of its content and makes them into presuppositions with respect to each other and into appearances *following each other* and into *happenings* interconnected according to *finite determinations of reflexion*;<sup>2</sup> on the other hand, the form of this finite mode of representation is also sublated in the faith in the one spirit and in the devotion of worship.<sup>3</sup>

### §566

In this separation, the *form* diverges from the *content* and in the form the different moments of the concept diverge into *particular spheres* or elements, in each of which the absolute content displays itself, ( $\alpha$ ) as eternal content, remaining together with itself in its manifestation; ( $\beta$ ) as differentiation of the eternal essence from its manifestation, which through this difference becomes the world of appearance into which the content enters; ( $\gamma$ ) as infinite return and reconciliation of the alienated world with the eternal essence, the withdrawal of the essence from appearance into the unity of its fullness.<sup>1</sup>

### §567

( $\alpha$ ) In the moment of *universality*, of the sphere of pure *thought* or the abstract element of the *essence*, it is therefore the absolute spirit that is first of all the *presupposition*, not, however, self-enclosed and static. As *substantial power* in the reflexion-determination of causality, it is *creator* of heaven and earth; but in this eternal sphere it generates only *its own self* as its *son*; it remains in original identity with what is thus differentiated from itself, but equally this determination—of being what is differentiated from the universal essence—eternally sublates itself, and, through this mediation of self-sublating mediation, the first substance essentially becomes *concrete individuality* and subjectivity, — is *spirit*.<sup>1</sup>

### §568

( $\beta$ ) But in the moment of the *particularity* of the judgement,<sup>1</sup> this concrete eternal essence is what is *presupposed*, and its movement is the creation of *appearance*,<sup>2</sup> the disintegration of the eternal moment of mediation, of the unitary son, into

independent opposites, on the one hand heaven and earth, elemental and concrete nature, and, on the other hand, spirit as standing in *relationship* with nature, hence *finite* spirit.<sup>3</sup> Spirit, as the extreme of the negativity that is within itself, asserts its independence to the point of evil; it is such an extreme through its relation to a nature confronting it and through its own naturalness which is thereby posited; in this naturalness it is, as thinking, also directed towards the eternal, but it stands in an external relation with it.<sup>4</sup>

### §569

(γ) In the moment of *individuality* as such, viz. of subjectivity and the concept itself, as the opposition of universality and particularity that has returned into its *identical ground*,<sup>1</sup> (1) the *universal* substance presents itself as *presupposition*, actualized out of its abstraction to *individual* self-consciousness; it presents this self-consciousness as *immediately identical* with the essence, as that *son* of the eternal sphere transposed into temporality; and in him it presents evil as *implicitly* sublated. But further, this immediate and thus sensory existence of the absolutely concrete, putting itself in judgement and expiring into the pain of *negativity*, in which it, as infinite subjectivity, is identical with itself, has become *for itself* as *absolute return* from negativity and as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality, — the Idea of the eternal, but *living* spirit, present in the world.<sup>2</sup>

### §570

(2) This objective totality is the *presupposition*, a presupposition that is in itself, for the *finite* immediacy of the individual subject. For the subject therefore it is initially something *other* and *intuited*, but the intuition of the truth that is *in itself*.<sup>1</sup> Through this witness of the spirit in him, the subject, owing to his immediate nature, initially determines himself as what is nugatory and evil, and further, according to the example of its truth, by means of faith in the unity, accomplished *implicitly* in that example, of universal and individual essentiality, he is also the movement of shedding his immediate natural determinacy and his own will, and of joining together with that example and its *In-itself* in the pain of negativity, and so of recognizing himself as united with the essence.<sup>2</sup> (3) Through this mediation the essence brings about its own indwelling in self-consciousness, and is the actual presence of the spirit that is in and for itself as the universal spirit.<sup>3</sup>

### §571

These three syllogisms, which constitute the one syllogism of the absolute mediation of spirit with itself, are the revelation of spirit, a revelation that explicates the life of spirit in the cycle of concrete shapes of representation.<sup>1</sup> In its result, the joining of spirit together with itself, the unfolding of the mediation pulls itself

together out of its dispersal and out of its temporal and external succession, not only to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling, but also to *thinking*. In the immanent simplicity of thinking the unfolding likewise has its expansion, but known as an inseparable connection of the universal, simple and eternal spirit within itself. In this form of truth, truth is the object of *philosophy*.<sup>2</sup>

[Remark] If the result, the spirit that is *for itself*, in which all mediation has sublated itself, is taken only in a *formal*, contentless sense, so that the spirit is not at the same time known as being *in itself* and objectively unfolding itself, then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness that knows itself within itself as absolute—*irony*. Irony, which knows how to reduce every objective content to nothing, to a *vanity*, is therefore itself the emptiness and vanity that for its determination derives its content from itself, a content that is thus contingent and arbitrary, it remains master over the content, is not bound by it, and, with the assurance that it stands at the very summit of religion and philosophy, it falls back rather into hollow wilfulness. Only when the pure infinite form, the self-manifestation that is together with itself, sheds the one-sidedness of subjectivity in which it is the vanity of thinking, is it the free thinking which also has its infinite determination as absolute content that is in and for itself, and has that content as an object in which it is likewise free. In this respect, thinking is itself only the formal aspect of the absolute content.<sup>3</sup>

## C. Philosophy

### §572

This science is the unity of art and religion, in so far as art's mode of intuition, external in form, its subjective production and splintering of the substantial content into many independent shapes, is not only held together into a whole in religion's *totality*, in religion's expansion unfolding itself in representation and its mediation of what is thus unfolded. It is also unified into the simple spiritual *intuition* and then elevated in it to *self-conscious thinking*. This knowledge is thus the thinkingly cognized *concept* of art and religion, in which the diversity in the content is cognized as necessary, and this necessity is cognized as free.<sup>1</sup>

### §573

Philosophy accordingly determines itself into a cognition of the necessity of the *content* of the absolute representation, as well as of the necessity of the two *forms*: *on the one hand*, immediate intuition and its *poetry* and the *presupposing* representation, the objective and external *revelation*; *on the other hand*, first the subjective withdrawal into self, then the subjective movement outwards and the identification of *faith* with the presupposition.<sup>1</sup> This cognition is thus the *recognition* of this content and its form, and *liberation* from the one-sidedness of the forms and the elevation of them into the absolute form, which determines itself to the content and remains identical with the content, and is in this respect the cognition of that necessity that is in and for itself.<sup>2</sup> This movement, which philosophy is, finds itself already accomplished, when at the conclusion it grasps its own concept, i.e. only *looks back* on its knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

[Remark] This would seem to be the place to deal with the *relationship of philosophy to religion* in a determinate discussion. The whole question turns entirely on the difference of the forms of speculative thinking from the forms of representation and of the reflective intellect. But it is the whole course of philosophy, and of logic in particular, which has not only made known this difference, but also assessed it, or rather has let its nature develop and direct itself in these very categories.<sup>4</sup> Only on the basis of this cognition of the forms can the genuine conviction that was in question be won, that the content of philosophy and of religion is the same, apart from the additional content of external nature and of finite mind which does not fall within the scope of religion. But religion is

the truth *for all men*, faith rests on the *witness of the spirit*, the spirit that, as witnessing, is the spirit in man. This witness, substantial in itself, initially couches itself, in so far as it is driven to explicate itself, in terms of the general culture of its worldly consciousness and intellect; in this way the truth lapses into the determinations and relationships of finitude in general. This does not prevent the spirit, even in the use of sensory representations and the finite categories of thinking, from holding on to its content, which being religious is essentially speculative, in the face of these representations and categories, from doing violence to them and being *inconsistent* with them. By this inconsistency it corrects their defects; that is why there is nothing easier for the intellect than to point out contradictions in the exposition of faith, and so to stage triumphs for its principle, formal *identity*. If the spirit gives way to this finite reflection, which has called itself reason and philosophy (- rationalism), then it reduces the religious content to finitude, reduces it in fact to nothing. Religion in that case has a perfect right to protest against such reason and philosophy and to open hostilities with them.<sup>5</sup> But it is a different matter if religion sets itself against conceptual reason, and against philosophy in general, and specifically also against a philosophy whose content is speculative and thus religious. Such opposition rests on deficiency of insight into the nature of the difference indicated and of the value of spiritual forms in general, and particularly of the thought-forms, and, most specifically of all, it rests on deficiency of insight into the difference between these forms and the content, which can be the same in both forms. Philosophy has endured reproaches and accusations, on the basis of its form from the side of religion, and, conversely, because of its speculative content from a self-styled philosophy, and likewise from a contentless piety; it had *too little* of God in it for the former, *too much* for the latter.

The charge of *atheism*, which used often to be brought against philosophy,—that it has *too little* of God, has become rare; but the charge of pantheism, that it has *too much* of him, has become all the more widespread; so much so, that it is treated not so much as an accusation, but as a proven *fact*, or even as a fact in need of no proof, a sheer fact. Piety in particular, which in any case in its pious superiority believes itself exempt from giving proofs, commits itself, in unison with the empty philosophy of the intellect (to which it claims to be so opposed, though in fact it rests entirely on this culture), to the assurance, as if it were just the mention of a familiar matter, that philosophy is the all-one doctrine or pantheism.<sup>6</sup> It must be said that it did more credit to piety and theology to accuse a philosophical system (e.g. Spinozism) of atheism than of pantheism, although at first sight the former accusation looks harsher and more invidious (cf. §71 Remark). After all, the accusation of atheism presupposes a determinate representation of a *contentful* God, and then arises from the fact that representation does not recognize in the philosophical concepts the peculiar forms to which it is committed.<sup>7</sup> That is to say, philosophy can indeed recognize its own forms in the categories of the religious mode of representation, and thus



also its own content in religious content, and do justice to religious content; but the converse does not hold, since the religious mode of representation does not apply the critique of thought to itself and does not comprehend itself, and is therefore exclusive in its immediacy.<sup>8</sup> The charge of pantheism instead of atheism against philosophy belongs especially to modern culture, to the new piety and new theology, which finds in philosophy *too much God*, so much so, that God, according to the assurance of the new theology, is supposed to be in fact everything and everything to be God. For this new theology, which makes religion only a subjective feeling and denies the knowledge of God's nature, thereby retains nothing more than a God *in general* without objective determinations. Without any interest of its own in the concrete, fulfilled concept of God, it regards such a concept only as an interest which *others* once had, and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature merely as something *historical*. The indeterminate God is to be found in all religions; every kind of piety (§72)—Indian piety towards monkeys, cows, etc. or towards the Dalai Lama, Egyptian piety towards the ox, etc.—is always veneration of an object which, along with its absurd determinations, also involves the abstraction of the genus, *of God in general*. If such a God is sufficient for this view to find God in everything that is called religion, then it must find at least such a God recognized in philosophy too, and can no longer very well accuse it of atheism. The mitigation of the reproach of atheism into that of pantheism has its ground therefore only in the superficiality of the representation to which this leniency has managed to attenuate and evacuate God.<sup>9</sup> As this representation sticks to its abstract universality, from which all determinacy is *excluded*, the determinacy is, in addition, only the profane, the worldly existence of things, which thereby persists *in fixed, undisturbed substantiality*. With such a presupposition, despite the *universality that is in and for itself*, which is affirmed of God in philosophy and in which the being of external things has no truth, they persist as before in maintaining that *worldly things nevertheless* retain *their being* and that it is worldly things that constitute what is determinate in the divine universality. So they make this universality into what they call *pantheistic* universality,—that *everything* (i.e. empirical things without distinction, the commonplace as well as those more highly regarded) *is*, possesses substantiality, and this being of worldly things is God.—It is only their own thoughtlessness, and a falsification of concepts stemming from it, that generates the representation and assurance of pantheism.<sup>10</sup>

But if those who depict any philosophy as pantheism are not able and willing to see this—for it is precisely the insight into concepts that they repudiate—they should above all have confirmed just as a *fact*, that *some philosopher* or *some human being* has indeed ascribed reality that is in and for itself, substantiality, to *all* things and regarded them as God, that such an idea has entered the head of some human being besides themselves alone. I propose to shed more light on this fact in this exoteric discussion; and this can only happen if the facts themselves are

placed before our eyes.<sup>11</sup> If we want to take so-called pantheism in its poetical, most sublime or, if you prefer, most crass shape, we must, as we all know, look for this in *oriental* writers, and the most extensive presentations are to be found in *Indian* literature. Among the riches open to us on this matter, I select from the most authentic account available to us, the *Bhagavad Gita*, and from among its tirades, dilated and repeated *ad nauseam*, a few of the most striking passages. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel, p. 162)<sup>12</sup> *Krishna* says of himself:

I am the breath, indwelling in the body of living things; I am the beginning, the middle of living things, and likewise their end.—I am the radiant sun among the stars, I am the moon among the lunar signs. I am the book of hymns among the holy books, sense among the senses, the intellect of living things, etc. I am Siva among the Rudras, Meru among the mountain peaks, Himalaya among the mountains, etc., among beasts I am the lion, etc., among letters I am A, I am the spring among the seasons, etc. I am the seed of all things, there is nothing that is without me, etc.

Even in these entirely sensory portrayals, *Krishna* (and we must not suppose that there is here, apart from *Krishna*, God, or a god, besides; he said just now, that he is Siva, also Indra, and later (Lesson 11, Couplet 15) it is said of him that Brahma too is in him) claims to be, not *everything*, but only *supreme* among everything; everywhere there is a distinction drawn between external, unessential existences and an *essential* existence among them, which *he* is. Even if, at the beginning of the passage, he is said to be the beginning, middle, and end of living things, this totality is distinguished from the living things themselves as individual existences. Thus even a portrayal which extends divinity so far in its existence cannot yet be called *pantheism*; we should rather say only that the infinitely manifold empirical world, the Everything, is reduced to a limited number of essential existences, to a *polytheism*. But the quoted passages already imply that even these substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence required to be called gods; even Siva, Indra, etc. dissolve in the *one* *Krishna*.<sup>13</sup>

A more explicit advance towards this reduction occurs in the following portrayal (Lesson 7, Couplets 7 ff.); *Krishna* speaks: I am the *origin* of the whole world and its *dissolution*. There is nothing superior to me. The universe hangs on me, like rows of pearls on a string. I am the taste in the waters, the lustre in sun and moon, the mystic name in all holy books, etc., the life in every living thing, etc., the intellect of the intelligent, the power of the strong, etc. Then he adds that through *Maya* (Schlegel: *Magia*), which is nothing independent either, but only his own *Maya*, through the peculiar qualities, the world is deceived and so does not know him, the *higher one*, the *unchangeable one*, and this *Maya* is hard to break through; but those who have a share in him have overcome *Maya*, etc.<sup>14</sup>—Then the representation is condensed in a simple expression; at the end of many rebirths, says *Krishna*, the man endowed with science advances to me: Vasudeva (i.e. *Krishna*) is the All; the great-souled one, the one who has this conviction, is hard to find. Others turn to other gods; I reward them according to

their faith, but the reward of those of little insight is limited. Fools regard me as *visible*, — *me, the invisible, imperishable one, etc.*<sup>15</sup>

*This All*, which Krishna declares himself to be, is not the Everything, any more than the Eleatic *one* or Spinoza's *substance* is the Everything. This Everything, the infinitely various sensory variety of the finite, is in all these representations determined as the *accidental*, which is not in and for itself, but has its truth in the substance, the one, which is different from the accidental and is alone the divine and God.<sup>16</sup> In any case, the Indian religion progresses to the representation of *Brahma*, the pure unity of thought within itself, in which the empirical Everything of the world, as also those proximate substantialities that are called gods, disappear. That is why *Colebrooke* and many others have determined the Indian religion in its essentials as *monotheism*. That this determination is not incorrect emerges from our brief quotations.<sup>17</sup> But this unity of God, and in fact of a spiritual God, is so far from concrete within itself, so powerless as it were, that the Indian religion is the monstrous confusion of being just as much the wildest *polytheism*. But the idolatry of the wretched Indian, when he worships the ape, or whatever else, is still not that wretched idea of a pantheism, for which *everything* is God, and God is *everything*. Indian monotheism, by the way, is itself an example of how little is gained by mere monotheism, if the Idea of God is not deeply *determined* within itself. For that unity, in so far as it is abstract within itself and therefore empty, itself has the effect of letting the concrete, whether as a number of gods or of empirical, worldly individualities, remain independent *outside* it.<sup>18</sup> In fact, according to the shallow representation of it, even that pantheism could consistently be called a monotheism as well; for if, according to this representation, God is identical with the world, then as there is only *one* world there would be in this pantheism only *one* God too. Perhaps empty numerical unity must be predicated of the world, but this abstract determination has no further particular interest; on the contrary, this numerical unity is just this: that in its *content* it is the infinite multiplicity and variety of finitudes. But it is only this illusion about empty unity, which makes possible and gives rise to the misconception of a pantheism. It is only the representation, floating in the indeterminate void, of the world as *one thing, the All*, that was ever able to be considered combinable with God; only that made it possible for people to think that we had meant that God is the world; for if the world had been taken as it is, as everything, as the endless mass of empirical existences, then it would hardly have been even held possible for there to have been a pantheism that asserted of such content that it is God.<sup>19</sup>

But to return once more to the facts of the case. If we want to see the consciousness of the one, not split, in the Indian way, into the determinationless unity of abstract thinking, on the one hand, and on the other, the tiresome, even litany-like, implementation in the particular, but in the finest purity and sublimity, we must consult the Mohammedans. When, e.g., in the excellent *Jelaleddin-Rumi* in particular, we find displayed the unity of the soul with the One, and this unity displayed as love, then this spiritual unity is an *elevation* above the finite

and the commonplace, a transfiguration of the natural and the spiritual, in which precisely the externality, the transience of immediate nature, and of empirical worldly spirit, is discarded and absorbed.<sup>20\*</sup>

\* In the interests of a more precise idea, I cannot refrain from quoting a few passages here, which may at the same time give some idea of the marvellous art of *Rückert's* rendering, from which they are taken:

III. I saw but One through all heaven's starry spaces gleaming:  
 I saw but One in all sea billows wildly streaming.  
 I looked into the heart, a waste of worlds, a sea, —  
 I saw a thousand dreams, — yet One amid all dreaming.  
 And earth, air, water, fire, when thy decree is given,  
 Are molten into One: against thee none hath striven.  
 There is no living heart but beats unfailingly  
 In the one song of praise to thee, from earth and heaven.

V. As one ray of thy light appears the noonday sun,  
 But yet thy light and mine eternally are one.  
 As dust beneath thy feet the heaven that rolls on high:  
 Yet only one, and one for ever, thou and I.  
 The dust may turn to heaven, and heaven to dust decay;  
 Yet art thou one with me, and shalt be one for aye.  
 How may the words of life that fill heaven's utmost part  
 Rest in the narrow casket of one poor human heart?  
 How can the sun's own rays, a fairer gleam to fling,  
 Hide in a lowly husk, the jewel's covering?  
 How may the rose-grove all its glorious bloom unfold,  
 Drinking in mire and slime, and feeding on the mould?  
 How can the darksome shell that sips the salt sea stream  
 Fashion a shining pearl, the sunlight's joyous beam?  
 Oh, heart! should warm winds fan thee, should'st thou floods endure,  
 One element are wind and flood; but be thou pure.

IX. I'll tell thee how from out the dust God moulded man, —  
 Because the breath of Love He breathed into his clay:  
 I'll tell thee why the spheres their whirling paths began, —  
 They mirror to God's throne Love's glory day by day:  
 I'll tell thee why the morning winds blow o'er the grove, —  
 It is to bid Love's roses bloom abundantly:  
 I'll tell thee why the night broods deep the earth above, —  
 Love's bridal tent to deck with sacred canopy:  
 All riddles of the earth dost thou desire to prove? —  
 To every earthly riddle is Love alone the key.

XV. Life shrinks from Death in woe and fear,  
 Though Death ends well Life's bitter need.  
 So shrinks the heart when Love draws near,  
 As though 'twere Death in very deed:  
 For wheresoever Love finds room,  
 There Self, the sullen tyrant, dies.  
 So let him perish in the gloom, —  
 Thou to the dawn of freedom rise.<sup>21</sup>

In this poetry, which soars above the external and sensory, who will recognize the prosaic idea which is formed of so-called pantheism and which rather transposes the divine down into the external and the sensory? The copious reports which *Tholuck* gives us of the poems of Jelaleddin and others in his

I refrain from multiplying examples of the religious and poetic representations which it is customary to call pantheistic. Of the philosophies to which that name has been given, e.g. the Eleatic, or Spinozist, it has already been remarked earlier (§50, Remark) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him finite, that in these philosophies this *Everything* has no truth, and that we should more correctly designate them as *monotheisms* and, in relation to the representation of the world, as *acosmisms*. They would be most accurately determined as the systems that conceive the absolute only as *substance*. Of the oriental, especially the Mohammedan, modes of representation, we may rather say that the absolute appears as the *utterly universal genus* which resides in the species, in the existences, but in such a way that no actual reality accrues to them. The fault of all these modes of representation and systems is that they do not proceed to the determination of substance as *subject* and as *mind*.<sup>23</sup>

These systems and modes of representation start from the one need common to all philosophies, as well as all religions, the need to conceive a representation of God and then of the *relationship* of God and the world. In philosophy it is more precisely recognised that God's relationship to the world is determined by the determination of God's nature. The reflective intellect begins by rejecting all systems and modes of representation, which, whether they spring from the heart, fantasy or speculation, express the interconnection of God and the world; and in order to have God purely in faith or consciousness, he is separated as the essence from the appearance, as the infinite from the finite. But after this separation the conviction also arises of the *relation* of the appearance to the essence, of the finite to the infinite, and so on, and with it the now reflective question as to the nature of this relation. It is in the form of the reflection about this relation that the whole difficulty of the matter lies. It is this relation that is called the *incomprehensible* by those who insist on knowing nothing of God's nature.<sup>24</sup> The close of philosophy is no longer the place, and not at all in an exoteric discussion, to waste a word on the question of what *comprehending* means. But as the view taken of this relation is closely connected with the view taken of science generally and with all the accusations against it, we may add this remark about it: since philosophy certainly has to do with *unity* in general, though not with abstract unity, mere

work. *Anthology of Oriental Mysticism*, are made from the very point of view here under discussion. In the Introduction, Tholuck proves how profoundly his heart has comprehended mysticism; there, too, he determines in more detail the character of oriental mysticism, and the contrasting character of western and Christian mysticism. Despite their difference, they share the determination of being mysticism. The combination of mysticism with so-called pantheism, he says (p. 33), involves the inner vitality of heart and mind which essentially consists in this: annihilation of that external *Everything* that is usually ascribed to pantheism. Otherwise Tholuck leaves matters standing at the usual unclear representation of pantheism; a more thorough discussion of this representation was initially of no interest for the author's emotional standpoint; but we see that he himself is gripped by remarkable enthusiasm for a mysticism which, according to the usual expression, is to be called entirely pantheistic. Where, however, he engages in philosophizing (p. 12); he does not get beyond the usual standpoint of the metaphysic of the intellect and its uncritical categories.<sup>22</sup>

identity and the empty absolute, but with *concrete* unity (the concept), and in its whole course it has to do entirely with this alone; each stage of the advance is a *peculiar determination* of this concrete *unity*, and the deepest and last of the determinations of unity is the determination of absolute mind. Now those who want to pass judgement on philosophy and hold forth about it might be expected to involve themselves with these *determinations* of *unity* and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them, at least to know this much, that of these determinations there is a *great number*, and that among them there is a great variety. But they show so little acquaintance with them, and still less any effort over them, that as soon as they hear of *unity*—and *relation* instantly involves *unity*—they stop short at wholly abstract, *indeterminate* unity, and abstract from the only thing of any interest, namely the unity's mode of determinacy. Hence they do not know how to say anything about philosophy except that dry identity is its principle and result, and that it is the system of identity. Clinging to this conceptless thought of identity, they really have not the faintest conception of concrete unity, the concept and the content of philosophy, but only of its opposite.<sup>25</sup> They proceed in the field of philosophy, as physicists do in the field of physics. Physicists too are well aware that they have before them a variety of sensory properties and stuffs—or usually stuffs only (for properties get transformed into stuffs too for the physicist)—and that these stuffs also stand in *relation* to one another. Now the question is: What type of relation is it? and the peculiarity and the entire difference of all natural things, inorganic and living, depends solely on the *different determinacy of this unity*. But instead of getting to know this unity in its different determinacies, ordinary physics (including chemistry too) conceives only one sort of unity, the most external, worst unity, viz. *composition*, applies only this unity in the whole range of natural structures and so incapacitates itself from understanding any of them.<sup>26</sup>

That insipid pantheism results just as immediately from this insipid identity; those who employ this brain-child of their own to accuse philosophy, learn from the consideration of God's *relation* to the world that one, but really only *one moment*, of this category, *relation*, and in fact the moment of indeterminacy, is *identity*; their conception now stops halfway, and they assert what is in fact false, that philosophy maintains the identity of God and the world, and since for them each of the two, the world as much as God, has solid substantiality, they work out that in the philosophical Idea God is *composed* of God and the world; and this is then the representation which they form of pantheism and which they ascribe to philosophy.<sup>27</sup> Those who in their thinking and apprehension of thoughts do not get beyond such categories, and with these categories, which they import into philosophy wherever nothing of the kind is to be found, give philosophy an itch so that they can scratch it, instantly and very easily avoid any difficulties that emerge in their conception of God's relation to the world, by confessing that this relation contains for them a contradiction which they do not understand at all; hence, they have to leave it at the wholly *indeterminate representation* of such a

relation and likewise of the specific modes of it, e.g. omnipresence, providence, etc. In this sense *faith* means no more than a refusal to advance to a determinate representation, to get more involved in the content. That men and classes of uncultivated intellect are satisfied with indeterminate representations is appropriate; but when a cultivated intellect and an interest in reflective study is willing to put up with indeterminate representations in what is acknowledged to be a higher and the highest interest, then it is hard to tell whether the mind really takes the content *seriously*.<sup>28</sup> But if those who cling to the aforesaid bare intellect took *seriously* e.g. the assertion of God's *omnipresence*, in the sense that they pictured the faith in it to themselves in determinate representation, in what difficulty would they be entangled by the faith they have in the *genuine reality* of sensory things? They surely would not want, like Epicurus, to let God dwell in the interspaces of things, i.e. in the *pores* of the physicists, the pores being the negative, which is supposed to be *alongside* the material reality. Even in this *alongside* they would have their pantheism of spatiality, — their Everything, determined as the asunderness of space. But since they would ascribe to God, in his relation to the world, an efficacy on and in filled space, on and in the world, they would have the infinite fragmentation of divine actuality into infinite materiality, they would have the misconception that they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine, in fact only as the necessary consequence of their own misconceptions of God and the world.<sup>29</sup> But to saddle philosophy with such a thing as this much-discussed unity or identity is so great a negligence of justice and truth that it can only be made comprehensible by the difficulty of getting thoughts and concepts into one's head, i.e. not abstract unity, but the multifarious modes of its determinacy. If factual claims are advanced and the facts are thoughts and concepts, then it is indispensable to understand such things. But even the fulfillment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous, by the fact that it long ago became a *foregone* conclusion that philosophy is pantheism, a system of identity, an all-one doctrine, so that anyone who was unaware of this fact would be treated either as ignorant of a familiar matter, or as prevaricating for some purpose. On account of this chorus, I believed that I had to speak my mind at greater length and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact; for initially it is only possible to speak exoterically about the external view of concepts as mere facts, by which the concepts themselves are perverted into their opposite. But the esoteric study of God and identity, as well as of cognition and concepts, is philosophy itself.<sup>30</sup>

#### §574

This concept of philosophy is *the self-thinking* Idea, the knowing truth (§236), the logical with the meaning that it is the universality *verified* in the concrete content as in its actuality. In this way science has returned to its beginning, and the logical is its *result* as the *spiritual*, such that out of the presupposing judgement, in

which the concept was only *in itself* and the beginning was something immediate, thus out of the *appearance* which it had in it there, the logical has risen into its pure principle and also into its element.<sup>1</sup>

### §575

It is this appearing which initially grounds the further development. The first appearance is constituted by the *sylogism* that has the *logical* as its ground, its starting-point, and *nature* as the middle that joins *the mind* together with the logical. The logical becomes nature and nature becomes mind.<sup>1</sup> Nature, which stands between the mind and its essence, does not in fact separate them into extremes of finite abstraction, nor does it separate itself from them into something independent, that as an other only joins together others; for the syllogism is determined *within the Idea*, and nature is essentially determined only as a transit point and negative moment and *in itself* the Idea; but the mediation of the concept has the external form of *transition*, and science has the form of the progression of necessity, so that only in the one extreme is the freedom of the concept posited as its joining together with itself.<sup>2</sup>

### §576

In the *second syllogism* this appearance is sublated in so far as this syllogism is already the standpoint of the mind itself, which is the mediator of the process, *presupposes* nature and joins it together with the *logical*.<sup>1</sup> It is the syllogism of *spiritual reflexion* within the Idea; science appears as a subjective *cognition*, whose aim is freedom and which is itself the way to produce its freedom.<sup>2</sup>

### §577

The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has *self-knowing reason*, the absolutely universal, for its *middle*, a middle that divides into *mind* and *nature*, making mind the presupposition, as the process of the Idea's *subjective* activity, and nature the universal extreme, as the process of the Idea that is *in itself*, objective.<sup>1</sup> The *self-judging* of the Idea into the two appearances (§§575, 576) determines them as *its* (self-knowing reason's) manifestations, and in it a unification takes place: it is the concept, the nature of the subject-matter, that moves onwards and develops, and this movement is equally the activity of cognition. The eternal Idea, the Idea that is in and for itself, eternally remains active, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute mind.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 7

Thinking that is in itself is of what is best in itself; and the highest thinking is of the highest object.<sup>3</sup>



The intellect thinks itself by communion in the thinkable. For the intellect becomes thinkable by touching and thinking.<sup>4</sup> So intellect and thinkable are the same; for what is receptive of the thinkable and the essence is intellect. But when it has it, it is active. So the divine feature which the intellect seems to have is the former rather than the latter; and contemplation is the pleasantest and best.<sup>5</sup> If therefore God does as well always, as we do sometimes, it is wonderful; but if he does better than we do, it is even more wonderful; and that is how it is.<sup>6</sup>

And life is present in him too. For the activity of intellect is life; but intellect is the activity; and activity that is in itself is the intellect's best and eternal life. We say that God is an eternal living thing, the best. So life and unceasing and eternal duration belong to God. For this is what God is.<sup>7</sup>

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**Michael Inwood** is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Trinity College, Oxford.

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