

OXFORD

The Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. HEGEL



Translated with introduction and commentary by

MICHAEL INWOOD

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OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
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First Edition published in 2018

Impression: 1

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Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017954184

ISBN 978-0-19-879062-4

Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

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Editor's Introduction

It has been said that the difference between Nietzsche and Hegel is that we can understand Nietzsche's individual sentences, but not what he is saying overall, whereas with Hegel it is the other way around: we can understand what he is saying overall, but not his individual sentences. This dictum is overoptimistic as far as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is concerned. Not only are its individual sentences often obscure, if not impenetrable, it is far from clear what the book is about overall. The problems begin with the title. In conformity with its derivation from the Greek words *phainomai* ('appear') and *logos* ('account, reason, etc.),' phenomenology' means 'study of appearance(s)'. But 'appearance' is ambiguous. It may mean the emergence or manifestation of something ('Hegel's book appeared in 1807', 'His honesty was quite apparent') or it may mean the way something seems in contrast to the way it really is ('Hegel's book appears to solve all philosophical problems', 'His honesty was only apparent'). Hegel uses 'appearance' (*Erscheinung*) and the verb 'to appear' (*erscheinen*) in both ways.¹ What appears is *Geist*. *Geist* is the usual German word for the intellectual aspect of an individual, the mind, but in the *Phenomenology* it more commonly refers to the collective mind or 'spirit' shared by a group of people. It is, as Hegel memorably puts it, 'I that is We, and We that is I' (PS ¶177). It can also refer to the third person of the Trinity, the holy spirit, and this religious connotation is never far from Hegel's mind when he uses the word *Geist*. Spirit appears on the scene in the course of the *Phenomenology*, but it does not appear all at once, as does, say, a book, or a person on my doorstep. It rather presents aspects of itself, fragmentary appearances in which fully fledged spirit is not revealed as a whole, but can be seen in retrospect as the source from which they stem: see ¶¶38, 47, and 440.

In Search of the Absolute

To learn more about the subject-matter of Hegel's book, we need to turn not to the long 'Preface' with which it begins, but to the shorter 'Introduction' that follows it. The Preface was written after Hegel had completed the rest of the book and was meant as an introduction not only to the *Phenomenology*, but to the whole philosophical system to which the *Phenomenology* was originally intended as an introduction. The Preface is thus more closely connected with the concluding paragraphs of the book, which present his whole system in outline, than it is with the earlier stages of the work.² The Introduction raises a problem to which the *Phenomenology*

¹ When an ordinary writer uses a word that is assigned more than one meaning in the dictionary, we normally assume that s/he is using it in only one of these meanings. But Hegel is not an ordinary writer and he often has in mind more than one meaning of a word when he uses it. His intention is to unearth deep and significant connections between seemingly disparate concepts. A striking example of this procedure is his use of *aufheben*, 'sublate', in all its senses at once: 'elevate', 'destroy', and 'preserve', i.e. 'kick upstairs'.

² Strictly speaking, the Preface should be read at the end of the book rather than the beginning. In his commentary, Quentin Lauer (1992) adopts this order, leaving the Preface until last.

purports to provide an answer, namely: can we know the 'absolute' and, if so, how? The problem arose with particular poignancy in the wake of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) which had argued that we cannot know 'things in themselves', rock-bottom reality, but only things as they 'appear' to us.³ Traditionally, the realm of things in themselves had been supposed to be populated by various supernatural entities, God or gods, and one of the motives of Kant's 'transcendental idealism' was to leave a space open for such entities. Kant argues, for example, that if we believe that God and His knowledge of the world are atemporal, then we must regard time as ideal, and not as a feature of rock-bottom reality (CPR, B71–72). Religious belief is, however, a matter not of knowledge, but of faith, a faith that is required if, as Kant did, we take morality seriously. (For Hegel's criticism of this, see his account of the moral world-view in the *Phenomenology* ¶¶599ff.) According to Hegel, such scepticism about our knowledge of the absolute presupposes that our cognitive equipment is like an 'instrument' or 'medium' or, as we might anachronistically say, a camera, which may distort our pictures of the absolute. There is no way in which we could, by inspecting the pictures of such a global camera and comparing them with reality, discover the distortion it introduces and make allowance for it. I cannot step outside my own consciousness to survey and assess it from an external standpoint.⁴

However, the camera-model of cognition is defective in several respects. First, it postulates a rift between myself and my cognitive equipment, between the photographer and the camera. But the photographer cannot be wholly denuded of *primary* cognitive equipment independent of the camera. I have, after all, to inspect the pictures supplied by my camera and to ask whether they are veridical or not. If I cannot rely on this primary equipment, more intimately connected with myself than the other, I have no basis for raising sceptical doubts about the reliability of my secondary cognitive equipment.⁵ I also need this primary equipment to have knowledge of myself, including the camera-model of my own cognition—unless we suppose (as Kant in effect did) that I take unreliable selfies with my secondary equipment. An adequate account of the Self must explain my ability to give that account. Here we have, in effect, two Selves, one that has a view of the world and another that has a reliable view, not of the world itself, but of that view of the world, and raises sceptical doubts about it.

³ It is tempting to paraphrase 'the absolute' as 'mind-independent reality'. No doubt the absolute *would be* independent of minds, if there *were* no minds. But since there are minds and the absolute is responsible for them, minds cannot be independent of the absolute and, conversely, the absolute cannot be entirely independent of minds. Moreover, in Hegel's view, there necessarily are minds, since the absolute must be known by minds. He never considers the possibility that there might have been no human minds.

⁴ No more can I, Hegel believes, step outside my own ethical order in order to assess it from a neutral standpoint. See ¶437, where the attempt to establish laws for one's society, or to test the laws that are already in place, is implicitly criticized for its pretension to occupying an Archimedean point outside one's society.

⁵ Cf. Hume (1975: pp.145f. (¶116)): 'There is a species of scepticism, *antecedent* to all study and philosophy... It recommends an universal doubt, not only of our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing; or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident.'

But there are further Selves in play too. For, secondly, the camera-model neglects the fact that I am only one among very many similar Selves and that my knowledge of the world would be intolerably impoverished if I could not supplement my own meagre first-hand experience of it with the testimony of other Selves who perceive parts of the world that I do not and from viewpoints that I do not occupy. How does the camera-model accommodate other Selves? Does it lapse into solipsism, regarding others not as Selves on a par with myself, but simply as entities recorded by my camera? Or does each of us have a camera of our own? Or do we all view the world through a single global camera? Each of these alternatives involves difficulties, difficulties that had not been squarely confronted by Kant, who distinguished between myself and others, between 'I' and 'we', only in his ethical writings, but not in his theoretical philosophy.⁶ Hegel, by contrast, is vividly aware of the distinction between oneself and others, and seems to repair this deficiency in Kant. Other Selves play at least two roles in Hegel's enterprise. First, they figure within some, if not all, of the shapes of consciousness that Hegel goes on to consider, most vividly in his account of self-consciousness in chapter IV.⁷ Secondly, they are responsible for a pressing sceptical problem that Hegel attempts to overcome in the *Phenomenology*: if others hold a view different from my own (or from 'science'), how can I settle the dispute in my own favour without begging the question?⁸

Thirdly, the camera-model differentiates the Self and its camera from the absolute itself. But how can that be? If the absolute is genuinely absolute, it cannot be sheerly distinct from Selves with their cameras and photographs. If it were, there would be two absolutes mysteriously disconnected from each other, since Selves and their pictures undoubtedly exist: they cannot, or at least *I* cannot, be yet one more illusory appearance. The Selves, their cameras, and photographs must rather be offshoots of the absolute, sent down by the absolute itself. It is open to dispute whether Hegel believed in such a thing as the absolute. But what is not in dispute is that he did not believe in an absolute that is separate from human knowers. Any absolute worthy of its name must encompass and account for the minds that, however imperfectly, know the absolute, and the onward advance of the *Phenomenology* is in large part driven by the quest for a type of knowledge that incorporates the knower in what is known.⁹

⁶ Bishop Berkeley, by contrast, assigned to minds, including minds other than one's own, a more solid ontological status than that of material objects. The being of material things is simply to be perceived, both by us and by God, but the being of a mind consists in perceiving. Though we depend on God for our existence, we are not simply ideas in the mind of God. However, this conflicts with his empiricist arguments for his overall doctrine, some of which—such as his argument that I cannot imagine a tree that is not perceived *by me*—tend towards solipsism.

⁷ It must be admitted, however, that the distinction becomes salient in political and ethical contexts of the work, beginning with chapter IV on 'self-consciousness', and is relatively subdued in the more theoretical parts of the work, such as chapters I–III on 'consciousness' and chapter V.A on theoretical reason.

⁸ This problem is examined by Forster (1989). Hegel's solution to it is, roughly speaking, to take his opponents on board and incorporate a modified version of their views into his own. Past philosophies and past shapes of consciousness are not simply rejected, but are 'sublated' or 'kicked upstairs': the truth in them is integrated into their successors, especially into Hegel's own 'science'.

⁹ This is a problem faced not only by an idealist, such as Hegel, but also by a materialist. Insofar as a materialist regards matter or energy as the absolute, s/he must treat 'matter' not as simply contrasting with 'mind', but as able to accommodate and account for minds, along with everything else.

Hegel's Response

Despite these deficiencies of the camera-model in terms of which the problem of the absolute is posed, the problem still remains. The derivation of our concepts and beliefs from the absolute itself does not entail that they are appropriate or true. Illusions and error, as well as truths, must stem from the absolute. How can we know which, if any, of our beliefs about ultimate reality are true and which are false? Hegel proposes the following solution: we should consider, not directly the absolute itself, but the series of forms or 'shapes' of consciousness that have occurred in our attempts to grasp the absolute.¹⁰ Each shape of consciousness—apart from the last, science itself, Hegel's own system¹¹—falls short of the truth, but Hegel's strategy is to advance towards the truth by using errors as stepping stones—not to avoid error at all costs (as Descartes attempted to do), since errors are, for Hegel, never sheer errors, but always contain a grain, or more, of truth. We begin with the simplest shape, the immediate sensory awareness of individual entities. This collapses, but not because Hegel criticizes it: that would allow Hegel's opponents to claim that he rejects sensory certainty only because of its failure to satisfy a criterion that *he* chooses to apply to it, a criterion that sensory certainty itself might not acknowledge. Sensory certainty collapses because it fails to meet a criterion that *it itself* endorses and applies to itself. Sensory certainty can do this because, as Hegel says in ¶85, 'consciousness is on the one hand consciousness of the object, on the other hand consciousness of itself; consciousness of what to it is the true, and consciousness of its knowledge of the true. Since both are *for consciousness*, consciousness itself is their comparison; it becomes a matter *for consciousness* whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not.' The sense-certain consciousness becomes aware of a conflict between what its objects purport to be, pure individuals, and its own way of getting to know them, by the use of universal terms (such as 'this', 'here', and 'now'), terms which therefore (in Hegel's view) capture only universals, not the individuals they aimed for. From the debris of sensory certainty there emerges a new shape of consciousness, perception of things with properties. Hegel himself purports to play no more part in its emergence than he did in the assessment of its predecessor. This new object of consciousness is, he tells us in ¶87, 'the knowledge of the first object', that is, sensory certainty's illicit universal knowledge of its individual objects becomes the object of the next shape of consciousness, the thing with its universal properties. In Hegel's view, any given shape necessarily has an immediate successor, and necessarily has the immediate successor it does have: the knowledge of its object acquired by shape of consciousness *n* becomes the object of shape of consciousness *n+1*. Hegel himself plays no part in deciding how the sequence is to proceed: his role is simply that of an onlooker. He does, however, see things that the shapes of consciousness themselves

¹⁰ 'Shape' translates *Gestalt* throughout. It is tempting, and perhaps closer to Hegel's meaning, to translate *Gestalt* as 'form', but this is excluded by the fact that in other contexts Hegel also uses the word *Form*, a near synonym of *Gestalt*, but not an exact synonym.

¹¹ The word 'science' (*Wissenschaft*) is used more widely in German than in English. What we would call 'art-history', for example, is in German 'art-science' (*Kunstwissenschaft*). Whenever Hegel speaks of 'science' in the *Phenomenology*, however, he means the ideal philosophy, i.e. the philosophy that he aspires to develop.

do not. Hegel (or 'we') can see that, and how, perception emerged from sensory certainty, but neither of these shapes can see this: see ¶87. If they knew as much as Hegel knows, they would have the conceptual resources of Hegel, and would amount to 'absolute knowledge' itself rather than simply rungs on the ladder towards it. Perception, in turn, undergoes a fate similar to that of sensory certainty, and is likewise supplanted by another shape, understanding and force. After that, there is a more abrupt transition, less easy to comprehend than the previous two and seemingly less conformable to the strategy Hegel outlines in the Introduction. This is the transition from 'Consciousness' in chapters I–III to 'Self-consciousness' in chapter IV, which is not only a different 'shape' (*Gestalt*), but also a new 'configuration' (*Gestaltung*), grouping together several related 'shapes', in contrast to those of the first configuration in chapters I–III.¹² Unlike the first three shapes, which have no obvious historical setting, but only a logical order, the shapes falling under the heading of self-consciousness form a rough historical sequence: the struggle for recognition and the ensuing enslavement remind us of the ancient world or perhaps of the state of nature, Stoicism and scepticism developed in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, while unhappy consciousness recalls early Christianity, though all four shapes occasionally resurface in subsequent, and historically later, shapes of consciousness. Reason, in chapter V, forms another configuration, but is divided into three sections—theoretical, practical, and a combination of the two. Theoretical (or 'observing') reason may be good enough for dealing with inorganic and organic nature but it flounders when it comes to the human Self: see ¶¶309ff. To deal with the Self, reason needs to become practical. Neither reason, nor its subsections, have any specific historical location. History begins in earnest with *Geist* in chapter VI, which ranges from the Greek city-state (as portrayed in Greek tragedy) down to the revolution in France and the contemporaneous development of individualistic morality in Germany. Spirit gathers up the preceding shapes of consciousness and presents their emergence in history: see e.g. ¶¶295, 440f., and 446. Finally, Religion, in chapter VII, introduces a new historical sequence, which begins with Zoroastrianism-cum-Judaism (see ¶720) and ends with Lutheranism, on the brink of its transformation into Hegelian philosophy. In his final chapter, VIII, Hegel stresses the unfolding of the shapes of consciousness in history (see ¶¶803 and 808). But the series of shapes in the *Phenomenology* corresponds to no single temporal sequence. Their ordering is primarily logical and only occasionally does the logical order mesh with a historical order.

Hegel believes that the process whereby each shape of consciousness generates its immediate successor—that each shape's knowledge of its object becomes the object of the next shape—guarantees the completeness of the shapes of consciousness he presents: see ¶79. This is somewhat overoptimistic, both because it is not obvious that the process in question does ensure completeness—after all, the process whereby numbers are generated by beginning with 0 and continually applying the operation '+1' does not capture all the numbers there are—and because Hegel's application of the procedure becomes more perfunctory, or at least less scrutable, as the

¹² In the Introduction, ¶78, Hegel seems to use *Gestaltung* in the same way as *Gestalt*. But later in the work, he uses it to refer to larger groups of related 'shapes': see ¶447.

Phenomenology proceeds. But even if the process that Hegel applied (or, rather, 'considered'—in view of his non-interventionist stance) were guaranteed to omit no shape of consciousness, it would not follow that consciousness of the absolute itself was to be found among them. For even if the absolute itself is ultimately accessible to human consciousness,¹³ there is little reason to suppose that our quest for it will ever come to an end and not continue indefinitely (as number-generation does), turning up new shapes of consciousness that Hegel never lived to consider.¹⁴

The Absolute Unmasked?

Here we need to ask: does Hegel answer, or even attempt to answer, the question about the absolute? In the Introduction, he seems to have dismissed the question, along with its presuppositions, and to have turned to a quite different subject, our successive views of the absolute. How could an account of our views of the absolute tell us anything about the absolute itself? Our successive diverse views about, say, the atom surely do tell us more about atoms, since they are supported by appropriate empirical evidence and are regarded as continually approximating closer to the real nature of the atom, even if there is no guarantee that our knowledge of it will ever be complete. But the absolute is not susceptible to empirical investigation in the way that atoms are. Any empirical evidence we have of the nature of rock-bottom reality can be dismissed by the Kantian sceptic as simply evidence concerning appearances, atoms included, and irrelevant to the nature of the underlying absolute. At this point, Hegel might have conceded that the investigation of successive views of the absolute is simply the best we can do and that we can never reach the absolute itself. This is not what he does, however. Contrary to our earlier supposition, he does not believe that shapes of consciousness proceed indefinitely. They advance towards a goal: 'the goal is fixed for knowledge just as necessarily as the sequence of the advance; it is situated where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, and the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept. So the advance towards this goal is also relentless, and no satisfaction is to be found at any earlier station' (§80). Generally speaking, each shape of consciousness finds itself to be unsatisfactory and gives way to a more complex and satisfactory shape, which is the 'truth' of its immediate predecessor, not, that is, *the* truth unqualified, since this new shape too will find itself unsatisfactory in turn, but what the predecessor really amounts to and what provides a resolution, albeit temporary, of its difficulties. No such defective shape of consciousness can reveal the absolute, not only because of its defects, the mismatch between object and concept, but also because it is necessary, even possible, to go *beyond* it: no lower shape of consciousness can express the full potential of the absolute's generative power. So the final shape of consciousness must

¹³ In a sense, Hegel himself accepts that the absolute is not accessible to human *consciousness*, since he believes that insofar as there is an absolute at all, it is the pure thoughts of his logic, which form the scaffolding both of nature and of the mind. When one thinks about, and in terms of, these thoughts, one is not 'conscious' in Hegel's sense, since the thoughts are not an object distinct from oneself.

¹⁴ Stekeler (2014) argues, reasonably enough, that humanity's quest for truth is never-ending, but his attribution of this view to Hegel is more controversial.

be unsurpassable, such that it neither needs to be, nor can be, supplanted by another shape that amounts to the 'truth' of it. Hegel's presentation of this final shape is two-pronged. It is so, because something like a distinction between the phenomenal world and the absolute occurs not only in the minds of us phenomenological philosophers surveying the successive shapes of consciousness, but also within the shapes of consciousness themselves. This is the distinction between worldly life, the history of which is surveyed in chapter VI ('Spirit'), and religion, the history of which is recorded in chapter VII ('Religion'). Religion, as Hegel conceives it, is our shared self-consciousness, in contrast to the consciousness of our worldly life. Hence the worldly shapes of consciousness that appear historically in chapter VI are accompanied by a religion, postulating a division between the social world and a relatively determinate absolute. This is true of the Greek world (§§446ff., 699ff.) and especially of the period from the medieval world down to the French revolution (§§487, 528ff.). The history of religions in VII correlates only very roughly with the history of worldly consciousness in VI, but their final stages neatly coincide. Chapter VI ends with the 'beautiful soul' (see §§658ff. and 795), the conscientious individual who forms the basis of the new State that is beginning to emerge in the wake of the French revolution,¹⁵ a State that gives due weight both to 'ethical life', or communal social morality, and to the individual moral conscience—in contrast to the ancient city-state, which merged the individual with ethical life, and to the revolutionary order of absolute freedom, which recognized only the individual citizen, guided, if by anything at all, only by individualistic morality and not by any objective ethical order. The beautiful soul is self-contained and autonomous. In his conscience and in his environing ethical society, he has all he needs for the moral management of his life. He does not need to look to heaven for guidance. Conversely, the concluding stage of religion, Lutheran Christianity, descends to meet the beautiful soul. Christianity is 'manifest' or 'revealed' religion, that is, the religion that is entirely open and above board, in which the absolute discloses itself to mankind. This is an essential characteristic of God Himself—God cannot be God unless He is known to humans, since humans are an essential aspect of God. This religion also provides a gratifying model of the way in which the shapes of our consciousness are involved in the absolute itself: they are, as it were, rungs of a ladder thrown down to us by God Himself, because of His need to be known by us. But this religion brings God down to earth in the form of a man, and subsequently situates Him, as the holy spirit, in the Christian community rather than in a remote heaven. 'God is dead', Hegel proclaims (§§752, 785), anticipating Nietzsche, but himself anticipated by Lutheran hymnists and no more intending his dictum as an unequivocal declaration of atheism than they did. Conversely, man, in the form of the beautiful soul, has risen to meet God halfway. In contrast to Descartes, and to many another philosopher, Hegel does not regard the Self as fixed and determinate, and in particular not as a free-floating ego. It undergoes a transforming education in parallel with the changes in its objects and in its attitudes towards them. The *Phenomenology* is, among other things, a quest for an adequate

¹⁵ In §§658ff. The beautiful soul is presented as a dead-end, who has dwindled away because of his inertia. His reappearance in §§795–7 as a crucial link between earth and heaven is surprising and hard to explain. My own explanation is therefore conjectural and controversial.

conception of the Self. The conscious Self is itself an offshoot of the absolute, and every shape of consciousness involves a conception not only of its object, but also of the Self and of its relationship to its object. It does not follow, however, that every shape involves an adequate conception of its own Self. In general, an adequate conception of the Self of shape n is provided only by its successor, $n+1$, so that 'knowledge . . . needs to go beyond itself' in order to 'find itself'. A shape adequate to the absolute must provide the Self with an adequate account of itself, and not leave it to the immediately successive shape to provide such an account.¹⁶ Only after this long education are we in a fit state to fuse with the similarly transformed deity. Thus God becomes man and, conversely, man becomes God. The absolute, Hegel believes, has at last come down to earth.

Who Am I?

This solution may well leave us dissatisfied. For one thing, it gives a disconcertingly parochial account of the humanization of the absolute. Why should we regard the religion, and the idealized citizen, of early 19th-century Germany as the appropriate juncture for the revelation of the absolute? Why should we even accept this religion's account of the absolute? Secondly, the account misses out Hegel himself. Even if we accept his assurance that he is simply an onlooker and that the shapes of consciousness are supplied by 'spirit' and not by himself, his own role and his insight into the succession of shapes needs to be explained in terms of the absolute from which it, like everything else, stems, not shuffled off onto the unphilosophical beautiful soul. Hegel found a division within himself: 'I raise myself in thought to the Absolute . . . thus being infinite consciousness; yet at the same time I am finite consciousness. . . . Both aspects seek each other and flee each other . . . I am the struggle between them'.¹⁷ Here we encounter the distinction that Hegel often marks as that between the 'singular' Self and the 'universal' Self. God is not to be identified with the singular Self, with what Kant memorably described as the 'crooked timber of humanity', but rather with the universal Self. However, we now have two candidates for the role of the universal Self: the dutiful conscientious citizen and the philosopher. Both have a claim to universality. Insofar as someone is a citizen, he (or she, as we might add, even if Hegel would not) is not a singular person, with all the idiosyncrasies that that implies, but a rational, dutiful and morally sensitive performer in a rational social order consisting of similarly exemplary people. Hegel *qua* philosopher is not the singular dance-loving, pie-eating, lottery-playing, wine-drinking Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel described in his biographies, but a pure thinker, whose thoughts might in principle be shared by any similarly gifted individual—and are, at some level, shared even by ungifted individuals. However, the two universal candidates are not one and the same. Hegel was no doubt a conscientious and dutiful citizen, as well as a philosopher. But not every dutiful citizen is a philosopher. This suggests that Hegel might have followed a different route in introducing his system to beginners.

¹⁶ This requirement is attested by 'observing reason', whose aim it is to find itself, or the mind, in things, since no account of the world can be complete if it leaves ourselves out (§§257–62).

¹⁷ Quoted by Fackenheim (1967), p.31 from Hegel (1895) I, p.65.

In the *Phenomenology* he proceeds by examining shapes of consciousness which, although they are often suffused with philosophical ideas, are not, for the most part, established philosophical doctrines. In his *Encyclopaedia*, by contrast, he presents a briefer alternative introduction, by way of an exposition and critique of various recent philosophies, especially pre-Kantian metaphysics (Leibniz, etc.), Hume's empiricism and Kant's transcendental idealism, and Descartes and Jacobi (see *Enc.* I, ¶¶25–78). He sketches an even briefer history of philosophy in ¶803 of the *Phenomenology*, and also remarks, in ¶805, on the fact that shapes of consciousness embody, or deploy, the general categories that later appear explicitly in the *Logic*.¹⁸ Sensory certainty, for example, is structured, initially at least, by the category of Being; and its successors, perception and understanding, depend respectively on the category of the thing and its properties and on such categories as force and law, categories that are applicable both to ourselves and to the things around us. In the shapes of consciousness of the *Phenomenology* categories are intertwined with empirical material and not considered in their purity. Perception, for example, does not explicitly consider the category of thing and properties; it deploys it in order to say that salt is white, cubical, and tart and to extricate itself from the difficulties this involves. By contrast, when science emerges fully fledged at the end of the book, under the heading 'Absolute Knowledge', categories are extracted from their empirical embodiment and considered in their purity. This is what Hegel primarily means by saying, in ¶77, that the soul purifies itself to spirit. It has broken free of empirical material and deals with pure categories. Liberation from the empirical progresses over the course of the *Phenomenology*.

However, Hegel's great philosophical predecessors have only subdued presence in the book as a whole. Why, we might ask, do they, and Hegel himself, not play a greater part in it? If God has become man, the philosopher has as good a claim to be His repository as does the dutiful citizen. Hegel has something to say about this at the very beginning of the *Phenomenology*, in ¶2 of the Preface. Philosophies are related to each other in a manner similar to that in which shapes of consciousness are. They form a succession analogous to the gradual growth of a tree: . . . Plato, Aristotle, . . . Descartes, Locke–Leibniz–Spinoza, Kant, . . . Hegel. Each of these philosophies (except perhaps the last!) is false, and this explains why it is followed by another philosophy. But none of them, or at least none of those that enter the philosophical mainstream,¹⁹ is entirely false, and that explains why each philosophy retains something of its predecessors. In fact, Hegel tends to regard a philosophy (like a shape of consciousness) as the 'truth of'

¹⁸ The plural 'categories' is Aristotle's and Kant's word rather than Hegel's. Hegel prefers such terms as 'thought-determinations' (*Denkbestimmungen*). In the *Phenomenology* he uses 'Kategorie' in the singular and identifies it with the I or Self, regarding its differentiation into distinct categories as problematic: see ¶235.

¹⁹ One problem with this conception of philosophy is the difficulty of deciding what counts as a philosophy and what does not. Hegel gives short shrift to some of his philosophical contemporaries, such as W.T. Krug and G.E. Schulze, and Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel, who might be regarded by others as very reputable philosophers. The question what is to count as philosophy, and as significant or great philosophy, is itself a philosophical question. Hence different philosophers may well present different histories of their subject. Some figures—Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, for example—would surely appear in any serious history, but the status of others—Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Jesus, St. Paul—is more precarious.

its supplanted predecessor, though, again, this does not mean that it is 'the true', since it will in turn be supplanted by *its* successor. Not every philosopher has regarded himself as absorbing the thought of his predecessors. Descartes, for example, believed that he was starting from a clean slate, whereas Aristotle explicitly tried to extract and absorb the views of his predecessors insofar as they were correct.²⁰ Hegel more explicitly and deliberately than any of his predecessors attempts to take his predecessors on board, to integrate their findings in what he regards as philosophy, or 'science', as such, not simply Hegel's philosophy: 'In the different philosophies that make their appearance, the *history of philosophy* presents, firstly, only one philosophy at different stages of its development and, secondly, it shows that the particular *principles*, on one of which each system was grounded, are only *branches* of one and the same whole. The last philosophy in time is the result of all preceding philosophies and must therefore contain the principles of all of them; and so, if it is in fact philosophy, it is the fullest, richest, and most concrete philosophy' (*Enc.* I, ¶13). Taken in isolation each of these preceding philosophies is false, if for no other reason, because they are 'one-sided', exclusively empiricist, for example, and neglecting the role of reason. This type of falsity is remedied when the philosophy is integrated into a more comprehensive philosophy, one that gives reason, as well as experience, its due. But, in other respects too, a philosophy may need modification before it can be integrated in a later philosophy; Plato's theory of recollection was for example adopted by Leibniz for his theory of innate ideas, but shorn of the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence with which Plato associated it. Past philosophies undergo similar modifications when they are integrated into Hegel's philosophy. So although, say, Platonism is false on its own it is no longer false once it is integrated or 'sublated' (see ¶30) in Hegelianism.

Why, then, did Hegel not proceed in this way towards fully fledged science, as he did in later works? There are several answers to this question. First, such a procedure may well tell us why, if we are already operating at the level of philosophy, we should advance to Hegelianism and not remain at some earlier stage of philosophy. What it does not tell us, however, is why we should ascend to philosophy in the first place. Yet this is precisely what Hegel wants to explain to his audience. He wants to guide us from the 'natural consciousness' characteristic of philosophers and non-philosophers alike, by way of his own 'presentation' of 'knowledge as it appears', the sort of knowledge that natural consciousness has, to science. 'Natural consciousness' and 'knowledge as it appears' are distinct from science. They are subject to empirical constraints and are confined, at any given stage of their development, to a particular way of looking at things, to the exclusion of other ways of looking at things. Science, by contrast, is free of empirical constraints and of such one-sidedness; it incorporates and surveys all possible ways of looking at things. In this respect, Hegel's own presentation is akin to, if not already, science. However, it displays the connection of science with non-philosophical communal life and its history, and its emergence from it. In particular, Hegel wants to establish the link between science and religion, and to show how the latter gives rise to the former. Secondly, if Hegel were simply

²⁰ There is a similar contrast between Jeremy Bentham, who purported to start afresh, and John Stuart Mill, who wanted to take the best from his predecessors.

to proceed from each philosophy to the next, there would be no special reason to suppose that the process ends with Hegel rather than continuing indefinitely to ever more advanced philosophies. But Hegel is not content with such a modest position. He regards his own philosophy not as simply one stage in the development of philosophy, but as the culmination of philosophy as such. One reason that might be offered for this startling claim is that Hegel, alone among the great philosophers, views philosophy as a single developing organism, each stage of which incorporates and advances on its predecessors. But though that might be a significant innovation, it would surely not be enough to establish that Hegelianism is the full-grown tree or, indeed, that there is any limit to the growth of the organism. By contrast, the *Phenomenology* offers what would be more compelling reasons, if only we could believe them, for accepting the special status of Hegelianism. It alone, among all possible ways of viewing things, leaves no loose ends that need to be tied up by a successor. It alone, with the cooperation of Lutheranism, brings gods, God, and the various versions of the absolute postulated by its predecessors, down to earth in the form of the logical structure of reality. It alone shows, at long last, that the world is cognitively and morally manageable. But why now? How come that this stupendous climax in the course of the world occurs now, in 1806? That is a third advantage that Hegel sees in the procedure he adopts in the *Phenomenology*. It gives an answer to this question that could not easily be derived simply from Hegel's position in the sequence of great philosophers. His system emerges in a cultural environment involving a confluence of extra-philosophical circumstances, as well as philosophical, especially Lutheranism and the moral conscience of the romantics, that are especially favourable to the birth of this new science: see e.g. ¶11.

‘Glory to Man in the highest! for Man is the master of things’²¹

Hegel is respectful of religion and regards it as an indispensable stepping stone on the road to truth. He is, however, equally respectful of the enlightenment's criticisms of religion (¶¶541ff.). His own criticisms of religion are twofold. First, it populates heaven with pictorial representations derived from the sensory world and, in the case of Christianity, bases its faith on ill-attested events remote in time and space.²² Secondly, it splits the universe in two, postulating a sharp rift between the divine world and the human world.²³ As a consequence it also divides the human Self, at least the religious Self, who has one foot planted in heaven and the other on earth. Providentially, however, religion itself, in the form of Lutheranism, supplies a solution, and the loose ends are tied up by philosophy. God has become man or,

²¹ From the *Hymn of Man*, by Algernon Charles Swinburne.

²² In ¶554 Hegel suggests that Christianity resorts to historical texts to buttress its faith only because its enlightenment critics seduce it into doing so, and in ¶568 that appeal to such empirical contingencies is only one aspect of Christian faith and is overemphasized by the enlightenment.

²³ Hegel's criticisms apply more incisively to 'faith'—the 18th-century target of the enlightenment's attack—than to 'religion'. For the distinction between faith and religion, see ¶¶487 and 673.

conversely, man has become God. The man in question is, however, the universal man, whether this be the dutiful citizen or the all-seeing philosopher. Moreover, the man in question has not simply cast aside his past history. The shapes of consciousness that Hegel surveys are familiar to this man and they constitute his 'substance': see ¶30. He has a Greek, a Roman, a medieval Catholic, an enlightened *philosophe*, a French revolutionary, and a conscientious moralist packed within him. That is why he can understand these shapes of consciousness when they are presented to him. Hence Hegel's humanism, if such it be, does not stand in stark contrast to theism, but is conceived as a development of it and preserves, as well as abolishes, its religious origins.²⁴ Such a humanism is not, however, immovably rooted in its parochial birth-place. Lutheranism and the beautiful soul explain, in Hegel's view, how it came to birth, but it might well appeal to many who are not 19th-century German Lutherans.

Hegel's humanism (or, as we might better call it, his 'theanthropism') need not remain parochial. It is, however, thoroughly anthropocentric. An important strand in Hegel's argument is this. In Kant's usage, as we have seen, 'things in themselves', *Dinge an sich*, are things as they are intrinsically, independently of us, independently, in fact, of anything else. Since we cannot know things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us, mediated and distorted by our cognitive equipment, our knowledge is less than fully satisfactory. Indeed, in ¶75, Hegel doubts whether such so-called knowledge is really knowledge at all. He, by contrast, confers another meaning on *an sich*. Something that is *an sich* is merely potential, not fully actual, not 'for itself', let alone 'in and for itself'.²⁵ If 'things in themselves' are taken in this sense, then it is the things that are defective, merely potential, rather than our knowledge. When we come to know them, we do not distort them, we actualize them and make them into what they really are. This is why God is not properly God unless He is known by man. To reach this conclusion, however, Hegel must already confer a special status on man and also on knowledge. We might well agree that to be properly actual a thing must enter into relations with other things. It is hard to conceive of anything existing even in a potential form, if it is *wholly* unrelated to everything else. Even an acorn, a merely potential oak-tree, is related to other entities. To realize its potential and become an actual tree, it needs to enter into closer relations, with soil, water, sunlight, and so on. But it does not need to be known by man. Why should it be otherwise with God? No doubt, God was in a barely comprehensible state of sheer potentiality before He created the world,²⁶ but His relationship to a world, even a world bereft of human knowers, should surely be enough to actualize Him. In religious terms, Hegel's answer is that God is spirit; that to be fully actualized, spirit must be self-conscious, know itself; and that God can only become self-conscious in virtue of being known by humans. It is not enough that they should love Him and worship Him; they must know Him inside and out. In more secular terms, Hegel's world-view is thoroughly anthropocentric: humankind is not simply one among many other species,

²⁴ That is, it 'sublates' them.

²⁵ Hegel is here influenced by Aristotle's distinction between what is *dunamei*, 'potential', and what is *energeiai*, 'actual'.

²⁶ Hegel is at odds with the Christian tradition, which regards God as wholly actual even before the creation: see ¶769.

perched precariously above the physical, organic, and animal levels of nature. Not only are we the highest creatures the universe contains,²⁷ it is we who confer meaning and value on the universe and, above all, bring to it self-knowledge, knowledge of the universe as a whole. It is only for us that the question of the knowability of the absolute arises as a problem at all. There is, as far as we know, nothing else that asks the question 'What is the absolute?', nothing else from which the absolute is hidden, since there is nothing else to which it could possibly be revealed. It does not follow from this that our answer to the question should be as anthropocentric as the question itself. Hegel's justification for this step is perhaps twofold. First, whatever else the absolute may be, it must at least be sufficient to generate the human spirit and the succession of shapes of consciousness in which it gradually unfolds; in Hegel's eyes this implies that the absolute is itself spirit. Secondly, the culmination of the onward march of the human spirit is the final completion of a logical system that is not only the underpinning of human thought, but, in Hegel's view, the logical structure of the universe itself. In theological terms, God's plan for the creation of the world is mirrored in the depths of the human mind and becomes fully explicit in that mind. Thanks to ourselves God becomes aware of what he had in mind all along.²⁸ Hegel's humanism differs from the humanism of the enlightenment in several respects. It does not stand in sharp contrast to theism: the new man-god is laden with his religious past. It is not open to the charge that it postulates a uniform and unchanging human nature: man has not always been God, he has laboriously developed in order to become God. It is not so thoroughly egalitarian as the enlightenment version: not everyone is a philosopher or even a politically active citizen. Here Hegel's collectivism comes into play. Peasants, as well as philosophers, play a part in the social order, and they are elevated to divinity along with the rest. Quite likely religious worship will continue in order to give them a glimpse of the absolute.²⁹ Hegel's humanism is a curious beast.

²⁷ The characterization of humanity as the highest creature is itself anthropocentric, but no other creature has any say in the matter. A justification of it might be that humans involve the other levels of nature—physical, organic, and animal—but also something extra, namely rationality and all that goes with it.

²⁸ Apart from Hegel's reluctance to admit that anything is incomprehensible, there is more than a remote analogy between his attitude to theism and that expressed in Hume (2008), p.120: 'I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible, difference between the *human* and the *divine* mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily acknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still farther in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of Nature, and among the rest to the oeconomy of human mind and thought. However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows, that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently of any determination?'

²⁹ Hegel proclaims the end of art, but never the end of religion. See Hegel (1993).

Note on the Translation and Commentary

My translation policy differs from Arnold Miller's in at least three respects. In the first place, Hegel's own punctuation and italicization often get lost in Miller. I have attempted to restore them in the belief that, while they often strike us as eccentric, it should be left for the reader to decide what effect they have on Hegel's meaning and not imposed on the reader by the translator. I have, however, moderated this policy when intelligibility seemed to require it. Secondly, Miller usually capitalized words that he took to have a significant technical meaning for Hegel. Thus he has 'Notion' for *Begriff* (which I transform into 'concept'), 'Understanding' for *Verstand*, and so on. This has no justification in Hegel's text and, in my view, draws an unwarranted sharp distinction between what is a technical use and what is not. Again, it should be left to the reader (or to a note) to decide this question and not imposed by the translator. I myself capitalize words only where grammar requires it, and also for the purpose of disambiguation: to distinguish between grammatically different uses of a word (especially between its use as a plain adjective or adverb and its use as a noun) and between different German words that have to be translated by the same English word, between, for example, 'self' for *sich* and 'Self' for *das Selbst* or again between (*das*) *Sein* ('Being') and *seiend* ('being, that is, in being') or *das Seiende* (sometimes 'beings'). I have been encouraged in this by the time-honoured practice in English prose, even non-philosophical prose, of differentiating a 'state' in the sense of 'condition' from a 'State' in the political sense, and a 'church' as a building from a 'Church' as an institution. Finally, despite his exaggerated respect for some of Hegel's technical terms, Miller nevertheless dissolves others into various paraphrases, especially in the case of *an sich*, *für sich*, *an und für sich*, *das Ansich*, etc. I have restored such terms in the form of 'in itself', etc., leaving it to the reader (or a note) to decide what Hegel means in the context. I have been especially concerned to preserve Hegel's distinction between what are for him near-synonyms, but not exact synonyms. An example of this is the distinction between *individuell*, etc. and *einzel*, etc., a distinction that gets lost in Miller, but is preserved in the French translations and in the 1991 translation of *Enc. I*.

I highlight and explain some of these terminological niceties in their context in the Commentary with which I have replaced John Findlay's 'Analysis of the Text'. Like Findlay, I attempt to explain what Hegel is saying in every paragraph of the *Phenomenology*. However, I pay more attention than Findlay did to explaining Hegel's way of expressing what he means. In addition, I supply details of the other works to which Hegel refers, and of the other philosophers with whom he engages. I also give references to parallel passages in Hegel's other works, and cross-references between different passages within the *Phenomenology*, which shed light on each other and on the structure of the work as a whole. Finally, I am more ready than Findlay was to assess Hegel's argument from a philosophical point of view. The overall aim of the Commentary is to enable readers to navigate their way through Hegel's text with philosophical understanding.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

I usually cite a work by its author and the date of the edition I consulted, but I also use the following abbreviations:

CPR	Kant, <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>
Enc. I, II, III	the respective volumes of Hegel's <i>Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences</i>
PH	Hegel, <i>The Philosophy of History</i>
PR	Hegel, <i>Outlines of the Philosophy of Right</i>
PS	Hegel, <i>Phenomenology of Spirit</i>
SL	Hegel, <i>Science of Logic</i>

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System of Science

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*First Part: The
Phenomenology of Spirit*

Bamberg and Würzburg
Joseph Anton Goebhardt

1807

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Preface

¶1. It is customary to begin a work by explaining in a preface the aim that the author set himself in the work, his reasons for writing it, and the relationship in which he believes it to stand to other earlier or contemporary treatments of the same subject. In the case of a philosophical work, however, such an explanation seems not only superfluous but, in view of the nature of the Thing,¹ even inappropriate and misleading. For the sort of statement that might properly be made about philosophy in a preface—say, a historical *report* of the main direction and standpoint, of the general content and results, a string of desultory assertions and assurances about the true—cannot be accepted as the way and manner in which to expound philosophical truth. Also, philosophy moves essentially in the element² of universality that embraces the particular within itself, and this creates the impression, more here than in the case of other sciences, that the Thing itself, in all its essentials, is expressed in the aim and the final results, whereas the elaboration is really the inessential. By contrast, we need no convincing that, in the general idea³ of what (for example) anatomy is—say, the knowledge of the parts of the body considered in their lifeless state—we are not yet in possession of the Thing itself, the content of this science, that we must in addition get to grips with the particular. Further, in the case of such an aggregate of information, which has no right to bear the name of science, a conversational account of aims and other such generalities is no different from the historical and unconceptual way in which the content itself (these nerves, muscles, etc.) is discussed. In the case of philosophy, by contrast, this would give rise to the incongruity that this manner of which philosophy makes use is shown by philosophy itself to be incapable of grasping the truth.⁴

¶2. So too, determining the relationship that a philosophical work supposes it has with other undertakings on the same subject introduces an extraneous concern, and obscures what really matters in the cognition of the truth. As the opposition between the true and the false becomes firmly fixed for opinion,¹ opinion tends to expect either assent or contradiction in response to a current philosophical system, and to see in any comment on such a system only the one or the other. Opinion does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of the truth; rather it sees in the diversity only contradiction. The bud disappears when the blossom bursts forth, and one could say that the bud is refuted by the blossom; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is declared to be a false Being-there² of the plant, and the fruit replaces the blossom as the truth of the plant. These forms are not only different, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of the organic unity, in which they not only do not conflict, but each is as necessary as the other; and this shared

necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. But the contradiction levelled against a philosophical system does not usually comprehend itself in this way; nor does the apprehending consciousness generally know how to liberate the contradiction from its one-sidedness or keep it free, and to recognize the reciprocally necessary moments in the shape of seeming conflict and contrariety.³

¶3. The demand for such explanations and the satisfaction of it are easily mistaken for a concern with what is essential. Where could a fuller expression of the inner core of a philosophical work be given than in its aims and results, and how could these be more distinctly recognized than by their difference from whatever else the age produces in the same sphere? But when this procedure is taken for more than the beginning of cognition, when it is accepted as actual cognition, then we must in fact count it as one of the devices for bypassing the Thing itself, and combining the semblance of seriousness and of application to the Thing with an actual avoidance of both. For the Thing is not exhausted by its *aim*, but by its *elaboration*, nor is the *result* the *actual* whole, but only the result together with its becoming. The aim by itself is a lifeless universal, while the tendency is a mere drift that as yet lacks its actuality; and the naked result is a corpse which has left the tendency behind. Similarly, the *difference* is really the *limit* of the Thing; it lies where the Thing ceases, or it is what the Thing is not. These exertions over the aim or the results, as well as over the differences and assessments of the one and the other, are therefore an easier task than they perhaps seem to be. For instead of dealing with the Thing, this sort of procedure is always away beyond it; instead of lingering in the Thing and forgetting itself in it, this sort of knowledge is always hankering for something else; it remains preoccupied with itself rather than absorbed in the Thing and surrendering to it. The easiest course is to pass judgement on a work of substance and solidity; to grasp it is harder; hardest of all is to combine the two by producing an account of it.¹

¶4. Culture and the emergence from the immediacy of substantial life will always have to begin in the following way. We get acquainted with *universal* principles and points of view; we work our way up at first only to the *thought* of the Thing in *general*; equally we learn to support or refute the Thing with reasons; we learn to apprehend the rich and concrete abundance with determinate precision, and to give an accurate account and a serious judgement of it. But this beginning of culture will first of all make room for the seriousness of life in its fullness, which leads into the experience of the Thing itself. And even if, in addition to all this, the seriousness of the concept descends into the depths of the Thing, this sort of information and assessment will retain its appropriate place in conversation.¹

¶5. The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of science—to the goal of its being able to give up the name of *love of knowledge* and become *actual knowledge*¹—that is what I have set out to do. The inner necessity that knowledge should be science lies in its nature, and the only satisfactory explanation of this is the presentation of philosophy itself. But the *external* necessity, insofar as it is conceived in a general way, leaving aside contingencies of the person and individual motives, is the same as the *inner* necessity, in the shape, that is, in which time represents the Being-there of its moments. To show that the time is ripe for the elevation of philosophy to a science—this would therefore be the only true justification of the attempts that

have this aim, because this would demonstrate the necessity of the aim, because it would indeed at the same time fulfil this very aim.²

¶6. When the true shape of truth is posited in this scientific character—or, what is the same thing, when the truth is asserted to have the element of its existence only in the *concept*—I am well aware that this seems to stand in contradiction with an idea, and with the consequences of that idea, whose presumption is as great as its prevalence in the convictions of our age. An explanation of this contradiction therefore seems hardly superfluous, even though here it can be no more than an affirmation, just like the view that it opposes. This is the view that the true exists only in what, or rather as what, is variously called intuition, immediate knowledge of the absolute, religion, Being—not in the centre of divine love, but the Being of this centre itself. If this is so, it follows that what is then required for the presentation of philosophy is not the form of the concept, but rather its contrary. The absolute is supposed not to be comprehended, but felt and intuited; it is not the concept of the absolute that is to have its say and find expression, but the feeling and intuition of it.¹

¶7. If we look at the appearance of such a demand in its wider context, and consider the stage at which *self-conscious spirit* stands *at present*, it is clear that spirit has now advanced beyond the substantial life it formerly led in the element of thought,—beyond this immediacy of its faith, beyond the satisfaction and security of the certainty that consciousness possessed of its reconciliation with the essence and of the universal presence of the essence both within and without. It has not only passed beyond all this into the other extreme of the insubstantial reflection of itself into itself, but beyond that too. Spirit has not only lost its essential life; it is also conscious of this loss, and of the finitude that is its own content. Turning away from the husks, and confessing and cursing its sorry state, it now requires from philosophy, not so much *knowledge* of what it *is*, as philosophy's help in establishing once more its substantiality and solidity of Being. Philosophy is supposed to meet this need, not by opening up the locked fastness of substance and raising this to self-consciousness, not by restoring its chaotic consciousness to the order of thought and the simplicity of the concept, but rather by blurring the distinctions of thought, by suppressing the differentiating concept and by establishing the *feeling* of the essence, providing *edification* rather than *insight*. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love are the bait required to arouse the desire to bite; not the concept, but ecstasy, not the cold advance of necessity in the Thing, but the ferment of enthusiasm, these are supposed to be what sustains and promotes the expansion of the wealth of substance.¹

¶8. Corresponding to this demand is the strenuous, almost zealous and apparently furious effort to tear men away from their absorption in the sensory, the commonplace, the singular,¹ and to direct their gaze to the stars; as if they had forgotten all about the divine, and were ready like worms to satisfy themselves with dirt and water. Formerly they had a heaven furnished with a vast wealth of thoughts and images. The meaning of all that is lay in the thread of light by which it was linked to heaven; instead of abiding in *this* present, our gaze glided along this thread beyond the present, up to the divine essence, to a present beyond, so to speak. The eye of the spirit had to be forcibly directed to earthly things and held there; and it has taken a long time and laborious effort to introduce the clarity that only other-worldly things

used to have into the fog and confusion enveloping the sense for this world, and to make attention to the present as such, to make what was called *experience*, interesting and valid.—Now we seem to need the opposite: sense seems so firmly rooted in the world that it requires just as much force to raise it up. The spirit is clearly so impoverished that, like a wanderer in the desert longing for a simple drink of water, it seems to crave for its refreshment only the meagre feeling of the divine in general. The extent of spirit's loss is to be measured by what satisfies it.²

¶9. This modest contentment in receiving, or parsimony in giving, is not, however, right for science. Whoever seeks mere edification, whoever wants to shroud in fog the worldly variety of his Being-there and of thought, in order to get the indeterminate enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity, can look for this where he likes. He will easily find the wherewithal to vent his ardour, and pride himself on it. But philosophy must beware of the wish to be edifying.

¶10. Still less must this complacency which renounces science make the claim that such hazy enthusiasm is superior to science. This prophetic talk supposes that it remains right in the centre and in the depths, looks disdainfully at determinacy (the *Horos*), and deliberately keeps away from the concept and necessity, away from the reflection that resides only in finitude. But just as there is an empty breadth, so too there is an empty depth; and just as there is an extension of substance that pours out into finite multiplicity without the power to hold it together, so is this an intensity without content, sheer force without any spread, and this is the same as superficiality. The force of spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in its display. Moreover, when this non-conceptual, substantial knowledge professes to have submerged the ownness of the Self in the essence, and to philosophize in a true and holy manner, it deludes itself: instead of surrendering to God, by spurning measure and determination it merely gives free rein by turns to the contingency of the content within itself and to its own wilfulness. When they give themselves up to the untamed ferment of the substance, they suppose that, by enshrouding self-consciousness and surrendering the understanding they become the *beloved* of God to whom he gives wisdom in sleep; and so what they in fact conceive and give birth to in their sleep are of course dreams.¹

¶11. Incidentally, it is not difficult to see that our time is a time of birth and of transition to a new period. Spirit has broken with the previous world of its life and ideas, and is on the point of submerging it in the past; it is at work on its own transformation. Indeed, spirit is never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth,—a qualitative leap,—and now the child is born, so the spirit that cultivates itself matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous **world**, whose instability is indicated only by isolated symptoms; the frivolity and boredom that infest the established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown, are heralds of approaching change. This gradual crumbling that did not alter the physiognomy of the whole is interrupted by the sunrise which, like lightning, all of a sudden reveals the contour of the new world.¹

¶12. But this new world does not have a complete actuality any more than the new-born child; and it is essential to bear this in mind. The first emergence is only its

immediacy or its concept. Just as a building is not finished when its foundation has been laid, so the achieved concept of the whole is not the whole itself. When we wish to see an oak in the power of its trunk and in the spread of its branches and the mass of its foliage, we are not satisfied if we are shown an acorn instead. So too, science, the crown of a world of the spirit, is not complete in its beginnings. The beginning of the new spirit is the product of a wide-ranging revolution in various forms of culture, the reward of a complicated, tortuous journey and of an equally immense and strenuous effort. This beginning is the whole that has returned into itself from succession as well as extension, the resultant *simple concept* of the whole. But the actuality of this simple whole consists in this: these configurations that have become moments again develop anew and take on a configuration, but now in their new element, in the sense that has emerged.¹

¶13. The initial appearance of the new world is, on the one hand, only the whole shrouded in its *simplicity*, or the general foundation of the whole. Yet the wealth of the former Being-there is still present to consciousness in recollection. In the newly appearing shape consciousness misses the range and particularization of content; but even more it misses the articulation of form whereby distinctions are securely determined and ordered in their firm relationships. Without this articulation, science lacks universal *intelligibility*, and gives the impression of being the esoteric possession of a few singletons;—an esoteric possession, since it is as yet present only in its concept, or only its interior is present; of a few singletons, since its unexpanded appearance makes its Being-there a singular thing. Only what is completely determined is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and becoming the property of everyone. The intelligible form of science is the way to science, open to everyone and equally accessible to everyone, and to attain to rational knowledge through the understanding is the just demand of the consciousness that approaches science; for the understanding is thinking, is the pure I in general; and what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common to science and the unscientific consciousness alike, enabling the unscientific consciousness to enter science immediately.¹

¶14. When it first begins and has thus achieved neither completeness of detail nor perfection of form, science is open to criticism for this. But it would be unjust, if such criticism is supposed to affect the essence of science, and it is equally inadmissible to refuse to recognize the demand for such articulation. This opposition seems to be the most important knot with which scientific culture is at present grappling, and which it still does not properly understand. One side insists on its wealth of material and its intelligibility, the other side scorns this intelligibility at least, and insists on its immediate rationality and divinity. Even if the former side is reduced to silence, whether by the force of truth alone or by the browbeating of the other, and even if it feels overwhelmed with regard to the fundamentals of the Thing, still it is by no means satisfied regarding the demands it makes: the demands are just, but not fulfilled. Its silence is only half due to the victory, but half to the boredom and indifference that are apt to be the consequence of a constantly aroused expectation and of promises not attended by fulfilment.¹

¶15. As for the content, sometimes the others certainly make it easy for themselves to have a wide range. They draw into their domain a mass of material, namely

material that is already familiar and well ordered, and by focusing chiefly on oddities and curiosities they seem all the more to have in their possession everything else that knowledge has already dealt with in its way, and also to be in control of what is still in disarray. And so they seem to subject everything to the absolute Idea, which thus seems to be cognized in everything and to have matured into an expanded science. But a closer inspection shows that this expansion has not come about through one and the same principle's spontaneous adoption of different shapes, but it is rather the shapeless repetition of one and the same principle, which is just externally applied to the different material, and acquires a tedious semblance of diversity. The Idea, which for itself is no doubt true, in fact always remains at its starting-point, if the development consists in nothing more than such a repetition of the same formula. When the knowing subject parades this single immobile form around in whatever is at hand, when the material is dipped into this stagnant element from outside, this does not fulfil what is needed any better than arbitrary notions about the content. It is not, that is, the wealth of shapes surging up from itself and their self-determining differentiation. Rather it is a monochromatic formalism that only arrives at the differentiation of the material because the material is already prepared and familiar.¹

¶16. Yet this formalism presents this monotony and abstract universality as the absolute; it assures us that dissatisfaction with it is an incapacity to master the absolute standpoint and stick to it. Formerly, the empty possibility of representing something in another way was sufficient to refute an idea, and this bare possibility, the universal thought, also had the entire positive value of actual cognition. Here too we see all value ascribed to the universal Idea in this form of non-actuality, and the dissolution of the distinct and determinate—or rather their banishment into the abyss of emptiness with no further development or intrinsic justification—presented as the speculative approach. To consider some Being-there as it is in the *absolute* just consists in saying of it: of course we have spoken of it just now as if it were something, but in the absolute, the $A=A$, there is nothing of the sort; in the absolute everything is one. To pit this single insight, that in the absolute everything is the same, against discriminating and fulfilled cognition, or cognition seeking and demanding fulfilment—or to pass off its *absolute* as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black—this is the naiveté of emptiness of cognition.—The formalism that recent philosophy denounced and reviled revived in its very midst, and it will not disappear from science, though its inadequacy is familiar and felt, until the cognizing of absolute actuality has become entirely clear about its nature.—A general idea, if it precedes the attempt to implement it, makes the implementation easier to follow. In consideration of this, it is useful to give a rough indication of it here, with the concomitant intention of taking the opportunity to eliminate some forms whose habitual acceptance is an obstacle for philosophical cognition.¹

¶17. In my view, which must be justified only by the presentation of the system itself, everything depends on conceiving and expressing the true not as *substance*, but just as much as *subject*. At the same time it should be noted that substantiality includes within itself the universal, or the *immediacy of knowledge* itself, as well as the immediacy that is *Being* or *immediacy for knowledge*.—If the conception of God as the one substance shocked the age in which this definition was announced, the reason for this was on the one hand the instinct that self-consciousness was only submerged

in it and not preserved. On the other hand, the contrary, which clings to thinking as thinking, to *universality* as such, is the same simplicity or undifferentiated, immobile substantiality. And if, thirdly, thinking unites the Being of substance with itself, and conceives immediacy or intuition as thinking, then the question is still whether this intellectual intuition does not fall back again into inert simplicity and does not present actuality itself in a non-actual manner.¹

¶ 18. The living substance is, moreover, Being which is in truth *subject*, or, what comes to the same thing, Being which is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or is the mediation of becoming-other-to-itself with itself. As subject, substance is pure *simple negativity*, and for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple; or the opposing duplication, which is again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its opposition: it is only this self-restoring equality, or reflection into itself in otherness—not an *original* unity as such, or *immediate* unity as such—that is the true. The true is the becoming of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, and has its end as its beginning, and is only actual through implementation and its end.¹

¶ 19. Thus the life of God and divine cognition may certainly be expressed as love's play with itself; this Idea degenerates into edification, and even insipidity, if the seriousness, the pain, the patience and labour of the negative are missing from it. *In itself* this life is indeed serene equality and unity with itself, which has no serious concern with otherness and alienation, or with the overcoming of this alienation. But this *in-itself* is the abstract universality, in which the nature of this life, *to be for itself*, and thus in general the self-movement of the form, are ignored. If the form is said to be equal to the essence, then it is ipso facto a misunderstanding to suppose that cognition can be satisfied with the in-itself or the essence, but can do without the form—that the absolute principle or the absolute intuition makes the completion of the former, or the development of the latter, superfluous. Just because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the essence is not to be conceived and expressed merely as essence, i.e. as immediate substance or as pure self-intuition of the divine, but just as much as *form*, and in the whole wealth of the developed form. Only in this way is it conceived and expressed as actuality.¹

¶ 20. The true is the whole. But the whole is only the essence completing itself through its development. Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially *result*, that only in the *end* is it what it is in truth; and precisely in this consists its nature: to be actual, subject, or becoming-its-own-self. Though it may seem contradictory that the absolute is to be conceived essentially as result, a brief consideration clears up this semblance of contradiction. The beginning, the principle, or the absolute, as it is initially and immediately expressed, is only the universal. If I say 'all animals', these words cannot amount to a zoology; it is equally obvious that such words as the divine, the absolute, the eternal, etc., do not express what is contained in them;—and only such words do, in fact, express the intuition as the immediate. Whatever is more than such a word, even just the transition to a proposition, contains a *becoming-other* that must be taken back, is a mediation. But it is mediation that inspires abhorrence, as if absolute cognition were abandoned when one makes more of mediation than just this: that it is nothing absolute and has no place in the absolute.¹

¶21. But this abhorrence in fact stems from unfamiliarity with the nature of mediation and of absolute cognition itself. For mediation is nothing other than self-moving equality-to-itself, or it is reflection into itself, the moment of the I that is for itself, pure negativity or, reduced to its pure abstraction, *simple becoming*. Because of its simplicity, the I or becoming in general, this mediating, is precisely immediacy in the course of becoming, and the immediate itself.—It is therefore a misunderstanding of reason when reflection is excluded from the true, and is not conceived as a positive moment of the absolute. It is reflection that makes the true a result, but also sublates this opposition to its becoming; for this becoming is equally simple, and therefore does not differ from the form of the true, which consists in showing itself as *simple* in the result; it is rather just this having-returned into simplicity.—Though the embryo is indeed human *in itself*, it is not human *for itself*; it is human for itself only as cultivated reason, which has *made* itself into what it is *in itself*. Only this is its actuality. But this result is itself simple immediacy, for it is self-conscious freedom, which is at rest within itself and has not put opposition aside to leave it lying there, but is reconciled with it.¹

¶22. What has been said can also be expressed by saying that reason is *purposive activity*. The promotion of what is supposedly nature over misunderstood thinking, and above all the banishment of external purposiveness, has brought the form of *purpose* in general into disrepute. Still, in the way in which Aristotle, too, determines nature as purposive activity, purpose is the immediate, at rest, the unmoved which is itself a mover; thus it is subject. Its power to move, taken abstractly, is *being-for-itself* or pure negativity. The result is the same as the beginning only because the *beginning* is *purpose*;—or the actual is the same as its concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has the Self or pure actuality within itself. The accomplished purpose or the actual realized is movement and unfolded becoming; but it is just this unrest that is the Self; and the Self is equal to that immediacy and simplicity of the beginning because it is the result, that which has returned into itself,—but that which has returned into itself is just the Self, and the Self is the equality and simplicity that relates itself to itself.¹

¶23. The need to represent the absolute as *subject* made use of the propositions: *God* is the eternal, or the moral world-order, or love, and so on. In such propositions the true is only posited directly as subject, not presented as the movement of reflecting itself into itself. In a proposition of this kind one begins with the word *God*. This by itself is a senseless sound, a mere name; only the predicate says *what God is*, is his fulfilment and meaning; the empty beginning becomes actual knowledge only in this end. In view of this it is hard to see why they do not speak merely of the eternal, of the moral world-order, etc., or, as the ancients did, of pure concepts, Being, the one, etc., of that which is the meaning, without adding the *senseless* sound as well.¹ But it is just this word that indicates that what is posited is not a Being or essence or universal in general, but something reflected into itself, a subject. Yet at the same time this is only anticipated. The subject is assumed as a fixed point to which, as their support, the predicates are attached by means of a movement that belongs to the one with knowledge of this subject, and which is not considered to belong to the point itself; yet it is only through this movement that the content would be presented as subject. Given the way in which this movement is constituted, it cannot belong to

the subject; yet, in accordance with the presupposition of this point, the movement too cannot be constituted otherwise, it can only be external. This anticipation that the absolute is subject is therefore not only not the actuality of this concept, it even makes this actuality impossible; for the anticipation posits the concept as a static point, while the actuality is self-movement.²

¶24. Among various consequences that flow from what has been said, this one can be emphasized: knowledge is only actual, and can only be presented, as science or as *system*; furthermore, a so-called basic proposition or principle of philosophy, if it is true, is also false, just insofar as it is only as a basic proposition or principle. It is therefore easy to refute it. The refutation consists in pointing out its deficiency; and it is deficient because it is only the universal or principle, only the beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it is derived and developed from the principle itself,—not effected from outside by affirmations and suggestions to the contrary. So the refutation would really be the development of the principle, and thus the repair of its deficiency, if it did not misunderstand itself by noticing only its *negative* activity, while remaining unconscious of its progress and result on the *positive* side.—The genuine *positive* realization of the beginning is at the same time, conversely, just as much a negative attitude towards it, viz. towards the one-sided form in which it is only *immediate* or *purpose*. And so the realization can also be taken as a refutation of that which constitutes the *basis* of the system, but it is more correct to regard it as a demonstration that the *basis* or the principle of the system is in fact only its *beginning*.¹

¶25. That the true is actual only as system, or that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the representation which casts the absolute as *spirit*—the most sublime concept and the one that belongs to the modern age and its religion. The spiritual alone is the *actual*; it is the essence, or *that-which-is-in-itself*,—the *interrelating* and *determinate, other-being* and *Being-for-itself*—and what remains within itself in this determinacy or in its being-outside-itself;—or it is *in and for itself*.—But it is this Being-in-and-for-itself at first only for us or *in itself*, or it is the spiritual *substance*. It must also be this *for itself*, it must be the knowledge of the spiritual and the knowledge of itself as spirit, i.e. it must be as *object* to itself, but just as immediately an object sublated, reflected into itself. It is *for itself* only for us, insofar as its spiritual content is generated by it itself; but insofar as it is for itself also for its own self, this self-generation, the pure concept, is at the same time the objective element in which it has its Being-there, and in this way it is, in its Being-there, for itself an object reflected into itself.—The spirit that, so developed, knows itself as spirit, is *science*; science is its actuality and the realm that it builds for itself in its own element.¹

¶26. *Pure* self-cognition in absolute otherness, this aether *as such*, is the ground and terrain of science; it is *knowledge in its universality*. The beginning of philosophy makes the presupposition or demand that consciousness dwell in this *element*. But this element achieves its very perfection and transparency only through the movement of its becoming. It is pure spirituality, as the *universal* that has the mode of simple immediacy;—this simplicity, when it has *existence* as simplicity, is the terrain that is thinking, the terrain that is in the spirit alone. Because this element, this immediacy of spirit, is the substance in general of spirit, this immediacy is the *transfigured essentiality*, the reflection which, itself simple, is for itself immediacy

as such, *Being* that is reflection into its own self. Science on its side requires of self-consciousness that it has ascended into this aether in order to be able to live with science and in science and in order to live with it and in it. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science at least hand him the ladder to this standpoint, show him this standpoint within himself. His right is based on the absolute independence which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowledge; for in each one, whether recognized by science or not, and whatever the content may be, the individual is the absolute form, i.e. he is the *immediate certainty* of himself and so, if this expression be preferred, unconditioned *Being*. The standpoint of consciousness consists in knowing of objective things in opposition to itself, and in knowing of itself in opposition to them. If science regards this standpoint as the *other*—regards that in which consciousness knows itself to be at home with itself rather as the loss of spirit—yet conversely the element of science is to consciousness a remote beyond in which it is no longer in possession of itself. Each of these two parties seems for the other to be the inverse of the truth. In entrusting itself immediately to science, the natural consciousness makes an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk on its head as well for once; the compulsion to adopt this unwonted posture and to move about in it is a seemingly unprepared and needless violence that it is expected to inflict on itself.—Whatever science may be intrinsically, in its relationship to immediate self-consciousness it presents itself as an inversion of it; or, because this self-consciousness has the principle of its actuality in the certainty of its own self, science assumes the form of non-actuality, since this principle is for itself outside science. Science must therefore combine such an element with itself, or rather show that and how this element belongs to itself. As long as science lacks such actuality, it is only the content as the *in-itself*, the *purpose* that is still only an *interior*, not yet spirit, only spiritual substance. This *in-itself* has to come out into the open and become *for itself*, and this simply means that this in-itself has to posit self-consciousness as one with itself.¹

¶27. It is this becoming of *science in general* or of *knowledge* that this *phenomenology* of spirit presents. Knowledge, as it is initially, or the *immediate spirit*, is the lack of spirit, the *sensory consciousness*. To become authentic knowledge, or to generate the element of science, which is the pure concept of science itself, it has to work its way through a long course.—This becoming, as it presents itself in its content and in the shapes emerging in it, will not be what one initially thinks of as an introduction to science for the unscientific consciousness; it will also be quite different from the foundation of science;—at all events it will be different from the enthusiasm which, like a shot from a pistol, begins immediately with absolute knowledge, and makes short work of other standpoints by declaring them unworthy of notice.¹

¶28. The task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge had to be seen in its universal sense, and the universal individual, self-conscious spirit, had to be considered in its education.—As regards the relationship between the two types of individual, every moment emerges in the universal individual, as it acquires its concrete form and its own configuration. The particular individual is the incomplete spirit, a concrete shape in whose whole Being-there **one** determinacy is dominant, while the others are present only in blurred outline. In the spirit that stands higher than another, the lower concrete Being-there has dwindled to an

inconspicuous moment; what was formerly the Thing itself is now just a trace; its shape is shrouded and has become a simple shading. The individual whose substance is the more elevated spirit runs through this past, in the way in which someone who takes up a higher science goes through the preparatory information he has long since absorbed, in order to bring its content to presence; he revives the recollection of it, without interest in it and without dwelling on it. The singleton must also pass through the educational stages of the universal spirit with regard to their content, but as shapes already discarded by the spirit, as stages on a way that has been prepared and levelled. Thus, as regards information, we see that what in former ages occupied men of mature spirit, has been reduced to the level of information, exercises, and even games of boyhood; and, in the pedagogical progression, we shall recognize the history of the education of the world as if traced in a silhouette. This past Being-there is already acquired property of the universal spirit that constitutes the substance of the individual and so, in appearing externally to him, constitutes his inorganic nature.—In this respect education, considered from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what is thus present before him, absorbing into himself his inorganic nature, and taking possession of it for himself. But, considered from the side of the universal spirit as substance, this is nothing but the fact that the substance gives itself its self-consciousness, and produces its becoming and its reflection into itself.¹

¶29. Science presents this educative movement in all its detail and necessity, as well as presenting, in its configuration, everything that has already been reduced to a moment and property of spirit. The goal is spirit's insight into what knowledge is. Impatience demands the impossible, namely, the attainment of the goal without the means. On the one hand, the *length* of this way has to be endured, because each moment is necessary;—on the other hand, we have to *dwell* on each moment because each is itself an entire individual shape and is considered absolutely only insofar as its determinacy is considered as a whole or a concretion, or the whole is considered in the peculiarity of this determination.—Since the substance of the individual, since even the world-spirit has had the patience to pass through these forms in the long expanse of time, and to undertake the prodigious labour of world-history, in which it displayed in each form as much of its entire content as that form was capable of holding, and since the world-spirit could not attain consciousness about itself by any lighter labour, then in accordance with the Thing the individual certainly cannot comprehend his own substance with less labour; and yet, at the same time, he has less trouble, since *in itself* all this is accomplished,—the content is already the actuality razed to a possibility, the immediacy overcome, the configuration by now reduced to its abbreviation, to the simple thought-determination. Already something *thought*, the content is *property* of the substance; it is no longer the Being-there that needs to be converted into the form of *Being-in-itself*, it is rather the *in-itself*—no longer merely in its original state nor immersed in Being-there—but *already recollected*, that requires conversion into the form of *Being-for-itself*. The nature of this operation must be described more precisely.¹

¶30. At the standpoint at which we here take up this movement, what is bypassed with regard to the whole is the sublation of *Being-there*; but what still remains and needs a higher reorientation is the *representation* and the *familiarity* with the forms. The Being-there taken back into the substance is, by that first negation, at first

transposed into the element of the Self only *immediately*; so this property that the Self has acquired still has the same character of unconceptualized immediacy, of immobile indifference, as Being-there itself has; Being-there has thus merely passed over into *representation*.—At the same time it is thereby something *familiar*, something that the spirit that-is-there has finished with, in which therefore this spirit no longer invests its activity nor, consequently, its interest. If the activity, which has finished with Being-there, is itself only the movement of the particular spirit that does not comprehend itself, knowledge, by contrast, is directed against the representation thus created, against this familiarity; *knowledge* is the doing of the *universal Self* and the interest of *thinking*.¹

¶31. The familiar in general, precisely because it is *well-known*, is not known. The commonest way in which we deceive ourselves and deceive others is to presuppose in inquiry something as familiar, and to accept it automatically; for all its talking to and fro, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it does not know what is happening to it. Subject and object, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, and so on, are indiscriminately presupposed as familiar and as valid foundations, and constitute fixed points for both departure and return. The movement proceeds back and forth between these points, while they remain unmoved, and so it only skims their surface. So apprehending and testing too consist in seeing whether everyone finds what is said about these in his representation as well, whether it seems that way to him, and is familiar or not.¹

¶32. The *analysis* of a representation, as it used to be carried out, was already nothing other than the sublation of the form of its familiarity. To dissect a representation into its original elements is to return to its moments, which at least do not have the form of the representation as we encounter it, but constitute the immediate property of the Self. This analysis, to be sure, only arrives at *thoughts* which are themselves familiar, fixed, and static determinations. But what is thus *separated*, this non-actuality, is itself an essential moment; for the concrete is what moves itself, only because it divides itself and makes itself something non-actual. The activity of division is the force and labour of the *understanding*, the most astonishing and greatest of powers, or rather the absolute power. The circle that remains self-enclosed and, as substance, holds its moments, is the immediate relationship and therefore arouses no astonishment. But that the accidental as such, detached from its surroundings, that what is bound and is actual only in its connection with other things, attains a Being-there of its own and a separate freedom—this is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thinking, of the pure I. Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is the most dreadful thing, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest force. Beauty without force hates the understanding because the understanding expects this of her when she cannot do it. But the life of the spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps clear of devastation;—it is the life that endures death and preserves itself in it. Spirit gains its truth only when, in absolute disintegration, it finds itself. It is this power, not as the positive which averts its eyes from the negative, as when we say of something that it is nothing or false, and then, finished with it, turn away and pass on to something else; spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and by dwelling on it. Dwelling on the negative is the magic force that converts it into Being.—This force is the very thing

that we earlier called the subject, the subject which, by giving in its own element Being-there to determinacy, sublates abstract immediacy, i.e. the immediacy which *simply is* in general, and is thereby genuine substance: the Being or immediacy that does not have mediation outside it but which is this mediation itself.¹

¶33. What is represented becomes property of pure self-consciousness, but this elevation to universality in general is only one side of education, not yet its completion.—In antiquity study differed in kind from that of modern times: it was the really thorough education of the natural consciousness. Trying its strength specifically on every part of its Being-there, and philosophizing about everything it came across, it made itself into a universality that was active through and through. In modern times, by contrast, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made; the effort to grasp it and to make it his own is more the unmediated eruption of the interior and the truncated generation of the universal than an emergence of the universal from the concrete and from the diversity of Being-there. That is why the task now consists not so much in purging the individual of the mode of sensory immediacy, and making him into a substance that thinks and is thought, but rather in the opposite, in actualizing and inspiriting the universal by sublating fixed, determinate thoughts. But it is far harder to bring fixed thoughts into a fluid state than sensory Being-there. The reason for this is what we said just now: these determinations have the I, the power of the negative, or pure actuality, as the substance and the element of their Being-there, whereas sensory determinations have only powerless, abstract immediacy, or Being as such. Thoughts become fluid when pure thinking, this inner *immediacy*, recognizes itself as a moment, or when the pure certainty of itself abstracts from itself;—not by leaving itself out, by setting itself aside, but by giving up the *fixity* of its self-positing, both the fixity of the pure concrete, which is the I itself in contrast to differentiated content, and the fixity of the differentiations which, posited in the element of pure thinking, have a share in that unconditionality of the I. Through this movement the pure thoughts become *concepts*, and are only now what they are in truth, self-movements, circles, that which is their substance, spiritual essentialities.¹

¶34. This movement of pure essentialities constitutes the nature of scientificity in general. Regarded as the interconnection of their content, the movement is the necessity of the content and the expansion of it into an organic whole. Through this movement the route by which the concept of knowledge is reached becomes likewise a necessary and complete becoming. And so this preparation ceases to be a contingent philosophizing that latches onto any old objects, relationships, and thoughts of the imperfect consciousness, as they occur by chance, or tries to establish the true by arguing the pros and cons, by inferences and conclusions from determinate thoughts. Instead, this route will encompass, through the movement of the concept, all the worldliness of consciousness in its necessity.¹

¶35. Further, an exposition of this sort constitutes the *first* part of science, because the Being-there of spirit at its outset is nothing but the immediate or the beginning, but the beginning is not yet its return into itself. The *element of immediate Being-there* is therefore the determinacy that distinguishes this part of science from the others.—Mention of this difference leads us into a discussion of some fixed thoughts which tend to crop up in this context.¹

¶36. The immediate Being-there of spirit, *consciousness*, has two moments: knowing and the objectivity which is negative to knowing. Since consciousness is the element in which spirit develops itself and unfolds its moments, this opposition pertains to the moments, and they all emerge as shapes of consciousness. The science of this journey is the science of the *experience* that consciousness undergoes; the substance is considered inasmuch as it and its movement are an object of consciousness. Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what is in its experience; for what is in its experience is only the spiritual substance, and in fact as *object* of substance's Self. But spirit becomes object because it is this movement of becoming an *other to itself*, i.e. *object of its Self*, and of sublating this otherness. And experience is the name given to just this movement, in which the immediate, what is not experienced, i.e. the abstract, whether the abstraction of sensory Being or of the mere simple thought, alienates itself and then returns to itself from this alienation, and is now displayed for the first time in its actuality and truth, and is also property of consciousness.¹

¶37. The disparity occurring in consciousness between the I and the substance that is its object is the distinction between them, the *negative* in general. The negative can be regarded as the *defect* of both, but it is their soul, or that which moves them; that is why some of the ancients conceived the *void* as the mover, since they grasped that the mover is the *negative*, though they did not yet grasp that the negative is the Self.¹—Now if this negative appears initially as a disparity between the I and the object, it is just as much the disparity between the substance and itself. What seems to proceed outside substance, what seems to be an activity directed against it, is its own doing, and substance shows itself to be essentially subject. When it has shown this completely, spirit has made its Being-there equal to its essence; it is object to itself, just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowledge and truth, is overcome. Being is absolutely mediated;—it is substantial content which is just as immediately property of the I, it is selfish or the concept. With this the phenomenology of spirit is concluded. What spirit prepares for itself in it, is the element of knowledge. In this element the moments of spirit now spread themselves out in the *form of simplicity*, which knows its object as its own self. They no longer fall apart into the opposition of Being and knowledge, but remain in the simplicity of knowledge; they are the true in the form of the true, and their diversity is only diversity of content. Their movement, which organizes itself in this element into a whole, is *logic* or *speculative philosophy*.²

¶38. Now because the system of spirit's experience deals only with the *appearance* of spirit, the advance from this system to the science of the *true* that is in the *shape* of the *true* seems to be merely negative, and one might wish to remain exempted from the negative inasmuch as it is the *false*, and demand to be led to the truth without more ado; why bother with the false?—The view that we should begin with science straight away, has already been discussed above. Our answer to it here needs to focus on the question of the constitution of the negative in general regarded as the *false*. Representations on this question especially obstruct the approach to truth. It will give us occasion to speak about mathematical cognition, which unphilosophical knowledge regards as the ideal that philosophy must strive to attain, though it has so far striven in vain.¹

¶39. The *true* and the *false* belong to those determinate thoughts that count as motionless, essences on their own, one of which is on one side, while the other is on the other, each standing fixed and isolated with nothing in common with the other. Against this view it must be maintained that truth is not a minted coin that is ready to be given and pocketed just as it is. Nor *is there* a false, any more than there is an evil. The evil and the false are not, of course, as bad as the devil, for in the devil they are even made into a particular *subject*; as the false and the evil, they are only *universals*, though each has its own essentiality in contrast to the other.—The false (for here it is only of this that we speak) would be the other of substance, its negative, while substance, as content of knowledge, is the true. But substance is itself essentially the negative, partly as differentiation and determination of the content, partly as a *simple* differentiating, i.e. as Self and knowledge in general. One can surely know falsely. If something is known falsely, this means that knowledge is in disparity with its substance. But in fact this disparity is differentiating in general, which is an essential moment. Out of this differentiating, to be sure, their parity emerges, and this emergent parity is the truth. But it is not truth in such a way that the disparity has been discarded, like dross from pure metal, not even like the tool that remains detached from the finished vessel; in the true as such, disparity is itself still immediately present as the negative, as the Self. However, this does not mean that we can say that the *false* constitutes a moment, let alone a component, of the true. ‘In every falsehood there is something true’—in this saying truth and falsity are treated like oil and water, which cannot be mixed and are only externally combined. It is precisely because of the significance of designating the moment of *complete otherness* that the expressions for truth and falsity must no longer be used where their otherness has been sublated. Similarly, talk of the *unity* of subject and object, of finite and infinite, of Being and thinking, etc. has the drawback, that object and subject, etc. signify what *they are outside their unity*, and so in their unity they are not meant to be what their expression suggests; in the same way the false is no longer, as false, a moment of truth.¹

¶40. *Dogmatism* as a way of thinking in knowledge and in the study of philosophy is nothing but the opinion that the true consists in a proposition which is a fixed result, or which is immediately known. To such questions as when was Caesar born, how many yards there were in a stadium and which stadium, etc., a *clear-cut* answer should be given, just as it is definitely true that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides of a right-angled triangle. But the nature of a so-called truth of that kind is different from the nature of philosophical truths.¹

¶41. As regards *historical* truths (to mention these briefly), insofar as their purely historical aspect is considered, it is readily granted that they concern the singular Being-there, the contingent and arbitrary aspect of a content, determinations of it that are not necessary.—But even such plain truths as the examples cited are not without the movement of self-consciousness. To know one of them, a good deal of comparison is called for, books must be consulted, or in some way or other research has to be undertaken; even in the case of an immediate intuition only the knowledge of the intuition along with its grounds is regarded as something of true value, although it is really only the bare result that we are supposed to be concerned about.¹

¶42. As for *mathematical* truths, we would be even less likely to regard someone as a geometer if he knew Euclid's theorems *outwardly* by rote, without knowing their proofs, without (as we might express the contrast) knowing them *inwardly*. Similarly, the information that the sides of right-angled triangles have the familiar relationship to each other, would be regarded as unsatisfactory, if someone were to acquire it by measuring many right-angled triangles. However, even in mathematical cognition, the *essentialness* of the proof does not yet have the significance and nature of being a moment of the result itself; in the result the proof is past and vanished. Since it is a result, the theorem is of course *a theorem seen to be true*. But this added circumstance does not affect its content, but only the relationship to the subject; the movement of the mathematical proof does not belong to that which is the object; it is an operation *external* to the Thing. Thus the nature of the right-angled triangle does not divide itself up in just the way presented in the construction that is needed for the proof of the proposition expressing its relationship; the entire production of the result is a process and means of cognition.—In philosophical cognition, too, the becoming of the *Being-there* as *Being-there* is different from the becoming of the *essence* or of the inner nature of the Thing. But in the first place philosophical cognition includes both, whereas mathematical cognition presents only the becoming of the *Being-there*, i.e. the becoming of the *Being* of the nature of the Thing in *cognition* as such. In the second place, philosophical cognition also unifies these two particular movements. The inner emergence or becoming of the substance is an uninterrupted passage into externality or into *Being-there*, *Being* for another, and conversely the becoming of the *Being-there* is the withdrawal into the essence. The movement is the twofold process and becoming of the whole, so that each one at the same time posits the other, and each therefore also has both of them in it as two aspects; together they make up the whole by dissolving themselves and making themselves into its moments.¹

¶43. In mathematical cognition, insight is, for the Thing, an external operation; it follows from this that the true Thing is altered thereby. So while the means—construction and proof—no doubt contain true propositions, it must equally be said that the content is false. In the above example the triangle is dismembered, and its parts consigned to other figures, to which the construction gives rise in it. Only at the end is the triangle restored, the triangle we are really dealing with, which was lost from sight during the procedure, emerging only in fragments belonging to other wholes.—So here we see the negativity of the content coming in as well; this negativity would have to be called a falsity of the content, with as much right as the disappearance of purportedly fixed thoughts in the movement of the concept.¹

¶44. But the real deficiency of this cognition concerns the cognition itself, as well as its material in general.—As regards the cognition, we do not, for the time being, see the necessity of the construction. It does not emerge from the concept of the theorem; it is rather imposed, and the instruction to draw just these lines when infinitely many others could be drawn has to be blindly obeyed without our knowing anything more than how to have the innocent faith that this will serve the purpose of carrying out the proof. Afterwards, this purposiveness also reveals itself, and for this reason it is only an external purposiveness, because it reveals itself only afterwards in the course of proof.—Similarly, the proof follows a path that begins somewhere, at a point whose relation to the result that is supposed to emerge is not yet known. As it

advances it takes up *these* determinations and relations, and leaves others aside, in accordance with a necessity that we do not immediately discern; an external purpose governs this movement.¹

¶45. Mathematics is proud of the *self-evidence* of this defective cognition, and flaunts it even in the face of philosophy, but it is based solely on the poverty of its *purpose* and the defectiveness of its *material*, and is therefore of a kind that philosophy must disdain.—The *purpose* or concept of mathematics is *magnitude*. This is precisely the inessential, unconceptual relationship. Accordingly, the movement of knowing proceeds on the surface, does not touch the Thing itself, not the essence or the concept, and is therefore no conceptual comprehension.—The *material*, regarding which mathematics provides a gratifying treasury of truths, is *space* and the *unit*. Space is the Being-there in which the concept inscribes its distinctions as in an empty dead element, in which they are just as motionless and lifeless. The *actual* is not something spatial, as it is considered in mathematics; neither concrete sensory intuition nor philosophy is concerned with such non-actuality as the things of mathematics are. In such a non-actual element there is after all only non-actual truth, i.e. rigid, dead propositions; we can stop at any one of them; the next proposition starts for itself anew, without the first proposition moving on to the other, and without a necessary connection arising in this way through the nature of the Thing itself.—Moreover, because of this principle and element—and herein consists the formalism of mathematical self-evidence—knowledge proceeds on the line of *equality*. For what is dead, since it does not move itself, does not arrive at distinctions of essence, at essential opposition or inequality, nor therefore at the passage of opposite into opposite, does not attain to qualitative, immanent movement, to self-movement. For it is only magnitude, the unessential distinction, that mathematics considers. It abstracts from the fact that it is the concept that divides space into its dimensions and determines the connections between them and within them; it does not, for example, consider the relationship of the line to the surface; and when it compares the diameter of the circle with the circumference, it runs up against their incommensurability, i.e. a relationship of the concept, an infinite that eludes mathematical determination.¹

¶46. Immanent, so-called pure mathematics also does not place *time* as time in juxtaposition to space, as the second material of its consideration. Applied mathematics does indeed deal with time, as well as with motion and other actual things; but it takes up the synthetic propositions, i.e. propositions about their relationships which are determined by their concept, from experience, and only applies its formulae to these presuppositions. Applied mathematics often gives so-called proofs of propositions, such as those regarding the equilibrium of the lever, or the relationship of space and time in the motion of falling, etc., but the fact that these are presented and accepted as proofs itself only proves how great is the need of proof for cognition, because where it has nothing else, cognition respects even the empty semblance of proof, and gains some satisfaction from it. A critique of these proofs would be both noteworthy and instructive, serving both to purify mathematics of this false adornment, and to show its limit, and hence the necessity of another kind of knowledge.—As regards *time*, one would suppose that it would constitute, as the counterpart of space, the material of the other part of pure mathematics; but it is the concept itself that is-there. The principle of *magnitude*, of unconceptual difference, and the

principle of *equality*, of abstract lifeless unity, cannot handle that pure unrest of life and of absolute differentiation. It is therefore only as paralysed, namely as the *unit*, that this negativity becomes the second material of mathematical cognition, which, as an external operation, reduces what is self-moving to material, in order to have in it now an indifferent, external, lifeless content.¹

¶47. Philosophy, by contrast, considers not the *inessential* determination, but the determination insofar as it is essential; its element and content is not the abstract or non-actual, but the *actual*, that which posits itself and lives within itself—Being-there in its concept. It is the process that generates and passes through its own moments, and this whole movement constitutes the positive and its truth. This truth therefore includes the negative too, that which would be called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one should abstract. The evanescent should, on the contrary, itself be regarded as essential, not in the determination of a fixture which, cut off from the true, is to be left lying somewhere or other outside it, any more than the true is to be regarded as a dead, static positive on the other side. Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is in itself and constitutes the actuality and movement of the life of truth. The true is thus the Bacchanalian frenzy in which no member is sober, and since each member immediately dissolves as soon as it breaks away, the frenzy is also transparent and simple repose. In that movement's court of judgement, of course the single shapes of spirit do not subsist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are also positive and necessary moments, as much as they are negative and evanescent.—In the *whole* of the movement, a whole conceived as repose, what differentiates itself in the movement and gives itself particular Being-there, is preserved as something that *recollects* itself, whose Being-there is knowledge of its own self, while this self-knowledge is just as immediately Being-there.¹

¶48. It might seem necessary to specify in advance the main features of the *method* of this movement or of science. But its concept already lies in what we have said and its proper exposition belongs to logic, or rather it is logic itself. For the method is nothing but the structure of the whole set out in its pure essentiality. But as for the views on this matter that have been prevalent until now, we must not forget that the system of ideas relating to the nature of philosophical method also belongs to a defunct culture.—If this should sound boastful or revolutionary, a tone that is far from my intention, we should bear in mind that the scientific finery offered by mathematics—with its explanations, classifications, axioms, sequences of theorems, their proofs, principles, and the derivation of consequences and conclusions from them—is in the general opinion already *obsolete* at the very least. Even if its unsuitability is not clearly seen, little or no use is made of it any more, and if people do not disapprove of it in itself, they are nevertheless not fond of it. And we must harbour this prejudice in favour of excellence, that it finds a use for itself and wins popularity. But it is not hard to see that the fashion of advancing a proposition, adducing reasons for it, and in the same way refuting the opposite proposition by reasons, is not the form in which truth can emerge. Truth is the movement of itself inside itself, whereas this method is the cognition that is external to the material. That is why this method is peculiar to mathematics, and must be left to mathematics, which, as we noted, has the unconceptual relationship of magnitude as its principle,

and dead space and the equally dead unit as its material. This method may also, in a freer style, i.e. blended more with wilfulness and contingency, remain in ordinary life, in a conversation or historical instruction for the sake of curiosity more than cognition, more or less like a preface too. In ordinary life, consciousness has for its content information, experiences, sensory concretions, also thoughts, principles—in general whatever it regards as available or as a fixed and stable Being or essence. Sometimes consciousness follows where this leads, sometimes it interrupts the connection by exercising free wilfulness over such content and conducts itself as an external determination and management of the content. It traces the content back to some certainty or other, even if it is only the sensation of the moment; and conviction is satisfied when it has reached a familiar resting-place.¹

¶49. But if the necessity of the concept banishes the looser gait of ratiocinative¹ conversation, as well as the stiffer gait of scientific pomp, we have already pointed out above that their place is not to be filled by the non-method of presentiment and inspiration, and by the wilfulness of prophetic utterance, which despises not only that type of science, but the scientific approach in general.

¶50. Kant rediscovered *triplicity* and, though he found it only by instinct and it was, in his hands, still dead, still unconceptualized, it has since been elevated to its absolute meaning, so that the genuine form is at the same time displayed in its genuine content and the concept of science has emerged. Nevertheless, we sometimes see this form used in a way that degrades it to a lifeless schema, to a veritable shadow, reducing scientific organization to a chart; this use too is not to be regarded as anything to do with science.—This formalism, of which we have already spoken generally and whose style we wish here to specify in more detail, supposes that it has comprehended and expressed the nature and the life of a shape when it has affirmed of it some determination of the schema as a predicate—it may be subjectivity or objectivity or, again, magnetism, electricity, etc., contraction or expansion, east or west, and the like. This can be multiplied to infinity, since in this way each determination or shape can be used again as a form or moment of the schema in the case of the other determination or shape, and each can gratefully perform the same service for the other—a circle of reciprocity by which one does not experience what the Thing itself is, not what the one is nor what the other is. Here, sometimes sensory determinations are taken up from ordinary intuition, and they are supposed, of course, to *mean* something other than what they say; sometimes what is in itself meaningful, the pure determinations of thought, such as subject, object, substance, cause, the universal, etc., are used just as indiscriminately and uncritically as they are in ordinary life, and as are strengths and weaknesses, expansion and contraction, so that this metaphysics is as unscientific as these sensory representations.¹

¶51. Instead of the inner life and the self-movement of its Being-there, such a simple determinacy of intuition—that is, in this case, sensory knowledge—is now expressed according to a superficial analogy, and this external and empty application of the formula is called *construction*.—The case with this sort of formalism is the same as with any other. What sort of blockhead would someone have to be, if he could not be taught in a quarter of an hour the theory that there are asthenic, sthenic, and indirectly asthenic diseases, and as many types of cure, and if he could not hope, since until quite recently such instruction still sufficed for the purpose, to be

transformed in this short time from a family doctor into a theoretical physician? When the formalism of the philosophy of nature teaches, say, that the intellect is electricity, or the animal is nitrogen or, again, *equal* to the south or north, etc., or represents it by a proxy, whether as baldly as it is expressed here or concocted with more technical terminology, then inexperience may be overcome by admiration and amazement at such force, which grasps together the seemingly remote, and at the violence that the inert sensory undergoes through this combination, a violence that imparts to the sensory the semblance of a concept but shirks the main Thing, which is to express the concept itself or the meaning of the sensory representation. Inexperience may venerate in all this a profound genius. It may delight, too, in the lustre of such determinations, since they replace the abstract concept with intuitive clarity and make it more gratifying; and it may congratulate itself on the kinship of soul it feels with such a splendid performance. The knack of this kind of wisdom is as quickly learned as it is easy to practise; the repetition of it, when it is familiar, becomes as insufferable as the repetition of a conjuring trick already seen through. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is no harder to handle than a painter's palette having only two colours, say red and green, the red for colouring the surface when a historical scene is required, the green for landscapes.—It would be hard to decide which is greater here, the ease with which everything in heaven and on earth and under the earth is coated with this broth of colour, or the vain pride in the excellence of this universal recipe: each supports the other. This method sticks the few determinations of the universal schema onto everything heavenly and terrestrial, on all natural and spiritual formations, in this way classifying everything; and what it produces is nothing less than a report as clear as daylight on the organism of the universe, that is, a chart resembling a skeleton with bits of paper stuck on it, or like the rows of closed boxes, with labels attached, in a spice-seller's stall. The chart is as clear as each of these; and just as in the first case flesh and blood has been removed from the bones, while in the second case the Thing, also bereft of life, is hidden in the boxes, so too the chart has left out or hidden the living essence of the Thing.—We have already remarked that this approach at the same time culminates in monochrome, absolute painting; ashamed of the distinctions of the schema, it submerges them, as belonging to reflection, in the emptiness of the absolute, so that pure identity, formless white, is produced. This uniform colouring of the schema and of its lifeless determinations, this absolute identity, and the transition from one to the other, are all alike dead understanding and all alike external cognition.¹

¶52. Excellence cannot escape the fate of being thus robbed of life and spirit, of being flayed and then seeing its skin wrapped around lifeless knowledge and its vanity. But that is only part of the picture. In this very fate we can discern the power that excellence exerts on hearts, if not on minds, as well as the development to universality and determinacy of form in which its perfection consists, and which alone makes it possible for this universality to be used in a superficial way.¹

¶53. Science has to organize itself only by the concept's own life; the determinacy that is taken from the schema and externally stuck onto Being-there, is, in science, the self-moving soul of the fulfilled content. The movement of that which is consists, on the one hand, in becoming an other to itself, and so becoming its own immanent content; on the other hand, that which is takes back into itself this unfolding or this

Being-there of itself, that is, it makes itself a *moment* and simplifies itself into determinacy. In the first movement, *negativity* is the distinguishing and the positing of *Being-there*; in this return into itself, it is the becoming of the *determinate simplicity*. It is in this way that the content shows that its determinacy is not received from something else and fastened on it, but it gives determinacy to itself and ranges itself by itself to a moment and to a place in the whole. The tabular understanding keeps for itself the necessity and the concept of the content, keeps for itself what constitutes the concreteness, the actuality, and living movement of the Thing that it arranges; or rather, it does not keep this for itself, it is not even aware of it; for if it had this insight, it would surely reveal it. It is not even aware of the need for such insight; otherwise it would abandon its schematizing, or at least realize that it is no more use to it than a table of contents. A table of contents is all that the understanding gives, the content itself it does not supply.—Even when the determinacy, one such as magnetism for example, is in itself concrete or actual, it is still reduced to something dead, since it is only predicated of another Being-there and not cognized as immanent life of this Being-there, or as having its native and peculiar self-generation and presentation in this Being-there. To add this main Thing is something the formal understanding leaves to others.—Instead of entering into the immanent content of the Thing, the understanding always surveys the whole and stands above the singular Being-there of which it speaks, that is, it does not see it at all. Scientific cognition, by contrast, requires one to surrender to the life of the object, or, what amounts to the same thing, to focus on and express its inner necessity. Immersing itself thus in its object, scientific cognition forgets that survey, which is merely the reflection of knowledge away from the content and into itself. But engrossed in the material and moving forward along with it, scientific cognition does return into itself, but not before the filling or content withdraws into itself, simplifies itself into determinacy, reduces itself to *one* side of a Being-there and passes over into its higher truth. In this way the simple, self-surveying whole itself emerges from the wealth in which its reflection seemed lost.¹

¶54. In general, because, as we expressed it above, substance is inherently subject, all content is its own reflection into itself. The subsistence or substance of its Being-there is equality-with-itself; for its inequality with itself would be its dissolution. Equality-with-self, however, is pure abstraction; and pure abstraction is *thinking*. When I say *quality*, I mean the simple determinacy; in virtue of the quality a Being-there is distinct from another, or is a Being-there; it is for itself, or it subsists in virtue of this simple uniformity with itself. But it is thereby essentially the *thought*.—It is comprehended in this that Being is thinking; this is the source of the insight which usually eludes the ordinary unconceptual talk about the identity of thinking and Being.—Now because the subsistence of the Being-there is equality-with-itself or pure abstraction, it is the abstraction of itself from itself, or it is itself its inequality with itself and its dissolution,—its own inwardness and withdrawal into itself,—its becoming.—Because this is the nature of that which is, and insofar as that which is has this nature for knowledge, knowledge is not the activity that deals with the content as something alien, is not reflection-into-itself away from the content; science is not that idealism which took the place of the *dogmatism of assertion* as a *dogmatism of assurance* or the *dogmatism of certainty of one's own self*; on the

contrary, since knowledge sees the content returning into its own inwardness, its activity is both absorbed in the content, for it is the immanent Self of the content, and at the same time it has returned into itself, for it is pure equality-with-itself in otherness; thus it is the cunning which, while seeming to abstain from activity, watches to see how determinacy and its concrete life, just where it supposes it is pursuing its own self-preservation and particular interest, is the reverse, a doing that dissolves itself and makes itself a moment of the whole.¹

¶55. Earlier we specified the significance of the *understanding* with regard to the self-consciousness of substance; we can now see clearly from what has been said here its significance with respect to the determination of substance as it simply is.—Being-there is quality, determinacy equal-to-itself or determinate simplicity, determinate thought; this is the understanding of Being-there. Consequently, Being-there is *nous*, which *Anaxagoras* was the first to recognize as the essence. His successors conceived the nature of Being-there more determinately as *eidos* or *idea*, that is, *determinate universality, kind*. The expression *kind* may seem too commonplace and too slight for the Ideas, for the beautiful and holy and eternal, which are all the rage nowadays. But in fact the Idea expresses neither more nor less than kind. But nowadays we often see an expression which determinately designates a concept spurned in favour of one which, if only because it belongs to a foreign language, shrouds the concept in fog and hence sounds more edifying.—Precisely because Being-there is determined as kind, it is simple thought; the *nous*, simplicity, is the substance. On account of its simplicity or equality-with-itself substance appears as fixed and enduring. But this equality-with-itself is also negativity; that is why that firm Being-there passes over into its dissolution. At first the determinacy seems to be what it is only because it is related to an *other*, and its movement seems to be imposed on it by an alien power; but it is precisely involved in this *simplicity* of thinking itself that the determinacy has its very otherness in it and is self-movement; for this simplicity is the self-moving and self-differentiating thought, it is its own inwardness, the pure *concept*. Thus the *intellectuality of the understanding* is a becoming and, as this becoming, it is *rationality*.¹

¶56. It is the nature of that which is, to be its own concept in its Being, and it is in this nature that in general *logical necessity* consists. This alone is the rationality and the rhythm of the organic whole; it is *knowledge* of the content, just as much as the content is concept and essence—or it alone is the *speculative*.—The concrete shape, moving itself, makes itself into a simple determinacy; it thereby raises itself to logical form, and is in its essentiality; its concrete Being-there is just this movement, and is immediately logical Being-there. That is why it is unnecessary to impose formalism on the content externally; the content is inherently a transition to formalism, which ceases, however, to be this external formalism, since the form is the native becoming of the concrete content itself.¹

¶57. So this is the nature of scientific method, first, to be inseparable from the content, and secondly, to determine its own rhythm by itself; as we have already remarked, this nature has its proper presentation in speculative philosophy.—What we have said here does express the concept, but cannot count for more than an anticipatory assurance. Its truth does not lie in this partly narrative exposition, and is therefore just as little refuted by assuring us that, on the contrary, it is not so, that

such and such is rather the case, by calling to mind and reciting conventional ideas, as if they were settled and familiar truths, or again by assuring us of novelties served up from the shrine of inner divine intuition.—This sort of reception is usually the first reaction on the part of knowledge to something unfamiliar: it resists it in order to save its freedom and its own insight, its own authority, from the alien authority (for this is the guise in which what is newly encountered first appears)—also to get rid of the semblance that something has been learned and of the kind of shame this is supposed to involve. Similarly, when the unfamiliar is greeted with applause, the reaction is of the same kind, and consists in what in another sphere was ultra-revolutionary speech and action.¹

¶58. The important thing, therefore, in the *study of science*, is to take on oneself the exertion of the concept. This requires attention to the concept as such, to the simple determinations, e.g. of *being-in-itself*, *being-for-itself*, *equality-with-self*, etc.; for these are pure self-movements such as could be called souls if their concept did not designate something higher than soul. The habit of running on in representations, when it is interrupted by the concept, finds it just as irksome as does formal thinking that ratiocinates back and forth in thoughts bereft of actuality. That habit should be called a material thinking, a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in the stuff, and therefore finds it painful at the same time to lift its Self clear of the matter, and to be together with itself. By contrast, the other mode, ratiocination, is freedom from content and vain condescension towards it; what is required of it is the effort to give up this freedom and, instead of being the wilfully moving principle of the content, to submerge this freedom in it, to let the content move by its own nature, that is, by the Self as its own Self, and to contemplate this movement. Renunciation of personal intrusion into the immanent rhythm of concepts, avoidance of intervention in the rhythm with wilfulness and wisdom garnered elsewhere, this abstention is itself an essential moment of attention to the concept.¹

¶59. In the ratiocinative attitude we need to pay more attention to the two aspects in respect to which conceptual thinking is opposed to it.—First, it adopts a negative attitude towards the content it apprehends; it knows how to refute it and annihilate it. That something is not the case,—this insight is the merely *negative*; it is a dead end that does not lead to a new content beyond itself; in order to have a content again, something *else* must be taken on from somewhere. Ratiocination is reflection into the empty I, the vanity of its knowledge.—But this vanity expresses not only the vanity of this content, but also the vanity of this insight itself; for this insight is the negative that does not see the positive within itself. Because this reflection does not get its own negativity as its content, it never gets inside the Thing, but is always beyond it; for this reason it imagines that with its affirmation of the void it is always way ahead of an insight rich in content. By contrast, in conceptual thinking, as we have shown above, the negative belongs to the content itself, and is the *positive*, both as the *immanent* movement and determination of the content, and as the *whole* of this movement. Conceived as a result, it is what emerges from this movement, the *determinate* negative, and consequently a positive content as well.¹

¶60. But in view of the fact that such thinking has a content, whether of representations or thoughts or a mixture of both, it has another aspect which makes comprehension difficult for it. The remarkable nature of this aspect is closely

connected with the above-mentioned essence of the Idea itself, or rather it expresses the Idea in its appearance as the movement which is thinking apprehension.—For whereas, in its negative attitude, which we have just discussed, ratiocinative thinking is itself the Self into which the content returns, in its positive cognition, by contrast, the Self is a represented *subject* to which the content is related as accident and predicate. This subject constitutes the basis to which the content is attached, and upon which the movement runs back and forth. Conceptual thinking adopts a different approach. Since the concept is the object's own Self, which presents itself as *its becoming*, it is not a static subject, which supports the accidents without moving; it is, on the contrary, the concept that moves itself and takes its determinations back into itself. In this movement the static subject itself perishes; it enters into the differences and the content, and it constitutes the determinacy, i.e. the differentiated content as well as its movement, instead of remaining opposed to it. The firm ground which ratiocination has in the static subject therefore shudders, and only this movement itself becomes the object. The subject that fulfils its content ceases to go beyond it, and cannot have any other predicates or accidents. Conversely, the dispersion of the content is thereby bound together under the Self; the content is not the universal which, free of the subject, would fit several. And so the content is, in fact, no longer a predicate of the subject; it is the substance, it is the essence and the concept of what we are talking about. It is the nature of representational thinking to follow the accidents or predicates and to go beyond them, and rightly so, since they are nothing more than predicates and accidents; but it is stopped in its tracks, when what has the form of a predicate in a proposition is the substance itself. It suffers, as we might represent it, a counter-thrust. It starts from the subject as if this remained the underlying ground, but since the predicate is really the substance, it finds that the subject has passed over into the predicate and has thereby been sublated; and, since in this way what seems to be the predicate has become the whole and independent mass, thinking cannot roam about freely, but is impeded by this weight.—Usually, the subject is first made the ground, as the *objective*, fixed Self; from there the necessary movement proceeds to the multiplicity of determinations or predicates. Here, the knowing I itself comes in to take the place of this subject and serves as the nexus of the predicates and as the subject supporting them. This second subject means to have done with the first subject and to return into itself beyond it. But since the first subject enters into the determinations themselves and is their soul, the second subject, namely the knowing subject, still finds it there in the predicate, and instead of being able to be the driving force in the movement of the predicate, deciding by ratiocination whether this or that predicate is to be ascribed to the first subject, it still has to deal with the Self of the content, is supposed to cooperate with it instead of being for itself.¹

¶61. What we have said can be formally expressed like this: the nature of the judgement or proposition in general, which involves the distinction of subject and predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition, and the identical proposition which the former becomes contains the counter-thrust against the subject-predicate relationship.—This conflict between the form of a proposition in general and the unity of the concept which destroys it resembles the conflict that occurs in rhythm between metre and accent. Rhythm results from the floating centre and the

unification of the two. So, too, in the philosophical proposition the identity of subject and predicate is not supposed to destroy the difference between them, which the form of the proposition expresses; their unity, rather, is supposed to emerge as a harmony. The form of the proposition is the appearance of the determinate sense, or the accent that distinguishes its fulfilment; but the fact that the predicate expresses the substance, and that the subject itself falls into the universal, is the *unity* in which the accent dies away.¹

¶62. Some examples will clarify what we have said. In the proposition *God is Being*, the predicate is *Being*; it has a substantial meaning in which the subject dissolves. Being is here supposed to be not a predicate, but the essence; because of this, God seems to cease to be that which he is in virtue of the structure of the proposition, viz. the fixed subject.—Instead of making headway in the transition from subject to predicate, thinking feels impeded by the loss of the subject and, because it misses it, is thrown back onto the thought of the subject; or, since the predicate itself is expressed as a subject, as *the Being*, as the *essence* that exhausts the nature of the subject, thinking finds the subject immediately in the predicate too; and now, instead of entering into itself in the predicate and maintaining the free position of ratiocination, it is still absorbed in the content, or is at least faced with the requirement to be absorbed in it.—So, too, when one says: the *Actual* is the *Universal*, the Actual as subject disappears in its predicate. The Universal is not supposed to have only the meaning of a predicate, in which case the proposition would assert that the Actual is universal; on the contrary, the Universal is supposed to express the essence of the Actual.—Thinking therefore loses the firm objective basis it had in the subject inasmuch as, in the predicate, it is thrown back onto the subject, and, in the predicate, it does not return into itself, but into the subject of the content.¹

¶63. This unaccustomed inhibition is in large measure the source of the complaints about the unintelligibility of philosophical writings, when apart from that the other cultural requirements for understanding them are present in the individual. In what we have said we see the reason for the entirely determinate reproach often made against philosophical works: that so much has to be read repeatedly before it can be understood—a reproach whose burden is supposed to be so outrageous and final that, if well founded, it admits of no rejoinder.—It is clear from the above what the situation is. The philosophical proposition, since it is a proposition, evokes the opinion that the ordinary relationship between subject and predicate and the usual attitude of knowledge obtain. The philosophical content of the proposition destroys this attitude and the opinion about it; the opinion learns by experience that the meaning is otherwise than it opined; and this correction of its opinion compels knowledge to go back to the proposition and now take it in another way.¹

¶64. A difficulty that should be avoided comes from mixing together the speculative mode and the ratiocinative mode, when what is said of the subject at one time has the meaning of its concept, while at another time it has only the meaning of its predicate or accidental property.—The one mode interferes with the other, and only a philosophical exposition of the sort that strictly excluded the ordinary type of relationship between the parts of a proposition would attain plasticity.¹

¶65. In fact non-speculative thinking has its right, which is valid, but disregarded in the mode of the speculative proposition. The sublation of the form of the

proposition must not take place only in an *immediate* manner, not through the mere content of the proposition. Rather, this opposite movement must be expressed; it must not just be that internal inhibition, but rather this return of the concept into itself must be *presented*. This movement, which constitutes what proof was formerly supposed to accomplish, is the dialectical movement of the proposition itself. This movement alone is the *actual* speculative, and only the expression of this movement is speculative presentation. As a proposition, the speculative is only the *internal* inhibition and the return of the essence into itself, but a return lacking *Being-there*. Hence we often see ourselves referred by philosophical expositions to this *inner* intuition, and in this way what we required, the presentation of the dialectical movement of the proposition, is withheld.—The *proposition* is supposed to express *what* the true is; but essentially the true is subject; as such it is just the dialectical movement, this procession that generates itself, steers its own course, and returns into itself.—In the other sort of cognition proof constitutes this aspect, the expressed inwardness. But once the dialectic has been separated from proof, the concept of philosophical demonstration has in fact been lost.¹

¶66. On this score it can be pointed out that the dialectical movement likewise has propositions for its parts or elements; the difficulty indicated seems, therefore, always to recur and to be a difficulty of the Thing itself.—This is like what happens in ordinary proof, where the grounds that it uses themselves again need grounding, and so on ad infinitum. But this form of grounding and conditioning belongs to the sort of demonstration that is different from the dialectical movement and so belongs to external cognition. As regards the dialectical movement itself, its element is the pure concept; it thus has a content which is, in its own self, subject through and through. Thus no content occurs which functions as an underlying subject, and whose meaning is assigned to it as a predicate; the proposition is immediately just an empty form.—Apart from the sensorily intuited or represented Self, it is mainly the name as name that designates the pure subject, the empty unconceptual One. For this reason it can be useful, e.g., to avoid the name *God*, since this word is not immediately at the same time a concept, but rather the authentic name, the steady repose of the underlying subject; whereas e.g., Being or the One, singularity, the subject, etc. themselves immediately indicate concepts as well.—Even if speculative truths are said of this subject, all the same their content lacks the immanent concept, because this content is present as a static subject, and through this circumstance such truths readily assume the form of mere edification.—From this side, too, the obstacle that arises from the habit of conceiving the speculative predicate according to the form of a proposition, and not as concept and essence, can be increased or diminished on the responsibility of the philosophical presentation itself. The presentation must, faithful to the insight into the nature of the speculative, retain the dialectical form and accept nothing except insofar as it is conceptualized and is the concept.¹

¶67. If the ratiocinative attitude is a hindrance to the study of philosophy, the conceit that flaunts settled truths without any ratiocination is no less so. The possessor of such truths sees no need to come back to them; he makes them the foundation and believes he can not only express them, but also judge and dispute by means of them. In view of this, it is particularly necessary that philosophizing should be made a serious business again. In the case of all sciences, arts, skills, and crafts,

people are convinced that a complex and laborious programme of learning and practice is necessary for competence. Yet when it comes to philosophy, it seems that the dominant prejudice is now that, although not everyone who has eyes and fingers, and gets leather and a tool, is thereby in a position to make shoes, everyone nevertheless immediately understands how to philosophize, and how to evaluate philosophy, since he possesses the yardstick for it in his natural reason—as if he did not equally possess the measure of a shoe in his own foot.—It seems that philosophical competence is made to consist precisely in lack of information and study, as though philosophy left off where they begin. Philosophy is often regarded as a formal kind of knowledge, void of content, and the insight is sorely lacking that, whatever truth there may be in the content of any discipline or science, it can only deserve the name if it has been engendered by philosophy; that the other sciences can try their hand as much as they like at ratiocination without philosophy, but without it they can have in them neither life, nor spirit, nor truth.¹

¶68. As for genuine philosophy, it lies at the end of a long journey of education, a movement as rich as it is profound, through which spirit arrives at knowledge. Instead of this we see sound common sense, which has never exerted or educated itself with genuine philosophy or other knowledge, and the immediate revelation of the divine, considering themselves a perfect equivalent of this journey and as good a substitute for it as chicory is reputed to be for coffee. It is not pleasant to observe that ignorance and the crudity without form or taste, that cannot itself focus its thinking on a single abstract proposition, still less on the connection of several propositions, sometimes claims to be freedom and tolerance of thinking, sometimes even genius. Genius, as we know, was once all the rage in poetry, as it now is in philosophy; but when the production of this genius made any sense, instead of poetry it generated trivial prose or, if it went beyond that, deranged speeches. Similarly nowadays a natural way of philosophizing, which regards itself as too good for the concept and as being, because of its lack of the concept, an intuitive and poetic type of thinking, brings to market the wilful combinations of an imagination that has only been disorganized by thought,—creations that are neither fish nor fowl, neither poetry nor philosophy.¹

¶69. On the other hand, when natural philosophizing flows along the calmer channel of sound common sense, it offers at best a rhetoric of trivial truths. If reproached with the insignificance of these truths, it assures us in response that their sense and fulfilment reside in its heart, and so must be present in the hearts of others too, since in general it thinks that with the innocence of the heart and the purity of conscience and the like it has said the last word, to which no objection can be raised, and beyond which nothing more can be demanded. But the point was this: that the best should not remain behind in the interior, but brought out of this cavern into the light of day. The effort of advancing ultimate truths of that kind could have been avoided long ago; for they have long since been available in the catechism, in popular proverbs, and so on.—It is not difficult to spot the indeterminacy or contortion in such truths, often it is easy to disclose the opposite truths to the consciousness of them within that self-same consciousness. When it struggles to extricate itself from the confusion induced in it, consciousness will fall into a new confusion, and may well resort to the outburst that the case is definitively *such* and

such, and all the rest is *sophistries*—a catch phrase of ordinary common sense against cultivated reason, just as ignorance of philosophy has adopted the expression *day-dreaming* to brand it once and for all.—Since common sense appeals to feeling, to its internal oracle, it has nothing to do with anyone who does not agree; it must explain that it has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same in himself;—in other words, it tramples underfoot the root of humanity. For it is the nature of humanity to press for agreement with others, and its existence resides only in the achieved community of consciousnesses. The anti-human, the bestial, consists in confinement to feeling, and in being able to communicate only by this means.¹

¶70. If anyone were to ask for a royal road to science,¹ no more convenient route can be suggested than to rely on sound common sense and also, incidentally, for the purpose of keeping abreast of the times and philosophy, to read reviews of philosophical works, perhaps even their prefaces and opening paragraphs; for the latter give the general principles on which everything depends, and reviews give, besides the historical summary, the assessment too, which, being an assessment, stands above the object assessed. One follows this common route in casual dress; but the exalted feeling of the eternal, the holy, the infinite strides along in the robes of a high priest—on a route that is rather already itself the immediate Being in the centre, the genius of profound original Ideas and exalted flashes of thought. However, just as such profundity does not yet reveal the source of the essence, so too these pyrotechnics are not yet the empyrean.² True thoughts and scientific insight are to be won only in the labour of the concept. The concept alone can produce the universality of knowledge that is not the ordinary indeterminacy and poverty of ordinary common sense, but cultivated and completed cognition; nor is it the extraordinary universality of the gift of reason corrupting itself by indolence and conceit of genius, but the truth matured to its natural form,—a truth capable of being the property of all self-conscious reason.³

¶71. I locate that by which science exists in the self-movement of the concept. But the ideas of our time about the nature and shape of truth diverge from this position, both in the ways cited above and in other superficial respects; in fact they are entirely at odds with it. This consideration promises, it seems, no favourable reception for an attempt to present the system of science in this determination. Meanwhile I can reflect that if, for example, at times the excellence of Plato's philosophy is located in his scientifically worthless myths, there have also been times, even called times of enthusiasm, when Aristotle's philosophy was esteemed for its speculative depth, and Plato's *Parmenides* (surely the greatest work of art of the ancient *dialectic*) was regarded as the true disclosure and *positive expression of the divine life*, times when, even with all the obscurity generated by *ecstasy*, this misunderstood ecstasy was in fact supposed to be nothing other than *the pure concept*.¹ I reflect too that the excellence in the philosophy of our time locates its own value in its scientific character, and even if the others take it in another way, it is in fact only by its scientific character that it makes its mark. And so I too can hope that this attempt to vindicate science for the concept, and to present it in this its peculiar element, will know how to make its way by the inner truth of the Thing itself. We must remain convinced that it is the nature of the true to win through when its time has come, and that it appears only when its time has come, and therefore never appears

prematurely, nor finds a public unripe for receiving it; we must also be convinced that the individual needs this effect in order to confirm what is as yet a Thing for himself alone, and to experience as something universal the conviction which at first belongs only to particularity. But in this connection the public must often be distinguished from those who behave as its representatives and spokesmen. In many respects the attitude of the public is quite different from, even contrary to, that of these spokesmen. Whereas the public good-naturedly prefers to blame itself when a philosophical work does not appeal to it, these others, by contrast, certain of their competence, put all blame on the author. The effect on the public is quieter than the activity of these dead when they bury their dead.² In general our insight now is altogether more cultivated, its curiosity more alert, and its judgement more swiftly formed, so that the feet of those who will carry you out are already at the door.³ But from this we must often distinguish the slower effect which rectifies the attention extorted by impressive assurances and corrects contemptuous censure, and gives some a place in the world of today only after a time, while others after a time have no place in the world of tomorrow.

§72. Incidentally, at a time when the universality of spirit has grown so much stronger and singularity, as is fitting, has become correspondingly less important, when, too, universality claims and holds on to its whole range and cultivated wealth, the share in the total work of spirit that falls to the activity of the individual can only be small. Because of this, the individual must all the more forget himself, as the nature of science in any case requires. Of course, he must become and do what he can; but less must be demanded of him, just as he in turn can expect less of himself, and may demand less for himself.¹

Introduction

¶73. It is a natural idea that in philosophy, before we come to deal with the Thing itself, namely with the actual cognition of what in truth is, it is necessary first to come to an understanding about cognition, which is regarded as the instrument by which we take possession of the absolute, or as the medium through which we catch sight of it. The concern seems justified, on the one hand that there may be various kinds of cognition, and one of them might be handier than another for the attainment of this goal, and so by a wrong choice among them,¹—and on the other hand that, since cognition is a capacity of a determinate kind and scope, without a more precise determination of its nature and limits, we shall get hold of clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth. What is more, this concern must surely turn into the conviction that the whole enterprise of securing for consciousness that which is in itself through cognition is absurd in its concept, and that between cognition and the absolute there lies a boundary that completely divides them. For, if cognition is the instrument for gaining possession of the absolute essence, it is immediately obvious that the application of an instrument to a Thing does not in fact leave it as it is for itself, but rather effects a forming and alteration of it. Or if cognition is not an instrument of our activity but a sort of passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it is through and in this medium. In both cases we use a means which immediately brings about the opposite of its intended aim; or what is really absurd is that we make use of a means at all. It seems, no doubt, that this drawback can be remedied through an acquaintance with the way in which the *instrument* works; for this enables us to subtract from the result the instrument's own contribution to the representation of the absolute which we gain by its means, and so to get the true in its purity. But this improvement would in fact only bring us back to where we were before. If from a thing we have formed we take away again what the instrument has done to it, then the thing—here the absolute—is for us exactly what it was before this now superfluous effort. If the instrument is supposed merely to bring the absolute a little closer to us, without altering anything in it, like a bird caught by a lime-twig, it would surely deride this ruse, if it were not in and for itself already with us and willing to be so; for in this case cognition would be a ruse, since by its complex endeavour it assumes the air of doing something quite different from simply establishing an immediate and thus effortless relation. Or if an examination of cognition, which we represent as a *medium*, acquaints us with the law of its refraction, it is again useless to subtract the refraction from the result; for cognition is not the refraction of the ray, but the ray itself by which truth reaches us, and if this were subtracted, only the pure direction or blank space would have been indicated to us.²

¶74. Meanwhile, if concern about falling into error injects a mistrust into science, which without any such misgivings gets on with the job itself and actually cognizes, it is hard to see why we should not, conversely, inject a mistrust into this mistrust and be concerned that this fear of erring is really the error itself. In fact this fear presupposes something, a great deal in fact, as truth, and it supports its misgivings and inferences on what itself needs to be examined first to see if it is truth. That is to say, it presupposes *representations of cognition as an instrument and medium*, also a *distinction between ourselves and this cognition*; but above all, it presupposes that the absolute *stands on one side and cognition on the other side*, for itself and separated from the absolute, and yet is something real or, to put it bluntly, it presupposes that cognition which, since it is outside the absolute, is surely outside the truth as well, is nevertheless genuine, an assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error stands exposed rather as fear of truth.¹

¶75. This conclusion stems from the fact that the absolute alone is true, or the true alone is absolute. The conclusion can be rejected by drawing a distinction: a cognition that does not cognize the absolute, as science aims to, can nevertheless be true as well, and cognition in general, though it may be incapable of grasping the absolute, can still be capable of some other truth. But we gradually come to see that beating about the bush in this way comes down to a murky distinction between an absolutely true and some other kind of true, and that the absolute, cognition, etc. are words that presuppose a meaning that first needs to be ascertained.¹

¶76. There is an alternative to tormenting ourselves with such useless ideas and stock phrases about cognition as an instrument for getting hold of the absolute, or as a medium through which we catch sight of the truth—and surely all these ideas of a cognition separated from the absolute, and an absolute separated from cognition, amount to those relationships; there is no need to bother with excuses which derive the incapacity of science from the presupposition of such relationships as these, in order to free oneself of the toil of science while at the same time assuming the air of serious and zealous endeavour; nor need we struggle for answers to all this. Instead of that we could reject them out of hand as contingent and arbitrary representations, and the associated use of words like the absolute, cognition, as well as the objective and the subjective and countless others, whose meaning is presupposed as universally familiar, could even be regarded as a fraud. For the pretence not just that their meaning is universally familiar, but also that their concept is in one's own possession, looks more as if it is supposed to avoid the main Thing, namely, to provide this concept. On the other hand, we could, with more right, spare ourselves the trouble of taking any notice at all of such ideas and locutions, with which science itself is supposed to be kept at bay; for they only amount to an empty appearance of knowing, which vanishes immediately when science itself comes on the scene. But science, in virtue of coming on the scene, is itself an appearance; its entrance is not yet science developed and expanded in its truth. It makes no difference here whether we suppose that *science* is the appearance because it comes on the scene *along with something else*, or whether we call that other untrue knowledge its appearing. But science must free itself of this semblance; and it can do this only by turning against it. For when faced with a sort of knowledge that is not genuine, science can neither just reject it as a common view of things, claiming that science is an entirely different sort

of cognition for which that other knowledge is of no account whatever; nor can science appeal to the intimation of something better within this other knowledge. By that first *claim*, science would be declaring its *Being* to be its power; but the untrue knowledge in turn appeals to the fact that *it is*, and *claims* that for it science is of no account; *one* bare claim is worth just as much as another. Still less can science appeal to the better intimation supposedly present in the cognition that is not genuine, to the sign within it pointing towards science; because, for one thing, it would similarly be appealing again to a Being; but, for another thing, it would be appealing to itself in the mode in which it is present in the non-genuine cognition, that is, it would be appealing to an inferior mode of its Being and to its appearance rather than to how it is in and for itself. It is for this reason that the presentation of knowledge as it appears is to be undertaken here.¹

¶77. Now because it has for its object only knowledge as it appears, this presentation itself seems not to be the free science, moving in its own peculiar shape; rather, from this standpoint it can be regarded as the path of the natural consciousness pressing on to true knowledge, or as the way of the soul passing through the sequence of its configurations as stations prescribed for it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself to spirit and, through the complete experience of itself, arrive at the awareness of what it is in itself.¹

¶78. Natural consciousness will prove to be only the concept of knowledge, or knowledge that is not real. But natural consciousness immediately takes itself to be real knowledge, and so this path has a negative meaning for it, and it counts what is in fact the realization of the concept as the loss of its own self; for on this path it loses its truth. The path can therefore be regarded as the way of *doubt*, or more precisely as the way of despair; for what happens on this path is not what is usually understood by doubting, shaking some supposed truth or other, followed by a convenient disappearance of the doubt and a return to that truth again, so that in the end the Thing is taken as it was in the first place. On the contrary, this path is the conscious insight into the untruth of knowledge as it appears, for which the supreme reality is what is in truth only the unrealized concept. That is why this self-accomplishing scepticism is also not the accoutrement with which the earnest zeal for truth and science fancies it has prepared and equipped itself in their service: with the *resolution*, namely, never in science to surrender upon authority to the thoughts of others, but to examine everything oneself and to follow only one's own conviction, or better still, to produce everything oneself and to regard only one's own deed as the true. The series of configurations which consciousness goes through on this path is rather the detailed history of the *education* of consciousness itself to science. That resolution represents education as immediately over and done with, as a past happening, in the simple manner of the resolution; but in contrast to this untruth, this path is the actual performance. To follow one's own conviction is admittedly more than submitting to authority; but the conversion of a belief based on authority into a belief from personal conviction does not necessarily alter the content of the belief or replace error with truth. Involvement in a system of opinion and prejudice on the authority of others and involvement in it from personal conviction differ only in respect of the vanity that goes with the latter policy. By contrast, the scepticism that is directed at the whole range of consciousness as it appears is what first gives spirit the capacity to

investigate what the truth is. For it gives rise to a despair in the so-called natural ideas, thoughts, and opinions—no matter whether they are called one's own or someone else's—whereas the consciousness that gets down to its investigation *right away* is still filled and encumbered with them, but because of that it is in fact incapable of the task it proposes to undertake.¹

¶79. The *completeness* of the forms of the consciousness that is not real will result from the necessity of the progression and interconnection itself. To make this comprehensible, we can in advance make the general remark that the presentation in its untruth of the consciousness that is not genuine is not a merely *negative* movement. This is a one-sided view such as the natural consciousness generally has of it; and a knowledge which makes this one-sidedness into its essence is one of the shapes of unfinished consciousness; it occurs in the course of the journey itself and will present itself there. To be precise, this is the scepticism that only ever sees *pure nothing* in the result and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinately the nothing *of that from which it results*. But the genuine result is in fact only the nothing taken as the result of that from which it derives; and so the nothing is itself a *determinate* nothing and has a *content*. The scepticism that ends up with the abstraction of nothing or with emptiness cannot go any further from there, but must wait to see whether anything new presents itself and, if so, what it is, in order to cast it into the same empty abyss. When, on the other hand, the result is conceived as it is in truth, as *determinate* negation, then a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made by which the advance through the complete series of shapes ensues of itself.¹

¶80. But the *goal* is fixed for knowledge just as necessarily as the sequence of the advance; it is situated where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, and the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept. So the advance towards this goal is also relentless, and no satisfaction is to be found at any earlier station. Whatever is limited to a natural life cannot of its own accord go beyond its immediate Being-there; but it is driven beyond it by something else, and this uprootedness is its death. But consciousness is for itself its own *concept*, thereby immediately the advance beyond what is limited and, since what is thus limited belongs to it, beyond itself; together with the singular the beyond is also posited for consciousness, even if only *alongside* the limited, as in spatial intuition. Thus consciousness suffers this violence at its own hands: it spoils its own limited satisfaction. On feeling this violence, anxiety may well draw back before the truth, and strive to maintain what it is in danger of losing. But this anxiety can find no rest, unless it wishes to remain in thoughtless indolence; thought spoils thoughtlessness and its restlessness disturbs indolence; or unless it entrenches itself as sentimentality, which claims to find everything *good of its kind*; this claim likewise suffers violence at the hands of reason, which finds something no good precisely insofar as it is a kind. Or fear of the truth may hide from itself and others behind the illusion that its burning zeal for truth is precisely what makes it so difficult, even impossible, for it to find any other truth but the sole truth of vanity—that one is always even cleverer than any thoughts one draws out of oneself or from others; this vanity which understands how to vaporize any truth, understands how to return from it into itself and revels in its own understanding, which knows how to dissolve

every thought and to find the barren I instead of any content, is a gratification which must be left to itself; for it flees from the universal and seeks only Being-for-itself.¹

¶81. After these preliminary general comments about the manner and necessity of the progression, it may be similarly useful to add a remark about the *method of carrying it out*. This exposition is presented as a *response of science to knowledge as it appears*, and as an *investigation and examination of the reality of cognition*; and so it seems as if it cannot take place without some presupposition which is adopted as a *standard* underlying it. For an examination consists in the application of an accepted standard, and the decision whether what is being examined is correct or incorrect depends on the resulting agreement or disagreement of it with the standard; and the standard in general, and science too if that happens to be the standard, is thereby accepted as the *essence* or as *the in-itself*. But here, where science first comes on the scene, neither science itself nor anything else has justified itself as the essence or as the in-itself; and without something of the sort it seems that no examination can take place.¹

¶82. This contradiction and its removal will emerge more determinately if we first recall the abstract determinations of knowledge and of truth as they occur in consciousness. To be precise, consciousness *distinguishes* from itself something to which it at the same time *relates* itself; or, as the expression goes, there is something *for consciousness*; and this determinate aspect, the *relating*, or the *Being* of something *for a consciousness*, is *knowing*. But from this Being for another we distinguish *Being-in-itself*; what is related to knowing is also distinguished from knowing and posited as *being* outside this relation as well; this aspect, the in-itself, is called *truth*. What is really involved in these determinations is of no further concern to us here; for as our object is knowledge as it appears, so too its determinations are initially taken up as they immediately present themselves; and they present themselves very much as we have conceived them.¹

¶83. If we now investigate the truth of knowledge, then it seems that we are investigating what knowledge is *in itself*. Yet in this investigation knowledge is *our* object, it is *for us*; and the *in-itself* of knowledge that emerged from the inquiry would thus be rather its Being *for us*; what we claimed to be its essence would not be its truth but only our knowledge of it. The essence or standard would lie within ourselves, and that which is supposed to be compared with it and about which a decision should be taken in light of this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize the standard.¹

¶84. But the nature of the object we are investigating avoids this separation or this semblance of separation and presupposition. Consciousness provides its standard within itself, and the investigation will therefore be a comparison of consciousness with itself; for the distinction that has just been made falls within it. In consciousness there is one thing *for another*, or consciousness in general has in it the determinacy of the moment of knowledge; at the same time, this other is to consciousness not merely *for it*, but also outside this relation or *in itself*: the moment of truth. Thus in what consciousness declares within itself to be the *in-itself* or the true we have the standard that consciousness itself sets up by which to measure its knowledge. If we call *knowledge* the *concept*, and call the essence or the *true*, on the other hand, that which is or the *object*, then the examination consists in seeing whether the concept

corresponds to the object. But if we call *the essence* or the *in-itself of the object the concept*, and conversely understand by the *object* the object as *object*, that is, as it is *for an other*, then the examination consists in seeing whether the object corresponds to its concept. It is easy to see that these amount to the same thing; but the essential point to bear in mind throughout the whole investigation is that both these moments, *concept* and *object*, *Being-for-another* and *Being-in-itself*, themselves fall within the knowledge we are investigating, and consequently we do not need to import standards, and to apply *our* notions and thoughts in the investigation; it is by leaving these aside that we succeed in considering the Thing as it is *in* and *for itself*.¹

¶85. So an intervention by us becomes superfluous in this respect, that concept and object, the standard and what is to be assessed, are present in consciousness itself. But not only that, we are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and really *assessing* them, so that, as consciousness assesses itself, all that remains for us in this respect too is simply to look on. For consciousness is on the one hand consciousness of the object, on the other hand consciousness of itself; consciousness of what to it is the true, and consciousness of its knowledge of the true. Since both are *for consciousness*, consciousness itself is their comparison; it becomes a matter *for consciousness* whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not. The object, admittedly, seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it; consciousness seems unable, as it were, to get behind the scenes to see the object *not* as it is *for consciousness*, but as it is *in itself*, and so unable to assess its knowledge by it. However, the very fact that consciousness knows of an object at all already involves this distinction: *to consciousness* something is the *in-itself*, while another moment is the knowledge, or the Being of the object *for* consciousness. This differentiation is at hand, and the assessment rests upon it. If in this comparison the two do not correspond, then it seems that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it conform to the object; but in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too, for the existing knowledge was essentially a knowledge of the object: along with the knowledge the object too becomes another, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge. Hence consciousness finds that what it previously took to be the *in-itself* is not in itself, or that it was *in itself* only *for consciousness*. Since consciousness thus finds in its object that its knowledge is at odds with the object, the object itself does not hold out either; or the standard of the assessment alters when that of which it was supposed to be the standard fails the test; and the assessment is not only an assessment of the knowledge, but also of the standard of the assessment.¹

¶86. This *dialectical* movement which consciousness exercises on itself, on its knowledge as well as on its object, *insofar as the new, true object emerges* from it *for consciousness*, is really what is called *experience*. In this connection there is a moment in the process just mentioned which needs to be brought out more clearly, and this will shed a new light on the scientific aspect of the following presentation. Consciousness knows *something*, this object is the essence or the *in-itself*; but it is also the *in-itself* for consciousness; with this the ambiguity of this truth comes in. We see that consciousness now has two objects: one is the first *in-itself*, the second is the *Being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*. The latter seems initially to be only the reflection of consciousness into itself, a representing, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of

that first object. But as we have shown above, consciousness thereby has its first object altered; the object ceases to be the in-itself, and becomes to consciousness an object that is the *in-itself* only for consciousness; and so this, *the Being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*, is then the true, which means, however, that this is the *essence* or the *object* of consciousness. This new object contains the nullity of the first, it is what experience has made of it.¹

¶87. In this presentation of the course of experience there is a moment in virtue of which it does not seem to agree with what is ordinarily understood by experience. That is, the transition from the first object and the knowledge of it, to the other object, *with which*, as they say, the experience has been had, was specified to the effect that the knowledge of the first object, or the *for-consciousness* of the first in-itself, is itself supposed to become the second object. By contrast, it usually seems that we gain the experience of the untruth of our first concept with *another* object which we come across by chance and externally, so that all in all only the pure *apprehension* of what is in and for itself falls to us. In the above view, however, the new object shows itself to have come about through a *reversal of consciousness* itself. This view of the Thing is our contribution, in virtue of which the sequence of consciousness's experiences is raised to a scientific progression and which is not for the consciousness that we are considering. But in fact this is the same circumstance as the one discussed above in connection with the relationship of our presentation to scepticism, namely that in each case the result emerging in an untruthful sort of knowledge should not be left to dwindle into an empty nothing, but must necessarily be conceived as the nothing *of that of which* it is the *result*; a result which contains whatever truth the preceding knowledge has in it. This presents itself here like this: since what first appeared as the object sinks to consciousness's knowledge of it, and the *in-itself* becomes a *Being-for-consciousness of the in-itself*, this is the new object, bringing on a new shape of consciousness too, for which the essence is something different from that of the preceding shape. It is this circumstance that guides the whole sequence of the shapes of consciousness in their necessity. But it is this necessity itself, or the *emergence* of the new object that presents itself to consciousness without its knowing what is happening to it, that for us, as it were, goes on behind the back of consciousness. There thus comes into the movement of consciousness a moment of *Being-in-itself* or *Being-for-us* that does not present itself for the consciousness that is comprehended in the experience itself; but the *content* of what we see emerge is *for consciousness*, and we comprehend only its formal aspect, or its pure emergence; *for consciousness* what has thus emerged is only as object, *for us* it is at the same time movement and becoming.¹

¶88. In virtue of this necessity, the path to science is itself already *science* and hence, in keeping with its content, science of the *experience of consciousness*.¹

¶89. The experience which consciousness has of itself can, in accordance with the concept of experience, comprehend within itself nothing less than the whole system of consciousness, or the whole realm of the truth of spirit, in such a way that the moments of this truth present themselves in this peculiar determinacy: they are not abstract, pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself emerges in its relation to them. This is why the moments of the whole are *shapes of*

consciousness. In pressing on to its true existence, consciousness will reach a point at which it sheds its semblance of being burdened with alien material that is only for it and as an other, a point where the appearance becomes equal to the essence, where consequently its presentation coincides with just this point in the authentic science of spirit; and finally, when consciousness itself grasps this its essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself.¹

A. Consciousness

I. Sensory Certainty: The This and Meaning

¶90. The knowledge that is our object at first or immediately can be nothing other than that which is itself immediate knowledge, *knowledge* of the *immediate* or *what simply is*. We have to adopt a similarly *immediate* or *receptive* approach, and thus alter nothing in the object as it presents itself, and exclude conceptualization from apprehension.¹

¶91. The concrete content of *sensory certainty* makes it immediately appear as the richest cognition, indeed as a cognition of infinite wealth for which no limit can be found, whether we *proceed outwards* in the space and time in which it extends, or whether we take a piece of this abundance, and proceed *inwards* by dividing it. Moreover, sensory certainty appears as the most *genuine* cognition; for it has not as yet omitted anything from the object, but has it before itself in its entirety. But in fact this *certainty* exposes itself as the most abstract and poorest *truth*. This is all it says about what it knows: 'it *is*'; and its truth contains only the *Being* of the Thing. Consciousness, for its part, is in this certainty only as pure *I*; or I am in this certainty only as pure *This*, and the object similarly only as pure *This*. I, *this I*, am *certain* of *this* Thing, not because *I*, as consciousness, have developed myself in the process or set thought in multifarious motion. And not because *the Thing* of which I am certain, is, in virtue of a host of distinct qualities, a rich complex of connections within itself, or a variety of relationships to other things. Neither of these has anything to do with the truth of sensory certainty. In this case neither I nor the Thing has the significance of a complex mediation: the I does not have the significance of a manifold representing or thinking; nor does the Thing have the significance of manifold qualities: no, the Thing *is*, and it *is*, only because it *is*. It *is*—this is what is essential for sensory knowledge, and this pure *Being*, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its *truth*. In the same way, certainty as a *relation* is an *immediate* pure relation: consciousness is *I*, nothing more, a pure *This*; the *singleton* knows the pure *This*, or *the singular*.¹

¶92. But in this *pure Being*, which constitutes the essence of this certainty, and which this certainty claims to be its truth, much more comes into play, if we look. An actual sensory certainty is not just this pure immediacy, but an *exemplifying by-play* of it.¹ Among the countless differences occurring here we find in every case a crucial difference, namely that in sensory certainty the two *This*'s already mentioned, a *This* as *I*, and a *This* as *object*, issue directly from the pure Being. If we reflect on this difference, it emerges that neither the one nor the other is present in sensory certainty only *immediately*; at the same time they are present as *mediated*: I have the certainty *through*

something else, viz. the Thing; and similarly the Thing is in the certainty *through* something else, viz. through the I.²

¶93. It is not just we who draw this distinction between the essence and the byplay, between immediacy and mediation; we find it in sensory certainty itself, and the distinction is to be taken up in the form it has in sensory certainty, not as we determined it just now. One element in sensory certainty is posited as the simple, immediate being, or as the essence, *the object*, while the other is posited as what is unessential and mediated, something that in sensory certainty is through an other, not *in itself*, the I, *a knowledge* that knows the object only because the *object* is, a knowledge that may either be or not be. But the object *is*, it is the true and the essence; it *is*, no matter whether it is known or not; it remains, even if it is not known; but the knowledge is not if the object is not.¹

¶94. So the object needs to be considered, to see whether in sensory certainty itself the object is in fact the kind of essence that sensory certainty presents it as; whether this concept of it as the essence corresponds to the way in which it is present in sensory certainty. To this end, we need not reflect on the object and ponder what it might be in truth; we need only consider the way in which it is present in sensory certainty.

¶95. So we have to put the question to *sensory certainty* itself: *What is the This?* If we take the This in the twofold shape of its Being, as the *Now* and as the *Here*, the dialectic it has in it will receive a form as intelligible as the This itself is. To the question: *What is the Now?* we answer, for example: *The Now is the night*. In order to test the truth of this sensory certainty a simple experiment suffices. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, nor can it lose anything through our preserving it. If *now, this noon*, we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale.¹

¶96. The Now that is night is *preserved*, i.e. it is treated as what it is made out to be, as a *being*; but it turns out to be, on the contrary, a non-being. The *Now* itself does indeed maintain itself, but as a Now that is not night; equally, it maintains itself against the day that it now is, as a Now that is also not day, or as a *negative* in general. This self-maintaining Now is, therefore, not an immediate Now but a mediated Now; for it is determined as a permanent and self-maintaining Now *by the very fact* that something else, viz. the day and the night, is not. For all that, it is still just as simple as before, *Now*, and in this simplicity it is indifferent to what is still in play by its side; the night and the day are definitely not its Being, but it is also day and night nonetheless; it is not in the least affected by this its other-being. A simple thing of this kind, which is through negation, neither This nor That, a *not-This*, and equally indifferent to being This as well as That—we call it a *universal*. So in fact the universal is the true of sensory certainty.¹

¶97. It is also as a universal that we *express* the sensory. What we say is: *This*, i.e. the *universal This*, or: *it is*, i.e. *Being in general*. Of course, in doing so we do not *represent* to ourselves the universal This or Being in general, but we *express* the universal; or our speech does not strictly express what we *mean* in this sensory certainty. But language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we ourselves immediately refute our *meaning*, and since the universal is the true of sensory certainty and language expresses this true alone, it is just not possible for us ever to say a sensory Being that we *mean*.¹

¶98. The same will be the case with the other form of the This, with *the Here*. *The Here* is, e.g., the *tree*. If I turn round, this truth has disappeared and is converted into the opposite truth: *The Here is not a tree*, but *a house* instead. The *Here* itself does not disappear; no, *it is*, enduring in the disappearance of the house, the tree, etc., and indifferent to whether it is house or tree. Again, then, the *This* shows itself to be *mediated simplicity*, or *universality*.¹

¶99. This sensory certainty shows, within its own self, the universal to be the truth of its object. *Pure being* remains, then, as the essence of sensory certainty, not however as something immediate, but as something to which negation and mediation are essential; consequently, it is not what we *mean* by *Being*, but *Being* with the *determination* that it is the abstraction, or the purely universal; and *our meaning*, for which the true of sensory certainty is not the universal, is all that still remains in the face of this empty or indifferent Now and Here.¹

¶100. If we compare the relationship in which *knowing* and the *object* first came on the scene, with the relationship in which they come to stand in this result, we find that it is reversed. The object, which was supposed to be the essential element, is now the inessential element in sensory certainty; for the universal which the object has come to be is no longer what the object was supposed to be essentially for sensory certainty. On the contrary, sensory certainty is now located in the opposite, viz. in knowledge, which previously was the inessential element. Its truth is in the object as *my* object, or in *my meaning*; it is, because *I* have knowledge of it. Sensory certainty, then, is indeed expelled from the object, but it is not yet sublated by this, but only driven back into the I. We now have to see what experience shows us about this reality of sensory certainty.¹

¶101. So the force of the truth of sense certainty now lies in the *I*, in the immediacy of my *seeing*, *hearing*, and so on; the disappearance of the singular Now and Here that we mean is prevented because *I* hold them fast. *The Now is day*, because I see daylight; *the Here is a tree*, for the same reason. But in this relationship sensory certainty experiences the same dialectic within itself as in the previous relationship. *I*, *this I*, see the tree and *affirm the tree as the Here*; but *another I* sees the house and maintains that Here is not a tree but a house instead. Both truths have the same authentication, viz. the immediacy of seeing, and the security and assurance of both about their knowledge; but the one truth vanishes in the other.¹

¶102. What does not disappear in all this is *I*, as *universal*, whose seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but a simple seeing which, though mediated by the negation of this house, etc., is equally simple and indifferent to what is still in play beside it, to the house, the tree. *I* is only universal like *Now*, *Here*, or *This* in general; I do indeed mean a *singular I*, but I can no more say what *I* mean in the case of *I* than I can in the case of *Now* and *Here*. When I say *this Here*, *Now*, or a *singular*, I am saying *all This's*, *all Heres*, *Nows*, *singulars*. Similarly, when I say *I*, *this singular I*, I say in general *all I's*; what I say is everyone: *I*, *this singular I*. When science is presented with the challenge, as if it were the acid test it simply could not withstand—to deduce, construct, find a priori, or however it is expressed, a so-called *this thing* or *a this man*, it is only reasonable that the challenge should say which *this* thing, or which *this I* it means; but it is impossible to say this.¹

¶103. So sensory certainty learns by experience that its essence is neither in the object nor in the I, and that the immediacy is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other; for in both, what I mean is rather an inessential, and the object and I are universals in which that Now and Here and I which I mean does not have a continuing subsistence, or *is* not. In this way we come to the point where we posit the *whole* of sensory certainty itself as its *essence*, and no longer only one of its moments, as happened in the two cases where first the object confronting the I, and then the I, was supposed to be its reality. Thus it is only sensory certainty as a *whole* which stands firm within itself as *immediacy* and by so doing excludes from itself all the opposition that occurred before.¹

¶104. This pure immediacy therefore no longer has any concern with the otherness of the Here as a tree which passes over into a Here that is a non-tree, or with the otherness of the Now as day which passes over into a Now that is night, or with another I with another object. Its truth maintains itself as a relation that remains equal to itself, and which makes no distinction between the I and the object with regard to what is essential and what is unessential, and so no distinction at all can penetrate into it either. So I, this I, affirm the Here as a tree, and do not turn round so that the Here becomes for me a non-tree; and I take no notice of the fact that another I sees the Here as non-tree, or that I myself at another time take the Here as non-tree, the Now as non-day. No, I am pure intuiting; I stick to my claim that the Now is day, or alternatively that the Here is a tree; and I do not compare the Here and Now themselves with each other, but stick firmly to *one* immediate relation: the Now is day.¹

¶105. Since, then, this certainty now refuses to come forth when we draw its attention to a Now that is night, or to an I for whom it is night, we go up to it and let the Now that is affirmed be pointed out to us. We must let it be *pointed out* to us; for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of *this* I which confines itself to one *Now* or one *Here*. Were we to take up this truth *afterwards*, or stand *at a distance* from it, it would have no significance at all; for we would sublimate the immediacy that is essential to it. We must therefore enter into the same point of time or space, let them be pointed out to us, i.e. let ourselves be made into the very same this I which is the one that knows with certainty. Let us, then, see how the immediate, that is pointed out to us, is constituted.¹

¶106. The *Now* is pointed out, *this Now. Now*; it has already ceased to be when it is pointed out. The *Now* that *is*, is another *Now* than the one pointed out, and we see that the *Now* is just this: already to be no more when it is. The *Now*, as it is pointed out to us, is a *Now* that *has been*, and this is its truth; it has not the truth of Being. So this much is true after all, that it has been. But what *has been*, an *ex-entity*, is, in fact, *no essence, no entity; it is not*, and we were concerned with Being.¹

¶107. In this pointing-out, then, we see only a movement which takes the following course: (1) I point out the *Now*, it is affirmed as the true; but I point it out as a *has-been*, or as something sublated, I sublimate the first truth. (2) Now I affirm as the second truth that it *has been*, is sublated. (3) But what has been, is not; I sublimate the *having-been-ness* or *sublatedness*, the second truth, and thereby negate the negation of the *Now*, and thus return to the first affirmation, that *Now* is. The *Now*, and pointing out the *Now*, are thus so constituted that neither the *Now* nor

the pointing out is immediately simple, but a movement which has various moments in it: a *This* is posited, but it is rather *an other* that is posited, or the *This* is sublated: and this *otherness*, or sublation of the first, is itself *again sublated*, and so has returned to the first. However, this first, reflected into itself, is not exactly the same as it was to begin with, viz. something *immediate*; on the contrary, it is *something reflected into itself*, or *simple* which, in its otherness, remains what it is: a *Now* which is absolutely many *Nows*. And this is the veritable *Now*, the *Now* as simple day which has within it many *Nows*, hours. Such a *Now*, an hour, is similarly many minutes, and this *Now* is likewise many *Nows*, and so on.—The *pointing-out* is thus itself the movement which expresses what the *Now* is in truth, viz. a result, or a plurality of *Nows* all taken together; and the pointing-out is the experience of learning that *Now* is a *universal*.¹

¶108. The *Here pointed out*, which I hold fast, is similarly a *this Here*, which in fact is *not this Here*, but a *Before and Behind*, an *Above and Below*, a *Right and Left*. The *Above* is itself similarly this manifold otherness of above, below, etc. The *Here*, which was supposed to be pointed out, vanishes in other *Heres*, but these likewise vanish. What is pointed out, held fast, and remains, is a *negative This*, which is thus only when the *Heres* are taken as they are supposed to be, but sublating themselves in the process; it is a simple complex of many *Heres*. The *Here* that is meant would be the point; but the point is not: on the contrary, when it is pointed out as something that is, the pointing-out shows itself to be not immediate knowledge, but a movement from the *Here* that is meant through many *Heres* into the universal *Here*, which is a simple plurality of *Heres*, just as the day is a simple plurality of *Nows*.¹

¶109. It is clear that the dialectic of sensory certainty is nothing other than the simple history of its movement or of its experience, and sensory certainty itself is nothing other than this history only. That is why the natural consciousness itself also always advances to this result, which is the true in sensory certainty, and it gains experience of it; but equally it only forgets it again and again, and begins the movement afresh. It is therefore astonishing when, in the face of this experience, it is proposed as universal experience, also as a philosophical assertion, and even as the result of scepticism, that the reality or the Being of external things as *these things*, or sensory things, has absolute truth for consciousness. Such an assertion does not even know what it is talking about, does not know that it is saying the opposite of what it wants to say. The truth for consciousness of the sensory *This* is supposed to be universal experience; but the contrary is universal experience. Every consciousness itself sublating again such a truth as e.g. *the Here is a tree*, or, *the Now is noon*, and expresses the contrary: the *Here* is *not* a tree, *but rather* a house; and insofar as this second assertion, sublating the first, again involves such an assertion of a sensory *This*, it instantly sublating that too. And in all sensory certainty only what we have seen is experienced in truth, viz. the *This* as a *universal*, the contrary of what that assertion claims to be universal experience.—With this appeal to the universal experience we may be permitted to anticipate its bearing on the practical sphere. In this regard we can tell those who affirm this truth and certainty of the reality of sensory objects that they should be sent back to the most elementary school of wisdom, viz. the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, and still have to learn the secret of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine; for the initiate into these secrets not only comes to doubt the Being of sensory things, but to despair of it;

and in part he brings about the nothingness in such things himself, and in part he sees them bring it about themselves. Even animals are not debarred from this wisdom; on the contrary, they show themselves to be profoundly initiated into it; for they do not just stand stock still in the presence of sensory things as if they were beings in themselves, but, despairing of this reality and in complete certainty of their nothingness, they help themselves without more ado and gobble them up. And all nature, like the animals, celebrates these revealed mysteries which teach what the truth of sensory things is.¹

¶110. But, in accordance with our previous remarks, those who advance such an assertion, themselves also say immediately the contrary of what they mean:—a phenomenon which is perhaps best calculated to induce reflection on the nature of sensory certainty. They speak of the existence of *external* objects, which can be more precisely determined as *actual*, absolutely *singular*, *wholly personal*, *individual* things, none of them absolutely similar to anything else; this Being-there, they say, has absolute certainty and truth. They mean *this* bit of paper on which I am writing—or rather have written—*this*; but what they mean is not what they say. If they actually wanted to *say* this bit of paper which they mean, and they wanted to *say* it, then this is impossible, because the sensory This that is meant is *inaccessible* to language, which belongs to consciousness, to the inherently universal. In the actual attempt to say it, it would therefore rot away; those who started to describe it could not complete the description, but would have to leave it to others, who in the end would themselves admit to speaking about a thing which *is* not. They certainly mean, then, *this* bit of paper here which is another bit entirely from the bit mentioned above; but they speak about ‘actual *things*, *external* or *sensory objects*, *absolutely singular entities*’, and so on; i.e. they say of them only what is *universal*. Consequently, what is called the inexpressible is nothing other than the untrue, the irrational, the merely meant.—If nothing more is said of something than that it is *an actual thing*, an *external object*, then what is expressed is only its supreme universality and thus its *equality* with everything rather than its distinctness. When I say: a *singular thing*, I am really saying it as *wholly universal*, for everything is a singular thing; and likewise *this* thing is anything you like. If we designate it more exactly as *this bit of paper*, then *each* and *every* bit of paper is a *this* bit of paper, and I have only ever said the universal. But if I want to help out speech—which has the divine nature of directly reversing the meaning, of making it into something else, and thus not letting it *get a word in*—by *pointing out* this bit of paper, experience teaches me what the truth of sensory certainty in fact is: I point it out, as a *Here*, which is a Here of other Heres, or is within itself a *simple Together* of many *Heres*, i.e. it is a universal. I take it up as it is in truth, and instead of knowing something immediate, I *perceive*.¹

II. Perception: The Thing and Illusion

¶111. Immediate certainty does not take over the true, for its truth is the universal; whereas it wants to take the *This*. Perception, on the other hand, takes its beings as something universal. Just as universality is its principle in general, the immediately self-differentiating moments within perception are universal: the I a universal I and the object a universal object. That principle has *emerged* for us, and therefore our

reception of perception is no longer a reception that appears, as that of sensory certainty was; it is a necessary reception. The two moments, which in their appearance just *fall from nowhere*, have come into being at the same time in the emergence of the principle: one is the movement of pointing-out, the other same movement as something simple; the former the *perceiving*, the latter the *object*.¹ In essence the object is the same as the movement: the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the moments, and the object is the gathered-togetherness of the moments. For us, or in itself, the universal as principle is the *essence* of perception, and, in contrast to this abstraction, both the moments differentiated—the perceiver and the perceived—are the *inessential*. But in fact, because both are themselves the universal or the essence, both are essential. Yet since they are related to each other as opposites, only one can be the essential moment in the relation, and the distinction of the essential and the inessential must be shared between them. One of them determined as the simple, the object, is the essence regardless of whether it is perceived or not; but the perceiving, as the movement, is the inconstant, which can as well be as not be, and the inessential.²

¶112. This object must now be determined more precisely, and this determination must be developed briefly from the result that has been reached; the more detailed development does not belong here. Since the principle of the object, the universal, is in its simplicity a *mediated* universal, the object must express this within itself as its nature; in this way it shows itself as *the thing with many properties*. The wealth of sensory knowledge belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, where it was only what was in play beside it; for only perception has *negation*, difference or manifoldness, in its essence.¹

¶113. So the This is posited as *not this*, or as *sublated*; and hence not as Nothing, but as a determinate Nothing or a *Nothing of a content*, viz. of the *This*. Consequently, the sensory itself is still present, but not in the way it was supposed to be in immediate certainty, not as the singular meant, but as a universal, or as what will determine itself as *property*. *Sublation* exhibits its veritable twofold significance which we have seen in the negative: it is at the same time a *negating* and a *preserving*; the Nothing, as *Nothing of the This*, preserves immediacy and is itself sensory, but a universal immediacy.—But Being is a universal in virtue of its having mediation or the negative in it; when it *expresses* this in its immediacy it is a *distinct, determinate* property. *Many* such properties are thereby posited at the same time, one the negative of the other. Since they are expressed in the *simplicity* of the universal, these *determinacies*, which are really properties only through the addition of a further determination, are related to *themselves*, are *indifferent* to each other, each for itself, free from the others. But the simple universality, equal to itself, is itself in turn distinct and free from its determinacies. It is pure relating-itself-to-itself, or the *medium* in which these determinacies all are, and so they *interpenetrate* in it as in a simple unity, but without *touching* each other; for it is just through participation in this universality that they are indifferent to each other, each for itself.—This abstract universal medium, which can be called *thinghood* in general or the *pure essence*, is nothing other than the *Here and Now*, as they have proved to be, viz. a *simple togetherness* of many; but the many are, in their *determinacy*, *simply universals* themselves. This salt is a simple Here, and at the same time manifold; it is white

and *also* tart, *also* cubical in shape, *also* of a determinate *weight*, etc. All these many properties are in one simple *Here*, in which they therefore interpenetrate; none has a different *Here* from the others, but each is everywhere, in the same *Here* in which the others are. And, at the same time, without being separated by diverse *Heres*, they do not affect each other in this interpenetration. The whiteness does not affect or alter the cubical shape, and neither affects the tartness, etc.; since each is itself a simple *relating-itself-to-itself*, it leaves the others alone, and is related to them only by the indifferent *Also*. This *Also* is thus the pure universal itself, or the medium, the *thinghood* that gathers them together in this way.¹

¶114. In the relationship which has thus emerged it is only the character of positive universality that is at first observed and developed; but another side presents itself, which must also be taken into consideration. That is, if the many determinate properties were utterly indifferent to each other and were simply and solely related to themselves, they would not be *determinate*; for they are determinate only insofar as they *differentiate* themselves, and *relate* themselves to *others* as opposites. But in this opposition they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium, a unity that is just as essential to them as negation; the differentiation of the properties, insofar as it is not an indifferent differentiation but exclusive, negating something else, thus falls outside this simple medium; and the medium, therefore, is not only an *Also*, an indifferent unity, but a *One* as well, an *exclusive unity*.—The *One* is the *moment of negation*; as it relates itself to itself in a simple way and excludes an other; and by this, *thinghood* is determined as *thing*. In the property negation is as *determinacy*, which is immediately one with the immediacy of Being, an immediacy which, through this unity with negation, is universality; but the immediacy is as *One*, when it is set free from this unity with the contrary and is in and for itself.¹

¶115. In these moments taken together, the thing as the true of perception is completed, so far as it is necessary to develop it here. It is (a) the indifferent, passive universality, the *Also* of the many properties or rather *matters*; (b) negation, equally simple; or the *One*, the exclusion of opposite properties; and (c) the many *properties* themselves, the relation of the first two moments, negation as it relates to the indifferent element, and therein expands into a host of differences; the point of singularity radiating out into plurality in the medium of subsistence. Insofar as these differences belong to the indifferent medium they are themselves universal, are related only to themselves and do not affect each other; but insofar as they belong to the negative unity they are at the same time exclusive; but they necessarily have this relation of opposition with properties that are remote from *their Also*. The sensory universality, or the *immediate* unity of Being and the negative, is thus a *property* only insofar as the *One* and the pure universality are developed from it and differentiated from each other, and when the sensory universality combines them; it is only this relation of the universality to the pure essential moments which completes the *thing*.¹

¶116. This, then, is how the thing of perception is constituted; and consciousness is determined as perceiver insofar as this thing is its object; it has *only to take* it and conduct itself as pure apprehension; and what thus presents itself to it is the true. If consciousness itself were to do anything in this taking, it would by such adding or omission alter the truth. Since the object is the true and universal, what is

equal-to-itself, while consciousness is the alterable and unessential, it can happen that consciousness apprehends the object incorrectly and deceives itself. The perceiver has consciousness of the possibility of illusion; for in the universality which is the principle, *otherness* itself is immediately for it, though as what is *null*, sublated. Its criterion of truth is therefore *equality-to-itself*, and its procedure is to apprehend the object as equal to itself. Since at the same time diversity is for the perceiver, it is a relating of the diverse moments of its apprehension to each other; but if a discrepancy emerges in the course of this comparison, then this is not an untruth of the object—for this is what is equal to itself—but an untruth of perceiving.¹

¶117. Let us see now what experience consciousness undergoes in its actual perceiving. *For us*, this experience is already contained in the development of the object, and of the attitude of consciousness towards it, given just now, and it will only be the development of the contradictions present therein.—The object that I receive presents itself as *purely one*; but I also notice in it the property, which is *universal* and thereby transcends singularity. The first Being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true Being; since the *object* is the true, the untruth falls in me, and the apprehension was not correct. Because of the *universality* of the property, I must rather take the objective essence as a *community* in general. I now further perceive the property as *determinate*, *opposed* to another and excluding it. Thus I did not factually apprehend the objective essence correctly when I determined it as a *community* with others, or as continuity and, because of the *determinacy* of the property, I must separate the continuity and posit the objective essence as a One that excludes. In the separated One I find many such properties which do not affect each other but are mutually indifferent; so I did not perceive the object correctly when I apprehended it as *exclusive* but, just as previously it was only continuity in general, so now it is a universal *common medium* in which many properties are present as sensory *universals*, each being for itself and, as *determinate*, excluding the others. But because of this the simple and the true that I perceive is also not a universal medium, but the *singular property* for itself which, however, is thus neither property nor a determinate Being; for now it is neither in a One nor in relation with others. But it is a property only in the One, and determinate only in relation to others. As this pure relating-of-itself-to-itself, it remains merely *sensory Being* in general, since it no longer has in it the character of negativity; and consciousness, for which there is now a sensory Being, is only a *meaning*,¹ i.e. it has entirely abandoned perception and withdrawn into itself. But sensory Being and meaning themselves pass over into perception; I am thrown back to the beginning and drawn once again into the same cycle which sublates itself in each moment and as a whole.²

¶118. So consciousness necessarily runs through this cycle again, but this time not in the same way as it did the first time. For it has gained the experience in perception that the outcome and the true of perception is its dissolution, or reflection out of the true and into itself. Thus it has been determined for consciousness how its perceiving is essentially constituted, viz. that it is not a simple pure apprehension, but *in its apprehension* is at the same time *reflected out* of the true and *into itself*. This return of consciousness into itself, which immediately *mingles* with the pure apprehension—for this return into itself has shown itself to be essential to perception—, alters the true. Consciousness at once recognizes this aspect as its own and takes it upon itself,

and it will thereby obtain the true object in its purity.—With this, we now have in perception the same as happened in the case of sensory certainty: the aspect in which consciousness is driven back into itself, but not initially in the sense in which this happened in sensory certainty, i.e. not as if the *truth* of perception fell in consciousness. On the contrary, consciousness recognizes that what falls in it is the *untruth* occurring in perception. But by this recognition it is at the same time able to sublimate this untruth; it differentiates its apprehension of the true from the untruth of its perception, corrects this untruth, and insofar as it undertakes this correction itself, the truth, as truth of *perceiving*, falls of course *within consciousness*. The procedure of consciousness which we have now to consider is thus so constituted that consciousness no longer merely perceives, but is also conscious of its reflection-into-itself, and separates this from simple apprehension itself.¹

¶119. At first, then, I become aware of the thing as *One*, and have to hold it fast in this true determination; if, in the movement of perceiving, something turns up which contradicts it, then this is to be recognized as my reflection. Now, there also occur in the perception diverse properties which seem to be properties of the thing; but the thing is *One*, and we are conscious that this diversity, by which it would cease to be *One*, falls in us. So in point of fact, this thing is white only to *our eyes*, *also tart to our tongue*, *also cubical to our feeling*, and so on. We get the entire diversity of these aspects, not from the thing, but from ourselves; and they fall asunder in this way for us, because the eye is quite distinct from the tongue, and so on. We are thus the *universal medium* in which such moments are separate and are for themselves. Through the fact, then, that we regard the determinacy of being a universal medium as our reflection, we maintain the equality-to-itself and truth of the thing, its being *One*.¹

¶120. But, regarded as situated, each for itself, in the universal medium, these *diverse aspects* which consciousness takes upon itself are *determined*; white is white only in opposition to black, and so on, and the thing is *One* precisely by the fact that it is opposed to others. The thing excludes others from itself, but not insofar as it is *One*—for to be *One* is the universal relating-to-itself, and the fact that it is *One* rather makes it like all the others—but through *determinacy*. Things themselves are therefore *determinate in and for themselves*; they have properties by which they differentiate themselves from others. Since the *property* is the thing's *own* property or a determinacy in the thing itself, the thing has *several* properties. For, in the first place, the thing is the true, it is *in itself*; and what is in it, is in it as its own essence, and not because of other things. Secondly, therefore, the determinate properties are not only on account of other things and for other things, but in the thing itself; but they are determinate properties in *it* only because they are a plurality of properties differentiating themselves from each other. And, thirdly, since they are thus in the thinghood, they are in and for themselves and indifferent to each other. It is in truth, then, the thing itself that is white, and *also cubical*, *also tart*, and so on. Or the thing is the *Also* or the universal medium in which the many properties subsist apart from each other, without touching or sublating each other; and taken in this way, the thing is taken as the true.¹

¶121. Now, in this perceiving, consciousness is at the same time conscious that it *also* reflects itself into itself, and that, in perceiving, the opposite moment to the *Also*

occurs. But this moment is the *unity* of the thing with itself, a unity which excludes difference from itself. Accordingly, it is this unity which consciousness has to take upon itself; for the thing itself is the *subsistence of the many diverse and independent properties*. Thus we say of the thing: *it is white, also cubical, and also tart, and so on*. But insofar as it is white, it is not cubical, and insofar as it is cubical and also white, it is not tart, and so on. The *positing-into-one* of these properties is due to consciousness alone, which must therefore not let them fall into One in the thing. To this end it brings in the *Insofar*, and thereby keeps the properties apart, and the thing as the Also. The *oneness* is taken upon itself by consciousness quite strictly, at first in such a way that what was called property is represented as *free matter*. The thing is in this way raised to a veritable *Also*, since it becomes a collection of matters and, instead of being One, merely an enclosing surface.¹

¶122. If we look back on what consciousness previously took upon itself and now takes upon itself, on what it previously ascribed and now ascribes to the thing, it emerges that consciousness alternately makes itself, and the thing as well, into both, into the pure, plurality-free *One*, and into an *Also* resolved into independent matters. Consciousness thus finds through this comparison that not only *its* taking of the true has in it the *diversity of apprehension* and *withdrawal into itself*, but rather the true itself, the thing, shows itself in this twofold way. With this the experience is at hand that the thing *displays* itself *for the* apprehending *consciousness* in a determinate manner, but *at the same time is reflected out* of the manner in which it presents itself *and back into itself*; or it has within itself an opposite truth.¹

¶123. Thus consciousness has also abandoned this second type of attitude in perceiving, viz. taking the thing as what is truly equal-to-itself, and itself for what is unequal, for what returns back into itself out of equality; and the object is now for consciousness this whole movement which was previously shared between the object and consciousness. The thing is *One*, reflected into itself; it is *for itself*, but it is also *for an other*; and in fact it is an *other* for itself, *as it is* for an other. Accordingly, the thing is for itself and *also* for an other, a *twofold* diverse Being, but it is *also One*; but the oneness contradicts this diversity; accordingly consciousness would again have to take upon itself this *positing-into-one* and keep it away from the thing. So it would have to say that *insofar* as it is for itself, the thing is not for an other. But the oneness also belongs to the thing itself as consciousness has found by experience; the thing is essentially reflected into itself. The *Also*, or the indifferent distinction, thus falls as much within the thing as does the *oneness*; but since the two are diverse they do not fall within the same thing, but in *diverse* things; the contradiction which is in the objective essence in general is distributed between two objects. The thing is indeed in and for itself, equal to itself, but this unity with itself is disturbed by other things; thus the unity of the thing is maintained, and at the same time so is the otherness outside the thing, as well as outside consciousness.¹

¶124. Now although the contradiction of the objective essence is in this way distributed among diverse things, yet the distinction will, for that reason, attach to the separated singular thing itself. The *diverse things* are thus posited *for themselves*; and the conflict falls in them reciprocally, such that each is diverse, not from itself, but only from the other. But each is thereby determined *as itself a distinct entity* and has the essential distinction from the others *in it*, but at the same time not in such a

way that this is an opposition in the thing itself; on the contrary, for itself it is *simple determinacy*, which makes up the thing's *essential* character, differentiating it from others. In fact, since the diversity is in it, it is of course necessarily in it as *actual* distinctness of a manifold constitution. But because the determinacy makes up the *essence* of the thing, by which it differentiates itself from other things and is for itself, this further manifold constitution is the *unessential*. Consequently, the thing does indeed have the *twofold Insofar* within its unity, but with *unequal value*; as a result, this state of opposition does not become an actual opposition in the thing itself; but insofar as the thing through its *absolute distinction* comes into opposition, it has opposition to another thing outside it. Of course, the further manifoldness is necessarily in the thing too, so that it cannot be left out, but it is *unessential* to it.¹

¶125. This determinacy, which makes up the essential character of the thing and differentiates it from all others, is now determined in such a way that the thing is thereby in opposition to other things, but is supposed to maintain itself for itself in this opposition. But it is only a thing, or a One that is for itself, insofar as it does not stand in this relation to others; for in this relation rather its connection with the other is posited, and connection with other is the cessation of Being-for-itself. It is just through the *absolute character* and its opposition that it enters into *relationship* with *others*, and is essentially only this relating; the relationship, however, is the negation of its independence, and it is really through its essential property that the thing goes to ruin.¹

¶126. The necessity for consciousness of the experience that the thing goes to ruin through the very determinacy that makes up its essence and its Being-for-itself, can be briefly considered in terms of the simple concept. The thing is posited as *Being-for-itself*, or as absolute negation of all otherness, therefore as absolute negation, relating only to itself; but self-related negation is the sublation of *itself*, or having its essence in an Other.¹

¶127. In fact, the determination of the object, as it has emerged, contains nothing else; the object is supposed to have within it an essential property which makes up its simple Being-for-itself, but along with this simplicity also diversity, which is supposed to be *necessary*, but not to make up the *essential* determinacy. This, however, is a distinction that still only lies in the words; the *unessential*, which at the same time is nonetheless supposed to be *necessary*, sublates itself, or is what has just been called the negation of itself.¹

¶128. With this, the last *Insofar*, which separated Being-for-itself from Being for another, falls away; rather, the object is *in one and the same respect the contrary of itself: for itself, insofar as it is for another, and for another, insofar as it is for itself*. It is *for itself*, reflected into itself, One; but, reflected into itself, this being One *for itself*, is posited in a unity with its contrary, with *Being for an Other*, and hence only as sublated; or this *Being-for-itself* is just as *unessential* as what was supposed to be the only unessential, viz. the relationship to another.¹

¶129. The object in its pure determinacies, or in the determinacies which were supposed to make up its essentiality, is thereby sublated, just as it became something sublated in its sensory Being. From sensory Being it becomes a universal; but this universal, since it *derives from the sensory*, is essentially *conditioned* by it, and hence is not veritably equal-to-itself at all, but universality *affected with an opposite*, and

because of this it separates into the extremes of singularity and universality, of the One of the properties and the Also of the free matters. These pure determinacies seem to express the *essentiality* itself, but they are only a *Being-for-Self* that is burdened with *Being for an Other*; since, however, the two are essentially *in a unity*, the unconditioned absolute universality is now present, and consciousness here first really enters the realm of the understanding.¹

¶130. Thus sensory singularity does indeed vanish in the dialectical movement of immediate certainty and becomes universality, but only *sensory universality*. Meaning has vanished, and perceiving takes the object as it is *in itself*, or as a universal in general; singularity therefore emerges in the object as true singularity, as *Being-in-itself* of the *One*, or as *reflectedness-into-itself*. But it is still a *conditioned* Being-for-itself, *alongside which* another Being-for-itself occurs, the universality opposed to singularity and conditioned by it; but these two contradictory extremes are not merely *alongside each other* but in one unity; or what is the same, the factor common to both, the *Being-for-itself*, is burdened with opposition generally, i.e. it is at the same time not a *Being-for-itself*. The sophistry of perceiving seeks to save these moments from their contradiction, and to hold onto them by differentiating *respects*, by the *Also* and *Insofar*, and finally to grasp the true by differentiating the *unessential* from an *essence* opposed to it. But these expedients, instead of warding off illusion in the apprehension, prove rather to be futile, and the true, which is supposed to be won by this logic of perceiving, proves to be in one and the same respect the contrary and thus to have as its essence the universality devoid of distinctions and determinations.¹

¶131. These empty abstractions of *singularity* and the *universality* opposed to it, and of the *essence* linked with something *unessential*, an *unessential* which is yet necessary all the same, are the powers whose play is the perceptual understanding, often so-called sound common sense; it takes itself to be solid, real consciousness, but is, in perceiving, only the play of *these abstractions*; generally, it is always at its poorest where it fancies itself to be the richest. Because it is driven about by these futile essences, thrown from one into the arms of the other and, in its endeavour by its sophistry to hold fast and affirm alternately first one essence and then the direct opposite, resists the truth, it supposes that philosophy has to do only with *things-of-thought*. In fact, philosophy does have to do with them too and recognizes them as the pure essences, as the absolute elements and powers; but in doing so, it recognizes them in their *determinacy* too, and is therefore master over them, whereas this perceptual understanding takes them for the true and is led on by them from one error to another. It does not itself arrive at the consciousness that it is such simple essentialities that hold sway in it, but fancies that it always has to do with wholly solid material and content, just as sensory certainty is unaware that the empty abstraction of pure Being is its essence; whereas it is, in fact, these essentialities in which perceptual understanding runs to and fro through all material and content; they are the adhesive and the mastery of that content and they alone are what the sensory *as essence* is for consciousness, what determines the relationships of the sensory to it, and it is in them that the movement of perceiving and of its true runs its course. This course, a perpetual alternation of determining the true and subblating this determining, really makes up the constant everyday life and activity of

perceptual consciousness, a consciousness which supposes it moves in the truth. It thus advances irresistibly to the outcome in which all these essential essentialities or determinations are equally sublated, but in each single moment it is conscious only of this *one determinacy* as the true, and then in turn of the opposite determinacy. It does indeed sense their unessentiality; to save them from the threatening danger, it resorts to the sophistry of now affirming as the true what it has itself just affirmed as the non-true. What the nature of these untrue essences is trying to get this understanding to do is *to bring together*, and thereby sublating, the *thoughts* of these non-essences, the thoughts of that *universality* and *singularity*, of the *Also* and *One*, of the *essentiality* that is necessarily linked to an *unessentiality*, and of an unessentiality that is nevertheless *necessary*. Yet the understanding resists this with the support of the *Insofar* and of the diverse *respects*, or by taking upon itself the one thought in order to keep the other quarantined as the true thought. But the nature of these abstractions brings them together in and for themselves; sound common sense is the prey of these abstractions, which spin it round and round in their whirling circle. Common sense tries to bestow truth on them by at one time taking their untruth upon itself, while at another time it calls illusion a semblance of the unreliable things, and by separating the essential from what is necessary to them yet supposedly unessential, and hanging on to the former as their truth as against the latter; but when it does this, it does not secure them their truth, it convicts itself of untruth.¹

III. Force and Understanding: Appearance and Supersensible World

¶132. In the dialectic of sensory certainty, hearing and seeing, etc., have been lost to consciousness, and, as perceiving, consciousness has arrived at thoughts, which it first brings together, however, in the unconditioned universal. This unconditioned would now itself in turn be nothing other than the one-sided *extreme* of *Being-for-itself*, if it were taken as inert simple essence, for it would then be confronted by non-essence; but, if it were related to this, it would itself be unessential, and consciousness would not have escaped from the illusion of perception; however, it has proved to be the sort of universal that has returned into itself out of such a conditioned *Being-for-itself*.—This unconditioned universal, which is now the true object of consciousness, is still as *object* of it; consciousness has not yet grasped its *concept* as *concept*. It is essential to distinguish the two: for consciousness, the object has returned into itself from its relationship to an other and has thus become concept *in itself*; but consciousness is not yet for itself the concept, and consequently does not recognize itself in that reflected object. *For us*, this object has emerged through the movement of consciousness in such a way that consciousness is involved in the emergence of it, and the reflection on both sides is the same or only *one* reflection. But since in this movement consciousness had for its content only the objective essence, not consciousness as such, for consciousness the result is to be posited in objective significance and consciousness is still drawing back from what has emerged, so that to consciousness it is the essence as objective.¹

¶133. With this, the understanding has indeed sublated its own untruth and the untruth of the object; and what has thereby emerged for it is the concept of the true, as a true that is *in itself*, which is not yet concept, or which lacks the *Being-for-itself* of consciousness, and which the understanding, without knowing itself therein, lets go its own way. The true goes about its essential business for itself, so that consciousness plays no part in its free realization, but merely looks on and simply apprehends it. To begin with, therefore, *we* have to step into its place and be the concept which develops what is contained in the result; in this developed object, which presents itself to consciousness as something that simply is, consciousness first becomes explicitly a comprehending consciousness.¹

¶134. The result was the unconditioned universal, initially in the negative and abstract sense that consciousness negated its one-sided concepts and abstracted them, that is, gave them up. But the result has, in itself, a positive significance: in it, the unity of *Being-for-itself* and *Being for an other* is posited or the absolute opposition is immediately posited as the same essence. It initially seems to concern only the form of the moments in reciprocal relation; but *Being-for-itself* and *Being-for-other* are the *content* itself as well, since the opposition in its truth can have no other nature than the one that emerged in the result, viz. that the content taken in perception to be true, belongs in fact only to the form and dissolves in the unity of the form. This content is at the same time universal; there can be no other content which by its particular constitution would resist integration in this unconditioned universality. A content of this kind would be some determinate way of being for itself and of relating to another. But *to be for itself* and *to relate to another in general* makes up the *nature* and *essence* of the content, and their truth is to be an unconditioned universal; and the result is purely and simply universal.¹

¶135. But because this unconditioned universal is object for consciousness, there emerges in it the distinction of form and content, and in the shape of content the moments look like they did when they first presented themselves: on one side, a universal medium of many subsistent matters, and on the other side, a One reflected into itself, in which their independence is extinguished. The former is the dissolution of the thing's independence, or the passivity that is a Being for an Other, while the latter is *Being-for-itself*. We have to see how these moments exhibit themselves in the unconditioned universality which is their essence. It is clear at the outset that, since they are only in this universality, they are no longer detached from each other at all but are within themselves essentially self-sublating sides, and what is posited is only their transition into each other.¹

¶136. So one of the moments appears as the essence that has stepped to one side, as universal medium, or as the subsistence of independent matters. But the *independence* of these matters is nothing other than this medium; or this *universal* is simply and solely the *plurality* of the diverse universals of this kind. That within itself the universal is in undivided unity with this plurality means, however, that these matters are each where the other is; they mutually interpenetrate,—but without coming into contact with each other, because conversely the differentiated plurality is equally independent. At the same time their pure porosity or their sublatedness is thereby posited. This sublatedness or the reduction of this diversity to a pure *Being-for-itself*, is in turn nothing other than the medium itself, and this is the *independence* of

the differences. Or the matters posited as independent immediately pass over into their unity, and their unity immediately passes over into unfolding, and this again goes back into reduction. But this movement is what is called *force*: one of its moments, namely the force as expansion of the independent matters in their Being, is the *expression* of force; but the force as the disappearance of the matters is the force *driven back* into itself out of its expression or the *force proper*. First, however, the force driven back into itself *must* express itself; and, secondly, in the expression it is force that is *within itself*, just as much as it is expression in this Being-within-itself.—When we thus keep the two moments in their immediate unity, the understanding, to which the concept of force belongs, is strictly speaking *the concept* which sustains the different moments as different; for *within themselves*, they are not supposed to be different; the difference is thus only in thought.—Or what has been posited in the foregoing is at first only the concept of force, not its reality. In fact, however, force is the unconditioned universal which is equally in itself what it is *for an Other*; or which contains the difference within itself—for difference is nothing other than the Being *for an Other*. So for force to be in its truth, it must be completely set free from thought and posited as the substance of these differences, i.e. *first: substance*, as this whole force, remaining essentially *in and for itself*, and *then: its differences as substantial*, or as moments subsisting for themselves. Force as such, or as driven back into itself, is thus for itself as *an exclusive One*, for which the unfolding of the matters is *another subsisting essence*; and thus two distinct independent sides are posited. But the force is also the whole, or it remains what it is according to its concept, that is, these *differences* remain pure forms, superficial *vanishing moments*. At the same time there would be no *difference* at all between the force proper *driven back* into itself and the *unfolding* of the independent matters, if they did not have a *subsistence*, or there would be no force if it did not *exist* in these opposite ways; but that it does exist in these opposite ways means nothing other than: the two moments are at the same time themselves *independent*.—It is therefore this movement in which the two moments perpetually acquire independence and then sublimate themselves again that we are to consider.—It is clear in general that this movement is nothing other than the movement of perceiving, in which the two sides, the perceiver and the perceived, are on the one hand one and undifferentiated as the *apprehension* of the true, and yet each side is at the same time equally *reflected* into itself or is for itself. These two sides are here moments of force; they are in a unity, but equally this unity, which appears as the middle term over against the extremes that are for themselves, perpetually disintegrates into just these extremes, which only are because of this.—Thus the movement, which previously displayed itself as the self-annihilation of contradictory concepts, here has the *objective* form and is movement of force, as a result of which the unconditioned universal emerges as something *non-objective*, or as the *interior* of things.¹

¶137. Force, as thus determined, is one side of its concept, since it is represented as *such* or as *reflected into itself*; but as a substantialized extreme and, in fact, the extreme posited under the determinacy of the One. The *subsistence* of the unfolded matters is thereby excluded from force and is an *other* than force. Since it is necessary

that *force itself* be this *subsistence*, or that *force express* itself, its expression presents itself like this: *this other approaches* the force and solicits it. But in fact, since it *necessarily* expresses itself, what was posited as another essence is in the force itself. Force was posited as a *One*, and its essence, self-expression, was posited as an *Other*, approaching it from outside. But this must be retracted: force is rather itself this universal medium of the subsistence of the moments as matters; or *force has expressed itself*, and what was supposed to be the other soliciting it is really force itself. So now it exists as the medium of the unfolded matters. But equally essentially it has the form of the sublatedness of the subsisting matters, or is essentially *One*; this *oneness*, since *force* is posited as the medium of matters, is thus *now something other than force*, and force has this its essence outside it. But since force must necessarily be this oneness, but is *not yet* posited as oneness, *this other approaches it* and solicits it to reflection into itself or sublates its expression. But in fact *force itself* is this reflectedness-into-itself, or this sublatedness of the expression; the oneness, *in the way* in which it appeared, viz. as an *Other*, vanishes; *force is this other itself*, it is force driven back into itself.¹

¶138. What turns up as other and solicits force, both to expression and to return into itself, immediately proves to be *itself force*; for the other shows up both as universal medium and as *One*, and in such a way that each of these shapes at the same time turns up only as a vanishing moment. Consequently, force, by the fact that an other is for it and it is for an *Other*, has not yet emerged from its concept at all. But there are at the same time two forces present; the concept of both is no doubt the same, but it has emerged from its unity into duality. Instead of remaining entirely and essentially only a moment, the opposition seems, by the bifurcation into wholly *independent forces*, to have withdrawn from the dominion of unity. We have now to see more closely what the situation is with this independence. Initially the second force turns up as the one that solicits and moreover, in its content, as the universal medium in contrast to the force determined as solicited; but since the second force is essentially an alternation of these two moments and is itself force, in fact it is similarly the universal medium *only when it is solicited to be so*, and similarly, too, it is a negative unity, or solicits the withdrawal of force, *only because it is solicited*. Consequently, this distinction, too, which obtained between the two forces, that one was supposed to be the *soliciting* force, the other the solicited, is transformed into the same reciprocal exchange of the determinacies.¹

¶139. The play of the two forces thus consists in their being determined in opposite ways, their *Being-for-one-another* in this determination, and the absolute, immediate alternation of the determinations,—a transition through which alone these determinations are, in which the forces seem to turn up *independently*. The soliciting force, e.g., is posited as universal medium, and the solicited, by contrast, as repressed force; but the former is itself universal medium only through the other's being repressed force; or the latter is really the soliciting force for the former and is what first makes it a medium. The first force has its determinacy only through the other and is soliciting only insofar as it is solicited by the other to be soliciting; and just as immediately, it loses the determinacy given to it; for this passes over, or rather has already passed over, to the other; the external soliciting force turns up as a universal medium, but only through its having been solicited by the other force to do so; but

this means that *the latter posits* the soliciting force in this way and *is really itself essentially* a universal medium; it posits the soliciting force in this way just because this other determination is essential *to it*, i.e. because *this is really its own self*.¹

¶140. For the completion of insight into the concept of this movement attention may be drawn to a further point, that the differences themselves show up in a twofold difference: *once* as a difference of *content*, in that one extreme is force reflected into itself, while the other is a medium of the matters; and *again* as a difference of *form*, in that one is soliciting, the other solicited, the former active, the latter passive. By the difference of content they *are* differentiated in general or for us; but by the difference of form they are independent, separating from each other in their relation and opposed. The extremes on both these sides are thus nothing *in themselves*; these sides in which their different essence was supposed to consist are only vanishing moments, are an immediate transition of each side into the opposite side; and this fact comes to be for consciousness in its perception of the movement of force. But for us, as we remarked already, there was also something more, viz. that in themselves the differences, as *differences of content and of form*, vanished; and on the side of form, the *active, soliciting* factor or *that-which-is-for-itself*, was in essence the same as that which, on the side of content, presented itself as force driven back into itself; the passive, *solicited* factor or that which is for an other on the side of form, was in essence the same as that which, on the side of content, presented itself as the universal medium of the many matters.¹

¶141. It results from this that the concept of force becomes *actual* through duplication into two forces, and how it comes to do so. These two forces exist as essences that are for themselves; but their existence is a movement of each towards the other, such that their Being is rather a pure *positedness through an Other*, i.e. their Being has really the pure significance of *vanishing*. They are not the sort of extremes that retain for themselves something firm, transmitting towards each other into the middle term and into their contact only an external property; on the contrary, what they are, they are only in this middle term and contact. In this there is immediately both the repression of force into itself, or its *Being-for-itself*, and its expression, both soliciting and being solicited; consequently, these moments are not distributed to two independent extremes offering each other only an opposed extremity, but their essence is purely and simply this: each is solely through the other, and what each force thus is through the other, it immediately no longer is, while it is it. They have thus, in fact, no substances of their own to support and maintain them. The *concept* of force rather maintains itself as *the essence* in its very *actuality*; *force as actual* is simply and solely in the *expression*, which at the same time is nothing other than a sublation of itself. This *actual* force, represented as being free from its expression and as being for itself, it is the force driven back into itself; but in fact this determinacy, as we have found, is itself only a moment of the *expression*. Thus the truth of force remains only the *thought* of force; the moments of its actuality, its substances and its movement, collapse unresistingly into an undifferentiated unity, a unity which is not force driven back into itself (for this is itself only such a moment), but this unity is *its concept as concept*. Thus the realization of force is at the same time loss of reality; in that realization it has really become something quite different, viz. this *universality*, which the understanding recognizes at the outset or immediately

as its essence and which also proves to be its essence in the supposed reality of force, in the actual substances.¹

¶142. Insofar as we regard *the first* universal as the understanding's *concept* in which force is not yet for itself, the second is now the *essence* of force as it exhibits itself *in and for itself*. Or, conversely, if we regard the first universal as the *immediate*, which was supposed to be an *actual* object for consciousness, then this second is determined as the *negative* of the sensorily objective force; it is force as it is, in its true essence, only as *object of the understanding*; the first universal would be force driven back into itself, or force as substance; while the second is the *interior* of things, as *interior*, which is the same as the concept as concept.¹

¶143. This veritable essence of things has now determined itself in such a way that it is not immediately for consciousness; on the contrary, consciousness has a mediated relationship to the interior and, as understanding, *looks through this intermediary play of forces into the true background of things*. The middle term which unites the two extremes, the understanding and the interior, is the developed *Being* of force which, for the understanding itself, is henceforth a *vanishing*. This Being is therefore called *appearance*; for semblance is what we call *Being* that is a *non-Being* within itself.¹ But it is not only a semblance; it is appearance, a *whole* of semblance. This *whole*, as whole or as a *universal*, is what constitutes the *interior*, the *play of forces* as *reflection* of the interior into itself. In it, the essences of perception are *posited* for consciousness in an objective way, as they are in themselves, viz. as moments immediately turning into the opposite without rest or Being, the One immediately into the universal, the essential immediately into the unessential, and vice versa. This play of forces is consequently the developed negative; but the truth of this negative is the positive, viz. the *universal*, the object that is *in itself*.—The *Being* of this object for consciousness is mediated through the movement of *appearance*, in which the *Being of perception* and the sensorily objective in general has only negative significance, and so consciousness reflects itself out of this movement back into itself as the true; but, as consciousness, it makes this truth again into an objective *interior*, and differentiates this reflection of things from its own reflection into itself; just as the mediating movement is likewise still an objective movement for it. For consciousness this interior is therefore an extreme over against it; but it is for consciousness the true, because in the interior, as the *in-itself*, it has at the same time the certainty of itself, or the moment of its Being-for-itself; but it is not yet conscious of this ground, for the *Being-for-itself* which the interior was supposed to have in its own self would be nothing other than the negative movement; but for consciousness this is still the *objective vanishing appearance*, not yet its *own* Being-for-itself; therefore the interior is for it certainly concept, but it does not yet know the nature of the concept.²

¶144. Within this *interior truth*, as the *absolute universal* which has been purged of the *opposition* of the universal and singular and has come to be *for the understanding*, for the first time there now opens up above the sensory world, as the *apparent world*, a *supersensible world* as the *true world*, above the vanishing *Hither* there opens up the enduring *Beyond*; an in-itself which is the first, and therefore imperfect, appearance of reason, or only the pure element in which the truth has its *essence*.¹

¶145. *Our object* is thus from now on the syllogism which has for its extremes the interior of things and the understanding, and for its middle term, appearance; but the

movement of this syllogism gives the further determination of what the understanding discerns in the interior through the middle term, and provides the experience that the understanding gains of this relationship of syllogistic interconnectedness.¹

¶146. For consciousness the interior is still *pure Beyond*, because consciousness does not yet find itself in it; the interior is *empty*, for it is merely the nothing of appearance, and positively the simple universal. This mode of being of the interior immediately accords with those who say that the interior of things is not cognizable; but the ground for this would have to be conceived otherwise. Certainly, no knowledge of this interior is forthcoming as it is here in its immediacy, but not because reason is too short-sighted or limited, or however else one likes to call it—on this question nothing is known yet, because we have not yet penetrated that deeply—but owing to the simple nature of the Thing itself, that is to say, because in the *void* nothing is cognized, or, expressed from the other side, just because this interior is determined as the *Beyond* of consciousness.—The result is, of course, the same if a blind person is placed amid the wealth of the supersensible world (assuming it has such wealth, whether it be its own specific content, or whether consciousness itself be this content), and if a sighted person is placed in pure darkness, or if you like, in pure light, if the supersensible world is just this; the sighted person sees as little in its pure light as in its pure darkness, and just as much as the blind person, in the abundance of the wealth that lies before him. If that were all there was to the interior and to our unification with it through appearance, then nothing would remain but to stick to appearance, i.e. to take something as true which we know is not true; or, in order that there may after all be something in the void—which of course first came about as emptiness of objective things, but must, as *emptiness in itself*, be taken also as emptiness of all spiritual relationships and of the distinctions of consciousness as consciousness—in order, then, that in this *complete void*, which is even called the *holy*, there may be something after all, we would have to fill it up with reveries, *appearances*, which consciousness engenders by itself; it would have to put up with being treated so badly, for it would not deserve anything better, since even reveries are better than its emptiness.¹

¶147. The interior or the supersensible Beyond has, however, *arisen*, it *comes* from appearance, and appearance is its mediation; or *appearance is its essence* and, in fact, its filling. The supersensible is the sensory and the perceived posited as it is in *truth*; but the *truth* of the *sensory* and the perceived is to be *appearance*. The supersensible is therefore *appearance as appearance*.—If this leads us to think that the supersensible is *therefore* the sensory world, or the world as it is *for immediate sensory certainty and perception*, then our understanding is topsy-turvy; for appearance is *not* the world of sensory knowledge and perception as a world that simply is, but this world posited *as sublated*, or in truth *as inner*. It is often said that the supersensible is *not* appearance; but what is here understood by appearance is not appearance, but rather the *sensory world* as itself real actuality.¹

¶148. The understanding, which is our object, finds itself in just this position, that the interior has come about for it, to begin with, only as the universal, still unfilled *in-itself*; the play of forces has just this sole negative significance of not being in itself, and this sole positive significance of being the *intermediary*, but outside the understanding. The relation of the understanding to the interior through the mediation is,

however, its movement, through which the interior will fill itself out for the understanding.—The play of forces is *immediately* for the understanding; *but the true* for it is the simple interior; the movement of force is therefore likewise the true only as something altogether *simple*. We have seen, however, that this play of forces is so constituted that the force which is *solicited* by another force is equally the *soliciting* force for this other force, which becomes itself a soliciting force only in virtue of this. What is present in this interplay is likewise merely the immediate alternation, or the absolute interchange, of the *determinacy* which constitutes the sole *content* of what emerges: to be either universal medium or negative unity. In its determinate emergence itself, it immediately ceases to be what it is on emerging; by its determinate emergence, it solicits the other side, which thereby *expresses* itself; that is, the latter is now immediately what the first was supposed to be. These two sides, the *relationship* of soliciting and the *relationship* of the opposed determinate content, are *each for itself* the absolute reversal and interchange. But these two relationships themselves are again one and the same; and the difference of *form*, of being the solicited and the soliciting, is the same as the difference of *content*, the solicited as such, viz. the passive medium, on the other hand the soliciting, the active, the negative unity or the One. In this way there vanishes all difference of *particular forces* which were supposed to be present in this movement, confronting each other in general, for they rested solely on those differences; and the difference between the forces, along with both those differences, likewise collapses into only one difference. Thus there is neither force, nor soliciting and being solicited, nor the determinacy of being a subsistent medium and a unity reflected into itself, there is neither something singly for itself, nor diverse oppositions; but what there is in this absolute exchange is only *difference as universal*, or as difference to which the many oppositions have been reduced. This difference as universal is consequently *the simplicity in the play of force itself* and the truth of this play; it is the *law of force*.¹

¶149. The absolutely changing appearance becomes the *simple difference* through its relation to the simplicity of the interior or of the understanding. The interior is initially only the universal in itself; but this in itself simple *universal* is essentially no less absolutely the *universal difference*: for it is the result of the exchange itself, or the exchange is its essence; but the exchange, since it is posited in the *interior* as it is in truth, is herewith received in that interior as likewise absolutely universal difference, becalmed and remaining equal to itself. Or negation is essential moment of the universal, and negation, or mediation, is therefore, in the universal, *universal difference*. This difference is expressed in the *law*, as the *stable* image of restless appearance. Thus the *supersensible* world is a *calm realm of laws* which, though beyond the perceived world—for this exhibits the law only through incessant change—is equally present in it and is its immediate tranquil image.¹

¶150. This realm of laws is indeed the truth of the understanding, and this truth has the *content* in the difference that is in the law; but at the same time this realm is only its *initial truth* and does not fill out appearance completely. The law is present in appearance, but is not the whole presence of appearance; with every change of circumstance the law has a different actuality. Thus appearance retains *for itself* an aspect that is not in the interior; or appearance is in truth not yet posited as *appearance*, as *sublated* Being-for-itself. This deficiency of the law must equally

reveal itself in the law itself. What seems to be defective in it is that while it does have difference in it, the difference is universal, indeterminate. However, insofar as it is not *the* law in general, but *a* law, it does have determinacy in it; consequently, there are indefinitely *many* laws. But this multiplicity is itself rather a defect; that is, it contradicts the principle of the understanding for which, as consciousness of the simple interior, the true is the in itself universal *unity*. The understanding must therefore let the many laws coincide in *one* law, just as, e.g., the law by which a stone falls, and the law by which the heavenly spheres move, have been comprehended as *one* law. But with this convergence the laws lose their determinacy; the law becomes more and more superficial, and as a result what is found is, in fact, not the unity of *these determinate* laws, but a law which leaves out their determinacy; as, e.g., the *one* law which combines in itself the laws of the fall of bodies to the earth and the law of heavenly motion, in fact expresses neither law. The unification of all laws in *universal attraction* expresses no more content than just the *mere concept of law itself*, which is posited in that law as simply *being*. Universal attraction merely says that *everything* has a *constant difference* in relation to *other* things. The understanding supposes that it has thereby found a universal law which expresses the universal actuality *as such*; but in fact it has only found the *concept of law itself*; although in such a way that at the same time it thereby declares: *all actuality is in its own self* conformable to law. The expression of *universal attraction* is therefore of great importance insofar as it is directed against the thoughtless *representation* to which everything presents itself in the shape of contingency and for which determinacy has the form of sensory independence.¹

¶151. Thus universal attraction, or the pure concept of law, stands in contrast to determinate laws. Insofar as this pure concept is regarded as the essence, or as the true interior, the *determinacy* of the determinate law itself still belongs to appearance, or rather to sensory Being. But the pure *concept* of law does not merely go beyond the law which, itself a *determinate* law, stands in contrast to *other determinate* laws, but also goes *beyond law* as such. The determinacy of which we spoke is itself really only a vanishing moment which can no longer occur here as essentiality; for only the law is present as the true; but the *concept* of law is turned against *the law* itself. That is to say, in the law the difference itself is apprehended *immediately* and taken up into the universal, but, along with that, a *subsistence* of the moments, whose relation the universal expresses, as essentialities that are indifferent and in-themselves. But these parts of the difference in the law are at the same time themselves determinate sides; in its true meaning, the pure concept of law as universal attraction must be conceived in such a way that in this concept, as something absolutely *simple*, the *differences*, that are present in the law as such, themselves *return again into the interior as simple unity*; this unity is the inner *necessity* of the law.¹

¶152. The law is thereby present in a twofold manner: once, as law in which the differences are expressed as independent moments; and, secondly, in the form of *simple* Being-withdrawn-into-itself which again can be called *force*, but in such a way that it is not repressed force, but force in general, or as the concept of force, an abstraction which absorbs into itself the very differences of what attracts and what is attracted. Thus *simple* electricity, e.g., is the *force*; but the expression of difference falls within *the law*; this difference is positive and negative electricity. In the case of

the motion of falling, the force is the simple factor, *gravity*, which has the *law* that the magnitudes of the different moments of the motion, the time elapsed and the *space* traversed, are related to each other as root and square. Electricity itself is not difference in itself, or in its essence the dual essence of positive and negative electricity; hence, it is usually said that it *has* the law *to be* in this way, and also that it *has the property* of expressing itself thus. It is true that this property is the essential and unique property of this force, or that it is *necessary* to it. But necessity here is an empty word; force *must* duplicate itself in this way, just *because* it *must*. Of course, if *positive* electricity is posited, *negative* electricity too is necessary *in itself*; for the *positive* is only as relation to a *negative*, or the positive is *in its own self* the difference from itself, as similarly the negative. But that electricity as such should divide itself in this way is not in itself the necessity; electricity, as *simple force*, is indifferent to its law—*to be* as positive and negative; and if we call the former its concept but the latter its Being, then its concept is indifferent to its Being; it merely *has* this property; that is, precisely, it is not *in itself* necessary to it.—This indifference takes another shape when it is said that to be as positive and negative belongs to the *definition* of electricity, or that this is simply *its concept and essence*. In that case, its Being would mean *its existence* in general; but the *necessity of its existence* is not involved in that definition; its existence is there, either because we *find* it, i.e. it is not necessary at all, or by means of other forces, i.e. its necessity is an external necessity. But in locating the necessity in the determinacy of *Being through something else*, we relapse again into the *multiplicity* of determinate laws which we have just left behind in order to consider the *law* as law; it is only with this law as law that we should compare its *concept* as concept, or its necessity, but in all these forms, necessity has shown itself to be still only an empty word.¹

¶153. There is still another way than that just indicated in which the indifference of law and force, or of concept and Being, is present. In the law of motion, e.g., it is necessary that motion be *divided* into time and space, or then also into distance and velocity. Since motion is only the relationship of these moments, motion (the universal) is here certainly divided *in its own self*; but now these parts, time and space, or distance and velocity, do not express in themselves this origin from one thing; they are indifferent to each other, space is represented as able to be without time, time without space, and distance at least without velocity,—just as their magnitudes are indifferent to each other; since they do not stand in relationship *as positive and negative*, and thus are not related to each other through *their essence*. The necessity of the *division* is thus certainly present here, but not the necessity of the *parts* as such for each other. But because of this that first necessity, too, is itself only a sham, false necessity; that is, motion is not itself represented as something *simple*, or as pure essence, but *already* as divided; time and space are its *independent* parts or *essences in themselves*, or distance and velocity are modes of Being or of representation, one of which can well be without the other, and motion is therefore only their *superficial* relation, not their essence. Represented as simple essence or as force, motion is indeed *gravity*, but gravity does not contain these differences in it at all.¹

¶154. The difference, then, in both cases is no *difference in its own self*: either the universal, the force, is indifferent to the division which is in the law, or the differences, the parts, of the law are indifferent to each other. The understanding, however,

has the concept of *this difference in itself* just because the law is, on the one hand, the interior, *what-is-in-itself*, but is, at the same time, *internally differentiated*; that this difference is thus *inner* difference is implied in the fact that the law is *simple* force or as *concept* of the difference, and therefore a *difference of the concept*. But at first this inner difference still falls only *within the understanding*, and is not yet *posited in the Thing itself*. It is therefore only its *own* necessity that the understanding announces; a difference that it therefore establishes only by declaring at the same time that the difference is not a *difference of the Thing itself*. This necessity, which is merely verbal, is thus a recital of the moments that constitute the cycle of the necessity; these moments are indeed differentiated, but at the same time their difference is expressly said to be not a difference of the Thing itself, and consequently is itself at once sublated again; this movement is called *explanation*. So a *law* is enunciated; from this law, its universal in itself, or the ground, is differentiated as the *force*; but it is said that this difference is no difference, rather that the ground is constituted exactly like the law. The single occurrence of lightning, e.g., is apprehended as a universal, and this universal is enunciated as the *law* of electricity; the explanation then condenses the *law* into the *force* as the essence of the law. This force is then *so constituted* that when it expresses itself, opposite electricities emerge, which disappear again into each other; that is, *the force is constituted exactly like the law*; there is said to be no difference whatever between them. The differences are the pure, universal expression or the law, and the pure force; but both have *the same content, the same constitution*: so the difference as difference of content, i.e. of the *Thing*, is also again withdrawn.¹

¶155. In this tautological movement, the understanding, as it turns out, sticks to the inert unity of its object, and the movement falls only in the understanding itself, not in the object; it is an explanation that not only explains nothing, but is so plain that, while it prepares to say something different from what has already been said, it really says nothing but only repeats the same thing. In the Thing itself this movement gives rise to nothing new; it comes into consideration only as a movement of the understanding. In it, however, we now recognize the very thing that was missing in the law, viz. the absolute exchange itself; for this *movement*, when we look at it more closely, is immediately the opposite of itself. That is to say, it posits a *difference* which is not only *not a difference* for us, but a difference that the movement itself sublates as a difference. This is the same exchange that presented itself as the play of forces; this involved the difference of the soliciting and the solicited, of force expressing itself and force repressed into itself; but these were differences which in truth were no differences, and therefore also immediately sublated themselves again. What is present here is not merely bare unity, such that *no difference* would be *posited*, but rather this *movement* in which a *difference is certainly established, but*, because it is no difference, is *sublated again*. With explanation, then, the change and exchange which just now was outside the interior and only in the appearance, has penetrated into the supersensible itself; but our consciousness has passed over from the interior as object to the other side, into the *understanding*, and there it has the exchange.¹

¶156. Thus this exchange is not yet an exchange of the Thing itself, but rather presents itself as *pure exchange* by the very fact that the *content* of the moments of the exchange remains the same. But since the *concept*, as concept of the understanding, is the same as the *interior* of things, *this exchange* becomes *as law of the interior* for the

understanding. The understanding thus undergoes the *experience* that it is a *law of appearance itself* that differences arise which are no differences, or that the *like-named repels* itself from itself; and similarly, that the differences are only such as are in truth no differences and sublimate themselves; or that the *unlike-named attracts* itself.—A *second law* whose content is opposed to what was just now called law, viz. the difference remaining constantly like itself; for this new law expresses rather the *becoming-unlike of the like* and the *becoming-like of the unlike*. The concept expects thoughtlessness to bring both laws together and to become conscious of their opposition.—The second is certainly also a law or an inner Being that is like itself, but a self-likeness rather of unlikeness; a constancy of inconstancy.—In the play of forces this law emerged precisely as this absolute passing-over and pure exchange; the *like-named*, the force, *decomposes* into an opposition which at first appears as an independent difference, but which in fact proves *to be no difference*; for it is the *like-named* which repels itself from itself, and therefore what is thus repelled essentially attracts itself, for it is *the same*; the difference established, since it is no difference, therefore sublimes itself again. Consequently, the difference displays itself as difference *of the Thing itself* or as absolute difference, and this difference of the *Thing* is thus nothing other than the like-named that has repelled itself from itself, and therefore merely posits an opposition which is no opposition.¹

¶157. Through this principle, the first supersensible, the tranquil kingdom of laws, the immediate copy of the perceived world, is turned round into its contrary; the law in general was that which *remains like* itself, along with its differences; now, however, it is posited that each of the two is really the contrary of itself; what is *like* itself really repels itself from itself, and what is *unlike* itself really posits itself as what is like itself. In fact, it is only when thus determined that the difference is the *inner* difference, or difference *in its own self*, when the like is unlike itself, and the unlike like itself.—*This second supersensible world* is in this way the *inverted* world; and indeed, since one side is already present in the first supersensible world, the *inversion* of this *first* world. With this, the interior is completed as appearance. For the first supersensible world was only the *immediate* elevation of the perceived world into the universal element; it had its necessary counterpart in the perceived world which still retained *for itself the principle of exchange and alteration*; the first realm of laws lacked that principle, but acquires it as inverted world.¹

¶158. So by the law of this inverted world, the *like-named* in the first world is the *unlike* of itself, and what is *unlike* in the first world is equally *unlike itself*, or it becomes *like* itself. In determinate moments, the result will be this: what in the law of the first world is sweet, in this inverted in-itself is sour, what in the former is black is, in the other, white. What in the law of the first is the north pole of the magnet is, in its other, supersensible in-itself (viz. in the earth), the south pole; but what is there south pole is here north pole.¹ Similarly, what in the first law of electricity is the oxygen pole becomes in its other, supersensible essence, hydrogen pole; and conversely, what is there the hydrogen pole becomes here the oxygen pole. In another sphere, revenge on an enemy is, by the *immediate law*, the supreme satisfaction of the injured individuality. *This law*, however, that I should display myself as essence in the face of one who does not treat me as an independent essence, and rather sublimate him as essence, *inverts* itself by the principle of the other world *into the opposite law*: the restoration

of myself as the essence by the sublation of the alien essence inverts itself into self-destruction. If, now, this inversion, which is displayed in the *punishment* of crime, is made into a *law*, it, too, is again only the law of the one world, which has *confronting* it an *inverted* supersensible world, in which what is contemned in the former meets with honour, and what in the former is held in honour, falls into contempt. The punishment which by the *law of the first world* disgraces and annihilates a man, is transformed in its *inverted world* into the pardon which preserves his essence and brings him to honour.²

¶159. Looked at superficially, this inverted world is the contrary of the first in the sense that it has the first world outside it and repels it from itself as an inverted *actuality*, that the *one* is *appearance*, while the *other* is the *in-itself*, that the *one* is the world as it is *for an Other*, whereas the other by contrast is the world as it is *for itself*; so that, to use the previous examples, what tastes sweet would be *really*, or *internally* in the thing, sour; or what is north pole in the actual magnet of appearance, would be south pole *in the inner or essential Being*; what presents itself as oxygen pole in apparent electricity would be hydrogen pole in unapparent electricity. Or an action, which in *appearance* is a crime, should, *in the interior*, be capable of really being good (a bad action may have a good intention), punishment should be punishment only in appearance, but *in itself*, or in another world, a benefit for the criminal. But such oppositions of inner and outer, of appearance and supersensible, as of two kinds of actuality, are no longer present here. The repelled differences are not distributed anew among two substances such as would support them and lend them a separate subsistence, whereby the understanding would withdraw from the interior and relapse again into its previous position. The one side, or substance, would again be the world of perception in which one of the two laws would go about its essential business, and confronting it would be an inner world, *just such a sensory world* as the first, only in *representation*; it could not be exhibited as a sensory world, could not be seen, heard, tasted, and yet it would be represented as such a sensory world. But in fact, if *the one posit* is something perceived, and its *in-itself*, as its inversion, is equally something *represented*, then the sour which would be the in-itself of the sweet thing is a thing just as actual as the sweet thing, viz. a *sour thing*; the black, which would be the in-itself of the white, is an actual black; the north pole which is the in-itself of the south pole is the north pole *present in the same magnet*; the oxygen pole which is the in-itself of the hydrogen pole is the oxygen pole *present in the same pile*. The *actual* crime, however, has *its inversion* and *its in-itself as possibility*, in the intention as such, but not in a good intention; for the truth of the intention is only the deed itself. But as regards its content, the crime has its reflection into itself, or its inversion, in the *actual* punishment; this is the reconciliation of the law with the actuality opposed to it in the crime. Finally, the *actual* punishment has its *inverted* actuality in it in such a way that the punishment is an actualization of the law, whereby the activity exercised by the law as punishment *sublates itself*, and, from being active, the law becomes again *quiescent* and valid, and the movement of individuality against the law, and the movement of the law against individuality, are extinguished.¹

¶160. So from the representation of inversion, which constitutes the essence of one side of the supersensible world, we must remove the sensory representation of the consolidation of the differences in a distinct element of subsistence, and this absolute

concept of the difference must be presented and conceived purely, as inner difference, as repulsion of the *like-named*, as *like-named*, from itself, and the being like of the unlike as unlike. We have to *think* the pure exchange, or *the opposition within itself, the contradiction*. For in the difference which is an inner difference, the opposite is not merely *one of two*;—if it were, it would be just a *being*, not an opposite;—but it is the opposite of an opposite, or the other is itself immediately present in it. Certainly, I put the contrary *here*, and the other of which it is the contrary, *there*; so I put the *contrary* on one side, in and for itself without the other. But just because I have here *the contrary in and for itself*, it is the contrary of itself, or it has in fact the other immediately within itself. Thus the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time encroached upon the other world and has it within itself; it is for itself the inverted world, i.e. the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is this world the difference as *inner* difference, or difference *in its own self*, or difference as *infinity*.¹

¶161. Through infinity we see the law completed to necessity within itself, and all moments of appearance taken up into the interior. That the simplicity of the law is infinity means, according to what has emerged: (α) it is something *like-itself*, which is, however, the *difference* in itself; or it is a like-named which repels itself from itself or divides in two. What was called the *simple force duplicates* itself and through its infinity is the law. (β) The division, which constitutes the parts represented in the *law*, presents itself as something subsistent; and considered without the concept of the inner difference, then these parts, space and time, or distance and velocity, which emerge as moments of gravity, are indifferent and without necessity for each other, as well as for gravity itself, just as this simple gravity is indifferent to them, or simple electricity is indifferent to positive and negative electricity. (γ) But through the concept of the inner difference, this unlike and indifferent part, space and time, etc., is a *difference* which is no *difference*, or only a difference of the *like-named*, and its essence is unity; as positive and negative they are inspired with regard to each other into activity, and their Being is rather to posit themselves as not-being and to sublimate themselves in the unity. There subsist two differentiated items, they are *in themselves*, they are *in themselves as opposites*, i.e. the opposite of themselves, they have their other in them and are only one unity.¹

¶162. This simple infinity, or the absolute concept, may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but rather is itself all differences, as also their sublatedness; so it pulsates within itself but does not move, vibrates within itself, yet is at rest. It is *like-itself*, for the differences are tautological; they are differences that are no differences. This essence like-itself is therefore related only to its own self; *to its own self*, so this is an other to which the relation proceeds, and the *relating-to-itself* is rather a *division*; or that very likeness-to-itself is inner difference. These *divided fragments* are thus *in and for themselves* each a contrary—*of an other*; so the *other* is at the same time announced therein together with itself. Or it is not the contrary *of an other* but only *the pure contrary*; and so it is therefore in its own self the contrary of itself. Or it is not a contrary at all, but purely for itself, a pure, self-like essence that has no difference in it; so we do not need to ask the question, still less to regard fretting over such a question as philosophy, nor even to consider it a question

philosophy cannot answer—the question, *how* from this pure essence, how does difference or otherness issue *forth* from it? For the division has already taken place, the difference is excluded from the like-itself and set apart from it; what was supposed to be *the like-itself* is thus already one of the divided fragments instead of being the absolute essence. *The like-itself divides itself*, means, therefore, just as well: it sublates itself as already divided, it sublates itself as otherness. The *unity*, of which it is usually said that difference cannot issue from it, is in fact itself only one moment of the division; it is the abstraction of the simplicity which confronts the difference. But because the unity is an abstraction, only one of the opposites, it is already said that it is the act of dividing; for if the unity is a *negative*, an *opposite*, then it is just posited as that which has opposition in it. The differences of *dividing* and of *becoming-like-itself* are therefore equally only *this movement of self-sublation*; for since the like-itself, which is supposed first to divide itself or become its contrary, is an abstraction or is *already itself* a divided fragment, its dividing is thereby a sublation of what it is, and therefore the sublation of its dividedness. *Becoming-like-itself* is equally an act of dividing; what becomes *like itself* thereby confronts the division; i.e. it thereby puts itself *on one side*, or rather it *becomes a divided fragment*.¹

¶163. Infinity, or this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, in which whatever is determined in any way, e.g. as Being, is rather the contrary of this determinacy, has certainly already been the soul of all that has gone before; but it is in the *interior* that it has itself first come forth freely. Appearance, or the play of forces, already presents it, but it is as *explanation* that it first of all steps forth freely; and since infinitude is finally object for consciousness, *as that which it is*, consciousness is thus *self-consciousness*. The understanding's *explanation* initially gives only the description of what self-consciousness is. The understanding sublates the differences present in the law, differences which have already become pure differences but are still indifferent, and posits them in one unity, the force. But this becoming-like is just as immediately a division, for the understanding sublates the differences and posits the unit of force only by establishing a new difference, that of law and force, which, however, at the same time is no difference; and besides the fact that this difference is likewise no difference, the understanding itself goes on to sublimate this difference again, in that it lets the force be constituted just as the law is.—However, this movement, or necessity, is thus still a necessity and a movement of the understanding, or the movement *as such is not its object*, but in this movement the understanding has as objects positive and negative electricity, distance, velocity, force of attraction, and a thousand other things that constitute the content of the moments of the movement. The reason why explaining involves so much self-satisfaction is just because in it consciousness, engaged, as one might express it, in immediate monologue with itself, enjoys only itself; although it seems to be occupied with something else, it is in fact preoccupied only with itself.¹

¶164. In the opposite law, as the inversion of the first law, or in the inner difference, infinity itself does indeed become *object* of the understanding; but once again the understanding falls short of infinity as such, since it again apportions to two worlds, or to two substantial elements, the difference in itself, the self-repulsion of the like-named, and the unlikes that attract each other; to the understanding, the *movement*, as it is in experience, is here a happening, and the like-named and the

unlike are *predicates*, whose essence is a substrate that simply is. What is, for the understanding, an object in a sensory covering, is for us in its essential form as a pure concept. This apprehension of the difference as it *is in truth*, or the apprehension of *infinity* as such, is *for us*, or *in itself*. The exposition of the concept of infinity belongs to science; but consciousness, now that it has this concept *immediately*, comes on the scene again as a form of its own, or as a new shape of consciousness, which does not recognize its essence in what has gone before, but regards it as another thing altogether.—Since this concept of infinity is an object for it, consciousness is thus consciousness of the difference as something that is also *immediately* sublated; consciousness is *for its own self*, it is a *differentiating of the undifferentiated*, or *self-consciousness*. I *differentiate myself from myself*, and *in this it is immediately for me that what is differentiated is not differentiated*. I, the like-named, repel myself from myself; but what is differentiated, posited as unlike, is immediately, now that it is differentiated, no difference for me. Consciousness of an Other, of an object in general, is of course itself necessarily *self-consciousness*, reflectedness into itself, consciousness of itself in its otherness. The *necessary advance* from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their true was a thing, an other than themselves, expresses just this, that not only is consciousness of the thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes. But it is only for us that this truth is present, not yet for consciousness. But self-consciousness has become only *for itself*, not yet *as unity* with consciousness in general.¹

¶165. We see that in the interior of appearance what the understanding in truth gets to experience is nothing other than appearance itself, only not appearance as it is as the play of forces, but rather that play of forces in its absolutely-universal moments and in their movement, and in fact the understanding experiences only *itself*. Elevated above perception, consciousness presents itself joined together with the supersensible through the middle term of appearance, a middle term through which it gazes into this background. The two extremes, the one, that of the pure interior, the other, that of the interior gazing into this pure interior, have now coincided, and just as they, as extremes, have vanished, so too the middle term, as something other than these extremes, has also vanished. This screen in front of the interior has therefore been drawn away, and the gaze of the interior into the interior is at hand: the gaze of the *undifferentiated* like-named, which repels itself, posits itself as *differentiated* interior, but *for which* just as immediately there is the *undifferentiatedness*, *self-consciousness*. It turns out that behind the so-called screen which is supposed to conceal the interior, there is nothing to be seen unless *we* go behind it ourselves, not only in order that we may see, but also that there may be something behind there that can be seen. But at the same time it emerges that we cannot go directly behind without ceremony; for this knowledge of what is the truth of the *representation* of appearance and its interior, is itself only the result of a complex movement whereby the modes of consciousness, meaning, perceiving, and the understanding, vanish; and it will likewise emerge that the cognition of *what consciousness knows when it knows itself*, requires still further circumstances, the exposition of which is what follows.¹

B. Self-Consciousness

IV. The Truth of Certainty of Oneself

¶166. In the previous modes of certainty the true for consciousness is something other than itself. But the concept of this true vanishes in the experience of it; the object was immediately of a certain sort *in itself*, the being of sensory certainty, the concrete thing of perception, the force of the understanding; but the object proves rather not to be like that in truth; instead, this *in-itself* turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for an other; the concept of the object sublates itself in the actual object or the first, immediate representation of the object sublates itself in experience, and certainty got lost in the truth. But from now on something has arisen that did not emerge in these previous relationships, viz. a certainty which is equal to its truth; for the certainty is to itself its own object, and consciousness is to itself the true. In this there is indeed an otherness too; that is to say, consciousness draws a distinction, but one which at the same time is for consciousness a non-distinction. If we give the name *concept* to the movement of knowing, and the name *object* to knowing as tranquil unity, or as I, then we see that not only for us, but for knowing itself, the object corresponds to the concept.—Or put in the other way, if what the object is *in itself* is called the *concept*, but what it is as *object* or *for an other* is called the object, then it is clear that Being-in-itself and Being-for-an-other are the same; for the *in-itself* is consciousness; but equally it is that *for which* an other (the *in-itself*) is; and it is for consciousness that the in-itself of the object, and the Being of the object for an Other, are the same; I is the content of the relation and the relating itself; I is I itself in contrast to an other, and at the same time it overarches this other, which, for the I, is equally only the I itself.¹

¶167. With self-consciousness, then, we have now entered the native realm of truth. We have to see how the shape of self-consciousness first emerges. If we consider this new shape of knowing, the knowing of oneself, in its relationship to the foregoing, the knowing of an Other, then this other has indeed vanished; but its moments have at the same time also been preserved, and the loss consists in this, that here they are present as they are *in themselves*. The *Being* of meaning, the *singularity* and the *universality* opposed to it of perception, as also the *empty interior* of the understanding, are no longer as essences, but as moments of self-consciousness, i.e. as abstractions or distinctions which at the same time are null *for* consciousness itself, or not distinctions at all and purely vanishing essences. Thus it seems that only the principal moment itself has been lost, viz. the *simple independent subsistence* for consciousness. But in fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the Being of the sensory and perceived world, and essentially the return from *otherness*. As self-consciousness, it is movement; but since

it distinguishes *only itself as* itself from itself, the difference, as an otherness, is *immediately sublated* for it; the difference *is* not, and *self-consciousness* is only the motionless tautology of: I am I; but since for it the difference does not have even the shape of *Being*, it is not self-consciousness. Hence otherness is for it *as a Being*, or as a *distinct moment*; but there is also for consciousness the unity of itself with this difference as a *second distinct* moment. With that first moment, self-consciousness is as *consciousness*, and the whole expanse of the sensory world is preserved for it, but at the same time only as related to the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself; and herewith the sensory world is for it a subsistence which, however, is only *appearance*, or a difference which, *in itself*, has no Being. This opposition of its appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is *desire* in general. From now on, consciousness, as self-consciousness, has a double object: one is the immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception, which however is marked *for it* with the *character of the negative*; and the second, viz. *itself*, which is the true *essence*, and is present initially only in the opposition of the first object. In this, self-consciousness presents itself as the movement in which this opposition is sublated and the equality of itself with itself arises for it.¹

¶168. But *for us* or *in itself*, the object which for self-consciousness is the negative has, on its side, returned into itself, just as consciousness has done on the other side. Through this reflection-into-itself the object has become *life*. What self-consciousness distinguishes from itself *as being*, also has in it, insofar as it is posited as being, not merely the mode of sensory certainty and perception, but it is Being reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is a *living creature*. For the *in-itself*, or the *universal* result of the relationship of the understanding to the interior of things, is the distinguishing of what is not to be distinguished, or the unity of what is distinguished. But this unity is, as we have seen, just as much its repulsion from itself; and this concept *divides* itself into the opposition of self-consciousness and life: the former is the unity *for which* the infinite unity of the differences is; the latter, however, *is* only this unity itself, so that it is not at the same time *for itself*. To the extent, then, that consciousness is independent, so too is its object independent *in itself*. Self-consciousness which is simply *for itself* and immediately marks its object with the character of the negative, or is initially *desire*, will therefore rather undergo the experience of the object's independence.¹

¶169. The determination of life as it emerges from the concept or from the universal result with which we enter this sphere, is sufficient to characterize it without developing its nature from that any further; the circle of this determination completes itself in the following moments. The *essence* is infinity as the *sublatedness* of all differences, the pure movement of axial rotation, the repose of this infinity as absolutely restless infinity; *independence* itself, in which the differences of the movement are resolved; the simple essence of time which, in this equality-with-itself, has the solid shape of space. But in this simple universal medium, the *differences* are just as much *differences*, for this universal fluidity has its negative nature only in being a *sublation of these differences*; but it cannot sublimate the items differentiated if they do not have a subsistence. It is just this fluidity, as independence equal-to-itself, which is itself the *subsistence* or the substance of these differences, in which they are therefore as

differentiated members and parts that *are for-themselves*. *Being* no longer has the significance of the *abstraction of Being*, nor has their pure essentiality the significance of the *abstraction of universality*; rather, their *Being* is just that simple fluid substance of pure movement within itself. The *difference*, however, of these members *with respect to one another*, as difference, consists in general in no other *determinacy* than the determinacy of the moments of infinity or of the pure movement itself.¹

¶170. The independent members are *for themselves*; but this *Being-for-self* is really just as *immediately* their reflection into the unity as this unity is the division into independent shapes. The unity is divided because it is absolutely negative or infinite unity; and because this *unity* is the *subsistence*, the difference, too, has independence only *in it*. This independence of the shape appears as something *determinate, for another*, for the shape is a product of division; and the *sublation* of the division accordingly takes place through an other. But this sublation is just as much within the shape itself, for it is just that fluidity that is the substance of the independent shapes; but this substance is infinite, and so the shape in its very subsistence is division, or the sublation of its *Being-for-itself*.¹

¶171. If we distinguish more exactly the moments contained here, we see that we have, as the *first* moment, the *subsistence of the independent* shapes, or the suppression of what the differentiating is in itself, namely, not to be in itself and to have no subsistence. The *second* moment, however, is the *subjugation* of that subsistence to the infinity of the difference. In the first moment there is the subsistent shape; as *being-for-itself*, or in its determinacy infinite substance, it emerges in opposition to the *universal* substance, disowns this fluidity and continuity with it and asserts itself as not dissolved in this universal, but rather as preserving itself by separation from this its inorganic nature, and by consuming it. Life in the universal fluid medium, a *calm* deployment of the shapes, becomes, just by so doing, the movement of those shapes or becomes life as *process*. The simple universal fluidity is the *in-itself*, and the difference of the shapes is the *Other*. But this fluidity itself becomes *the other* through this difference; for now it is *for the difference*, which is in and for itself, and consequently is the infinite movement by which this calm medium is consumed: life as a *living thing*.—This *inversion*, however, is for that reason again an *invertedness in its own self*; what is consumed is the essence; the individuality which maintains itself at the expense of the universal and gives itself the feeling of its unity with itself, just by so doing sublates *its opposition with the Other, the opposition through which it is for itself*; the *unity* with itself that it gives to itself is just the *fluidity* of the differences or the *universal dissolution*. But conversely, the sublation of the individual subsistence is equally the generation of it. For since the *essence* of the individual shape is universal life, and what is-for-itself is in itself simple substance, when what is-for-itself posits the other within itself it sublates this its *simplicity* or its essence, i.e. it divides it, and this division of the undifferentiated fluidity is just the positing of individuality. Thus the simple substance of life is the division of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these subsistent differences; and the dissolution of the division is just as much division or an articulation of members. With this, the two sides of the whole movement which were distinguished, viz. the calmly deployed shaping in the universal medium of independence, and the process of life, collapse into one another; the latter is just as much a shaping as it is the sublation of shape; and the

former, the shaping, is just as much a sublation as it is shaping. The fluid element is itself only the *abstraction* of the essence, or it is *actual* only as shape; and its articulation of itself into members is again a division of what is articulated or a dissolution of it. It is this whole cycle that constitutes life: not what was expressed at the outset, the immediate continuity and solidity of its essence, nor the subsistent shape and the discrete being for itself, nor the pure process of these, nor even the simple combination of these moments, but rather the whole that develops itself and dissolves its development and in this movement simply maintains itself.¹

¶172. Since we start from the first immediate unity and return through the moments of shaping and of process to the unity of these two moments, and thus back again to the first simple substance, this *reflected unity* is different from the first unity. In contrast to that *immediate* unity, or unity expressed as a *Being*, this second unity is the *universal* unity which has in it all these moments as sublated. It is the *simple genus* which, in the movement of life itself, does not *exist for itself as this simple*; rather, in this *result*, life points to something other than itself, viz. to consciousness, for which life is as this unity, or as genus.¹

¶173. This other life, however, for which the *genus* as such is, and which is genus for its own self, *self-consciousness*, is initially to itself only as this simple essence, and has itself as *pure I* for object; in its experience, which we are now to consider, this abstract object will enrich itself for self-consciousness and undergo the unfolding which we have seen in life.¹

¶174. The simple I is this genus or the simple universal, for which the differences are no differences, but only by its being the *negative essence* of the shaped independent moments; and self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by sublating this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as independent life; self-consciousness is *desire*. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it posits this nothingness *for itself* as its truth, annihilates the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as *true* certainty, as the sort of certainty that has arisen for it in an *objective manner*.¹

¶175. In this satisfaction, however, self-consciousness undergoes the experience of the independence of its object. Desire and the self-certainty obtained in the satisfaction of desire are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from sublating this other; for there to be this sublation, there must be this Other. Thus self-consciousness cannot sublimate the object by its negative relation to it; because of that it instead generates the object again, and the desire as well. It is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of desire; and through this experience this truth has dawned on self-consciousness itself. But at the same time self-consciousness is no less absolutely for itself, and it is so only by sublating the object; and it must get its satisfaction, for it is the truth. Owing to the independence of the object, therefore, self-consciousness can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation within itself; and it must effect this negation of itself in itself, for it is *in itself* the negative, and must be for the other what it is. Since the object is negation in its own self, and yet is at the same time independent, it is consciousness. In life, which is the object of desire, *negation* is either *in an other*, viz. in desire, or as a *determinacy* confronting another indifferent shape, or as life's *inorganic universal nature*. But this universal independent nature in which negation is as absolute negation, is the genus

as such, or as *self-consciousness*. *Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.*¹

¶176. The concept of self-consciousness is only completed in these three moments: (a) the pure undifferentiated I is its first immediate object; (b) but this immediacy is itself an absolute mediation, it is only as a sublation of the independent object, or it is desire. The satisfaction of desire is of course the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth; and (c) but the truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness. There is for consciousness an object which, in its own Self, posits its otherness or posits the difference as a null difference, and in so doing is independent. The differentiated, merely *living*, shape does indeed also sublimate its independence in the process of life itself, but it ceases with its difference to be what it is; but the object of self-consciousness is just as independent in this negativity of itself; and thus it is for itself genus, universal fluidity in the peculiarity of its isolation; it is living self-consciousness.¹

¶177. There is a *self-consciousness for a self-consciousness*. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness come to be for it; *I*, which is the object of its concept, is in fact not *object*; the object of desire, however, is only *independent*, for it is the universal indestructible substance, the fluid essence equal-to-its-own-self. When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much I as object.—With this, we already have before us the concept of *spirit*. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is, this absolute substance which, in the perfect freedom and independence of its opposition, viz. of diverse self-consciousnesses that are for themselves, is the unity of these self-consciousnesses: *I* that is *We*, and *We* that is *I*. It is in self-consciousness, as the concept of spirit, that consciousness first has its turning-point, where it leaves behind the colourful semblance of the sensory here-and-now and the empty night of the supersensible Beyond, and steps out into the spiritual day of presence.¹

A. Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: lordship and bondage

¶178. Self-consciousness is *in* and *for itself*, when, and by the fact that, it is in and for itself for another self-consciousness; that is, it is only as something recognized. The concept of this its unity in its duplication, of the infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness, is a many-sided and ambiguous interlacing, so that the moments of this unity must on the one hand be kept strictly apart, and on the other hand must in this differentiation at the same time also be taken and cognized as not distinct, or always in their opposite significance. The twofold sense of the distinct moments lies in the essence of self-consciousness, which is to be infinite, or immediately the contrary of the determinacy in which it is posited. The explication of the concept of this spiritual unity in its duplication presents to us the movement of *recognition*.¹

¶179. There is for self-consciousness another self-consciousness; it has come *out of itself*. This has a twofold significance: *first*, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *other* essence; *secondly*, in doing so it has sublated the other, for it does not see the other as an essence either, but in the *other* sees *its own self*.¹

¶180. It must sublimate this *otherness* of itself; this is the sublation of the first double sense, and is therefore itself a second double sense; *first*, it must proceed to sublimate *the other* independent essence in order thereby to become certain *of itself* as the essence; *secondly*, in so doing it proceeds to sublimate *its own self*, for this other is itself.¹

¶181. This ambiguous sublation of its ambiguous otherness is equally an ambiguous return *into itself*; for *first*, through the sublation, it receives back its own self, for by sublating *its otherness* it again becomes equal to itself; but *secondly*, it equally gives the other self-consciousness back to it again, for it found itself in the other, it sublates this Being *of itself* in the other, thus lets the other again go free.¹

¶182. But this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this way been represented as *the doing of one* of the self-consciousnesses; but this doing of the one has itself the double significance of being both *its own doing* and *the doing of the other* as well; for the other is equally independent, closed within itself, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the origin. The first self-consciousness does not have the object before it as the object initially is only for desire, but an independent object that is for itself, to which, therefore, it can do nothing for itself, if that object does not do in its own self what the first does to it. Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees *the other* do the same as it does; each does itself what it requires of the other, and therefore also does what it does only insofar as the other does the same; one-sided doing would be useless because what is supposed to happen can only come about through both.¹

¶183. Thus the doing has a double sense not only because it is directed *on itself* as well as *on the other*, but also because it is inseparably the *doing of the one* as well as *of the other*.¹

¶184. In this movement we see repeated the process which presented itself as a play of forces, but repeated in consciousness. What, in that play, was for us, is here for the extremes themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness which splits into the extremes; and each extreme is this exchanging of its determinacy and absolute transition into the opposite determinacy. But, as consciousness, it does indeed come *outside itself*, yet, in its Being-outside-itself, it is at the same time kept back within itself, *for itself*, and its outside-itself is *for it*. It is for it that it immediately *is*, and *is not*, another consciousness; and equally that this other is for itself only when it sublates itself as a being-for-itself, and is for itself only in the Being-for-itself of the other. Each is to the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and joins together with itself, and each is to itself, and to the other, an immediate essence that is for itself, which at the same time is for itself only through this mediation. They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing one another*.¹

¶185. This pure concept of recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its unity, now has to be considered, to see how its process appears for self-consciousness. At first, the process will present the side of the *inequality* of the two, or the bifurcation of the middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing.¹

¶186. Self-consciousness is initially simple Being-for-itself, equal-to-its-own-self through the exclusion *from itself* of everything *else*; its essence and absolute object is, to it, *I*; and in this *immediacy* or in this *Being* of its Being-for-itself, it is a *singleton*.

What is other for it is as an unessential object, marked with the character of the negative. But the other is also a self-consciousness; an individual comes face to face with an individual. Entering the scene *immediately* in this way, they are for one another in the manner of ordinary objects; *independent* shapes, consciousnesses submerged in the *Being of life*—for here the object that is determines itself as life—, consciousnesses that have not yet accomplished *for each other* the movement of absolute abstraction, of eradicating all immediate Being, and of being merely the purely negative Being of consciousness equal-to-itself, or have not as yet presented themselves to each other as pure *Being-for-itself*, that is, as *self-consciousnesses*. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and therefore its own certainty of itself still has no truth; for its truth would be only that its own Being-for-itself had presented itself to it as an independent object, or, what is the same thing, that the object had presented itself as this pure certainty of itself. But according to the concept of recognition this is not possible, unless each of these objects accomplishes this pure abstraction of Being-for-itself, the one for the other, just as the other for the one, each in itself by its own doing and again by the doing of the other.¹

¶187. But the *presentation* of itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any determinate *Being-there*, not to the universal singularity of Being-there in general, not attached to life. This presentation is the *twofold* doing: doing of the other, and doing through its own self. Insofar as it is the doing *of the other*, so each aims at the death of the other. But in this the second doing is also present, *the doing through its own self*; for the former involves the staking of its own life. Thus the relationship of the two self-consciousnesses is determined in such a way that they *prove* themselves and each other through a life-and-death combat.—They must engage in this combat, for they must elevate their certainty of themselves, certainty *of being for themselves*, to the truth, in the other and in themselves. And it is only through staking one's life that freedom is established, that it is proved that to self-consciousness the essence is not *Being*, not the *immediate* mode in which it comes on the scene, not its submergence in the expansion of life,—but rather that there is nothing present in it which would not be a vanishing moment for it, that it is only pure *Being-for-itself*. The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a *person*; but it has not attained to the truth of this recognition as recognition of an independent self-consciousness. Similarly, as each stakes its life, so each must aim at the other's death; for it values the other no more than itself; its essence presents itself to it as an other, it is outside itself and must sublimate its Being-outside-itself; the other is a manifoldly entangled consciousness that simply is; it must intuit its otherness as pure Being-for-itself or as absolute negation.¹

¶188. However, this trial by death sublimes the truth which was supposed to issue from it, just as it thereby also sublimes the certainty of itself in general; for as life is the *natural* position of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the *natural* negation of consciousness, negation without independence, which thus remains without the required significance of recognition. Death has indeed given rise to the certainty that both of them staked their life and scorned it, in themselves and in the other; but not for those who endured this combat. They sublimate their consciousness posited in this alien essentiality, which is natural

Being-there, or they sublate themselves, and are sublated as *extremes* wanting to be for themselves. But with this there vanishes from the play of exchange the essential moment, that of decomposing into extremes with opposite determinacies; and the middle term collapses into a dead unity which is decomposed into dead, unopposed extremes that simply are; and the two do not reciprocally give and receive themselves back from each other through consciousness, but leave each other free only indifferently, as things. Their deed is abstract negation, not the negation of consciousness, which *sublates* in such a way as to *preserve* and *maintain* what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated.¹

¶189. In this experience, it dawns on self-consciousness that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness the simple I is the absolute object, which, however, is for us or in itself the absolute mediation and has as its essential moment subsistent independence. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience; through this there is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself but for another, i.e. is as consciousness that *is*, or consciousness in the shape of *thinghood*. The two moments are essential;—since initially they are unequal and opposed, and their reflection into unity has not yet ensued, they are as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent consciousness for which the essence is Being-for-itself, the other is the dependent consciousness for which the essence is life or Being for another; the former is the *lord*, the latter is the *bondsman*.¹

¶190. The lord is the consciousness that is *for itself*, no longer merely the concept of such a consciousness. Rather, it is a consciousness that is for itself, which is mediated with itself through *another* consciousness, namely, through a consciousness to whose essence it belongs to be synthesized with independent *Being* or thinghood in general. The lord gets into relation with these two moments, to a *thing* as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness for which thinghood is what is essential; and since he is (a) as concept of self-consciousness, immediate relation of *Being-for-itself*, but (b) from now on, at the same time, as mediation, or as a Being-for-itself which is for itself only through another, he is related (a) immediately to both, and (b) mediately to each through the other. The lord relates himself mediately to the *bondsman through independent Being*, for it is just this which holds the bondsman; it is his chain from which he could not abstract in the combat, thus proving to be dependent, to have his independence in thinghood. But the lord is the power over this Being, for he proved in the combat that it counts for him only as something negative; since he is the power over this, while this Being is the power over the other, in this syllogism he thus has the other under him. Equally, the lord relates himself *mediately to the thing through the bondsman*; the bondsman, as self-consciousness in general, also relates himself negatively to the thing, and sublates it; but at the same time the thing is independent for the bondsman, and he therefore cannot through his negating have done with it to the point of annihilation, or he only *works on* it. For the lord, by contrast, there *comes about* through this mediation the *immediate* relation as the sheer negation of the thing, or *enjoyment*; he succeeds in doing, what desire failed to do: in having done with it, and satisfying himself in enjoyment. Desire failed in this because of the thing's independence; but the lord, who has interposed the bondsman between it and himself, thereby joins together

only with the dependence of the thing and enjoys it purely; as for the side of independence he leaves that to the bondsman, who works on the thing.¹

¶191. In these two moments recognition comes about for the lord through another consciousness; for this other consciousness posits itself in these moments as something unessential, first in working on the thing, and secondly in dependency on a determinate Being-there; in neither moment can it become master over Being and attain to absolute negation. Thus there is present here this moment of recognition, in which the other consciousness sublates itself as Being-for-itself, and thereby itself does what the first does to it. Likewise the other moment, that this doing of the second is the first's own doing; for what the bondsman does is really the doing of the lord; to the lord alone belongs Being-for-itself, the essence; he is the pure negative power for which the thing is nothing, and thus the pure, essential doing in this relationship; to the bondsman belongs a doing that is not pure, but unessential. But for recognition proper the moment is lacking, that what the lord does to the other he should also do to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he should also do to the other. What has thereby arisen is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal.¹

¶192. In this, the unessential consciousness is for the lord the object, which constitutes the *truth* of certainty of himself. But it is clear that this object does not correspond to its concept, but rather that there, where the lord has fulfilled himself, he finds something quite other than an independent consciousness. What is for him is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one; therefore, he is not certain of *Being-for-itself* as the truth, but his truth is rather the unessential consciousness and its unessential doing.¹

¶193. The *truth* of the independent consciousness is accordingly the *servile consciousness*. This servile consciousness does indeed appear initially *outside* of itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as lordship showed that its essence is the inverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the contrary of what it immediately is; as a consciousness *driven back* into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be converted into true independence.¹

¶194. We have seen what servitude is only in relationship to lordship. But it is self-consciousness, and accordingly we have now to consider what it is in and for itself. Initially, for servitude the lord is the essence; hence the *independent consciousness that is for itself* is its *truth*, a truth, however, that *for it* is not yet *within it*. But it does *in fact* have *within itself* this truth of pure negativity and *Being-for-itself*, for it has *experienced* this essence within it. That is to say, this consciousness has had anxiety, not about this or that and not just at odd moments, but anxiety for its whole essence; for it has felt the fear of death, of the absolute lord. In this it has been internally dissolved, has trembled through and through within itself, and everything fixed has quaked in it. But this pure universal movement, the absolute liquidization of all subsistence, is the simple essence of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, *pure Being-for-itself*, which is thus *within* this consciousness. This moment of pure Being-for-itself is also *for it*, for in the lord this moment is its *object*. Furthermore, this consciousness is not only this universal dissolution *in general*, but in its service it accomplishes it *actually*; in serving it sublates its attachment to natural Being-there in all *singular* moments; and gets rid of this Being-there by working on it.¹

¶195. However, the feeling of absolute power in general, and in the singularity of service, is only dissolution *in itself*, and although the fear of the lord is indeed the beginning of wisdom, in this the consciousness is *for it itself*, not *Being-for-itself*. Through work, however, it comes to its own self. In the moment which corresponds to desire in the lord's consciousness, the side of unessential relation to the thing did seem to have fallen to the lot of the serving consciousness, since in that relation the thing retains its independence. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby unalloyed self-feeling. But for that reason this satisfaction is itself only a disappearance, for it lacks the *objective* side or *subsistence*. Work, by contrast, is desire *held in check*, *fleetingness staved off*, or work *cultivates*. The negative relation to the object becomes its *form* and something *permanent*, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence. This *negative* middle term or the formative *doing* is at the same time *the singularity* or the pure Being-for-itself of consciousness, which now, in working, steps outside itself into the element of permanence; in this way, therefore, the working consciousness arrives at the intuition of independent Being *as of its own self*.¹

¶196. However, the forming does not only have this positive significance that in it the serving consciousness, as pure Being-for-itself, becomes a *being* in its own eyes; the forming also has a negative significance in the face of its first moment, fear. For, in cultivating the thing, the serving consciousness's own negativity, its Being-for-itself, becomes an object for it only through its sublating the being, the *form*, opposed to it. But this objective *negative* is just the alien essence before which it has trembled. Now, however, it destroys this alien negative, posits *itself* as such a negative in the element of permanence, and thereby becomes *for itself* a *being-for-itself*. In the lord, the Being-for-itself is *an other* to it, or only *for it*; in fear, the Being-for-itself is *within it itself*; in its cultivating, the Being-for-itself becomes for it as *its own* Being-for-itself, and it arrives at the consciousness that it itself is in and for itself. The form is *posited outside*, but is not regarded as thereby becoming something other than serving consciousness; for it is precisely this form that is its pure Being-for-itself, which in this externality is seen by it to be the truth. Through this rediscovery of itself by itself, the serving consciousness realizes that it is precisely in its labour, wherein it seemed to have only an *alienated mind*, that it acquires a *mind of its own*.—For this reflection, the two moments of fear and of service in general, as also that of cultivating, are necessary, and both at the same time in a universal mode. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains a formality and does not extend to the conscious actuality of Being-there. Without the cultivating, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become for it itself. If consciousness forms the thing without that initial absolute fear, it is only a vain mind of its own; for its form or negativity is not negativity *in itself*; and therefore its forming cannot give it the consciousness of itself as the essence. If it has not endured absolute fear but only some anxiety, the negative essence has remained for it something external, its substance has not been infected by it through and through. Since not all acquisitions of its natural consciousness have been shaken, it still belongs *in itself* to determinate Being; a mind of one's own is *self-will*, a freedom that is still enmeshed in servitude. As little as the pure form can become the essence for it, just as little is that form, regarded as expansion over the singular, a universal forming, an absolute

concept; rather it is a skill that is master over a few things, but not over the universal power and the whole objective essence.¹

B. Freedom of self-consciousness: stoicism, scepticism, and the unhappy consciousness

¶197. For the independent self-consciousness, on the one hand its essence is only the pure abstraction of *the I*, and on the other hand, when this abstraction develops and acquires differences, this differentiation does not become an objective essence that is *in itself*; so this self-consciousness does not become an I that in its simplicity is genuinely self-differentiating, or that in this absolute differentiation remains identical with itself. By contrast, the consciousness that is driven back into itself becomes, in the act of forming, its own object as form of the thing it has cultivated, and in the lord it intuits at the same time Being-for-itself as consciousness. But for the subservient consciousness as such, these two moments—that of *itself* as independent object, and that of this object as a consciousness, and hence its own essence—fall apart. Since, however, the *form* and the *Being-for-itself* are *for us*, or *in themselves*, the same, and since in the concept of the independent consciousness the *Being-in-itself* is consciousness, the side of *Being-in-itself* or *thinghood*, which received the form in the labour, is no other substance than consciousness, and a new shape of self-consciousness has arisen for us; a consciousness which, as the infinitude or the pure movement of consciousness, is aware of itself as the essence; a consciousness that *thinks* or is free self-consciousness. For to *think* means to be one's own object not as *abstract I*, but as an I that has at the same time the significance of *Being-in-itself*, of having itself for object, or of relating itself to the objective essence in such a way that it has the significance of the *Being-for-itself* of the consciousness for which it is.—For *thinking*, the object does not move in representations or shapes, but in *concepts*, i.e. in a distinct *Being-in-itself*, which immediately, for consciousness, is not at all distinct from it. What is *represented*, *shaped*, a *being*, has, as such, the form of being something other than consciousness; but a concept is at the same time a *being*, and this difference, insofar as it is in the concept itself, is its determinate content,—but since this content is at the same time a content conceptualized, consciousness remains *immediately* conscious of its unity with this determinate and differentiated being, not, as in the case of representation, where consciousness still has specifically to remind itself that this is *its* representation; whereas the concept is for me immediately *my* concept. In thinking, *I am free*, because I am not in an other, but remain simply together with myself, and the object, which is for me the essence, is in undivided unity my *Being-for-myself*; and my movement in concepts is a movement within myself.—But in this determination of this shape of self-consciousness it is essential to keep in mind that this shape is *thinking* consciousness *in general*, or its object is *immediate* unity of *Being-in-itself* and *Being-for-itself*. The consciousness homonymous with itself that repels itself from itself becomes to itself an *element that is in-itself*; but at first it is to itself this element only as universal essence in general, not as this objective essence in the development and movement of its manifold Being.¹

¶198. This freedom of self-consciousness, when it emerged as its conscious appearance in the history of spirit, was, as we know, called *Stoicism*. Its principle is that consciousness is thinking essence, and that something has essentiality for consciousness, or is true and good for it, only as consciousness comports itself therein as thinking essence.¹

¶199. The manifold expansion of life, differentiating itself within itself, the singularization and complication of life, is the object on which desire and labour are active. This manifold doing has now contracted into the simple differentiating which occurs in the pure movement of thinking. What has more essentiality is not the difference that presents itself as *determinate thing*, or as *consciousness of a determinate natural Being-there*, as a feeling, or as *desire* and *purpose for this desire*, whether this purpose is set by one's *own* consciousness or by *an alien consciousness*, but only the difference that is a *thought* difference, or is immediately not distinct from me. This consciousness is consequently negative towards the relationship of lordship and bondage; its doing is, in lordship, not to have its truth in the bondsman, nor, as bondsman, to have its truth in the will of the lord and in his service, but to be free, whether on the throne or in chains, in all the dependency of its singular Being-there, and to maintain for itself the lifelessness that constantly *withdraws* from the movement of Being-there, from activity as well as from suffering, into *the simple essentiality of thought*. Self-will is the freedom that fastens onto a singularity and stands *within* bondage, while Stoicism is the freedom that always comes immediately out of bondage and back into the *pure universality* of thought. As universal form of the world-spirit, Stoicism could only emerge in a time of universal fear and bondage, but also in the time of a universal culture that had elevated cultivation up to thinking.¹

¶200. Now, it is true that for this self-consciousness the essence is neither an other than itself, nor the pure abstraction of the I; the essence is I, which has otherness in it, but as a difference in thought, so that in its otherness the I has immediately returned into itself. Yet at the same time this essence of self-consciousness is only an *abstract* essence. The freedom of self-consciousness is *indifferent* to natural Being-there, has therefore *likewise let this Being-there go free*, and the *reflection* is a *double* reflection. Freedom in thought has only *pure thought* as its truth, a truth without the fullness of life; and so it is also only the concept of freedom, not living freedom itself; for the essence of that freedom is at first only *thinking* in general, the form as such, which has turned away from the independence of things and returned into itself. But since the singularity, as acting, should present itself as full of life or, as thinking, should grasp the living world as a system of thought, there would have to reside *in thought itself a content*, for the expansion of action a content of what is good, for the expansion of thinking a content of what is true, in order that in *what is for consciousness* there should be no other ingredient *whatsoever* except the concept which is the essence. But here the concept as *abstraction* cuts itself off from the multiplicity of things, and so it has *no content in itself* but a content *given to it*. Consciousness does indeed eliminate the content as an alien Being, when it thinks it; but the concept is a *determinate* content, and this *determinacy* of the concept is the alien element that it has in it. Stoicism therefore got into difficulties when it was asked, as they expressed it, for the *criterion* of truth in general, i.e. strictly speaking, for a *content of thought itself*. To the question put to it, *what is good and true*, it again gave in answer the

contentless thinking itself: the true and the good shall consist in rationality. But this equality of thinking with itself is again only the pure form in which nothing is determined; the true and the good, wisdom and virtue, the universal words at which Stoicism has to come to a standstill, are therefore no doubt uplifting in general, but since they cannot in fact come to any expansion of the content, they soon begin to generate boredom.¹

¶201. This thinking consciousness, in the way in which it has determined itself as abstract freedom, is thus only the incomplete negation of otherness; *withdrawn* from Being-there only into itself, it has not accomplished itself as absolute negation of Being-there in it. The content, it is true, for it counts only as thought, but also as *determinate* thought, and at the same time as determinacy as such.¹

¶202. *Scepticism* is the realization of that of which Stoicism is only the concept,—and the actual experience of what freedom of thought is; this freedom is *in itself* the negative and must display itself as such. With the reflection of self-consciousness into the simple thought of itself, the independent Being-there or the permanent determinacy has, vis-à-vis that reflection, in fact fallen outside of the infinitude [of thought]; in Scepticism the entire inessentiality and dependence of this other now comes *before consciousness*; thought becomes the complete thinking that annihilates the Being of the *multiply determined* world, and the negativity of free self-consciousness becomes for itself real negativity in this manifold configuration of life.—It is clear that just as Stoicism corresponds to the *concept* of the *independent* consciousness, which appeared as the relationship of mastery and bondage, so Scepticism corresponds to the *realization* of this concept as the negative attitude towards otherness, as desire and labour. But if desire and labour were unable to effect the negation for self-consciousness, this polemical attitude towards the multiple independence of things will, by contrast, meet with success, because it turns against them as free self-consciousness that is already complete within itself; more specifically, because this attitude has, within its own self, *thinking* or infinitude, and in this the independencies in their difference are for it only vanishing magnitudes. The differences, which in the pure thinking of itself are only the abstraction of differences, here become *all* the differences, and all differentiated Being becomes a difference of self-consciousness.¹

¶203. In this way what *scepticism* does in general, and the *manner* in which it does it, has determined itself. Scepticism exhibits the *dialectical movement* which sensory certainty, perception, and the understanding are; it also exhibits the unessentiality of what counts, in the relationship of lordship and service, and what counts for abstract thinking itself, as something *determinate*. This relationship at the same time comprises within itself a *determinate mode* in which ethical laws, too, are present as commands of mastery; but the determinations in abstract thinking are concepts of science into which contentless thinking spreads itself, attaching the concept in a way that is in fact merely external to the Being that is independent for it and constitutes its content, and regards as valid only *determinate* concepts, even though they are also pure abstractions.¹

¶204. The *dialectical* as negative movement, in the way it immediately *is*, initially appears to consciousness as something to which it is surrendered, and which is not engendered by consciousness itself. As *Scepticism*, on the other hand, this movement

is a moment of self-consciousness, to which it does not *happen* that what is for it the true and the real vanish without its knowing how, but which, in the certainty of its freedom, itself makes this other ostensible reality vanish. Self-consciousness causes to vanish not only the objective as such, but its own attitude to it, in which it counts as objective and is made valid, hence, too, its *perceiving* is made to vanish, along with its *reinforcement* of what it is in danger of losing, *sophistry*, and the *truth* it has *determined* and *established from its own resources*. Through this self-conscious negation self-consciousness procures *for itself the certainty of its freedom*, produces the experience of that certitude, and thereby elevates it to *truth*. What vanishes is the determinate, or the difference, which, in whatever way and whatever its source, establishes itself as fixed and immutable. This difference has nothing permanent in it, and *must* vanish for thinking, because the different is just this, not to be *self-contained*, but to have its essentiality only in an other; but thinking is the insight into this nature of the different, it is the negative essence, as simple.¹

¶205. In the variability of all that would stabilize itself before it, the sceptical self-consciousness thus experiences its own freedom as given to it by itself and preserved by itself. It is for itself this ataraxia of thinking that thinks itself, the unchanging and *genuine certainty of itself*. This certainty does not issue from something alien, compressing its complex development within itself, as a result which would leave its coming-to-be behind it; no, consciousness itself is the *absolute dialectical unrest*, this melange of sensory and thought representations whose differences coincide, and whose equality likewise dissolves in turn—for equality is itself the *determinacy* in contrast to the unequal. But it is precisely here that this consciousness, instead of being consciousness equal-to-itself, is in fact just an utterly contingent confusion, the vertigo of a perpetually self-engendering disorder. *It is this for itself*; for consciousness itself maintains and produces this confusion in motion. That is why it also confesses to it, it confesses to being a wholly *contingent, singular* consciousness,—a consciousness which is *empirical*, takes its guidance from what has no reality for it, obeys what is for it no essence, does and brings to actuality what has no truth for it. But equally, while it evaluates itself in this way as *singular, contingent* and, in fact, animal life, and *lost* self-consciousness, it also, on the contrary, makes itself again into a consciousness that is *universal* and *equal to itself*; for it is the negativity of all singularity and all difference. From this equality-to-itself, or rather within this equality-to-itself, it falls back again into this contingency and confusion, for this self-moving negativity has to do solely with what is singular, and galls with the contingent. This consciousness is therefore the unconscious rambling, passing back and forth from the one extreme of self-consciousness, equal-to-itself, to the other extreme of the contingent consciousness that is confused and confusing. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together; *at one time* it recognizes its freedom as elevation above all the confusion and all the contingency of Being-there, and *at another time* likewise confesses to a relapse into *inessentiality* and to gallivanting in it. It lets the unessential content in its thinking vanish, but in this very act it is the consciousness of something unessential; it pronounces absolute *vanishing*, but the *pronouncement is*, and this consciousness is the vanishing pronounced; it pronounces the nullity of seeing, hearing, etc., and it *itself sees, hears*, etc; it pronounces the nullity of ethical essentialities, and makes these same essentialities the powers of its action. Its doings and its

words always contradict each other, and likewise it itself has the double contradictory consciousness of unchangeableness and equality, and of utter contingency and inequality with itself. But it keeps the poles of this contradiction of itself apart, and adopts the same attitude to it as it does in its purely negative movement in general. Point out *equality* to it, and it points out *inequality*; and when it is now confronted with the inequality it has just pronounced, it switches to pointing out *equality*; its chatter is in fact a squabble of self-willed children, one of whom says A if the other says B, and in turn says B if the other says A, and who by contradicting *themselves* purchase the pleasure of remaining in contradiction *with each other*.¹

¶206. In Scepticism, consciousness experiences itself in truth as a consciousness contradictory within itself; from this experience emerges a *new shape*, which brings together the two thoughts which Scepticism holds apart. Scepticism's thoughtlessness about itself must vanish, because it is in fact *one* consciousness which has these two modes in it. This new shape is thereby one which is *for itself* the double consciousness, of itself as self-liberating, unchangeable, and equal to itself, and of itself as self-confusing and self-inverting, and the consciousness of this its contradiction.— In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself; in Scepticism, this freedom realizes itself, annihilates the other side of determinate Being-there, but more exactly duplicates *itself*, and is now to itself something twofold. In this way the duplication which earlier was divided between two singletons, the lord and the bondsman, has now settled in one; with this, the duplication of self-consciousness within itself, which is essential in the concept of spirit, is present, but not yet its unity, and the *unhappy consciousness* is the consciousness of itself as the double, merely contradictory essence.¹

¶207. This *unhappy, internally split* consciousness, since this contradiction of its essence is to itself *one* consciousness, must always have in the one consciousness the other consciousness too, and so it must immediately be driven out of each of them again, as soon as it thinks it has arrived at victory and the repose of unity. But its true return into itself, or its reconciliation with itself, will display the concept of spirit, the spirit that has become alive and entered into existence, because this is already in it—that as one undivided consciousness it is a duplicated consciousness: it itself *is* the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, and it itself *is* both, and the unity of both is also to it the essence; but *for itself* it is not yet this essence itself, not yet the unity of the two self-consciousnesses.¹

¶208. Since it is initially only the *immediate unity* of the two, but for it the two are not the same, but opposed, one of them, namely the simple unchangeable, is to it as the *essence*; but the other, the multiple changeable, is as the *unessential*. The two are, *for it*, essences that are alien to one another; and because it is itself the consciousness of this contradiction, it ranges itself on the side of the changeable consciousness, and is to itself the unessential; but as consciousness of unchangeableness, or of the simple essence, it must at the same time set about freeing itself from the unessential, i.e. freeing itself from itself. For though it is *for itself* only the changeable, and the unchangeable is, for it, something alien, yet *it is itself* simple, and hence unchangeable, consciousness, a consciousness of which it is thus conscious as *its* essence, but in such a way that for itself again *it itself* is not this essence. The position it assigns to the two cannot therefore be an indifference of them towards each other, i.e. not an

indifference of itself towards the unchangeable; rather, it is itself immediately both of them, and the *relation of the two* is for it as a relation of the essence to the non-essence, so that this latter is to be sublated; but since for it both are equally essential and contradictory, it is merely the contradictory movement in which the contrary does not come to rest in its contrary, but within it only generates itself anew as a contrary.¹

¶209. Here, then, we have a struggle against an enemy, victory over whom is rather a defeat, where attainment of the one is rather the loss of it in its contrary. Consciousness of life, of its Being-there and activity, is only grief over this Being-there and activity, for it has in this only the consciousness of its contrary as the essence and of its own nothingness. It passes over out of this into an ascent to the unchangeable. But this ascent is itself this consciousness; so the ascent is the consciousness of the contrary, namely of itself as singularity. The unchangeable that enters into consciousness is by this very fact at the same time affected by singularity, and is only present with the latter; far from having destroyed singularity in the consciousness of the unchangeable, singularity only emerges constantly in it.¹

¶210. But in this movement consciousness experiences just this *emergence of singularity in the unchangeable*, and of *the unchangeable in singularity*. There comes to be *for consciousness* singularity *in general* in the unchangeable essence, and at the same time *its own* singularity in it. For the truth of this movement is just the *oneness* of this double consciousness. *This unity becomes for it*, but is *initially* a unity *in which the diversity* of the two is *still* the dominant feature. Thus there is present for consciousness the threefold way in which singularity is linked with the unchangeable: *first*, consciousness again emerges for itself as opposed to the unchangeable; and it is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle which remains the element of the whole relationship. But *secondly*, the *unchangeable* itself has *singularity in it* for consciousness, so that singularity is the shape of the unchangeable and with this the entire mode of existence passes over into the unchangeable. *Thirdly*, *consciousness* finds *its own self* as this singular in the unchangeable. The *first* unchangeable is to consciousness only the *alien* essence condemning singularity; since the *second* unchangeable is a *shape of singularity* as consciousness itself is, consciousness, *thirdly*, comes to be spirit, it has the joy of finding itself in it, and becomes conscious that its singularity is reconciled with the universal.¹

¶211. What presents itself here as mode and relationship of the unchangeable arose as the *experience* which the divided self-consciousness undergoes in its unhappiness. Now this experience is, of course, not *its own one-sided* movement, for this self-consciousness is itself unchangeable consciousness, accordingly the latter is at the same time singular consciousness too, and the movement is just as much a movement of the unchangeable consciousness, which takes part in the movement as much as the other; for the movement runs through these moments: first, the unchangeable is opposed to the singular in general; then, itself singular, it is opposed to the other singular; and finally, it is one with this singular. But this consideration, insofar as it belongs to us, is here untimely, for what has arisen for us up to now is only unchangeableness as unchangeableness of consciousness, which is therefore not true unchangeableness, but still burdened with an opposition, not the unchangeable *in and for itself*; we do not know, therefore, how the latter will behave. What has

emerged here is only this: that to consciousness, which is our object here, the determinations indicated appear in the unchangeable.¹

¶212. For this reason therefore the unchangeable *consciousness* also retains in its very shaping the character and foundation of dividedness and Being-for-itself with regard to the singular consciousness. Consequently, for the latter, the unchangeable's acquisition of the shape of singularity is altogether a *happening*; just as it also merely *finds* itself opposed to it and thus has this relationship *by nature*; that, finally, it does *find itself* in the unchangeable, appears to it to be brought about partly, no doubt, by itself, or to take place because it is itself singular; but a part of this unity, both as regards its origin and insofar as it is, appears as belonging to the unchangeable; and the opposition persists within this unity itself. In fact, through the *shaping* of the unchangeable, the moment of the beyond has not only remained, but is rather still established; for if the beyond seems, on the one hand, to have been brought closer to consciousness through the shape of singular actuality, on the other hand from now on it confronts it as an opaque sensory *one*, with all the rigidity of something *actual*; the hope of becoming one with it must remain a hope, i.e. without fulfilment and presence, for between the hope and the fulfilment stands precisely the absolute contingency or immobile indifference which lies in the shaping itself, the shaping that grounds the hope. Through the nature of this *one* that *simply is*, through the actuality that it has assumed, it necessarily happens that it has vanished in time, and that it has been in space and far away, and remains utterly far away.¹

¶213. If at first the mere concept of the divided consciousness determined itself to set about sublating itself as singular and becoming the unchangeable consciousness, from now on its endeavour has this determination: rather to sublimate its relationship to the pure *unshaped* unchangeable, and to acquire a relation only with *the shaped unchangeable*. For the *oneness* of the singular with the unchangeable is henceforth *essence* and *object* for consciousness, just as in the concept the shapeless abstract unchangeable was the essential object; and the relationship of this absolute dividedness of the concept is now what it has to turn away from. But as for the initially external relation to the shaped unchangeable as an alien actuality, it has to elevate this to absolute unification.¹

¶214. The movement in which the unessential consciousness strives to attain this oneness is itself the *threefold* movement corresponding to the threefold relationship that this consciousness will have with its shaped Beyond: first, as *pure consciousness*; secondly, as *singular essence* that comports itself towards *actuality* as desire and work; and thirdly, as *consciousness of its Being-for-itself*.—We now have to see how these three modes of its Being are present and determined in that universal relationship.¹

¶215. First, then, when consciousness is considered as *pure consciousness*, the shaped unchangeable, when he is for the pure consciousness, seems to be posited as he is in and for himself. But how he is in and for himself, this, as we have already mentioned, has not yet arisen. For him to be in consciousness as he is in and for himself, this would certainly have to proceed from him rather than from the consciousness; but his presence here is thus at first only one-sidedly at hand through consciousness, and for that very reason not perfect and genuine, but remains burdened with imperfection or an opposition.¹

¶216. But although the unhappy consciousness therefore does not possess this presence, it is at the same time beyond pure thinking insofar as this is the abstract thinking of Stoicism which *averts its eyes* from *singularity* altogether, and the merely *agitated* thinking of Scepticism,—which is in fact only singularity as unconscious contradiction and restless movement; it is beyond both of these, it brings and keeps together pure thinking and singularity, but has not yet risen to that thinking *for which* the singularity of consciousness is reconciled with pure thinking itself. It stands rather in the middle, where abstract thinking comes into contact with the singularity of consciousness as singularity. Consciousness itself *is* this contact; it is the unity of pure thinking and singularity; this is also *for consciousness*, this thinking singularity or pure thinking, and the unchangeable itself essentially as singularity. But what is not *for it* is that this, its object, the unchangeable, which essentially presents itself to it in the shape of singularity, is *consciousness itself*, itself, which is singularity of consciousness.¹

¶217. In this first mode therefore, where we consider it as *pure consciousness*, it does not *comport itself to its object* thinkingly, but, since it is indeed *in itself* pure thinking singularity, and its object is just this pure thinking, though the *relation of one to the other* is not *itself pure thinking*, it only goes, so to speak, *towards* thinking, and is *devotion*. As such, its thinking remains the amorphous peal of bell-ringing, or a warm cloud of mist, a musical thinking that does not get as far as the concept, which would be the only immanent objective mode. This infinite pure inner feeling will indeed find its object, but the object will make its entrance not as a conceptualized object, and will therefore enter as something alien. What we have here therefore is the inward movement of the *pure* heart which *feels* itself, but feels itself painfully as division; the movement of an infinite *yearning* that has the certainty that its essence is such a pure heart, pure *thinking* that *thinks* itself *as singularity*; certainty that it is known and recognized by this object, precisely because the object thinks itself as singularity. At the same time, however, this essence is the unattainable *Beyond* which flees as we grasp at it, or rather has already fled. It has already flown; for it is on the one hand the unchangeable that thinks itself as singularity, and consciousness therefore immediately attains its own self in it, *its own self*, but as *the consciousness opposed to the unchangeable*; instead of grasping the essence, it only *feels* it and has fallen back into itself; since in the attainment it cannot keep itself as this opposed consciousness at bay, it has, instead of grasping the essence, only grasped the inessentiality. Just as on one side, in striving to attain *itself in the essence*, it grasps only its own separated actuality, so on the other side it cannot grasp the other as a singular, or as *actual*. Where the other is sought, it cannot be found, for it is supposed to be precisely a *Beyond*, the sort of thing that cannot be found. When sought as a singular, it is not a *universal* singularity in thought, not a *concept*, but a singular as object, or *something actual*; an object of immediate sensory certainty, and for that very reason only the sort of thing that has vanished. For consciousness therefore only the *grave* of its life can come to presence. But because this grave is itself an actuality and it goes against the nature of actuality to grant a lasting possession, this presence of the grave, too, is merely the struggle of an endeavour that is bound to be lost. But having learned from experience that *the grave* of its *actual* unchangeable essence has *no actuality*, that the *vanished singularity*, as vanished, is not the true singularity,

consciousness will give up looking for the unchangeable singularity as *actual*, or holding on to it as vanished, and only in this way is it able to find singularity as genuine or as universal.¹

¶218. But initially the *return of the heart into its own self* is to be taken to signify that it has its *actuality* as a *singular*. It is the *pure heart* which *for us* or *in itself* has found itself and is satiated within itself, for although *for it* in its feeling the essence separates itself from it, yet *in itself* this feeling is *self-feeling*, it has felt the object of its pure feeling, and this object is itself; from this it thus emerges as self-feeling, or as something that is actual for itself. In this return into itself its *second relationship* has emerged for us, the relationship of desire and work, which confirm for consciousness the inner certainty of itself (which it has attained for us), by sublation and enjoyment of the alien essence, namely the essence in the form of independent things. But the unhappy consciousness *finds* itself only as *desiring* and *working*; it is not on hand for consciousness that the inner certainty of itself lies at the basis of its finding itself thus, and that its feeling of the essence is this self-feeling. Since it does not have this certainty *for its own self*, its interior rather still remains the broken certainty of itself; the confirmation that it would obtain through work and enjoyment is therefore just such a *broken* confirmation; or rather it must for itself nullify this confirmation so that it does find confirmation in it, but only confirmation of what it is for itself, namely confirmation of its dividedness.¹

¶219. The actuality against which desire and work are directed is no longer for this consciousness a *nullity in itself*, something merely to be sublated and consumed by it, but something like that consciousness itself, an *actuality broken in two*, which is only on one side null in itself, but on the other side is also a sanctified world; it is a shape of the unchangeable, for this has received in itself singularity, and because, as the unchangeable, it is a universal, its singularity has in general the significance of all actuality.¹

¶220. If consciousness were for itself independent consciousness, and actuality were to it null in and for itself, then in the labour and in the enjoyment it would attain to the feeling of its independence, in virtue of the fact that it would be consciousness itself that sublated actuality. But since this actuality is to consciousness a shape of the unchangeable, it is unable of itself to sublimate it. But when it does succeed in nullifying actuality and enjoying it, this essentially happens for consciousness in virtue of the fact that the unchangeable itself *surrenders* its shape, and *hands it over* to consciousness for enjoyment.—Consciousness, for its part, *likewise* emerges here as something actual, but equally as internally broken, and in its labour and enjoyment this dividedness displays itself as breaking up into a *relationship to actuality* or *Being-for-itself*, and a *Being-in-itself*. This relationship to actuality is *altering* or *activity*, the Being-for-itself that belongs to the *singular* consciousness as such. But in this, consciousness is also *in itself*: this side belongs to the unchangeable Beyond; it is the faculties and forces, an alien gift, which the unchangeable also hands over to consciousness for it to use.¹

¶221. Accordingly, in its activity, consciousness is initially in the relationship of two extremes; on one side it stands as active worldliness, and confronting it is passive actuality: the two sides are in relation with one another, but both have also withdrawn into the unchangeable and keep to themselves. From each side therefore only a

surface detaches itself in response to the other, and this enters the play of movement with regard to the other.—The extreme of actuality is sublated by the active extreme; but actuality, on its side, can be sublated only for the reason that its unchangeable essence sublates it itself, repels itself from itself, and hands over what is repelled to the activity. The active force appears as *the power* in which actuality is dissolved; but because of this, for this consciousness, to which the *in-itself* or the essence is something other than itself, this power, in the form of which it enters the lists in its activity, is the beyond of consciousness itself. So instead of returning from its activity back into itself and having proved itself for its own self, consciousness rather reflects this movement of activity back into the other extreme, which is thereby displayed as a pure universal, as the absolute power from which the movement proceeded in all directions, and which is the essence both of the self-disintegrating extremes as they at first emerged, and of the exchange itself.¹

¶222. By the fact that the unchangeable consciousness *renounces* its shape and *surrenders* it, by the fact that by contrast the singular consciousness *gives thanks*, i.e. *denies* itself the satisfaction of the consciousness of its *independence*, and assigns the essence of the activity not to itself but to the beyond, by these two moments of *reciprocal self-renunciation* of both parties there certainly arises for consciousness its *unity* with the unchangeable. But this unity is at the same time affected with separation, is again broken within itself, and from it the opposition of the universal and singular emerges again. For consciousness does *make a show* of renouncing the satisfaction of its self-feeling, but it obtains the *actual* satisfaction of it; for *it has been* desire, work, and enjoyment; as consciousness *it has willed, acted, and enjoyed*. Likewise its *thanks-giving*, in which it recognizes the other extreme as the essence and sublates itself, is itself *its own* activity which counterbalances the activity of the other extreme, and opposes an *equal* activity to the self-sacrificing benefaction; if the other extreme delivers over to consciousness its *surface*, consciousness gives thanks *all the same*, and in surrendering its activity, i.e. its *essence*, it really does more than the other which only discards a surface from itself. Thus not only in the actual desiring, working, and enjoying, but even in the thanks-giving itself where the contrary seems to happen, the entire movement is reflected into the *extreme of singularity*. Consciousness feels itself therein as this singular consciousness, and does not let itself be deceived by the semblance of its renunciation, for the truth of this consciousness is that it has not surrendered itself; what has come about is only the double reflection into the two extremes; and the result is the renewed splitting into the opposed consciousness of the *unchangeable*, and the consciousness of the willing, accomplishing, and enjoying *confronting* it, and of the self-renunciation itself, or in general of the *singularity that is for itself*.¹

¶223. This has introduced the *third relationship* of the movement of this consciousness, a relationship which proceeds from the second as a consciousness that has in truth proved itself as independent by its willing and accomplishing. In the first relationship it was only *concept* of actual consciousness, or the *inner heart* that is not yet actual in its doing and enjoyment; the *second* is this actualization as external doing and enjoying; but on its return from this, it is the sort of consciousness that has *experienced* itself as actual and activating consciousness, or for which it is *true* to be *in and for itself*. But in this the enemy is now discovered in his ownmost shape. In the

struggle of the heart the singular consciousness is only as musical, abstract moment; in work and enjoyment, as the realization of this essence-bereft Being, consciousness can immediately forget *itself*, and the conscious *stake* in this actuality is cancelled out by the thankful recognition. But this cancellation is in truth a return of consciousness into itself, and into itself as the actuality that is genuine for it.¹

¶224. This third relationship, in which this genuine actuality is one of the extremes, is the *relation* of that actuality, as nullity, to the universal essence; and the movement of this relation is still to be considered.

¶225. Concerning first the opposed relation of consciousness where its *reality* is to it *immediately the null*, its actual doing thus becomes a doing of nothing, its enjoyment a feeling of its unhappiness. Activity and enjoyment thereby lose all *universal content and significance*, for this would give them a Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself, and both withdraw into singularity, on which consciousness is directed in order to sublimate it. Consciousness is conscious of itself as *this actual singleton* in the animal functions. These functions are no longer performed ingenuously, as something that is null in and for itself and which cannot acquire any importance or essentiality for the spirit; instead, since it is in them that the enemy reveals himself in his characteristic shape, they are rather the object of serious endeavour, and come precisely to be of supreme importance. This enemy, however, generates himself in his defeat, and consciousness, in fixing its attention on him, far from freeing itself from him, rather always dwells on him, and always sees itself as defiled; and since at the same time this content of its efforts, instead of being something essential, is the most base, instead of being a universal, is the most singular, we see only a personality confined to its own self and its petty doings, a personality afflicting itself, as unhappy as it is impoverished.¹

¶226. But to these two, the feeling of its unhappiness and the poverty of its activity, is linked also the consciousness of its unity with the unchangeable. For the attempted immediate annihilation of its actual Being is *mediated* by the thought of the unchangeable, and happens in this *relation*. *The mediate* relation constitutes the essence of the negative movement in which consciousness is directed against its singularity, but which, as a *relation*, is *in itself* positive as well and will produce this its *unity* for consciousness itself.¹

¶227. This mediate relation is thus a syllogism in which singularity, initially fixing itself in opposition to the *in-itself*, is joined together with this other extreme only through a third term. Through this middle term the extreme of the unchangeable is for the unessential consciousness, which at the same time also involves this: it is likewise for the unchangeable consciousness only through this middle term, and thus this middle term is one which represents the two extremes to one another, and is the reciprocal minister of each one with the other. This middle term is itself a conscious essence, for it is an activity mediating consciousness as such; the content of this activity is the extinction that consciousness undertakes with its singularity.¹

¶228. In the middle term then, consciousness frees itself from activity and enjoyment as *its own*; it throws off the essence of its *will* from itself as an extreme that is *for itself*, and casts upon the middle term or minister the ownership and freedom of the decision, and herewith the *guilt* of its activity. This mediator, being in immediate relation with the unchangeable essence, ministers with its *advice* on what is right. The

action, since it is compliance with an alien resolution, ceases, as regards the doing or the *willing*, to be its own. But there is still left to the unessential consciousness the *objective* aspect, viz. the *fruit* of its labour, and the *enjoyment*. This too it likewise casts off from itself, and just as it renounces its will, so it renounces the *actuality* it received in work and in enjoyment; it renounces them *partly* as the attained truth of its self-conscious *independence*—when it sets about representing and speaking something entirely alien, something that makes no sense to it;—it renounces them partly as *external property*,—when it forgoes part of the possession it has acquired through work; partly it renounces the *enjoyment* it has had—when, in fasting and mortifications, it once more completely denies itself enjoyment as well.¹

§229. Through these moments of relinquishment, of its own decision, then of property and enjoyment, and finally through the positive moment of engaging in an enterprise it does not understand, it deprives itself in truth and completely of the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, of actuality as its *Being-for-itself*; it has the certainty of having in truth estranged its *I*, and of having made its immediate self-consciousness into a *thing*, into an objective Being.—Only through this *actual* sacrifice could it confirm the self-renunciation; for only in the sacrifice does the *deception* vanish which lies in the *inner* recognition by giving thanks through heart, sentiment, and tongue, a recognition which indeed discards from itself all power of Being-for-itself and ascribes it to a gift from above, but which in this very discarding retains its *outer* stake in the possession it does not give up, and its *inner* stake in the consciousness of the decision it has itself made, and in the consciousness of its content determined by itself, which it has not exchanged for an alien content, filling it up senselessly.¹

§230. But in the sacrifice actually carried out, just as consciousness has sublated the *activity* as its own, so *in itself* its *unhappiness* has also withdrawn from it. That this withdrawal has happened *in itself* is however the doing of the other extreme of the syllogism, of the essence *being-in-itself*. But the sacrifice of the unessential extreme was at the same time not a one-sided doing, but contained within itself the doing of the other. For the surrender of its own will is negative only on one side, by *its concept* or *in itself*, but it is at the same time positive, viz. the positing of will as the will of an *other*, and specifically of the will, not as a singular will, but as universal will. For this consciousness this positive significance of the negatively posited singular will is the will of the other extreme, a will which, just because it is an other for consciousness, comes about for it not through itself, but through the third party, the mediator as counsellor. Hence, *for consciousness*, its will does indeed become universal will that is *in itself*, but *to itself consciousness* is *not* this *in-itself*; for it, the surrender of its own will, as *singular*, is not in its concept the positive aspect of universal will. Similarly, its surrender of possession and enjoyment has only the same negative significance, and the universal that thereby comes about for it, is not for it its *own doing*. This *unity* of the objective and Being-for-itself, which is in the *concept* of activity, and which therefore becomes the essence and *object* for consciousness—just as this unity is not the concept of its activity, so too it is not given to consciousness that the unity comes about *for it* as an object, immediately and through itself; instead, it lets the mediating minister express this certainty, itself still broken, the certainty that only *in itself* is its unhappiness the reverse, viz. an activity that satisfies itself in

the activity or blissful enjoyment, that its impoverished activity likewise is *in itself* the reverse, viz. an absolute activity; that by the concept activity is only activity at all as activity of the singular. But *for consciousness* itself activity and its actual activity remain an impoverished activity, and its enjoyment remains pain, and the sublation of them in its positive significance remains a *beyond*. But in this object, in which its doing and Being, as the doing and Being of this *singular* consciousness, are to it Being and doing *in themselves*, there has come about for consciousness the representation of *reason*, of the certainty of consciousness that, in its singularity, it is absolutely *in itself*, or all reality.¹

C. (AA.) Reason

V. Certainty and Truth of Reason

¶231. In the thought it has grasped, that the *singular* consciousness is *in itself* absolute essence, consciousness returns into itself. For the unhappy consciousness the *Being-in-itself* is the *beyond* of itself. But its movement has accomplished this in it: it has posited singularity in its complete development, or it has posited the singularity that is *actual consciousness*, as the *negative* of itself, namely, as the *objective* extreme, or it has wrested its Being-for-itself away from itself and has turned it into Being; in this movement its *unity* with this universal has also come to be for consciousness, a unity which, for us, no longer falls outside it, since the sublated singular is the universal; and which, since consciousness maintains itself in this its negativity, is, in consciousness as such, its essence. Its truth is that which appears in the syllogism, whose extremes were held absolutely asunder when they entered the scene, as the middle term which proclaims to the unchangeable consciousness that the singular has renounced itself, and, to the singular, that the unchangeable is for it no longer an extreme, but is reconciled with it. This middle term is the unity immediately aware of, and relating, both, and is the consciousness of their unity, which it proclaims to consciousness and thereby *to itself*; it is the certainty of being all truth.¹

¶232. Now that self-consciousness is reason, its hitherto negative relationship to otherness turns round into a positive relationship. So far it has been concerned only with its independence and freedom, with a view to saving and maintaining itself for itself at the expense of the *world* or of its own actuality, both of which appeared to it as the negative of its essence. But as reason, assured of itself, it has made its peace with them, and can endure them; for it is certain of itself as actuality, or certain that actuality is none other than itself; its thinking is itself immediately actuality; and thus it adopts towards actuality the attitude of idealism. Conceiving itself in this way, it is for it as if the world had now arisen for it for the first time; previously it does not understand the world; it desires it and works on it, withdraws from it into itself and demolishes it for itself, and demolishes its own self as consciousness—both as consciousness of the world as the essence and as consciousness of the nullity of the world. It is only after the grave of its truth has been lost, after the demolition of its actuality has itself been demolished, and after the singularity of consciousness is in itself absolute essence for it, it is then that it discovers the world as *its* new actual world, which in its permanence holds an interest for it which previously lay only in its disappearance; for the *subsistence* of the world becomes for consciousness its own *truth* and *presence*; it is certain of experiencing only itself therein.¹

¶233. Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality; this is how idealism expresses its *concept*. Just as the consciousness, that *comes on the scene* as

reason, *immediately* has that certainty in itself, so too *idealism* expresses that certainty *immediately*: I am I, in the sense that I, which is an object for me, is not merely an *empty* object in general, as in self-consciousness in general, nor is it merely an object that withdraws from the others, leaving them in force *alongside* it, as in the case of free self-consciousness; instead, it is an object with the consciousness of the *non-Being* of any other object, it is the sole object, all reality and all presence. But self-consciousness is all reality not merely *for itself* but also *in itself*, only through *becoming* this reality, or rather through *demonstrating* itself to be such. It demonstrates itself thus on *the path* on which first, in the dialectical movement of meaning, perceiving and the understanding, otherness vanishes as *in itself*, and then, in the movement through the independence of consciousness in lordship and bondage, through the thought of freedom, the sceptical liberation and the combat of absolute liberation of the consciousness divided within itself, otherness, insofar as it is only *for consciousness*, vanishes *for consciousness itself*. Two sides entered the scene, one after the other: one in which the essence or the true had for consciousness the determinacy of *Being*, the other in which it had the determinacy of being only *for consciousness*. But the two reduced themselves to one truth, that what *is*, or the *in-itself*, only is insofar as it is *for consciousness*, and what is *for consciousness* is also *in itself*. The consciousness which is this truth has this path behind it and has forgotten it, when it comes on the scene *immediately* as reason, or this reason which comes immediately on the scene enters the scene only as the *certainty* of that truth. Thus reason merely *affirms* that it is all reality, but does not itself comprehend this; for that forgotten path is the comprehension of this immediately expressed assertion. And equally, to anyone who has not traversed that path this assertion is incomprehensible when he hears it in this pure form,—for in a concrete shape he does indeed make the assertion himself.¹

¶234. Idealism, which does not present that path but begins with this assertion, is therefore also pure *affirmation*, which does not comprehend its own self, nor can it make itself comprehensible to others. It expresses an *immediate certainty* which is confronted by other immediate certainties, which have, however, got lost on that path. With equal right, therefore, the *affirmations* of these other *certainties*, too, take their place *alongside* the *affirmation* of that certainty. Reason appeals to the *self-consciousness* of each and every consciousness: *I am I*, my object and essence is I; and no consciousness will deny reason this truth. But in basing the truth on this appeal, reason sanctions the truth of the other certainty, namely: *there is for me an other*; an other than *I* is object and essence for me, or, in that *I* am object and essence to myself, I am so only by drawing back from the other in general, and taking my place as an actuality *alongside* it.—Only when reason comes on the scene as a *reflection* from this opposite certainty does its assertion about itself enter the scene not merely as certainty and affirmation, but as *truth*; and not *alongside* other truths but as the *sole* truth. Its *immediate entry on the scene* is the abstraction of its *sheer presence*, whose *essence* and *Being-in-itself* is absolute concept, i.e. the *movement of its having-come-about*.—Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness or its object in diverse ways, according to the precise stage it occupies of the world-spirit becoming conscious of itself. How it *immediately* finds and determines itself and its object at any time, or how it is *for itself*, depends on what it has already *become*, or what it already is *in itself*.¹

¶235. Reason is the certainty of being all *reality*. This in-itself or this *reality* is, however, still a universal pure and simple, the pure *abstraction* of reality. It is the first *positivity*, which self-consciousness is, *in its own self, for itself*, and I is therefore only the *pure essentiality* of beings or is the simple *category*. The *category*, which formerly had the significance of being the essentiality of beings, *indeterminately* of beings in general or of beings facing consciousness, is now *essentiality* or simple *unity* of beings only as actuality that thinks; or the category is this, that self-consciousness and Being are *the same* essence; *the same*, not in comparison, but in and for themselves. It is only the one-sided, bad idealism that lets this unity again plant itself on one side as consciousness, and confronting it an *in-itself*.—But now this category or *simple* unity of self-consciousness and Being has *difference* in itself; for its essence is just this: in *otherness*, or in absolute difference, to be immediately equal to itself. The difference therefore *is*, but is perfectly transparent, and as a difference that is at the same time no difference. It appears as a *plurality* of categories. Since idealism proclaims *the simple unity* of self-consciousness to be all reality, and immediately makes it the essence without having comprehended it as absolutely negative essence—only this has negation, determinacy, or difference within itself—this second point, that in the category there are *differences* or *species*, is even more incomprehensible than the first. This affirmation in general, as well as the affirmation of a *determinate number* of species of categories, is a new affirmation, which, however, itself implies that we no longer have to accept it as affirmation. For since *the difference* originates in the pure I, in the pure understanding itself, it is thereby posited that the *immediacy*, the *affirming* and *finding*, are here abandoned and *comprehension* begins. But to take the plurality of categories again in some way or other as a find, e.g., from judgements, and accepting them like that, should in fact be regarded as an outrage on science; where else should the understanding be able to show a necessity, if it is unable to do so in its own self, which is pure necessity?¹

¶236. Now because the pure essentiality of things, like their difference, belongs thus to reason, we can, strictly speaking, no longer talk of *things* at all, i.e. of something which would be for consciousness merely the negative of itself. For to say that the many categories are *species* of the pure category means that *this latter* is still their *genus* or *essence*, not opposed to them. But they are already something ambiguous, which at the same time has in itself otherness in its *plurality* in *contrast* to the pure category. In fact, they contradict the pure category by this plurality, and the pure unity must sublimate them in itself, thereby constituting itself as *negative unity* of the differences. But, as *negative* unity, it excludes from itself the *differences* as such, as well as that first *immediate* pure unity as such, and is *singularity*; a new category which is consciousness as excluding, i.e. consciousness for which there is *an other*. Singularity is the transition of the category from its concept to an *external* reality, the pure *schema* which is both consciousness and, since it is singularity and exclusive unit, the pointing to an other. But this other of this category is merely the *other first categories*, viz. *pure essentiality* and *pure difference*; and in this category, i.e. just in the positedness of the other, or in this other itself, consciousness is equally itself. Each of these diverse moments refers to another moment; but at the same time in them we do not get to any otherness. The pure category refers to the *species*, which pass over into the negative category or singularity; this latter, however, refers back to them; it is

itself pure consciousness which in each species remains to itself this clear unity with itself, but a unity which equally is referred to an other, which, when it is, has vanished, and when it has vanished, also regenerates itself.¹

¶237. Here we see pure consciousness posited in a twofold manner: once as the restless *movement to and fro* that runs through all its moments, having in them before its eyes an otherness that sublates itself in the act of grasping it; and again, rather as the *tranquil unity* certain of its own truth. For this unity that movement is the *other*, while for this movement that tranquil unity is the other; and consciousness and object alternate in these reciprocal determinations. Thus at one time consciousness is to itself a search moving hither and thither, and its object is the *pure in-itself* and essence; at another time, it is to itself the simple category, and the object is the movement of the differences. But consciousness as essence is this whole course itself, of passing out of itself as simple category into singularity and the object, and of intuiting this course in the object, sublating it as a distinct object, *appropriating* it, and proclaiming itself as this certainty of being all reality, of being both itself and its object.¹

¶238. Its first proclamation is only this abstract empty word that everything is *its own*. For the certainty of being all reality is at first only the pure category. This reason which first recognizes itself in the object finds expression in the empty idealism which grasps reason only as it is initially, and fancies that by indicating this pure *Mine* of consciousness in all Being,¹ and by declaring things to be sensations or representations, it has indicated this pure *Mine* as completed reality. It therefore must at the same time be absolute empiricism, since for the *filling* of the empty *Mine*, i.e. for the difference and all development and shaping of the difference, its reason requires an alien impulse, in which the *variety* of sensation or representation is first to be found. This idealism therefore becomes the same kind of self-contradictory equivocation as scepticism, except that, while scepticism expresses itself negatively, this idealism expresses itself positively; but it fails as much as scepticism to bring together its contradictory thoughts, the thought of pure consciousness as all reality, and likewise the thought of the alien impulse or of sensation and representation as an equal reality; instead it rushes to and fro from one to the other, and has ended up by falling into bad infinity, namely sensory infinity. Since reason is all reality in the sense of the abstract *Mine*, and the *other* is to it an *indifferent alien*, what is here posited is precisely the same knowing of an other by reason, which we met with as *meaning*, *perceiving*, and as the *understanding* that apprehends what is meant and what is perceived. Such a knowing is at the same time asserted by the concept of this idealism itself not to be a true knowing, for only the unity of apperception is the truth of knowing. The pure reason of this idealism, in order to reach this *other* which is *essential* to it, i.e. which is thus the *in-itself*, but which it does not have within it, is therefore thrown back by its own self onto that knowing which is not a knowing of the true; in this way, it condemns itself of its own knowledge and volition to an untrue knowing, and cannot get away from meaning and perceiving, which for it have no truth. It is involved in immediate contradiction, affirming as the essence a duet of utter opposites, the *unity of apperception* and equally the *thing*, which, whether it is called *alien impulse*, or *empirical* essence, or *sensibility*, or the *thing in itself*, remains in its concept the same alien adjunct to that unity.²

¶239. This idealism is involved in this contradiction because it affirms the *abstract concept* of reason as the true; consequently, reality immediately arises for it equally as the sort of reality that is not the reality of reason, while at the same time reason is supposed to be all reality; reason remains a restless searching, which in its very searching declares the satisfaction of finding to be utterly impossible.—Actual reason, however, is not so inconsistent; on the contrary, at first only the *certainty* of being all reality, it is conscious in this concept, as *certainty*, as *I*, of not yet being reality in truth, and is impelled to raise its certainty to truth and to fill up the *empty Mine*.¹

A. Observing reason

¶240. In fact, we now see this consciousness, for which *Being* has the significance of *its own*,¹ revert to meaning and perceiving, though not to certainty of a mere *other*, but with the certainty of being this other itself. Previously, its perception and *experience* of various sides of the thing just *happened* to consciousness, while here consciousness arranges the observations and the experience itself. Meaning and perceiving, which previously were sublated for us, are now sublated by and for consciousness itself. Reason sets out to *know* the truth; to find as concept that which, for meaning and perceiving, is a thing, i.e. to have in thinghood the consciousness only of itself. Reason now has, therefore, a universal *interest* in the world, because it is the certainty of having presence in the world, or that the presence is rational. It seeks its other, knowing that therein it possesses nothing other than itself: it seeks only its own infinitude.²

¶241. At first only glimpsing itself in actuality, or knowing actuality only as *its own* in general, with a sense of this it advances to take universal possession of its assured property, and plants the sign of its sovereignty on every height and in every depth. But this superficial Mine is not its ultimate interest; the joy of this universal seizure of possession still finds in its property the alien other which abstract reason does not have within itself. Reason glimpses itself as a deeper essence than the pure *I is*, and must demand that difference, *manifold Being*, become the *I's* very own, that the *I* intuit itself as actuality and find itself present as shape and thing. But if reason excavates all the entrails of things and opens every vein in them so that it may gush forth to meet itself, it will not attain this joy; it must have completed itself within itself before it can experience the completion of itself.¹

¶242. Consciousness *observes*; i.e. reason wants to find and to have itself as an object that is, as an *actual, sensorily-present* mode. The consciousness of this observing indeed opines and says that it wants to undergo experience, *not of itself* but, on the contrary, *of the essence of things as things*. That this *consciousness* opines and says this, is implied in the fact that it *is* reason; but reason as such is not as yet object for this consciousness. If it knew that *reason* is equally the essence of things and of consciousness itself, and that only in consciousness can reason be present in its own proper shape, it would descend into its own depths, and seek reason there rather than in things. If it had found it within, reason would be directed from there outside to actuality again, in order to intuit therein its sensory expression, but at once to take it essentially as *concept*. Reason, as it *immediately* arises as consciousness's certainty of being all reality, takes its reality in the sense of the *immediacy of Being*, and similarly

it takes the unity of the I with this objective essence in the sense of an *immediate unity*, a unity in which reason has not yet separated and reunited again the moments of Being and the I, or a unity which reason has not yet cognized. Reason, therefore, as observing consciousness, approaches things in the opinion that it takes them in truth as sensory things opposed to the I; but its actual doing contradicts this opinion, for it *cognizes* things, it transforms their sensuality into *concepts*, i.e. into just a Being which is at the same time I, consequently transforms thinking into a thinking that is, or Being into a thought Being, and it asserts, in fact, that it is only as concepts that things have truth. For observing consciousness, all that emerges from this is what *the things* are, but for us, what *consciousness itself* is; but the result of its movement will be that consciousness will become for itself what it is in itself.¹

¶243. We have to consider *the doing* of observing reason in the moments of its movement, how it apprehends nature and spirit, and, finally, the relation of both, as sensory Being, and how it seeks itself as actuality that is.¹

A. OBSERVATION OF NATURE

¶244. When thoughtless consciousness affirms observation and experience as the source of truth, its words may well sound as if only tasting, smelling, feeling, hearing, and seeing were involved; in the zeal with which it recommends tasting, smelling, etc., it forgets to say that in fact it has also just as essentially already determined the object of its sensation, and this determination is worth at least as much to consciousness as that sensation. It will also readily admit that in general its concern here is not solely with perceiving, and will not let, e.g., the perception that this penknife lies alongside this snuff-box, pass for an observation. What is perceived should at least have the significance of a *universal*, not of a *sensory This*.¹

¶245. This universal is thus at first only what *remains-equal-to-itself*; its movement is only the uniform recurrence of the same doing. Consciousness, which to that extent finds in the object only *universality* or the *abstract Mine*, must take upon itself the movement proper to the object and, since it is not yet the understanding of the object, must at least be the remembrance of it, which expresses in a universal way what in actuality is present only in a singular way. This superficial elevation out of singularity, and the equally superficial form of universality into which the sensory is merely taken up, without having become in its own self a universal, the *describing* of things, does not yet have the movement in the object itself; the movement is really only in the describing. The object, as soon as it is described, has therefore lost its interest; if the one has been described, then another must be dealt with, and continually sought, in order that the describing does not give out. If it is no longer so easy to find new *whole* things, then we must go back to those already found, divide them further, analyse them, and bring to light fresh sides of thinghood in them. This restless, insatiable instinct can never run out of material; to discover a distinctive new genus, or even a new planet which, although it is an individual, possesses the nature of a universal, can be the lot of only a lucky few. But the limit of what, like the elephant, the oak, gold, is *distinctive*, of what is *genus* and *species*, passes through many stages into the infinite *particularization* of the chaos of animals and plants, of mountain-types, or the metals, earths, etc., that only force and skill can bring to view. In this realm of the indeterminacy of the universal, where particularization

approximates again to *singularization*, and again, here and there, descends to it entirely, an inexhaustible fund is opened up for observation and description. But here, where an immense field opens up for that instinct, at the limit of the universal, it can have found not an immeasurable wealth, but instead merely the boundary of nature and of its own doing: it can no longer know whether what seems to be in itself is not a contingency; what bears in itself the stamp of a confused or immature structure, feeble and barely developing out of rudimentary indeterminacy, can lay no claim even to be only described.¹

¶246. If this searching and describing seems to be concerned only with things, we see that in fact it does not continue indefinitely in *sensory perceiving*; on the contrary, that by which things are *cognized* is more important to it than the remaining complex of sensory properties which, of course, the thing itself cannot dispense with, but which consciousness does without. Through this distinction between the *essential* and the *unessential*, the concept rises up out of sensory dispersion, and cognition thereby declares that it is just as essentially concerned *with its own self* as with things. With this double essentiality cognition lapses into vacillation as to whether what is essential and necessary for *cognition* is so also in respect of *things*. On the one hand, the *differentiae* are supposed to serve only cognition, enabling it to distinguish things from one another; but, on the other hand, it is not the unessential side of things that is supposed to be cognized, but that side whereby the things themselves *break loose* from the universal continuity of Being in general, *separate* themselves from the other, and are *for themselves*. Differentiae are supposed, not merely to have an essential relation to cognition, but also the essential determinacies of things, and the artificial system is supposed to conform to the system of nature itself and to express only this. This is necessary from the concept of reason, and the instinct of reason—for, in this observing, reason behaves only as instinct—has also in its systems achieved this unity, where, namely, its objects are themselves so constituted that they have in them an essentiality or a *Being-for-itself*, and are not merely accident of this *instant* or this *Here*. The distinguishing marks of animals, e.g., are taken from their claws and teeth; for in fact it is not only cognition that thereby *distinguishes* one animal from another; but the animal itself *separates* itself thereby; by means of these weapons it maintains itself *for itself* and detached from the universal. The plant, by contrast, does not attain to *Being-for-itself*, but merely touches the limit of individuality; it is at this limit, therefore, where the plant displays the semblance of division into sexes, that the plant has been catalogued and differentiated.¹ What, however, stands on a lower level cannot itself any longer distinguish itself from another, but gets lost when it enters into opposition. *Being at rest* and *Being in relationship* come into conflict with each other, the thing in the latter is something other than it is according to the former, whereas the individual consists in maintaining itself in relationship to something else.² What, however, is unable to do this and *chemically* becomes something other than it is *empirically*, confuses cognition and embroils it in the same conflict as to whether it ought to keep to the one side or the other, since the thing itself is nothing stable³ and in it the two sides fall apart.

¶247. In such systems of universal stability, the stability therefore has the significance of being the stability both of cognition and of the things themselves. But this expansion of *the stable determinacies*, each of which calmly describes the course of

its progression and gets room to go its own way, quite as much passes over essentially into its contrary, into the confusion of these determinacies; for the differentia, the universal determinacy, is the unity of opposites, of the determinate and the universal in itself; it must therefore split up into this opposition. If, now, on one side, the determinacy gains the ascendancy over the universal in which it has its essence, then on the other side again, the universal in turn establishes its own domination over the determinacy, pushes the determinacy to its limit and there mixes up its distinctions and essentialities. Observation, which kept them properly apart and believed that in them it had something firm, sees principles encroaching on one another, transitions and confusions forming, and what it at first took to be just separate, it sees in this combined, and what it reckoned to be together, it sees separated; and so this adherence to tranquil, stable Being inevitably sees itself tormented just in its most universal determinations—e.g. what are the essential differentiae of the animal, the plant—by instances which rob it of every determination, render mute the universality to which it had risen, and reduce it to an observation and description devoid of thought.¹

¶248. This observing which confines itself to the simple, or curbs the sensory dispersion by the universal, thus finds in its object the *confusion of its principle*, because the determinate must, by its nature, lose itself in its contrary; reason must therefore advance from the inert determinacy which had the semblance of permanence, to observing determinacy as it is in truth, viz. as *relating itself to its contrary*. What are called essential differentiae are *passive* determinacies which, when expressed and apprehended as *simple*, do not present what constitutes their nature, which is to be vanishing *moments* of the movement which withdraws back into itself. Since the reason-instinct now reaches the point of looking for the determinacy in accordance with its nature, which is essentially to be not for itself but to pass over into the opposite, it searches for the *law* and for the *concept* of the law; indeed, it searches for them equally as actuality that *is*, but this actuality will in fact vanish for it, and the sides of the law become pure moments or abstractions, so that the law comes to light in the nature of the concept, which has eliminated in itself the indifferent subsistence of sensory actuality.¹

¶249. To the observing consciousness, the *truth of the law* is in *experience*, in the same way that *sensory Being* is *for consciousness*; not in and for itself. But if the law does not have its truth in the concept, then it is a contingency, not a necessity, or not in fact a law. But the fact that the law is essentially as concept, not only does not conflict with its presence for observation, but is rather the very reason why it has necessary *Being-there* and is for observation. The universal, in the *sense of the universality of reason*, is also universal in the sense involved in the concept, viz. that the universal is *for consciousness*, that it presents itself as what is present and actual, or that the concept presents itself in the mode of thinghood and sensory Being;—but without thereby losing its nature and lapsing into inert subsistence or indifferent succession. What is universally valid is also universally effective; what *ought* to be, in fact also *is*, and what only *ought* to be without *being* so, has no truth. The instinct of reason, for its part, rightly holds firmly to this, and refuses to be led astray by figments of thought which only *ought* to be and, as *Oughts*, are supposed to have truth, although they are nowhere met with in experience,—refuses to be led astray

by hypotheses any more than by all the other invisibilities of a perennial Ought; for reason is just this certainty of having reality, and what is not for consciousness as a self-essence, i.e. what does not appear, is for consciousness nothing at all.¹

¶250. That the truth of law is essentially *reality*, no doubt again becomes, for this consciousness which sticks to observation, an *opposition* to the concept and to the universal in itself; or a thing such as its law is, is to it not an essence of reason; it opines that it obtains in it something *alien*. But it refutes its own opinion by its deed, in which it does not itself take its universality in the sense that *all singular* sensory things would have to have shown to it the appearance of the law, in order to be able to assert the truth of the law. That stones fall when raised above the Earth and let go, for this it does not at all require this experiment to be made with every stone; it does perhaps say that it must have been conducted with at least a great number, then from this we can *by analogy* draw an inference about the rest with the greatest probability or with perfect right. But analogy not only does not give a perfect right, but on account of its nature refutes itself so often that the inference to be drawn from analogy itself is rather that analogy does not permit any inference to be made. The *probability*, which the result of analogy would come down to, loses, in face of *truth*, every distinction of lesser and greater probability; let it be as great as it likes, it is nothing as against truth. But the instinct of reason does in fact accept such laws as *truth*, and it is only in relation to their necessity, which it does not recognize, that it resorts to this distinction, and reduces the truth of the Thing itself to probability, in order to indicate the imperfect way in which the truth is present for the consciousness which has not yet attained to insight into the pure concept; for universality is present only as *simple immediate* universality. But, at the same time, on account of this universality, the law has truth for consciousness; that the stone falls, is true for consciousness because for it the stone is *heavy*, that is, because in heaviness the stone has *in and for itself* the essential relation to the Earth which expresses itself as fall. Consciousness thus has in experience the *Being* of the law, but it likewise has the law as *concept*; and it is only *because of both circumstances* together that the law is true for consciousness; it is valid as law because it presents itself in appearance, and is also in its own self concept.¹

¶251. Because the law is at the same time *in itself concept*, the reason-instinct of this consciousness itself proceeds, necessarily, but without knowing that this is its aim, to *purify* the law and its moments into the *concept*. It sets up experiments concerning the law. On its first appearance the law presents itself impurely, enveloped in singular, sensory Being, the concept constituting its nature immersed in empirical material. In its experiments the reason-instinct sets out to find out what happens in such and such circumstances. By this the law seems only to be all the more plunged in sensory Being; but really this sensory Being gets lost in the process. The inner significance of this investigation is to find *pure conditions* of the law; and this means nothing else (even if the consciousness expressing itself in this way should opine that it means something different by it) than to raise the law entirely into the shape of the concept, and to *eliminate* all subjugation of its moments to *determinate Being*. For example, negative electricity, which at first announces itself, say, as *resin-electricity*, and positive electricity as *glass-electricity*, these, as a result of experiments, lose altogether this significance and become purely *positive* and *negative* electricity, neither of which is

any longer attached to a particular kind of thing; and we can no longer say that there are bodies which are positively electrical and others which are negatively electrical. In the same way, the relationship of acid and base and their reciprocal movement constitute a law in which these opposites appear as bodies. But these isolated things have no actuality; the power which forces them apart cannot prevent them from at once entering again into a process; for they are only this relation. They cannot, like a tooth or a claw, remain for themselves and as such be pointed out. That this is their essence, to pass over immediately into a neutral product, makes their *Being* into a Being which is in itself sublated or into a universal Being; and acid and base have truth only as *universals*. Therefore, just as glass and resin can just as well be positively as negatively electrical, so acid and base are not bound as properties to this or that *actuality*; each thing is only *relatively* acid or base; what seems to be a decided base or acid gets in the so-called *synsomatics* the opposite significance in relation to something else.—In this way the result of the experiments sublates the moments or energies as properties of determinate things, and frees the predicates from their subjects. These predicates, as they are in truth, are found only as universals; because of this independence they therefore get the name of *matters*, which are neither bodies nor properties, and certainly we are on our guard against calling oxygen, etc., positive and negative electricity, heat, etc., bodies.¹

¶252. The *matter*, by contrast, is not a thing that *is*, but Being as *universal*, or in the mode of the concept. Reason, which is still instinct, makes this correct distinction, without being conscious that just by testing the law in all sensory Being, it thereby sublates the merely sensory Being of the law, and that when it conceives the moments of the law as *matters*, their essentiality has become for the law a universal, and in this expression is marked as an unsensory sensory, as an incorporeal and yet objective Being.¹

¶253. We have now to see what turn its result takes for the reason-instinct, and what new shape of observing emerges therewith. We see, as the truth of this experimenting consciousness, the pure law, which liberates itself from sensory Being, we see it as *concept* which, while present in sensory Being, moves in it independently and unrestrained, and, while immersed in it, is free of it and *simple* concept. This, which is in truth the *result* and *essence*, now emerges for this consciousness itself, but as *object*, and indeed, since for it the object is precisely not a *result* and is without relation to the preceding movement, as a *particular kind* of object, and the relationship of consciousness to it as another kind of observing.¹

¶254. Such an object, which has the process in it in the *simplicity* of the concept, is the *organic*. It is this absolute fluidity in which the determinacy, through which it would be only *for another*, is dissolved. If the inorganic thing has the determinacy for its essence, and for that reason constitutes the completeness of the moments of the concept only together with another thing, and therefore gets lost when it enters into the movement: then in the organic essence, by contrast, all determinacies through which it is open to an other are subjugated under the organic simple unity; none of them emerges as essential, as free to enter into relation with an other, and consequently the organic maintains itself in its relation itself.¹

¶255. The *sides of the law* which the reason-instinct here proceeds to observe are, as follows from this determination, initially *organic* nature and *inorganic* nature in their relation to one another. The latter is, for organic nature, just the freedom—a

freedom opposed to the *simple concept* of organic nature—of the *detached* determinacies in which the individual nature is *at the same time dissolved*, and from the continuity of which it *at the same time* breaks away and is *for itself*. Air, water, earth, zones, and climate are such universal elements, which constitute the indeterminate simple essence of individualities, and in which these individualities are at the same time reflected into themselves. Neither the individuality, nor the elemental, is simply in and for itself; on the contrary, in the independent freedom in which for observation they enter the lists against each other, they behave at the same time as *essential relations*, but in such a way that the independence and mutual indifference of the two are the predominant feature, and only in part pass into abstraction. Here, then, the law is present as the relation of an element to the formation of the organic which, at one time, has the elemental Being over against it, and, at another time, exhibits it within its organic reflection. But *laws* of this kind—that animals belonging to the air have the constitution of birds, those belonging to water have the constitution of fish, that nordic animals have thick, hairy pelts, and so on—such laws at once display a poverty which does not correspond to the organic manifold variety. Besides the fact that organic freedom knows how to withdraw its forms from these determinations again, and everywhere necessarily presents exceptions to such laws, or rules as we might like to call them, this remains, even for the creatures which these laws do apply to, such a superficial determination that even the expression of the necessity of the laws cannot be other than superficial and does not get any further than *great influence*; and this does not tell us what strictly belongs to this influence and what does not. Such relations of the organic to the elemental cannot therefore in fact be called *laws*; for, first, as we mentioned, such a relation, in its content, does not exhaust the range of the organic in the least, but secondly, even the moments of the relation itself remain mutually indifferent and express no necessity. In the concept of acid lies the *concept* of base, just as negative electricity lies in the concept of positive electricity; but however often the thick, hairy pelt is *encountered* together with the north, or the structure of fish together with water, the structure of birds together with air, still the concept of thick hair does not lie in the concept of north, the concept of the structure of fish does not lie in the concept of sea, the concept of the structure of birds does not lie in the concept of air. Because of this freedom of the two sides with respect to each other, there are also land animals which have the essential characteristics of a bird, of the fish, and so on. The necessity, because it cannot be comprehended as an inner necessity of the essence, also ceases to have sensory Being—there, and can no longer be observed in actuality, but has *withdrawn* from it. Having thus no place in the real essence itself, the necessity is what is called a teleological relation, a relation which is *external* to the related terms, and therefore really the contrary of a law. It is the thought completely liberated from necessary nature, a thought which abandons this necessary nature and moves above it for itself.¹

¶256. If the above-mentioned relation of the organic to elemental nature does not express the essence of the organic, the organic is, by contrast, contained in the *purpose-concept*. It is true that, for this observing consciousness, this concept is not the organic's own *essence*, but falls outside it, and is then only that external *teleological* relation. Yet the organic, as it has been determined above, is, in fact, the real purpose itself; for since the organic *itself preserves itself* in the relation to another, it is

just that natural essence in which nature reflects itself into the concept, and the moments, separated from each other in necessity, of a cause and an effect, of an agent and a patient, are brought together into unity, so that here something emerges not merely as a *result* of necessity; but, because it has returned into itself, the last, or the result, is just as much the *first*, which begins the movement, and is to itself the *purpose*, which it actualizes. The organic does not produce something but *only preserves itself*, or what is produced, is as much already present as it is produced.¹

¶257. We must examine more closely this determination, as it is in itself and as it is for the reason-instinct, in order to see how the latter finds itself therein, but does not recognize itself in what it finds. The purpose-concept, then, to which observing reason ascends, is reason's *conscious concept*, but it is also no less present as an *actuality*, and is not just an *external relation* of this actuality, but its *essence*. This actuality, which is itself a purpose, is related purposively to another, which means: its relation is a contingent relation *with respect to what both immediately are*; immediately, both are independent and mutually indifferent. But the essence of their relation is something other than what they thus seem to be, and their doing has another sense than what it is *immediately* for sense-perception; the necessity is hidden in what happens, and shows itself *only in the end*, but in such a way that just this end shows that the necessity has also been what is first. The end, however, shows this priority of itself by the fact that through the alteration that the doing has undertaken, nothing else emerges than what was already there. Or if we start from what is first, then this in its end or in the result of its doing, returns only to itself; and through this very fact it demonstrates itself to be something that has *its own self* for its end, and thus, as first, has already returned to itself or is *in and for itself*. Therefore, what it arrives at through the movement of its doing is *itself*; and that it arrives only at itself, is its *self-feeling*. With this there is certainly present the distinction between *what it is* and *what it seeks*, but this is merely the *semblance of a distinction*, and it is thereby concept within its own self.¹

¶258. But this is just how *self-consciousness* is constituted: it distinguishes itself from itself in such a manner that at the same time no distinction emerges in it. Hence it finds in the observation of organic nature nothing else than this essence, it finds itself as a thing, *as a life*, but still makes a distinction between what it is itself and what it has found, a distinction, however, which is no distinction. Just as the instinct of the animal seeks and consumes food, but thereby brings forth nothing other than itself, so too the instinct of reason in its quest finds only reason itself. The animal finishes up with self-feeling. The reason-instinct, on the other hand, is at the same time self-consciousness; but because it is only instinct it is put on one side over against consciousness, and has its opposition in it. Its satisfaction is therefore divided by this opposition, it does indeed find itself, *viz.* the purpose, and likewise this purpose as *thing*. But first, for the instinct the purpose falls *outside the thing*, which presents itself as purpose. Secondly, this purpose as purpose is at the same time *objective*, and for the instinct therefore it does not fall within itself as consciousness either, but in another understanding.¹

¶259. Examined more closely, this determination lies just as much in the concept of the thing, that of being *in its own self a purpose*. That is to say, it preserves *itself*; i.e. it is at one and the same time its nature to conceal the necessity, and to exhibit it in

the form of a *contingent* relation; for its freedom or its *Being-for-itself* is just this, to treat its necessity as a matter of indifference; thus it presents itself as something whose concept falls outside its Being. Similarly, reason has the necessity of intuiting its own concept as falling outside it, hence as a *thing*, as something towards which it is *indifferent* and which is therefore reciprocally *indifferent* towards reason and towards its concept. As instinct, reason also remains inside this *Being* or *indifference*, and the thing that expresses the concept remains for it something other than this concept, and the concept other than the thing. Thus, for reason, the organic thing is in its own self a *purpose* only in the sense that the necessity which presents itself as hidden in the doing of the thing, since the doer behaves in it as an indifferent being-for-itself, falls outside the organic itself.—Since, however, the organic as a purpose in its own self cannot behave in any other way than as such a thing, it is apparent and sensorily present that it is a purpose in its own self, and it is thus observed. The organic shows itself to be something that *preserves* itself and *returns* and *has returned* into itself. But this observing consciousness does not recognize in this Being the purpose-concept, or the fact that the purpose-concept does not exist somewhere else in an understanding, but exists right here, and is as a thing. It draws a distinction between the purpose-concept, on the one hand, and Being-for-itself and self-preservation, on the other, a distinction which is no distinction. That it is no distinction is not for this consciousness, but what is for it is a doing that appears contingent and indifferent with regard to what comes about through it; and the unity which nevertheless links the two together,—that doing and this purpose, falls asunder for this consciousness.¹

¶260. On this view, what belongs to the organic itself is the doing lying in the middle between its first and last term, insofar as this doing has in it the character of singularity. Insofar, however, as the doing has the character of universality and the doer is equated with what is produced through it, purposive doing as such would not belong to the organic. That singular doing, which is only a means, passes, in virtue of its singularity, under the determination of an altogether singular or contingent necessity. What the organic does for the preservation of itself as individual or itself as genus is therefore, as regards this immediate content, entirely lawless, for the universal and the concept fall outside it. Accordingly, its doing would be an empty functioning devoid of any content within itself; it would not even be the functioning of a machine, for this has a purpose, and its functioning therefore has a determinate content. Abandoned in this way by the universal, it would be the activity merely of a being as a *being*, i.e. an activity that is not at the same time reflected into itself, as the activity of an acid or base is; a functioning which could not separate itself from its immediate Being-there, nor give up this Being-there (which gets lost in the relation to its opposite), yet still preserve itself. But the Being whose functioning is the functioning considered here is posited as a thing that *preserves itself* in its relation to its opposite; *the activity* as such is nothing but the pure essenceless form of its Being-for-itself, and its substance, which is not merely determinate Being but the universal, its *purpose*, does not fall outside it; it is an activity which within itself returns into itself, and is not turned back into itself by anything alien.¹

¶261. However, this unity of universality and the activity is not for this *observing consciousness*, because that unity is essentially the inner movement of the organic and can only be conceived as concept; but observation seeks the moments in the

form of *Being* and *permanence*; and because it is essential to the organic whole that it does not have the moments in it in this form and does not let them be found in it, consciousness converts the opposition into an opposition that conforms to its own point of view.¹

¶262. In this way, the organic essence arises for observing consciousness as a relation of two *fixed* moments that simply *are*—an opposition whose two sides thus seem, on the one hand, to be given to it in observation, and on the other hand, as regards their content, express the opposition of the organic *purpose-concept* and of *actuality*; but because the concept as such is effaced therein, they express them in an obscure and superficial way, in which thought has sunk to the level of representation. Thus we see that the concept is roughly what is meant by the *inner*, and actuality by the *outer*; and their relation generates the law *that the outer is the expression of the inner*.¹

¶263. When we consider more closely this inner with its opposite and their relation to each other, it emerges that, in the first place, the sides of the law no longer function as in the case of previous laws, in which they appeared as independent *things*, each as a particular body; nor, in the second place, in such way that the universal is supposed to have its existence somewhere else, *outside beings*. On the contrary, the organic essence is made the foundation, entirely unseparated, as content of the inner and outer, and is the same for both; the opposition is thus still only a purely formal one, whose real sides have the same in-itself for their essence, but at the same time, since inner and outer are also an opposed reality and a diverse *Being* for observation, they each seem to observation to have a peculiar content of their own. However, this peculiar content, since it is the same substance or organic unity, can in fact only be a diverse form of that substance, of that unity; and this is implied by the observing consciousness when it says that the outer is merely the *expression* of the inner.—These are the same determinations of the relationship, viz. the indifferent independence of the diverse terms and their unity in that independence, a unity in which they vanish, that we have seen in the purpose-concept.¹

¶264. We have now to see what *shape* the inner and outer have in their *Being*. The inner as such must have an outer *Being* and a shape, just as much as the outer as such; for it is an object, or is itself posited as being and as present for observation.¹

¶265. The organic substance as *inner* is the *simple* soul, the pure *purpose-concept* or the *universal*, which in its partition equally remains a universal fluidity, and therefore appears in its *Being* as the *doing* or the *movement* of the *vanishing* actuality; whereas the *outer*, opposed to that inner that simply is, consists in the *quiescent Being* of the organic. The law, as the relation of that inner to this outer, thus expresses its content, once in the presentation of universal *moments* or *simple essentialities*, and again in the presentation of the actualized essentiality or the *shape*. Those first simple organic *properties*, if we may call them that, are *sensibility*, *irritability*, and *reproduction*. These properties, at least the first two, seem indeed to relate not to the organism in general, but only to the animal organism. In fact the vegetable organism also expresses only the simple concept of the organism, which *does not develop* its moments; consequently, in regard to those moments, so far as they are supposed to be for observation, we must confine ourselves to the organism which presents their developed *Being*-there.¹

¶266. Now, as regards these moments themselves, they immediately emerge from the concept of the end-in-itself. For *sensibility* expresses in general the simple concept of organic reflection into itself, or the universal fluidity of this concept, while *irritability* expresses organic elasticity, the capacity, in reflection, at the same time to behave *reactively*, and the actualization opposed to the initial quiescent *Being-within-itself*, an actualization in which that abstract Being-for-itself is a Being *for another*. *Reproduction*, however, is the action of this *whole* organism reflected into itself, its activity as purpose in itself, or as *genus*, in which the individual thus repels itself from itself, and reproduces, by engendering them, either its organic parts or the whole individual. Reproduction, taken in the meaning of *self-preservation in general*, expresses the formal concept of the organic, or sensibility; but it is, strictly speaking, the real organic concept, or the *whole*, which returns into itself, either as the individual by producing the singular parts of itself, or, as genus, by producing individuals.¹

¶267. The *other meaning* of these organic elements, viz. as the *outer*, is the mode of their *shape*, according to which they are present as *actual* parts, but at the same time as *universal* parts or organic *systems*; sensibility, say, as a nervous system, irritability as a muscular system, reproduction as viscera for the preservation of the individual and the genus.¹

¶268. Laws peculiar to the organic accordingly concern a relationship of the organic moments in their twofold meaning, once as being a *part* of the organic *structure*, and again as being a *universal fluid* determinacy which pervades all those systems. Thus, in the expression of such a law, a determinate *sensibility*, e.g., as a moment of the *whole* organism, would have its expression in a determinately formed nervous system, or it would also be linked with a determinate *reproduction* of the organic parts of the individual or with the propagation of the whole individual, and so on.—Both sides of such a law can be *observed*. The *outer*, in accordance with its concept, is *Being for another*; sensibility, e.g., has its immediately actualized mode in the sensitive *system*; and, as a *universal property*, it is in its externalizations equally something objective. The side which is called the *inner* has its *own outer* side, which is distinct from what is called the *outer* in the whole.¹

¶269. Both sides of an organic law would thus no doubt be observable, but not the laws of their relation; and observation does not suffice, not because, *as observation*, it is too short-sighted and we ought not to proceed empirically but ought to start from the Idea; for such laws, if they were something real, would have in fact to be actually present and therefore observable; but rather because the thought of laws of this kind proves to have no truth.

¶270. There turned out to be a law in the relationship according to which the universal organic *property* in an organic *system* had made itself into a thing, and in this thing had a structured imprint, so that both were the same essence, present once as a universal moment, and again as a thing. But, in addition, the side of the inner is, for itself, also a relationship of several sides; and consequently there presents itself, to begin with, the thought of a law as a relation to one another of the universal organic activities or properties. Whether such a law is possible must be decided from the nature of such a property. However, such a property as a universal fluidity is, on the one hand, not something that is limited in the manner of a thing and sticks to the difference of a Being-there which is supposed to constitute its shape; sensibility

extends beyond the nervous system and permeates all other systems of the organism;—on the other hand, this property is a universal *moment*, which is essentially unseparated and inseparable from reaction or irritability, and from reproduction. For, as reflection into itself, it purely and simply has reaction in it. Mere reflectedness into itself is passivity or dead Being, not a sensibility; any more than action, which is the same as reaction, without reflectedness into itself, is irritability. It is precisely reflection in action or reaction, and action or reaction in reflection, whose unity constitutes the organic, a unity which is synonymous with organic reproduction. It follows from this that, in every mode of actuality, the same *quantity* of sensibility as of irritability must be present—since to begin with we are considering the relationship of sensibility and irritability to one another—and that an organic phenomenon can be apprehended and determined or, if you like, explained, just as much in terms of the one as of the other. What one person takes, say, for high sensibility, another may equally well consider as high irritability, and irritability of the same degree. If they are called *factors*, and this is not to be a meaningless word, they are thereby declared to be moments of the *concept*; thus the real object whose essence is constituted by this concept, has them in it in an equal way, and if the object is determined in the one way as very sensitive, it must also be declared, in the other way, to be equally irritable.¹

¶271. If sensibility and irritability are distinguished, as is necessary, then they are distinguished in accordance with the concept, and their opposition is *qualitative*. But when, apart from this true difference, they are also posited as beings and diverse for representation, such that they could be sides of the law, then they appear in *quantitative* diversity. Their peculiar qualitative opposition thus enters into *magnitude*, and there arise laws of the kind, for example, that sensibility and irritability stand in an inverse relationship of their magnitude, so that as the one grows the other decreases; or better, taking directly the magnitude itself as the content, that the size of something increases as its smallness decreases.—But if a determinate content is given to this law, say, that the size of a hole *increases*, the more what it is filled with *decreases*, then this inverse relationship can equally be changed into a direct relationship and expressed by saying that the size of the hole *increases* in direct relationship to the amount taken away;—a *tautological* proposition, whether expressed as a direct or an inverse relationship, a proposition which in its peculiar expression means simply this, that a quantity increases as this quantity increases. Just as the hole, and what fills it and is taken away, are qualitatively opposed, but what is real in them, and its determinate quantity, is one and the same in both, and similarly, increase of magnitude and decrease of smallness are the same, and their meaningless opposition amounts to a tautology: so are the organic moments equally inseparable in their reality and in their magnitude, which is the magnitude of that reality; one decreases only with the other and increases only with it, for one purely and simply has meaning only insofar as the other is present;—or rather, it is a matter of indifference whether an organic phenomenon is considered as irritability or as sensibility; this is so in general, and equally when its magnitude is under discussion. Similarly, it is a matter of indifference whether we speak of the increase of a hole as an augmentation of the hole as the emptiness, or as an augmentation of the filling removed. Or a number, e.g. *three*, remains equally large whether I take it positively or negatively, and if I enlarge the

three to four, then both the positive and the negative have become four,—just as the south pole of a magnet is exactly as strong as its north pole, or a positive electricity, or an acid, is exactly as strong as its negative, or the base on which it acts.—An organic *Being-there* is just such a magnitude as that three, or a magnet, etc.; it is that which is augmented or diminished, and when it is augmented *both* its factors are augmented, just as both poles of the magnet or both electricities increase if a magnet, etc., is strengthened.—That the two can be diverse just as little in *intension* and *extension*, that the one cannot decrease in extension but increase in intension, while the other, conversely, is supposed to diminish its intension but increase in extension, falls under the same concept of empty opposition; the real intension is purely and simply as great as the extension, and vice versa.¹

¶272. It is evident that what really happens in this law-giving is that at the outset irritability and sensibility constitute the determinate organic opposition; but this content gets lost and the opposition degenerates into the formal opposition of increase and decrease of quantity, or of diverse intension and extension,—an opposition which no longer has anything to do with the nature of sensibility and irritability, and no longer expresses it. Hence such an empty game of law-giving is not confined to the organic moments but can be played everywhere and with everything, and rests in general on unfamiliarity with the logical nature of these oppositions.¹

¶273. Finally, if instead of sensibility and irritability, reproduction is brought into relation with one or the other of them, then even the occasion for this law-giving falls away; for reproduction does not stand in opposition to those moments as they do to one another; and since this law-giving is based on such an opposition, here even the semblance of its taking place falls away.

¶274. The law-giving just considered contains the differences of the organism in their significance as moments of its *concept*, and strictly speaking should be an a priori law-giving. But the law-giving itself essentially involves this thought, that those differences have the significance of *present givens*, and that the merely observing consciousness has, in any case, to confine itself only to their *Being-there*. The organic actuality necessarily contains such an opposition as its concept expresses, and which can be determined as irritability and sensibility, as both of these in turn appear diverse from reproduction.—The *externality* in which the moments of the organic concept are here considered is the inner's *own immediate* externality, not the *outer* which is the outer of the whole, and is *shape*, and in relation with which the inner is to be considered later on.¹

¶275. If, however, the opposition of the moments is conceived as it is in *Being-there*, then sensibility, irritability, reproduction, sink *down* to the level of common *properties*, which are universalities equally indifferent towards one another as are determinate weight, colour, hardness, etc. In this sense it may well be observed that an organic entity is more sensitive or more irritable or of greater reproductive force than another,—just as we may observe that the sensibility, etc., of one is diverse in *kind* from that of another, that one reacts differently to determinate stimuli than another, as a horse reacts differently to oats than to hay, and a dog again differently to both, etc., differences as readily observable as that one body is harder than another, and so on.—But these sensory properties, hardness, colour, etc., as also the phenomena of receptivity to the stimulus of oats, of irritability in response to loads, or of the

number and kind of young produced, when they are related to one another and compared among themselves, essentially conflict with any conformity to a law. For the determinacy of their *sensory Being* just consists in their existing in complete mutual indifference, and displaying the freedom of nature released from the concept rather than the unity of a relation, displaying their irrational playing up and down on the scale of contingent magnitude between the moments of the concept, rather than these moments themselves.¹

¶276. The *other* side, according to which the simple moments of the organic concept are compared with the moments of the *structure*, would first furnish the authentic law expressing the true *outer* as a copy of the *inner*.—Now, because those simple moments are interpenetrating fluid properties, they do not have in the organic thing such a separate, real expression as what is called a singular system of the shape. Or if the abstract Idea of the organism is genuinely expressed in those three moments, merely because they are not anything static, but only moments of the concept and of movement, then the organism, on the other hand, as a structure, is not captured in three such determinate systems as anatomy explicates them. Insofar as such systems are supposed to be found in their actuality, and to be legitimated by being so found, it must also be borne in mind that anatomy presents us not only with three such systems but with a good many more.—Furthermore, apart from this, the *system* of sensibility in general must mean something quite different from what is called the *nervous system*, similarly the irritable *system* something different from the *muscular system*, the reproductive *system* something different from the *viscera* of reproduction. In the systems of *shape* as such, the organism is apprehended from the abstract side of dead existence; its moments, taken in this way, belong to anatomy and the cadaver, not to cognition and the living organism. As such parts, the moments have really ceased *to be*, for they cease to be processes. Since the *Being* of the organism is essentially universality or reflection into itself, the *Being* of its whole, like its moments, cannot consist in an anatomical system; on the contrary, the actual expression of the whole, and the externalization of its moments, are really present only as a movement which runs its course through the various parts of the structure, a movement in which what is carved out and fixed as a singular system essentially displays itself as a fluid moment; consequently, this actuality, as anatomy finds it, must not rank as their reality, but only that actuality as a process, in which alone even the anatomical parts make any sense.¹

¶277. It emerges, then, first that the moments of the organic *inner*, taken for themselves, are incapable of furnishing the sides of a law of Being, since in such a law the sides should be able to be asserted of a Being-there, to be distinguished from one another, and neither side able to be equally named in place of the other; and secondly, that, placed on one side, the moments do not have in the other side their realization in a fixed system; for such a system is no more something that would have any organic truth than it is the expression of those moments of the inner. The essence of the organic, since it is in itself the universal, rather consists in general in having its moments just as universal in actuality, i.e. as pervasive processes, but not in giving an image of the universal in an isolated thing.

¶278. In this way the *representation* of a law in the organic gets lost altogether. The law wants to grasp and express the opposition as inert sides, and in them the

determinacy which is their relation to one another. The *inner*, to which the appearing universality belongs, and the *outer*, to which belong the parts of the inert shape, were supposed to constitute the corresponding sides of the law, but as thus held apart, they lose their organic significance; and what underlies the representation of law is precisely this, that each of its two sides should have an indifferent subsistence that is for itself, the relation being shared between them as a twofold determinacy corresponding to that relation. Whereas each side of the organic is intrinsically just this: to be simple universality in which all determinations are dissolved, and to be the movement of this dissolution.¹

¶279. Insight into the difference between this law-giving and previous forms will make its nature perfectly clear.—If, namely, we look back to the movement of perceiving and of the understanding, which in perception reflects itself into itself and thereby determines its object, the understanding does not there have before itself in its object the *relation* of these abstract determinations, of the universal and singular, of the essential and the external: it is itself the transition, to which this transition does not become objective. Here, by contrast, the organic unity, i.e. just the relation of those opposites,—and this relation is pure transition—is itself the *object*. This transition in its simplicity is immediately *universality*; and since this universality enters into the difference whose relation the law is supposed to express, its moments, *as universal*, are objects of this consciousness, and the law runs: the *outer* is the expression of the *inner*. Here, the understanding has grasped *the thought* of the law itself, whereas previously it only looked for laws generally, and the moments of the laws occurred to it as a determinate content, not as the thoughts of the laws.—As regards the content, then, the laws obtained here ought not to be such as are merely a tranquil admission of differences that simply *are* into the form of universality, but laws which immediately have in these differences the unrest of the concept too, and consequently at the same time have the necessity of the relation between the sides. But just because the object, the organic unity, immediately unites the infinite sublation or the absolute negation of Being with inert Being, and the moments are essentially *pure transition*, no sides that simply *are* emerge such as are required for the law.¹

¶280. In order to obtain such sides, the understanding must keep to the other moment of the organic relationship, viz. to the *reflectedness* of organic Being—there into itself. But this Being is so completely reflected into itself that no determinacy with regard to another is left over for it. The *immediate* sensory Being is immediately one with the determinacy as such, and therefore expresses a qualitative difference in that Being, as e.g. blue in contrast to red, acid in contrast to alkaline, and so on. But the organic Being that has returned into itself is completely indifferent towards another, its Being—there is a simple universality and denies to observation any lasting sensory differences or, what is the same thing, displays its essential determinacy only as the *exchange* of determinacies that *are*. Consequently, the way in which difference expresses itself as being is just this, that it is an *indifferent* difference, i.e. difference as *magnitude*. In this, however, the concept is extinguished and necessity has vanished.—But the content and filling of this indifferent Being, the exchange of sensory determinations, gathered together into the simplicity of an organic determination, then expresses this at the same time, that the content really does not have

that determinacy—that of the immediate property—, and the qualitative element falls solely in the magnitude, as we saw above.¹

¶281. Although, then, the objective element, which is apprehended as organic determinacy, has the concept within itself and thereby distinguishes itself from what is for the understanding that, in apprehending the content of its laws, behaves as purely perceptual, nevertheless this apprehension relapses entirely into the principle and the manner of the merely perceiving understanding, for the reason that what is apprehended is utilized as moments of a *law*; for what is apprehended thereby acquires the mode of a fixed determinacy, the form of an immediate property or of an inert appearance, it is, furthermore, received into the determination of magnitude and the nature of the concept is suppressed.—The conversion of something merely perceived into something reflected into itself, of a merely sensory determinacy into an organic determinacy, thus loses its value again, and loses it by the fact that the understanding has not yet sublated law-giving.¹

¶282. To draw the comparison with regard to this conversion by some examples, perhaps something which for perception is an animal with strong muscles is determined as an animal organism of high irritability, or what for perception is a condition of great weakness is determined as a condition of high sensibility, or, if one prefers, as an abnormal affection and, indeed, an exponentiation of it (expressions which translate the sensory facts into Latin, and a bad Latin at that, instead of into the concept). That an animal has strong muscles may also be expressed by the understanding by saying that the animal possesses a great *muscular force*,—and similarly, great weakness as a slight *force*. Determination in terms of irritability has this advantage over determination as *force*, that the latter expresses indeterminate, but the former determinate, reflection into itself, for the *peculiar* force of the muscle is precisely irritability,—and it has the advantage over determination by strong muscles, that reflection into itself is at the same time contained in it, as it already is in force. Similarly, weakness or slight force, *organic passivity*, finds determinate expression in terms of *sensibility*. But when this sensibility is so taken for itself and fixed and, in addition, is bound up with *magnitude* and, as greater or lesser sensibility, is opposed to a greater or lesser irritability, each is wholly reduced into the sensory element and to the ordinary form of a property, and their relation is not the concept but, on the contrary, *magnitude*, into which the opposition now falls and becomes a thoughtless difference. Though the indeterminacy of the expressions *force* and *strength* and *weakness* was thereby removed, there now arises the equally empty and indeterminate dabbling in the oppositions of a higher and lower sensibility and irritability, in their ascent and descent relatively to one another. Just as strength and weakness are entirely sensory thoughtless determinations, greater or lesser sensibility and irritability are no less the sensory appearance thoughtlessly apprehended and likewise expressed. Those conceptless expressions have not been replaced by the concept; instead, strength and weakness have been filled with a determination which, taken solely for itself, is based on the concept and has it as its content, but loses completely this origin and character.—By the form of simplicity and immediacy in which this content is made into the side of a law, and by the magnitude that constitutes the element of the difference of such determinations, the essence, which is originally as concept and posited as concept,

retains the mode of sensory perceiving, and remains as far removed from cognition as it was in the determination by strength and weakness of force or by immediate sensory properties.¹

¶283. Now there still remains to be considered, *for itself alone*, what the *outer* of the organic is, and how in it the opposition of *its* inner and outer determines itself; just as at first the *inner* of the whole in relation to its *own* outer was considered.¹

¶284. The *outer*, considered for itself, is the *structure* in general, the system of life articulating itself in the *element* of Being, and at the same time essentially the Being of the organic essence *for an other*,—objective essence in its *Being-for-itself*.—This *other* appears initially as its outer inorganic nature. If these two are considered in relation to a law, the inorganic nature cannot, as we saw above, constitute the side of a law over against the organic essence, because the latter is at the same time purely and simply for itself, and has a universal and free relation to inorganic nature.¹

¶285. However, if the relationship of these two sides in the organic shape itself is determined more closely, then this shape is, on one side, turned against the inorganic nature, while on the other side it is *for itself* and reflected into itself. The *actual* organic essence is the middle term which unites the *Being-for-itself* of life, with the *outer* in general or *Being-in-itself*.—The extreme of *Being-for-itself* is, however, the inner as infinite One, which takes back into itself, out of their subsistence and connection with the outer, the moments of the shape itself; this extreme, devoid of content of its own, gives itself its content in the shape and appears in the shape as its process. In this extreme as simple negativity or *pure singularity*, the organic has its absolute freedom in virtue of which it is indifferent and secured with regard to Being for another, and with regard to the determinacy of the moments of the shape. This freedom is at the same time freedom of the moments themselves, it is their possibility of appearing, and Being apprehended, as *being-there*, and in this they are also liberated and indifferent with regard to one another, just as they are with regard to the outer, for the *simplicity* of this freedom is *Being* or their simple substance. This concept, or pure freedom, is one and the same life, however varied the play in which the shape or the Being for another may rove about; it is a matter of indifference to this stream of life what kind of mills it drives.—Now, in the first place it is to be noted that this concept is not to be conceived here as it was formerly, when we were considering the proper inner in its form of *process* or of the development of its moments, but in its form as *simple inner*, which constitutes the purely universal side in contrast to the actual living essence, or as the *element* in which the members of the shape, which simply are, have their *subsistence*; for it is this shape that we are considering here, and in it the essence of life is as the simplicity of subsistence. In the next place, the *Being for another*, or the determinacy of the actual structure, is taken up into this simple universality which is its essence, a determinacy which is equally simple, universal, and non-sensory, and can only be the determinacy which is expressed as *number*.—The number is the middle term of the shape which links the indeterminate life with the actual life, simple like the former and determinate like the latter. That which in the former, the *inner*, would be as number, the outer would have to express in its fashion as multiform actuality, manner of life, colour, etc., in general as the entire host of differences which develop in appearance.¹

¶286. If the two sides of the organic whole—the one being the *inner*, while the other is the *outer*, in such a way that each again has within its own self an inner and outer—are compared with respect to the inner which each side has, then the inner of the first side was the concept as the unrest of *abstraction*; the second, however, has for its inner a quiescent universality and in it also a quiescent determinacy, number. If, therefore, the first side, because the concept develops its moments in it, made a deceptive promise of laws on account of the semblance of necessity of the relation, the second directly renounces this, since number shows itself to be the determination of one side of its laws. For number is just that completely quiescent, lifeless, and indifferent determinacy in which all movement and relation is extinguished, and which has broken the bridge to the vitality of drives, the manner of life, and the rest of sensory Being-there.¹

¶287. But to consider the *shape* of the organic as such and the inner as an inner merely of the shape, is in fact no longer to consider the organic. For the two sides which were supposed to be related are posited in only an indifferent manner towards each other, and the reflection into itself, which constitutes the essence of the organic, is thereby sublated. What really happens here is that the attempted comparison of inner and outer is transferred to inorganic nature; here the infinite concept is only the *essence*, which is concealed inside, or falls outside in self-consciousness, and no longer, as in the organic, has its objective presence. This relation of inner and outer has thus still to be considered in its own proper sphere.¹

¶288. In the first place, that inner of shape, as the simple singularity of an inorganic thing, is the *specific gravity*. As simple Being, it can be observed just as well as the determinacy of number, of which alone it is capable, or, strictly speaking, it can be found by comparing observations and it seems in this way to give one side of the law. Shape, colour, hardness, toughness, and a countless host of other properties would together constitute the *outer* side, and would have to express the determinacy of the inner, the number, so that the one side would have its counterpart in the other.¹

¶289. Now, because negativity is conceived here not as movement of the process, but as unity *brought to rest* or *simple Being-for-itself*, it appears rather as that by which the thing resists the process and preserves itself within itself as indifferent towards it. But in virtue of the fact that this simple Being-for-itself is a tranquil indifference towards another, specific gravity takes its place as one *property alongside* others; and with that, all necessary relation of it to this plurality, or all conformity to law, ceases.—Specific gravity, as this simple inner, does not have difference within itself, or it has only the unessential difference; for it is just its *pure simplicity* that sublates all essential differentiation. This unessential difference, *magnitude*, would therefore have to have its counterpart or the *other* in the other side, which is the plurality of properties, since it is only in this way that it is difference at all. If this plurality itself is concentrated into the simplicity of the opposition, and determined, say, as *cohesion*, so that this cohesion is the *for-itself in otherness* (just as specific gravity is *pure Being-for-itself*), then this cohesion is at first the pure determinacy posited in the concept in contrast to that other determinacy, and the manner of law-giving would be that which we considered above, concerning the relation of sensibility to irritability.—In the next place, cohesion, as *concept* of Being-for-itself in otherness, is further only the *abstraction* of the side standing over against specific

gravity, and as such has no existence. For Being-for-itself in otherness is the process in which the inorganic would have to express its Being-for-itself as a *self-preservation*, which would secure it from emerging from the process as moment of a product. But just this is contrary to its nature, which has no purpose or universality within itself. Its process, rather, is merely the determinate behaviour in which its Being-for-itself, its specific gravity, *sublates* itself. But this determinate behaviour itself, in which its cohesion would subsist in its true concept, and the determinate magnitude of its specific gravity, are concepts completely indifferent towards each other. If the type of behaviour were left out of account, and our attention confined to the representation of magnitude, then we could perhaps think of the determination like this, that a greater specific weight, as a superior Being-within-itself, would resist involvement in the process more than would a smaller specific weight. But, conversely, the freedom of Being-for-itself only proves itself in the facility with which it meshes with everything, and preserves itself in this multiplicity. This intensity without extension of relations is a hollow abstraction, for extension constitutes the *Being-there* of intension. But the self-preservation of the inorganic in its relation falls, as we have noted, outside the nature of this relation, since the inorganic does not contain within itself the principle of movement, or because its Being is not absolute negativity and concept.¹

¶290. This other side of the inorganic, by contrast, when considered not as process but as quiescent Being, is ordinary cohesion, a *simple* sensory property occupying the side facing the liberated moment of *otherness*, which is dispersed into a number of indifferent properties, and, like specific gravity, enters among these properties themselves; the multiplicity of properties together then constitutes the other side facing this side. In this, however, as in the other properties, *number* is the sole determinacy, and this not only does not express a relation and a transition of these properties to one another, but is essentially just this: to have no necessary relation, but to present the abolition of all conformity to law; for number is the expression of determinacy as an *unessential* determinacy. This being so, then a series of bodies in which the difference is expressed as a numerical difference of their specific gravities by no means runs parallel to a series in which the difference is that of the other properties, even if, to facilitate the Thing, only one or some of these properties are taken. For in fact it is only the entire bundle of properties that could constitute the other side in this parallel. To put this bundle in order internally and bind it into a whole, observation has available, on the one hand, the determinacies of magnitude of these various properties, but on the other hand, their differences come into play as qualitative. Now in this heap of properties, what would have to be designated as positive or negative and would mutually sublimate each other—in general, the internal figuration and exposition of the formula, which would be very complex—would belong to the concept, but the concept is excluded by the very manner in which the properties are supposed to be lying there, and to be taken up, as just *being*; in this Being, no property displays the character of a negative with regard to the other; on the contrary, one property *is* just as well as the other is, nor does it indicate otherwise its place in the arrangement of the whole.—In the case of a series which progresses with parallel differences—whether the relationship is meant as increasing on both sides at once, or increasing only on one side and decreasing on the other,—what is of

interest is only the *final* simple expression of this combined whole, which was supposed to constitute one side of the law over against specific gravity; but this one side, as a *result that just is*, is precisely nothing other than what has already been mentioned, viz. a single property, as, say, ordinary cohesion is as well, alongside which the others, specific gravity among them, are indifferently present, and each of the others can with equal right, i.e. with equal injustice, be chosen as the representative of the entire other side; the one, like the other, would merely represent [*repräsentieren*], in German, *vorstellen*, the essence, but would not be the Thing itself. So that the attempt to find series of bodies which would run in simple parallel and would express the essential nature of the bodies according to a law of these sides must be regarded as a thought that is ignorant of its task and of the means whereby it should be carried out.¹

¶291. Previously, the relation of the inner and outer in the shape, which is supposed to present itself to observation, was straightaway transferred to the sphere of the inorganic; the determination which draws it in this direction can now be more precisely indicated, and there emerges from there still another form and relation of this relationship. That is to say, what in the case of the inorganic seems to offer the possibility of such a comparison of the inner and outer, falls away entirely in the case of the organic. The inorganic inner is a simple inner which offers itself for perception as a property that just is; its determinacy is therefore essentially magnitude, and this inner appears, as a property that just is, indifferent towards the outer, or the many other sensory properties. But the Being-for-itself of the organic living creature does not take its place on one side in this way over against its outer; on the contrary, it has within itself the principle of *otherness*. If we determine Being-for-itself as *simple, self-preserving relation to itself*, then its otherness is simple *negativity*; and organic unity is the unity of a relating-to-itself that is equal-to-itself, and of pure negativity. This unity is, as unity, the inwardness of the organic; this is thereby in itself universal, or it is *genus*. But the freedom of the genus, in the face of its actuality, is different from the freedom of specific gravity in the face of the shape. The freedom of specific gravity is a freedom that just is, or such that it takes its place on one side as a particular property. But because it is a freedom that just is, it is also only *one determinacy* which *essentially* belongs to this shape, or whereby this shape, *as essence*, is something determinate. The freedom of the genus, however, is a universal freedom and is indifferent towards this shape or towards its actuality. The *determinacy*, which attaches to the *Being-for-itself, as such*, of the inorganic, therefore falls, in the organic, *under its* Being-for-itself, just as, in the inorganic, it falls only under the *Being* of the inorganic; hence, although the determinacy, already in the inorganic, is at the same time only as a *property*, yet it acquires the dignity of the *essence*, because, as the simple negative, it stands over against Being-there as Being for another; and this simple negative is, in its ultimate singular determinacy, a number. The organic, however, is a singularity, which is itself pure negativity, and therefore exterminates within itself the fixed determinacy of number, which attaches to *indifferent Being*. Insofar as it has within it the moment of indifferent Being, including the moment of number, the number can thus be taken as merely a playful diversion, but not as the essence of its vitality.¹

¶292. But now, though pure negativity, the principle of the process, does not fall outside the organic, and the organic therefore does not have this negativity as a

determinacy in its *essence*, but the singularity itself is universal in itself, yet in the organic this pure singularity is not developed and actual in its moments as themselves *abstract* or *universal*. On the contrary, this expression withdraws outside that universality, which falls back into *inwardness*; and between the actuality or shape, i.e. the self-developing singularity, and the organic universal or the genus, there comes the *determinate* universal, the *species*. The existence, to which the negativity of the universal or of the genus attain, is only the developed movement of a process which runs its course in the *parts of the shape that just is*. If the genus, as quiescent simplicity, had within it the differentiated parts, and if, in consequence, its *simple negativity* as such were at the same time a movement which ran through parts which were equally simple and immediately universal within themselves, parts which here were actual as such moments, then the organic genus would be consciousness. But, as it is, the *simple determinacy*, as determinacy of the species, is present in the genus in an unspiritual manner; actuality starts from the genus, or what enters into actuality is not the genus as such, i.e. is not the thought at all. The genus as organic actuality is merely replaced by a representative. This representative, number, seems to mark the transition from the genus into the individual structure, and to provide observation with the two sides of the necessity, once as simple determinacy, and once again as developed shape, brought forth to manifold variety; but this number really marks the indifference and freedom of the universal and the singular with regard to one another, a singular that is abandoned by the genus to the essenceless difference of magnitude, but the singular itself, as a living creature, proves to be equally free from this difference. True universality, as we have determined it, is here only *inner essence*; as *determinacy of the species* it is a formal universality, and, over against this, that true universality takes its stand on the side of singularity, which is thereby a living singularity and, in virtue of its *inner*, overrides its *determinacy as species*. But this singularity is not at the same time a universal individual, i.e. one in which the universality would have outer actuality as well; the universal individual falls outside the living organism. This *universal* individual, however, as it is *immediately* the individual of natural structures, is not consciousness itself; its Being-there as *singular organic living individual* could not fall outside it if were supposed to be consciousness.¹

¶293. Consequently, we see a syllogism in which one extreme is the *universal life as a universal* or as genus, while the other extreme is the *same universal as a singular*, or as a universal individual; but the middle term is composed of both extremes: the first seems to fit into it as a *determinate* universality or as *species*, while the other seems to fit in as *strict* or singular *singularity*.—And since this syllogism pertains in general to the side of the *structure*, it equally comprehends within it what is differentiated as inorganic nature.¹

¶294. Now, since the universal life, as *the simple essence of the genus*, develops from its side the differences of the concept, and must exhibit them as a series of simple determinacies, this series is a system of differences posited as indifferent, or a *numerical series*. Whereas previously the organic in the form of singularity was set over against this essenceless difference, which neither expresses nor contains its living nature—and whereas just the same must be said in respect of the inorganic, in accordance with its whole Being-there, developed in the multitude of its properties,—it is now the universal individual we have to consider, not only as free from any

articulation of the genus, but also as the power over the genus. The genus, which splits up into species according to the *universal determinacy* of number, or may adopt as its basis of division singular determinacies of its Being-there, e.g. shape, colour, etc., suffers violence in this peaceful enterprise from the side of the universal individual, *the Earth*, which, as the universal negativity, enforces against the systematization of the genus the differences, such as the Earth has them in itself, and whose nature, because of the substance to which they belong, is another nature than that of the genus. This doing of the genus comes to be a quite limited enterprise which it may carry on only inside those powerful elements, and which becomes interrupted, incomplete, and stunted everywhere owing to their unbridled violence.¹

¶295. It follows from this that in shaped Being-there observation can encounter reason only *as life in general*, a life, however, which in its differentiating does not actually have any rational ordering and articulation in itself, and is not an immanently grounded system of shapes. If, in the syllogism of organic structure, the middle term, which contains the species and its actuality as a singular individuality, had within itself the extremes of inner universality and of universal individuality, then this middle term would have *in the movement* of its actuality the expression and the nature of universality, and would be the self-systematizing development.—Thus *consciousness* has, as the middle term between the universal spirit and its singularity or sensory consciousness, the system of structures of consciousness, as a life of the spirit organizing itself into a whole—the system that we are considering here, and which has its objective Being-there as world-history. But organic nature has no history; it falls from its universal, from life, immediately down into the singularity of Being-there, and the moments of simple determinacy and of singular vitality, united in this actuality, bring forth Becoming merely as the contingent movement, in which each moment is active in its own part and the whole is preserved; but this mobility is limited *for itself* only to its point, because the whole is not present in this point, and it is not present in it because here the whole is not as a whole *for itself*.¹

¶296. Apart, then, from the fact that in organic nature observing reason attains only to the intuition of itself as universal life in general, it gets the intuition of life's development and actualization only in accordance with systems differentiated quite universally, systems whose determination, their essence, lies not in the organic as such, but in the universal individual; and *under the auspices* of these differences of the Earth, in accordance with the series which the genus attempts to establish.¹

¶297. Since, then, the *universality of organic life* in its actuality allows itself to fall down immediately into the extreme of *singularity* without the genuine mediation that is for-itself, the observing reason has before it, as a thing, only *meaning*; and if reason can take an idle interest in observing this meaning, it is limited to the description and narration of the meanings and whims of nature. This unspiritual freedom of meaning will, it is true, offer everywhere the beginnings of laws, traces of necessity, allusions to order and sequence, ingenious and plausible relations. But, as regards law and necessity, when observation relates the organic with the differences of the inorganic that just are, the elements, zones, and climates, it does not get *beyond great influence*. So, too, on the other side, where individuality has the significance, not of the Earth, but of the *oneness immanent* in organic life, where this oneness, in immediate unity with the universal, does indeed constitute the genus, the simple

unity of which, however, for that very reason determines itself only as number, and therefore sets free the qualitative appearance,—on this other side observation cannot get beyond *smart remarks, interesting relations, friendly approaches to the concept*. But smart remarks are not a *knowledge of necessity*, interesting relations go no further than *interest*, while the interest is still nothing more than the opinion of reason; and the *friendliness* of what is individual, with which it alludes to a concept, is a childlike friendliness which is childish if it wants to be, or purports to be, valid in and for itself.¹

B. OBSERVATION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN ITS PURITY AND IN ITS RELATION TO EXTERNAL ACTUALITY. LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS

¶298. Observation of nature finds the concept realized in inorganic nature, laws whose moments are things which, at the same time, behave as abstractions; but this concept is not a simplicity reflected into itself. The life of organic nature, by contrast, is only this simplicity reflected into itself; the opposition of itself, as the universal and the singular, does not split up in the essence of this life itself; the essence is not the genus which, in its undifferentiated element, would be separate and move itself, and at the same time would be, for itself, undifferentiated in its opposition. Observation finds this free concept, whose universality contains developed singularity just as absolutely within itself, only in the concept itself existing as concept, or in self-consciousness.¹

¶299. When observation now turns in upon itself and focuses on the actual concept as free concept, it finds, to begin with, the *laws of thinking*. This singularity which thinking is within its own self is the abstract movement of the negative, a movement wholly retracted into simplicity, and the laws are outside reality.—That they have no *reality*, means, in general, nothing else than that they lack truth. They are indeed not supposed to be the *entire* truth either, but nevertheless *formal* truth. But what is purely formal without reality is the figment of thought, or the empty abstraction, without the bifurcation in it which would be nothing other than the content.—On the other hand, however, since they are laws of pure thinking, but pure thinking is the universal in itself, and therefore a knowledge which has Being in it and therein all reality, these laws are absolute concepts, and are inseparably the essentialities both of form and of things. Since the universality that moves itself within itself is the *divided* simple concept, in this way the concept has *content* in itself, and the sort of content that is all content, only not a sensory Being. It is a content which is neither in contradiction with the form nor separated at all from it, but rather essentially the form itself; for the form is nothing other than the universal separating itself into its pure moments.¹

¶300. But in the way in which this form or content is *for observation* as observation, it acquires the determination of a content *found*, given, i.e. a content that *merely is*. It becomes a *quiescent Being* of relations, a multitude of detached necessities which, as a *fixed* content in and for themselves, *in their determinacy*, are supposed to have truth, and thus are, in fact, withdrawn from the form.—This absolute truth of fixed determinacies or of many diverse laws contradicts, however, the unity of self-consciousness, or the unity of thinking and form in general. What is asserted to be a

fixed law that is in itself constant can only be a moment of the unity that reflects itself into itself, can only emerge as a vanishing magnitude. But torn out of this context of movement by the consideration of them, and set up singly, the content is not missing from them, for they have a determinate content, but rather they lack the form which is their essence. In fact, these laws are not the truth of thinking, not because they are supposed to be merely formal and to have no content, but rather for the opposite reason, because they are supposed in their determinacy, or just *as a content* from which the form has been removed, to rank as something absolute. In their truth, as vanishing moments in the unity of thinking, they would have to be taken as a knowledge,¹ or as a thinking movement, but not as *laws* of knowledge. But observing is not knowledge itself, and is not acquainted with it; it converts its own nature into the shape of *Being*, i.e. it grasps its negativity only as *laws* of Being.—It is sufficient here to have pointed out the invalidity of the so-called laws-of-thinking from the general nature of the case. The more precise development belongs to speculative philosophy in which they show themselves as what they are in truth, viz. singular vanishing moments whose truth is only the whole of the thinking movement, which is knowledge itself.²

¶301. This negative unity of thinking is for itself, or rather it is *Being-for-its-own-self*, the principle of individuality, and in its reality is *active consciousness*. Consequently, the observing consciousness is, by the nature of the Thing, led towards this consciousness as the reality of those laws. Since this connection is not for the observing consciousness, it thus supposes that thinking, in its laws, remains over on one side for it, and that, on the other side, it obtains another Being in what is now an object for it, viz. the active consciousness, which is for itself in such a way that it sublates otherness and has its actuality in this intuition of itself as the negative.¹

¶302. A *new field* thus opens up for *observation* in the *acting actuality of consciousness*. Psychology contains the multitude of laws in accordance with which the spirit variously responds to the various modes of its actuality as an *otherness it finds before it*; on the one hand, spirit receives these modes into itself, and *becomes conformable* to the habits, customs, and way of thinking it encounters, as that in which it is an object to itself as actuality,—on the other hand, spirit knows itself as spontaneously active in the face of them, it picks out from them, with inclination and passion, something only particular for itself, and *makes* what is objective *conform to itself*; in the first case it behaves negatively towards itself as singularity, in the second case, negatively towards itself as universal Being.—According to the first side, independence gives to what is encountered only the *form* of self-conscious individuality in general and, as regards the content, remains within the encountered universal actuality; but according to the other side, independence gives this actuality at least a peculiar modification which does not contradict its essential content, or even a modification of the sort whereby the individual, as particular actuality and peculiar content, sets itself in opposition to the universal actuality, an opposition which becomes crime when the individual sublates that actuality in a merely singular manner, or when it does this in a universal way and thus for all, putting another world, another right, law, and customs in place of the ones present.¹

¶303. Observational psychology, which at first recounts its perceptions of the *universal modes* which it encounters in the active consciousness, finds all sorts of

faculties, inclinations, and passions, and since, in the enumeration of this collection, the memory of the unity of self-consciousness defies repression, psychology must at least go so far as to be astonished that such a contingent medley of heterogeneous things can be together in the spirit, as in a bag, particularly too since they show themselves to be not dead, inert things but restless movements.¹

¶304. Observation, in enumerating these diverse faculties, is on the universal side; the unity of these manifold capacities is the opposite side to this universality, the *actual* individuality.—However, to apprehend once more in this way the different actual individualities, and to recount that one man has more inclination for this, another for that, that one has more understanding than another, all this has something much less interesting even than enumerating the species of insects, mosses, etc.; for these give observation the right to take them thus singly and unconceptually, because they belong essentially to the element of contingent singularization. On the other hand, to take conscious individuality unspiritually, as a singular phenomenon that just is, involves the contradiction that its essence is the universal of spirit. But, since apprehension admits this individuality at the same time into the form of universality, it finds the *law of individuality*, and seems now to have a rational purpose and to conduct a necessary enterprise.¹

¶305. The moments constituting the content of the law are, on the one hand, the individuality itself, on the other hand, its universal inorganic nature, viz. the encountered circumstances, situation, habits, customs, religion, and so on; from these the determinate individuality is to be comprehended. They comprise the determinate as well as the universal, and are at the same time *something present*, which offers itself for observation and, on the other side, expresses itself in the form of individuality.¹

¶306. Now the law of this relationship of the two sides would have to contain the kind of effect and influence exerted on the individuality by these determinate circumstances. But this individuality consists precisely *both* in being the *universal*, and hence coalescing in a calm, immediate way with the universal *present*, the customs, habits, etc., and becoming conformed to them; *and equally* in reacting in opposition to them and rather inverting them,—as well as in behaving towards them in its singularity with complete indifference, neither letting them affect it, nor being active against them. Therefore, *what* is to have influence on the individuality, and *what kind* of influence it is to have,—which really mean the same thing,—depends solely on the individuality itself; to say that *by this influence* this individuality has *become this determinate individuality* means nothing else than that *the individuality was this already*. Circumstances, situation, customs, etc., which on the one hand are indicated as *present*, and on the other hand are indicated *in this determinate individuality*, express only the indeterminate essence of the individuality, which is not the point at issue. If these circumstances, way of thinking, customs, in general the state of the world, had not been, then of course the individual would not have become what he is; for all the elements comprised in this state of the world are this universal substance.—But to have particularized itself in this way in *this* individual—and it is such an individual that is to be comprehended—, the state of the world would have to have particularized itself in and for itself, and to have operated on an individual in this determinacy which it has given itself; only in this way would it have made him into this determinate individual that he is. If the exterior has

constituted itself in and for itself in the way that it appears in the individuality, the latter would be comprehended from the former. We would have a double gallery of images, one of which would be the reflection of the other; the one the gallery of the complete determinacy and delimitation of external circumstances, the other the same gallery translated into the mode in which those circumstances are in the conscious essence; the former the surface of the sphere, the latter the centre which represents the surface within itself.¹

¶307. But the surface of the sphere, the world of the individual, immediately has an ambiguous significance: it is *world* and *situation* as it is *in and for itself*, and it is *the world of the individual*; it is the latter *either* insofar as the individual has merely coalesced with that world, has let it, just as it is, enter into him, and behaved towards it only as formal consciousness,—or, on the other hand, it is the world of the individual, insofar as what is present has been *inverted* by the individual.—Since, on account of this freedom, actuality is capable of this twofold significance, the world of the individual is to be comprehended only from the individual himself; and the *influence* on the individual of actuality, which is represented as *being* in and for itself, receives through the individual the absolutely opposite sense, that the individual either lets the stream of inflowing actuality *have its way* in him, or else breaks it off and inverts it. The result of this, however, is that *psychological necessity* becomes such an empty phrase that there is present the absolute possibility that what is supposed to have had this influence could just as well not have had it.¹

¶308. Herewith the *Being* falls away, which would be *in and for itself* and was supposed to constitute one side, and the universal side at that, of a law. The individuality is what *its world* is, the world that is *its own*; individuality is itself the circle of its doing, in which it has presented itself as actuality, and as purely and simply the unity of *Being present* and *Being made*; a unity whose sides do not fall apart, as in the representation of psychological law, as a world present *in itself* and an individuality *being for itself*; or, if those sides are thus considered each for itself, then there is no necessity and no law of their reciprocal relation.¹

C. OBSERVATION OF THE RELATION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS TO ITS IMMEDIATE ACTUALITY. PHYSIOGNOMY AND PHRENOLOGY

¶309. Psychological observation finds no law of the relationship of self-consciousness to actuality, or to the world opposed to it; and, through the mutual indifference of both, it is forced to fall back on the *peculiar determinacy* of real individuality which is *in and for itself*, or contains the opposition of *Being-for-itself* and *Being-in-itself* effaced in its absolute mediation. Individuality has now become the object for observation, or the object to which observation turns.¹

¶310. The individual is in and for itself; it is *for itself* or is a free doing; but it is also *in itself*; or it has itself an *original* determinate *Being*,—a determinacy which in accordance with the concept is the same as what psychology wanted to find outside the individual. So the opposition emerges *within the individual itself*, this duality of being the movement of consciousness, and the fixed Being of an appearing actuality, an actuality of a sort that in the individual is immediately *its own*. This *Being*, the *body* of the determinate individuality, is individuality's *originality*, its not-having-done.

But since the individual is at the same time only what it has done, its body is also the expression of itself which it has *produced*; at the same time a *sign*, which has not remained an immediate Thing, but a sign in which the individual only makes known what it *is*, in the sense that it sets its original nature to work.¹

¶311. If we consider the moments present here in relation to the previous view, then we have here a universal human shape, or at least the universal shape of a climate, a part of the world, a people, just as previously we had the same universal customs and culture. In addition to this, there are the particular circumstances and situation within the universal actuality; here this particular actuality is as a particular formation of the shape of the individual.—On the other side, just as previously the free doing of the individual and actuality as *its own* had been posited in the face of the actuality present, here the shape stands as expression of *its* actualization posited by the individual itself, the traits and forms of its spontaneously active essence. But the actuality, universal as well as particular, which observation previously found outside the individual, is here the actuality *of the individual*, its congenital body, and it is precisely in this that the expression belonging to its doing falls. In the psychological account, the actuality that is in and for itself and the determinate individuality were supposed to be related to one another; here, however, the *whole* determinate *individuality* is the object of observation; and each side of the opposition is itself this whole. To the outer whole, therefore, belongs not only the *original Being*, the congenital body, but equally the formation of the body belonging to the activity of the inner; the body is the unity of the unformed Being and the formed Being, and is the individual's actuality permeated by Being-for-itself. This whole, which embraces within it the determinate original fixed parts and the traits arising solely from the doing, *is*, and this *Being* is the *expression* of the inner, of the individual posited as consciousness and movement.—This *inner*, too, is no longer a formal, spontaneous activity, devoid of content or indeterminate, an activity whose content and determinacy would reside, as before, in external circumstances, but it is an original character, determined in itself, whose form is merely the activity. It is the relationship between these two sides that is therefore under consideration here, how it is to be determined, and what is to be understood by this *expression* of the inner in the outer.¹

¶312. This outer, in the first place, makes the inner visible only as an *organ*, or, in general, makes it into a Being for another; for the inner, insofar as it is in the organ, is *the activity* itself. The speaking mouth, the working hand, and the legs too, if you want to add them, are the actualizing and accomplishing organs, which have within them the doing *as doing*, or the inner as such; but the externality which the inner gains through them is the deed as an actuality separated from the individual. Speech and labour are externalizations in which the individual no longer keeps and possesses himself within himself, but lets the inner go completely outside him, and surrenders it to something else. For this reason we can just as well say that these externalizations express the inner too much, as that they do so too little; *too much*,—because the inner itself breaks out in them, there remains no opposition between them and it; they give not merely an *expression* of the inner, but immediately the inner itself; *too little*,—because in speech and action the inner turns itself into something else, thus thereby surrenders itself to the element of change, which inverts the spoken word and the accomplished deed, and makes of them something other than they are in and for

themselves as actions of this determinate individual. Not only do the products of the actions, through this externality stemming from the influence of others, lose the character of being something constant in face of other individualities; but since, in their relationship to the inner which they contain, they behave as a separated, indifferent outer, they can, as inner, *through the individual itself*, be something other than they appear,—either because the individual intentionally makes them for appearance into something other than they are in truth,—or because the individual is too clumsy to give itself the outer side it really wanted, and to establish it so firmly that its work cannot be perverted by others. The doing, then, as a completed work, has the double and opposed significance of being either the *inner* individuality and *not* its *expression*, or, as the exterior, an actuality *free* from the inner, an actuality which is something quite different from the inner.—On account of this ambiguity, we must look around for the inner as it still is *within the individual itself*, but in a visible or external way. In the organ, however, it is only as immediate *doing* itself, which attains its externalization in the deed, which either does, or again does not, represent the inner. The organ, regarded in the light of this opposition, does not therefore provide the expression which is sought.¹

¶313. Now if the outer shape could express the inner individuality only insofar as that shape is not an organ or not a *doing*, hence insofar as it is a whole *at rest*, then it would behave as a subsistent thing, which calmly received the inner as something alien into its passive Being-there, and would thereby become the sign of it;—an external contingent expression whose *actual* side lacked any meaning for itself,—a language whose sounds and sound-combinations are not the Thing itself, but are linked with it by free wilfulness and are contingent for the Thing.¹

¶314. Such an arbitrary combination of elements that are something external for one another yields no law. Physiognomy, however, is supposed to differentiate itself from other bad arts and unwholesome studies by the fact that it considers the determinate individuality in the *necessary* opposition of an inner and an outer, of the character as a conscious essence and this same character as a shape that just is, and it relates these moments to each other as they are related to each other by their concept, and must therefore constitute the content of a law. In astrology, palmistry, and sciences of this sort, on the other hand, what seems to be related is only an outer to an outer, something or other to something alien to it. *This* constellation at birth and, when this external element is brought closer to the body itself, *these* lines on the hand, are *external* moments for long or short life, and the fate in general of the singular man. As externalities, their relationship is one of indifference towards each other, and they lack the necessity for one another that ought to lie in the relation of an *outer* to an *inner*.¹

¶315. Admittedly the hand does not seem to be such a very external factor for fate; it seems rather to relate to it as something inner. For fate in turn is also only the appearance of what the determinate individuality is *in itself* as an inner original determinacy.—Now, to what this determinacy is in itself, the palmist, like the physiognomist, takes a shorter cut than, e.g., Solon, who thought he could only know this from and after the course of the whole life; Solon considered the appearance, while they consider the *in-itself*. That the hand, however, must present the in-itself of the individuality in respect of its fate is easy to see from the fact that, next to

the organ of speech, it is the hand most of all by which man comes to appearance and actualization. It is the animated craftsman of his fortune; we may say of the hand that it *is* what the man *does*, for in the hand, as the active organ of his self-fulfilment, the man is present as the animating soul, and since he is originally his own fate, his hand will thus express this in-itself.¹

¶316. From this determination, that the *organ* of activity is a *Being* in him *as well as the doing*, or that the inner Being-*in-itself* is itself *present* in it and has a *Being for* others, another view of the organ emerges than the preceding. Namely, if the organs in general showed themselves unable to be taken as *expressions* of the inner, for the reason that in them the doing is present *as doing*, while the doing *as deed* is merely external, and inner and outer in this way fall apart and are, or can be, alien to each other, then the organ must, in accordance with the determination considered, be taken again as also *middle term* of both, since this very fact that the doing is *present* in it constitutes at the same time an *externality* of the doing, and, moreover, an externality other than the deed; for that externality remains with and in the individual. Now, this middle term and unity of the inner and outer is in the first place itself external too; but then this externality is at the same time taken up into the inner; as *simple* externality it stands over against the dispersed externality, which either is merely a *single* work or state contingent for the whole individuality, or else, as *complete* externality, is fate split up into a multiplicity of works and states. Thus the *simple lines of the hand*, the *timbre* and *compass* of the *voice* as the individual determinacy of *language*,—this too again, as it acquires through the hand a firmer existence than it does through the voice, *writing*, and indeed in its particularity as *handwriting*—all this is expression of the inner, so that, as the *simple externality*, the expression again stands over against the *manifold externality* of action and of fate, stands in relationship to them as an *inner*.—Thus, if at first the determinate nature and innate peculiarity of the individual, together with what these have become through cultivation, are taken as the *inner*, as the essence of the action and the fate, then the individual has its *appearance* and externality *at first* in its mouth, hand, voice, handwriting, as well as in the other organs and their permanent determinacies; and only *then* does it express itself *further* on the outside in its actuality within the world.¹

¶317. Now, because this middle term determines itself as the externalization, which is at the same time taken back into the inner, its Being-there is not limited to the immediate organ of doing; the middle term is rather the movement and form of the countenance and the figure in general, a movement and form which do not accomplish anything. These features and their movement are, according to this concept, the doing held back, remaining in the individual, and in accordance with the individual's relation to the actual doing, they constitute its own supervision and observation of the doing, *externalization as reflection on* the actual externalization.—The individual is therefore not dumb regarding and in his external doing, because at the same time he is there reflected into himself, and he externalizes this reflectedness into himself; this theoretical doing, or the individual's speech with himself about his doing, is also perceptible for others, for this speech is itself an externalization.¹

¶318. In this inner, which in its externalization remains an inner, the individual's *Being-reflected* out of its actuality is therefore observed; and we have to see what the

situation is with this necessity which is posited in this unity.—This reflectedness is in the first place different from the deed itself and therefore can be something *other* than the deed, and can be taken for something other; we see in someone's face whether he is in *earnest* about what he is saying or doing.—Conversely, however, what is here supposed to be the expression of the inner is at the same time an expression that just *is*, and hence itself lapses into the determination of *Being*, which is absolutely contingent for the self-conscious essence. It is therefore indeed an expression, but at the same time also only as a *sign*, so that, for the content expressed, the constitution of that by which it is expressed is a matter of complete indifference. In this appearance, the inner is no doubt a *visible* invisible, but it is not tied to this appearance; it can take on another appearance, just as well as another inner can take on the same appearance.—Lichtenberg therefore rightly says: *Suppose the physiognomist ever did take the measure of a man, it would only require a gallant resolve for him to make himself incomprehensible again for thousands of years.*¹ Just as, in the previous relationship, the given circumstances were a being from which the individuality took what *it* was able to and wanted, either submitting to or perverting that being, for which reason it did not contain the necessity and the essence of the individuality;—so here, the apparent immediate Being of the individuality is one which either expresses its reflectedness out of actuality and its Being-within-itself, or which is for the individuality merely a sign indifferent to what is signified and therefore in truth signifies nothing; for the individuality, it is as much its countenance as its mask which it can lay aside.—The individuality permeates its shape, moves and speaks in it; but this entire Being-there equally turns into a Being that is indifferent towards the will and the action; individuality effaces in it the significance it formerly had, the significance of having in it the individuality's reflectedness into itself or its true essence, and instead it places its essence conversely in the will and in the deed.²

¶319. The individuality *gives up that reflectedness-into-itself* which is expressed in the *features*, and *places its essence in the work*. Herein it contradicts the relationship established by the instinct of reason, which engages in the observation of the self-conscious individuality, with regard to what its *inner* and *outer* are supposed to be. This point of view leads us to the thought which really lies at the base of the *science*—if one wishes to call it that—of physiognomy. The opposition which this observation encounters has the form of the opposition of the practical and the theoretical, both, that is, posited within the practical itself,—the opposition of individuality actualizing itself in acting (acting in its most universal sense), and individuality as it is in this acting at the same time outside it, reflected into itself, and the acting is its object. Observation accepts this opposition in the same inverted relationship in which the opposition determines itself in appearance. As the *inessential outer* it regards the *deed* itself and the work, whether it be that of speech or a more durable actuality,—but as the *essential inner* it counts the Being-within-itself of the individuality. Of the two sides that the practical consciousness has in it, the intending and the deed (the *opining* about its action and the *action* itself), observation selects the former side as the true inner; this true inner is supposed to have its more or less *inessential* externalization in the deed, but its true externalization in its shape. The latter externalization is the immediate sensory presence of the individual spirit; the inwardness which is supposed to be the true inwardness is the peculiarity of the

intention and the singularity of the Being-for-itself; both together the spirit *opined*. What observation has for its objects is thus *opined* Being-there, and it looks for laws within such Being-there.¹

¶320. Immediate opining about the opined presence of the spirit is natural physiognomy, the hasty judgement about the inner nature and the character of its shape at the first sight of it. The object of this opinion is of such a kind that its essence involves its being in truth something other than merely sensory immediate Being. Indeed, what is present is also just this reflectedness-into-itself out of the sensory within the sensory, what is the object of observation is visibility as visibility of the invisible. But just this sensory immediate presence is the *actuality* of spirit, as it is only for opinion; and observation, in accordance with this side, busies itself with this opined Being-there of spirit, with physiognomy, handwriting, sound of voice, etc.—It relates such Being-there to just such an *opined inner*. It is not the murderer, the thief, who is supposed to be recognized, but the *capacity to be one*; the fixed abstract determinacy thereby gets lost in the concrete, infinite determinacy of the *single* individual, which now demands more ingenious depictions than those qualifications are. Such ingenious depictions certainly say more than the qualification of murderer, thief, or kind-hearted, unspoiled, and so on, but not nearly enough for their purpose, which is to express the opined Being or the single individuality; any more than the depictions of the bodily shape which go further than a flat forehead, a long nose, etc. For the single shape, like the single self-consciousness, is, as opined Being, inexpressible. The science of the knowledge of human beings, which deals with the human being presumed by opinion, like the science of physiognomy which deals with his actuality presumed by opinion, and aims at raising the unconscious judging of natural physiognomy to a branch of knowledge, is therefore something endless and bottomless; it can never succeed in saying what it opines because it merely opines and its content is something merely opined.¹

¶321. The *laws* which this science sets out to find are relations between these two opined sides, and hence can themselves be nothing more than an empty opining. Also, this knowing presumed by opinion, a knowing which takes it upon itself to deal with the actuality of spirit, has as its object just the fact that spirit reflects itself into itself out of its sensory Being-there, and the determinate Being-there is for spirit an indifferent contingency; consequently this knowing must immediately know, regarding the laws it has discovered, that they do not say anything, that it is really just idle chatter, or merely the voicing of *an opinion of oneself*; an expression which contains the truth of presenting this as one and the same thing,—stating ones own *opinion*, and thus providing not the Thing but merely an opinion of *oneself*. As regards their *content*, however, these observations cannot diverge from these: ‘It always rains when we have our annual fair’, says the shopkeeper; ‘and every time, too’, says the housewife, ‘when I am drying my washing.’¹

¶322. Lichtenberg, who characterizes physiognomic observation in this way, also says this: ‘If anyone said: “You certainly act like an honest man, but I see from your figure that you are forcing yourself and are a rogue at heart”; without a doubt, every gallant fellow to the end of the world will respond to such address with a box on the ear.’ This retort is *apt*, because it refutes the first presupposition of such a science of opining, viz. that *the actuality* of man is his face, etc.—The *true Being* of man is rather

his deed; in the deed the individuality is actual, and it is the deed that sublates what is *opined* in both its sides. First, what is opined as a quiescent bodily Being; the individuality, in the action, presents itself rather as the *negative* essence, which only *is* insofar as it sublates Being. Then, too, the deed equally sublates the inexpressibility of the opinion in respect of the self-conscious individuality, which in the opinion is an infinitely determined and determinable individuality. In the accomplished deed this bad infinity is annihilated. The deed is something simply determinate, a universal, to be captured in an abstraction; it is murder, theft, or a good deed, a brave deed, and so on, and what *it is* can be *said* of it. The deed *is* this, and its Being is not merely a sign, but the Thing itself. *It is* this, and the individual man *is* what *the deed is*; in the simplicity of *this Being*, the individual man is a universal essence that is for others, and ceases to be only opined. It is true that, in the deed, he is not posited as spirit; but when it is a question of his *Being* as Being, and, *on the one hand*, the twofold Being, of the *shape* and the *deed*, is at odds with itself, and the shape and the deed are each supposed to be his actuality, then it is the deed alone that must be affirmed as his *genuine Being*,—not his figure, which should express what he opines with regard to his deeds, or what one opined that he merely could do. Similarly, *on the other hand*, when his *work* and his inner *possibility*, capacity, or intention are opposed, it is the work alone which is to be regarded as his true actuality, even if he deceives himself on the point, and, turning away from his action into himself, opines to be something other in this inner than in the *deed*. Individuality, which entrusts itself to the objective element when it becomes the work, does of course thereby risk being altered and perverted. But what constitutes the character of the deed is just this: whether the deed is an actual Being that endures, or whether it is merely an opined work, that passes away in intrinsic futility. The objectivity does not alter the deed itself; it only shows *what* it is, i.e. whether it *is* or whether it *is nothing*.—The dismemberment of this Being into intentions and subtleties of that sort, whereby the *actual* man, i.e. his deed, is to be explained by returning to an opined Being, however the individual himself may create for himself particular intentions concerning his actuality, must be consigned to the idleness of opinion; if this idleness wants to set its sterile wisdom to work, to deny the agent the character of reason, and to ill-treat him in such as fashion as to declare, instead of the deed, rather the figure and the features to be his Being, then it has to undergo the above retort, which demonstrates that the figure is not the in-itself but, on the contrary, can be an object of manipulation.¹

¶323. If we look now at the range of relationships in general, in which the self-conscious individuality can be observed standing towards its exterior, there will be one left which has still to be made an object for observation. In psychology it is the *external actuality* of *things* which is supposed to have its conscious *counterpart* in the spirit and to make spirit comprehensible. In physiognomy, by contrast, spirit is supposed to be cognized in its *own* exterior, as in a Being which is *language*—the visible invisibility of its essence. There still remains the determination of the side of actuality according to which the individuality expresses its essence in its immediate actuality, an actuality fixed and purely being-there.—This last relation is thus distinguished from the physiognomic by the fact that the physiognomic relation is the *speaking* presence of the individual who, in his *acting* externalization, at the same

time presents the externalization *reflecting* itself into itself and *contemplating* itself, an externalization which is itself movement, features in repose which are themselves essentially a mediated Being. In the determination yet to be considered, however, the exterior is finally a wholly *immobile* actuality which is not in its own self a talking sign but, separated from self-conscious movement, presents itself for itself and as a mere thing.¹

¶324. In the first place, regarding the relation of the inner to this its outer, it is clear that this relation must be comprehended as a relationship of *causal connection*, since the relation of one Being-in-itself to another Being-in-itself, as a *necessary* relation, is such a relationship.¹

¶325. Now, for spiritual individuality to have an effect on the body it must, as cause, be itself bodily. The bodily element, however, in which it is as cause, is the organ, but the organ not of the doing with regard to external actuality, but of the doing of the self-conscious essence within itself, operating outwards only with regard to its own body; it is not directly ascertainable what organs these can be. If we were thinking only of organs in general, the organ for labour in general would be readily at hand, similarly the organ of the sexual drive, and so on. Organs of that sort, however, are to be considered as instruments or parts which spirit, as one extreme, possesses as a middle term in the face of the other extreme, which is the external *object*. Here, however, an organ is understood in which the self-conscious individual, as an extreme, preserves itself *for itself* in the face of its own actuality opposed to it, is not at the same time turned outwards but reflected within its action, and in which the side of *Being* is not a *Being for another*. Certainly, in the physiognomic relation the organ is also considered as a Being-there reflected into itself and commenting on the doing; but this Being is an objective Being, and the result of the physiognomic observation is this, that self-consciousness confronts this actuality of itself as something indifferent. This indifference vanishes in the fact that this reflectedness into itself is itself *efficacious*; this Being-there thereby obtains a necessary relation to it; but to have an effect on that Being-there the reflectedness must itself have a Being, though not, strictly speaking, an objective Being, and as such an organ it is supposed to be indicated.¹

¶326. Now, in ordinary life, anger, e.g., as such an internal doing, is located in the liver; Plato even assigns the liver something still higher, something which is even regarded by some as the highest function of all, viz. prophesying, or the gift of expressing the holy and eternal in an irrational manner. But the movement which the individual has in his liver, heart, and so on, cannot be regarded as the movement of the individual wholly reflected into himself; rather it is in him in such a way that it is already implanted in his body and has an animal Being-there turning outwards to externality.¹

¶327. The *nervous system*, on the other hand, is the immediate repose of the organic in its movement. The *nerves* themselves, it is true, are again the organs of a consciousness already immersed in its orientation outward; brain and spinal cord, however, may be considered as the immediate presence of self-consciousness, a presence which abides within itself, is not objective and also does not go outwards. Insofar as the moment of Being which this organ has is a *Being for another*, a Being-there, it is dead Being, no longer the presence of self-consciousness. But this

Being-within-itself is, in accordance with its concept, a fluidity, in which the circles cast into it immediately dissolve, and no difference expresses itself as *being*. Meanwhile, as spirit itself is not something abstractly-simple, but a system of movements in which it differentiates itself into moments, but in this very differentiation remains free, and as spirit articulates its body in general into a variety of functions, and determines one single part for only one function, so too can the fluid *Being* of its *Being-within-self* be represented to oneself as an articulated Being; and it seems that it must be represented in this way, because the *Being* of spirit reflected into itself is, in the brain, itself again only a middle term between spirit's pure essence and its corporeal articulation, a middle term which therefore must partake of the nature of both and thus also have in it again, from the corporeal side, the articulation that simply *is*.¹

¶328. The spiritual-organic Being has at the same time the necessary side of an *inert subsistent* Being-there; the former, as the extreme of Being-for-itself, must step back, and have this latter as the other extreme over against it, which is then the object on which the spiritual-organic Being acts as cause. If now the brain and spinal cord are that corporeal *Being-for-itself* of spirit, then the skull and the vertebral column are the other extreme to it, an extreme which is separated off, viz. the fixed, inert thing.—When, however, anyone thinks of the proper location of spirit's Being-there, it is not the back that comes to mind but only the head, and so, in examining a type of knowledge like the one we are now dealing with, we can be satisfied with this reason—not such a bad reason in this case—in order to confine this Being-there to the skull. Should it occur to anyone to think of the back as the location of spirit insofar as by it, too, knowing and doing are no doubt sometimes partly driven *in* and partly driven *out*, this would be no proof at all that the spinal cord must be taken as included in the indwelling seat of spirit, and its column as the corresponding Being-there, because this would prove too much; for one may equally recall that there are other popular external ways, too, for getting at the activity of spirit in order to stimulate or inhibit it.¹—The vertebral column is, then, ruled out, and *rightly so*, if you like; and it is as well *constructed* as many another doctrine in philosophy of nature that the skull alone indeed does not contain the *organs* of the spirit. For this was previously excluded from the concept of this relationship, and for this reason the skull was taken on the side of the Being-there; or, if we are not to be allowed to recall the *concept* of the Thing, then certainly experience teaches that we do *not* murder, steal, write poetry, etc., with the skull, in the way that we see with the eye as an organ.—For that reason we must also abstain from the expression *organ* for that *significance* of the skull of which we have yet to speak. For although it is commonly said that reasonable men pay attention not to the word but to the *Thing*, yet this does not give us permission to designate a Thing with a word inappropriate to it; for this is at once ineptitude and deceit, which opines and pretends that it lacks only the right *word*, and hides from itself that in fact it misses the Thing, i.e. the concept; if the concept were on hand, then it would also have its right word.—What is determined here in the first instance is only this: that just as the brain is the living head, the skull is the *caput mortuum*.²

¶329. It is in this dead Being, then, that the spiritual movements and determinate modes of the brain would have to mount their presentation of external actuality, an actuality, however, which is still in the individual himself. For the relationship of

those movements and modes to the skull, which as dead Being does not have spirit dwelling within it, there initially presents itself the external mechanical relationship established above, so that the organs proper—and these are in the brain—here press the skull out rounded, there widen or flatten it, or in whatever other way one cares to present this influence on it. As itself a part of the organism, it must indeed be credited, like every bone, with a living self-formation so that, considered from this point of view, it is rather the skull that on its part presses on the brain, and imposes its outer limitation; and it also has the capacity for this, being the harder. But in that case the same relationship would still remain in the determination of their reciprocal activity; for whether the skull is the determinant or the determined, this would produce no alteration at all in the causal connection, except that the skull would then be made the immediate organ of self-consciousness because in it, as *cause*, would be found the side of *Being-for-itself*. But since *Being-for-itself*, as *organic vitality*, falls *in both* in the same way, the causal connection between them in fact falls away. This development of the two, however, would be connected in the interior, and would be an organic pre-established harmony, which would leave the two interrelated sides free in respect of each other, and leave each with its own *shape* to which the shape of the other need not correspond; and still more so the shape and the quality with regard to each other,—as the form of the grape and the taste of the wine are free with regard to each other.—But since the determination of *Being-for-itself* falls on the side of the brain, while the determination of *Being-there* falls on the side of the skull, a causal connection between them *also* has to be posited within the organic unity; a necessary relation between them as external for one another, i.e. a relation itself external through which, therefore, the *shape* of each would be determined by the other.¹

¶330. However, as regards the determination in which the organ of self-consciousness would be an active cause on the opposite side, one can talk in diverse and various ways; for what is in question is the constitution of a cause which is considered in regard to its *indifferent* Being-there, its shape and size, a cause whose interior and Being-for-itself are to be precisely of a kind which does not concern the immediate Being-there at all. The organic self-formation of the skull is in the first place indifferent to mechanical influence, and the relationship of these two relationships is, since the former is a relating-of-itself-to-itself, just this very indeterminateness and limitlessness. Then again, even if the brain were to receive into itself the differences of spirit as differences that simply are, and were a plurality of internal organs each occupying a different space, it would be left undetermined whether a spiritual moment would, according as it was originally stronger or weaker, have to possess in the first case a more *expanded* brain-organ and in the latter case a more *contracted* brain-organ, or alternatively the other way about. (But it is contradictory to nature for the brain to be such a plurality of internal organs, for nature gives the moments of the concept a Being-there of their own, and therefore puts the *fluid simplicity* of organic life *purely on one side*, and its *articulation* and *division*, equally in its differences, on the *other side*, so that in the way they are to be conceived here, they display themselves as particular anatomical things.) Similarly with the question whether the *cultural development* of the brain would enlarge or diminish the organ, whether it would make it coarser and thicker or finer. From the fact that it remains

undetermined how the cause is constituted, it is equally left undetermined how the influence operates on the skull, whether it is an enlarging or a narrowing and contraction. When this influence is determined, as it were, more *imposingly* as a *stimulation*, it is undetermined whether this takes place by swelling, in the manner of a cantharidin plaster,¹ or by shrivelling, in the manner of vinegar.—All views of this kind can be supported by plausible grounds, for the organic relation, which intervenes just as much, accommodates the one as readily as the other, and is indifferent to all this understanding.²

¶331. However, it is not the job of observing consciousness to seek to determine this relation. For in any case it is not the brain as an *animal* part that stands on the one side, but the brain as the *Being* of the *self-conscious* individuality.—The individuality as a lasting character and self-moving conscious doing is *for itself* and *within itself*; confronting this Being-for-itself and Being-within-itself stands its actuality and Being-there for another; the Being-for- and within-itself is the essence and subject which has a Being in the brain; this Being is *subsumed under the subject*, and gets its value only through the indwelling meaning.¹ But the other side of self-conscious individuality, the side of its Being-there, is *Being* as independent and subject, or as a *thing*, viz. a bone: the *actuality and Being-there of man is his skull-bone*.—This is the relationship and the understanding that the two sides of this relation have in the consciousness observing them.²

¶332. Observation has now to deal with the more determinate relation of these sides; the skull-bone does have in general the meaning of being the immediate actuality of spirit. But the many-sidedness of spirit gives its Being-there a corresponding variety of meanings; what we have to obtain is the determinacy of the meaning of the singular places into which this Being-there is divided; and we have to see how these places contain an indication of that meaning.

¶333. The skull-bone is not an organ of activity, nor even a speaking movement; we neither commit theft, murder, etc. with the skull-bone, nor does it in the least betray such deeds by a change of countenance, so that the skull-bone would become a speaking gesture.—Nor has this *being* the value even of a *sign*. Countenance and gesture, tone of voice, even a pillar, a post erected on a desert island, directly proclaim that something else is meant by them than what they *simply are* immediately. They at once profess to be signs, since they have in them a determinacy which points to something else, by the fact that it does not properly belong to them. One may well also entertain a variety of thoughts in connection with a skull, like Hamlet over Yorick's skull;¹ but the skull-bone for itself is such an indifferent, unencumbered thing that nothing else is immediately to be seen in it, or to be opined, than simply the bone itself; it does indeed remind us of the brain and its determinacy, and of skulls of a different formation, but not of a conscious movement, since there is impressed on it neither a look nor a gesture, nor anything that proclaims itself to come from a conscious doing; for it is an actuality whose role it is to present another sort of side of the individuality, one that would no longer be Being reflecting itself into itself, but purely *immediate Being*.²

¶334. Further, while the skull-bone does not itself feel, it seems that perhaps a more determinate significance could still be found for it in the fact that determinate sensations, by their proximity, might enable us to ascertain what it is meant by it; and

when a conscious mode of spirit has its feeling in a determinate area of the skull, that place will perhaps indicate, in its shape, that mode and its particularity. Just as, e.g., some people complain of feeling a painful tension somewhere in the head when they are thinking hard, or even when *thinking* at all, so too could *stealing*, *committing murder*, *writing poetry*, etc., each be accompanied by its own sensation, which would have to have its particular place besides. This area of the brain, which would in this way be more moved and activated, would probably also develop the adjacent area of the bone more; or this area would, from sympathy or consensus, not be inert, but would enlarge or diminish itself or modify its shape in some way or other.—What, however, makes this hypothesis improbable is this, that feeling in general is something indeterminate, and the feeling in the head as the centre might be the universal accompanying feeling of all suffering, so that mixed up with the thief's—murderer's—poet's head-itching or headache are other feelings which could as little be distinguished from one another and also from those we can call merely bodily feelings, as an illness can be determined from the symptom of headache, if we limit its significance merely to the bodily.

¶335. In fact, from whatever side we look at the Thing, any necessary reciprocal relation falls away, as does any indication of it speaking by itself. If, all the same, the relation is still to obtain, what is left and necessary is an *unconceptual*, free, pre-established harmony of the corresponding determination of the two sides; for one of the two sides is to be *non-spiritual actuality, a mere thing*.—On the one side, then, there stands a multitude of inert skull-areas, on the other a multitude of spirit-properties, whose multiplicity and determination will depend on the state of psychology. The more impoverished the representation of spirit, the easier the Thing becomes from this side; for partly, the properties become all the fewer, and partly, all the more detached, rigid, and ossified, and therefore all the more akin to bone-determinations, and more comparable with them. But, although much is made much easier by the impoverished representation of spirit, yet there still remains a very great multitude on both sides; there remains for observation the entire contingency of their relation. If the children of Israel, who are said to correspond to the sands of the sea-shore,¹ should each take unto himself the grain of sand whose sign he is, this indifference and wilfulness, assigning to each his own grain, would be no more glaring than that which allots to every capacity of soul, to every passion, and—what must equally be considered here—to each nuance of character which the more refined psychology and knowledge of human nature likes to talk about, its particular skull-area and bone-form.—The skull of a murderer has—not this organ or even sign—but this bump; but this murderer still has a multitude of other properties, as well as other bumps, and along with the bumps also hollows; one has a choice among bumps and hollows. And again, his murderous disposition can be related to any bump or hollow, and this in turn to any property; for the murderer is neither merely this abstraction of a murderer, nor does he have only one elevation and one hollow. The observations undertaken on this point must, for that reason, sound just as good as the rain of the shopkeeper and of the housewife at the annual fair and on wash-day. Shopkeeper and housewife were also in a position to make the observation that it always rains when this neighbour goes by, or when they eat roast pork. Just as rain is indifferent to circumstances like these, so too, for observation, *this* determinacy of

spirit is indifferent to *this* determinate Being of the skull. For of the two objects of this observation, one is an arid *Being-for-itself*, an ossified property of spirit, while the other is an arid *Being-in-itself*; such an ossified thing as both are is completely indifferent to everything else; it is just as indifferent to the high bump whether a murderer is in its vicinity, as it is to the murderer whether flatness is close by him.²

¶336. There remains of course the indisputable *possibility* that a bump at some place or other is connected with some property, passion, etc. One *can in imagination represent* the murderer with a high bump here at this place on the skull, and the thief with one there. From this side phrenology is still capable of great expansion; for initially it seems to confine itself to connecting a bump with a property in *the same individual*, such that the individual possesses both. But natural phrenology—for there must be such a science as well as a natural physiognomy,—already goes beyond this limitation; it not only judges that a cunning man has a bump as big as your fist behind his ears, but also represents that, not the unfaithful wife herself, but the other conjugal individual, has bumps on the forehead.—Similarly, one can also *represent in imagination* the man who is living under the same roof as the murderer, or even his neighbour, or, further afield, his fellow-citizens, etc. with high bumps on some part or other of the skull, as well as the flying cow, that first was caressed by the crab, that was riding on the donkey, and afterwards, and so on.—But if *possibility* is taken, not in the sense of the possibility of *representing*, but in the sense of *inner possibility*, or the possibility of *the concept*, then the object is an actuality of the kind which is a pure thing, and is, and should be, without a significance of this sort, and can therefore have it only in representation.¹

¶337. If the observer, despite the indifference of the two sides, nevertheless sets to work to determine relations, partly invigorated by the universal rational ground that the *outer is the expression of the inner*, and partly relying on the analogy of the skulls of animals—which indeed may well have a simpler character than human beings, but of which at the same time it will be all the harder to say what character they do have, since it cannot be so easy for anyone really to penetrate in imaginative representation into the nature of an animal,—then the observer finds, in the affirmation of the laws that he claims to have discovered, an *excellent aid* in a distinction which must necessarily occur to us here too.—The *Being* of spirit cannot at least be taken as something simply fixed and immovable. Man is free; it is admitted that the *original Being* consists merely of *dispositions*, over which he has much power, or which require favourable circumstances for their development; i.e. an *original Being* of spirit is equally well to be spoken of as a Being of the sort that does not exist as Being. Were observations therefore to contradict what it occurs to someone to affirm as a law,—should it happen to be fine weather at the annual fair or on wash-day, then shopkeeper and housewife could say that *really* it *ought* to rain, and that the *disposition* to rain is nevertheless *present*; so too with skull-observing,—that this individual *really ought* to be as, according to the law, his skull proclaims, and he has an *original disposition*, but one that has not been developed: this quality is not present, but it *ought* to be *present*.—The *law* and the *ought* are based on observation of actual rainfall, and of the actual sense in the case of this determinacy of the skull; but if the *actuality* is not present, the *empty possibility* serves equally well.—This possibility, i.e. non-actuality, of the proposed law, and hence observations contradicting the law, inevitably

result from the fact that the freedom of the individual, and the developing circumstances, are indifferent to *Being* in general, indifferent to it both as original inner Being and as outer bony Being, and also from the fact that the individual can be something else than he is originally and internally, and still more than what he is as a bone.¹

¶338. We obtain then the possibility that this bump or hollow on the skull may signify something actual, or it may only signify a *disposition*, and, indeed, indeterminately a disposition to something, that it may signify something non-actual; we see what happens, as always, to a bad subterfuge, viz. that it is itself ready to be used against what it is supposed to support. We see opining led by the nature of the Thing to say the *contrary*, but *thoughtlessly*, of what it cherishes;—to say that by this bone something is indicated, but equally *also not* indicated.

¶339. What opinion has in mind with this subterfuge is the true thought which just demolishes the opinion, that *Being* as such is not the truth of spirit at all. As the disposition is already an *original Being*, which has no share in the activity of spirit, just such a Being is the bone for its part too. A being without any spiritual activity is, for consciousness, a thing, and, far from being the essence of consciousness, is rather its contrary, and consciousness is only *actual* to itself through the negation and abolition of such a Being.—From this angle it must be regarded as a complete denial of reason to pass off a bone as the *actual Being-there* of consciousness; and it is passed off as this when it is regarded as the exterior of spirit, for the exterior is just the actuality that is. It is no use saying that from this exterior we *only infer* the interior, which is something different, that the outer is not the inner itself, but only its expression. For in the relationship of the two to one another the determination of the *actuality thinking itself*, and *thought of*, does fall on the side of the inner, but on the side of the outer falls the determination of *the actuality which is*.—When, therefore, a man is told: You (your interior) are this, *because* your bone is constituted in such and such a way, this means nothing else than: I regard a bone as *your actuality*. To reply to such a judgement with a box on the ear, like the above-mentioned reply in the case of physiognomy, initially dislodges the *soft* parts from their aspect and position, and proves only that these are no true *in-itself*, not the actuality of spirit; the retort here would, strictly speaking, have to go the length of beating in the skull of anyone making such a judgement, in order to demonstrate in a manner just as palpable as his wisdom, that for a man, a bone is nothing *in itself*, much less *his* true actuality.¹

¶340. The crude instinct of self-conscious reason will reject out of hand such a science of skulls,—this other observing instinct of self-conscious reason which, having attained to a glimpse of *cognition*, has grasped it in an unspiritual way, according to which the outer is the expression of the inner. But the worse the thought, the less sometimes does it strike one wherein its badness determinately lies, and the harder it is to analyse it. For the thought is said to be worse, the purer and emptier the abstraction which it takes to be the essence. But the opposition we are here concerned with has for its terms the individuality conscious of itself, and the abstraction of the externality that has become wholly a *thing*—that inner Being of spirit conceived as fixed unspiritual Being, opposed to just such a Being.—But with this, observing reason also seems in fact to have reached its peak, at which point it must abandon itself and do an about-turn; for only what is wholly bad has in itself the immediate necessity of reversing

itself.—Just as it can be said of the Jewish people that it is precisely because they stand before the portal of salvation that they are, and have been, the most rejected of peoples: what this people should be in and for itself, this self-essentiality, it is not in its own eyes, but it displaces it beyond itself; by this estrangement it opens up to itself the *possibility* of a higher Being-there, if it could take back its object again into itself, than if it had remained within the immediacy of Being; because spirit is all the greater, the greater the opposition from which it returns into itself; but it makes itself this opposition in the sublation of its immediate unity and in the estrangement of its Being-for-itself. However, if such a consciousness does not reflect itself, the midpoint, in which it stands, is an unhappy void, since what should fulfil it has become a fixed extreme. Thus this final stage of observing reason is its worst, but because of that its reversal is necessary.¹

¶341. For a survey of the series of relationships considered so far which constitute the content and object of observation shows that in their *first mode*, in the observation of the relationships of inorganic nature, *sensory Being* already *disappears* for it; the moments of its relationship present themselves as pure abstractions and as simple concepts which should be firmly tied to the Being-there of things, a Being-there, however, which gets lost, so that the moment proves to be a pure movement and a universal. This free process, complete within itself, retains the significance of something objective, but now emerges as a *unit*; in the process of the inorganic, the unit is the non-existent inner; but existing as a unit, the process is the organic.—The unit, as Being-for-itself or negative essence, confronts the universal, draws away from it, and remains free for itself, so that the concept, realized only in the element of absolute singularization, does not find in organic existence its genuine expression, to be there as a *universal*, but remains an exterior, or what is the same thing, an *interior* of organic nature.—The organic process is only free *in itself*, but is not free *for itself*; in the *purpose* the Being-for-itself of its freedom makes its entry, *exists* as another essence, as a wisdom conscious of itself that is outside the process. Observing reason thus turns to this wisdom, turns to spirit, to the concept existing as universality, or to purpose existing as purpose; and henceforth the object before it is its own essence.¹

¶342. Reason turns at first to the purity of the object; but since it is the apprehension of the object, which moves in its differences as a being, *laws of thinking* emerge for it, relations of constant to constant; but since their content is only moments, these laws go astray into the unit of self-consciousness.—This new object, similarly taken as a *being*, is the *single, contingent* self-consciousness; observation stands, therefore, within the opened spirit and the contingent relationship of conscious actuality to unconscious actuality. This object alone is in itself the necessity of this relation; observation therefore gets to grips with it more closely, and compares its willing and doing actuality with its actuality reflected into itself and contemplating, an actuality that is itself objective. This exterior, although a language of the individual which he has within himself, is at the same time, as sign, something indifferent to the content it is supposed to signify, just as that which posits for itself the sign is indifferent to it.¹

¶343. Because of this, observation finally goes back again from this inconstant language to *fixed Being*, and declares, in accordance with its concept, that externality is the outer and immediate actuality of spirit, not as an organ, and not as language or sign, but as a *dead* thing. What was sublated by the very first observation of inorganic

nature, viz. that the concept ought to be present as a thing, is reinstated by this last mode in such a way that it makes the actuality of spirit itself into a thing or, expressing it the other way round, gives to dead Being the significance of spirit.—With this, observation has here reached the point where it declares what our concept of it was, viz. that the certainty of reason seeks its own self as objective actuality.—Of course, one does not mean here that spirit, which is represented by a skull, is expressed as a thing; there is not supposed to be any materialism, as it is called, involved in this thought, but rather spirit is supposed still to be something other than this bone; but spirit *is*, itself signifies nothing else than: it is a *thing*. When *Being* as such, or thingly Being, is predicated of spirit, then for that reason the genuine expression of this is that spirit *is* the same kind of thing as a *bone*. It must therefore be regarded as extremely important that the true expression has been found for the fact that it is purely said of spirit: it *is*. If it is customarily said of spirit: *it is*, it has a *Being*, is a *thing*, a singular *actuality*, then what is *meant* by this is not something we can see or take in our hands or touch, and so on, but something like that is what is *said*; and what in truth is said expresses itself as: *the Being of spirit is a bone*.¹

¶344. Now this result has a twofold significance. One is its true significance, insofar as it is a completion of the result of the preceding movement of self-consciousness. The unhappy self-consciousness estranged its independence, and struggled to make its *Being-for-itself* into a *thing*. It thereby reverted from self-consciousness to consciousness, i.e. to the consciousness for which the object is a *Being*, a *thing*;—but here, what is a thing is self-consciousness; the thing is, therefore, the unity of the I and Being, the *category*. Since the object is determined thus for consciousness, *consciousness has reason*. Consciousness, as well as self-consciousness, *is in itself* strictly reason; but only that consciousness for which the object has determined itself as the category can be said to *have* reason; from this, however, we must still distinguish the knowledge of what reason is.—The category, which is the *immediate* unity of *Being* and of what is *one's own*, must pass through both forms, and it is precisely to observing consciousness that the category presents itself in the form of *Being*. This consciousness, in its result, enunciates as a proposition that of which it is the unconscious certainty—the proposition that is implicit in the concept of reason. This proposition is the *infinite judgement* that the Self is a thing,—a judgement that sublates itself.¹—Through this result, then, the category acquires this determinate addition, that it is this self-sublating opposition. The *pure* category, which is for consciousness in the form of *Being* or *immediacy*, is the still *unmediated*, merely *present* object, and consciousness is an equally unmediated attitude. The moment of that infinite judgement is the transition of *immediacy* into mediation or *negativity*. The object present is consequently determined as a negative object, while consciousness is determined as *self-consciousness* facing it, or the category, which has run through the form of Being in observation, is now posited in the form of Being-for-itself: consciousness no longer aims to *find* itself *immediately*, but to produce itself by its own activity. *It itself* is the purpose of its doing, as in observing it was concerned only with things.²

¶345. The other significance of the result is the significance already considered, that of unconceptual observation. This knows no other way of grasping and expressing itself than naively asserting the *actuality* of self-consciousness to be the bone just

as it occurs as a sensory thing, which at the same time does not lose its objectivity for consciousness. It also has no clear consciousness, however, about the fact that it says this, and does not grasp its proposition in the determinacy of its subject and predicate, and their relation, still less in the sense of the infinite, self-dissolving judgement, and of the concept.—Rather, out of a deeper-rooted self-consciousness of spirit, which here appears as a natural honesty, it conceals from itself the ignominy of the unconceptual, naked thought which takes a bone for the actuality of self-consciousness, and whitewashes that thought by the additional thoughtlessness of mixing in all sorts of relationships of cause and effect, of sign, organ, etc. which have no sense here, and of hiding the frivolity of the proposition by distinctions derived from them.

¶346. Brain fibres and the like, when regarded as the Being of spirit, are already an actuality in thought, only hypothetical,—not the true actuality as *being-there*, not felt and seen actuality; when they *are there*, when they are seen, they are dead objects, and then no longer pass for the Being of spirit. But objectivity proper must be an *immediate, sensory* objectivity, so that in this objectivity as dead—for the bone is what is dead, insofar as what is dead is present in the living creature itself—spirit is posited as actual.—The concept of this representation is that reason is to itself *all thinghood*, even thinghood that is *purely objective itself*; but reason is this *in the concept*, or only the concept is the truth of this representation; and the purer the concept itself is, the sillier the representation to which it degenerates when its content is not as concept, but as representation,—if the self-sublating judgement is not taken with the consciousness of this its infinitude, but as a permanent proposition whose subject and predicate are valid each for itself, the Self fixed as Self, the thing fixed as thing, and yet one is supposed to be the other.—Reason, essentially the concept, is immediately divided into itself and its contrary, an opposition that, just because of this, is equally immediately sublated. But when reason presents itself as its own self and as its contrary, and is held fast in the entirely singular moment of this asunderness, it is apprehended irrationally; and the purer the moments of this asunderness, the cruder is the appearance of this content which is either only for consciousness, or only ingenuously expressed by it.—The *profundity* which spirit draws forth from within, but only as far as its *representational* consciousness where it lets it remain, and the *ignorance* of this consciousness about what it is that it is saying, are the same conjunction of the high and the low which, in the living creature, nature naively expresses in the conjunction of the organ of its highest fulfilment, the organ of generation, with the organ of pissing.—The infinite judgement, as infinite, would be the fulfilment of life apprehending itself; but when the consciousness of this life remains in representation it behaves like pissing.¹

B. *The actualization of rational self-consciousness through itself*

¶347. Self-consciousness found the thing as itself, and found itself as a thing; i.e. *it is for it* that *in itself* it is objective actuality. It is no longer the *immediate* certainty of being all reality; but a certainty for which the immediate in general has the form of a sublated immediate, so that its *objectivity* still has only the value of a surface, whose interior and essence is *self-consciousness itself*.—The object, to which it is positively related, is therefore a self-consciousness; the object is in the form of thinghood, i.e. it

is *independent*; but self-consciousness has the certainty that this independent object is for it not anything alien; thus it knows that it is *in itself* recognized by the object; it is *spirit* that has the certainty of having its unity with itself in the duplication of its self-consciousness and in the independence of both. This certainty has now to be elevated to truth for self-consciousness; what holds good for it, that it is *in itself* and in its inner certainty, has to enter into its consciousness and become *for it*.¹

¶348. What the universal stations of this actualization will be is already signified in a general way from a comparison with the path followed so far. That is, just as observing reason repeated, in the element of the category, the movement of *consciousness*, viz. sense-certainty, perceiving, and understanding, so reason will again run through the double movement of *self-consciousness* too, and pass over from independence into its freedom. To begin with, this active reason is conscious of itself merely as an individual and as such must demand and produce its actuality in the other,—but then, when its consciousness ascends to universality, the individual becomes *universal* reason, and is conscious of itself as reason, as something already recognized in and for itself, which in its pure consciousness unites all self-consciousness; it is the simple spiritual essence which, in attaining at the same time to consciousness, is the *real substance*, into which the earlier forms return as into their ground, so that, with regard to the ground, they are merely single moments of its becoming, moments which do indeed break loose and appear as determinate shapes, but in fact have *Being-there* and *actuality* only as sustained by the ground, and have their *truth* only insofar as they are in it and remain in it.¹

¶349. If we take in its reality this goal, which is the *concept* that has already arisen for us,—viz. the recognized self-consciousness that has the certainty of itself in the other free self-consciousness, and has its truth precisely in it,—or if we bring out this still inner spirit as the substance that has already advanced to its *Being-there*, then in this concept *the realm of ethical life* opens up. For this is nothing else than, in the independent *actuality* of individuals, the absolute spiritual *unity* of their essence; it is a self-consciousness, universal in itself, that takes itself to be actual in another consciousness, in such a way that this other consciousness has complete independence or is a thing for it, and that it is precisely therein that the universal self-consciousness is aware of its unity with the other, and only in this unity with this objective essence is it self-consciousness. This ethical substance, the *abstraction of universality*, is only the law *in thought*, but it is just as immediately actual *self-consciousness*, or it is *custom*. The *singular* consciousness, conversely, is only this unitary being insofar as it is conscious of the universal consciousness in its singularity as its own Being, insofar as its doing and *Being-there* is the universal custom.¹

¶350. It is in the life of a people in fact that the concept of the actualization of self-conscious reason has its complete reality—intuiting, in the independence of the *other*, complete unity with it, or having for my object, as *my* *Being-for-myself*, the free *thinghood* of an Other I encounter, a thinghood that is the negative of myself. Reason is present as the fluid universal *substance*, as unchangeable simple *thinghood*, which bursts asunder into many completely independent essences, just as light bursts asunder into stars as countless points shining for themselves, which in their absolute *Being-for-themselves* are dissolved in the simple independent substance, not merely *in themselves*, but *for themselves*; they are conscious of being these singular

independent essences because of the fact that they sacrifice their singularity, and this universal substance is their soul and essence; just as this universal is again the *doing* of themselves as singular, or is the work that they have produced.¹

¶351. The *purely singular* doings and activities of the individual relate to the needs which he has as a natural creature, i.e. as a *singularity that just is*. That even these, its commonest functions, do not come to nothing, but have actuality, come about through the universal sustaining medium, through the *power* of the entire people.—But it is not only this *form of the subsistence* of his doing in general that the individual has in the universal substance, but equally *its content*; what he does *is* the universal skill and custom of all. This content, insofar as it is completely singularized, is, in its actuality, confined within the framework of the doing of all. The *labour* of the individual for his needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own, and the satisfaction of his own needs he obtains only through the labour of others.—As the singleton in his *singular* labour already *unconsciously* accomplishes a *universal* labour, so again he also accomplishes the universal labour as his *conscious* object; the whole becomes, as a *whole*, his product, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in so doing receives back from it his own self.—There is nothing here which would not be reciprocal, nothing in which the independence of the individual would not, in the dissolution of its Being-for-itself in the *negation* of itself, give itself its *positive* significance of being for itself. This unity of Being for another or of making oneself a thing, and of Being-for-itself, this universal substance, speaks its *universal language* in the customs and laws of its people. But this unchangeable essence that just is, is nothing but the expression of the singular individuality itself which seems opposed to it; the laws proclaim what each singleton *is* and *does*; the individual recognizes them not only as his *universal* objective thinghood, but equally recognizes himself in them, or recognizes them as singularized in his own individuality and in each of his fellow citizens. In the universal spirit, therefore, each has only the certainty of himself, of finding nothing but himself in the actuality that is; he is as certain of the others as he is of himself.—I intuit in all of them that they are for themselves only these independent essences, just as I am; I intuit in them the free unity with the others in such a way that, just as this unity is through me, so it is through the others themselves,—I intuit them as me, me as them.¹

¶352. In a free people, therefore, reason is in truth actualized; it is a present living spirit in which the individual not only finds his *determination*, i.e. his universal and singular essence, expressed and present as thinghood, but is himself this essence and has also attained his determination. The wisest men of antiquity have therefore made the announcement: *that wisdom and virtue consist in living in conformity with the customs of one's people*.¹

¶353. But from this happy condition of having reached its determination and of living in it, self-consciousness, which initially is spirit only immediately and *in accordance with the concept*, has withdrawn, or else—has not yet reached it; for both may equally well be said.¹

¶354. Reason *must withdraw from this happy condition*; for the life of a free people is only *in itself*, or *immediately*, the *real ethical order*, or it is an ethical order that *is*, and therefore this universal spirit itself is also a singular spirit, the whole of the

customs and laws are a *determinate* ethical substance, which only in the higher moment, viz. in the *consciousness of its essence*, sheds this limitation and in this cognition alone has its absolute truth, but not immediately in its Being; in its Being it is a limited ethical substance, and absolute limitation is just this, that spirit is in the form of *Being*.¹

¶355. Further, the *single* consciousness, as it immediately has its existence in the real ethical order or in the people, is therefore a solid trust, for which spirit has not resolved itself into its *abstract* moments, and which therefore is not aware of itself *as being pure singularity for itself*. But once it has arrived at this thought, as it must, then this *immediate* unity with spirit, or its *Being* in spirit, its trust, is lost; *isolated* for itself, the single consciousness is now the essence to itself, no longer universal spirit. The *moment of this singularity of self-consciousness* is, of course, within universal spirit itself, but only as a vanishing quantity which, as soon as it emerges for itself, just as immediately dissolves in universal spirit, and enters consciousness only as trust. In thus establishing itself—and each moment, because it is a moment of the essence, must succeed in displaying itself as the essence—the individual has thereby placed himself in opposition to the laws and customs; they are only a thought without absolute essentiality, an abstract theory without actuality; but the individual as this I is to itself the living truth.¹

¶356. Or, self-consciousness has *not yet attained this happy condition* of being ethical substance, the spirit of a people. For having returned back from observation, spirit, at first, is not yet actualized as such through itself; it is posited only as *inner* essence or as abstraction.—Or, spirit *is*, at first, *immediately*; but in being immediately, it is *singular*; it is the practical consciousness, which steps into its world which it finds before it, with the aim of duplicating itself in this determinacy of a singular, of engendering itself as a This, as its counterpart that just is, and of becoming conscious of this unity of its actuality with the objective essence. Consciousness has the *certainty* of this unity; it holds that the unity, or that this agreement of itself with thinghood, is already present *in itself*, and has only to become present *to itself* through its own agency, or that the production of the unity is equally the *finding* of it. Since this unity means *happiness*, this individual is herewith sent out into the world by its spirit *to seek its happiness*.¹

¶357. If then, for us, the truth of this rational self-consciousness is the ethical substance, here, for that self-consciousness, is the beginning of its ethical world-experience. Insofar as self-consciousness has not yet attained the ethical substance, this movement presses towards it; and what sublates itself in the ethical substance are the single moments which for self-consciousness are valid in their isolation. They have the form of an immediate willing or *natural impulse* which obtains its satisfaction, a satisfaction which is itself the content of a new impulse.—But insofar as self-consciousness has lost the happiness of being in the substance, these natural impulses are bound up with consciousness of their purpose as the true determination and essentiality; the ethical substance has declined into a selfless predicate, whose living subjects are the individuals who have to fulfil their universality by their own efforts and to provide for their determination by themselves.—In the former meaning, then, those shapes are the becoming of the ethical substance and precede it; in the latter meaning, they follow it and resolve for self-consciousness what its determination is.

In the former case, the immediacy or rawness of the impulses gets lost in the movement of experiencing what their truth is, and their content passes over into a higher content, while in the latter case, what is lost is the false representation of the consciousness which posits its determination in those impulses. In the former case, the *goal* they attain is the ethical substance, while, in the latter, the goal is the consciousness of those impulses,¹ and in fact a consciousness of such a sort that it knows them as its own essence; and to that extent this movement would be the becoming of morality, of a higher shape than ethical substance. But these shapes, at the same time, constitute only one side of the becoming of morality, namely, the side that falls in *Being-for-itself*, or in which consciousness sublates *its* purposes,—not the side where morality emerges from the substance itself. Since these moments cannot as yet have the significance of being made into purposes in opposition to the lost ethical order, they count here, in fact, for no more than their bare content, and the goal they press towards is the ethical substance. But since in our times that form of these moments is more familiar in which they appear after consciousness has lost its ethical life and, in searching for it, repeats those forms, they may be represented more in terms of this sort.²

¶358. Self-consciousness which is at first only the concept of spirit, enters on this path with the determinacy of being, to itself, the essence as a singular spirit; and its purpose is therefore to give itself actualization as a single self-consciousness and to enjoy itself as this single self-consciousness in its actualization.

¶359. In the determination of being, in its own eyes, the essence as a *being-for-itself*, it is the *negativity* of the other; in its consciousness, therefore, it itself as the positive confronts something which certainly *is*, but has for it the significance of something that is-not-in-itself; consciousness appears split into this actuality found before it and the *purpose* which it accomplishes by sublating that actuality, a purpose that it makes into actuality in place of the former. [a] Its initial purpose, however, is its *immediate* abstract *Being-for-itself* or to intuit itself as *this singleton* in another, or to intuit another self-consciousness as itself. [b] The experience of what the truth of this purpose is raises self-consciousness to a higher level, and from now on it is its own purpose, insofar as it is at the same time *universal* and has the *law immediately* within it. In carrying out this *law* of its *heart*, however, it learns by experience that the *single* essence, in doing so, cannot maintain itself, but rather that the good can only be accomplished through the sacrifice of this essence, and [c] self-consciousness becomes *virtue*. The experience that virtue undergoes can only be this, that its purpose is already attained in itself, that happiness is found immediately in the doing itself, and the doing itself is the good. The concept of this entire sphere, that thinghood is the *Being-for-itself* of spirit itself, dawns on self-consciousness in the movement of this sphere. Having found this concept, self-consciousness is thus, to itself, actuality as individuality immediately expressing itself, an individuality which meets no resistance in an actuality opposed to it, and whose object and purpose is only this expression itself.¹

A. PLEASURE AND NECESSITY

¶360. Self-consciousness which, to itself, is *reality* in general, has its object in its own self, but as an object which it initially has only *for itself*, and which is not yet in being;

Being confronts it as an actuality other than its own; and self-consciousness sets out, by accomplishing its Being-for-itself, to intuit itself as another independent essence. This *first purpose* is to become conscious of itself as singular essence in the other self-consciousness, or to make this other into itself; it has the certainty that *in itself* this other is already itself.—Insofar as it has raised itself out of the ethical substance and the tranquil Being of thinking to its *Being-for-itself*, it has left behind the law of custom and Being-there, the findings of observation, and theory, as a grey shadow in the process of disappearing; for this is rather a knowledge of something whose Being-for-itself and actuality is other than that of self-consciousness. Instead of the heavenly-seeming spirit of the universality of knowing and doing in which the sensation and the enjoyment of singularity are silent, there has entered into it the spirit of the Earth, for which what counts as true actuality is only that Being which is the actuality of the singular consciousness.

It despises intellect and science,
The supreme gifts of man—It has surrendered to the devil
And must go under.¹

¶361. It plunges therefore into life and brings to fulfilment the pure individuality in which it arises. It does not so much make its own happiness as immediately take and enjoy it. The shadows of science, laws and principles, which alone stand between it and its own actuality, vanish like a lifeless mist which can be no match for the certainty of its reality; it takes hold of life much as a ripe fruit is plucked, which readily offers itself to the hand that takes it.¹

¶362. Its doing is only in one moment a doing of *desire*; it does not aim at the destruction of the objective essence in its entirety, but only at the form of its otherness or its independence, which is a semblance devoid of essence; for *in itself* it counts this otherness as the same essence as itself, or its selfhood. The element in which desire and its object subsist, mutually indifferent and independent, is *living Being-there*; the enjoyment of desire sublates this Being-there insofar as it belongs to the object of desire. But here this element which gives to both a separate actuality is rather the category, a Being which is essentially a *represented* Being; it is therefore the *consciousness* of independence, which preserves the individuals each for itself—whether it now be natural consciousness, or consciousness developed into a system of laws. This separation is not in itself for self-consciousness, which knows the other as *its own* selfhood. It attains therefore to the enjoyment of *pleasure*, to the consciousness of its actualization in a consciousness which appears as independent, or to the intuition of the unity of the two independent self-consciousnesses. It attains its purpose, but just in doing so it experiences what the truth of that purpose is. It comprehends itself as *this singular essence that is-for-itself*, but the actualization of this purpose is itself the sublation of it; for it becomes an object to itself not as *this single* self-consciousness, but rather as the *unity* of itself and the other self-consciousness, hence as a sublated singleton or a *universal*.¹

¶363. The pleasure enjoyed has indeed the positive significance of having become *to itself* as objective self-consciousness; but equally it has the negative significance of having sublated *itself*; and since it comprehended its actualization in the former

significance only, its experience enters its consciousness as a contradiction in which the attained actuality of its singularity sees itself destroyed by the negative *essence*, which confronts it, devoid of actuality and empty, and yet is the power consuming it. This essence is nothing else than the *concept* of what this individuality in itself is. This individuality is, however, as yet the poorest shape of self-actualizing spirit; for it is, to itself, at first only the *abstraction* of reason, or the *immediacy* of the *unity* of *Being-for-itself* and *Being-in-itself*; its essence is, therefore, only the *abstract* category. Nevertheless it no longer has the form of *immediate, simple* Being, as it has for the observing spirit, where it is abstract *Being* or, posited as alien, is *thinghood* in general. Here in this thinghood there has entered Being-for-itself and mediation. Thinghood therefore makes its entry as a *circle* whose content is the developed pure relation of the simple essentialities. The actualization attained by this individuality consists therefore in nothing more than this, viz. that it has cast forth this circle of abstractions from its confinement within simple self-consciousness, into the element of *Being-for-it* or of objective expansion. So what becomes an *object* to self-consciousness as its essence in the pleasure of enjoyment is the expansion of those empty essentialities, of pure unity, of pure difference, and their relation; further, the object which the individuality experiences as its *essence*, has no content. It is what is called *necessity*; for necessity, *fate*, and the like, is just that about which we cannot say *what* it does, what its determinate laws and positive content are, because it is the absolute pure concept itself intuited as *Being*, the *relation* that is simple and empty, but also irresistible and imperturbable, whose work is merely the nothingness of singularity. It is this *fixed connection*, because what is connected is the pure essentialities or the empty abstractions; unity, difference, and relation are categories each of which is nothing in and for itself, but only in relation to its contrary, and they cannot therefore be separated from one another. They are related to one another through their *concept*, for they are the pure concepts themselves; and this *absolute relation* and abstract movement constitutes necessity. The merely single individuality which, in the first instance, has only the pure concept of reason for its content, instead of having taken the plunge from dead theory into life, has therefore really only plunged into the consciousness of its own lifelessness and partakes of itself only as empty and alien necessity, as *dead* actuality.¹

¶364. The transition takes place from the form of the *One* into that of *universality*, from one absolute abstraction into the other, from the purpose of pure *Being-for-itself* which has thrown off community with *others*, into the *pure* contrary which is thereby equally abstract *Being-in-itself*. Consequently, the way in which this appears is that the individual has simply met its downfall, and the absolute rigidity of singularity is pulverized on the equally hard but continuous actuality.—Since it is, as consciousness, the unity of itself and its contrary, this downfall is still for it its purpose and actualization, as also the contradiction of what was *to it* the essence and what is *in itself* the essence;—it experiences the double meaning involved in what it did, viz. when it *took hold* of its *life*; it took life but in doing so it really got hold of death.¹

¶365. This *transition* of its living Being into lifeless necessity therefore appears to it as an inversion which is not mediated by anything at all. The mediator would have to be that in which both sides would be one, where, therefore, consciousness recognized

one moment in the other, its purpose and doing in fate, and its fate in its purpose and doing, *its own essence* in this *necessity*. But this unity is, for this consciousness, just pleasure itself, or the *simple single* feeling, and the transition from the moment of this its purpose into the moment of its true essence is for it a sheer leap into the opposite; for these moments are not contained and linked together in feeling, but only in the pure Self, which is a universal or thinking. Consciousness, therefore, through its experience in which it should have found its truth, has really become a riddle to itself, the consequences of its deeds are, to it, not the deeds themselves; what befalls it is, *for it*, not the experience of what it is *in itself*, the transition is not a mere alteration of the form of the same content and essence, represented now as content and essence of consciousness, and again as object or *intuited* essence of itself. The *abstract necessity* therefore counts as the merely negative, uncomprehended *power of universality*, in which individuality is smashed to pieces.¹

¶366. This is as far as the appearance of this shape of self-consciousness goes; the final moment of its existence is the thought of the loss of itself in necessity, or the thought of itself as an essence that is absolutely *alien* to it. However, self-consciousness has *in itself* survived this loss; for this necessity or pure universality is *its own* essence. This reflection of consciousness into itself, knowing the necessity as *itself*, is a new shape of consciousness.¹

B. THE LAW OF THE HEART AND THE FRENZY OF SELF-CONCEIT

¶367. What necessity in truth is in self-consciousness, it is for its new shape of self-consciousness, in which it knows itself as the necessary; it knows that it has the *universal* or the *law immediately* within itself, and because of its determination of being *immediately* present in the Being-for-itself of consciousness, it is called the *law of the heart*. Like the previous shape, this shape is *for itself*, as *singularity*, essence; but it is richer in having the determination that its *Being-for-itself* counts for it as necessary or universal.

¶368. The law, therefore, which is immediately self-consciousness's own law, or a heart which nevertheless has a law within it, is the *purpose* which self-consciousness proceeds to actualize. It remains to be seen whether its actualization will correspond to this concept and whether in that actualization it will experience this, its law as the essence.¹

¶369. This heart is confronted by an actuality; for in the heart the law is, at first, only *for itself*, it is not yet actualized, and is therefore at the same time something *other* than the concept. This other thereby determines itself as an actuality which is the opposite of what is to be actualized, and consequently is the *contradiction of the law* and the *singularity*. This actuality is, therefore, on the one hand a law by which the single individuality is oppressed, a violent ordering of the world which contradicts the law of the heart and, on the other hand, a humanity suffering under that ordering, a humanity that does not follow the law of the heart, but is subjected to an alien necessity.—It is evident that this actuality which appears *over against* the present shape of consciousness is nothing else but the foregoing discordant relationship of individuality and its truth, the relationship of a cruel necessity by which the former is oppressed. *For us*, the preceding movement stands over against the new shape, because the latter in itself has arisen from it, and the moment from which

it has come is therefore necessary for it; but to the new shape that moment appears as something *found before it*, since it has no consciousness of its own *origin*, and to it the essence is rather to be *for its own self*, or the negative relatively to this positive in-itself.¹

¶370. This individuality therefore directs its energies to sublating this necessity which contradicts the law of the heart, and also the suffering brought about by it. And so it is no longer the levity of the previous shape, which only wanted the singular pleasure; on the contrary, it is the earnestness of a high purpose which seeks its pleasure in displaying the *excellence* of its own essence, and in promoting the *welfare of humanity*. What it actualizes is itself the law, and its pleasure is therefore at the same time the universal pleasure of all hearts. To it the two are *inseparable*; its pleasure is what conforms to the law, and the actualization of the law of universal humanity procures for it its own singular pleasure. For within its own self, individuality and the necessary are *immediately* one; the law is the law of the heart. Individuality is not yet dislodged from its seat, and the unity of the two has not been brought about by their mediating movement, not yet through discipline. The actualization of the immediate undisciplined essence passes for a display of its excellence and as promotion of the welfare of humanity.¹

¶371. The law, on the other hand, which confronts the law of the heart is separated from the heart, and free for itself. Humanity which is subject to this law does not live in the blessed unity of the law with the heart; but either lives in cruel separation and in suffering, or at least dispenses with the enjoyment of *itself* in *compliance* with the law, and lacks the consciousness of its own excellence in *transgressing* it. Because that authoritative divine and human order is separated from the heart, it is for the latter a *semblance* which ought to lose what is still associated with it, viz. the power of authority and actuality. In its *content* it may well by chance agree with the law of the heart, and then the latter can accept it; but for the heart, the essence is not the bare conformity to law as such, but that in the law it has the consciousness of *itself*, that it has satisfied *itself* in it. Where, however, the content of universal necessity does not agree with the heart then necessity, even as regards its content, is in itself nothing and must give way to the law of the heart.¹

¶372. The individual, then, *accomplishes* the law of his heart; this law becomes a *universal order*, and pleasure becomes an actuality which in and for itself conforms to law. But, in this actualization, the law of the heart has in fact eluded the individual; it immediately becomes merely the relationship which was supposed to be sublating. The law of the heart, through its very actualization, ceases to be a law of the *heart*. For in its actualization it receives the form of *Being*, and is now *universal* power for which *this* heart is a matter of indifference, so that the individual, by *setting up his own* order, no longer finds it to be his own. Consequently, what the individual brings about through the actualization of his law, is not *his* law; on the contrary, since the order is *in itself* his own, but for him an alien order, what the individual brings about is merely the entanglement of himself in the actual order, an entanglement in it, moreover, not as a superior power which is only alien to him, but hostile.—By his deed the individual posits himself *in*, or rather *as*, the universal element of the actuality in being, and his deed is supposed to have, even according to the sense he attributes to it, the value of a universal order. But the individual has thereby *freed*

himself from himself; he goes on growing as universality for himself and purges himself of singularity; the individual who wants to recognize universality only in the form of his immediate Being-for-himself therefore fails to recognize himself in this free universality, while at the same time he belongs to it, for it is his doing. This doing, therefore, has the reverse significance, that of *contradicting* the universal order, for the individual's deed is supposed to be the deed of *his* singular heart, not free universal actuality; and at the same time he has in fact *recognized* the latter, for the doing has the sense of positing his essence as *free actuality*, i.e. of recognizing the actuality as his essence.¹

¶373. The individual has, through the concept of his doing, determined the more precise way in which the actual universality, to which he has attached himself, turns against him. His deed, as *actuality*, belongs to the universal; but its content is the very individuality which, as this *singular* individuality, wants to preserve itself in opposition to the universal. It is not any determinate law the setting-up of which would be in question; on the contrary, the immediate unity of the singular heart with universality is the thought, elevated into a supposedly valid law, that, in what is law, *every heart* must recognize its own *self*. But only the heart of this individual has posited its actuality in his deed, which expresses for him his *Being-for-himself* or *his pleasure*. The deed is supposed to be immediately valid as a universal; that is to say, it is in truth something particular, and has merely the form of universality; the *particular* content of the deed is supposed, *as such*, to rank as a universal. Consequently, others do not find fulfilled in this content the law of their heart, but rather the law of *another heart*; and, precisely in accordance with the universal law that each shall find in what is law his own heart, they turn against the actuality the heart set up, just as it turned against theirs. Thus, just as the individual at first finds only the rigid law, now he finds the hearts of men themselves, opposed to his excellent intentions and detestable.¹

¶374. Because this consciousness at first knows universality only as *immediate*, and necessity as necessity of the *heart*, the nature of the actualization and the efficacy is unknown to it; it does not know that this actualization, as that which *is*, is in its truth rather the *universal in itself*, in which the singularity of consciousness, which entrusts itself to it in order to *be this* immediate *singularity*, perishes instead; instead of this *Being of its own*, it therefore attains in Being the alienation of *itself*. But that in which it does not recognize itself is no longer dead necessity, but necessity animated by the universal individuality. It took this divine and human order, which it found in force, to be a dead actuality in which those who belong to that order would, like itself—which fixes itself as this heart, being for itself in opposition to the universal—have no consciousness of themselves; but it finds instead that this order is really animated by the consciousness of all, that it is the law of all hearts. It learns by experience that the actuality is an order with life in it, and it experiences this in fact precisely in actualizing the law of its own heart; for this means nothing else than that individuality becomes an object to itself as a universal, but an object in which consciousness does not recognize itself.¹

¶375. Thus, for this shape of self-consciousness, what emerges from its experience as the true, *contradicts* what this shape is *for itself*. But what it is for itself, has itself the form of absolute universality for it, and it is the law of the heart which is immediately

one with *self*-consciousness. At the same time, the subsisting and living order is equally its *own essence* and work; it produces nothing else but that; this order is in equally immediate unity with self-consciousness. In this way self-consciousness belongs to a twofold opposed essentiality, it is contradictory in itself and disrupted in its innermost core. The law of *this* heart is only that in which self-consciousness recognizes itself; but the universally valid order has, through the actualizing of that law, equally become for self-consciousness its own *essence* and its own *actuality*; thus what contradicts itself in its consciousness is the two terms, in the form of the essence and of its own actuality for it.¹

§376. When self-consciousness announces this moment of its conscious downfall and therein the result of its experience, it reveals itself as this inner inversion of itself, as the derangement of consciousness, which finds that its essence is immediately unessence, its actuality immediately an unactuality.—The derangement cannot be taken to mean that in general something devoid of essence is regarded as essential, something non-actual as actual, so that what for one of us is essential or actual would not be so for another, and that the consciousness of actuality and non-actuality, or of essentiality and unessentiality, would thus fall apart.—If something is in fact actual and essential for consciousness in general, but is not so for me, then in the consciousness of its nothingness I have at the same time, since I am consciousness in general, the consciousness of its actuality,—and since they are both fixed, this is a unity which is madness in general. But in this state only an *object* is deranged for consciousness, not consciousness as such within and for itself. But in the result of experience which has emerged here, consciousness, in its law, is conscious *of itself* as this actuality; and at the same time, since the very same essentiality, the same actuality, is *alienated* from it, it is, as self-consciousness, as absolute actuality, conscious of its own unactuality, or the two sides count for it, in their contradiction, as immediately *its own essence*, which is thus deranged in its inmost core.¹

§377. The heart-throb for the welfare of humanity therefore passes into the ravings of a deranged self-conceit, into the fury of consciousness to preserve itself from destruction; and it does this by expelling from itself the perversion which it is itself, and by striving to look on it and express it as something else. It therefore speaks of the universal order as a perversion of the law of the heart and its happiness a perversion invented by fanatical priests, debauched despots and their minions, who compensate themselves for their own degradation by degrading and oppressing others, a perversion wielded to the nameless misery of deluded humanity.—In this its derangement, consciousness declares *individuality* to be what is deranging and perverted, but an *alien* and *contingent* individuality. It is the heart, however, or the *singularity of consciousness, immediately aspiring to universality*, that is this deranging and perverted principle itself, and the outcome of its doing is merely that this contradiction comes to *its* consciousness. For the true is for it the law of the heart,—something merely *opined* which has not, like the subsisting order, endured the light of day, but rather, as soon as it is exposed to it, passes away. This its law ought to have *actuality*; the law, then, as *actuality*, as *valid order*, is, to it, purpose and essence; but *actuality*, that very law as *valid order*, is instead immediately to it the null and void.—Similarly, its *own* actuality, *the heart itself* as singularity of consciousness, is to itself the essence; but its purpose is to posit it *in being*; thus it is rather its Self

as something non-singular that is immediately for it the essence, or purpose as law, hence as a universality, which it would be for its own consciousness.—This its concept becomes, by its doing, its object; thus the heart undergoes experience rather of its Self as the unactual, and of unactuality as its actuality. It is therefore not a contingent and alien individuality, but just this heart, which in every aspect is, within itself, the perverted and perverting.¹

¶378. Since, however, the immediately universal individuality is the perverted and the perverting, this universal order, since it is the law of all *hearts*, i.e. of what is perverted, is itself no less the perverted in itself, as raving derangement declared. On the one hand, this order proves itself to be a *law* of all hearts, by the resistance which the law of a heart encounters in other singletons. The subsisting laws are defended against the law of an individual, because they are not unconscious, empty, and dead necessity, but spiritual universality and substance, in which those in whom this spiritual substance has its actuality live as individuals, and are conscious of themselves; so that even when they complain about this order, as running counter to the inner law, and maintain against it the opinions of the heart, in fact with their hearts they cling to it as their essence, and if this order is taken from them, or they place themselves outside it, they lose everything. Since it is precisely in this that the actuality and power of the public order consist, this order thus appears as the essence equal to itself, universally vivified, and individuality appears as the form of this order.—But this order is equally a perversion.¹

¶379. For the fact that it is the law of all hearts, that all individuals are immediately this universal, implies that the order is an actuality which is only the actuality of the individuality *that is for itself*, or only the actuality of the heart. The consciousness which sets up the law of its heart therefore experiences resistance from others, because it contradicts the *equally singular* laws of their heart; and these others in their resistance are doing nothing else but setting up and claiming validity for their law. The *universal* that is present here is, then, only a universal resistance and struggle of all against one another, in which each claims validity for his own singularity, but at the same time does not succeed, because his singularity experiences the same resistance and is dissolved reciprocally by the others. What seems to be public *order*, then, is this universal hostility, in which each wrests what he can for himself, executes justice on the singularity of others and establishes his own, which equally vanishes at the hands of others. This order is the *course of the world*, the semblance of an unchanging course that is only an *opined universality*, and whose content is rather the essenceless play of establishing and dissolving singularities.¹

¶380. If we consider the two sides of the universal order in comparison with each other, then the latter universality has for its content the restless individuality for which opinion or singularity is law, for which the actual is unactual, and the unactual is the actual. But at the same time it is the *side of the actuality* of the order, for to it belongs the *Being-for-itself* of individuality.—The other side is the *universal* as *tranquil* essence, but for that very reason only as an *interior*, which, though it is not nothing at all, still is no actuality and can itself become actual only by sublation of the individuality which has arrogated actuality to itself. This shape of consciousness, which consists in becoming for oneself in the law, in what is *in itself* true and good, not as singularity but only as *essence*, and yet in knowing individuality as the

perverted and perverting, and therefore knowing that it must sacrifice singularity of consciousness—this shape of consciousness is *virtue*.¹

C. VIRTUE AND THE COURSE OF THE WORLD

¶381. In the first shape of active reason, self-consciousness took itself to be pure individuality, and it was confronted by empty universality. In the second shape, the two sides of the opposition each had *both* moments within them, law and individuality; but one side, the heart, was their immediate unity, the other their opposition. Here, in the relationship of virtue and the course of the world, each of the two members is unity and opposition of these moments, or a movement of law and individuality with regard to one another, but an opposed movement. To the consciousness of virtue the *law* is the *essential*, and individuality is what is to be sublated, and sublated therefore in individuality's own consciousness as well as in the course of the world. In this consciousness, the particular individuality is to be brought under the discipline of the universal, what is in itself true and good; but under that discipline it still remains a personal consciousness: true discipline is just the sacrifice of the entire personality as proof that in fact consciousness does not still remain attached to singularities. In this singular sacrifice, the individuality in *the course of the world* is at the same time eradicated, for it too is a simple moment common to both.—In the course of the world, individuality behaves in a way which is the reverse of its behaviour when it is posited in the virtuous consciousness, viz. it makes itself the essence, whereas what is *in itself* good and true it subjugates to itself.—Further, the course of the world, too, is for virtue not merely this universal *perverted by individuality*; on the contrary, the absolute *order* is likewise a common moment, present for consciousness in the course of the world, only not as an *actuality in being*, but as the *inner essence* of the course of the world. Therefore this order, strictly speaking, has not first to be produced by virtue, for producing is, as *doing*, consciousness of individuality, and individuality is rather to be sublated; but this sublating merely makes room, as it were, for the in-itself of the course of the world to enter into existence in and for itself.¹

¶382. The universal *content* of the actual course of the world has already emerged; looked at more closely, it is again nothing else but the two preceding movements of self-consciousness. From them has issued the shape of virtue; since they are its origin, it has them before it; but virtue sets out to sublimate its origin, and to realize itself, or to become *for itself*. The course of the world is thus, on the one hand, the single individuality which seeks its pleasure and enjoyment, in doing so in fact finds its downfall, and thereby satisfies the universal. But this very satisfaction, like the rest of the moments of this relationship, is a perverted shape and movement of the universal. The actuality is only the singularity of the pleasure and enjoyment, whereas the universal is opposed to it, a necessity which is merely the empty shape of the universal, a merely negative reaction and a doing devoid of content.—The other moment of the course of the world is individuality that in and for itself wants to be law, and in this pretension disturbs the subsisting order; the universal law, it is true, preserves itself in face of this self-conceit, and no longer makes its entry as something opposed to consciousness and empty, as a dead necessity, but as a *necessity within consciousness itself*. But, when it exists as the *conscious* relation of an absolutely

contradictory actuality, it is derangement; when it is as an *objective* actuality, however, it is pervertedness in general. The universal, then, does display itself in both sides as the power of their movement; but the *existence* of this power is merely a universal perversion.¹

¶383. It is from virtue now that the universal is supposed to receive its true actuality by sublating individuality, the principle of the perversion; virtue's purpose is, by so doing, to reverse again the perverted course of the world and to produce its true essence. This true essence is at first in the course of the world only as its *in-itself*; it is not yet actual, and consequently virtue only *believes in* it. This faith virtue proceeds to elevate to vision, without, however, enjoying the fruits of its labour and sacrifice. For insofar as it is *individuality*, it is the *doing* of the conflict it wages with the course of the world; but its purpose and true essence is the defeat of the actuality of the course of the world; the existence of the good thereby effected is thus the cessation of its *doing* or of the *consciousness* of individuality.—What the outcome of this conflict itself is, what experience virtue undergoes in it, whether, by the sacrifice it undertakes, the course of the world succumbs while virtue triumphs—this must be decided by the nature of the living *weapons* borne by the combatants. For the weapons are nothing else but the *essence* of the combatants themselves, an essence which comes to light only for both of them reciprocally. Their weapons have already disclosed themselves from what in itself is present in this conflict.¹

¶384. For the virtuous consciousness the *universal* is genuine in *faith*, or *in itself*, not yet an actual, but an *abstract*, universality; in this consciousness itself it is *as purpose*, in the course of the world it is *as its interior*. It is precisely in this determination that the universal, for the course of the world, presents itself in virtue too; for virtue at first *wills* to accomplish the good, and does not, as yet, pass it off as actuality. This determinacy can also be looked at in this way: the good, in entering the lists in the conflict with the course of the world, thereby presents itself as being for *an other*, as something that is not *in and for itself*, for otherwise it would not want to first gain its truth by vanquishing its contrary. That it is, to begin with, only *for an other*, means the same as was shown before in the opposite way of looking at it, viz. that it is, to begin with, an *abstraction* which has reality, not in and for itself, but only in its relationship.¹

¶385. The good or universal, then, as it enters the scene here, is what are called *gifts, capacities, forces*. It is a mode of being of the spiritual, in which it is represented as a universal, which requires the principle of individuality for its vitality and movement, and in individuality has its *actuality*. This universal is *put to good use* by this principle, insofar as the principle is in the consciousness of virtue, but is *misused* by it insofar as it is in the course of the world;—a passive instrument which, controlled by the hand of free individuality, indifferent to the use it makes of it, can also be misused for the production of an actuality, which is its destruction; a lifeless material lacking an independence of its own, which can be formed this way or that, and even to its own ruin.¹

¶386. Since this universal is equally at the disposal of the consciousness of virtue and the course of the world, it can hardly be foreseen whether virtue thus armed will conquer vice. The weapons are the same; they are these capacities and forces. Virtue has, it is true, set up an ambush: its faith in the original unity of its purpose and the

essence of the course of the world, a unity that is supposed to fall on the enemy from the rear during the fight, and *in itself* to accomplish that purpose, so that in fact, because of this, for the knight of virtue his own *doing* and struggling is really a sham-fight which he *can* not take seriously,—because he posits his genuine strength in the fact that the good is *in and for itself*, i.e. accomplishes itself,—a sham-fight that he also *dare* not allow to become serious. For what he turns against the enemy and finds turned against himself, and what he runs the risk of eroding and damaging in himself as well as in his enemy, is supposed not to be the good itself; for he fights to preserve and accomplish that; rather, what is risked in the fight is only the indifferent gifts and capacities. But these are, in fact, nothing else but just that very universal devoid of individuality, the universal which is supposed to be preserved and actualized by the conflict.—But, at the same time, this universal is *already actualized* immediately by the very concept of the conflict; it is the *in-itself*, the *universal*; and its actualization means only this, that it is *at the same time for an other*. The two sides specified above, in accordance with each of which it became an abstraction, *are no longer separated*, but in and through the conflict the good is posited in both modes at once.—The virtuous consciousness, however, enters into conflict with the course of the world, as something opposed to the good; what the course of the world offers to it in this conflict is the universal, not only as an abstract universal, but as a universal animated by individuality and being for an other, or the *actual good*. Therefore, wherever virtue comes to grips with the course of the world, it always hits upon places which are the actual existence of the good itself which, as the *in-itself* of the course of the world, is inextricably interwoven in every appearance of the course of the world and also has its Being-there in the actuality of the course of the world; for virtue, therefore, the course of the world is invulnerable. All the moments which in virtue itself were supposed to be risked and sacrificed, are just such existences of the good, and hence are inviolable relationships. Consequently, the conflict can only be an oscillation between preserving and sacrificing; or rather there can be no place either for a sacrifice of what is one's own, or for a violation of what is alien. Not only is virtue like the combatant who, in the conflict, is only concerned with keeping his sword bright, but it has even started the fight in order to preserve the weapons; and not only can it not use its own weapons, it must also preserve intact those of the enemy and protect them against its own attack, for all are noble parts of the good, on behalf of which it went into battle.¹

¶387. For this enemy, on the other hand, the essence is not the *in-itself*, but *individuality*; its force is therefore the negative principle for which nothing is subsistent and absolutely sacred, but which can risk and endure the loss of anything and everything. Its victory is therefore as certain intrinsically as it is through the contradiction in which its opponent gets entangled. What for virtue is *in itself* is, for the course of the world, only for *it*; the course of the world is free from every moment that for virtue is firm and to which it is bound. Such a moment the course of the world has in its power, since it regards it as something it can either sublimate or let subsist; and in its power too it has the virtuous knight attached to this moment. The knight cannot disentangle himself from it, as if it were a cloak thrown round him from which he could free himself by leaving it behind; for to him it is the essence that cannot be sublated.¹

¶388. Finally, as regards the ambush from which the *good in-itself* is supposed to fall upon the course of the world cunningly from the rear, this is in itself a vain hope. The course of the world is the alert consciousness, certain of itself, that cannot be got at from behind, but faces in every direction; for its nature is that everything is *for it*, that everything stands *in front of it*. But the good *in-itself*, if it is *for* its enemy, then it is in the conflict we have seen; but insofar as it is not *for him*, but *in itself*, it is the passive instrument of gifts and capacities, a material lacking actuality; represented as Being-there, it would be a dormant consciousness, remaining in the background, one knows not where.¹

¶389. Virtue, therefore, is conquered by the course of the world because its purpose is, in fact, the abstract, unactual *essence* and because, as regards actuality, its doing rests on *distinctions* which lie in words alone. It wanted to consist in bringing the good into *actuality* by the *sacrifice of individuality*, but the side of *actuality* is itself nothing else but the side of *individuality*. The good was supposed to be that which is *in itself* and opposed to what *is*; but the *in-itself*, taken in its reality and truth, is rather *Being itself*. The *in-itself* is, initially, the *abstraction of essence* in contrast to actuality; but abstraction is precisely that which is not genuine, but only *for consciousness*, which means, however, that it is itself that which is called *actual*; for the actual is what is essentially *for an other*, or it is *Being*. But the consciousness of virtue rests on this distinction between the *in-itself* and *Being*, a distinction which has no truth.—The course of the world was supposed to be the perversion of the good because it had *individuality* for its principle; but individuality is the principle of *actuality*; for it is precisely individuality that is consciousness, whereby *that-which-is-in-itself* is equally *for an other*; the course of the world does pervert the unchangeable, but it perverts it in fact from the *nothing of abstraction into the Being of reality*.¹

¶390. Thus the course of the world triumphs over what, in opposition to it, constitutes virtue; it triumphs over virtue, for which the essenceless abstraction is the essence. However, it does not triumph over something real but over the creation of distinctions that are no distinctions, over this pompous talk about the supreme good of humanity, about the oppression of humanity, about sacrifices for the good, and the misuse of gifts;—ideal essences and purposes of this kind crumble as empty words which lift up the heart and leave reason empty, which edify, but raise no edifice; declamations which express no content determinately, except that the individual who professes to act for such noble purposes and who deals in such fine phrases is in his own eyes an excellent creature;—a puffing-up which expands his head in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, but expands it with an empty swelling.—Ancient virtue had its determinate secure meaning, for it had in the *substance* of the people its *contentful foundation*, and for its purpose an *actual good already in existence*; consequently, too, it was not directed against actuality as against a *universal perversion*, and against a *course of the world*. But the virtue we are considering is outside the substance, a virtue devoid of essence, a virtue only of representation and words, words that lack that content.—This emptiness of the rhetoric struggling with the course of the world would be exposed at once if one had to say what its phrases mean;—they are therefore *presupposed as familiar*. The demand to put the familiar into words would be fulfilled either by a fresh flood of phrases or countered by an appeal to the heart, which *inwardly* says what they mean;

that is, by a confession of inability to say *it in fact*.—The nullity of this rhetoric seems, too, in an unconscious way to have acquired certainty for the culture of our time, since all interest in the whole mass of those phrases, and the manner of flaunting oneself with them, has vanished; a loss which is expressed in the fact that they give rise only to boredom.¹

¶391. The result, then, which issues from this opposition consists in consciousness's discarding like an empty cloak the representation of a good *in itself*, that has as yet no actuality. In its conflict it has learnt by experience that the course of the world is not as bad as it looked; for its actuality is the actuality of the universal. With this experience, the means of producing the good through the *sacrifice* of individuality falls away; for individuality is precisely the *actualization* of what is-in-itself; and the perversion ceases to be regarded as a perversion of the good, for it is instead precisely the conversion of the good, as a mere purpose, into actuality; the movement of individuality is the reality of the universal.¹

¶392. However, with this result, that which as *course of the world* stood opposed to the consciousness of what is-in-itself, has in fact likewise been conquered and has vanished. In that opposition, the *Being-for-itself* of individuality was opposed to the essence or the universal, and appeared as an actuality separated from *Being-in-itself*. But since it has come to light that actuality is in undivided unity with the universal, then, just as the *in-itself* of virtue is merely a *view*,¹ so does the *Being-for-itself* of the course of the world also prove to be no more. The individuality of the course of the world may well opine that it acts only for *itself* or *self-interestedly*; it is better than it opines, its doing is at the same time a doing that is-*in-itself*, *universal*. When it acts self-interestedly, it simply does not know what it is doing; and when it avers that all men act self-interestedly, it is simply affirming that none of them knows what doing is.—When it acts *for itself*, this is just bringing into actuality what, at first, is only *in-itself*; thus the purpose of the *Being-for-itself*, a purpose which opines that it is opposed to the in-itself,—its empty cunning, as well as its finespun explanations which know how to point out self-interest everywhere—all these have vanished, along with the purpose of the in-itself and its rhetoric.²

¶393. Thus the *doing and activity of individuality* is an *end in itself*; it is the *employment of forces, the play of their manifestations*, that gives them life, when otherwise they would be the dead in-itself; the in-itself is not an unfulfilled abstract universal devoid of existence, but it is itself immediately the presence and actuality of the process of individuality.¹

C. Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself

¶394. Self-consciousness has now grasped the concept of itself which, at first, was only our concept of it, viz. that in the certainty of itself it is all reality; and from now on purpose and essence are to it the self-moving interpenetration of the universal—of the gifts and capacities—and the individuality.—The singular moments of this fulfilling and interpenetration, *before the unity* in which they have coalesced, are the purposes hitherto considered. These have vanished, as abstractions and chimeras that belong to those first insipid shapes of spiritual self-consciousness, and have their truth only in the opined Being of the heart, of imagination and rhetoric, not in reason. Reason, now certain in and for itself of its reality, no longer seeks only to

produce itself as *purpose* in *opposition* to the actuality immediately-in-being but, on the contrary, has the category as such for the object of its consciousness.—That is, the determination of self-consciousness as *being for itself*, or *negative*, the determination in which reason first entered the scene, is sublated; *this* self-consciousness *found* before it an *actuality* which was supposedly the negative of it, and only by sublating it could it actualize its own *purpose*. But since *purpose* and *Being-in-itself* have proved to be the same thing as *Being for another* and the *actuality found before it*, truth no longer separates from certainty, no matter whether the posited purpose is taken as certainty of self and the actualization of the purpose as the truth or, alternatively, the purpose is taken for the truth and the actuality for certainty; on the contrary, the essence and the purpose in and for itself is the certainty of immediate reality itself, the interpenetration of *Being-in-itself* and *Being-for-itself*, of the universal and the individuality; the doing is within its own self its truth and actuality, and the *presentation* or the *expression of the individuality* is, for this doing, the purpose in and for itself.¹

¶395. With this concept of itself, therefore, self-consciousness has returned into itself out of the opposed determinations which the category had for it, and which were involved in its approach to the category, as observing self-consciousness and then as active self-consciousness. It has for its object the pure category itself, or it is the category which has become conscious of itself. Its account with its previous shapes is thereby closed; they lie in oblivion behind it, they do not confront it as its world found before it, but develop solely within itself as transparent moments. Yet they still fall apart in its consciousness as a *movement* of distinct moments, a movement which has not yet concentrated itself into its substantial unity. But in *all* these moments self-consciousness holds fast the simple unity of Being and the Self, a unity which is their *genus*.¹

¶396. Consciousness has thereby cast off all opposition and every condition of its doing; it starts afresh *from itself*, and aims not at *an other*, but *at itself*. Since individuality is in its own self actuality, the *material* of its operation and the *purpose* of the doing lie in the doing itself. The doing has, therefore, the aspect of the movement of a circle which moves freely within itself in a void, which, unimpeded, now expands, now contracts, and quite contentedly plays only in and with its own self. The element in which individuality presents its shape has the significance of a pure reception of this shape; it is the daylight in general, to which consciousness wants to display itself. The doing alters nothing and goes against nothing; it is the pure form of transposition from *not-being-seen* into *being-seen*, and the content which is brought out into the daylight and displays itself, is nothing other than what this doing already is in itself. It is *in itself*: this is its form as unity in *thought*; and it is *actual*—this is its form as *unity in being*; the doing itself is a *content* only in this determination of simplicity, in contrast to the determination of its transition and its movement.¹

A. THE SPIRITUAL ANIMAL KINGDOM AND DECEIT, OR THE THING ITSELF

¶397. This individuality, real in itself, is at first again a *singular* and *determinate* individuality; it knows itself as the absolute reality, and this absolute reality is therefore, as individuality becomes conscious of it, an *abstract, universal* reality, which, without

filling and content, is merely the empty thought of this category.—We have to see how this concept of the individuality real in itself determines itself in its moments, and how its concept of itself enters into its consciousness.¹

¶398. The concept of this individuality, which, as such, is for itself all reality, is initially a *result*; individuality has not yet presented its movement and reality, and is posited here *immediately* as simple *Being-in-itself*. Negativity, however, which is the same as that which appears as movement, is in the *simple in-itself* as *determinacy*; and *Being* or the simple in-itself, becomes a determinate range. Accordingly, individuality enters the scene as an original determinate nature,—as *original* nature, for it is *in itself*,—as originally *determinate*, for the negative is in the in-itself and this latter is thus a quality. This limitation of Being, however, can *not limit the doing* of consciousness, for here consciousness is a completed act of relating *itself to itself*; relation to an other, which the limitation of consciousness would be, is sublated. The original determinacy of the nature is, therefore, only a simple principle,—a transparent universal element, in which the individuality remains just as free and equal to itself as it is unimpeded in unfolding its differences in it, and in its actualization is pure interaction with itself. Just as indeterminate animal-life breathes its breath of life, say, into the element of water, or air or earth, and within these again into more determinate principles, plunges all its moments into them, yet, despite this restriction of the element, keeps them in its power and maintains itself in its unity and, as this particular organization, remains the same universal animal-life.¹

¶399. This determinate original *nature* of consciousness, which remains freely and entirely in this nature, appears as the immediate and sole proper *content* of that which for the individual is his purpose; admittedly, it is a *determinate* content, but it is only a *content* at all insofar as we consider the *Being-in-itself* in isolation; in truth, however, it is reality permeated by individuality, actuality when consciousness, as singular, has it within it, and when it is initially posited *as being*, not yet as doing. For doing, however, that determinacy is, on the one hand, not a limitation it would aspire to overcome, because, regarded as a quality in being, it is the simple colour of the element in which the doing moves; but on the other hand, the negativity is *determinacy* only in Being; but doing is itself nothing else but negativity; so in the active individuality determinacy is dissolved into negativity in general or into the inclusive concept of all determinacy.¹

¶400. In *doing* and the consciousness of doing, the simple original nature now enters into the difference which pertains to doing. *At first*, doing is present as object, and indeed as *object* such that it still belongs to consciousness, present as *purpose*, and hence opposed to an actuality present at hand. The *other* moment is the *movement* of the purpose represented as at rest, the actualization as the relation of the purpose to the wholly formal actuality, hence the representation of the *transition* itself, or the *means*. The *third* moment is, finally, the object, no longer as purpose, of which the doer is immediately conscious as *its own*, but as it is out in the open and as an *other* for the doer.—But now in accordance with the concept of this sphere these diverse sides are to be established in such a way that the content in them remains the same and no distinction enters in, whether between individuality and Being in general, or of the *purpose* in contrast to *individuality* as *original nature*, or in contrast to the actuality at hand; or again of the means in contrast to actuality as absolute

purpose, or of the actuality effected in contrast to the purpose, or the original nature, or the means.¹

¶401. First of all, then, the originally determinate nature of individuality, its immediate essence, is not as yet posited as active, and so is called *particular* capacity, talent, character, and so on. This peculiar tinge of spirit is to be regarded as the sole content of the purpose itself and as the sole reality. If we represented consciousness as going beyond this content, and as wanting to bring another content to actuality, then we would represent it as a *nothing* working towards the *nothing*.—Further, this original essence is not merely the content of the purpose, but is in itself also the *actuality*, which otherwise appears as the *given* material of the doing, as actuality *found beforehand* and to be formed in the doing. That is to say, doing is only pure transposition from the form of not yet presented Being into that of presented Being; the Being-in-itself of that actuality opposed to consciousness has declined to a mere empty show. This consciousness, then, when determining itself to action, does not let itself be led astray by the show of the actuality at hand, and equally it has to stop floundering about in empty thoughts and purposes, and stick to the original content of its essence. True, this original content is only *for* consciousness *once it has actualized it*; but the distinction between something *that is for* consciousness only *within consciousness itself*, and an actuality outside it that is in itself, has fallen away.—Consciousness must act merely in order that what *it is in itself* should be *for it*, or action is just the coming-to-be of spirit *as consciousness*. What consciousness is *in itself*, it thus knows from its actuality. Therefore, the individual cannot know what *he is* until he has brought himself to actuality through doing.—However, in that case he seems unable to determine the *purpose* of his doing until he has done it; but at the same time, since he is consciousness, he must have the action before him in advance as *entirely his own*, i.e. as *purpose*. The individual going into action seems, therefore, to find himself in a circle in which each moment already presupposes the other, and thus he seems unable to find a beginning, because he gets to know his original essence, which must be his purpose, *only from the deed*, while, in order to do it, he must have *the purpose beforehand*. But for that very reason he has to start *immediately*, and, whatever the circumstances, without further scruples about *beginning*, *means*, or *end*, proceed to activity; for his essence and his nature, being-*in-itself*, is beginning, means, and end, all in one. As *beginning*, this nature is at hand in the *circumstances* of the action; and the *interest* which the individual finds in something is the answer already given to the question: whether and what is to be done here. For what seems to be an actuality found before him is in itself his original nature, which has merely the semblance of a *Being*,—a semblance that lies in the concept of self-dividing doing, but which announces itself as *his* original nature by the *interest* he finds in this actuality.—Similarly, the *how* or the *means* is determined in and for itself. *Talent* is likewise nothing else but the determinate, original individuality considered as *inner means* or *transition* from purpose to actuality. But the *actual* means and the real transition are the unity of talent with the nature of the Thing, present in that interest: talent represents in the means the side of doing, interest the side of content, both are the individuality itself, as an interpenetration of Being and doing. What is at hand, therefore, are *circumstances* found before him, which *in themselves* are the individual's original nature; next, the

interest which posits the circumstances as what is *its own* or as *purpose*; finally, the connection and sublation of this opposition in the *means*. This connection itself still falls within consciousness and the whole just considered is one side of an opposition. This still remaining semblance of opposition, is sublated by the *transition* itself or the *means*;—for the means is *unity* of the outer and inner, the contrary of the determinacy it has as *inner* means; it therefore sublates this determinacy and posits itself—this unity of doing and Being—equally as an *outer*, as the individuality itself becomes actual, i.e. as the individuality which is posited *for individuality itself* as the *being*. In this way, the entire action does not go outside itself, either as the *circumstances*, or as *purpose*, or *means*, or as *work*.¹

¶402. But with the work the difference of the original natures seems to enter; the work, like the individual's original nature it expresses, is something *determinate*; for the negativity freely discharged by the doing as an *actuality in being*, inheres in the work as a quality. Consciousness, however, in the face of the work, determines itself as that which has in it the determinacy as negativity *in general*, as doing; it is thus the universal in contrast to that determinacy of the work; it can therefore *compare* the work with other works, and thereby apprehend the individualities themselves as *diverse*, apprehend the individual who ventures further in his work either as greater energy of will or as a richer nature, i.e. a nature whose original determinacy is less limited; another, by contrast, as a weaker and poorer nature.¹

¶403. In contrast with this unessential difference of *magnitude*, the *good* and *bad* would express an absolute difference; but this has no place here. In whichever of these two ways something might be taken, it is in like manner a doing and a feat, a self-presentation and self-expression of an individuality, and for that reason it is all good; and it would really be impossible to say what badness was supposed to be.—What would be called a bad work is the individual life of a determinate nature, which actualizes itself in it; it would be degraded into a bad work only by the comparative thought, which, however, is an empty thing, since it goes beyond the essence of the work, which consists in being a self-expression of the individuality, and seeks and demands in it one knows not what else besides.—The comparative thought could only concern the above-mentioned difference. But this, as a difference of magnitude, is in itself an inessential difference, and here for the determinate reason that what is compared with each other would be different works or individualities; but these do not concern each other at all; each is related only to itself. The original nature alone is the *in-itself*, or what could be laid down as a standard for judging the work, and conversely; both, however, correspond to each other, there is nothing *for* the individuality that is not *from* it, or there is no *actuality* that is not the individuality's nature and its doing, and no doing nor in-itself of the individuality that is not actual, and only these moments are to be compared.¹

¶404. Therefore, there is no place at all for either *exaltation*, or *lamentation*, or repentance; for all that sort of thing stems from the thought that imagines another *content* and another in-itself than the original nature of the individual and its execution present in actuality. Whatever it is that the individual does, and whatever happens to him, he has done it himself, and he is it himself; he can have only the consciousness of the pure transposition of *himself* from the night of possibility into the day of presence, from the *abstract in-itself* into the significance of *actual* Being,

and the certainty that what happens to him in the latter is nothing else but what lay dormant in the former. It is true that the consciousness of this unity is likewise a comparison, but what is compared has merely the *semblance* of opposition; a semblance of form which, for the self-consciousness of reason, aware that individuality in its own self is actuality, is nothing more than semblance. So the individual, since he knows that in his actuality he can find nothing else but its unity with himself, or only the certainty of himself in its truth, *can savour only joy in himself*.¹

¶405. This is the concept which consciousness, certain of itself as absolute interpenetration of individuality and Being, forms of itself; let us see whether this concept is confirmed by experience, and whether its reality squares with it. The work is the reality which consciousness gives itself; it is that in which the individual is for consciousness what he is *in himself*, and in such a manner that the consciousness, *for which* the individual becomes in the work, is not particular consciousness, but *universal* consciousness; in the work in general, consciousness has ventured forth into the element of universality, into the space of Being, devoid of determinacy. The consciousness which withdraws from its work is in fact the universal consciousness,—because, in this opposition, it becomes the *absolute negativity* or the doing,—in contrast to its work, which is the *determinate* work; it thus goes beyond itself as the work, and is itself the space devoid of determinacy, which is left unfilled by its work. But if their unity maintained itself before in the concept, this happened just because the work as a work *in being* was sublated. But it is supposed *to be*, and we have to see how in its *Being* the individuality will maintain its universality, and will know how to satisfy itself.—In the first place, we have to consider for itself the work that has come about. It has received into itself the whole nature of the individuality; its *Being* is therefore itself a doing in which all differences interpenetrate and dissolve; the work is thus cast out into a *subsistence* in which the *determinacy* of the original nature in fact rounds on other determinate natures, encroaches on them, as these others encroach on it, and gets lost as a vanishing element in this universal movement. If *within the concept* of the individuality, real in and for itself, all moments—circumstances, purpose, means, and the actualization—are equal to each other, and the original determinate nature counts only as universal element, yet on the other hand, when this element becomes objective Being, its *determinacy* as such comes to the light of day in the work, and obtains its truth in its dissolution. More precisely, this dissolution presents itself thus: in this determinacy the individual, as *this* individual, has become actual to himself; but the determinacy is not only the content of the actuality, but equally its form, or the actuality as such in general is just this determinacy of being opposed to self-consciousness. From this side, the actuality turns out to be an actuality that has vanished from the concept, and is merely an *alien* actuality *found there*. The work *is*, i.e. it is for other individualities, and is for them an alien actuality, in place of which *they* must posit their own actuality in order to acquire through their doing the consciousness of *their* unity with actuality; or *their* interest in this work, an interest posited through *their* original nature, is another interest than the *peculiar* interest of this work, which is thereby converted into something else. Thus the work is in general something transient, which is obliterated by the counter-play of other forces and interests, and presents the reality of the individuality as vanishing rather than accomplished.¹

¶406. In its work, then, there arises for consciousness the opposition of doing and Being, an opposition which in the earlier shapes of consciousness was at the same time the *beginning* of doing, while here it is only a *result*. But in fact this opposition likewise lay at the foundation, when consciousness went into action as individuality real in itself; for the *determinate original nature* was presupposed as the in-itself for the action, and pure accomplishment for the sake of accomplishment had this nature as *content*. Pure doing, however, is the form *equal to itself*, to which the *determinacy* of the original nature is thus unequal. Here, as elsewhere, it is a matter of indifference which of the two is called *concept* and which *reality*; the original nature is what is *thought* or is the in-itself in contrast to the doing in which it first has its reality; or the original nature is the *Being* both of the individuality as such and of the individuality as the work, while doing is the original *concept* as absolute transition, or as the *coming-to-be*. This *disparity* between concept and reality, which lies in the essence of the concept, is what consciousness experiences in its work; in the work, therefore, consciousness becomes to itself what it is in truth, and its empty concept of itself vanishes.¹

¶407. In this fundamental contradiction of the work—the work which is the truth of this individuality that is, to itself, real in itself—all the sides of the individuality thus enter the scene again as contradictory; or the work, as the content of the whole individuality, when transported into *Being* from the *doing*, which is the negative unity holding captive all the moments, now lets the moments go free; and in the element of subsistence they become indifferent to one another. Concept and reality thus separate as purpose and as that which is the *original essentiality*. It is contingent that the purpose has a genuine essence, or that the in-itself is made the purpose. Likewise, concept and reality again separate from one another as *transition* into actuality and as *purpose*; or it is contingent that the *means* is chosen which expresses the purpose. And finally, taking these inner moments together, whether they have within them an inner unity or not, the doing of the individual is again contingent with regard to *actuality* in general; *fortune* decides just as well for an ill-determined purpose and ill-chosen means, as against them.¹

¶408. If, now, consciousness thereby becomes aware in its work of the *opposition* between willing and achieving, between the purpose and the means, and, again, between this interior in its entirety and the actuality itself, of what in general the *contingency of its doing* involves *within itself*, then the *unity* and *necessity* of the doing are nevertheless equally present, too; the latter side overlaps the former, and the *experience of the contingency of the doing* is itself only a *contingent experience*. The *necessity* of the doing consists in the fact that *purpose* is purely and simply related to *actuality*, and this unity is the concept of doing; action takes place because doing is in and for itself the essence of actuality. In the work, of course, there emerges the contingency that *being-accomplished* has, as against *willing and accomplishing*; and this experience, which seems as if it must count as truth, contradicts that concept of action. If, however, we consider the content of this experience in its completeness, then this content is the *vanishing work*; what is *preserved* is not the *vanishing*; the vanishing is itself actual and is bound up with the work and vanishes with it; the *negative itself goes to ruin* along with the *positive whose negative* it is.¹

¶409. This vanishing of the vanishing lies in the concept of individuality itself, the individuality that is real in itself; for that in which the work vanishes or what vanishes in the work, and what was supposed to give experience, as it has been called, its supremacy over individuality's own concept of itself, is the *objective actuality*; but objective actuality is a moment which even in this consciousness itself no longer has any truth for itself; truth consists solely in the unity of consciousness with the doing, and the *true work* is only that unity of *doing and Being*, of *willing* and *achieving*. To consciousness, then, because of the certainty underlying its action, the actuality *opposed* to that certainty is itself such as to be *for consciousness* only; to consciousness as self-consciousness which has returned into itself, and for which all opposition has vanished, opposition can no longer come about in this form of consciousness's *Being-for-itself* as against *actuality*; on the contrary, the opposition and the negativity that come to light in the work affect not merely the content of the work *or* even the content of consciousness, but the actuality as such, and hence affect the opposition present only in that actuality, and present only in virtue of it, and the vanishing of the work. In this way, then, consciousness is reflected out of its transient work into itself, and affirms its concept and certainty as what *is* and *endures* in the face of the experience of the *contingency* of doing; it experiences in fact its concept, in which actuality is only a moment, something *for consciousness*, not the in- and for-itself; it experiences actuality as a vanishing moment, and actuality therefore counts for consciousness only as *Being* in general, whose universality is the same thing as the doing. This unity is the true work; the work is the *Thing itself*, which affirms itself completely and is experienced as that which endures, independently of the Thing that is the *contingency* of the individual doing as such, the contingency of the circumstances, means, and actuality.¹

¶410. The *Thing itself* is only opposed to these moments insofar as they are supposed to be valid in isolation, but as an interpenetration of the actuality and the individuality it is essentially their unity; it is equally a doing and, as doing, *pure doing* in general, *hence just as much a doing of this individual*; and it is this doing as still belonging to him in opposition to actuality, as *purpose*; equally, it is the *transition* from this determinacy into the opposed determinacy, and lastly it is an *actuality* which is present *for consciousness*. The *Thing itself* thus expresses the *spiritual* essentiality in which all these moments are sublated as valid for themselves, and are valid therefore only as universal, and in which for consciousness its certainty of itself is objective essence, a *Thing*; the object engendered by self-consciousness as *its own object*, without ceasing to be a free and authentic object.—The *thing* of sensory certainty and of perceiving now has its significance through self-consciousness and for self-consciousness alone; on this rests the distinction between a *thing* and a *Thing*.—A movement corresponding to sensory certainty and perception will run its course here.¹

¶411. In the *Thing itself*, then, as the interpenetration of individuality and objectivity that has itself become objective, self-consciousness has come into possession of its true concept of itself, or has attained to consciousness of its substance. At the same time, as it is here, it is a consciousness that has come about just now, and hence an *immediate* consciousness of its substance, and this is the determinate way in which spiritual essence is present here and it has not yet developed into a genuinely real

substance. The *Thing itself* has, in this immediate consciousness of its substance, the form of the *simple essence* which, as a universal, contains within itself all its various moments and is appropriate to them, but, again, is also indifferent to them as determinate moments and free for itself, and as this free *simple, abstract* Thing itself *counts as the essence*. The various moments of the original determinacy or of the *Thing of this* individual, of his purpose, of the means, of the doing itself, and of the actuality, are for this consciousness, on the one hand, single moments which it can abandon and surrender in favour of the *Thing itself*; but on the other hand, they all have the Thing itself as their essence but only in such a way that it, as their *abstract* universal, is to be found *in* each of these various moments, and can be a *predicate* of them. The Thing itself is not yet the subject; but those moments count as subject because they fall on the side of *singularity* in general, whereas the Thing itself is at first only the simple universal. It is the *genus* which is found in all these moments as *species* of itself, and is likewise free of them.¹

¶412. Consciousness is called *honest* when it has on the one hand attained to this idealism that *the Thing itself* expresses, and on the other hand has in the Thing itself, as this formal universality, the true; a consciousness which is always concerned solely with the Thing itself and therefore busies itself solely with the various moments or species of it; and when it does not attain the Thing itself in one of these moments or in one meaning, it for that very reason gets hold of it in another, and consequently does in fact always obtain the satisfaction which it should enjoy in accordance with its concept. Whichever way things turn out, it has accomplished and attained the *Thing itself*, for, as this *universal* genus of those moments, it is the predicate of them all.¹

¶413. If this consciousness does not bring a *purpose* to *actuality*, yet it has after all *willed* it, i.e. it makes the *purpose* as *purpose*, the *mere doing* which does nothing, into the Thing itself, and can therefore express and console itself with the fact that all the same something was *done* and *set afoot*. Since the universal itself contains subsumed under it the negative or the vanishing, the fact that the work annihilates itself, this too is *its* doing; it has provoked the others to this, and in the *vanishing* of its actuality still finds satisfaction, like naughty boys who enjoy *themselves* when they get their ears boxed just because they are the cause of it. Or, again, suppose it has *not even attempted* to carry out the Thing itself and has *done absolutely nothing*, then it has not been *able* to; *the Thing itself* is to it just the *unity* of its *resolve* and *the reality*; it asserts that the *actuality* would be nothing else but what it was *possible* for it to do.—Finally, suppose something of interest to it in general has come its way without any effort on its part, then to it this *actuality* is the Thing itself just in the interest it finds in it, even though that actuality has not been produced by itself; if it is a stroke of luck that has befallen it personally, then it embraces it as its *deed* and *desert*; if, on the other hand, it is a world-event of no special concern to it, it makes it likewise its own; and a *deedless interest* serves it as a *party*, which it has taken for or against, and *combated* or *espoused*.¹

¶414. The *honesty* of this consciousness, as well as the satisfaction that it everywhere enjoys, obviously consists in fact in its *not bringing together* the *thoughts* it has about the Thing itself. To it, *the Thing itself* is as much *its own Thing* as *not a work* at all, or *pure doing* and an *empty purpose*, or even a *deedless actuality*; it makes one

meaning after another the subject of this predicate, and forgets them one after another. Now, in merely having-willed, or even in having-been-incapable, the Thing itself has the meaning of an *empty purpose* and of a unity of willing and achieving only *in thought*. The consolation for the annihilation of the purpose, having willed after all, or *done* something *purely* after all, as well as the satisfaction of having given others something to do, makes *pure doing*, or the thoroughly bad work, the essence; for that work is to be called bad which is no work at all. Finally, in the lucky event of *finding* the actuality *before it*, this Being without deed becomes the Thing itself.¹

¶415. The truth of this honesty, however, is to be not as honest as it looks. For it cannot be so thoughtless as to let these various moments in fact fall apart; it must have immediate consciousness about their opposition because they are purely and simply related to each other. The *pure* doing is essentially the doing of *this* individual, and this doing is just as essentially an *actuality* or a Thing. Conversely, the *actuality* is essentially only as *his* doing and as *doing in general* as well; and *his doing* is at the same time only as doing in general; so actuality too. While, then, it seems to the individual that his concern is only with the *Thing itself* as *abstract actuality*, it is also a fact that he is concerned with it as *his own* doing. But equally, while he is concerned merely with *doing* and *activity*, he is not really in earnest about it; rather, he has only to do with *a Thing* and with the Thing as *his own*. Finally, while he seems to will only *his* Thing and *his* doing, he is again concerned with the *Thing in general* or with the actuality enduring in and for itself.¹

¶416. Just as the Thing itself and its moments appear here as *content*, equally necessarily, too, they are as *forms* in consciousness. They enter the scene as content only to vanish, each making room for the other. They must therefore be present in the determinacy of *sublated* moments; but they are thus sides of consciousness itself. The *Thing itself* is present as the in-itself or the *reflection into itself* of consciousness; but the *supplanting* of the moments by one another expresses itself in consciousness in their being posited in consciousness, not in themselves but only for *another*. One of the moments of the content is exposed by it to the light of day and represented for *others*; but consciousness is at the same time reflected back from it into itself and the opposite moment is equally present within it; consciousness retains it for itself as its own. At the same time too it is not just some one of the moments that is *merely* exposed to the outside, and another that is merely retained in the interior; on the contrary, consciousness alternates with them, for it must make the one as well as the other the essential moment for itself and for the others. *The whole* is the self-moving interpenetration of the individuality and the universal; but because this whole is present for this consciousness only as the *simple* essence, and thus as the abstraction of the *Thing itself*, its moments fall as separated outside the Thing itself and outside each other; and, *as a whole*, it is exhaustively presented only by the separating alternation of exposure and of retention-for-itself. Since in this alternation consciousness has one moment for itself and as essential in its reflection, but another only externally in *it*, or for the *others*, there thus enters a play of individualities with one another in which each and all find themselves both deceiving and deceived.¹

¶417. So an individuality sets about carrying something out; it thereby seems to have made something *the Thing*; it acts, and in acting becomes for others, and seems

to be having to do with *actuality*. The others therefore take its doing for an interest in the Thing as such and for the purpose of *the Thing's being accomplished in itself*, no matter whether by the first individuality or by them. Accordingly, when they point out that this Thing has already been brought about by them, or, if it has not, offer and furnish their assistance, then this consciousness has really left the position they opine it to occupy; what interests it in the Thing itself is *its own* doing and activity, and when they become aware that this was *the Thing itself*, then they feel cheated.—But in fact their eagerness to come and help was itself nothing else but a desire to see and display *their* own doing, not the *Thing itself*; that is, they wanted to deceive the others in just the way that they complain of having been deceived.—Now that it is clear that one's *own doing* and *activity*, the play of *one's forces*, count as the Thing itself, consciousness seems to ply its essence *for itself*, not for the others, and concerned only about doing as *its own* doing, not about doing as the doing of *others*, it thereby seems to let the others have their own way equally in *their* Thing. But again they are mistaken; this consciousness has already left the position they opined it to occupy. It has to do not with the Thing as *this singular Thing of its own*, but with it as *Thing*, as a universal, which is for everyone. It interferes, therefore, in their doing and their work, and, if it can no longer take the work out of their hands, it at least shows an interest in it by the fact that it busies itself with passing judgement on it; if it gives it the stamp of its approval and its praise, this is meant in the sense that, in the work, it praises not only the work itself, but at the same time *its own* generosity and moderation in not having damaged the work as a work, nor damaged it by its censure. In showing an interest in the *work*, it is enjoying *its own self* in it; and the work which it censures is equally welcome to it for just this enjoyment of *its own* doing which its censure provides. But those who think, or pretend, that they have been deceived by this interference, really wanted to practise the same kind of deceit themselves. They pass off their doing and activity as something for themselves alone in which their only purpose was *themselves* and *their own* essence. However, in doing something, and thus presenting and exposing themselves to the light of day, they immediately contradict by their deed their pretence of wanting to exclude the light of day itself, the universal consciousness, and the participation of everyone; actualization is, on the contrary, a display of what is one's own in the universal element whereby it becomes, and should become, the *Thing* of everyone.¹

¶418. It is, then, equally a deception of oneself and of others if one purports to have to do with the *pure Thing* alone; a consciousness that broaches a Thing soon finds by experience that others hurry along like flies to freshly poured milk, and want to have a hand in it; and they find in this consciousness that it too has to do with the Thing, not as an object, but as *its own* Thing. On the other hand, if what is supposed to be essential is only the *doing itself*, the employment of forces and capacities, or the expression of this individuality, then equally they find by experience mutually that they *all* busy themselves and regard themselves as invited, and instead of a *mere* doing, or a *singular* proprietary doing, rather something has been broached that is *for others* as well, or a *Thing itself*. In both cases the same thing happens and only has a different sense from the sense that was assumed and supposed to be valid in each case. Consciousness experiences both sides as equally essential moments, and in so doing learns what the *nature of the Thing itself* is, viz. that it is neither merely a Thing

which stands opposed to doing in general and to singular doing, nor doing which stands opposed to subsistence and would be the free *genus* of these moments as its *species*, but rather an essence, whose *Being* is the *doing* of the *single* individual and of all individuals, and whose doing is immediately *for others*, or is a *Thing* and is only a Thing as the *doing* of *each* and *everyone*; the essence which is the essence of all essences, the *spiritual essence*. Consciousness learns by experience that no one of these moments is *subject*, but rather gets dissolved in the *universal Thing itself*; the moments of the individuality which, one after the other, counted as subject for the thoughtlessness of this consciousness, coalesce into simple individuality, which, as *this* individuality, is no less immediately universal. The Thing itself thereby loses the relationship of a predicate, and the determinacy of lifeless abstract universality; it is rather the substance permeated by individuality; it is the subject in which individuality figures both as itself, or as *this* individuality, and equally as *all* individuals; and it is the universal that is a *Being* only as this doing of all and each; it is an actuality in the fact that *this* consciousness knows it as its own singular actuality and as the actuality of all. The pure *Thing itself* is what determined itself above as the *category*, as the Being that is I or the I that is Being, but as *Thinking*, which still distinguishes itself from *actual self-consciousness*; but here the moments of actual self-consciousness, insofar as we call them its content (purpose, doing, and actuality), and also insofar as we call them its form (Being-for-itself and Being-for-another), are posited as one with the simple category itself, and the category is thereby at the same time the entire content.¹

B. REASON AS LAWGIVER

¶419. The spiritual essence is, in its simple Being, *pure consciousness* and *this self-consciousness*. The originally-*determinate* nature of the individual has lost its positive meaning of being *in itself* the element and the purpose of his activity; it is merely a sublated moment, and the individual is a *Self*, as universal Self. Conversely, the *formal Thing itself* has its filling in the acting individuality differentiating itself within itself; for the differences of this individuality constitute the *content* of that universal. The category is *in itself*, as the universal of *pure consciousness*; it is equally *for itself*, for the *Self* of consciousness is equally a moment of the category. The category is absolute *Being*, for that universality is the simple *equality-with-itself* of *Being*.¹

¶420. Thus what is the object for consciousness has the significance of being the true; *it is* and *it counts*, in the sense of *being* and *counting in* and *for itself*; it is the *absolute Thing* which no longer suffers from the opposition of certainty and its truth, of the universal and singular, of the purpose and its reality, but the Thing whose Being-there is the *actuality* and the *doing* of self-consciousness; this Thing itself is therefore the *ethical substance*; the consciousness of it is *ethical* consciousness. Its object likewise counts for consciousness as the *true*, for consciousness combines self-consciousness and Being in a unity; it amounts to the *absolute*, for self-consciousness can no longer and does not want any longer to go beyond this object, for it is together with itself in it; it *cannot*, for this object is all Being and power,—it does not *want* to, for it is the *Self* or the will of this Self. It is the *real* object within its own self as object, for it has in it the difference of consciousness; it divides itself into masses which are the *determinate laws* of the absolute essence. These masses, however, do not obscure the concept, for the moments of Being and of pure consciousness and of the Self remain

enclosed within it,—a unity which constitutes the essence of these masses and which, in this difference, no longer lets these moments come apart from one another.¹

¶421. These laws or masses of the ethical substance are immediately recognized; we cannot ask after their origin and justification, nor can we look for anything else, for anything other than the essence that is *in* and *for itself* could only be self-consciousness itself; but self-consciousness is nothing other than this essence, for it is itself the Being-for-itself of this essence, which is the truth, just because it is as much the *Self* of consciousness as it is its *in-itself* or pure consciousness.¹

¶422. Since self-consciousness knows itself as a moment of the *Being-for-itself* of this substance, it thus expresses within it the Being-there of the law as follows: *sound reason* knows immediately what is *right* and *good*. Just as it *knows* the law *immediately*, so too the law *is valid* for it immediately, and it says immediately: this *is* right and good. And it does indeed say: *this*; these are *determinate* laws; the law is the Thing itself replete with significant content.

¶423. What is thus given immediately must likewise be taken up and considered immediately; just as in the case of what sensory certainty immediately announces as being, we had to see how it was constituted, so here, too, we have to see how the Being announced by this immediate ethical certainty is constituted, or how the masses of the ethical substance, that are immediately in being, are constituted. Examples of some laws of this sort will show us this, and since we take them in the form of declarations of sound reason with its *knowledge*, *we ourselves* do not have first to introduce the moment which has to be brought out in them, when they are considered as *immediate* ethical laws.¹

¶424. 'Everyone ought to speak the truth.'—In this duty as expressed unconditionally, the condition will at once be admitted: *if* he knows the truth. The command, then, will now run: *everyone ought to speak the truth, at all times according to his information and conviction about it*. Sound reason, just this ethical consciousness, which knows immediately what is right and good, will also explain that this condition was already so bound up with its universal utterance that this is how it *meant* that command. But with this it in fact admits that already, in expressing the command, it really immediately violates it. It *said*: everyone ought to speak the truth; but it *meant*: he ought to speak according to his information and conviction about it; that is, what it *said was different from what it meant*; and to speak otherwise than one means, amounts to not speaking the truth. The amended untruth or blunder is now expressed like this: *everyone ought to speak the truth according to his knowledge and conviction of it at the time*.—But the *universal necessity*, valid *in itself*, which the proposition intended to express, has thereby really been inverted into an utter *contingency*. For speaking the truth becomes contingent on whether I am informed of it and can convince myself of it; and nothing more is said than that true and false ought to be spoken pell-mell in accordance with the information, opinion, and conception that someone happens to have of them. This *contingency of the content* has *universality* merely in the *form of a proposition* in which it is expressed; but as an ethical proposition it promises a universal and necessary *content*, and thus contradicts itself by the contingency of the content.—Finally, if the proposition is amended to: the contingency of information and conviction of the truth *ought* to be dropped, and the truth *ought* also to be *known*, then this would be a command

which directly contradicts the one we started from. Sound reason was at first supposed to possess *immediately* the capacity to speak the truth; now, however, it is said that it *should know* the truth, that is, that it does not *immediately* know how to speak it.—Looking at this from the side of the content, then the content has dropped out in the demand that one should *know* the truth; for the demand relates to *knowing in general*: one ought to know; what is demanded is, therefore, really what is free of all determinate content. But here the issue was about a *determinate* content, a *distinction* in the ethical substance. Yet this *immediate* determination of the substance is a content which showed itself to be a complete contingency instead and which, when elevated to universality and necessity by announcing *knowledge* as the law, in fact vanishes.¹

¶425. Another celebrated command is: *Love thy neighbour as thyself*. It is directed to the singleton in his relationship with singletons and *affirms the relationship as a relationship of the singleton* to the *singleton*, or as a relationship of sensibility. Active love,—for inactive love has no Being and is therefore hardly what is meant,—aims at removing evil from someone and doing good to him. To this end one has to distinguish what is bad in him, what is the good fit for the purpose of countering this evil, and what in general is his well-being; i.e. I must love him with *understanding*; love without understanding will harm him, perhaps more than hatred. Essential beneficence with understanding is, however, in its richest and most important shape the universal intelligent activity of the State,—an activity compared with which the doing of the singleton, as a singleton, becomes altogether so trifling that it is hardly worth the trouble of talking about it. The activity of the State is, moreover, of such great power that, if the singular doing wanted to oppose it, and either to be a downright crime for itself, or out of love of another to cheat the universal out of the right and the part that it has in it, such a doing would be altogether useless and inevitably frustrated. The only significance left for the beneficence that is a sentiment, is that of an entirely single doing, of help in need, which is as contingent as it is momentary. Chance determines not only the occasion for it but also whether it is a *work* at all, whether it is not at once dissolved and even perverted into evil. Thus this acting for the good of others, which is declared to be *necessary*, is constituted in such a way that it perhaps can exist, but also perhaps not; that, if by chance the occasion offers, the action is perhaps a work, is perhaps good, but also perhaps not. This law, therefore, no more has a universal content than the first one we considered, and does not express, as it should as an absolute ethical law, something that is *in and for itself*. Or such laws stop short at the *Ought*, but have no *actuality*; they are not *laws*, but merely *commands*.¹

¶426. But it is in fact clear from the nature of the Thing itself, that a universal absolute *content* must be abandoned; for any *determinacy* posited in the simple substance (and its essence is to be simple) is *inadequate* to it. The command in its simple absoluteness itself expresses *immediate ethical Being*; the difference that appears in it is a determinacy, and therefore a content which is subsumed *under* the absolute universality of this simple Being. Since, then, an absolute content must be given up, the command can only claim *formal universality*, or that it is not self-contradictory, for universality without content is formal universality, and absolute content is itself tantamount to a difference which is no difference, or to absence of content.¹

¶427. All that is left, then, for law-giving is the *pure form of universality* or, in fact, the *tautology* of consciousness which confronts the content, and is a *knowledge*, not of a content *in being* or a proper *content*, but of the *essence* or of the equality-to-itself of this essence.

¶428. The ethical essence is thus not itself immediately a content, but only a standard for deciding whether a content is capable of being a law or not, insofar as it does not contradict itself. Law-giving reason is demoted to a merely *testing* reason.¹

C. REASON AS LAW-TESTING

¶429. A difference within the simple ethical substance is for it a contingency, which, in the determinate command, we saw emerge as contingency of knowledge, of actuality, and of doing. The *comparison* of that simple Being with the determinacy that fails to correspond to it fell within us; and in that comparison the simple substance has shown itself to be formal universality or pure *consciousness*, which is free from the content and confronts it, and is a *knowing* of it as determinate content. In this way this universality remains the same as what the *Thing itself* was. But in consciousness it is something else; it is, namely, no longer the thoughtless, inert genus, but is related to the particular and counts as its power and truth.—This consciousness seems at first to be the same process of testing which we were previously, and it seems that its doing cannot be anything other than what has already happened, a comparison of the universal with the determinate, from which, as before, their disparity would emerge. Here, however, the relationship of the content to the universal is different, since the universal has acquired another significance; it is *formal* universality, of which the determinate content is capable, for in that universality the content is considered only in relation to itself. In our testing, the solid universal substance confronted the determinacy, which developed itself as a contingency of the consciousness into which the substance entered. Here, one term of the comparison has vanished; the universal is no longer the substance that *is* and *counts*, or that which is right in and for itself, but simple knowing or form, which compares a content only with itself, and considers whether it is a tautology. Laws are no longer given, but *tested*; and for the testing consciousness the laws are *already* given; it takes up their *content* simply as it is, without concerning itself, as we did, with the singularity and contingency inherent in its actuality; it sticks to the command as a command, and its attitude towards it is just as simple as its being a standard for it.¹

¶430. But for this reason this testing does not get far; just because the standard is the tautology, and indifferent to the content, one content is just as acceptable to it as its opposite.—Suppose the question is whether it ought to be a law in and for itself that there be *property*; *in and for itself*, not from utility for other purposes; the ethical essentiality consists just in the fact that the law is equal only to itself, and because of this equality with itself, thus grounded in its own essence, is not something conditional. Property in and for itself does not contradict itself; it is an *isolated* determinacy, or a determinacy posited as equal only to itself. Non-property, ownerlessness of things or community of goods is just as little self-contradictory. That something belongs to nobody, or to the first-comer who takes possession of it, or to all together, to each according to his need or in equal portions—that is a *simple determinacy*, a *formal thought*, like its contrary, property.—Admittedly, if the ownerless thing is considered

as a *necessary object of need*, then it is necessary that it become the possession of some singleton; and it would be contradictory to make the freedom of the thing into a law instead. But by ownerlessness of the thing is not meant an absolute ownerlessness, but it should *become a possession* according to the *need* of the singleton, and, moreover, not in order to be kept, but to be used immediately. But to provide for need exclusively according to contingency is contradictory to the nature of the conscious essence which alone is under discussion; for such an essence must represent its need to itself in the form of *universality*, must provide for the whole of its existence, and acquire a lasting good. Because of this, the thought that a thing should fall in a contingent way to the lot of the first self-conscious life that comes along and needs it, did not accord with itself.—In the community of goods, where needs would be provided for in a universal and constant manner, either each is allotted as much *as he needs*; then this inequality and the essence of consciousness, whose principle is the *equality* of singletons, contradict each other. Or, in accordance with the latter principle, the distribution is *equal*; then the share lacks the relation to the need, the relation that is, however, the very concept of the share.¹

¶431. Still, if in this way non-property appears contradictory, this happens only because it has not been left as a *simple* determinacy. The same applies to property, if this is resolved into moments. The single thing that is my property thereby counts as a *universal*, a *fixture*, a *permanency*; but this contradicts its nature, which consists in its being used and in *vanishing*. At the same time, it counts as what is *mine*, which all the others recognize and from which they exclude themselves. The fact, however, that I am recognized involves rather my equality with everyone, the contrary of exclusion.—What I possess is a *thing*, i.e. a Being for others in general, entirely universal and undetermined to be only for me; that *I* possess it, contradicts its universal thinghood. Consequently, property contradicts itself on all sides just as much as non-property; each has in it these two opposed, contradictory moments of singularity and universality.—But each of these determinacies when represented *simply*, as property or non-property, without developing them further, is as *simple* as the other, i.e. is not self-contradictory.—The standard of law, which reason has within itself, therefore fits every case equally well, and is thus in fact no standard at all.—It would have to be strange, too, if tautology, the principle of contradiction, which is admitted to be only a formal criterion for the cognition of theoretical truth, i.e. something which is quite indifferent to truth and falsehood, *were supposed to be more* than this for the cognition of practical truth.¹

¶432. In both the moments, just considered, of the filling of the previously empty spiritual essence, the positing of immediate determinacies in the ethical substance, and then the knowledge whether they are laws, has sublated itself. The result therefore seems to be this: neither determinate laws nor a knowledge of them can have any place. But the substance is the *consciousness* of itself as the absolute *essentiality*, a consciousness, therefore, which can give up neither the *distinction* in the substance nor the *knowledge* of that distinction. That law-giving and law-testing have proved to be futile, has this significance, that both, when taken singly and in isolation, are merely unstable *moments* of the ethical consciousness; and the movement in which they enter the scene has the formal sense that the ethical substance thereby presents itself as consciousness.¹

¶433. Insofar as these two moments are more precise determinations of consciousness of the *Thing itself* they can be regarded as forms of the *honesty* which, as it previously did with its formal moments, now busies itself with a supposed content of the good and the right, and with testing such established truth, and opines that in sound reason and intelligent insight it has the force and validity of the commands.¹

¶434. However, without this honesty, the laws do not count as the *essence* of *consciousness*, nor, similarly, does the testing count as a doing *inside* consciousness; on the contrary, these moments, as they each for itself enter the scene *immediately* as an *actuality*, express in the one case an invalid establishing and Being of actual laws, and in the other case an equally invalid liberation from them. The law, as a determinate law, has a contingent content,—this has here the significance that it is the law of a single consciousness concerning a wilful content. That immediate law-giving is thus the tyrannical insolence which makes wilfulness into a law and ethics into obedience to such wilfulness,—obedience to laws which are *merely* laws and not at the same time *commands*. So, too, the second moment, insofar as it is isolated, signifies testing the laws, moving the immovable, and the insolence of a knowledge which argues itself into freedom from absolute laws, treating them as an alien wilfulness.¹

¶435. In both forms, these moments are a negative relationship to the substance or the real spiritual essence; or in them the substance does not as yet have its reality, but rather consciousness contains the substance still in the form of its own immediacy, and substance is at first only a *willing* and *knowing* of this individual, or the *Ought* of a command without actuality and a knowledge of formal universality. But since these modes sublated themselves, consciousness has returned into the universal and those oppositions have vanished. The spiritual essence is actual substance through the fact that these modes are valid, not singly, but only as sublated modes; and the unity in which they are merely moments is the Self of consciousness which, posited from now on in the spiritual essence, makes that essence actual, fulfilled, and self-conscious.¹

¶436. Thus first of all the spiritual essence is for self-consciousness as law that is *in itself*; the universality of testing, which was formal universality, not universality that is *in itself*, is sublated. The spiritual essence is equally an eternal law which is grounded not in the *will of this individual*, but is in and for itself, the absolute pure *will of all*, which has the form of immediate *Being*. Nor is this will a *command*, which only *ought to be*: it *is* and it is *valid*; it is the universal I of the category, the I which is immediately actuality, and the world is only this actuality. But since this *law in being* is purely and simply valid, the obedience of self-consciousness is not service to a master whose orders are a wilfulness, and in which it does not recognize itself. On the contrary, the laws are thoughts of its own absolute consciousness, thoughts which it itself immediately *has*. Also, it does not *believe* in them, for although faith does intuit the essence too, it intuits it as an alien essence. Ethical *self-consciousness* is *immediately* one with the essence through the *universality* of its *Self*; faith, by contrast, starts from the *singular* consciousness, it is the movement of that consciousness always approaching this unity, without ever reaching the presence of its own essence.—The absolute consciousness, by contrast, has sublated itself as singular consciousness, this mediation is accomplished, and only through its accomplishment, is this consciousness immediate self-consciousness of the ethical substance.¹

¶437. The difference between self-consciousness and the essence is therefore perfectly transparent. Because of this, the *differences in the essence* itself are not contingent determinacies; on the contrary, in virtue of the unity of the essence and self-consciousness (and it is only from self-consciousness that inequality could arise), the differences are the masses into which the unity articulates itself and permeates them with its life, undivided spirits transparent to themselves, stainless celestial shapes that preserve in their differences the undefiled innocence and harmony of their essence.—Self-consciousness is equally a simple, clear *relationship* to them. They *are*, and nothing more,—this is what constitutes the consciousness of its relationship to them. Thus, Sophocles's Antigone acknowledges them as the *unwritten* and *infallible* Law of the gods:

Its life is not of yesterday or today, but everlasting,
And no one knows at what time it appeared.¹

They *are*. If I inquire after their origin and confine them to the point of their source, then I have gone beyond them; for now it is I who am the universal, while they are the conditioned and limited. If they are supposed to prove their validity to my insight, then I have already set in motion their unshakeable Being-in-itself, and regard them as something which, for me, is perhaps true, but also is perhaps not true. The ethical disposition consists just in sticking steadfastly to what is right, and abstaining from all attempts to move it, to shake it, or to reduce it.—If something has been deposited with me, it *is* the property of someone else and I acknowledge it because it *is so*, and I keep myself unflinchingly in this relationship. If I should retain the deposit for myself, then according to the principle of my testing, the tautology, I commit no contradiction whatsoever; for then I no longer look upon it as the property of someone else; to retain something which I do not regard as belonging to someone else is perfectly consistent. Alteration of *the point of view* is no contradiction; for what we are concerned with is not the point of view as such, but the object and content, which ought not to be self-contradictory. Just as I can—as I do when I give something away—alter the view that it is my property into the view that it belongs to someone else, without becoming guilty thereby of a contradiction, so I can equally pursue the reverse course.—It is not, therefore, because I find something not self-contradictory that it is right; on the contrary, it is right because it is what is right. That something *is* the property of another, this is *fundamental*; I have not to quibble about it, or hunt around for or entertain thoughts, connections, considerations of various kinds; I have to think neither of making laws nor of testing them; by such movements of my thought I would undermine that relationship, since, if I liked, I could in fact just as well make the contrary conform to my indeterminate tautological knowledge and make that the law. But whether this or the opposite determination is the right, that is determined *in and for itself*; for myself, I could make whichever of them I liked the law, and just as well neither of them, and as soon as I start to test them I already tread an unethical path. It is because the right is for me *in and for itself*, that I am within the ethical substance; this substance is thus the *essence* of self-consciousness; but this self-consciousness is the *actuality* and *Being-there* of the substance, its *Self* and its *will*.²

(BB.) Spirit

VI. Spirit

¶438. Reason is spirit when the certainty of being all reality is elevated to the truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself.—The coming-to-be of spirit was indicated in the immediately preceding movement in which the object of consciousness, the pure category, ascended to the concept of reason. In *observing* reason, this pure unity of the *I* and *Being*, of *Being-for-itself* and *Being-in-itself*, is determined as the *in-itself* or as *Being*, and the consciousness of reason *finds* this unity. But the truth of observation is rather the sublation of this immediate instinct of finding, the sublation of this unconscious *Being-there* of this truth. The *intuited category*, the *thing found*, enters into consciousness as the *Being-for-itself* of the *I*, which now knows itself in the objective essence as the *Self*. But this determination of the category, as *Being-for-self* opposed to *Being-in-itself*, is equally one-sided and a self-sublating moment. The category is therefore determined for consciousness as it is in its universal truth, as essence that is *in-* and *for-itself*. This still *abstract* determination, which constitutes the *Thing itself*, is at first the *spiritual essence*, and the consciousness of this essence is a formal knowing of it, which busies itself with all sorts of content of the essence; in fact this consciousness, as a singularity, is still distinct from substance, and either makes wilful laws or opines that in its knowing as such it has the laws as they are in and for themselves; and regards itself as the power sitting in judgement on them.—Or, looked at from the side of substance, this is spiritual essence that *is in* and *for itself*, but which is not yet *consciousness* of itself. But the essence that *is in* and *for itself*, and which is at the same time actual as consciousness and represents itself to itself, this is *spirit*.¹

¶439. Its *spiritual essence* has already been designated as the *ethical substance*; but spirit is the *ethical actuality*. Spirit is the *Self* of the actual consciousness which it confronts, or rather which confronts itself as an objective actual *world*, but a world that has, for the *Self*, entirely lost the significance of something alien, just as the *Self* has entirely lost the significance of a *Being-for-itself* separated from the world, whether dependent on it or not. Spirit is the *substance* and the universal, permanent essence equal-to-itself,—it is the unshakeable and indissoluble *ground* and *starting-point* for the doing of everyone,—and it is their *purpose* and *goal*, as the *in-itself*, in thought, of all self-consciousnesses.—This substance is equally the universal *work* that generates itself through the *doing* of all and everyone as their unity and equality, for it is the *Being-for-itself*, the *Self*, the doing. As *substance*, spirit is unwavering righteous *equality-with-itself*; but as *Being-for-itself* it is the dissolved essence, the self-sacrificing benevolent essence, in which everyone accomplishes his own work,

tears asunder the universal Being, and takes from it his share. This dissolution and singularization of the essence is precisely the moment of the doing and Self of everyone; it is the movement and soul of substance and the actuated universal essence. Just because it is Being dissolved in the Self, it is not the dead essence, but is *actual* and *alive*.¹

¶440. Spirit is thus the self-supporting, absolute, real essence. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions from it; what they are is this: spirit analyses itself, differentiates its moments, and dwells on single moments. This isolating of such moments has spirit itself as its *presupposition* and its *subsistence*, or the isolation exists only in spirit, which is existence. In this isolation they have the semblance of *being* as such; but that they are only moments or vanishing quantities is shown by their push forwards and their return into their ground and essence; and this essence is just this movement and dissolution of these moments. Here, where spirit, or the reflection of these moments into themselves, is posited, we may briefly recall this aspect in our own reflection on them; they were consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. Spirit, then, is *consciousness* in general, which comprehends within itself sensory certainty, perception, and the understanding, insofar as in its self-analysis spirit holds fast to the moment of *being* an *objective* actuality to itself, and abstracts from the fact that this actuality is its own Being-for-itself. If, on the contrary, it holds fast to the other moment of the analysis, that its object is its own *Being-for-itself*, then it is self-consciousness. But as immediate consciousness of the *Being-in-and-for-itself*, as unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, spirit is consciousness that *has reason*; it is consciousness which, as the word 'has' indicates, has the object as *in itself* rationally determined or determined by the value of the category, but in such a way that the object does not as yet have for the consciousness of it the value of the category. Spirit is the consciousness which we were considering just now. When this reason, which spirit *has*, is finally intuited by spirit as the sort of reason that *is*, or as reason that is *actual* in spirit and is its world, then spirit is in its truth; it *is* spirit, it is the *actual ethical* essence.¹

¶441. Spirit is the *ethical life* of a people insofar as spirit is the *immediate truth*; the individual that is a world. Spirit must advance to the consciousness of what it immediately is, must sublimate the beautiful ethical life, and by way of a series of shapes attain to knowledge of itself. These shapes, however, are differentiated from the previous ones by the fact that they are the real spirits, proper actualities, and instead of shapes merely of consciousness, are shapes of a world.¹

¶442. The *living ethical* world is spirit in its *truth*; when spirit first arrives at abstract *knowledge* of its essence, the ethical order is submerged in the formal universality of right. Spirit, henceforth divided within itself, inscribes one of its worlds, the *realm of culture*, in the harsh actuality of its objective element, and over against this realm, it inscribes in the element of thinking the *world of faith*, the *realm of the essence*. Both worlds, however, when grasped by spirit—which after this loss of itself withdraws into itself—when grasped by the *concept*, are confounded and revolutionized by *insight* and its dissemination, the *enlightenment*, and the realm divided and expanded into the *hither side* and the *beyond* returns into self-consciousness, which now, in *morality*, grasps itself as the essentiality and grasps the essence as the actual Self; it no longer posits its *world* and its *ground*

outside itself, but lets everything fade away into itself, and, as *conscience*, is spirit *certain of itself*.¹

¶443. The ethical world, the world rent asunder into the hither side and the beyond, and the moral world-view, are thus the spirits whose movement and return into the simple Self of spirit, a Self that is for itself, will develop, and as their goal and result the actual self-consciousness of absolute spirit will arise.¹

A. *The true spirit, the ethical order*

¶444. Spirit is, in its simple truth, consciousness, and prisms its moments apart from each other. *Action* separates spirit into substance and consciousness of substance; and separates the substance as well as consciousness. Substance, as universal *essence* and *purpose*, confronts itself as the *singularized* actuality; the infinite middle term is self-consciousness which, *in itself* unity of itself and the substance, now becomes it *for itself* and unites the universal essence and its singularized actuality; it raises the actuality to the essence and acts ethically,—and it lowers the essence to the actuality, and carries out the purpose, the substance merely in thought; it produces the unity of its Self and the substance as *its own work*, and thus as *actuality*.¹

¶445. In this dispersion of consciousness, the simple substance has, on the one hand, maintained opposition to self-consciousness, and on the other hand it thereby equally presents within its own self the nature of consciousness, viz. to differentiate itself within itself, as a world articulated into its masses. Substance thus splits up into a differentiated ethical essence, into a human and a divine law. Similarly, the self-consciousness confronting the substance assigns itself, according to its essence, to one of these powers and, as knowledge, splits up into ignorance of what it does, and knowledge of what it does, a knowledge which for that reason is a deceptive knowledge. In its deed it thus experiences the contradiction of those powers into which the substance divided itself and their mutual destruction, as well as the contradiction between its knowledge of the ethical character of its action, and what is ethical in and for itself, and thus meets *its own* downfall. In fact, however, through this movement the ethical substance has become *actual self-consciousness*, or *this* Self has come to be *in and for itself*; but in the process the ethical order itself has gone to ruin.¹

A. THE ETHICAL WORLD. HUMAN AND DIVINE LAW: MAN AND WOMAN

¶446. The simple substance of spirit divides itself as consciousness. Or, just as the consciousness of abstract Being, of sensory Being, passes over into perception, so too does the immediate certainty of real ethical Being; and just as for sense-perception simple Being becomes a thing of many properties, so for ethical perception the case of action is an actuality with many ethical relations. For the former, however, the useless multiplicity of properties concentrates itself into the essential opposition of singularity and universality; and still more for ethical perception, which is the purified substantial consciousness, the multiplicity of ethical moments becomes the duality of a law of singularity and a law of universality. But each of these masses of substance remains spirit in its entirety; if in sense-perception things have no other substance than the two determinations of singularity and universality, here these determinations express only the superficial opposition of the two sides towards each other.¹

¶447. In the essence we are considering here, singularity has the significance of *self-consciousness* in general, not of a singular contingent consciousness. In this determination, therefore, the ethical substance is *actual* substance, the absolute spirit *realized* in the multiplicity of *consciousness* that is-there; this spirit is the essence of the *commonwealth* which, when we entered the practical configuration of reason in general, was *for us* the absolute essence, and here has emerged *for itself* in its truth as conscious ethical essence, and as the *essence for the* consciousness which is here our object. The commonwealth is spirit which is *for itself* in that it maintains itself in the *counterglow of individuals*,—and it is *in itself* or substance, in that it maintains them within itself. As the *actual substance* it is a *people*, and as *actual consciousness* a *citizen* of that people. *This* consciousness has its *essence* in the simple spirit, and the certainty of itself in the *actuality* of this spirit, in the people as a whole, and immediately therein it has its *truth*, thus not in something that is not actual, but in a spirit that *exists* and *prevails*.¹

¶448. This spirit can be called the human law, because it is essentially in the form of *actuality conscious of itself*. In the form of universality it is the *well-known* law, and the *prevailing* custom; in the form of singularity it is the actual certainty of itself in the *individual* in general, and the certainty of itself as *simple individuality* is that spirit as government; its truth is its manifest *validity*, exposed to the light of day; an *existence* which for immediate certainty assumes the form of Being-there set free.¹

¶449. Confronting this ethical power and manifestability there is, however, another power, the *divine law*. For the ethical *State-power*, as the *movement of conscious doing*, has its opposite in the *simple* and *immediate essence* of the ethical order; as *actual universality* State-power is a counterweight to individual Being-for-itself; and as actuality in general it still has in the *inner* essence something other than what it is itself.¹

¶450. It has already been mentioned that each of the opposite ways in which the ethical substance exists contains the entire substance, and all the moments of its content. If, then, the commonwealth is substance as actual doing conscious of itself, the other side has the form of immediate substance or substance that simply is. The latter is thus on the one hand the inner concept or the universal possibility of the ethical order in general, but on the other hand equally has within it the moment of self-consciousness. This moment, expressing the ethical order in this element of *immediacy* or of *Being*, or an *immediate* consciousness of itself, both as essence and as this Self in an other, i.e. as a *natural ethical* commonwealth,—this is the *family*. The family, as the *unconscious*, still inner concept, stands opposed to its self-conscious actuality; as the *element* of the people's actuality, it stands opposed to the people itself; as *immediate ethical Being*, it stands over against the ethical order that forms and maintains itself by *labour* for the universal;—the Penates stand opposed to the universal spirit.¹

¶451. However, although the *ethical Being* of the family determines itself as *immediate* Being, it is within itself an *ethical* essence, but not *insofar as* it is the *natural* relationship of its members, or insofar as their relation is an *immediate* relation of *actual single* members; for the ethical element is in itself *universal*, and this relationship of nature is essentially just as much a spirit, and is ethical only as spiritual essence. We have to see what its peculiar ethical character consists in.—In the first place, because the ethical element is in itself universal, the ethical relation

between family members is not the relation of sensibility, or the relation of love. It seems, then, that the ethical element must be placed in the relationship of the *single* family member to the *whole* family as the substance; so that his doing and actuality has only the family as its purpose and content. But the conscious purpose which the *doing* of this whole has, insofar as this purpose concerns the whole, is itself the singularity. The acquisition and maintenance of power and wealth is in part concerned only with need and pertains to desire; in part, they become in their higher determination something only intermediate. This determination does not fall within the family itself, but bears on what is genuinely universal, the commonwealth; it is, rather, negative with regard to the family, and consists in extracting the singular from the family, subduing his naturalness and singularity, and training him to *virtue*, to life in and for the universal. The *positive* purpose peculiar to the family is the singular as such. Now for this relation to be ethical, neither he who acts, nor he to whom the action relates, can present himself according to a *contingency*, as happens, say, in rendering some assistance or service. The content of the ethical action must be substantial or whole and universal; therefore it can only be related to the *whole* singular or to him as universal. And this, again, must not be understood as if it were only *represented* that a *service* would promote his total happiness, whereas the service, as it is an immediate and actual action, produces only a single effect on him;—nor that the service, as education, in a *series* of efforts, actually has him in his entirety as its object, and produces him as a work; for apart from the negative purpose with regard to the family, the *actual action* has only a limited content;—just as little, finally, should the service be represented as a help in need by which in truth the singular in his entirety is rescued; for such help is itself a completely contingent deed, the occasion of which is an ordinary actuality which can either be or not be. The action, then, which embraces the entire existence of the blood-relative, does not concern him as a citizen, for the citizen does not belong to the family, nor does it concern him as one who is supposed to become a citizen and *to cease* to count as this singularity; it has as its object and content *this* single family member, as a *universal* essence released from his sensory, i.e. singular, actuality, it no longer concerns the *living*, but the *dead*, who, after the long succession of dispersed Being-there, has concentrated himself into a complete configuration, and has raised himself out of the unrest of contingent life into the calm of simple universality.—Because he is *actual* and *substantial* only as a citizen, the singleton, so far as he is not a citizen and belongs to the family, is only the *unactual* marrowless shadow.¹

¶452. This universality to which the singleton as *such* attains is *pure Being*, *death*; it is *immediate*, *natural having-become*, not the *doing* of a *consciousness*. For this reason, the duty of the family member is to add this side, so that his ultimate *Being* too, this *universal* Being, shall not belong solely to nature and remain something irrational, but shall be something *done*, and the right of consciousness be asserted in it. Or rather, the sense of the action is that because in truth the calm and universality of an essence conscious of itself do not belong to nature, the semblance of such a doing, a semblance that nature has arrogated, shall fall away, and the truth be established.—What nature did in him is that aspect in which his becoming a universal displays itself as the movement of a *being*. This movement falls, of course,

within the ethical commonwealth, and has this for its purpose; death is the fulfilment and the supreme labour which the individual as such undertakes for the commonwealth. But insofar as he is essentially *singular*, it is contingent that his death was immediately connected with his labour for the universal and was a result of it; on the one hand, if his death was such a result, it is the *natural* negativity and the movement of the singular as a *being*, in which consciousness does not return into itself and become self-consciousness; or since the movement of the *being* is such that it is sublated and attains to *Being-for-itself*, death is the side of bifurcation in which the attained Being-for-itself is something other than the being which entered into the movement.—Because the ethical order is spirit in its *immediate* truth, the sides into which spirit's consciousness separates also fall into this form of *immediacy*, and singularity passes over into this *abstract* negativity which, without consolation and reconciliation *in its own self*, must receive them *essentially* through an *actual* and *external action*.—And so blood-relationship completes the abstract natural movement by adding the movement of consciousness, interrupting the work of nature, and rescuing the blood-relative from destruction, or better, because destruction, its becoming pure Being, is necessary, by taking on itself the deed of destruction. Through this it comes about that even the *dead* Being, the universal *Being*, becomes something that has returned into itself, a *Being-for-itself*, or the pure *singular* singularity, lacking any force, is raised to *universal individuality*. The dead, since he has liberated his *Being* from his *doing* or the negative unit, is empty singularity, merely a passive *Being for another*, at the mercy of all lowly irrational individuality and the forces of abstract materials, all of which are now more powerful than himself, the former on account of the life it possesses, the latter on account of their negative nature. The family keeps away from the dead this dishonouring doing of unconscious desire and abstract essences, and puts its own doing in its place, and weds the relative to the bosom of the earth, to the elemental imperishable individuality; the family thereby makes him the companion of a commonwealth which overpowers and keeps under control the forces of singular materials and the lowly vitalities, which sought to unloose themselves against him and to destroy him.¹

¶453. This last duty thus constitutes the perfect *divine* law, or the positive *ethical* action towards the singleton. Every other relationship to him which does not remain at the level of love but is ethical, belongs to human law and has the negative significance of raising the singleton above confinement in the natural commonwealth to which he, as *actual*, belongs. But now although human right has for its content and power the actual ethical substance conscious of itself, the entire people, while the divine right and law has for its content and power the singleton who is beyond actuality, yet he is not without power; his power is the *abstract*, pure *universal*, the *elemental* individual which, just as it is the ground of the individuality, draws it back into the pure abstraction, as into its essence, when this individuality breaks loose from the element and constitutes the self-conscious actuality of the people.—How this power presents itself in the people itself, will be developed further.¹

¶454. Now, in the one law as in the other there are also *differences* and *gradations*. For since both essences have in them the moment of consciousness, difference unfolds within themselves; and this constitutes their movement and peculiar life. Consideration of these differences shows the mode of *operation* and the mode of *self-consciousness*

of the two *universal essences* of the ethical world, and also their *connection* and *transition* into one another.¹

¶455. The *commonwealth*, the higher law whose validity manifests itself in the light of day, has its actual vitality in the *government* as that in which it is an individual. Government is the *actual spirit reflected into itself*, the simple *Self* of the entire ethical substance. This simple power does indeed allow the essence to expand into its articulation, and to give to each part subsistence and a Being-for-itself of its own. Spirit has in this its *reality* or its *Being-there*, and the family is the *element* of this reality. But spirit is at the same time the force of the whole, which brings these parts together again into a negative unit, gives them the feeling of dependence, and keeps them in the consciousness of having their life only in the whole. So the commonwealth may, on the one hand, organize itself into systems of personal independence and of property, of right concerning persons and right concerning things; likewise it may articulate into associations of their own, and allow independence to, the ways of working for purposes which are in the first instance singular—those of gain and enjoyment. The spirit of universal association is the *simplicity* and the *negative* essence of these systems that isolate themselves. So that they do not become rooted and set in this isolation, thereby letting the whole break up and the spirit evaporate, the government has from time to time to shake them to their core by wars, by this means to violate and confound their established order and right to independence, while making the individuals who, absorbed in this order, break loose from the whole and strive after inviolable *Being-for-itself* and security of the person, feel in the task imposed on them their lord and master, death. Spirit, by this dissolution of the form of subsistence, wards off from ethical Being-there the lapse into natural Being-there, and it preserves the Self of its consciousness and raises it into *freedom* and into its *force*.—The negative essence shows itself to be the genuine *power* of the commonwealth and the *force* of its self-preservation; the commonwealth therefore has the truth and confirmation of its power in the essence of the *divine law* and in the *realm of the nether world*.¹

¶456. The divine law which reigns in the family has likewise on its side differences within itself whose relation constitutes the living movement of its actuality. But among the three relationships, of husband and wife, of parents and children, of siblings as brother and sister, the *relationship of husband and wife* is in the first place the *immediate* self-cognition of one consciousness in the other, and the cognition of the mutual recognition. Because this is *natural* self-cognition, and not ethical self-cognition, it is only a *representation*, an *image* of spirit, not the actual spirit itself.—The representation or the image, however, has its actuality in something other than itself; this relationship therefore has its actuality not in itself but in the child,—an other, whose coming-to-be is the relationship, and that in which the relationship itself vanishes; and this alternation of successive generations has its permanence in the people.—The piety of husband and wife towards each other is thus mixed with a natural relation and with sentiment, and their relationship does not have its return into itself within itself; similarly the second relationship, the *piety of parents and children* towards each other. The piety of parents towards their children is affected precisely by this emotional impact of having the consciousness of the relationship's actuality in the other, and of seeing the Being-for-itself come about in the other,

without taking it back again; but it remains an alien actuality of its own;—but the piety of children towards parents is affected, conversely, by the emotional impact of having the coming-to-be of itself, or the in-itself, in a vanishing other, and of attaining Being-for-itself and a self-consciousness of its own only through separation from the source,—a separation in which the source dries up.¹

¶457. Both these relationships are confined within the transition and the inequality of the sides which are assigned to them.—The unmixed relationship obtains, however, between *brother* and *sister*. They are the same blood which has, however, in them arrived at its *rest* and *equilibrium*. Therefore, they do not desire one another, nor have they given to, or received from, one another this Being-for-itself; on the contrary, they are free individualities in regard to each other. Consequently, the feminine, as sister, has the supreme *presentiment* of the ethical essence; she does not attain to *consciousness*, or to the actuality, of this essence, because the law of the family is the *internal* essence that is *in-itself*, an essence which does not lie in the daylight of consciousness, but remains internal feeling and the divine element exempt from actuality. The feminine is bound to these Penates and intuitus in them both its universal substance and also its singularity, yet in such a way that this relation of singularity is at the same time not the natural relation of pleasure.—As a *daughter*, the woman must now see her parents vanish with natural emotion and ethical resignation, for only at the cost of this relationship does she arrive at the *Being-for-self* of which she is capable. Thus in the parents, she does not intuit her Being-for-self in a positive mode.—The relationships of *mother* and *wife*, however, involve singularity, partly as something natural pertaining to pleasure, partly as something negative which discerns in those relationships only their vanishing; and also, again, the singularity is for that very reason something contingent which can be replaced by another singularity. In the household of the ethical order, it is not *this* husband, not *this* child, but a *husband, children in general*,—not sensibility, but the universal, on which these relationships of the woman are based. The difference between the ethical life of the woman and that of the man consists just in this, that in her determination for singularity and in her pleasure, she remains immediately universal and alien to the singularity of desire; whereas in the husband these two sides are separated, and since he possesses as a citizen the *self-conscious* force of *universality*, he thereby purchases for himself the right of *desire* and, at the same time, preserves his freedom in regard to desire. Insofar, then, as in this relationship of the wife there is an admixture of singularity, her ethical character is not pure; but insofar as her ethical character is pure, the singularity is a matter of *indifference*, and the wife lacks the moment of recognizing herself as *this* Self in the other.—The brother, however, is for the sister the calm, equal essence in general, her recognition in him is pure and unmixed with any natural relation; in this relationship, therefore, the indifference of the singularity, and its ethical contingency, are not present; but the moment of the *singular Self*, recognizing and recognized, may here assert its right, because it is linked to the equilibrium of the blood and to a relation devoid of desire. The loss of the brother is therefore irreparable to the sister and her duty towards him is the highest.¹

¶458. This relationship is at the same time the limit at which the self-contained life of the family dissolves and goes outside itself. The brother is the side on which spirit

of the family becomes individuality which turns towards something else, and passes over into the consciousness of universality. The brother abandons this *immediate, elemental*, and therefore, strictly speaking, *negative* ethical life of the family, in order to acquire and produce the ethical life that is conscious of itself and actual.

¶459. He passes from the divine law, within whose sphere he lived, over to human law. But the sister becomes, or the wife remains, the head of the household and the guardian of the divine law. In this way, the two sexes overcome their natural essence and emerge in their ethical significance, as diversities which share between them the two differences that the ethical substance assumes. These two *universal* essences of the ethical world therefore have their determinate individuality in *naturally* distinct self-consciousnesses, because the ethical spirit is the *immediate* unity of the substance with self-consciousness;—an immediacy which appears therefore, on the side of reality and of difference, as the Being-there of a natural difference.—It is that side which, in the shape of individuality that is real to itself, showed itself in the concept of the spiritual essence as an *originally determinate nature*. This moment loses the indeterminacy which it still has there, and the contingent diversity of predispositions and capacities. It is now the determinate opposition of the two sexes whose naturalness acquires at the same time the significance of their ethical determination.¹

¶460. The difference of the sexes and their ethical content remains, however, in the unity of the substance, and its movement is just the constant becoming of that substance. The man is sent out by the spirit of the family into the commonwealth and finds in this his self-conscious essence; just as the family in this way has in the commonwealth its universal substance and subsistence, so, conversely, the commonwealth has in the family the formal element of its actuality, and in the divine law its force and authentication. Neither of the two alone is in and for itself; human law proceeds in its living movement from the divine, the law valid on earth from that of the nether world, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy, and equally returns whence it came. The power of the nether world, on the other hand, has its *actuality* on earth; through consciousness, it becomes Being-there and activity.¹

¶461. The universal ethical essences are, then, the substance as universal consciousness, and the substance as singular consciousness; they have the people and the family for their universal actuality, but the man and the woman for their natural Self and the activating individuality. In this content of the ethical world we see achieved those purposes which the previous insubstantial shapes of consciousness set themselves; what reason apprehended only as object has become self-consciousness, and what self-consciousness had only within itself has become present as true actuality.—What observation knew as something *found-already-there*, in which the Self had no part, is here custom found-already-there, but an actuality which is at the same time deed and work of the one finding it.—The singleton, seeking the pleasure of *enjoying his singularity*, finds it in the family, and the necessity in which the pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his people;—or self-consciousness is this: knowing the *law of the heart* as the law of all hearts, knowing the consciousness of the *Self* as the recognized universal order;—it is *virtue*, which enjoys the fruits of its sacrifice, which brings about what it sets out to do, viz. to bring forth the essence into actual presence, and its enjoyment is this universal life.—Finally, consciousness

of *the Thing itself* finds satisfaction in the real substance which contains and preserves in a positive manner the abstract moments of that empty category. The Thing itself has, in the ethical powers, a genuine content that has taken the place of the insubstantial commands which sound reason wanted to give and to know;—just as it thereby has a contentful, intrinsically determinate standard for testing—not the laws, but what is done.¹

¶462. The whole is a stable equilibrium of all the parts, and each part is an indigenous spirit, which does not seek its satisfaction beyond itself but finds it within itself, because it is itself in this equilibrium with the whole.—This equilibrium can be living, it is true, only because inequality arises in it and is brought back to equality by *justice*. Justice, however, is neither an alien essence situated beyond, nor the actuality unworthy of the essence, an actuality of mutual malice, treachery, ingratitude, etc. which would execute the judgement in the manner of thoughtless contingency, as an uncomprehended connection and an unconscious doing and omission; on the contrary, as justice of *human* right, justice which brings back the Being-for-itself that breaks away from the equilibrium, the independence of classes and individuals, into the universal, it is the government of the people, the government which is the individuality, present to itself, of the universal essence and is the proper self-conscious will of all.—The justice, however, which brings back to equilibrium the universal when it becomes too powerful over the singleton, is equally the simple spirit of him who has suffered injustice,—a spirit not split up into the one who has suffered the wrong and an essence beyond; he himself is the power of the nether world, and it is *his* Erinys which wreaks vengeance; for his individuality, his blood, lives on in the household; his substance has an enduring actuality. The wrong which can be inflicted on the singular in the ethical realm is simply this, that something purely and simply *happens* to him. The power which inflicts this wrong on the consciousness, which makes him into a mere thing, is nature, it is the universality not of the *commonwealth*, but the *abstract* universality of *Being*; and the singularity, in resolving the wrong suffered, does not turn against the commonwealth, for it is not at its hands that it has suffered, but against Being. As we saw, the consciousness of the blood of the individual resolves this wrong in such a way that what has *happened* becomes instead a *work*, in order that *Being*, the *ultimate*, should also be something *willed* and thereby agreeable.¹

¶463. In this way the ethical realm is in its *subsistence* an immaculate world, a world unsullied by any discord. Similarly, its movement is a tranquil transition of one of its powers into the other, in such a way that each preserves and brings forth the other. We do indeed see it divide itself into two essences and their actuality; but their opposition is rather the authentication of one through the other, and where they come immediately into contact with each other, as actual, their middle term and element is their immediate interpenetration. The one extreme, the universal conscious spirit, becomes, through the *individuality* of the *man*, joined together with its other extreme, its force and its element, with *unconscious* spirit. On the other hand, the *divine* law has its individualization, or the *unconscious* spirit of the singleton has its Being-there, in the woman, through whom, as the *middle term*, the unconscious spirit rises out of its unactuality into actuality, out of the unknowing and unknown into the conscious realm. The union of the man and the woman constitutes the active middle term of the whole, and the element which, sundered into these extremes of

divine and human law, is equally their immediate unification which makes those first two syllogisms into one and the same syllogism, and unites into one the opposite movements: one from actuality down to unactuality,—the downward movement of human law, which organizes itself into independent members, to the danger and trial of death,—and the other, the upward movement of the law of the nether world to the actuality of the light of day and to conscious Being-there. Of these movements, the former falls to the man, the latter to the woman.¹

B. THE ETHICAL ACTION. HUMAN AND DIVINE KNOWLEDGE. GUILT AND DESTINY

¶464. But the way in which the opposition is constituted in this ethical realm is such that self-consciousness has not yet made its entry in its right as *singular individuality*; in this realm individuality counts, on the one side, only as *universal will*, and on the other side, as *blood* of the family; *this singleton* counts only as the *unactual shadow*.—As yet no deed has been committed; but the deed is the *actual Self*.—The deed disturbs the peaceful organization and movement of the ethical world. What appears in this world as order and harmony of its two essences, each of which confirms and completes the other, becomes through the deed a transition of *opposites* in which each proves itself to be the nullity, rather than the confirmation, of itself and the other;—it becomes the negative movement or the eternal necessity of the dreadful *destiny* which engulfs in the abyss of its *simplicity* the divine and the human law alike, as well as the two self-consciousnesses in which these powers have their Being-there,—and for us passes over into the *absolute Being-for-itself* of the purely singular self-consciousness.¹

¶465. The *ground* from which this movement starts, and on which it proceeds, is the realm of ethical life; but the *activity* of this movement is self-consciousness. As *ethical* consciousness, it is the *simple, pure orientation* towards the ethical essentiality, or *duty*. In it there is no wilfulness and equally no struggle, no indecision, since the making and the testing of laws has been given up; on the contrary, the ethical essentiality is for this consciousness what is immediate, unwavering, without contradiction. Consequently, we are not faced with the sorry spectacle of a collision between passion and duty, nor with the comedy of a collision between duty and duty,—a collision which, as regards content, is the same as that between passion and duty; for passion is equally capable of being represented as a duty, because when consciousness withdraws into itself out of the immediate substantial essentiality of duty, duty becomes the formal universal into which every content fits equally well, just as we found before. But the collision of duties is comic because it expresses a contradiction, viz. the contradiction of an *absolute in opposition*: an absolute, and immediately the nothingness of this so-called absolute or duty.—The ethical consciousness, however, knows what it has to do, and has decided whether to belong to the divine or the human law. This immediacy of its decisiveness is a *Being-in-itself* and therefore has at the same time the significance of a natural Being, as we have seen; it is nature, not the contingency of circumstances or choice, that assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other law,—or conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves their individual Being-there and actualization in the two sexes.¹

¶466. Now, because, on the one hand, the ethical order essentially consists in this immediate *decisiveness*, and for that reason only one of the laws is the essence for

consciousness, while, on the other hand, the ethical powers are actual in the *Self* of consciousness, these powers acquire the significance of *excluding* and *opposing* one another;—in self-consciousness they are *for themselves*, just as in the ethical *realm* they are only *in themselves*. The ethical consciousness, because it has *decided* for one of the powers, is essentially *character*; for it the two powers do not have equal *essentiality*; for this reason, the opposition appears as an *unfortunate* collision of duty merely with an *actuality* without right. The ethical consciousness is, as self-consciousness, in this opposition and as such it at once proceeds to force this opposed actuality into subjection to the law it belongs to, or else to outwit it. Since it sees right only on one side and wrong on the other, the consciousness which belongs to the divine law perceives in the other side contingent human *violence*; while the consciousness assigned to human law sees in the other side only the obstinacy and the *disobedience* of internal Being-for-itself; for the commands of government are the universal public sense open to the light of day; the will of the other law, however, is the sense of the nether world, closed up in the interior, and in its Being-there it appears as the will of singularity and, in contradiction with the first law, is a wanton outrage.¹

¶467. In this way there arises in consciousness the opposition of the *known* and the *not-known*, just as in substance the opposition of the *conscious* and the *unconscious*; and the absolute right of ethical *self-consciousness* comes into conflict with the divine *right* of the *essence*. For self-consciousness, as consciousness, objective actuality as such has essence; but according to its substance it is the unity of itself and this opposite, and ethical self-consciousness is the consciousness of the substance; therefore the object, in its opposition to self-consciousness, has lost entirely the significance of having essence for itself. Just as the spheres in which the object is only a *thing* have long since vanished, so too have these spheres in which consciousness establishes something from out of itself and makes a single moment into the essence. Against such one-sidedness, actuality has a force of its own; it stands in alliance with the truth against consciousness, and first displays to consciousness what the truth is. The ethical consciousness, however, has imbibed from the cup of absolute substance forgetfulness of all the one-sidedness of Being-for-itself, of its purposes and peculiar concepts, and has, therefore, at the same time drowned in this Stygian water all essentiality of its own and all independent significance of objective actuality. Its absolute right is, therefore, that when it acts in accordance with the ethical law, it shall not find in this actualization anything other than simply the accomplishment of this law itself, and the deed shall manifest nothing other than ethical doing.—The ethical, as the absolute *essence* and the absolute *power* at the same time, cannot endure any perversion of its content. If it were only absolute *essence* without the power, then it could experience perversion through the individuality; but the individuality, as ethical consciousness, in giving up one-sided Being-for-itself, renounced perversion; just as, conversely, mere power would be perverted by the essence if it were still such a Being-for-itself. On account of this unity, the individuality is the pure form of the substance that is the content, and the doing is the transition from thought to actuality merely as the movement of an opposition devoid of essence whose moments have no particular content diverse from each other and no essentiality. Consequently, the absolute right of the ethical

consciousness is that the *deed*, the *shape* of its *actuality*, shall be nothing other than what it *knows*.¹

¶468. But the ethical essence has split itself into two laws, and consciousness, as an undivided stance towards law, is assigned only to one. Just as this *simple* consciousness insists on the absolute right that to it, as ethical, the essence has *appeared* as it is *in itself*, so this essence insists on the right of its *reality*, or on its being twofold. But at the same time this right of the essence does not stand over against self-consciousness, as if it were somewhere else, but it is, on the contrary, self-consciousness's own essence; it has its Being-there and its power in self-consciousness alone, and its opposition is the *deed* of *self-consciousness*. For this latter, just because it is a Self to itself and advances to the deed, raises itself out of *simple immediacy*, and itself posits the *bifurcation*. By the deed it gives up the determinacy of ethical life, of being the simple certainty of the immediate truth, and posits the separation of itself, a separation into itself as the active party, and the actuality over against it, an actuality which, for it, is negative. By the deed, therefore, it becomes *guilt*. For the deed is its *doing*, and the doing is its ownmost essence; and the *guilt* also acquires the significance of *crime*; for as simple, ethical consciousness, it has sided with one of the laws, but renounced the other and violated it by its deed.—*Guilt* is not the indifferent, ambiguous essence, whereby the deed as *actually* seen in the light of day could, or perhaps could not, be the *doing* of its Self, as if with the doing there could be linked something external and contingent that did not belong to it, from which aspect, therefore, the doing would be guiltless. On the contrary, the doing is itself this bifurcation of positing itself for itself and over against it an alien external actuality; that there is such an actuality belongs to the doing itself and results from it. Therefore, only non-doing is guiltless, like the Being of a stone, not even that of a child.—As regards content, however, the ethical *action* has in it the moment of crime, because it does not sublimate the *natural* allocation of the two laws to the two sexes, but rather, as *undivided* focus on the law, remains within *natural immediacy*, and, as doing, makes this one-sidedness into guilt by seizing on only one of the sides of the essence, and reacting negatively towards the other, i.e. violating it. The place in the universal ethical life of guilt and crime, of doing and acting, will receive more determinate expression later; but this much is immediately evident, that it is not *this singleton* who acts and is guilty; for as *this* Self he is only the unactual shadow, or he is merely as universal Self, and the individuality is purely the *formal* moment of the doing in general, while the content is the laws and customs and, determinately for the singleton, those of his status; he is the substance as genus, which by its determinacy, becomes indeed a species, though the species remains at the same time the universal of the genus. Self-consciousness within the people descends from the universal only as far down as particularity, and not down to the single individuality which, in its doing, posits an exclusive Self, an actuality negative to itself; on the contrary, at the basis of its action lies secure confidence in the whole, unmixed with anything alien, with any fear or enmity.¹

¶469. Ethical self-consciousness now experiences in its deed the developed nature of its *actual* course of action, as much when it submitted to divine law as when it submitted to human law. The law that is manifest to it is linked in the essence with

the opposed law; the essence is the unity of both; but the deed has only carried out one law against the other. But since the two laws are linked in the essence, the fulfilment of the one evokes the other and calls it forth as a violated and now hostile vengeance-seeking essence, into which the deed transformed it. To the action, only one side of the overall decision is clearly manifest; but the decision is *in itself* the negative which confronts the decision with something else, with something alien to the decision that is knowledge. Actuality therefore keeps concealed within it the other side which is alien to this knowledge, and does not reveal itself to consciousness as it is in and for itself,—not to the son the father in his offender whom he slays,—not the mother in the queen whom he makes his wife.¹ In this way, the ethical self-consciousness is beleaguered by a light-shunning power which breaks forth only after the deed has happened, and catches it in the act; for the accomplished deed is the sublated opposition between the knowing Self and the actuality confronting it. The agent cannot deny the crime and his guilt;—the deed is this: to move what is unmoved, and to bring forth what was at first only locked up in possibility, and hence to link the unconscious to the conscious, the non-being to Being. In this truth, therefore, the deed steps out into the sunlight,—as something in which the conscious is bound up with the unconscious, what is one's own with what is alien, as the divided essence, whose other side consciousness experiences, and also experiences as its own, but as the power it has violated and roused to hostility.²

¶470. It can be that the right which lay in ambush is not present in its own proper shape for the acting *consciousness*, but is present only *in itself* in the inner guilt of the decision and the acting. But the ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt more pure, if it *knows beforehand* the law and the power it confronts, if it takes them to be violence and wrong, to be an ethical contingency, and, like Antigone, knowingly commits the crime. The accomplished deed reverses its view; the very *accomplishment* declares that what is *ethical* must be *actual*; for the *actuality* of the purpose is the purpose of acting. Acting immediately declares the *unity* of *actuality* and *substance*, it declares that actuality is not contingent for the essence, but that, in union with the essence, it is not granted to any right that is not true right. The ethical consciousness must, on account of this actuality and on account of its doing, recognize its opposite as its own actuality, must recognize its guilt;

*Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred.*¹

¶471. This recognition expresses the sublated discord between the ethical *purpose* and *actuality*, it expresses the return to an ethical *disposition*, which knows that nothing counts except what is right. But the agent thereby surrenders its *character* and the *actuality* of its Self, and has gone to ruin. Its *Being* consists in its belonging to his ethical law, as its substance; but in the recognition of the opposite, this law has ceased to be substance for it; and instead of its actuality it has attained unactuality, the disposition.—The substance does appear, it is true, *in* the individuality as its *pathos*, and the individuality appears as that which animates the substance and hence stands above it; but the substance is a pathos that is at the same time its character; the ethical individuality is immediately and in itself one with its universal, it has its existence in it alone, and is unable to survive the destruction which this ethical power suffers at the hands of the opposite power.¹

¶472. But along with this, this individuality has the certainty that that individuality whose pathos is this opposing power *suffers no more evil than it has inflicted*. The movement of the ethical powers against each other and of the individualities positing them into life and action have attained their *true end* only insofar as both sides experience the same destruction. For neither power has any advantage over the other to make it a *more essential* moment of the substance. The equal essentiality of both and their indifferent subsistence alongside each other is their selfless Being; in the *deed* they are as a Self-essence, but a diverse Self-essence, which contradicts the unity of the Self, and constitutes their lack of right and necessary destruction. The *character* likewise belongs on the one hand, with respect to its pathos or substance, to one of the individualities only, while on the other hand, on the side of knowing, the one character like the other is split up into a conscious and an unconscious part; and since each itself calls forth this opposition and its not-knowing too is, through the deed, its own work, each posits itself into the guilt that consumes it. The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other side, would thus be only the part and the unfinished work which irresistibly advances to the equilibrium of the two. Only in the equal subjugation of both sides is absolute right accomplished, and the ethical substance as the negative power which devours both sides, or all-powerful and righteous *destiny*, has entered the scene.¹

¶473. If both powers are taken according to their determinate content and its individualization, we are presented with the picture of their conflict in its shaping as, on its formal side, the conflict of the ethical order and self-consciousness with unconscious nature and a contingency stemming from nature (the latter has a right against self-consciousness, because self-consciousness is only the *true spirit*, only in *immediate* unity with its substance)¹ and, with regard to content, as the clash between divine and human law.—The youth comes away from the unconscious essence, from the spirit of the family, and becomes the individuality of the commonwealth; but that he still belongs to the nature from which he wrenched himself loose is evidenced by the fact that he emerges in the contingency of two brothers, who with equal right take control of the commonwealth; the inequality of the earlier and later birth, as a difference of nature, has no significance *for them* when they enter the ethical essence. But the government, as the simple soul or the Self of the spirit of the people, does not tolerate a duality of individuality; and the ethical necessity of this unity is challenged by nature as the contingency of plurality. These two brothers therefore fall into dispute and their equal right to the State-power demolishes them both, for they were equally in the wrong. From the human point of view, the one who has committed the crime is the one who, *not in possession*, attacks the commonwealth at the head of which the other stood; by contrast, the one who knew how to apprehend the other merely as a *singleton*, detached from the commonwealth, and banished him in this powerlessness, has the right on his side; he has struck only at the individual as such, not the commonwealth, not at the essence of human right. The commonwealth, attacked and defended by empty singularity, maintains itself, and the brothers both meet their mutual destruction at each other's hands; for individuality, which links the peril of the whole to *its Being-for-itself*, has expelled itself from the commonwealth and dissolves itself within itself. The commonwealth, however, will honour the one who was found on its side; on the other hand, the government, the restored simplicity of

the Self of the commonwealth, will punish the other, who already proclaimed its devastation on the walls, by withholding the last honour; he who came to violate the highest spirit of consciousness, the community, must be stripped of the honour of his entire completed essence, the honour of the departed spirit.²

¶474. But if the universal thus easily knocks off the pure tip of its pyramid and indeed carries off the *victory* over the rebellious principle of singularity, the family, it has thereby merely embarked on a *conflict* with the divine law, a conflict of spirit conscious of itself with the unconscious spirit; for the latter is the other essential power, and is therefore not destroyed, but merely offended, by the former. But it has only the bloodless shade to help it to *actual* implementation in face of the power-wielding law exposed to the light of day. As the law of weakness and darkness it therefore at first succumbs to the law of the daylight and of force, for the former power counts below, not on earth. But the actuality which has taken away from the internal element its honour and power has thereby consumed its essence. The manifest spirit has the root of its force in the nether world; the people's *certainty*, sure of itself and assuring itself, has the *truth* of its oath, which binds all into one, solely in the mute and unconscious substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness. The accomplishment of the manifest spirit is thereby transformed into the contrary, and it learns by experience that its supreme right is the supreme wrong, that its victory is rather its own downfall. The dead, whose right is violated, knows therefore how to find instruments of its vengeance, which are of an actuality and potency equal to the power that injures it. These powers are other commonwealths whose altars the dogs or birds defiled with the corpse, which has not been raised into unconscious universality by its due restoration to the elemental individual, but has remained above the earth in the realm of actuality, and now obtains as a force of divine law a self-conscious actual universality. They rise up in hostility and destroy the commonwealth which has dishonoured and shattered its force, the piety of the family.¹

¶475. In this representation, the movement of human and divine law has the expression of its necessity in individuals in whom the universal appears as a *pathos* and the activity of the movement appears as *individual* doing, which gives a semblance of contingency to the necessity of the movement. But individuality and doing constitute the principle of singularity in general, a principle which in its pure universality was called the inner divine law. As a moment of the manifest commonwealth it has not only that efficacy in the underworld—or, in its Being-there, an external efficacy, but it has an equally manifest Being-there and movement that are actual in the actual people. Taken in this form, what was represented as a simple movement of the individualized pathos acquires another aspect, and the crime and consequent destruction of the commonwealth acquire the authentic form of their Being-there.—So human law in its universal Being-there, the commonwealth, in its overall activation manliness, in its actual activation the government, *is, moves, and maintains* itself by consuming into itself the separation of the Penates, or the independent singularization into families presided over by womankind, and by keeping them dissolved in the continuity of its fluidity. But the family is, at the same time, in general the element of human law, the universal ground activating the singular consciousness. Since the commonwealth only gets its subsistence through the breakdown of domestic happiness and the dissolution of the self-consciousness

into universal self-consciousness, it creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it, in womankind in general, its internal enemy. Womankind—the eternal irony of the commonwealth—changes by intrigue the universal purpose of the government into a private purpose, transforms its universal activity into a work of this determinate individual, and perverts the universal property of the State into a possession and ornament for the family. Womankind in this way ridicules the earnest wisdom of mature age which, indifferent to singularity—to pleasure and enjoyment, as well as to actual activity—only thinks of and cares for the universal; she makes this wisdom an object of derision for the frivolity of unripe youth and an object of contempt for its enthusiasm; in general, she elevates the force of youth to what has validity, the force of the son, in whom the mother has borne her lord, that of the brother, in whom the sister has the man as her equal, that of the youth, through whom the daughter, withdrawn from her dependence, obtains the enjoyment and dignity of wifedom.—The commonwealth, however, can only maintain itself by suppressing this spirit of singularity, and, because it is an essential moment, it all the same creates it and, moreover, creates it by its repressive attitude towards it as a hostile principle. However, this principle, since it is merely evil and futile in its separation from the universal purpose, would be quite ineffectual if the commonwealth itself did not recognize the force of youth, the manhood which, still immature, stands within singularity, as the *force* of the whole. For the commonwealth is a people, it is itself individuality, and essentially is only for *itself* in such a way that *other individualities* are *for it*, that it *excludes* them from itself and knows itself independent of them. The negative side of the commonwealth, suppressing the singularization of individuals *internally*, but *self-active* in an *outward* direction, has its weapons in individuality. War is the spirit and the form in which the essential moment of the ethical substance, the absolute *freedom* of the ethical *Self-essence* from all Being-there, is present in its actuality and authentication. While, on the one hand, war makes the singular *systems* of property and of personal independence, as well as of singular *personality* itself, feel the force of the negative, on the other hand, this negative essence rises up in war as that which preserves the whole; the brave youth in whom womankind finds her pleasure, the suppressed principle of corruption, now steps into the limelight and is what counts. Now, it is natural force and what appears as a contingency of fortune, that decide on the Being-there of the ethical essence and on the spiritual necessity; because the Being-there of the ethical essence rests on strength and fortune, it is *already decided* that it has gone to ruin.—Just as previously only the Penates went to ruin in the spirit of a people, so now the *living* spirits of the peoples go to ruin through their own individuality in a *universal* commonwealth, whose *simple universality* is spiritless and dead, and whose vitality is the *single* individual, as singular. The ethical shape of spirit has vanished and another shape takes its place.¹

¶476. This downfall of the ethical substance and its passage into another shape is thus determined by the fact that the ethical consciousness is directed towards the law in a way that is essentially *immediate*; this determination of immediacy means that nature in general enters into the action of ethical life. The actuality of ethical life simply reveals the contradiction and the germ of corruption that the beautiful unanimity and tranquil equilibrium of the ethical spirit has precisely in this very

tranquillity and beauty; for this immediacy has the contradictory meaning of being the unconscious tranquillity of nature, and also the self-conscious restless tranquillity of spirit.—On account of this naturalness, this ethical people is, in general, an individuality determined by nature and therefore limited, and thus finds its sublation in another individuality. But when this determinacy—which, posited in Being-there, is limitation, but equally the negative in general and the Self of the individuality,—vanishes, the life of spirit and this substance, which is conscious of itself in everyone, is lost. The substance emerges as a *formal universality* in them, no longer dwelling in them as a living spirit, but the simple solidity of its individuality has splintered into a multitude of points.¹

C. THE STATE OF RIGHT

¶477. The universal unity into which the living immediate unity of individuality and substance withdraws is the spiritless commonwealth which has ceased to be the substance, itself unconscious, of individuals, and in which they now have the value of Self-essences and substances, in accordance with their singular Being-for-itself. The universal, split up into the atoms of absolutely many individuals, this dead spirit is an *equality*, in which *all* count as *each*, as *persons*.—What in the world of the ethical order was called the hidden divine law, has in fact emerged from its interior into actuality; in the ethical order the *singleton* counted, and was actual, only as the universal *blood* of the *family*. As *this* singleton, he was the *selfless departed* spirit; but now he has emerged from his unactuality. Because the ethical substance is only the *true* spirit, the singleton therefore withdraws into the *certainty* of his own self;¹ he is that substance as the *positive* universal, but his actuality consists in being a *negative* universal *Self*.—We saw the powers and the shapes of the ethical world sink in the simple necessity of empty *destiny*. This power of the ethical world is the substance reflecting itself into its simplicity; but the absolute essence reflecting into itself, just that necessity of empty destiny, is nothing else but the *I* of self-consciousness.²

¶478. This *I* thereby counts henceforth as the essence that is *in and for itself*; *to be so recognized* is its substantiality; but its substantiality is *abstract universality* because its content is this rigid *Self*, not the *Self* dissolved in the substance.

¶479. Personality, then, has here stepped out of the life of the ethical substance; it is the independence of consciousness, an independence which has *actual validity*. The *unactual thought* of such independence, which comes into its own through *renunciation* of *actuality*, occurred earlier as *stoical* self-consciousness; just as this proceeded from lordship and bondage, as the immediate Being-there of *self-consciousness*, so personality has proceeded from the immediate *spirit*, which is the universal dominant will of all, and equally their service of obedience. What was for Stoicism the *in-itself* only in *abstraction* is now *actual world*. Stoicism is nothing else but the consciousness which reduces to its abstract form the principle of the state of right,¹ spiritless independence; by its flight from *actuality* it attained only to the thought of independence; it is absolutely *for itself*, in that it does not attach its essence to any Being-there, but wants to give up every Being-there and posits its essence solely in the unity of pure thinking. In the same way, the right of the person is not tied to a richer or more powerful Being-there of the individual as such, nor again to a

universal living spirit, but rather to the pure unit of its abstract actuality, or to that unit as self-consciousness in general.²

¶480. Now, just as the *abstract* independence of Stoicism exhibited its actualization, so too will this latter independence repeat the movement of the first. The former passes over into the sceptical confusion of consciousness, into a drivel of the negative which wanders shapeless from one contingency of Being and thought to the other, dissolves them, admittedly, in absolute independence but no less engenders them again and is in fact merely the contradiction of the independence and dependence of consciousness.—The personal independence of *right* is similarly rather this equal universal confusion and reciprocal dissolution. For what counts as the absolute essence is self-consciousness as the pure *empty unit* of the person. In contrast to this empty universality, substance has the form of *fulfilment* and of *content*, and this content is now entirely liberated and disorderly; for the spirit that subdued it and held it together in its unity is no longer present.—This empty unit of the person is, therefore, in its *reality* a contingent Being-there and essenceless movement and doing that reaches no stability. Like scepticism, the formalism of *right* is thus in virtue of its concept without peculiar content, it finds before it a manifold subsistence, its possession, and, as scepticism did, stamps it with the same abstract universality, whereby it is called *property*. But whereas in scepticism the actuality so determined is called *semblance* in general and has only a negative value, in *right* it has a positive value. That negative value consists in the fact that the actual has the significance of the Self as thinking, as the universal *in itself*, while this positive value consists in its being *mine* in the signification of the category, as a *recognized* and *actual* validity.—Both are the same *abstract universal*; the actual content or the *determinacy* of what is mine—whether it be an external possession, or also the inner wealth or poverty of spirit and character—is not contained in this empty form and does not concern it. The content belongs, therefore, to an *autonomous power*, which is something other than the formal universal, to a power which is contingency and wilfulness.—Consciousness of *right*, therefore, in its actual validity itself, experiences instead the loss of its reality and its complete unessentiality, and to designate an individual as a *person* is an expression of contempt.¹

¶481. The free power of the content determines itself in such a way that the dispersion of the content into the absolute *multiplicity* of personal atoms is, by the nature of this determinacy, at the same time gathered into *one* point, alien to them and likewise spiritless. This point is, on the one hand, like the rigidity of their personality, purely singular actuality, but in contrast to their empty singularity, it has at the same time the significance for them of all content, hence of the real essence, and as against their supposedly absolute, but in itself essenceless actuality it is the universal power and absolute actuality. In this way, this lord of the world is to himself the absolute person, at the same time embracing within himself all Being-there, the person for whose consciousness no higher spirit exists. He is a person, but the solitary person who stands over against *all*; these all constitute the authoritative universality of the person, for the singular as such is true only as a universal multiplicity of singularity; cut off from this multiplicity, the solitary Self is, in fact, the unactual, impotent Self.—At the same time it is the consciousness of the content which has confronted that universal personality. But this content, liberated from its negative

power, is the chaos of spiritual powers which, unleashed as elemental essences, move against each other madly and destructively in a wild debauch; their impotent self-consciousness is the powerless enclosure and arena of their tumult. In this knowledge of himself as the totality of all actual powers, this lord of the world is the monstrous self-consciousness that knows itself as the actual God; but since he is only the formal Self which is unable to tame those powers, his movement and self-enjoyment are a similarly monstrous debauch.¹

¶482. The lord of the world has the actual consciousness of what he is—the universal power of actuality—in the destructive violence he exercises against the Self of his subjects, the Self confronting him. For his power is not the *unity* of spirit in which persons would recognize their own self-consciousness, they are rather as persons for themselves and exclude continuity with others from the absolute rigidity of their atomicity; they are, therefore, in a merely negative relationship, both to one another and to him who is their relation or continuity. As this continuity, he is the essence and the content of their formalism, but the content alien to them, and the hostile essence which rather sublates the very thing that counts for them as their essence, Being-for-itself empty of content,—and as the continuity of their personality, he destroys this personality itself. Thus the personality of right rather experiences its lack of substance, when the alien content asserts its validity in it,—and it asserts its validity in persons because it is their reality. On the other hand, the destructive burrowing in this essenceless soil acquires the consciousness of its all-mastery, but this Self is sheer devastation, therefore just out of itself and rather the abandonment of its self-consciousness.

¶483. Such, then, is the constitution of that side in which self-consciousness is *actual* as absolute essence. But the *consciousness driven back into itself* from this actuality ponders this inessentiality of itself; earlier we saw the stoical independence of pure thinking pass through scepticism and find its truth in the unhappy consciousness—the truth of what the situation is with its Being-in-and-for-itself. If this knowledge then appeared merely as the one-sided view of consciousness as such, here the *actual* truth of that view has emerged. This truth consists in the fact that this *universal validity* of self-consciousness is the reality alienated from it. This *validity* is the universal actuality of the Self, but this actuality is immediately perversion as well; it is the loss of the essence of the Self.—The actuality of the Self that was not present in the ethical world has been won by its return into the *person*; what was unified in the ethical world now enters the scene developed, but alienated from itself.¹

B. Self-alienated spirit. Culture

¶484. The ethical substance kept the opposition enclosed in its simple consciousness, and kept this consciousness in immediate unity with its essence. The essence has, therefore, the simple determinacy of *Being* for consciousness, which is directed immediately upon it and whose custom it is; consciousness does not regard itself as *this exclusive Self*, nor does substance have the significance of a Being-there excluded from consciousness, with which consciousness would have to posit its unity only by the alienation of itself and at the same time produce the substance. But that spirit whose Self is the absolutely discrete unit has its content confronting it as an equally

hard actuality, and here the world has the determinacy of being something external, the negative of self-consciousness. This world is, however, spiritual essence, it is in itself the interpenetration of Being and individuality; this its Being-there is the *work* of self-consciousness; but equally an immediately present actuality alien to it, an actuality which has Being of its own and in which it does not recognize itself. This actuality is the external essence and the free content of right; but this external actuality, which the lord of the world of right encompasses in himself, is not merely this elemental essence contingently present for the Self, but it is, on the contrary, the Self's own labour, though not positive labour,—rather its negative labour. It obtains its Being-there through self-consciousness's *own* estrangement and abandonment of its essence, an abandonment which, in the devastation which prevails in the world of right, seems to inflict on self-consciousness the external violence of the unchained elements. These elements for themselves are only pure devastation and the dissolution of themselves; but this dissolution, this negative essence of theirs, is just the Self; it is their subject, their doing and becoming. But this doing and becoming whereby the substance becomes actual is the alienation of personality, for the Self that is valid in and for itself *immediately*, i.e. *without alienation*, is without substance and is the plaything of those raging elements; *its* substance, therefore, is its very estrangement, and the estrangement is the substance or the spiritual powers ordering themselves into a world and thereby preserving themselves.¹

¶485. Substance is in this way *spirit*, self-conscious *unity* of the Self and the essence; but the two have the significance of alienation for each other. Spirit is *consciousness* of an objective actuality free for itself; but this consciousness is confronted by the unity of the Self and the essence, *actual* consciousness by *pure consciousness*. On the one hand, actual self-consciousness, through its estrangement, passes over into the actual world, and the latter back into actual self-consciousness; but on the other hand, this same actuality, the person as well as the objectivity, is sublated; they are purely universal. This alienation of theirs is *pure consciousness* or the *essence*. The present has its opposition immediately in its *beyond*, which is the thinking of the present and its being-thought, just as the beyond has its opposition in the here-and-now, which is its actuality alienated from it.¹

¶486. Consequently, this spirit builds itself not merely *one* world, but a world that is double, divided and opposed.—The world of the ethical spirit is its own *present*; and therefore each of its powers is in this unity, and insofar as the two differentiate themselves, each is in equilibrium with the whole. Nothing has the significance of the negative of self-consciousness; even the departed spirit is present in the *blood* of kinship, in the *Self* of the family, and the universal *power* of the government is the *will*, the Self of the people. Here, however, what is present signifies only objective *actuality*, which has its consciousness beyond; each singular moment as *essence* receives this essence, and with it actuality, from an other, and insofar as it is actual, its essence is something other than its actuality. Nothing has an indwelling spirit grounded within itself, but everything is outside itself in an alien spirit; the equilibrium of the whole is not the unity which remains together with itself, nor its calming that has returned into itself, but everything rests on the alienation of the opposite. The whole, therefore, like each single moment, is a self-alienated reality; it falls apart into a realm in which *self-consciousness* as well as its object is *actual*, and into

another, the realm of *pure* consciousness which, beyond the first, does not have actual presence, but is in *faith*. Now, just as the ethical world which is separated into divine and human law and their shapes, and its consciousness which is separated into knowing and unconsciousness, returns from that dividedness into its destiny, into the *Self* as the *negative* power of this opposition, so these two realms of the self-alienated spirit will also return into the *Self*; but if the former was the first, immediately valid *Self*, the single *person*, this second realm, which returns out of its estrangement into itself, will be the *universal Self*, the consciousness grasping the *concept*, and these spiritual worlds, all of whose moments insist on a fixed actuality and non-spiritual subsistence of their own, will dissolve in *pure insight*. This insight, as the *Self grasping* itself, completes culture; it apprehends nothing but the *Self* and everything as the *Self*, i.e. it *comprehends* everything, obliterates all objectivity and converts all *Being-in-itself* into a *Being-for-itself*. Turned against faith as the alien realm of the *essence* lying beyond, it is the *enlightenment*. In this realm too, into which the alienated spirit escapes as into the consciousness of a repose equal to itself, enlightenment completes alienation; it confounds the housekeeping that the alienated spirit carries out here by introducing the implements of the world of here-and-now, a world that spirit cannot disclaim as its property, because its consciousness likewise belongs to it.—In this negative transaction pure insight at the same time realizes itself and produces its own object, the uncognizable *absolute essence* and *utility*. Since in this way actuality has lost all substantiality and nothing in it is *in itself* any more, not only the realm of faith, but also the realm of the real world, is overthrown, and this revolution produces *absolute freedom*, and with this freedom the previously alienated spirit has completely returned into itself, abandons this land of culture and passes over into another land, the land of *moral consciousness*.¹

I. THE WORLD OF SELF-ALIENATED SPIRIT

¶487. The world of this spirit breaks up into a twofold world; the first is the world of actuality or of spirit's alienation itself; but the other is the world which spirit, rising above the first, builds itself in the aether of pure consciousness. This second world is *opposed* to that alienation and is, for just that reason, not free from it, but really only the other form of alienation, which consists precisely in having the consciousness in two kinds of world, and which embraces both. Therefore, it is not the self-consciousness of the absolute essence as it is *in* and *for itself*, not religion, that is considered here, but *faith*, so far as this is a *flight* from the actual world and thus not *in* and *for itself*. This flight from the realm of the present is therefore within its own self a twofold flight. Pure consciousness is the element into which spirit raises itself, but it is not only the element of faith, but equally of the *concept*; consequently, both together make their entry at the same time, and faith comes into consideration only in its opposition to the concept.¹

a. Culture and its realm of actuality

¶488. The spirit of this world is the spiritual *essence* permeated by a *self-consciousness* which knows itself immediately present as *self-consciousness being for itself*, and knows the *essence* as an actuality confronting it. But the *Being-there* of this

world, as also the actuality of self-consciousness, rests on the movement in which this self-consciousness estranges itself from its personality, thereby producing its world and reacting towards it as an alien world, so that it must now get it into its power. But the renunciation of its Being-for-itself is itself the engendering of actuality, and so by this renunciation self-consciousness immediately gets actuality in its power.—Or self-consciousness is only *something*, it only has *reality* insofar as it alienates itself; by so doing, it posits itself as a universal, and this its universality is its validity and its actuality. This *equality* with everyone is, therefore, not that equality of right, not that immediate recognition and validity of self-consciousness simply because it *is*; on the contrary, its validity depends on its having made itself conformable to the universal by the alienating mediation. The spiritless universality of right accepts into itself every natural mode of character as well as of Being-there, and justifies it. The universality which is valid here, however, is the universality that has *come about* and for that reason it is *actual*.¹

¶489. It is therefore through *culture* that the individual here has validity and actuality. His true *original nature* and substance is the spirit of the *alienation* of *natural* Being. This estrangement is, therefore, both the *purpose* and the *Being-there* of the individual; it is at once the *means* or the *transition*, both of the *substance* from *thought* into *actuality*, and, conversely, of the *determinate individuality* into *essentiality*. This individuality cultivates itself into what it is *in itself*, and only by so doing *is it in itself* and has actual Being-there; it has as much actuality and power as it has culture. Although the Self here actually knows itself as *This*, yet its actuality consists solely in the sublation of the natural Self; consequently, the originally *determinate* nature is reduced to the *unessential* difference of quantity, to a greater or lesser energy of will. But purpose and content of the will belong solely to the universal substance itself and can only be a universal; the particularity of a nature, which becomes purpose and content, is something *powerless* and *unactual*; it is a *kind*, which vainly and ridiculously struggles to get to work; it is the contradiction of giving to the particular the actuality that is immediately the universal. If, therefore, individuality is erroneously posited in the *particularity* of nature and character, then in the real world no individualities and characters are to be found, but individuals have an equal Being-there for each other; this supposed individuality is really only the *meant* Being-there, which has no permanence in this world, where only that which estranges itself and, therefore, only the universal, obtains actuality.—That is why what is *meant* ranks as what it is, as a kind. Kind is not quite the same as *espèce*, ‘the most formidable of all epithets; for it denotes mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt.’ *Kind* and *good of its kind* are, however, German expressions which add an air of honesty to this connotation, as if it were not really meant so badly, or, again, as if in fact it does not yet include in itself the consciousness of what kind, and what culture and actuality, are.¹

¶490. What, in relation to the single *individual*, appears as his culture, is the essential moment of the *substance* itself, viz. the immediate passage of its universality from thought into actuality, or the simple soul of the substance whereby the *in-itself* is *something recognized* and *Being-there*. The movement of the individuality cultivating itself is, therefore, at the same time the coming about of the individuality as the universal, objective essence, i.e. the coming about of the actual world. Although this

world has come about through individuality, it is for self-consciousness something immediately alienated and has for it the form of immobile actuality. But at the same time, certain that this world is its substance, self-consciousness sets about getting it in its power; it gains this power over it through culture, which, looked at from this aspect, has the appearance of self-consciousness making itself conformable to actuality, and doing so to the extent that the energy of its original character and talent permits. What appears here as the sway of the individual, under which the substance comes and is thereby sublated, is the same thing as the actualization of the substance. For the power of the individual consists in the fact that it makes itself conformable to that substance, i.e. that it estranges its own Self and thus posits itself as the substance that is objective. Its culture and its own actuality are, therefore, the actualization of the substance itself.¹

¶491. The Self is actual to itself only as *sublated* Self. Therefore, the Self does not constitute for it the unity of *consciousness* of itself and the object; on the contrary, the object is, to it, the negative of itself.—Thus, by means of the Self as the soul, substance is fashioned in its moments in such a way that one opposite inspires the other, each by its alienation gives the other subsistence and equally receives subsistence from it. At the same time, each moment has its determinacy as an insuperable validity and a firm actuality in face of the other. Thinking fixes this difference in the most universal way by the absolute opposition of *good* and *bad* which, shunning each other, cannot in any way become one and the same. This fixed Being, however, has as its soul the immediate transition into its opposite; the Being-there is really the inversion of every determinacy into its opposite, and it is only this alienation that is the essence and maintenance of the whole. We now have to consider this actualizing movement and inspiration of the moments; the alienation will alienate itself, and, through this alienation, the whole will return into its concept.¹

¶492. We have first to consider the simple substance itself in the immediate organization of its moments, which are-there, as yet uninspired.—Just as nature arrays itself into the universal elements—among which air is the *enduring*, purely universal, transparent essence, while water is the essence that is perpetually *sacrificed*, *fire* is their *ensouling* unity which divides their simplicity into opposition while equally it perpetually resolves their opposition, lastly *earth* is the *firm knot* of this structure and the *subject* of these essences and of their process, is their departure and their return,—so in the same way the inner *essence* or the simple spirit of self-conscious actuality arrays itself into just such universal, but spiritual masses, arrays itself as a world—into the *first* mass, the *in itself universal* spiritual essence, *equal to itself*,—into the other mass, the essence that *is-for-itself*, having become *unequal* within itself, *sacrificing* and *surrendering* itself,—and into the *third*, which as self-consciousness is the subject and has the force of fire immediately within itself. In the first essence self-consciousness is conscious of itself as *Being-in-itself*, but in the second it has the becoming of *Being-for-itself* through the sacrifice of the universal. Spirit, however, is itself the *Being-in-and-for-itself* of the whole, which *sunders* itself into a substance which endures, and a substance which sacrifices itself, and which also equally *withdraws* them again into its unity, both as the outburst of flame consuming the substance, and also the abiding shape of that substance.—We see that these essences correspond to the commonwealth and the family in the ethical

world, without, however, possessing the native spirit which they have; on the other hand, while destiny is alien to this spirit, here self-consciousness is and knows itself to be the actual power of these essences.¹

¶493. We have to consider how initially these members are represented within pure consciousness as *thoughts* or as being-*in-themselves*, and also how they are represented in actual consciousness as *objective* essences.—In that form of simplicity, the first essence, as the *self-equal*, immediate, and unchangeable *essence* of all consciousnesses, is the *good*,—the independent spiritual power of the *in-itself*, alongside which the movement of consciousness that is-*for-itself* is only a sideshow. The other member, by contrast, is the *passive* spiritual essence or the universal, insofar as it surrenders itself and lets individuals get in it the consciousness of their singularity; it is the nugatory essence, the *bad*.—This absolute dissolution of the essence is itself permanent; as the first essence is the foundation, starting-point, and result of individuals and in it they are purely universal, the second essence, by contrast, is on the one hand the self-sacrificing *Being for another*, and on the other hand, for that very reason, their constant return to themselves as the *singular* and their perpetual *becoming-for-themselves*.¹

¶494. But these simple *thoughts* of the good and bad are likewise immediately self-alienated; they are *actual* and are in actual consciousness as *objective* moments. Thus the first essence is *State-power*, the other is *wealth*. As State-power is the simple *substance*, so is it the universal *work*, the absolute *Thing itself*, in which individuals find their *essence* expressed, and where their singularity is purely and simply just consciousness of their *universality*; it is also the work and the simple *result*, from which the fact that it derives from their *doing* vanishes; it remains the absolute foundation and subsistence of all their doing.—This *simple*, ethereal substance of their life is, in virtue of this determination of their unchangeable equality-with-themselves, *Being* and, with that, merely *Being for another*. It is thus in itself immediately the opposite of itself, *wealth*. Although this is indeed the passive or the nugatory, it is likewise a universal spiritual essence, equally the *constantly becoming result* of the *labour* and the *doing of all*, just as it is dissolved again in the *enjoyment* of all. In enjoyment the individuality does indeed become *for itself* or as *singular*, but this enjoyment itself is the result of the universal doing, just as, reciprocally, the enjoyment produces the universal labour and the enjoyment of all. The *actual* has purely and simply the spiritual significance of being immediately universal. Doubtless, in this moment each singleton opines that he is acting *self-interestedly*; for it is the moment in which he gets the consciousness of being for himself, and for that reason does not take it as something spiritual; yet, even when looked at superficially, it is evident that each in his enjoyment enables all to enjoy, that in his labour he is working for all as well as for himself and all are working for him. His *Being-for-himself* is therefore in itself *universal* and the self-interest is only something opined, which cannot get as far as making actual what it opines, viz. to do something that would not benefit all.¹

¶495. In these two spiritual powers, then, self-consciousness recognizes its substance, content, and purpose; in them it intuits its dual-essence, in one its *Being-in-itself*, in the other its *Being-for-itself*.—But it is at the same time, as spirit, the negative *unity* of their subsistence and of the separation of individuality and the universal,

or of actuality and the Self. Dominion and wealth are therefore present for the individual as objects, i.e. as things from which he knows himself *free*, and between which he opines that he can choose, and even choose neither. As this free and *pure* consciousness he confronts the essence as something which is merely *for him*. He then has the essence as *essence* within himself.—In this pure consciousness the moments of substance are to him not State-power and wealth, but the thoughts of *good* and *bad*.—But further, self-consciousness is the relation of its pure consciousness to its actual consciousness, of what is thought to the objective essence, it is essentially *judgement*.—It has indeed already emerged for the two sides of the actual essence, through their immediate determinations, which of them is the good and which the bad; the good is State-power, the bad is wealth. But this first judgement cannot be regarded as a spiritual judgement; for in it one side has been determined only as the *being-in-itself* or the positive, the other only as the *being-for-itself* and the negative. But as spiritual essences they are each the interpenetration of both moments, hence not exhausted in those determinations, and the self-consciousness which relates to these essences is *in* and *for itself*; it must therefore be related to each essence in a twofold manner, whereby their nature, which consists in being self-alienated determinations, will come to light.¹

¶496. Now, to self-consciousness that object is *good* and *in itself*, in which it finds itself, while that object is bad in which it finds the contrary of itself; the *good* is the *likeness* of the objective reality to it, while the bad is their *unlikeness*. At the same time, what *for self-consciousness* is good and bad, is *in itself* good and bad; for self-consciousness is just that in which these two moments of *Being-in-itself* and of *Being-for-it*, are the same; it is the actual spirit of the objective essences, and the judgement is the demonstration in them of its power, a power which *makes* them into what they are *in themselves*. It is not how they are the *like* or the *unlike* immediately in themselves, i.e. not abstract *Being-in-itself* or *Being-for-itself*, that is their criterion and their truth, but what they are in the relation of spirit to them: their likeness or unlikeness to spirit. Spirit's *relation* to the essences, which, initially posited as *objects*, become *through spirit* the *in-itself*, becomes at the same time their *reflection into themselves*, through which they acquire actual spiritual Being, and what *their spirit* is, comes to light. But just as their first *immediate determination* differentiates itself from the *relation* of spirit to them, so also will the third moment, their own spirit, be different from the second.—First of all, their *second in-itself*, which emerges through the relation of spirit to them, must already turn out otherwise than the *immediate in-itself*; for this *mediation* of spirit rather moves the *immediate* determinacy and makes it into something else.¹

¶497. Accordingly, the consciousness that *is in* and *for itself* does indeed now find in the *State-power* its *simple essence* and *subsistence* in general, but not its *individuality* as such, it does find there its *Being-in-itself*, but not its *Being-for-itself*, rather it finds therein doing, as singular doing, denied and subdued to obedience. Before this power, therefore, the individual reflects himself into himself; it is to him the oppressing essence and the *bad*; for, instead of being the like, it is what is purely and simply unlike individuality.—*Wealth*, on the other hand, is the *good*; it makes for universal enjoyment, surrenders itself, and procures for everyone the consciousness of their Self. It is *in itself* universal beneficence; if it refuses some benefit and is not

accommodating to every need, this is a contingency, which does not detract from its universal necessary essence of imparting itself to all singletons and being a thousand-handed provider.¹

¶498. These two judgements give the thoughts of good and bad a content which is the contrary of the one they had for us.—But at first self-consciousness related to its objects only incompletely, viz. only according to the standard of *Being-for-itself*. But consciousness is equally an essence that is-*in-itself* and must likewise make this aspect the standard, and only when it has done this is the spiritual judgement complete. According to this aspect, the *State-power* expresses the *essence* of consciousness to it; this power is in part the tranquil law, in part government and command, which regulates the singular movements of the universal doing; the one is the simple substance itself, the other is its doing, animating and sustaining itself and everyone. The individual thus finds therein his ground and essence expressed, organized, and actuated.—On the other hand, through the enjoyment of *wealth*, the individual does not experience his universal essence, but only gets a *transitory* consciousness and enjoyment of himself as a *singularity* that is-for-itself and of the *unlikeness* to his essence.—The concepts of good and bad thus receive here a content opposite to what they had before.¹

¶499. Each of these two ways of judging finds a *likeness* and an *unlikeness*; the first judging consciousness finds the State-power *unlike* it, and the enjoyment of wealth *like* it; by contrast, the second judging consciousness finds the State-power like it and the enjoyment of wealth *unlike* it. We have before us a twofold *like-finding* and a twofold *unlike-finding*, an opposite relation to the two real essentialities.—We must assess this diverse judging itself, for which we have to apply the standard set up. According to this, the *like-finding* relation of consciousness is the *good*, the *unlike-finding* relation is the *bad*; and these two modes of relation we are henceforth to hold fast themselves as *diverse shapes of consciousness*. By reacting in a diverse way, consciousness itself comes under the determination of diversity, as being good or bad, not according to whether it had for its principle either *Being-for-itself* or pure *Being-in-itself*, for both alike are essential moments; the twofold judging considered above represented the principles separately and therefore contains merely *abstract* ways of *judging*. Actual consciousness has within it both principles, and the difference falls solely in its *essence*, viz. in the *relation* of itself to the real.¹

¶500. There are two opposite modes of this relation: one is an attitude to State-power and wealth as to something *like*, the other as to something *unlike*.—The consciousness of the like-finding relation is *noble* consciousness. In the public power it considers what is like it, seeing that in the public power it has its own *simple essence* and its actuation, and it stands towards it in the service of actual obedience and of inner respect. Similarly, in the case of wealth, it considers that this procures for it consciousness of its other essential side, that of *Being-for-itself*; it therefore considers wealth likewise as *essence* in relation to itself, and recognizes that source of its enjoyment as a benefactor to whom it lies under an obligation.¹

¶501. The consciousness of the other relation is, on the contrary, the *base* consciousness, which clings to the *unlikeness* to the two essentialities, thus sees in the sovereign-power a fetter and a suppression of *Being-for-itself*, and therefore hates the ruler, obeys only with a secret malice, and is always on the point of rebellion,—in

wealth, by which it attains to the enjoyment of its Being-for-itself, it similarly considers only the unlikeness, viz. with the permanent *essence*; since through wealth it comes only to consciousness of singularity and of transitory enjoyment, it loves wealth, but despises it, and with the vanishing of the enjoyment, of what is in itself evanescent, it regards its relationship to the rich as also having vanished.¹

¶502. Now, these relations express, in the first instance, the *judgement*, the determination of what the two essences are as *objects* for consciousness, not as yet what they are *in* and *for themselves*. The reflection which is represented in the judgement is on the one hand a positing of the one determination as well as the other only *for us*, and therefore a like sublation of both, not yet the reflection of them for consciousness itself. On the other hand, they *are* only *essences* immediately, they have neither *become* such, nor are they *self-consciousnesses* within themselves; that for which they are is not yet their enlivening; they are predicates which are not yet themselves subjects. On account of this separation, the whole of the spiritual judging also still falls apart into two consciousnesses, each of which lies under a one-sided determination.—Now, just as at first the *indifference* of the two sides of alienation—one of which was the *in-itself* of pure consciousness, viz. the determinate *thoughts* of good and bad; the other their *Being-there* as State-power and wealth—rose into a relation between them, into a *judgement*, so must this external relation rise to inner unity or, as a relation of thinking, rise to actuality, and the spirit of both shapes of the judgement must come into view. This happens when the *judgement* becomes a *syllogism*, the mediating movement in which the necessity and middle term of both sides of the judgement come into view.¹

¶503. The noble consciousness thus finds itself, in the judgement, confronting the State-power in such a way that the latter is, indeed, not yet a Self, but only the universal substance, of which, however, it is conscious as its *essence*, as the purpose and absolute content. With such a positive relation to this substance, it adopts a negative attitude to its own purposes, to its particular content and Being-there, and lets them vanish. This consciousness is the heroism of *service*,—the *virtue* which sacrifices singular Being to the universal, thereby bringing this universal into Being-there,—the *person*, who renounces possessions and enjoyment and acts and is actual for the established power.¹

¶504. Through this movement the universal becomes joined together with Being-there in general, just as the consciousness that is-there cultivates itself to essentiality through this estrangement. What this consciousness alienates itself from in its service is its consciousness immersed in Being-there; but the *Being* that is alienated from itself is the *in-itself*; through this culture, therefore, it wins self-respect and respect in the eyes of others.—The State-power, however, which was at first only the universal in *thought*, the *in-itself*, becomes through this very movement the universal in *being*, actual power. It is actual power only in the actual obedience which it gets through self-consciousness's *judgement* that the State-power is the *essence*, and through the free sacrifice of self-consciousness. This doing, which joins the essence together with the Self, produces the *twofold* actuality, itself as that which has *true* actuality, and the State-power as the true that is valid.¹

¶505. Through this alienation, however, the State-power is not yet a self-consciousness knowing itself as State-power; it is only its *law*, or its *in-itself*, that is

valid; it has as yet no *particular will*; for the serving self-consciousness has not as yet estranged its pure Self and inspirited the State-power with that, but only with its Being; it has only sacrificed its *Being-there* to it, not its *Being-in-itself*.—This self-consciousness counts as one that is conformable to the *essence* and is recognized on account of its *Being-in-itself*. In it the others find their *essence* actuated, but not their Being-for-itself,—they find their thinking or pure consciousness fulfilled, not their individuality. It therefore possesses validity in their *thoughts* and enjoys *honour*. It is the *haughty* vassal who is active on behalf of the State-power insofar as the latter is not a will of its own, but an *essential* will, and who is valid in his own eyes only in this *honour*, only in the *essential* representation of universal opinion, not in the *grateful* representation of individuality, for he has not helped this individuality to its *Being-for-itself*. If this self-consciousness were to stand in relationship to the State-power's own will, a will that has not yet come about, its *language* would be *advice*, imparted for the universal interest.¹

¶506. The State-power, therefore, still lacks a will in the face of advice, and the ability to decide between the diverse opinions about the universal interest. It is not yet a *government*, and therefore not yet in truth an actual State-power.—The *Being-for-itself*, the *will*, which as will is not yet sacrificed, is the inner, separated spirit of the estates, and this, as against its speaking about the *universal* interest, reserves to itself its *particular* interest, and is inclined to make this chatter about the universal interest a substitute for action. The sacrifice of Being-there, which happens in service, is indeed complete when it has gone as far as death; but the surmounted danger of death itself, which one survives, leaves behind a determinate Being-there and hence a *particular For-itself*, which makes the advice about the universal interest ambiguous and suspect and in fact reserves to itself its own opinion and the particular will in regard to the power of the State. Its conduct is, therefore, unlike with regard to the power of the State and falls under the determination of the base consciousness, being always on the point of revolt.¹

¶507. This contradiction, which Being-for-itself has to sublimate, has the form of the inequality of *Being-for-itself* with regard to the universality of State-power; at the same time it takes the following form: this estrangement of Being-there, when it is complete, viz. in death, is an estrangement that simply is, not one that returns into consciousness,—consciousness does not survive the estrangement, is not *in* and *for* itself, but merely passes over into the unreconciled contrary. Consequently, the true sacrifice of *Being-for-itself* is solely that in which it surrenders itself as completely as in death, yet in this estrangement no less preserves itself; it thereby becomes in actuality what it is in itself, becomes the identical unity of itself and of itself as the opposite. Because the departed inner spirit, the Self as such, comes forward and alienates itself, the State-power is at the same time raised to a Self of its own; just as without this alienation the acts of honour, the acts of the noble consciousness, and the counsels of its insight, would retain the ambiguity that would still have that secluded reserve of particular intention and of self-will.¹

¶508. But this alienation happens solely in *language*, which here enters the scene in its peculiar significance.—In the world of the ethical order *law* and *command*,—in the world of actuality initially *counsel*, language has the *essence* as content and is the form of that content; but here it acquires for its content the form itself, the form

which language itself is, and is valid as *language*; it is the force of speaking as such, a force that performs what has to be performed. For language is the *Being-there* of the pure Self as Self; in it, the *singularity* of self-consciousness, a singularity that *is for itself*, comes as such into existence, so that it is *for others*. Otherwise the *I*, as *this pure I*, is not *there*; in every other externalization it is immersed in an actuality and in a shape from which it can withdraw; it is reflected into itself from its action, as well as from its physiognomic expression, and such incomplete Being-there, in which there is always too much and too little, it lets lie lifeless behind. Language, however, contains it in its purity, it alone expresses *I*, the *I* itself. This *Being-there* of the *I* is, as *Being-there*, an objectivity which has in it the true nature of the *I*. The *I* is *this I*—but equally the *universal I*; its appearance is equally immediately the estrangement and the vanishing of *this I*, and thereby its remaining in its universality. The *I* that utters itself is *perceived by ear*; it is an infection in which it has immediately passed into unity with those for whom it is there, and is universal self-consciousness.—That it is perceived by ear implies that its *Being-there* itself immediately *dies away*; this its otherness is taken back into itself; and its Being-there is just this: as a self-conscious *Now*, when it is there, not to be there, and through this vanishing to be there. This vanishing is thus itself immediately its abiding; it is its own knowing of itself, and its knowing of itself as a Self that has passed over into another Self, that has been perceived and is universal.¹

¶509. Spirit obtains this actuality here because the extremes, of which it is the *unity*, have just as immediately the determination of being actualities of their own for themselves. Their unity is decomposed into rigid sides, each of which is for the other an actual object excluded from it. Consequently, the unity emerges as a *middle term*, which is excluded and differentiated from the separated actuality of the sides; it has, therefore, itself an actual objectivity distinct from its sides and is *for them*, i.e. it is a being-there. The *spiritual substance* enters as such into existence only when it has gained for its sides the sort of self-consciousnesses that know this pure Self as *immediately valid* actuality, and therein also immediately know that they are such only through alienating *mediation*. Through the knowledge of the pure Self, the moments are refined into the self-knowing category, and thereby so far refined as to be moments of spirit; through the knowledge of the mediation, spirit enters into Being-there as spirituality.—Spirit is thus the middle term which presupposes those extremes and is engendered by their Being-there,—but equally it is the spiritual whole bursting forth between them, which divides itself into them and only through this contact with the whole engenders each of them in its principle.—The fact that both extremes are already *in themselves* sublated and decomposed produces their unity, and this is the movement which joins the two together, interchanges their determinations, and joins them together, and does so indeed *in each extreme*. This mediation thus posits the *concept* of each of the two extremes in its actuality, or it makes what each is *in itself* into its *spirit*.¹

¶510. The two extremes, the State-power and the noble consciousness, are split up by the latter, the State-power into the abstract universal which is obeyed, and into the will that is-for-itself, which, however, does not yet itself conform to the universal,—and the noble consciousness into the obedience of the sublated Being-there, or the *Being-in-itself* of self-respect and honour, and into the not yet sublated

pure Being-for-itself, the will still remaining in reserve. The two moments into which both sides are purified and which, therefore, are moments of language, are the *abstract universal*, called the universal interest, and the *pure Self*, which in its service renounced its consciousness immersed in manifold Being-there. Both are the same in the concept; for pure Self is just the abstract universal, and consequently their unity is posited as their middle term. But the *Self* is at first actual only in consciousness, in the one extreme,—while the in-itself is first actual in the State-power, the other extreme; what consciousness lacks is the actual transference to it of the State-power, not merely as *honour*,—and what the State-power lacks is its being obeyed, not merely as the so-called *universal interest*, but as will, or its being the deciding Self. The unity of the concept in which the State-power still stands and into which consciousness has refined itself becomes actual in this *mediating movement*, whose simple Being-there, as *middle term*, is language.—However, the unity does not yet have for its sides two Selves present as *Selves*; for the State-power is at first only inspirited into a Self; this language is, therefore, not yet spirit as it completely knows and expresses itself.¹

¶511. The noble consciousness, because it is the extreme which is the Self, appears as the source of the *language* by which the sides of the relationship take shape as ensouled wholes.—The heroism of mute service becomes the *heroism of flattery*. This speaking reflection of service constitutes the spiritual self-decomposing middle term and reflects back into itself not only its own extreme, but also reflects the extreme of universal power back into this extreme itself, and makes that power, which is at first *in itself*, into *Being-for-itself* and into the singularity of self-consciousness. The result of this is that the spirit of this power is an *unlimited monarch*;—*unlimited*: the language of flattery raises this power into its refined *universality*; the moment as product of language, of Being-there refined to spirit, is a purified equality-to-itself;—a *monarch*: language likewise raises *singularity* to its peak; what the noble consciousness estranges from itself on this side of the simple spiritual unity is the pure in-itself *of its thinking*, its very I. More determinately, language raises the singularity, which is otherwise only something *opined*, into its purity which is-there, by giving the monarch a *name* of his own; for it is in the name alone that the *difference* of the singleton from all others is not *opined*, but is made actual by all; in the name, the singleton *counts* as a pure singular, no longer only in his own consciousness, but in the consciousness of all. By his name, then, the monarch is purely and simply separated off from everyone else, exclusive and solitary; in his name, he is the atom that can impart nothing of its essence and has no equal.—This name is thus the reflection-into-itself or the *actuality*, which the universal power has *within its own self*; through the name this power is the *monarch*. Conversely, he, *this singleton*, thereby knows *himself*, *this singleton*, as the universal power, knows that the nobles are not only ready for the service of the State-power, but that they place themselves round the throne as *ornaments*, and that to him who sits on it they continually say what he is.¹

¶512. The language of their praise is in this way the spirit that in the *State-power itself* joins the two extremes together; it reflects the abstract power into itself and gives it the moment of the other extreme, the *Being-for-itself* that wills and decides, and by so doing gives it self-conscious existence; or this *singular, actual* self-consciousness

thereby attains to the certain knowledge of itself as the power. It is the point of the Self into which the many points have flowed together through the estrangement of *inner certainty*.—Since, however, this spirit of State-power's own consists in having its actuality and nourishment in the sacrifice of the doing and the thinking of the noble consciousness, it is *self-alienated independence*; the noble consciousness, the extreme of *Being-for-itself*, receives back the extreme of *actual universality* in return for the universality of thinking which it estranged from itself; the power of the State has *passed over* to the noble consciousness. In the noble consciousness, the State-power is first genuinely actuated; in the *Being-for-itself* of the noble consciousness it ceases to be the *inert essence*, which it was when it appeared as the extreme of abstract Being-in-itself.—Considered *in itself*, *State-power reflected into itself*, or its having become spirit, simply means that it has become a *moment of self-consciousness*, i.e. it is only as *sublated*. Consequently, it is now the essence as something whose spirit is to be sacrificed and surrendered, i.e. it exists as *wealth*.—State-power does, indeed, at the same time continue to subsist as an actuality in the face of wealth, into which it is ever changing in accordance with its concept, but it is an actuality whose concept is just this movement of passing over, through service and the veneration through which it comes about, into its contrary, into the estrangement of power. Thus for itself the peculiar *Self* that is the will of State-power becomes, through the debasement of the noble consciousness, a self-estranging universality, a complete singularity and contingency which is at the mercy of every more powerful will; what remains to it of *universally* recognized and non-communicable independence is the empty name.¹

¶513. While, therefore, the noble consciousness determined itself as that which related to the universal power in the mode of *likeness*, the truth of it is rather to retain, in its service, its own Being-for-itself, and in the proper renunciation of its personality, to be nevertheless the actual sublation and dismemberment of the universal substance. Its spirit is the relationship of complete unlikeness, on the one hand, retaining its will in its honour, while on the other hand, giving up its will, both alienating itself from its interior and becoming supreme unlikeness with itself, and thereby subjecting the universal substance to itself and making it completely unlike itself.—It is clear that, with this, its determinacy, which it had in the *judgement* in comparison with what was called base consciousness, has vanished, and hereby the base consciousness has vanished too. The base consciousness has achieved its purpose, viz. to bring the universal power under Being-for-itself.¹

¶514. Self-consciousness, thus enriched by the universal power, exists as *universal beneficence*, or this power is the *wealth* which is itself in turn an object for consciousness. For wealth is indeed the universal that is subjugated to consciousness, but this universal has not yet by this first sublation returned absolutely into the Self.—The *Self* has not yet for its object *itself as Self*, but rather the *sublated universal essence*. Since this object has only just come about, the *immediate* relation of consciousness to it is posited and so consciousness has not yet exhibited its unlikeness with it; it is the noble consciousness which preserves its Being-for-itself in the universal which has become unessential, and therefore recognizes the object and is grateful to the benefactor.¹

¶515. Wealth already has within it the moment of Being-for-itself. It is not the selfless universal of State-power, or the naive inorganic nature of spirit; it is rather

State-power as it, through the will, holds its own against him who wants to get it in his power for his enjoyment. But since wealth has merely the form of essence, this one-sided Being-for-itself, which is not *in itself*, but is rather the sublated in-itself, is the return, essenceless in its enjoyment, of the individual into himself. Wealth itself therefore needs enlivening; and the movement of its reflection consists in the fact that wealth, which is only for itself, becomes *Being-in-and-for-itself*, that though it is the sublated essence, it becomes an essence; it thus receives within itself a spirit of its own.—Since the form of this movement has been expounded before, it is sufficient here to determine its content.¹

¶516. The noble consciousness, then, is not related here to the object as essence in general; on the contrary, it is the very *Being-for-itself* that is something alien to it; it *finds before it* its Self as such alienated, as an objective fixed actuality which it has to receive from another fixed Being-for-itself. Its object is the Being-for-itself, and so what is *its own*; but, because it is an object, it is at the same time immediately an alien actuality which is a Being-for-itself of its own, a will of its own, i.e. it sees its Self in the power of an alien will on which it depends to let it have its own Self.¹

¶517. Self-consciousness can abstract from every singular aspect, and for this reason it retains, in an obligation pertaining to such an aspect, its recognition and *validity-in-itself* as an essence that is for itself. Here, however, as regards the aspect of its pure ownmost *actuality* or its I, it sees itself outside itself and belonging to another, sees its *personality* as such dependent on the contingent personality of another, on the contingency of an instant, on a wilfulness, or some other utterly unimportant circumstance.—In the state of right, what is in the power of the objective essence appears as a *contingent content* from which it is possible to abstract, and the power does not affect the *Self as such*; on the contrary, the Self is recognized. Here, however, the Self sees the certainty of itself, as such, to be completely devoid of essence and the pure personality to be absolute impersonality. The spirit of its gratitude is, therefore, the feeling of the most profound abjection as well as of the most profound rebellion. When the pure I intuits itself outside itself and dismembered, then in this dismemberment everything that has continuity and universality, everything that is called law, good and right, has at the same time come apart and gone to ruin; everything in the mode of likeness is dissolved, for the *purest unlikeness*, the absolute inessentiality of the absolutely essential, the Being-outside-itself of Being-for-itself, are at hand; the pure I itself is absolutely torn apart.¹

¶518. Therefore, although this consciousness gets back from wealth the objectivity of Being-for-itself and sublates it, it is not only, like the preceding reflection, not completed in accordance with its concept, but is unsatisfied for consciousness itself; the reflection, in which the Self receives itself as something objective, is the immediate contradiction posited in the pure I itself. As Self, however, it stands at the same time immediately above this contradiction, it is absolute elasticity, which sublates this sublatedness of the Self, rejects this rejection, whereby Being-for-itself becomes as something alien to it and, rebelling against this reception of itself, is *for itself* in the *reception* itself.¹

¶519. Since, then, the relationship of this consciousness is linked with this absolute dismemberment, within its spirit the difference of this consciousness, its being determined as noble consciousness in contrast to the *base* consciousness, falls away

and both are the same.—The spirit of beneficent wealth can, further, be differentiated from the spirit of the consciousness receiving the benefit, and has to be considered particularly.—The spirit of wealth was the essenceless Being-for-itself, the surrendered essence. But through its communication it becomes an in-itself; when it has fulfilled its determination of sacrificing itself, it sublates the singularity of enjoying only for itself, and as sublated singularity it is *universality* or *essence*.—What it communicates, what it gives to others, is *Being-for-itself*. It does not, however, give up itself as a selfless nature, as the disinterestedly self-surrendering condition of life, but as a self-conscious essence keeping itself for itself; it is not the inorganic power of the element that is known by the receiving consciousness as in itself transitory, but is the power over the Self, the power that knows itself as *independent* and *wilful*, and at the same time knows that what it dispenses is the Self of an other.—Wealth thus shares its abjection with the client; but arrogance takes the place of rebellion. For on the one hand, it knows as well as the client, that *Being-for-itself* is a contingent *thing*; but it is itself this contingency in whose power the personality stands. In this arrogance, which opines that it has, with a meal, acquired an alien I-self and thereby gained for itself the submission of that other's innermost essence, it overlooks the inner rebellion of the other; it overlooks the casting off of all fetters, overlooks this pure dismemberment in which, since the *likeness-to-itself* of Being-for-itself has become purely and simply unlike, all likeness, all subsistence, is torn apart, and which tears apart the opinion and view-point of the benefactor most of all. It stands immediately before this innermost abyss, before this bottomless depth, in which all support and substance have vanished; and in this depth it sees nothing but a common thing, a play of its caprice, a contingency of its wilfulness; its spirit consists in being an entirely essenceless opinion, a spirit-forsaken veneer.¹

¶520. Just as self-consciousness had its language in the face of State-power, or spirit emerged between these extremes as an actual middle term, so too self-consciousness has a language in the face of wealth, but still more does its rebellion have its language. The language that gives wealth the consciousness of its essentiality and thereby gets it in its power, is likewise the language of flattery, but of ignoble flattery;—for what it declares as essence, it knows as the surrendered essence, the essence that is not *in itself*. The language of flattery, however, as we have already observed, is spirit that is still one-sided. For its moments are indeed the *Self* which has been refined by the culture of service into pure existence, and the Being-in-itself of power. Yet the pure concept in which the simple *Self* and the in-itself, the former a pure I and the latter this pure essence or thinking, are the same,—this unity of the two sides, between which interaction takes place, is not present in the consciousness of this language; to this consciousness the object is still the *in-itself* in opposition to the Self, or to it the *object* is not at the same time consciousness's own *Self* as such.—The language of dismemberment is, however, the perfect language and the true existing spirit of this entire world of culture. This self-consciousness, to which the rebellion rejecting its rejection pertains, is immediately the absolute likeness-to-itself in its absolute dismemberment, the pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself. It is the likeness of the identical judgement, in which one and the same personality is both subject and predicate. But this identical judgement is at the same time the infinite judgement; for this personality is absolutely divided, and

subject and predicate are purely and simply *indifferent beings*, which have nothing to do with one another, which have no necessary unity, so much so that each is the power of a personality of its own. The *Being-for-itself* has its *Being-for-itself* for its object as an out-and-out *other*, and at the same time equally immediately as *itself*,—itself as an other, not as if this had another content, but the content is the same Self in the form of absolute opposition and a completely indifferent Being-there of its own.—Here, then, there is present the *spirit* of this real world of culture, a spirit *conscious* of itself in its truth and of its *concept*.¹

¶521. This spirit is this absolute and universal inversion and alienation of actuality and of thought; it is *pure culture*. What is experienced in this world is that neither the *actual essences* of power and wealth, nor their determinate *concepts*, good and bad, or the consciousness of good and bad, the noble and the base consciousness, have truth; on the contrary, all these moments become inverted, one into the other, and each is the contrary of itself.—The universal power, which is the *substance*, when it attains to a spirituality of its own through the principle of individuality, receives its own Self merely as a name on it and is, while it is *actual* power, the powerless essence that sacrifices itself.—But this surrendered, selfless essence, or the Self that has become a thing, is rather the return of the essence into itself; it is the *Being-for-itself that is-for-itself*, the existence of spirit.—The *thoughts* of these essences, of the *good* and *bad*, are similarly inverted in this movement; what is determined as good, is bad; what is determined as bad, is good. The consciousness of each one of these moments, the consciousness assessed as noble and base, are rather in their truth just as much the reverse of what these determinations are supposed to be, the noble consciousness base and rejected, just as rejection veers round into the nobility of the most highly cultivated freedom of self-consciousness.—Considered formally, everything is likewise *outwardly* the reverse of what it is for *itself*; and, again, it is not in truth what it is for itself, but something other than it wants to be, Being-for-itself rather the loss of itself, and self-alienation rather self-preservation.—What we have here, then, is that all moments execute a universal justice on one another, each just as much alienates itself in itself, as it enculturates itself into its contrary and in this way inverts it.—True spirit, however, is just this unity of the absolutely separated extremes and, indeed, it is just through the *free actuality* of these *selfless* extremes that, as their middle term, it comes to existence. Its Being-there is the universal *speaking* and the dismembering *judging* for which all those moments, which are supposed to count as essences and as actual members of the whole, dissolve, and which is equally this self-dissolving play with itself. This judging and speaking is, therefore, what is true and invincible, while it overwhelms everything; it is this *alone* that *truly* matters in this real world. Every part of his world gets to have its spirit expressed therein, or gets to be talked about with spirit and to have said of it what it is.—The honest consciousness takes each moment as an abiding essentiality, and is the uncultivated thoughtlessness of not knowing that it is equally doing the reverse. The dismembered consciousness, however, is consciousness of the inversion, and, moreover, of the absolute inversion; what is dominant in it is the concept, which brings together the thoughts which, to honesty, lie far apart, and its language is therefore spirited.¹

¶522. The content of spirit's talk of and about itself is thus the inversion of all concepts and realities, the universal deception of itself and others, and the impudence

of expressing this deception is for that very reason the greatest truth. This talk is the extravagance of the musician who 'heaped up and mixed together thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every kind of character; now with a deep bass he descended into hell, then, contracting his throat, he rent the vaults of heaven with a falsetto tone . . . , frantic and soothed, imperious and mocking, by turns.'—To the tranquil consciousness which, in its honest way, posits the melody of the good and the true in the equality of the tones, i.e. in *unison*, this talk appears as 'a rigmarole of wisdom and folly, as a medley of as much skill as banality, of as many correct as false ideas, a mixture of a complete perversion of sentiment, of perfect infamy, and of entire frankness and truth. It will be unable to resist entering into all these tones and running up and down the entire scale of feelings from the profoundest contempt and rejection to the highest admiration and emotion; but blended with the latter will be a tinge of ridicule which detracts from their nature'; but the former will have in their very frankness a strain of reconciliation, will find in their convulsing depths the all-powerful note which restores spirit to itself.¹

¶523. If we consider, in contrast with the talk of this self-aware confusion, the talk of that *simple consciousness* of the true and the good, then in face of the frank and conscious eloquence of the spirit of culture, it can only be taciturn; for to the spirit of culture it can say nothing that it does not itself know and say. If it gets beyond its monosyllabic talk, then it says the same as the other pronounces, but in doing so also commits the folly of opining that it is saying something new and different. Its very syllables, *shameful*, *base*, are already this folly, for the other says them about itself. If this spirit perverts in its talk every monotone, because this self-likeness is only an abstraction, while in its actuality the perversion is within itself, and if, on the other hand, the straightforward consciousness takes under its protection the good and noble, i.e. what keeps its self-likeness in its utterance, in the only way here possible—that is, the good does not lose its value by being *linked* or *mixed* with the bad; for this is its *condition* and *necessity*, herein lies the *wisdom* of nature,—then this consciousness, while it opined that it was contradicting, has thereby merely condensed the content of spirit's talk into a trivial mode which, in making the *contrary* of the noble and good into the *condition* and *necessity* of the noble and good, thoughtlessly opines that it is saying something other than that what is called noble and good is in its essence the reverse of itself, just as, conversely, the bad is the excellent.¹

¶524. If the simple consciousness compensates for this spiritless *thought* by the *actuality* of the excellent, by adducing the excellent in the *example* of a fictitious case or even of a true anecdote, and thus showing that it is no empty name but is *at hand*, then it is opposed by the *universal* actuality of the perverted doing of the whole of the real world, in which this example thus constitutes only something entirely isolated, an *espèce*; and to present the Being-there of the good and noble as a single anecdote, whether fictitious or true, is the severest thing that can be said about it.—Finally, should the simple consciousness demand the dissolution of this whole world of perversion, then it cannot require of the *individual* his removal from this world, for Diogenes in his barrel is conditioned by the world, and this demand of the singleton is just what counts as the bad, viz. to care *for himself* as a *singleton*. But if the demand of this removal is directed at the universal *individuality*, it cannot have the meaning that reason should give up again the spiritual, cultivated consciousness

it has arrived at, should submerge the expansive wealth of its moments back in the simplicity of the natural heart, and relapse into the wilderness and proximity of animal consciousness, a nature which is also called innocence; on the contrary, the demand for this dissolution can only be directed to the *spirit* of culture itself, that it return out of its confusion to itself as *spirit*, and win a still higher consciousness.¹

¶525. But in fact, spirit has already accomplished this in itself. Consciousness's dismemberment, which is conscious of itself and expresses itself, is the sniggering over the Being-there, as well as over the confusion of the whole and over itself; the sniggering is at the same time the fading echo, still audible to itself, of this whole confusion.—This self-perceiving vanity of all actuality and of every definite concept is the double reflection of the real world into itself; once in *this Self* of consciousness as *this Self*, and again in the pure *universality* of consciousness, or in thinking. In the first case, spirit that has come to itself has directed its gaze into the world of actuality and still has it as its purpose and immediate content; but, in the other case, its gaze is in part turned only into itself and negatively towards the world of actuality, and in part is turned away from that world towards heaven and its object is the beyond of this world.¹

¶526. In that first aspect of the return into the Self, the *vanity* of all *things* is its *own vanity*, or it *is* vain. It is the Self that-is-for-itself, which knows not only how to pass judgement on and chatter about everything, but how to give spirited expression to the firm essences of actuality, as also to the firm determinations posited by judgement, in their *contradiction*, and this contradiction is their truth.—From the point of view of form, it knows everything to be self-alienated, *Being-for-itself* separated from *Being-in-itself*, what is opined and the purpose separated from the truth; and separated from both again, the *Being for another*, what is professed separated from the real opinion and from the true Thing and intention.—Thus it knows how to express correctly each moment in contrast to the other, in general the inversion of everything; it knows better than each moment what that moment is, no matter how it is determined. Since it knows the substantial on the side of the *discord* and the *conflict* which the substantial unites within itself, but not on the side of this unification, it understands very well how to *pass judgement* on the substantial, but has lost the capacity to *grasp* it.—Moreover, this vanity needs the vanity of all things in order to get from them the consciousness of the Self, it therefore engenders this vanity itself and is the soul that supports it. Power and wealth are the supreme purposes of its exertion, it knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it cultivates itself into the universal, attains to the possession of it, and in this possession has universal validity; power and wealth are the actual recognized powers. However, this its validity is itself vain; and just by getting power and wealth in its power it knows they are not Self-essences, knows rather itself as the power over them, but them as vain. The fact that in possessing them it is itself outside them, it displays in the spirited language which is, therefore, its supreme interest and the truth of the whole; in such language, *this Self*, as this pure Self, belonging neither to actual determinations nor to determinations in thought, becomes a spiritual Self that is genuinely universally valid. It is the self-dismembering nature of all relationships and the conscious dismembering of them; but only as self-consciousness in revolt does it know its own dismemberment and, in this knowledge of it, it has immediately risen above it. In that vanity, all

content becomes something negative which can no longer be grasped positively; the positive object is merely the *pure I itself*, and the dismembered consciousness is *in itself* this pure likeness-to-itself of self-consciousness that has returned to itself.¹

b. Faith and pure insight

¶527. The spirit of the alienation of itself has its Being-there in the world of culture; but since this whole has become alienated from itself, there stands beyond that world the unactual world of *pure consciousness*, or of *thinking*. Its content is what is purely thought, thinking is its absolute element. But since thinking is initially the *element* of this world, consciousness only *has* these thoughts, but it does not yet *think* them, or it does not know that they are thoughts; but they are for consciousness in the form of *representation*. For it steps out of actuality into pure consciousness, yet is itself in general still in the sphere and determinacy of actuality. The dismembered consciousness is at first *in itself* the *likeness-to-itself* of pure consciousness, for us, not for itself. Thus it is only the *immediate* elevation, not yet accomplished within itself, and it still has within it its opposite principle by which it is conditioned, without having become master of it through the mediated movement. Consequently, the essence of its thought counts for it, not as *essence* only in the form of the abstract in-itself, but in the form of a *common-actuality*, of an actuality that has only been raised into another element without having lost in this element the determinacy of an unthought actuality.—It is essential to distinguish it from the *in-itself* which is the essence of the *stoic* consciousness; what counted for Stoicism was only the *form of thought* as such, which, besides that, has some alien content taken from actuality; but what counts for the consciousness under consideration is not the *form of thought*;—likewise it is essentially distinct from the *in-itself* of the virtuous consciousness, for which the essence does indeed stand in relation to actuality, and for which it is essence of actuality itself, but is initially only unactual essence;—for the consciousness under discussion what counts is the essence that, although beyond actuality, is yet actual essence. Similarly, the right and good in itself of law-giving reason, and the universal of law-testing consciousness, do not have the determination of actuality.—If therefore pure thinking fell within the world of culture itself as an aspect of alienation, *viz.* as the standard of the abstract good and bad in judging, then, having passed through the movement of the whole, it has become enriched with the moment of actuality and thereby of content. But this actuality of the essence is at the same time only an actuality of *pure* consciousness, not of *actual* consciousness; although raised into the element of thinking, it does not yet count as a thought for this consciousness, but rather it lies for it beyond its own actuality; for the actuality of the essence is the flight from its own actuality.¹

¶528. *Religion*—for that is obviously what we are talking about,—as it emerges here as the faith of the world of culture, does not yet emerge as it is *in and for itself*.—It has already appeared to us in other determinacies, *viz.* as *unhappy consciousness*, as a shape of the substance-bereft movement of consciousness itself.—It appeared, too, in the ethical substance as faith in the underworld; but consciousness of the departed spirit is, strictly speaking, not *faith*, not the essence posited in the element of pure consciousness beyond the actual, but faith itself has immediate presence; its element is the family.—Here, however, religion has for one thing proceeded from the

substance and is pure consciousness of it; for another, this pure consciousness is alienated from its actual consciousness, the *essence* is alienated from its *Being-there*. So religion is indeed no longer the substance-bereft movement of consciousness, but it still has the determinacy of opposition to actuality as *this* actuality in general, and of opposition to the actuality of self-consciousness in particular; it is therefore essentially only a *faith*.¹

§529. This *pure consciousness* of the absolute essence is an *alienated* consciousness. We have to look more closely to see how that of which it is the other determines itself, and we must consider it only in connection with this other. Initially, then, this pure consciousness seems to have over against it only the *world* of actuality; but since it is the flight from this world and therefore is the *determinacy* of *opposition*, it has this determinacy within itself; pure consciousness is therefore within its own self alienated from itself, and faith constitutes only one side of it. At the same time, the other side has already arisen for us. Pure consciousness, that is, is reflection out of the world of culture in such a way that the substance of that world, as well as the masses into which it articulates itself, show up as what they are in themselves, as *spiritual* essentialities, as absolutely restless movements or determinations which immediately sublimate themselves in their contrary. Their essence, simple consciousness, is thus the simplicity of the *absolute difference* which is immediately no difference. Consequently, it is pure *Being-for-itself*, not as the Being-for-itself of *this singleton*, but the Self, *universal* within itself, as restless movement which attacks and pervades the *tranquil essence* of the *Thing*. Thus there is present in this Self the certainty that immediately knows itself as truth, pure thinking as the *absolute concept* in the power of its *negativity*, which eliminates every objective essence supposedly standing over against consciousness, and makes it into a Being of consciousness.—This pure consciousness is at the same time equally *simple*, just because its difference is no difference. But as this form of simple reflection-into-itself, it is the element of faith in which spirit has the determinacy of *positive universality*, of *Being-in-itself* in contrast to that Being-for-itself of self-consciousness.—Forced back into itself out of the essenceless, merely dissolving world, spirit, in accordance with the truth, is in an undivided unity the *absolute movement* and *negativity* of its appearing, as well as its inwardly *satisfied* essence and its positive *repose*. But lying in general under the determinacy of *alienation*, these two moments fall apart as a dual consciousness. The former is *pure insight* as the spiritual *process* concentrating itself in *self-consciousness*, a process which is confronted by consciousness of what is positive, the form of objectivity or of representation, and which turns against it; but pure insight's own object is only the *pure I*.—The simple consciousness of the positive, or of tranquil likeness-to-itself, on the other hand, has for its object the inner *essence* as essence. Pure insight initially has, therefore, no content within itself, because it is negative Being-for-itself; to faith, on the other hand, there belongs content, without insight. If the former does not step outside self-consciousness, the latter certainly has its content in the element of pure self-consciousness likewise, but in *thinking*, not in *concepts*, in *pure consciousness*, not in *pure self-consciousness*. Hence faith is certainly pure consciousness of the *essence*, i.e. of the *simple interior*, and thus is thinking,—the cardinal moment in the nature of faith, which is usually overlooked. The *immediacy*, with which the essence is in it, lies in the fact that its object is *essence*, i.e. a *pure thought*. This *immediacy*, however, so far as *thinking* enters into

consciousness, or pure consciousness enters into self-consciousness, acquires the significance of an objective *Being* which lies beyond the consciousness of the Self. It is through this meaning which the immediacy and simplicity of *pure thinking* obtains in *consciousness*, that the *essence* of faith declines from thinking into *representation*, and becomes a supersensible world which is, supposedly, essentially an *other* of self-consciousness.—In pure insight, on the other hand, the transition of pure thinking into consciousness has the opposite determination; objectivity has the significance of a merely negative, self-sublating content, returning into the Self; that is to say, only the Self is really the object to itself, or the object only has truth so far as it has the form of the Self.¹

¶530. Just as faith and pure insight belong in common to the element of pure consciousness, so also are they in common the return from the actual world of culture. Consequently, they present themselves according to three aspects. First, each is *in* and *for itself*, apart from all relationships; secondly, each relates to the *actual* world, which is opposed to pure consciousness; and thirdly, each relates to the other within pure consciousness.

¶531. In the *faithful* consciousness, the aspect of *Being-in-and-for-itself* is its absolute object whose content and determination has emerged. For according to the concept of faith the object is nothing other than the real world raised into the universality of pure consciousness. The articulation of the real world, therefore, constitutes the organization of the universality of pure consciousness too, except that in the latter the parts do not alienate themselves in their inspiring, but are essences that are in and for themselves, spirits that have returned into themselves and abide together with themselves.—The movement of their transition is therefore only for us an alienation of the determinacy in which they are in their difference, and only for us is it a *necessary* series; for faith, however, their difference is a tranquil diversity and their movement a *happening*.¹

¶532. To name them briefly according to the external determination of their form: just as in the world of culture State-power, or the good, was the first term, so here, too, the first is *the absolute essence*, spirit that is-in- and -for-itself, insofar as it is the simple *eternal substance*. But in the realization of its concept, which consists in being spirit, it passes over into *Being for another*; its likeness-to-itself becomes an *actual*, *self-sacrificing* absolute essence; it becomes a *Self*, but a transitory Self. Consequently, the third term is the return of this alienated Self and of the demoted substance into their initial simplicity; only in this way is substance represented as spirit.¹

¶533. These distinct essences, when taken back into themselves by thinking, out of the flux of the actual world, are immutable eternal spirits, whose Being consists in thinking the unity which they constitute. Removed thus from self-consciousness, these essences nevertheless intervene in it; if the essence were unmoved in the form of the first simple substance, it would remain alien to self-consciousness. But the estrangement of this substance, and then its spirit, has in self-consciousness the moment of actuality and thereby makes itself a participant in the faithful self-consciousness, or the faithful consciousness belongs to the real world.¹

¶534. According to this second relationship, on the one hand the faithful consciousness itself has its actuality in the real world of culture, and constitutes the spirit of that world and its Being-there which we have already considered; but on

the other hand, the faithful consciousness confronts this its actuality as a vanity, and is the movement of sublating it. This movement does not consist in its having a high-spirited consciousness about the perversion of the real world; for it is the simple consciousness, which counts the high-spirited as a vanity, because high-spiritedness still has the real world for its purpose. On the contrary, the real world confronts the tranquil realm of its thinking as a spiritless Being-there, which therefore has to be overcome in an external manner. This obedience of service and praise, by sublating sensory knowing and doing, produces the consciousness of unity with the essence that is-in-and-for-itself, though not as intuited actual unity, but rather this service is only the perpetual producing, which does not completely attain its goal in the present. The community does indeed attain to it, for it is universal self-consciousness; but for the singular self-consciousness the realm of pure thinking necessarily remains a beyond of its actuality, or since this beyond, through the estrangement of the eternal essence, has entered into actuality, the actuality is an uncomprehended, sensory actuality; but one sensory actuality remains indifferent to the other, and the beyond has only received the further determination of remoteness in space and time.—However, the concept, the actuality of spirit present to itself, remains in the faithful consciousness the *interior*, which is everything and produces everything, but does not itself come forth.¹

¶535. In *pure insight*, however, the concept is alone the actual; and this third aspect of faith, that of being an object for pure insight, is the proper relationship in which faith here appears.—Pure insight itself is likewise to be considered partly in and for itself, partly in relationship to the actual world so far as this is still present positively, viz. as vain consciousness, and lastly, in that relation to faith.¹

¶536. We have seen what pure insight is in and for itself; as faith is the tranquil *pure consciousness* of spirit as *essence*, so is pure insight the *self-consciousness* of this essence; it therefore knows the essence, not as *essence*, but as absolute *Self*. It therefore sets out to sublating all independence that is *other* to self-consciousness, whether it be the independence of the actual or of what-is-in-itself, and to make it into a *concept*. Pure insight is not only the certainty of self-conscious reason that it is all truth; but it *knows* that it is.

¶537. However, as the concept of pure insight first enters the scene, it is not yet *realized*. Accordingly, its consciousness still appears as *contingent*, *singular* consciousness, and what is for it the essence appears as a *purpose*, which it has to actualize. It has, at first, the *intention* of making *pure insight universal*, i.e. of making everything that is actual into a concept, and into a concept in every self-consciousness. The intention is *pure*, for it has pure insight for its content; and this insight is likewise *pure*, for its content is solely the absolute concept, which meets with no opposition in an object, nor is it limited within its own self. In the unlimited concept there lie immediately the two aspects: that everything objective has only the significance of *Being-for-itself*, of self-consciousness, and that this has the significance of a *universal*, that pure insight should become the property of every self-consciousness. This second aspect of the intention is a result of culture insofar as in culture the differences of objective spirit, the parts and the determinations of judgement of its world, as well as the differences that appear as originally determinate natures, have all perished. Genius, talent, particular capacities in general, belong to the world of actuality, insofar

as this world still contains the aspect of being a spiritual animal kingdom, which, amid confusion and mutual violence, cheats and struggles over the essence of the real world.—The differences, certainly, have no place in this world as honest espèces; individuality neither contents itself with the unactual *Thing itself* nor has it *particular* content and purposes of its own. On the contrary, it counts merely as something universally valid, viz. as cultivated; and the difference is reduced to less or greater energy,—a *quantitative* difference, i.e. an inessential difference. This last diversity has, however, been effaced by the fact that in the complete dismemberment of consciousness the difference turned into an absolutely qualitative difference. In dismemberment, what is for the I the other, is only the I itself. In this infinite judgement all one-sidedness and peculiarity of the original Being-for-itself is eradicated; the Self knows itself, as pure Self, to be its object; and this absolute likeness of both sides is the element of pure insight.—Pure insight is, therefore, the simple, internally undifferentiated *essence*, and equally the universal *work* and universal possession. In this *simple* spiritual substance, self-consciousness gives itself and maintains in every object the consciousness of this its *singularity* or *doing*, just as, conversely, the individuality of self-consciousness is therein *like itself* and universal.—This pure insight is thus the spirit that calls to *every* consciousness: *be for yourselves* what you all *are in yourselves*,—*rational*.¹

II. THE ENLIGHTENMENT

¶538. The peculiar object against which pure insight directs the force of the concept is faith, as the form of pure consciousness confronting it in the same element. But it also has a relation to the actual world for, like faith, it is the return from the actual world into pure consciousness. We have, first of all, to see how its activity with regard to the impure intentions and perverse insights of the actual world is constituted.

¶539. We have already mentioned the tranquil consciousness that stands opposed to this turmoil which, having once settled down starts up all over again; it constitutes the side of pure insight and intention. This tranquil consciousness, however, has, as we saw, no *particular insight* about the world of culture; this world itself has rather the most painful feeling and the truest insight about itself—the feeling that all its bulwarks are crumbling, that through all moments of its Being-there it is being broken on the wheel and all its bones smashed; it is also the language of this feeling and the spirited talk which pronounces judgement on every aspect of its condition. Here, therefore, pure insight can have no activity and content of its own and thus can only conduct itself as the formal and trustworthy *apprehension* of this spirited insight of the world and of its language. Since this language is dispersed, and the assessment some gossip of the instant, which at once gets forgotten again, and is a whole only for a third consciousness, this third consciousness can only differentiate itself as *pure* insight by the fact it concentrates these dispersed traits into a universal picture and then makes them into an insight for everyone.¹

¶540. By this simple means pure insight will manage to dispel the confusion of this world. For it has emerged that it is not the masses and the determinate concepts and individualities that are the essence of this actuality, but that this has its substance and support solely in the spirit which exists as judging and discussing, and that the interest of having a content for this ratiocination and chatter alone preserves the whole

and the masses of its articulation. In this language of insight, its self-consciousness is for it still a *being-for-itself, this singleton*; but the vanity of the content is at the same time the vanity of the Self that knows it is vain. Now when the calmly apprehending consciousness brings into a collection the most striking versions of all this spirited prattle, the versions that penetrate the Thing, then the soul that still preserves the whole, the vanity of spirited assessment, goes to join the other vanity of Being-there, it goes to ruin. The collection shows to most people a better wit, or to everyone at least a more varied wit, than their own, and shows that knowing-all and passing judgement in general are something universal and now universally familiar; with this, the only interest that was still present evaporates, and singular insightfulness is resolved into universal insight. However, the knowledge of the essence still stands firm above vain knowledge, and pure insight only appears in its proper activity insofar as it enters the lists against faith.¹

a. The struggle of the enlightenment with superstition

¶541. The various modes of the negative attitude of consciousness, the attitude of scepticism and that of theoretical and practical idealism, are subordinate shapes compared with that of *pure insight* and its diffusion, the *enlightenment*; for pure insight is born of the substance, knows the pure *Self* of consciousness as absolute, and copes with the pure consciousness of the absolute essence of all actuality.—Since faith and insight are the same pure consciousness, but opposed as regards form—the essence is for faith as *thought*, not as *concept*, and therefore a sheer opposite to *self-consciousness*, whereas for pure insight the essence is the *Self*—each is for the other the sheer negative of it.—As the two enter the lists against each other, all *content* pertains to faith; for each moment, in its tranquil element of thinking, obtains subsistence;—while pure insight is initially devoid of content and is rather the pure vanishing of it; but by the negative movement against what is negative to it, it will realize itself and give itself a content.¹

¶542. Pure insight knows faith as what is opposed to it, opposed to reason and truth. Just as faith is, for pure insight, in general a tissue of superstitions, prejudices, and errors, so for it the consciousness of this content further organizes itself into a realm of error in which, on the one hand, false insight is as the *universal mass* of consciousness, immediately, naively, and without reflection into itself, but it also has in it the moment of reflection-into-self, or of self-consciousness, separated from the naivety, as an insight which remains for itself in the background, and an evil intention by which that naive consciousness is duped. The mass is the sacrificial victim of the deception of a *priesthood* which pursues its envious vanity, of being in exclusive possession of insight, as well as its further self-interest, and at the same time it conspires with *despotism* which, as a synthetic, non-conceptual unity of the real realm and this ideal realm—a curiously inconsistent essence—stands above the bad insight of the multitude and the bad intent of the priests, and also unites both within itself; from the stupidity and confusion of the people by the means of the deceiving priesthood, despotism, which despises both, derives the advantage of undisturbed domination and the fulfilment of its desires and wilfulness, but is at the same time the same dullness of insight, the same superstition and error.¹

¶543. The enlightenment does not strike against these three sides of the enemy indiscriminately; for since its essence is pure insight, the *universal* in and for itself, its true relation to the other extreme is that in which it aims at what is *common* and *alike* in both extremes. The side of *singularity*, isolating itself from the universal naive consciousness, is its opposition which it cannot immediately affect. The immediate object of its activity is therefore not the will of the deceiving priesthood and of the oppressive despot, but rather the insight devoid of will that does not singularize itself to Being-for-itself, the *concept* of rational self-consciousness which has its Being-there in the mass but is not yet present in it as concept. Pure insight, however, in wrenching this honest insight and its naive essence away from prejudices and errors, wrests from the hands of the bad intent the reality and power of its deceit, an intent whose realm has its *soil* and *material* in the uncomprehending consciousness of the universal mass—whose *Being-for-itself* has its *substance* in the *simple* consciousness in general.¹

¶544. The relation of pure insight to the naive consciousness of the absolute essence now has a twofold aspect: on the one hand, pure insight is *in itself* the same as that consciousness, but on the other hand, this naive consciousness gives free rein to the absolute essence, as well as to its parts, in the simple element of its thought, and lets them acquire subsistence and be valid only as its *in-itself* and hence in an objective manner, but in this in-itself it disowns its *Being-for-itself*.—Insofar as, according to the first aspect, for pure insight this faith is *in itself* pure self-consciousness and ought only to become this *for itself*, pure insight has, in this concept of faith, the element in which, instead of false insight, it realizes itself.¹

¶545. Since from this aspect both are essentially the same and the relation of pure insight happens through and in the same element, their communication is *immediate* and their giving and receiving is an unimpeded flow of each into the other. Whatever wedges of any sort may be driven into consciousness, it is *in itself* this simplicity in which everything is dissolved, forgotten, and naive, and which is therefore utterly receptive to the concept. On this account the communication of pure insight is comparable to a calm expansion or to the *diffusion*, say, of a perfume in the unresisting atmosphere. It is a penetrating infection which does not make itself noticeable beforehand as something opposed to the indifferent element into which it insinuates itself, and therefore cannot be averted. Only when the infection has spread is it *for the consciousness* that unheedingly submitted to it. For what consciousness received into itself was indeed the simple essence, like itself and like consciousness, but at the same time it was the simplicity of negativity reflected into itself, which subsequently also unfolds, in keeping with its nature, into something opposed to it and thereby reminds consciousness of its former state; such simplicity is the concept, which is the simple knowing that knows itself and at the same time its contrary, but knows this contrary as sublated within it. Consequently, as soon as pure insight is for consciousness, it has already spread; the struggle against it betrays the infection that has occurred; the struggle is too late, and every remedy only aggravates the disease, for it has gripped the marrow of spiritual life, viz. consciousness in its concept, or the pure essence itself of consciousness; therefore, too, there is no force in consciousness which could overcome the disease. Because the disease is in the essence itself, its manifestations, while still singularized, can be

suppressed and the superficial symptoms smothered. This is greatly to its advantage; for it does not now squander its force uselessly nor does it show itself unworthy of its essence, which is the case when it breaks out in symptoms and single eruptions against the content of faith and against the network of its outward actuality. Rather, now an invisible and unnoticed spirit, it infiltrates the vital parts through and through and soon has taken complete possession of all the viscera and members of the unconscious idol, and ‘*one fine morning* it gives its comrade a shove with the elbow, and bang! crash! the idol lies on the ground.’—*On one fine morning*, whose noon is not bloody if the infection has penetrated every organ of spiritual life; memory alone then still preserves the dead mode of the spirit’s previous shape as a vanished history, vanished one knows not how; and the new serpent of wisdom raised on high for adoration has in this way painlessly shed merely a withered skin.¹

¶546. But this silent, ceaseless weaving of the spirit in the simple interior of its substance, spirit concealing its doing from itself, is only one side of the realization of pure insight. Its diffusion consists not merely in the fact that like goes together with like; nor is its actualization merely an expansion with no opposition. On the contrary, the doing of the negative essence is no less essentially a developed movement differentiating itself within itself which, as conscious doing, must set up its moments in a determinate manifest Being-there and must be present as a loud noise and a violent struggle with the opposition as such.¹

¶547. We have therefore to see how *pure insight* and *intention* reacts *negatively* against the other opposed to it that it finds before it.—Pure insight and intention, which react negatively, can, since its concept is all essentiality and there is nothing outside it, only be the negative of itself. As insight, therefore, it becomes the negative of pure insight, it becomes untruth and unreason and, as intention, it becomes the negative of pure intention, becomes a lie and insincerity of purpose.¹

¶548. Pure insight gets entangled in this contradiction through engaging in dispute and opining that it is combating something *else*.—It only opines this, for its essence as absolute negativity is to have otherness within itself. The absolute concept is the category; the concept is this: that knowing and the *object* of knowing are the same. Consequently, what pure insight pronounces to be its other, what it pronounces to be an error or a lie, can be nothing else but pure insight itself; it can condemn only what it is itself. What is not rational has no *truth*, or what is not comprehended *is not*; when, therefore, reason speaks of an *other* than itself, it speaks in fact only of itself; in this, it does not go outside itself.—This struggle with the opposition, therefore, combines within itself the significance of being the *actualization* of reason. This actualization consists, that is, just in the movement of developing the moments and taking them back into itself; one part of this movement is the differentiation in which the comprehending insight places itself over against itself as *object*; so long as it lingers in this moment it is alienated from itself. As pure insight it is devoid of all *content*; the movement of its realization consists in *it itself* becoming as its content, for nothing else can become its content because it is the self-consciousness of the category. But since pure insight at first knows the content in its opposite only as *content* and not yet as itself, it does not recognize itself in it. Its completion therefore has the sense that it recognizes the content, which at first is objective to it, as its own content. Its result, however, will thus be neither the re-establishment of the errors it

combats, nor merely its initial concept, but an insight that recognizes the absolute negation of itself as its own actuality, as its own self, or its concept recognizing its own self.—This nature of enlightenment's combat with errors, which consists in combating itself in them and in condemning in them what it itself affirms, is *for us*, or it is what enlightenment and its combat is *in itself*. But it is in the first aspect of this struggle, the defilement of enlightenment through the adoption of the negative attitude into its self-equal *purity*, that it is an *object for faith*, and so faith experiences it as a lie, as unreason, and as bad intention, just as faith is for enlightenment error and prejudice.—As regards its content, it is initially an empty insight whose content appears to it as an other, consequently, it *finds* it *before* itself in the shape of a content which is not yet its own, as a Being-there entirely independent of itself, in faith.¹

¶549. So the way in which enlightenment conceives its object initially and generally, is that it takes it as *pure insight* and that, not recognizing itself, declares it to be error. In *insight* as such, consciousness grasps an object in such a way that the object becomes for it the essence of consciousness, or becomes an object which consciousness permeates, in which consciousness preserves itself, remains together with itself and present to itself, and since it is thereby the movement of the object, produces it. It is just this that enlightenment rightly declares faith to be, when it says of it that what is for faith the absolute essence, is a Being of its own consciousness, is its own thought, a product of consciousness. Enlightenment thereby declares faith to be error and fiction with respect to the same thing as enlightenment is.—Enlightenment that wants to teach faith the new wisdom does not tell it anything new; for faith's object is also for it directly this, *viz.* the pure essence of its own consciousness, so that this consciousness does not posit itself as lost and negated in that object, but rather puts its trust in it, *i.e.* it finds itself *as this* consciousness, or as *self-consciousness*, precisely *in the object*. When I trust someone, his *certainty of himself* is for me the *certainty of myself*; I recognize my own Being-for-myself in him, I recognize that he recognizes my Being-for-myself and that it is for him purpose and essence. But trust is faith, because its consciousness *immediately relates* to its object and it thus also intuits this: that it is *one* with the object and in it.—Further, since what is an object for me is that in which I recognize myself, in general I am at the same time in that object as *another* self-consciousness, *i.e.* as a self-consciousness which has become, in that object, alienated from its particular singularity, *viz.* from its naturalness and contingency, but which, first, remains therein self-consciousness and, secondly, precisely in that object, is an *essential* consciousness just as pure insight is.—The concept of insight involves not only that consciousness recognizes itself in the object of its insight and, without abandoning the element of thought and only withdrawing from it into itself, has itself *immediately* in the object, but it is conscious of itself as also the *mediating* movement or of itself as the *doing* or producing; this unity of itself as unity of the *Self* and the object is thereby *for it* in thought.—Faith, too, is just this consciousness; *the obedience and the doing* are a necessary moment, through which the certainty of Being in the absolute essence comes about. This doing of faith does not of course appear in such a way that the absolute essence itself is produced by it. But the absolute essence of faith is essentially not the *abstract* essence lying beyond the faithful consciousness, it is, on the contrary, the spirit of the community, the unity of the abstract essence and self-consciousness. For it to be this spirit of the

community, in this the doing of the community is an essential moment; it is the spirit of the community, *only through the producing* of consciousness,—or rather, *not without* being produced by consciousness; or essential as the producing is, it is also just as essentially not the sole ground of the essence, but only a moment. The essence is at the same time in and for itself.¹

¶550. On the other side, the concept of pure insight is to itself an *other* than its object; for it is just this negative determination that constitutes the object. Thus, from the other side, insight also declares the essence of faith to be something *alien* to consciousness, to be not *its* essence but a changeling foisted on it. But here enlightenment is entirely foolish; faith experiences it as a speaking that does not know what it is saying, and does not understand the Thing when it talks about priestly deceit and deception of the people. It speaks about this as if by some hocus-pocus of conjuring priests something absolutely *alien* and *other* had been palmed off on consciousness as the essence, and at the same time it says that this is an essence of consciousness, that consciousness believes in it, puts its trust in it, and seeks to make it favourably disposed towards itself,—i.e. that consciousness intuits in it *its pure* essence just as much as *its* singular and universal *individuality*, and through its doing produces this unity of itself with its essence. Thus what it declares to be something *alien* to consciousness, it immediately declares to be the *ownmost* of consciousness.—How then can it possibly speak about deceit and deception? Since it *immediately* declares the contrary of what it asserts regarding faith, it rather reveals itself to faith as the conscious *lie*. How are deception and deceit supposed to take place where consciousness in its truth has immediately the *certainty of itself*, where in its object it possesses *its own self*, insofar as it just as much finds itself in it as produces itself in it? The distinction is no longer present even in the words.—If the general question has been proposed, *whether it is permissible to delude a people*, the answer would in fact have to be that the question is pointless, because it is impossible to deceive a people in this matter.—Brass instead of gold, counterfeit instead of genuine bonds, may well be sold in isolated cases, many may be persuaded to believe that a battle lost was a battle won, and other lies about sensory things and single events may be made credible for a time; but in the knowledge of that essence in which consciousness has the *immediate certainty of itself*, the thought of deception is quite out of the question.¹

¶551. Let us see further how faith experiences the enlightenment in the *different* moments of its own consciousness, to which the view indicated above referred only generally. These moments are: pure thinking or, as object, the *absolute essence* in and for itself; then its *relation*—as a *knowing*—to the absolute essence, the *ground of its faith*, and lastly, its relation to absolute essence in its doing, or *its service*. Just as pure insight has in general failed to recognize itself, and has denied itself, in faith, so too in these moments it will behave in an equally perverse manner.¹

¶552. Pure insight adopts a negative attitude to the *absolute essence* of the faithful consciousness. This essence is pure *thinking*, and pure thinking posited within itself as an object or as the *essence*; in the faithful consciousness, this in-itself of thinking acquires at the same time, for consciousness that is for itself, the form, but only the empty form, of objectivity; the in-itself is in the determination of something *represented*. To pure insight, however, since it is pure consciousness on the side of the *Self that is for itself*, the *other* appears as a *negative of self-consciousness*. This could still be

taken either as the pure *in-itself* of thinking, or alternatively as the *Being* of sensory certainty. But since it is at the same time for the *Self* and this, as a *Self* that has an object, is actual consciousness, pure insight's peculiar object as such is an *ordinary thing* of *sensory certainty*, a thing that *is*. This its object appears to insight in the *representation* of faith. It condemns this representation, and in it its own object. But here it already does faith the injustice of conceiving its object as if it were its own object. For according to this it says about faith that its absolute essence is a piece of stone, a block of wood, which has eyes and sees not, or again, a piece of dough which, having grown in the field, is transformed by man and returned to the field,—or in whatever other ways faith anthropomorphizes the essence, making it objective and representable to itself.¹

¶553. Enlightenment, which professes to be pure, here makes what is, for spirit, eternal life and holy spirit into an actual, *transitory thing*, and defiles it with the in itself nugatory view of sensory certainty—with a view that is entirely absent from faith in its worship, so that it is a downright lie when enlightenment imputes this view to faith. What faith reveres, is for it by no means either stone or wood or dough, nor any other temporal, sensory thing. If enlightenment has a mind to say that, all the same, its object is *also* this, or even that it is in itself and in truth this, then first, faith is equally well aware of *that Also*, but it lies outside its worship; but secondly, for faith in general such a thing as a stone, etc. is not *in itself*; on the contrary, what is in itself for faith is solely the essence of pure thinking.¹

¶554. The *second moment* is the relation of faith as a *knowing* consciousness to this essence. For faith, as a pure thinking consciousness, this essence is immediate; but the pure consciousness is just as much a *mediated* relation of certainty to the truth; a relation which constitutes the *ground of faith*. For enlightenment, this ground likewise becomes a contingent *knowledge of contingent* events. But the ground of the knowledge is the *knowing* universal and in its truth the absolute *spirit* which, in abstract pure consciousness or in thinking as such, is only absolute *essence*, but, as self-consciousness, is the *knowledge* of itself. Pure insight posits this conscious universal, the *simple, self-knowing spirit*, likewise as a negative of self-consciousness. Pure insight itself is indeed *pure mediated* thinking, i.e. thinking that mediates itself with itself, it is pure knowing; but since it is a *pure insight*, a *pure knowing*, that does not as yet know itself, i.e. is not yet aware that it is this pure mediating movement, the movement appears to insight, as does everything that it itself is, as an other. Comprehended in its actualization, therefore, it develops this moment that is essential to it, but this moment appears to it as belonging to faith and, in its determinacy of being something external to pure insight, as a contingent knowledge of just such commonly actual historical narratives. Here, then, it falsely imputes to religious belief that its certainty is grounded on some *single historical testimonies* which, considered as historical testimonies, would certainly not yield the degree of certainty about their content which is given by newspaper accounts of any happening; further, that its certainty rests on the contingency of the *preservation* of these testimonies—on the one hand, the preservation by means of paper, and on the other hand, by the skill and honesty of the transference from one piece of paper to another—, and lastly, on the *correct interpretation* of the sense of dead words and letters. In fact, however, it does not occur to faith to tie its certainty to such testimonies and contingencies; faith, in its

certainty, is an unsophisticated relationship to its absolute object, a pure knowing of it which does not mix in letters, paper, and copyists with its consciousness of the absolute essence, and does not mediate itself with it through such things. On the contrary, this consciousness is the self-mediating ground of its knowledge; it is the spirit itself which bears witness to itself, in the *interior* of the *singular* consciousness as well as through the *universal presence* in everyone of faith in this spirit. If faith also wants to obtain from history that mode of grounding, or at least confirmation, of its content that enlightenment talks about, and seriously opines and acts as if that were of any importance, then it has already let itself be seduced by the enlightenment; and its efforts to ground and consolidate itself in such a way are merely testimonies it gives of its infection.¹

¶555. There still remains the third side, the *relation of consciousness to the absolute essence*, as a *doing*. This doing is the sublation of the particularity of the individual, or of the natural mode of its Being-for-itself, whence proceeds its certainty of being pure self-consciousness in accordance with its doing, i.e. of being, as singular consciousness that *is-in-and-for-itself*, one with the essence.—Since, in doing, *purpose* and *fitness for purpose* are distinguished, and pure insight in relation to this doing likewise *adopts a negative attitude* and, as in the other moments, denies its own self, it must, as regards *fitness for purpose*, display its lack of understanding, since insight combined with intention, the agreement of purpose and means, appears to it as an other, or rather as the contrary of insight,—but as regards the *purpose* it has to make the bad, enjoyment, and possession its purpose and thereby prove itself to be the impurest intention, since pure intention, as other, is equally impure intention.¹

¶556. Accordingly, we see that as regards *purposiveness*, enlightenment finds it foolish when the faithful individual awards himself the superior consciousness of not being chained to natural enjoyment and pleasure by *actually* denying himself natural enjoyment and pleasure, and demonstrating *by his deed* that his contempt for them is no *lie* but is *true*.—Similarly, enlightenment finds it foolish that the individual absolves himself of his determinacy of being absolutely singular, excluding all others and possessing property, by itself giving up its property; whereby he shows *in truth* that he is not in earnest with this isolation of himself, but is elevated above the natural necessity of singularizing himself and of denying, in this absolute singularization of Being-for-itself, that others are the same thing as *himself*.—Pure insight finds both unfit for the purpose as well as wrong,—it is *not to the purpose* of proving oneself free of pleasure and possession, to deny oneself pleasure and give away a possession; in the contrary case, therefore, pure insight will declare someone a *fool* who, in order to eat, adopts the means of actually eating.—Insight also finds it *wrong* to deny oneself a meal and to give away butter and eggs, not for money, or give away money and not for butter and eggs, but simply to give them away without receiving anything in return; it declares a meal or the possession of things of that sort to be an end in itself, and hence in fact declares itself to be a very impure intention, which treats such enjoyment and possession as something wholly essential. Again, it also affirms as a pure intention the necessity of rising above natural existence, above acquisitiveness about the means of existence; only it finds it foolish and wrong that this elevation should be demonstrated *through the deed*, or this pure intention is in truth a

deception, which feigns and demands an *inner* elevation, but presents it as superfluous, foolish, and even wrong to be in earnest about it, to put this elevation *actually to work* and *demonstrate its truth*.—Pure insight thus denies itself both as pure insight, for it denies immediately purposive doing, and as pure intention, for it denies the intention of proving itself freed from the purposes of singularity.¹

¶557. It is thus that enlightenment submits itself to be experienced by faith. It presents itself in this bad light because, just by its relationship to an other, it gives itself a *negative reality*, or exhibits itself as the contrary of itself; but pure insight and intention must enter into this relationship, for it is their actualization.—This actualization initially appeared as a negative reality. Perhaps its *positive reality* is better constituted; let us see how things stand with this.—If all prejudice and superstition have been banished, the question arises, *What next? What is the truth enlightenment has propagated in their stead?*—It has already declared this positive content in its extirpation of error, for that alienation of itself is just as much its positive reality.—In what, for faith, is absolute spirit, it interprets any *determination* it discovers there as wood, stone, etc., as singular, actual things; since in general it comprehends *all determinacy*, i.e. all its content and filling, in this way as a *finitude*, as *human essence and representation*, the *absolute essence* becomes for enlightenment a *vacuum* to which no determinations, no predicates, can be attributed. Such a coupling would be in itself reprehensible; and it is just in this that the monstrosities of superstition have been engendered. Reason, *pure insight*, is certainly not empty itself, since the negative of itself is *for it*, and is its content; on the contrary, it is rich, but rich only in singularity and limitation; to let nothing of that sort appertain to the absolute essence or be attributed to it, this is reason's insightful mode of living, which knows how to put itself and its wealth of finitude in their place, and how to deal with the absolute in a worthy manner.¹

¶558. In contrast to this empty essence there stands, as the *second moment* of the positive truth of enlightenment, *singularity* in general, excluded from an absolute essence, the singularity of consciousness and of all Being, as *absolute Being-in-and-for-itself*. Consciousness, which in its very first actuality is *sensory certainty* and *meaning*, returns here to this from the whole course of its experience and is again a knowledge of what is *purely negative of itself*, or of *sensory things*, i.e. *beings*, which indifferently confront its *Being-for-itself*. Here, however, it is not *immediate*, natural consciousness, but it has *become* such a consciousness to itself. At first at the mercy of all the entanglement into which it was plunged by its unfolding, now led back by pure insight to its first shape, it has *experienced* that shape as the *result*. *Grounded* on insight into the nothingness of all other shapes of consciousness and hence of everything beyond sensory certainty, this sensory certainty is no longer meaning, but is rather the absolute truth. This nothingness of everything that lies beyond sensory certainty is no doubt merely a negative proof of this truth; but it is not susceptible of any other proof; for the positive truth of sensory certainty within its own self is just the *unmediated Being-for-itself* of the concept itself as object, and that too in the form of otherness,—that to every consciousness it is *utterly certain* that it *is*, and *other actual things* outside it, and that in its *natural Being* it, like these things, is *in and for itself* or *absolute*.¹

¶559. Lastly, *the third moment of the truth of enlightenment* is the relationship of the singular essences to the absolute essence, the relation between the first two moments. Insight, as pure insight into what is *like* or *unrestricted*, also goes *beyond* what is *unlike*, viz. beyond finite actuality, or beyond itself as mere otherness. As the beyond of this otherness it has the *void* to which, therefore, it relates the sensory actuality. Into the determination of this *relationship*, both of the sides do not enter as *content*, for one of them is the void, and it is only through the other, the sensory actuality, that a content is present. But the *form* of the relation, to the determination of which the side of the *in-itself* contributes, is a matter of choice; for the form is what is *in itself negative*, and therefore self-opposed; Being as well as nothing; *in-itself* as well as the *contrary*; or, what is the same thing, the relation of *actuality* to *in-itself* as the beyond, is as much a *negating* as a *positing* of actuality. Finite actuality can therefore, properly speaking, be taken just as one requires. The sensory is therefore now related *positively* to the absolute as to the *in-itself*, and sensory actuality is itself *in itself*; the absolute makes it, fosters and cherishes it. Again, sensory actuality is related to the absolute as its contrary, as to its own *non-Being*; in this relationship it is not in itself, but only *for an other*. Whereas in the preceding shape of consciousness the *concepts* of the opposition were determined as the *good* and *bad*, for pure insight, by contrast, they become the purer abstractions of *Being-in-itself* and *Being-for-an-other*.¹

¶560. Both ways of viewing the positive and the negative relations of the finite to the in-itself are, however, in fact equally necessary, and everything is thus as much *in itself* as it is *for an other*, or everything is *useful*. Everything surrenders to everything else, now lets itself be used by others and is *for them*, and now, so to speak, stands again on its hind legs, is stand-offish towards the other, is for itself, and uses the other in its turn.—For man, as the thing *conscious* of this relation, there emerges from this his essence and his position. As he is immediately, as natural consciousness *in itself*, man is *good*, as a singular consciousness he is *absolute* and the other is *for him*; and moreover, since the moments have for him, as the animal conscious of itself, the significance of universality, *everything* is for his pleasure and amusement and, as one who has come from the hand of God, he roams in the world as in a garden planted for him.—He must also have plucked from the tree of the cognition of good and evil; he possesses in this an advantage which distinguishes him from all other creatures, for it so happens that his nature, though good in itself, is *also* so constituted that an excess of amusement does it harm, or rather his singularity has *also its beyond* within it, can go beyond itself and destroy itself. Countering this, reason is for him a useful means for appropriately restricting this transgression, or rather for preserving himself when he oversteps what is determined; for this is the force of consciousness. Enjoyment on the part of the conscious essence that is in itself *universal*, must not itself be something determinate as regards variety and duration, but universal; measure therefore has the determination of preventing pleasure in its variety and duration from being cut short; i.e. the determination of measure is measurelessness.—Just as everything is useful to man, so man is useful likewise, and his determination is just as much to make himself a publicly useful and serviceable member of the troop. He must serve the others just as much as he takes care of himself, and so far as he serves others, so far is he taking care of himself: one hand

washes the other. But wherever he is to be found, there he is in his right place; he makes use of others and is made use of himself.¹

¶561. Different things are useful to one another in different ways; but all things have this useful reciprocity through their essence, viz. through being related to the absolute in two ways, the positive way, whereby they are themselves *in and for themselves*, and the negative, whereby they are *for others*. The *relation* to the absolute essence, or religion, is therefore of all usefulness the most useful of all; for it is *pure utility itself*, it is this subsistence of all things, or their *Being-in-and-for-themselves*, and it is the fall of all things, or their *Being for an other* thing.¹

¶562. To faith, of course, this positive result of enlightenment is as much an abomination as its negative attitude towards faith. This insight into the absolute essence which sees nothing in it but just the absolute essence, the *être suprême*, or the *void*,—this *intention* according to which everything in its immediate Being—there is *in itself* or good, that finally, the *relation* of the singular conscious Being to the absolute essence, *religion*, is exhaustively expressed by the concept of utility, is for faith utterly *detestable*. This *wisdom*, peculiar to enlightenment, necessarily appears to faith at the same time as banality itself and as the *confession* of banality; because it consists in knowing nothing of the absolute essence or, what amounts to the same thing, in knowing this entirely insipid truth about it, that it is precisely only the *absolute essence*; and, on the other hand, in knowing only of finitude and, moreover, knowing it as the true, and knowing this knowledge of finitude as the true, as the highest.¹

¶563. Faith has the divine right, the right of absolute *likeness-to-itself* or of pure thinking, as against enlightenment, and it receives at its hands nothing but wrong; for enlightenment distorts faith in all its moments, changing them into something other than they are in it. But enlightenment has only a human right as against faith and for its own truth; for the wrong it commits is the right of *unlikeness*, and consists in perverting and altering, a right which belongs to the nature of *self-consciousness* in opposition to the simple essence or to *thinking*. But since the right of enlightenment is the right of self-consciousness, it will not only *also* retain the right, so that two equal rights of spirit would be left confronting each other and neither could satisfy the other, but it will maintain its absolute right because self-consciousness is the negativity of the concept, a negativity which is not only *for itself*, but also encroaches on its contrary; and because faith itself is a consciousness it will not be able to deny enlightenment its right.¹

¶564. For enlightenment does not counter the faithful consciousness with principles peculiar to itself, but with principles which the faithful consciousness has in it; enlightenment merely presents faith with its *own thoughts*, bringing them together, while faith unconsciously lets them fall apart; it merely reminds faith when *one* of its modes is present to it, of the *other* modes which it *also* has, but one of which it always forgets when the other mode is present. Enlightenment shows itself to faith to be pure insight by the fact that in a *determinate* moment it sees the whole, and so brings forward the *opposite* relating to this moment, and, inverting one in the other, brings out the negative essence of both thoughts, the *concept*. To faith, enlightenment appears as a distortion and a lie just because it points out the *otherness* of its moments; in doing so, it seems to faith immediately to make something else out of them than they are in their singularity; but this *other* is equally essential and in truth it is present

in the faithful consciousness itself, only this does not think about it, but has it somewhere else; consequently, it is neither alien to faith, nor can faith disavow it.¹

¶565. Enlightenment itself, however, which reminds faith of the opposite of its separated moments, is no more enlightened about itself. It has a purely *negative* attitude towards faith in that it excludes its own content from its purity and takes that content to be the *negative* of itself. It therefore neither recognizes itself in this negative, in the content of faith, nor for this reason does it bring the two thoughts together, the one which it brings forward itself and the one against which it brings forward the first. Since it does not recognize that what it condemns in faith is immediately its own thought, it is itself in the opposition of the two moments, only one of which, viz. in every case the one opposed to faith, it recognizes, but separates the other from the first, just as faith does. Consequently, enlightenment does not produce the unity of both as the unity of these moments, i.e. the concept; but the concept *arises* before it for itself, or enlightenment finds the concept merely as *at hand*. For, in itself, the realization of pure insight is just this, that insight, whose essence is the concept, at first becomes to itself as an absolute *other* and repudiates itself—for the opposition of the concept is an absolute opposition—and out of this otherness it comes to itself, or to its concept.—But enlightenment *is* only this movement, it is the still unconscious activity of the pure concept, an activity which does indeed arrive at itself as object, but takes it to be an *other* and, also, is not aware of the nature of the concept, viz. that it is the undifferentiated which absolutely sunders itself.—As against faith, then, insight is the *power* of the concept insofar as it is the movement and the relating of the moments lying apart in faith's consciousness, a relating in which their contradiction comes to light. Herein lies the absolute *right* of the force which insight exercises over faith; but the *actuality* to which it brings this force lies just in the fact that the faithful consciousness is itself the concept, and therefore itself recognizes the opposite which insight puts before it. Insight is therefore in the right as against the faithful consciousness because it makes valid in faith what is necessary to faith itself and what faith has in itself.¹

¶566. First of all, enlightenment affirms this moment of the concept, that it is a *doing* of *consciousness*; it affirms this *against* faith,—that its absolute essence is an essence of *its* consciousness as a Self, or that it has been *produced* through consciousness. To the faithful consciousness its absolute essence, just as it is the *in-itself* for it, is at the same time not like an alien thing *situated* in it, one knows not how and whence; on the contrary, its trust consists just in its *finding* itself as *this* personal consciousness in the absolute essence, and its obedience and service consist in producing it, through its *doing*, as *its* absolute essence. Enlightenment really only reminds faith of this, if faith roundly declares that the in-itself of the absolute essence lies *beyond* the *doing* of consciousness.—But while it does indeed supplement the one-sidedness of faith with the opposite moment of the *doing* of faith in contrast to the *Being*, of which alone faith is thinking here, enlightenment itself equally does not bring its thoughts together; it isolates the pure moment of *doing* and declares of the in-itself of faith that it is *only* a *product* of consciousness. But the isolated doing opposed to the in-itself is a contingent doing and, as representational, a creating of fictions—representations that are not *in themselves*; and this is how enlightenment regards the content of faith.—But, conversely, pure insight

equally says the contrary. In affirming the moment of *otherness* which the concept has within it, it pronounces faith's essence to be something which *in no way concerns* consciousness, lies *beyond* it, is alien to it and unrecognized. The case is similar with faith, as on the one hand it puts its trust in the essence and has the *certainty of itself* in it, while on the other hand the essence is inscrutable in all its ways and unattainable in its Being.¹

¶567. Further, when enlightenment regards the object of its veneration as stone and wood, or as some other finite anthropomorphic determinacy, it asserts against the faithful consciousness a right which the latter itself concedes. For since the faithful consciousness is this divided consciousness, having a *beyond* of *actuality* and a pure *hither side* of this *beyond*, there is in fact *also* present in it this view of the sensory thing according to which it is *valid in* and *for itself*; but faith does not bring together these two thoughts of *what-is-in-and-for-itself*, which is for it at one time the *pure essence* and at another time a common *sensory thing*.—Even its pure consciousness is affected by the latter view; for the differences of its supersensory realm, because this lacks the concept, are a series of independent *shapes* and their movement is a *happening*, i.e. they are only in *representation* and have within them the mode of sensory Being.—Enlightenment, on its side, likewise isolates *actuality* as an essence forsaken by spirit, isolates determinacy as an undisturbed finitude, as if it were not even a *moment* in the spiritual movement of the essence itself, not nothing, but also not a something that *is in* and *for itself*, but something vanishing.¹

¶568. It is clear that the same is the case with the *ground of knowledge*. The faithful consciousness itself recognizes a contingent *knowledge*; for it has a relationship to contingencies, and the absolute essence itself is for faith in the form of a represented common actuality; the faithful consciousness is thereby *also* a certainty which does not have the truth within itself, and it confesses to being such an unessential consciousness, on the hither side of the self-certifying and self-verifying spirit. But it forgets this moment in its immediate spiritual knowledge of the absolute essence.—Enlightenment, however, which reminds it of this, in turn thinks *only* of contingent knowledge and forgets the other,—thinks only of the mediation which happens through an alien *third* term, not of the mediation in which the immediate is itself the third term through which it mediates itself with the other, viz. with *its own self*.¹

¶569. Finally, enlightenment in its view of the *doing* of faith finds the rejection of enjoyment and belongings wrong and purposeless.—As to the wrongness, enlightenment secures the agreement of the faithful consciousness in faith's own recognition of this actuality of possessing, holding on to, and enjoying property; in the affirmation of property its behaviour is all the more isolated and stubborn, and in its enjoyment it is all the more crudely abandoned, since its religious *doing—giving up* possession and enjoyment—falls beyond this actuality and purchases its freedom for that side of actuality. This service of sacrificing natural activities and enjoyment in fact has, owing to this opposition, no truth; retention occurs *alongside* sacrifice; the latter is merely a *sign*, which performs actual sacrifice in only a small portion, and it therefore in fact only *represents* sacrifice.¹

¶570. As regards *purposiveness*, enlightenment finds it inept to throw away *one* possession in order to know and to prove that one is liberated from *all* possessions, to deny oneself *one* enjoyment in order to know and to prove that one is liberated from

all enjoyment. The faithful consciousness itself conceives the absolute doing as a *universal* doing; for faith, not only is the action of its absolute essence as its object a universal action, but the singular consciousness, also, is supposed to prove that it is entirely and universally liberated from its sensory essence. But throwing away a *single* possession, or renouncing a *single* enjoyment, is not this *universal* action; and since in the action the *purpose*, which is a universal purpose, and the *performance*, which is a single performance, would have to stand before consciousness in their essential incompatibility, the action proves to be an action in which consciousness has no part, and this action thereby proves to be really too *naive* to be an action at all; it is too naive to fast, in order to prove that one is liberated from the pleasure of the repast,—too naive to remove another pleasure *from the body*, as Origen did, in order to show that it is done with. The action itself proves to be an *external* and *single* doing; but desire is rooted *inwardly* and is a *universal*; its pleasure disappears neither with the instrument nor by singular abstention.¹

¶571. But enlightenment on its side here isolates the *internal*, the *unactual*, in contrast to actuality, just as it held fast to the externality of thinghood in contrast to the inwardness of faith in its intuition and devotion. It places the essential in the *intention*, in the *thought*, and thereby spares itself the actual accomplishment of liberation from natural purposes; on the contrary, this inwardness is itself the formal element which has its filling in the natural impulses, which are justified simply by the fact that they are internal, that they belong to *universal* Being, to nature.¹

¶572. Enlightenment, then, has an irresistible power over faith because the moments which enlightenment champions are found in faith's own consciousness. Examining the effect of this force more closely, its behaviour towards faith seems to dismember the *beautiful* unity of trust and immediate *certainty*, to pollute its *spiritual* consciousness with base thoughts of *sensory* actuality, to destroy the heart which is *calmed* and *secure* in its submission, through the *vanity* of the understanding and of a will and accomplishment of its own. But in fact, enlightenment rather introduces the sublation of the *thoughtless*, or rather *non-conceptual*, *separation* that is present in faith. The faithful consciousness weighs and measures by a twofold standard, it has two sorts of eyes, two sorts of ears, two sorts of tongue and language, has duplicated all representations without comparing the twofold senses. Or faith lives in two sorts of perception, one the perception of the *slumbering* consciousness, living purely in non-conceptual thoughts, the other the perception of the waking consciousness which lives purely in sensory actuality, and in each of them it manages a particular housekeeping.—The enlightenment illuminates that heavenly world with representations belonging to the sensory world, and points out this finitude which faith cannot deny, because it is self-consciousness and hence is the unity to which both modes of representation belong and in which they do not fall apart; for they belong to the same inseparable *simple* Self into which faith has passed.¹

¶573. As a result, faith has lost the content which filled its element, and sinks down into a listless weaving of the spirit within itself. It has been expelled from its realm, or this realm has been ransacked, since the waking consciousness has usurped all the differentiation and expansion of it and has vindicated earth's ownership of every portion of it and given them back to the earth. Yet faith is not on that account satisfied, for this illumination has everywhere brought to light only singular essence,

so that what speaks to spirit is actuality devoid of essence, and finitude forsaken by spirit.—Since faith is without any content and it cannot remain in this void, or since, in going beyond the finite which is the sole content, it finds only the void, it is a *sheer yearning*, its truth an empty beyond, for which a fitting content can no longer be found, for everything is otherwise engaged.—Faith has, in fact, thereby become the same as enlightenment, viz. the consciousness of the relation of what is in itself finite to the absolute without predicates, an absolute uncognized and uncognizable; except that the latter is *satisfied* enlightenment, while faith is *unsatisfied* enlightenment. However, enlightenment itself will show whether it can remain in its satisfaction; that yearning of the troubled spirit which mourns over the loss of its spiritual world lurks in the background. Enlightenment itself bears within it this blemish of unsatisfied yearning,—as *pure object* in its *empty* absolute essence,—as *doing* and *movement* in *going beyond* its singular-essence to the unfilled beyond,—as a *filled object* in the *selflessness* of the useful. Enlightenment will sublimate this blemish; from a closer examination of the positive result, which to it is the truth, it will emerge that in that result the blemish is in itself already sublated.¹

b. The truth of enlightenment

¶574. Spirit's listless weaving, no longer differentiating anything within itself, has thus entered into its own self beyond consciousness, while consciousness, on the other hand, has become clear to itself. The first moment of this clarity is determined in its necessity and its condition by the fact that pure insight, or insight that is *in itself* concept, actualizes itself; it does so when it posits otherness or determinacy within itself. In this way it is negative pure insight, i.e. negation of the concept; this negation is equally pure; and thus there has come about the *pure thing*, the absolute essence, that has no further determination whatever. Determined more precisely, pure insight, as absolute concept, is a differentiation of differences which are no longer differences, of abstractions or pure concepts which are no longer self-supporting, but have support and differentiation only through the *movement as a whole*. This differentiation of the non-differentiated consists simply in the fact that the absolute concept makes itself into its *object* and posits itself as the *essence* over against that *movement*. Because of this, the essence lacks the side in which abstractions or differences are *held apart from each other*, and therefore becomes *pure thinking as pure thing*.—This, then, is just that listless, unconscious weaving of spirit within itself to which faith sank down when it lost the differentiated content;—it is at the same time that *movement* of pure self-consciousness for which the essence is supposed to be the absolutely alien beyond. For because this pure self-consciousness is the movement in pure concepts, in differences that are not differences, it in fact collapses into unconscious weaving, i.e. into pure *feeling* or pure *thinghood*.—The self-alienated concept—for the concept here still stands at the stage of this alienation—does not, however, recognize this *like essence* of the two sides, of the movement of self-consciousness and of its absolute essence, does not recognize their *like essence* which is, in fact, their substance and subsistence. Since the concept does not recognize this unity, the essence counts for it only in the form of the objective beyond, while the differentiating consciousness, which in this way has the in-itself outside it, counts as a finite consciousness.¹

¶575. In regard to that absolute essence, enlightenment gets caught up in the same conflict with itself that it formerly had with faith, and it divides into two parties. A party proves itself to be the *victor* by splitting into two parties; for in so doing, it shows that it possesses within itself the principle that it combated, and thus has sublated the one-sidedness in which it previously entered the scene. The interest which was divided between itself and the other party now falls entirely within itself and forgets the other party, because that interest finds within itself the opposition that occupies it. At the same time, however, the opposition has been raised into the higher victorious element in which it presents itself purified. So that therefore the schism that arises in a party, which seems to be a misfortune, demonstrates rather that party's good fortune.¹

¶576. The pure essence itself has no difference in it; therefore the way in which difference comes into it is that there emerge two such pure essences for consciousness, or a twofold consciousness of the essence.—The pure absolute essence is only in pure thinking, or rather it is pure thinking itself, therefore utterly *beyond* the finite, beyond *self-consciousness*, and is only the negative essence. But in this way it is just *Being*, the negative of self-consciousness. As the *negative* of self-consciousness it is *also* related to it; it is the *outer Being* which, related to self-consciousness within which the differences and determinations fall, acquires within it the differences of being tasted, seen, etc.; and the relationship is *sensory* certainty and perception.¹

¶577. If we start from this *sensory* Being into which that negative beyond necessarily passes, but abstract from these determinate modes of the relation of consciousness, then what remains is pure *matter* as the listless weaving and moving within itself. In this connection, it is essential to consider that *pure matter* is merely what is left *over* when we *abstract* from seeing, feeling, tasting, etc., i.e. it is not what is seen, felt, tasted, etc.; what is seen, felt, tasted, is not *matter*, but colour, a stone, a salt, etc.; matter is rather the *pure abstraction*, and so what is present is the *pure essence of thinking*, or pure thinking itself as the intrinsically undifferentiated, undetermined, predicateless absolute.¹

¶578. One of the enlightenments calls the absolute essence that predicateless absolute which lies beyond actual consciousness in the thinking from which we started out; the other enlightenment calls it *matter*. If these were to be distinguished as *nature* and spirit or God, then the unconscious weaving within itself would lack the wealth of unfolded life for it to be nature, and spirit or God would lack self-differentiating consciousness. The two, as we saw, are simply the same concept; the difference lies not in the Thing, but simply and solely in the diverse starting-points of the two formations, and in the fact that each stops short at a point of its own in the movement of thinking. If they were to disregard their starting- and stopping-points they would coincide and would recognize that what to the one is, so it pretends, an abomination, and what to the other is a folly, are the same thing. For to the one, the absolute essence is in its pure thinking, or is immediately for pure consciousness, is outside finite consciousness, the *negative* beyond of it. If it were to reflect, first, that that simple immediacy of thinking is nothing other than *pure Being*, and secondly, that what is *negative* for consciousness is at the same time related to it, that in the negative judgement the 'is' (copula) holds together the two separated terms,—then the relation of this beyond to consciousness would reveal itself in the determination

of an *external being*, and herewith as the same thing as what is called *pure matter*; the missing moment of *presence* would be gained.—The other enlightenment sets out from sensory Being, then *abstracts* from the sensory relation of tasting, seeing, etc., and makes that Being into a pure *in-itself*, into *absolute matter*, into what is neither felt nor tasted; this Being has in this way become the predicateless simple, the essence of *pure consciousness*; it is the *pure concept* as being *in itself*, or *pure thinking within itself*. This insight does not in its consciousness take the opposite step from the *being*, which is *purely* a being, to what is thought, which is the same as the *pure being*, or it does not take the step from the purely positive to the purely negative; when, after all, the positive is *pure* solely through negation, while the *pure negative*, as pure, is within its own self like itself and just for that reason positive.—Or neither of them has arrived at the concept of Descartes's metaphysics, that *Being* and *thinking* are, *in themselves*, the same, at the thought that *Being*, *pure Being*, is not something *concrete* and *actual*, but *pure abstraction*, and conversely, pure thinking, likeness-to-itself or the essence, is partly the *negative* of self-consciousness and therefore *Being*, partly, as immediate simplicity, is likewise nothing other than *Being*; *thinking is thinghood*, or *thinghood is thinking*.¹

¶579. Here the essence has *division* in it only in such a way that it pertains to two different ways of considering it; on the one hand, the essence must have difference within itself; on the other, just in this respect, the two ways of considering it merge together into one; for the abstract moments of pure Being and the negative, by which they are differentiated, are then united in the object of these modes of consideration.—The universal common to both is the abstraction of pure vibration within itself, or of pure self-thinking. This simple movement, revolving on an axis, must burst asunder because it is itself only movement when it differentiates its moments. This differentiation of the moments leaves behind the unmoved as the empty husk of pure *Being*, which is no longer any actual thinking, no longer any life within itself; for this differentiation is, as difference, all the content. This differentiation, however, which posits itself *outside* that *unity*, is herewith an alternation of the moments which *does not return into itself*, an alternation of *Being-in-itself* and of *Being-for-an-other* and of *Being-for-itself*;—actuality, as it is object for the actual consciousness of pure insight,—*utility*.¹

¶580. Bad as utility may look to faith or sentimentality, or even to the abstraction calling itself speculation, which clings to the *in-itself*, yet it is in utility that pure insight achieves its realization and has itself for its *object*, an object which it now no longer repudiates and which, too, does not have for it the value of the void or of the pure beyond. For pure insight is, as we saw, the concept itself in being, or the pure personality equal to itself, differentiating itself within itself in such a way that each of the differentiated items is itself pure concept, i.e. is immediately not differentiated; pure insight is simple, pure self-consciousness which is *for itself* as well as *in itself* in an immediate unity. Its *Being-in-itself* is therefore not enduring *Being*, but immediately ceases to be anything in its difference; such a Being, however, that immediately has no support, is not *in itself*, but essentially *for an other*, which is the power that absorbs it. But this second moment, opposed to the first, to the *Being-in-itself*, vanishes just as immediately as the first; or as *Being only for other*, it is rather the *vanishing* itself, and there is *posited* the *having-returned* into itself, the *Being-for-itself*.

This simple Being-for-itself, however, as likeness-to-itself, is rather a *Being*, or thereby *for an other*.—This nature of pure insight in the *unfolding of its moments*, or pure insight as *object*, is expressed in the useful. What is useful, is something subsisting *in itself* or a thing, this Being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment; hence it is absolutely *for an other*, but is only for an other inasmuch as it is in itself; these opposed moments have returned into the inseparable unity of Being-for-itself. But while the useful does express the concept of pure insight, it is not pure insight as such but insight as *representation* or as its *object*; it is only the restless alternation of those moments, one of which is indeed the having-returned into itself, but only as *Being-for-itself*, i.e. as an abstract moment stepping aside in the face of the other moments. The useful itself is not the negative essence, having in itself these moments, in their opposition, at the same time *unseparated* in *one* and *the same regard* or having them as a *thinking*, such as they are as pure insight; the moment of *Being-for-itself* is certainly in the useful, but not in such a way that it *overarches* the other moments, the in-itself and *Being for other*, in which case it would be the *Self*. In the useful, therefore, pure insight has its own concept in its *pure* moments for *object*; it is the consciousness of this *metaphysics*, but not as yet the comprehension of it; consciousness has not yet reached the unity of *Being* and the *concept* itself. Since the useful still has the form of an object for pure insight, pure insight does have a *world*, no longer of course a world that is in and for itself, but still a world all the same, which it differentiates from itself. Yet since the oppositions have mounted to the summit of the concept, the next stage will be their collapse and enlightenment's experiencing the fruits of its deeds.¹

¶581. Looking at the object attained in relation to this whole sphere, we see that the actual world of culture concentrated itself in the *vanity* of self-consciousness,—in the *Being-for-itself* which still has the confusion of the world of culture as its content and is still the *singular* concept, not yet the concept that is for itself *universal*. But returned into itself, that concept is *pure insight*,—pure consciousness as the pure *Self* or negativity, just as faith is pure consciousness as *pure thinking* or positivity. In that *Self*, faith has the moment that makes it complete;—but it goes to ruin through this completion, and it is now in pure insight that we see the two moments, as the absolute essence which is purely in *thought* or the negative, and as *matter*, which is the positive *being*.—This completeness still lacks that *actuality* of self-consciousness which belongs to the *vain* consciousness,—the world out of which thinking raised itself to itself. What it lacks is attained in utility insofar as pure insight obtained positive objectivity in it; pure insight is thereby an actual consciousness satisfied within itself. This objectivity now constitutes its *world*; it has become the truth of the entire preceding world, of the ideal, as well as of the real, world. The first world of spirit is the expansive realm of its self-dispersing Being-there and of the singularized *certainty* of itself; just as nature disperses its life into infinitely various shapes, in the absence of the *genus* of those shapes. The second world of spirit contains the *genus* and is the realm of *Being-in-itself* or of the *truth* in opposition to that certainty. But the third realm, the *useful*, is the *truth* which is equally the *certainty* of itself. The realm of the truth of *faith* lacks the principle of *actuality*, or certainty of oneself as this *singleton*. But the actuality or the certainty of oneself as this singleton lacks the in-itself. In the object of pure insight both worlds are united. The useful is the object,

insofar as self-consciousness sees right through it and has in it the *singular certainty* of itself, its enjoyment (its *Being-for-itself*); in this way self-consciousness *sees into* the object, and this insight contains the *true* essence of the object (which is to be something that is seen through or to be *for an other*); this insight is thus itself *true knowing*, and self-consciousness has just as immediately the universal certainty of itself, its *pure consciousness*, in this relationship, in which *truth* as well as presence and *actuality* are thus united. The two worlds are reconciled and heaven is transplanted to the earth below.¹

III. ABSOLUTE FREEDOM AND TERROR

¶582. Consciousness has found its concept in utility. But the concept is first still an *object*, and secondly, for that very reason, still a *purpose*, of which consciousness does not yet find itself in immediate possession. Utility is still a predicate of the object, not itself a subject or the immediate and sole *actuality* of the object. It is the same thing that appeared before, that is, that *Being-for-itself* has not yet proved to be the substance of the remaining moments, whereby the useful would immediately be nothing other than the Self of consciousness and the latter would thereby be in possession of it.—This withdrawal of the form of objectivity of the useful has, however, already happened *in itself*, and from this inner revolution there emerges the actual revolution of actuality, the new shape of consciousness, *absolute freedom*.¹

¶583. That is to say, there is in fact present no more than an empty semblance of objectivity, separating self-consciousness from possession. For, on the one hand, all subsistence and validity of the determinate members of the organization of the actual world and the world of faith have, in general, returned into this simple determination as into their ground and spirit; but on the other hand, this simple determination no longer has anything of its own for itself, it is rather pure metaphysics, pure concept or knowledge of self-consciousness. That is to say, of the *Being-in-and-for-itself* of the useful as object, consciousness recognizes that its *Being-in-itself* is essentially *Being for another*; *Being-in-itself*, as the *selfless*, is in truth the passive Self, or that which is a Self for another Self. The object, however, is for consciousness in this abstract form of *pure Being-in-itself*, for consciousness is a pure *act of insightfulness* whose differences are in the pure form of concepts.—But the *Being-for-itself* into which Being for an other returns, the Self, is not a Self distinct from the I, the very own Self of what is called object; for consciousness, as pure insight, is not a *singular* Self confronted by the object as equally a Self of *its own*, but it is the pure concept, the gazing of the Self into the Self, the absolute seeing of *itself* doubled; the certainty of itself is the universal subject, and its knowing concept is the essence of all actuality. If, then, the useful was merely the alternation of the moments, an alternation which did not return into its own *unity*, and hence was still an object for knowing, it ceases to be this; for the knowing is itself the movement of those abstract moments, it is the universal Self, the Self of itself as well as of the object and, as universal, it is the unity, returning into itself, of this movement.¹

¶584. With this, spirit is at hand as *absolute freedom*; spirit is the self-consciousness which grasps the fact that its certainty of itself is the essence of all the spiritual masses, of the real as well as of the supersensory world, or conversely, that essence and actuality are consciousness's knowledge of *itself*.—It is conscious of its pure

personality and therein of all spiritual reality, and all reality is solely the spiritual; the world is for it simply its own will, and this is universal will. And what is more, this will is not the empty thought of the will that is posited in silent consent or consent through a representative, but a really universal will, the will of all *singletons* as such. For the will is in itself the consciousness of personality, or of each one, and it is as this genuine actual will that it ought to be, as the *self-conscious* essence of each and every personality, so that each, undivided from the whole, always does everything, and what enters the scene as doing of the whole is the immediate and conscious doing of *each* one.¹

¶585. This undivided substance of absolute freedom ascends the throne of the world without any power being able to offer resistance to it. For since, in truth, consciousness alone is the element in which the spiritual essences or powers have their substance, their entire system, which organized and maintained itself by division into masses, has collapsed, now that the singular consciousness conceives the object as having no other essence than self-consciousness itself, or as being absolutely the concept. What made the concept into an *object* in being, was its differentiation into separate *subsistent* masses; but when the object becomes a concept, there is no longer anything subsisting in it; negativity has permeated all its moments. It comes into existence in such a way that each singular consciousness raises itself out of its allotted sphere, no longer finds its essence and its work in this particular mass, but grasps its Self as the *concept* of will, grasps all masses as the essence of this will, and therefore can also only actualize itself in a labour which is a total labour. In this absolute freedom, therefore, all estates, which are the spiritual essences into which the whole articulates itself, are abolished; the singular consciousness that belonged to such a member, and willed and accomplished in it, has sublated its limitation; its purpose is the universal purpose, its language universal law, its work the universal work.¹

¶586. The object and the *difference* have here lost the significance of *utility*, which was the predicate of all real Being; consciousness does not begin its movement in the object as if this were *something alien* from which it first returned into itself, but on the contrary, the object is for it consciousness itself; the opposition consists, therefore, solely in the difference between the *singular* and the *universal* consciousness; but the singular consciousness itself is immediately in its own eyes that which had only the *semblance* of opposition, it is universal consciousness and will. The *beyond* of this actuality of consciousness hovers over the corpse of the vanished independence of real Being, or the Being of faith, merely as the exhalation of a stale gas, of the vacuous *être suprême*.¹

¶587. After the sublation of the different spiritual masses and of the restricted life of the individuals, as well as of this life's two worlds, all that is present, then, is the movement of universal self-consciousness within itself as an interaction between self-consciousness in the form of *universality* and in the form of *personal* consciousness; the universal will goes *into itself* and is *singular* will, confronted by the universal law and work. But this *singular* consciousness is no less immediately conscious of itself as universal will; it is conscious that its object is a law given by that will and a work accomplished by it; therefore, in passing over into action and in creating objectivity, it is effecting nothing singular, but only laws and State-actions.

¶588. This movement is thus the interaction of consciousness with itself in which it lets nothing break loose in the shape of a *free object* confronting it. It follows from this that it cannot arrive at any positive work, neither universal works of language nor of actuality, neither at laws and universal arrangements of *conscious* freedom, nor at deeds and works of *willing* freedom.—The work to which the freedom acquiring *consciousness* could devote itself, would consist in that freedom, as *universal* substance, making itself into an *object* and *enduring Being*. This otherness would be the *difference* in freedom whereby it divided itself into subsisting spiritual masses and into members of various powers; such that these masses would, on the one hand, be the *thought-things* of a power divided into legislative, judicial, and executive power, but on the other hand the *real essences* that emerged in the real world of culture, and, when the content of the universal doing was given closer attention, they would be the particular masses of labour, which are further differentiated as more specific *estates*.—The universal freedom, which would have separated itself in this way into its members and by the very fact of doing so would have made itself into a substance *in being*, would thereby be free from singular individuality, and would divide the *multitude* of *individuals* among its various members. But the doing and Being of the personality would thereby find itself restricted to a branch of the whole, to one kind of doing and Being; posited in the element of *Being*, personality would receive the significance of a *determinate* personality; it would cease to be in truth universal self-consciousness. Neither by the *representation* of obedience under *self-given* laws which would assign it a share, nor by its *representation-by-proxy* in law-giving and universal doing, does self-consciousness let itself be cheated out of *actuality*,—the actuality of *itself* making the law and accomplishing, not a singular work, but the universal *itself*; for where the Self is merely *represented-by-proxy* and is *represented*, there it is not *actual*; where it is *deputized for*, it is not.¹

¶589. Just as the singular self-consciousness does not find itself in this *universal work* of absolute freedom as substance that is-there, no more does it find itself in the real *deeds* and *individual* actions of the will of this freedom. For the universal to arrive at a deed it must concentrate itself into the One of individuality and put at the head a singular self-consciousness; for the universal will is only an *actual* will in a Self that is One. But *all other singletons* are thereby excluded from the *entirety* of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be a deed of the *actual universal* self-consciousness.—Universal freedom, therefore, can produce no positive work or deed; there remains for it only *negative doing*; it is merely the *fury* of evanescence.¹

¶590. But the supreme actuality and the actuality most opposed to universal freedom, or rather the sole object that that freedom still has, is the freedom and singularity of actual self-consciousness itself. For that universality which cannot bring itself to advance to the reality of organic articulation, and whose purpose is to maintain itself in unbroken continuity, at the same time differentiates itself within itself, because it is movement or consciousness in general. And, indeed, by virtue of its own abstraction, it separates into extremes equally abstract, into the simple, inflexible, cold universality, and the discrete, absolute, hard rigidity and self-willed punctuality of actual self-consciousness. Now that it has completed the destruction of the real organization, and now subsists for itself, this is its sole object—an object that

no longer has any other content, possession, Being-there, or external expansion, but is merely this knowledge of itself as an absolutely pure and free singular Self. The only handle for getting a grip on it is its *abstract* Being-there in general.—The relationship, then, of these two, since they are indivisibly absolute for themselves, and thus cannot admit any part as a middle term, whereby they would be linked together, is wholly *unmediated* pure negation, the negation, moreover, of the singleton as a *being* in the universal. The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore *death*, a death moreover which has no inner range and filling; for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free Self; it is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or a mouthful of water.¹

¶591. In the banality of this syllable consists the wisdom of the government, the understanding of the universal will of the way to accomplish itself. The government is itself nothing other than the self-establishing focal point or the individuality of the universal will. The government, a willing and accomplishing, that proceeds from a point, at the same time wills and accomplishes a determinate order and action. With this, on the one hand it excludes the other individuals from its deed, and on the other hand, it thereby constitutes itself as a government that is a determinate will, and so stands opposed to the universal will; consequently, it is downright impossible for it to present itself as anything other than a *faction*. What is called government is merely the *victorious* faction, and in the very fact of its being a faction lies immediately the necessity of its downfall; and its being the government makes it, conversely, into a faction and guilty. If the universal will insists on the government's actual actions as the crime that it has committed against it, the government, in return, has nothing determinate and tangible by which the guilt of the will opposed to it could be exposed; for what stands opposed to it, as to the *actual* universal will, is only unactual pure will, *intention*. *Falling-under-suspicion*, therefore, takes the place, or has the significance and effect, of *being guilty*; and the external reaction against this actuality that lies in the simple interior of intention, consists in the dry extermination of this Self in being, from which nothing else can be taken away except only its very Being.¹

¶592. In this *work* peculiar to it, absolute freedom becomes its own object, and self-consciousness experiences what absolute freedom *is*. *In itself*, it is just this *abstract self-consciousness*, which effaces all difference and all subsistence of difference within itself. It is as such that it is an object to itself; the *terror* of death is the intuition of this negative essence of freedom. But absolutely free self-consciousness finds this reality of itself quite different from what its concept of itself was, viz. that the universal will would be merely the *positive* essence of personality, and that personality would know itself in it only positively or as preserved. Here, however, this self-consciousness which, as pure insight, simply separates its positive and its negative essence—the predicateless absolute as pure *thinking* and the predicateless absolute as pure *matter*—finds itself confronted with the absolute *transition* of the one into the other in its actuality.—The universal will, as absolutely *positive*, actual self-consciousness, because it is this self-conscious actuality *elevated* to pure *thinking* or to *abstract matter*, changes round into the *negative* essence and proves to be equally the *sublation* of *thinking-of-oneself*, or of self-consciousness.¹

¶593. Absolute freedom, as *pure equality-with-itself* of the universal will, thus has within it *negation*, but thereby *difference* in general, and it develops this again as

actual difference. For pure *negativity* has in the self-equal universal will the *element* of subsistence, or the *substance* in which its moments realize themselves; it has the matter which it can convert into its own determinacy; and insofar as this substance has shown itself to be the negative for the singular consciousness, the organization of spiritual masses, to which the multitude of individual consciousnesses are assigned, thus cultivates itself again. These consciousnesses, which have felt the fear of death, of their absolute master, again submit to negation and differences, arrange themselves among the masses, and turn back to an apportioned and limited work, but thereby back to their substantial actuality.¹

§594. Out of this tumult, spirit would be thrown back to its starting-point, to the ethical and real world of culture, which would have been merely refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the master which has again entered men's hearts. Spirit would have to traverse anew and continually repeat this cycle of necessity if the result were only the complete interpenetration of self-consciousness and substance—an interpenetration in which self-consciousness, which has experienced the negative force of its universal essence against it, would want to know and find itself, not as this particular, but only as a universal, and therefore could also endure the objective actuality of universal spirit, an actuality excluding self-consciousness as a particular.—But in absolute freedom there was no reciprocal action between a consciousness that is immersed in manifold Being-there or that sets itself determinate purposes and thoughts, and a valid *outer* world, whether of actuality or of thinking, but between a world purely and simply in the form of consciousness, as universal will, and likewise a self-consciousness drawn together out of all expansive Being-there or manifold purpose and judgement, and into the simple Self. The culture which self-consciousness achieves in interaction with that essence is, therefore, the grandest and the last, is that of seeing its pure, simple actuality immediately vanish and pass away into empty nothingness. In the world of culture itself self-consciousness does not get as far as intuiting its negation or alienation in this form of pure abstraction; on the contrary, its negation is the filled negation, either honour or wealth, which it gains in place of the Self that it has alienated from itself;—or the language of spirit and of insight which the dismembered consciousness acquires; or its negation is the heaven of faith, or the utility of the enlightenment. All these determinations have been shed in the loss experienced by the Self in absolute freedom; its negation is the meaningless death, the pure terror of the negative that contains nothing positive, nothing that fills it.—At the same time, however, this negation in its actuality is not something *alien*; it is neither the universal *necessity* lying beyond, in which the ethical world perishes, nor the singular contingency of private possession or of the whim of the possessor on which the dismembered consciousness sees itself dependent,—on the contrary, it is the *universal will*, which in this its ultimate abstraction has nothing positive and therefore can give nothing in return for the sacrifice;—but for that very reason the will is unmediatedly one with self-consciousness, or it is the purely positive, because it is the purely negative; and the meaningless death, the unfilled negativity of the Self, veers round in the inner concept into absolute positivity. For consciousness, the immediate unity of itself with the universal will, its demand to know itself as this determinate point in the universal will, is transformed into the utterly opposite experience. What vanishes for it in that experience is the abstract *Being* or the immediacy of the insubstantial point, and this

vanished immediacy is the universal will itself, which it now knows itself to be, insofar as it is *sublated immediacy*, insofar as it is pure knowing or pure will. It thereby knows that will as itself, and knows itself as essence, but not as the essence *immediately in being*; it does not know the will as the revolutionary government or as anarchy striving to constitute anarchy, nor itself as the centre of this faction or of the opposing faction, but on the contrary, the *universal will* is its *pure knowing and willing* and *consciousness* is the universal will, as this pure knowing and willing. It does not lose *itself* in that will, for the pure knowing and willing is much more itself than is the atomic point of consciousness. It is thus the interaction of pure knowing with itself; pure *knowing* as *essence* is the universal will; but this *essence* is purely and simply only pure knowing. Self-consciousness is, therefore, the pure knowing of the essence as pure knowing. Further, as *singular Self*, it is only the form of the subject or of actual doing, a form that is known by it as *form*; similarly, *objective* actuality, *Being*, is for it simply selfless form, for that actuality would be the unknown; this knowing, however, knows knowing as the essence.¹

¶595. Absolute freedom has thus equalized the opposition of the universal will and the singular will with itself; the self-alienated spirit, driven to the extreme of its opposition, in which pure willing and what purely wills are still differentiated, reduces the opposition to a transparent form and finds itself therein.—Just as the realm of the actual world passes over into the realm of faith and insight, so does absolute freedom pass from its self-destroying actuality and over into another land of self-conscious spirit where, in this unactuality, freedom counts as the true; in the thought of this truth spirit refreshes itself, insofar as spirit *is* and remains *thought*, and knows this Being which is enclosed in self-consciousness as the complete and perfect essence. There has arisen the new shape, that of the *moral spirit*.¹

C. Spirit certain of itself. Morality

¶596. The ethical world showed the merely departed spirit in it, *the singular Self*, to be its destiny and its truth. This *person of right*, however, has its substance and fulfilment outside the ethical world. The movement of the world of culture and of faith sublates this abstraction of the person, and through the completed alienation, through the ultimate abstraction, substance becomes for the Self of spirit at first the *universal will*, and finally property of spirit's own. Here, then, knowledge seems at last to have become completely equal to its truth; for its truth is this very knowledge, and all opposition between the two sides has vanished, vanished not *for us* or *in itself*, but for self-consciousness itself. That is to say, self-consciousness has gained mastery over the opposition of consciousness itself. This consciousness rests on the opposition between the certainty of itself and the object; but now the object is for consciousness itself the certainty of itself, knowledge—just as the certainty of itself as such no longer has purposes of its own, is therefore no longer within determinacy, but is pure knowledge.¹

¶597. Thus for self-consciousness, its knowledge is the *substance* itself. For it, this substance is, in an indivisible unity, just as *immediate* as absolutely *mediated*. It is *immediate*—like the ethical consciousness, it knows its duty and does it itself, and belongs to this duty as to its own nature; but self-consciousness is not *character*, as

the ethical consciousness is, which on account of its immediacy is a determinate spirit, belongs to only one of the ethical essentialities, and has the side of *not knowing*.—The consciousness of this substance is *absolute mediation*, as are the self-cultivating consciousness and the faithful consciousness; for it is essentially the movement of the Self, consisting in sublating the abstraction of *immediate Being-there* and becoming a universal to itself;—yet neither through pure alienation and dismemberment of itself and of actuality,—nor by flight. Rather, it is *immediately present* to itself in its substance, for this substance is its knowledge, it is the intuited pure certainty of itself; and just *this immediacy*, which is its own actuality, is all actuality, for the immediate is *Being* itself and, as pure immediacy refined by absolute negativity, this immediacy is *Being* in general, or *all Being*.¹

¶598. The absolute essence is therefore not exhausted in the determination of being the simple *essence* of *thinking*, but it is all *actuality*, and this actuality is only as knowledge; what consciousness did not know would have no sense for consciousness and can be no power for it; into its knowing will all objectivity and all the world have withdrawn. It is absolutely free in that it knows its freedom, and just this knowledge of its freedom is its substance and purpose and sole content.¹

A. THE MORAL WORLD-VIEW

¶599. Self-consciousness knows duty as the absolute essence; it is bound only by duty, and this substance is its own pure consciousness; for it duty cannot acquire the form of something alien. However, enclosed within itself in this way, moral self-consciousness is not yet posited and considered as *consciousness*. The object is immediate knowledge and, permeated in this way purely by the Self, is not an object. But self-consciousness, essentially mediation and negativity, has in its concept the relation to an *otherness* and is consciousness. This otherness, because duty constitutes its sole essential purpose and object, is, on the one hand, an actuality completely *without significance* for consciousness. But because this consciousness is so completely enclosed within itself, it behaves with perfect freedom and indifference towards this otherness, and therefore *Being-there*, on the other hand, is a *Being-there* left completely free by self-consciousness, likewise related only to itself; the freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer also is the negative object of its consciousness. The object is thereby a world completed within itself to an individuality of its own, an independent whole of laws peculiar to itself, as well as an independent operation of those laws, and a free actualization of them—in general, a *nature* whose laws like its doing belong to itself, as an essence that is unconcerned about moral self-consciousness, just as the latter is unconcerned about it.¹

¶600. From this determination a *moral world-view* is cultivated, which consists in the *relation* between the *moral Being-in-and-for-itself* and the *natural Being-in-and-for-itself*. At the basis of this relation lies, on the one hand, the complete *indifference* and exclusive *independence of nature* and that of *moral purposes* and activity with respect to each other, and, on the other hand, the consciousness of the exclusive essentiality of duty and of the utter dependence and inessentiality of nature. The moral world-view contains the development of the moments which are present in this relation of such entirely conflicting presuppositions.¹

¶601. To begin with, then, the moral consciousness in general is presupposed; duty counts as the essence for this consciousness, a consciousness that is *actual* and *active*, and in its actuality and deed fulfils its duty. But at the same time the presupposed freedom of nature is for this consciousness, or it learns *by experience* that nature is not concerned with giving it the consciousness of the unity of its actuality with that of nature, and hence that nature *perhaps* lets it become *happy*, or *perhaps not*. The immoral consciousness, by contrast, finds, perhaps by chance, its actualization, where the moral consciousness sees only an *occasion* for acting, but does not see the happiness of performance and the enjoyment of achievement falling to its lot through this action. Therefore, it finds rather ground for complaint about such a state of discrepancy between itself and Being-there, and of the injustice which restricts it to having its object merely as *pure duty*, but refuses to let it see the object and *itself* actualized.¹

¶602. The moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness and leave this moment out of its absolute purpose. The purpose, which is expressed as *pure duty*, essentially involves that it contains this *singular* self-consciousness; *individual conviction* and the knowledge of it constituted an absolute moment of morality. This moment in the *purpose* that has become *objective*, in the *fulfilled* duty, is the *singular* consciousness intuiting itself as actualized, or *enjoyment*, which is thus involved in the concept of morality, not indeed immediately of morality regarded as *disposition*, but in the concept of its *actualization*. In virtue of this, however, enjoyment is also involved in morality as disposition; for this sets out not to remain disposition in contrast to action, but to *act* or to actualize itself. Thus the purpose, expressed as the whole with the consciousness of its moments, is that the fulfilled duty be a purely moral action as well as realized *individuality*, and that nature, as the side of *singularity* confronting the abstract purpose, be *one* with this purpose.—Necessary as the experience is of the disharmony of the two sides, because nature is free, even so, duty alone is what is essential, and nature by contrast with it is what is selfless. That whole *purpose*, which is constituted by the harmony, contains within it actuality itself. It is at the same time the *thought* of *actuality*. The harmony of morality and nature,—or, since nature comes into consideration only insofar as consciousness experiences its unity with it,—the harmony of morality and happiness, is *thought of as being* necessarily, or it is *postulated*. For *demanding* expresses that something that is not yet actual is thought of as *being*; a necessity not of the *concept* as concept, but of *Being*. But necessity is at the same time essentially a relation in virtue of the concept. The *Being* that is demanded, then, belongs not to the representation of contingent consciousness, but it lies in the concept of morality itself, whose true content is the *unity* of the *pure* and the *singular* consciousness; it pertains to the singular consciousness that this unity be *for it* as an actuality, which in the *content* of the purpose is happiness, but in the *form* of the purpose is Being-there in general.—This demanded Being-there, or the unity of both, is therefore not a wish or, regarded as purpose, not the sort of purpose whose attainment is still uncertain, but rather a demand of reason, or an immediate certainty and presupposition of reason.¹

¶603. This first experience and this postulate are not the only ones, but a whole circle of postulates opens up. Nature, that is to say, is not merely this wholly free *external* mode, in which, as a pure object, consciousness has to realize its purpose.

This consciousness is, *within its own self*, essentially a consciousness *for which* there is this other free actuality, i.e. consciousness is itself something contingent and natural. This nature, which is to consciousness its own nature, is *sensibility*, which in the *shape* of volition, as *impulses* and *inclinations*, has for itself a *determinate* essentiality of its own, or *singular purposes*, and so is opposed to the pure will and its pure purpose. However, in contrast to this opposition, it is, to pure consciousness, rather the relation of sensibility to it, its absolute unity with it, that is the essence. Both of these, pure thinking and the sensibility of consciousness, are *in themselves one consciousness*, and it is precisely pure thinking for which and in which this pure unity is; but as consciousness, what is for it is the opposition of itself and the impulses. In this conflict of reason and sensibility, for reason the essence is that the conflict resolve itself and that, as a *result*, the unity of the two emerge, not that *original* unity in which both are in one individual, but a unity that emerges from the *known* opposition of the two. Only such a unity is *actual* morality, for in it is contained the opposition whereby the Self is consciousness or is, only now, an actual Self, a Self in fact, and at the same time a universal; or in that unity there is expressed that *mediation* which, as we see, is essential to morality.—Since, of the two moments of the opposition, sensibility is sheer *otherness*, or the negative, while, on the other hand, the pure thinking of duty is the essence, nothing of which can be abandoned, it seems that the unity produced can only come about by the sublation of sensibility. But since sensibility is itself a moment of this becoming, the moment of *actuality*, we have to be content, initially, with expressing the unity by saying that sensibility is *in conformity* with morality.—This unity is likewise a *postulated Being*, it is not *there*; for what *is there* is consciousness, or the opposition of sensibility and pure consciousness. But at the same time, the unity is not an in-itself, like the first postulate, in which free nature constitutes one side of the unity, and in consequence the harmony of nature with the moral consciousness falls outside the unity; on the contrary, nature here is that nature which is within consciousness itself, and here we have to do with morality as such, with a harmony that is the very own harmony of the acting Self; consciousness has, therefore, itself to bring this harmony about, and to be making continuous progress in morality. But the *completion* of morality *has to be postponed to infinity*; for if it actually came about, then the moral consciousness would sublimate itself. For *morality* is only moral *consciousness* as the negative essence, and for the pure duty of this essence sensibility has only a *negative* significance, is merely *not in conformity*. But in the harmony, *morality as consciousness*, or morality's *actuality*, vanishes, just as in the moral *consciousness*, or in the actuality, its *harmony* vanishes. The completion, therefore, is not actually attainable, but is to be thought of only as an *absolute task*, i.e. as a task that simply remains a task. Yet at the same time its content has to be thought of as a content that simply must *be*, and not remain a task; whether we represent the consciousness to be altogether sublated in this goal, or not; which alternative we should really adopt in this case can no longer be clearly distinguished in the dim remoteness of infinity, to which for that very reason the attainment of the goal is to be postponed. Strictly speaking, we shall have to say that the determinate representation on this point ought not to be of interest and ought not to be sought, because this leads to contradictions,—of a task that ought to remain a task and yet be fulfilled,—of a morality that is supposed to be no longer consciousness, no longer

actual. But the consideration that perfected morality would contain a contradiction would impair the sanctity of the moral essentiality and make absolute duty appear as something unactual.¹

¶604. The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature, the final purpose of the *world*; the other, the harmony of morality and the sensory will, is the final purpose of *self-consciousness* as such; the first, then, is harmony in the form of *Being-in-itself*, the other, in the form of *Being-for-itself*. But what connects, as middle term, these two extreme final purposes that are thought, is the movement of *actual* action itself. They are harmonies whose moments, in their abstract differentiation, have not yet become objects; this happens in the actuality in which the sides emerge in consciousness proper, each as the *other* of the *other*. Whereas previously the postulates contained the harmonies only separated, as *being* respectively in itself and *for* itself, the postulates that have arisen in this way now contain harmonies *that are in and for themselves*.¹

¶605. The moral consciousness as the *simple knowing* and *willing* of pure *duty* is, in acting, related to the object opposed to its simplicity, related to the actuality of the *multifaceted case*, and thereby has a multifaceted moral *relationship*. Here there arise, regarding content, the *multiple* laws in general and, regarding form, the contradictory powers of the knowing consciousness and of the non-conscious.—In the first place, as regards the *multiple duties*, what is valid for the moral consciousness in general is only the *pure duty* in them; the *multiple duties* as multiple are *determinate* and therefore as such are nothing sacred for the moral consciousness. At the same time, however, since they are *necessary* in virtue of the concept of *acting*, which involves a multifaceted actuality and therefore a multifaceted moral relation, these multiple duties must be regarded as being in and for themselves. Further, since they can be only in a moral *consciousness*, they are at the same time in another consciousness than that for which only pure duty, as pure duty, is in and for itself and is sacred.¹

¶606. Thus it is postulated that there is *another* consciousness which sanctifies them, or which knows and wills them as duties. The first consciousness maintains pure duty, *indifferent* to all *determinate content*, and duty is only this indifference towards such content. But the other consciousness contains the equally essential relation to acting and the *necessity* of *determinate* content; since for it duties are valid as *determinate* duties, the content as such is thereby just as essential as the form which makes the content a duty. This consciousness is consequently a consciousness in which the universal and the particular are simply one, and so its concept is the same as the concept of the harmony of morality and happiness. For this opposition likewise expresses the separation of the moral consciousness *equal to itself* from the actuality which, as *manifold Being*, conflicts with the simple essence of duty. While, however, the first postulate expresses only the harmony of morality and nature, as a harmony that is *in being*, because in it nature is this negative of self-consciousness, the moment of *Being*, now however the *in-itself* is essentially posited as consciousness. For now that which is has the form of the *content of duty*, or is the *determinacy* in the *determinate* duty. The in-itself is thus the unity of terms that, as *simple essentialities*, are essentialities of thinking and are therefore only in a consciousness. So consciousness is henceforth a master and ruler of the world, who produces the harmony of

morality and happiness, and at the same time sanctifies duties as *multiple*. This sanctification means this much, that for the consciousness of *pure duty*, the determinate duty cannot be immediately sacred; but because a determinate duty, on account of the actual acting, which is a determinate acting, is likewise *necessary*, its necessity falls outside that consciousness into another consciousness, which is thus the consciousness mediating the determinate duty and pure duty, and is the reason why the determinate duty is valid as well.¹

¶607. In the actual action, however, consciousness behaves as this Self, as a completely singular consciousness; it is directed towards actuality as such, and has actuality for its purpose; for it wills to achieve something. *Duty in general* thus falls outside it into another essence, which is consciousness and the sacred lawgiver of pure duty. For the consciousness that acts, just because it is acting, the other of pure duty is immediately valid; pure duty is thus the content of another consciousness, and is sacred for the acting consciousness only mediately, viz. in the other consciousness.¹

¶608. Because it is in this way posited that the validity of duty, as what is sacred *in and for itself*, falls outside the actual consciousness, this latter accordingly stands altogether on one side as the *imperfect* moral consciousness. Just as, in regard to its *knowledge*, it knows itself then as a consciousness whose knowledge and conviction are imperfect and contingent; similarly, in regard to its *willing*, it knows itself as a consciousness whose purposes are affected with sensibility. On account of its unworthiness, therefore, it cannot regard happiness as necessary, but as something contingent, and can expect it only from grace.

¶609. But though its actuality is imperfect, all the same for its *pure* will and knowledge duty counts as the essence; in the concept, therefore, so far as the concept is opposed to reality, or in thinking, it is perfect. But the absolute essence is just this entity that is thought and postulated beyond actuality; the absolute essence is, therefore, the thought in which morally imperfect knowledge and willing count as perfect, and which thus, since it regards knowledge and willing as supremely important, also bestows happiness according to worthiness, viz. according to the *merit ascribed* to the imperfect moral consciousness.¹

¶610. In this, the moral world-view is completed; for in the concept of moral self-consciousness the two aspects, pure duty and actuality, are posited in a single unity, and consequently the one, like the other, is not posited as being in and for itself, but as a *moment*, or as sublated. This becomes explicit for consciousness in the last part of the moral world-view; that is to say, it posits pure duty in an essence other than itself, i.e. it posits pure duty partly as something *represented*, partly as something that is not what is valid in and for itself, but rather it is the non-moral that counts as perfect. Similarly, it posits itself as a consciousness whose actuality, which falls short of duty, is sublated and, as *sublated* or in the *representation* of the absolute essence, no longer contradicts morality.¹

¶611. For the moral consciousness itself, however, its moral world-view does not have the signification that consciousness develops its own concept in it and makes this its object; it has no consciousness of this opposition of form nor of the opposition in content either; it does not relate and compare the sides of this opposition with one another, but rolls onward in its development, without being the *concept* which holds the moments together. For it knows the *pure essence*, or the object, so far as it is *duty*,

so far as it is an *abstract* object of its pure consciousness, only as a pure knowing or as its own self. It therefore comports itself only as thinking, not as comprehending conceptually. Consequently, the object of its *actual* consciousness is not yet transparent to it; it is not the absolute concept, which alone grasps *otherness* as such, or its absolute contrary, as its own self. It does indeed hold its own actuality, like all objective actuality, to be the *inessential*; but its freedom is the freedom of pure thinking, in contrast to which, therefore, nature has likewise arisen as something that is equally free. Because both are in it in a like manner, the *freedom of Being*, and the inclusion of this Being within consciousness, its object becomes as an object *in being*, which *at the same time* is only *in thought*; in the last part of its world-view, the content is essentially posited in such a way that its *Being* is only a *represented* Being, and this conjunction of Being and thinking is pronounced to be what in fact it is, *representation*.¹

¶612. When we consider the moral world-view in such a way that this objective mode is nothing other than the very concept of moral self-consciousness, which it makes objective to itself, then through this consciousness concerning the form of the origin of the moral world-view, there emerges another shape of its exposition.—That is to say, the first thing from which we set out is the *actual* moral self-consciousness, or the fact that *there is such a moral self-consciousness*. For the concept posits it in the determination that all actuality in general has essence for it only so far as it is in conformity with duty, and it posits this essence as knowledge, i.e. in immediate unity with the actual Self; hence this unity is itself actual, it *is* a moral, actual consciousness.—Now this, as consciousness, represents its content to itself as an object, viz. as the *final purpose of the world*, as harmony of morality and all actuality. But since it represents this unity as *object*, and is not yet the concept which has power over the object as such, the unity is a negative of self-consciousness for it, or it falls outside it, as a beyond of its actuality, and yet at the same time as something that is *also in being*, albeit only in thought.¹

¶613. What is left over for this self-consciousness which, as self-consciousness, is something *other* than the object, is thus the non-harmony between consciousness-of-duty and actuality, including of course its own actuality. Accordingly, the proposition now runs as follows: *There is no morally perfect, actual* self-consciousness;—and since there is morality at all, only insofar as it is perfect, for duty is the *pure unadulterated in-itself*, and morality consists only in conformity to this purity,—the second proposition simply claims that there is *no moral actuality*.

¶614. But since, thirdly, it is one Self, it is *in itself* the unity of duty and actuality; this unity therefore becomes an object for it as perfect morality,—but as a *beyond* of its actuality,—yet a beyond that ought to be actual nevertheless.¹

¶615. In this goal of the synthetic unity of the first two propositions, the self-conscious actuality as well as duty is posited only as a sublated moment; for neither is singular, but each of the pair, whose essential determination includes *being free from the other*, is thus in the unity no longer free from the other, and so each of them is sublated, and with this, as regards content, they become object, such that *each of them passes for the other*, and as regards form they become such that this exchange between them is at the same time only *represented*.—Or what is *actually not* moral, because it is likewise pure thinking and is elevated above its actuality, is

in representation moral after all and is taken to be completely valid. In this way, the first proposition, that there *is* a moral self-consciousness, is reinstated, but bound up with the second, that there *is* none, viz. that there *is* one, but only in representation; or there really is none, yet, all the same, it is allowed by another consciousness to pass for one.¹

B. SHIFTING

¶616. In the moral world-view we see, on the one hand, consciousness *itself generating* its object *with consciousness*; we see that it neither finds the object before it as something alien, nor does the object come before it in an unconscious manner either, but consciousness proceeds everywhere in accordance with a ground on the basis of which it *posits the objective essence*; it thus knows this essence as its own self, for it knows itself as the *active* consciousness that generates it. Consciousness seems, therefore, to arrive here at its peace and satisfaction, for this can only be found where it no longer needs to go beyond its object, because the object no longer goes beyond it. On the other side, however, consciousness itself really posits the object *outside itself* as a beyond of itself. But this being-in-and-for-itself is equally posited as something that is not free from self-consciousness, but is for the sake of self-consciousness and by means of it.¹

¶617. The moral world-view is, therefore, in fact nothing other than the cultivation of this fundamental contradiction in its various aspects; it is, to employ here a Kantian expression where it is most appropriate, a *whole nest* of thoughtless contradictions.¹ The way in which consciousness proceeds in this development, is to establish one moment and to pass immediately from it to another, sublating the first; but now, as soon as it has *set up* this second moment, it also *shifts* it aside again, and makes the contrary the essence instead. At the same time, it is *also* conscious of its contradiction and *shifting*, for it passes from one moment, *immediately in relation to this very moment*, over to the opposite moment; *because* a moment has no reality for it, it posits that very same moment as *real*, or, what comes to the same thing, in order to affirm *one moment* as being in itself, it affirms the *opposite* as the one that-is-in-itself. In so doing it confesses that, in fact, it is in earnest with none of them. This is what must be considered more closely in the moments of this befuddling movement.²

¶618. Let us, to begin with, take for granted the presupposition that there is an actual moral consciousness, because the presupposition is made immediately and not in relation to something preceding, and let us turn to the harmony of morality and nature, the first postulate. The harmony is supposed to be *in itself*, not for actual consciousness, not present; on the contrary, the present is rather only the contradiction of the two. In the present, *morality* is assumed as *on hand* and actuality is so placed that it is not in harmony with it. The *actual* moral consciousness, however, is an *acting* consciousness; it is just in this that the actuality of its morality consists. But in the *acting* itself, this position is immediately shifted; for acting is nothing other than the actualization of the inner moral purpose, nothing other than the production of an *actuality determined by the purpose* or the production of the harmony of the moral purpose and actuality itself. At the same time, the accomplishment of the action is for consciousness, it is the *presence* of this unity of actuality and purpose; and

because, in the accomplished action, consciousness actualizes itself as this singular consciousness, or intuitively Being-there returned into it, and because enjoyment consists in this, there is also contained in the actuality of the moral purpose that form of actuality which is called enjoyment and happiness.—Action, therefore, in fact immediately fulfils what was proposed as not taking place, and was supposed to be only a postulate, only a beyond. Consciousness thus proclaims through its deed that it is not in earnest with postulating, because the sense of the action is really this, to make into presence what was not supposed to be in presence. And since the harmony is postulated for the sake of the action—that is to say, what is supposed to become *actual* through action, must be so *in itself*, otherwise actuality would not be *possible*,—the connection of action and postulate is so constituted that, for the sake of the action, i.e. for the sake of the *actual* harmony of purpose and actuality, this harmony is posited as *not actual*, as *beyond*.¹

¶619. So when *action* takes place, the *incongruity* between purpose and actuality is not taken seriously at all; *action* itself by contrast does seem to be taken seriously. In fact, however, the actual action is only an action of the *singular* consciousness, and so itself only something singular, and the work contingent. But the purpose of reason as the universal, all-embracing purpose, is nothing less than the whole world; a final purpose going far beyond the content of this singular action, and therefore to be placed altogether beyond all actual acting. Because the universal best ought to be carried out, nothing good is done. In fact, however, the *nullity* of actual acting, and the *reality* of the *whole* purpose alone, which are now proposed, these, too, are in every respect again shifted. The moral action is not something contingent and restricted, for it has as its essence pure *duty*; this constitutes the *sole entire* purpose; and thus the action, amid all other limitation of its content, is, as actualization of that purpose, the accomplishment of the entire absolute purpose. Or, again, if actuality is taken as nature, which has its *own* laws and stands opposed to pure duty, so that duty cannot realize its law within nature, then, since duty as such is the essence, what we are in fact *concerned with is not the accomplishment* of pure duty, which is the whole purpose; for the accomplishment would really have as its purpose, not pure duty, but its opposite, *actuality*. But there is again a shift from the position that it is not actuality with which we are concerned; for according to the concept of moral action, pure duty is essentially an *active* consciousness; thus there certainly ought to be action, absolute duty ought to be expressed in the whole of nature, and the moral law to become natural law.¹

¶620. If then we allow that this *highest good* is the essence, then consciousness is not in earnest with morality at all. For in this highest good, nature does not have a law other than that of morality. Hence moral action itself drops out, for action takes place only under the presupposition of a negative which is to be sublated by the action. But if nature is in conformity with the ethical law, then this law would in fact be violated by the action, by the sublation of what is in being.—In that assumption, there is admitted as the essential situation one in which moral action is superfluous, and does not take place at all. The postulate of the harmony of morality and actuality,—a harmony posited by the concept of moral action, a concept which involves bringing the two into agreement,—is expressed from this point of view, too, as follows: Because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is that moral action should not be present at all.¹

¶621. When we put together these moments, which consciousness traversed in its moral representation, it is clear that consciousness sublates each one again in its contrary. Consciousness starts from the fact that, *for it*, morality and actuality do not harmonize, but it is not in earnest about this, for in the action the presence of this harmony is *for it*. But it is not in earnest about this *acting* either, since the acting is something singular; for it has such a high purpose, *the highest good*. But this again is only a shifting of the Thing, for with this all action and all morality would fall away. Or consciousness is not really in earnest with *moral* action, but its heart's desire, the absolute, is that the highest good be accomplished, and that moral action be superfluous.¹

¶622. From this result consciousness must proceed still further in its contradictory movement, and of necessity again shift this *sublation* of moral action. Morality is the in-itself; if it is to have a place, the final purpose of the world cannot be fulfilled, but rather the moral consciousness must be *for itself* and find itself confronted by a *nature opposed* to it. But the moral consciousness must be perfected within its own self. This leads to the second postulate of the harmony of itself and the nature which is immediately in it, sensibility. Moral self-consciousness proposes its purpose as pure, as independent of inclinations and impulses, so that the purpose has eliminated within itself the purposes of sensibility.—But it again shifts this proposed sublation of the sensory essence. It acts, it brings its purpose into actuality, and the self-conscious sensibility, which is supposed to be eliminated, is precisely this middle term between pure consciousness and actuality,—it is the instrument of pure consciousness for its actualization, or the organ, and it is what is called impulse, inclination. Moral self-consciousness is not, therefore, in earnest with the sublation of inclinations and impulses, for it is just these that are the *self-actualizing self-consciousness*. But they ought not to be *suppressed* either, but only to be *in conformity* with reason. And they are in conformity with reason, for moral *action* is nothing else but consciousness actualizing itself, thus giving itself the shape of an *impulse*, i.e. it is immediately the present harmony of impulse and morality. But impulse is not in fact merely this empty shape which could have within it a spring other than the one it is, and be impelled by it. For sensibility is a nature which has within itself its own laws and motivating springs; consequently, morality cannot therefore be in earnest about being itself the mainspring impelling the impulses, the angle of inclination for inclinations. For since these have their own fixed determinacy and peculiar content, the consciousness to which they were to conform would be rather in conformity with them; a conformity which moral self-consciousness rejects. The harmony of the two is thus merely *in itself* and *postulated*.—In moral action the *present* harmony of morality and the sensibility was proposed, but *is now* shifted; the harmony is beyond consciousness in a nebulous remoteness where nothing can any longer be accurately distinguished or comprehended; for our attempt just now to comprehend this unity failed.—But in this in-itself consciousness surrenders itself altogether. This in-itself is its moral perfection, where the struggle of morality and sensibility has ceased, and the latter is in conformity with morality in a way that is beyond our grasp.—For that reason this perfection is again only a shifting of the Thing, since in fact it would be rather *morality* itself that was abandoned in that perfection, because it is only consciousness of the absolute purpose as the *pure* purpose, and so in *opposition* to all other

purposes; morality is the *activity* of this pure purpose, and also conscious of its elevation above sensibility, of the interference of sensibility and of its opposition and conflict with it.—Consciousness itself immediately announces that it is not in earnest about moral perfection when it shifts it away into *infinity*, i.e. affirms that the perfection is never complete.¹

¶623. Thus for consciousness what really counts is only this intermediate state of imperfection,—a state that is nevertheless at least supposed to be a *progression* towards perfection. But it cannot even be that; for progression in morality would really be a journey towards its disappearance. That is to say, the goal would be the above-mentioned nothingness or sublation of morality and of consciousness itself; but to approach ever nearer to nothingness means to *diminish*. Besides, *progression* in general, just like *diminishing*, would assume *quantitative* differences in morality; but there can be no question of these in it. In morality, as the consciousness for which the ethical purpose is *pure* duty, there cannot be any thought at all of diversity, least of all of the superficial diversity of quantity; there is only one virtue, only one pure duty, only one morality.¹

¶624. Since, then, it is not moral perfection that is taken seriously, but rather the intermediate state, i.e. as just discussed, non-morality, we thus return, from another side, to the content of the first postulate. That is to say, we cannot see how happiness is to be demanded for this moral consciousness on account of its *worthiness*. It is conscious of its imperfection and cannot, therefore, in fact demand happiness as a desert, as something of which it is worthy, but it can only ask for happiness from free grace, i.e. it can only ask for happiness *as such* in and for itself, and can expect it, not on that absolute ground, but as coming to it by contingency and wilfulness.—Here, then, non-morality declares just what it is,—that it is concerned not about morality, but solely about happiness in and for itself without relation to morality.¹

¶625. By this second aspect of the moral world-view, the other affirmation of the first aspect, in which the disharmony of morality and happiness is presupposed, is again also sublated.—That is to say, it is a fact of experience that in this present world what is moral often fares badly, whereas the immoral often flourishes. But the intermediate state of an imperfect morality, which has emerged as what is essential, shows manifestly that this perception, this supposed experience, is merely a shifting of the Thing. For since morality is imperfect, i.e. morality in fact *is not*, what can we make of the experience that morality fares badly?—Since, at the same time, it has turned out that we are dealing with happiness in and for itself, it is evident that with the judgement that immorality prospers, we were not thinking of an injustice that occurs here. The designation of an individual as immoral falls away *in itself*, when morality in general is imperfect, and has therefore only an arbitrary basis. Therefore, the sense and content of the judgement of experience is solely this, that happiness in and for itself should not befall some people, i.e. it is *envy*, which covers itself with the cloak of morality. The reason, however, why so-called good luck should fall to the lot of others, is good friendship, which *grants* and *wishes* them, and itself, this grace, i.e. this lucky chance.¹

¶626. Morality, then, in the moral consciousness is imperfect; this is what is now proposed. But it is the essence of morality to be only the *perfectly pure*; imperfect

morality is therefore impure, or it is immorality. Morality itself is thus in another essence than the actual consciousness; this other essence is a holy moral lawgiver.—The *imperfect* morality in consciousness, which is the ground of this postulating, *initially* has the significance that morality, when it is posited in consciousness as *actual*, stands in relation to an *other*, to a Being-there, and therefore itself receives within it otherness or difference, giving rise to a whole variety of moral commands. The moral self-consciousness at the same time, however, holds these *many* duties to be unessential; for it is concerned only with the *one* pure duty, and the many duties have no truth *for it* insofar as they are *determinate* duties. They can therefore have their truth only in an other and are made sacred, which they are not for the moral consciousness, by a holy lawgiver.—But this itself is again only a shifting of the Thing. For the moral self-consciousness is, to itself, the absolute, and duty is purely and simply only what *it knows* as duty. But it knows as duty only pure duty; what is not sacred for it is not sacred in itself, and what is not in itself sacred, cannot be sanctified by the holy essence. The moral consciousness, too, is not all in earnest at all about getting something sanctified *by another* consciousness than itself; for what is sacred to it is purely and simply only what is sacred through *itself and within it*.—It is, therefore, no more in earnest about the holiness of this other essence, for in this essence something was supposed to attain to essentiality, when for the moral consciousness, i.e. in itself, it has no essentiality.¹

¶627. If the holy essence was postulated in order that in it duty might have its validity, not as pure duty, but as a multiplicity of *determinate* duties, then this again must be shifted, and the other essence must be holy only insofar as only *pure duty* has validity in it. In fact pure duty also has validity only in another essence, not in the moral consciousness. Although in the moral consciousness pure morality alone seems to be valid, this moral consciousness must nevertheless be put in another way, for it is at the same time a natural consciousness. In it, morality is affected and conditioned by sensibility, and so is not in and for itself, but a contingency of free *will*; but in it as pure *will*, morality is a contingency of *knowledge*; *in and for itself*, therefore, morality is in another essence.¹

¶628. This essence, then, is here the purely perfect morality, because in it morality does not stand in relation to nature and sensibility. But the *reality* of pure duty is its *actualization* in nature and sensibility. The moral consciousness posits its imperfection in the fact that in it morality has a *positive* relation to nature and sensibility, when it counts it as an essential moment of morality that it should have simply a *negative* relation to them. The pure moral essence, on the other hand, because it is elevated above the *struggle* with nature and sensibility, does not stand in a *negative* relation to them. Therefore, in fact, there remains for it only the *positive* relation to them, i.e. precisely what just now counted as the imperfect, as the immoral. But *pure morality* completely separated from actuality, so that it was likewise without any positive relation to it, would be an unconscious, unactual abstraction, in which the concept of morality, which involves thinking of pure duty and a will and a doing, would be utterly sublated. Such a purely moral essence is therefore again a shifting of the Thing, and has to be given up.¹

¶629. In this purely moral essence, however, the moments of the contradiction, in which this synthetic representation flounders about, draw near, and so do the

opposed *Also's*, which this representation, without bringing its thoughts together, makes follow after each other, and one contrary always give way to the other, to the point where it has to give up its moral world-view and seek refuge within itself.¹

¶630. The moral consciousness recognizes that its morality is not perfect for the reason that it is affected by a sensibility and nature opposed to it, which in part tarnishes morality itself as such, and in part gives rise to a host of duties, through which in the concrete case of actual action it gets into difficulty; for each case is the concrescence of many moral relations, just as an object of perception in general is a thing of many properties; and since the *determinate* duty is a purpose, it has a content, and its content is part of the purpose, and morality is not pure.—Morality therefore has its *reality* in another essence. This reality, however, means nothing other than that morality is here *in* and *for itself*,—*for itself*, i.e. being the morality of a *consciousness, in itself*, i.e. having *Being-there* and *actuality*.—In that first imperfect consciousness morality is not carried out; therein it is the *in-itself* in the sense of a *thought-thing*; for it is associated with nature and sensibility, with the actuality of Being and of consciousness that constitutes its content, and nature and sensibility are the morally null.—In the second consciousness morality is present as *perfectly accomplished* and not as an unfulfilled thought-thing. But this accomplishment consists precisely in the fact that morality has *actuality* in a *consciousness*, as well as *free actuality*, Being-there in general, and is not the void but the fulfilled, the contentful; i.e. the accomplishment of morality is posited in the fact that what has just been determined as the morally null is present within it and in it. At one time morality is supposed to have validity simply and solely as the unactual thought-thing of pure abstraction, but then again equally to have no validity in this mode; its truth is supposed to consist in its being opposed to actuality and to be entirely free and empty of it, and then again, to consist in its being actuality.¹

¶631. The syncretism of these contradictions, which is expounded in the moral world-view, collapses internally, since the distinction on which it rests, the distinction between what must necessarily be thought and posited, and yet is at the same time inessential, becomes a distinction which no longer lies even in the words. What in the end is posited as something diverse, both as the null and also as the real, is one and the same thing, Being-there and actuality; and what is supposed to be absolutely only as the beyond of actual Being and consciousness, and yet equally to be only in consciousness, and as a beyond to be the null, is pure duty and the knowledge of duty as the essence. The consciousness which draws this distinction that is no distinction, which declares that actuality is the null and the real at the same time,—that pure morality is both the true essence and also devoid of essence, such a consciousness expresses in one and the same breath the thoughts which it previously separated, and itself proclaims that it is not in earnest about this determination and segregation of the moments of the *Self* and the *in-itself*, but that on the contrary, what it declares as the absolute *being* outside consciousness, it really keeps enclosed within the *Self* of self-consciousness, and that what it declares as what is absolutely *thought* or the absolute *in-itself*, it for that very reason takes to be something that has no truth.—It dawns on consciousness that the segregation of these moments is a shifting, and that it would be *hypocrisy* if it were to retain them after all. But as moral pure self-consciousness, it flees with abhorrence back into itself, away from this disparity

between its *representation* and that which is its *essence*, away from this untruth which declares as true what counts for it as untrue. It is *pure conscience* which disdains such a moral world-representation; it is *within its own self* the simple spirit, certain of itself, that immediately acts conscientiously without the mediation of those representations, and in this immediacy has its truth.—But if this world of shifting is nothing other than the development of moral self-consciousness in its moments, and hence is its *reality*, then, by retreating into itself, it will not become anything else in its essence; its retreat into itself is really only the *attained consciousness* that its truth is a pretence. It would always *have to pass off* this pretended truth anew as *its* truth, for it would have to express and present itself as an objective representation, but would *know* that this is merely a shifting; it would therefore be, in fact, hypocrisy, and this *contempt* for that shifting would already be the first expression of hypocrisy.¹

C. CONSCIENCE. THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL, EVIL AND ITS FORGIVENESS

¶632. The antinomy of the moral world-view, that there is a moral consciousness, and that there is none,—or that the validity of duty is a beyond of consciousness and, conversely, takes place only within consciousness, this antinomy was condensed in the representation in which the non-moral consciousness counts as moral, its contingent knowing and willing are assumed to have full weight, and happiness is granted to it as a gift of grace. Moral self-consciousness did not take this self-contradictory representation upon itself, but transferred it to an essence other than itself. But this transposition beyond itself of what it must think of as necessary is as much the contradiction in form, as the other was in content. But because what appears as contradictory, and in whose separation and subsequent resolution the moral world-view flounders about, is in itself the same thing, *viz.* pure duty as *pure knowing*, is nothing other than the *Self* of consciousness, and the *Self* of consciousness is *Being* and *actuality*,—and similarly, because what is supposed to lie beyond *actual* consciousness is nothing other than pure thinking and thus is, in fact, the *Self*, because this is so, self-consciousness, *for us* or *in itself*, retreats into itself, and knows as its own self that essence, in which what is *actual* is at the same time *pure knowing* and *pure duty*. It itself is what is, in its contingency, completely valid in its own eyes, and knows its immediate singularity as pure knowing and acting, as true actuality and harmony.¹

¶633. This *Self of conscience*, spirit immediately certain of itself as the absolute truth and Being, is the *third Self*, which has come about for us from the third world of the spirit and must be briefly compared with the preceding Selves. The totality or actuality that presents itself as the truth of the ethical world is the *Self* of the *person*; its Being-there is *being-recognized*. Just as the person is the *Self* devoid of substance, so is its Being-there abstract actuality too; the person *counts*, and does so immediately; the *Self* is the point immediately reposing in the element of its Being; this point is without separation from its universality, and therefore the two are not in motion and relation to one another: the universal is in it without differentiation, and is neither the content of the *Self*, nor is the *Self* filled by itself.—The *second Self* is the world of culture which has arrived at its truth, or the spirit of division restored to itself,—absolute freedom. In this *Self*, that first immediate unity of singularity and universality breaks apart; the universal, which equally remains a purely spiritual

essence, being-recognized or universal will and knowing, is *object* and content of the Self and its universal actuality. But it does not have the form of Being-there free from the Self; in this Self, therefore, it arrives at no filling and at no positive content, at no world. Moral self-consciousness does indeed let its universality go free, so that it becomes a nature of its own, and equally it holds it fast within itself as sublated. It is, however, merely the shifting play of the alternation of these two determinations. It is as conscience that it first has, in its *self-certainty*, the *content* for the previously empty duty, as well as for the empty right and the empty universal will; and because this self-certainty is equally the *immediate*, it has Being-there itself.¹

¶634. Having arrived at its truth, moral self-consciousness therefore abandons, or rather sublates, the separation within itself which gave rise to the shifting, the separation between the *in-itself* and the *Self*, between pure duty as pure *purpose*, and *actuality* as a nature and sensibility opposed to the pure purpose. It is, when thus returned into itself, *concrete* moral spirit which does not, in the consciousness of pure duty, set itself an empty standard opposed to actual consciousness; on the contrary, pure duty, as also the nature opposed to it, are sublated moments; spirit is, in an immediate unity, a *self-actualizing moral* essence, and the action is immediately a *concrete* moral shape.¹

¶635. Suppose a given case of action; it is an objective actuality for the knowing consciousness. This consciousness, as conscience, knows it in an immediate, concrete manner, and at the same time the case is only as conscience knows it. Knowing is contingent insofar as it is something other than the object; but the spirit certain of itself is no longer such a contingent knowing and creation of thoughts within itself, thoughts at variance with actuality, but since the separation of the *in-itself* and the *Self* is sublated, the case is, in the sensory *certainty* of knowing, immediately as it is *in itself*, and it is *in itself* only in the way that it is in this knowing.—Action as actualization is thereby the pure form of will; the simple conversion of an actuality, as a case that *is*, into an actuality that is *done*, the conversion of the bare mode of *objective* knowing into the mode of knowing of *actuality* as a product of consciousness. Just as sensory certainty is immediately taken up, or rather converted, into the in-itself of spirit, so this conversion, too, is simple and unmediated, a transition through the pure concept without alteration of the content, the content being determined by the interest of the consciousness that knows it.—Further, conscience does not split up the circumstances of the case into a variety of duties. It does not behave as a *positive universal medium*, wherein the many duties would acquire, each for itself, unshakeable substantiality, such that *either* no action could take place at all, because each concrete case involves opposition in general, and, in a case of morality, opposition of duties, and so, in the determination of action, one side, one duty would always be *violated*;—*or else*, if action does take place, violation of one of the conflicting duties would actually intervene. Conscience is rather the negative One, or absolute Self, which eliminates these various moral substances; it is simple dutiful action, which fulfils not this or that duty, but knows and does what is concretely right. Only now, therefore, is it moral *action* as action at all, an action into which the preceding deedless consciousness of morality has passed.—The concrete shape of the deed may be analysed by the differentiating consciousness into various properties, i.e. here, into various moral relations, and these may either

each be declared to be absolutely valid (as it must be if it is supposed to be duty), or else compared and tested. In the simple moral action of conscience, duties are lumped together in such a way that all these single essences are immediately *demolished*, and the testing and sifting of duty has no place at all in the unwavering certainty of conscience.¹

¶636. Just as little is there present in conscience that fluctuating uncertainty of consciousness which now posits so-called pure morality outside itself into another, holy essence and takes itself to be unholy, but then again posits moral purity within itself, and the connection of the sensory with the moral in that other essence.

¶637. It renounces all these postures and impostures of the moral world-view, when it renounces the consciousness that takes duty and actuality to be contradictory. According to this consciousness, I act morally when I am *conscious* of accomplishing only pure duty and *nothing else* whatsoever, and this means, in fact, *when I do not* act. But when I actually act, I am conscious of an *other*, of an actuality, which is present, and of an actuality I want to produce, I have a *determinate* purpose and fulfil a *determinate* duty; and in this there is something *other* than the pure duty which alone should be intended.—Conscience, on the other hand, is consciousness concerning the fact that, when the moral consciousness declares *pure duty* to be the essence of its action, this pure purpose is a shifting of the Thing; for the Thing itself is that pure duty consists in the empty abstraction of pure thinking, and has its reality and content only in a determinate actuality, in an actuality which is the actuality of consciousness itself, and of consciousness not as a thought-thing but as a singleton. Conscience has *for itself* its truth in the *immediate certainty* of itself. This *immediate* concrete certainty of itself is the essence; looking at this certainty from the point of view of the opposition of consciousness, it is one's own immediate *singularity* that is the content of the moral doing; and the *form* of that doing is just this Self as a pure movement, viz. as the *knowing* or one's *own conviction*.¹

¶638. Looking at this more closely in its unity and in the significance of its moments, the moral consciousness apprehended itself only as the *in-itself* or *essence*; but as conscience it apprehends its *Being-for-itself* or its Self.—The contradiction of the moral world-view *resolves itself*, i.e. the difference which lies at its base proves to be no difference, and it converges on pure negativity; but this is just the Self; a simple *Self*, which is a *pure* knowing, as well as knowledge of itself as *this singular* consciousness. Consequently, this Self constitutes the content of the previously empty essence; for it is the *actual* Self, which no longer has the significance of being a nature alien to the essence and independent in laws of its own. As the negative, it is the *difference* of the pure essence, a content and, moreover, a content that is valid in and for itself.¹

¶639. Further, this Self, as pure knowing equal to itself, is the *utterly universal*, so that just this knowing, *as its own* knowing, as conviction, is the *duty*. Duty is no longer the universal confronting the Self, but it is known to have no validity when thus separated; it is now the law that is for the sake of the Self, not the Self that is for the sake of the law. Law and duty, however, have for that reason the significance not only of *Being-for-itself* but also of *Being-in-itself*; for this knowing, in virtue of its likeness-to-itself, is precisely the *in-itself*. In consciousness this *in-itself* also separates

itself from that immediate unity with Being-for-itself; in this confrontation it is *Being*, *Being for another*.—Duty itself, as duty forsaken by the Self, is now known to be only a *moment*; from its significance of being the *absolute essence*, it has sunk down to Being, which is not Self, is not *for itself*, and is therefore *Being for another*. But this *Being for another* remains an essential moment just because the Self, as consciousness, constitutes the opposition of Being-for-itself and Being for another, and now duty is within itself something immediately *actual*, no longer merely abstract pure consciousness.¹

¶640. This *Being for another* is, therefore, the substance that is-*in-itself*, distinct from the Self. Conscience has not given up pure duty or the abstract *in-itself*, but duty is the essential moment of comporting itself, as *universality*, towards others. Conscience is the common element of the self-consciousnesses, and this element is the substance in which the deed has *subsistence* and *actuality*; the moment of *being-recognized* by others. The moral self-consciousness does not have this moment of recognition by others, of *pure consciousness* which is *there*; and consequently is not acting, not actualizing at all. Its *in-itself* is for it either the abstract, *unactual* essence, or Being as an *actuality* that is not spiritual. The *actuality* of conscience, however, an *actuality in being*, is an *actuality* that is a *Self*, i.e. Being-there conscious of itself, the spiritual element of being-recognized. The doing is thus only the transposition of its *singular* content into the *objective* element, in which the content is universal and recognized, and it is just the fact that the content is recognized that makes the action an *actuality*. The action is recognized and thereby *actual*, because the *actuality* that is-there is immediately linked with the conviction or knowledge, or knowledge of its purpose is immediately the element of Being-there, is the universal recognition. For the *essence* of the action, duty, consists in conscience's *conviction* about it; this conviction is the *in-itself* itself; it is the *in itself universal self-consciousness*, or the *being-recognized*, and hence the *actuality*. What is done with the conviction of duty is, therefore, immediately something that has consistency and Being-there. There is, then, no more talk of good intentions coming to nothing, or of the good man faring badly; on the contrary, the duty that is known to be such is fulfilled and comes to *actuality*, just because conformity with duty is the universal of all self-consciousnesses, is that which is recognized and so that which is in being. But separated and taken on its own, without the content of the Self, this duty is *Being for another*, the transparent, which has merely the significance of an essentiality in general, lacking any substance.¹

¶641. If we look back at the sphere with which *spiritual reality* made its entry in general, the concept involved was that the expression of individuality is the *in-and-for-itself*. But the shape which immediately expressed this concept was the *honest consciousness*, which busied itself with the *abstract Thing itself*. This *Thing itself* was there a *predicate*; but in conscience it is for the first time a *subject*, which has posited all the moments of consciousness within it, and for which all these moments, substantiality in general, external Being-there and essence of thinking, are contained in this certainty of itself. The *Thing itself* has substantiality in general in the ethical realm, external Being-there in culture, the self-knowing essentiality of thinking in morality; and in conscience it is the *subject* that knows these moments within it. If the honest consciousness always seizes only *the empty Thing itself*, conscience, on the

other hand, wins the Thing in its fullness, a fullness given to it by conscience by way of itself. Conscience is this power because it knows the moments of consciousness as *moments*, and dominates them as their negative essence.¹

¶642. If we consider conscience in relation to the single determinations of the opposition which appears in action,—and also its consciousness concerning the nature of those determinations, then first of all conscience comports itself towards the *actuality* of the *case* in which it has to act, as a *knower*. Insofar as the moment of *universality* is in this knowing, it pertains to the knowledge of conscientious action to embrace the actuality lying before it in an unrestricted manner, and thus to know accurately the circumstances of the case and take them into consideration. But this knowing, since it is *aware of universality* as a *moment*, is therefore a knowing of these circumstances that is conscious that it does not embrace them, or that it is not conscientious about this. The genuinely universal and pure relation of knowing would be a relation to something not *opposed*, a relation to itself; but *action*, in virtue of the opposition it essentially contains, is related to a negative of consciousness, to an actuality that *is in itself*. In contrast to the simplicity of pure consciousness, this actuality is the absolute *other* or manifoldness *in itself*, and is an absolute multiplicity of circumstances which divides up and spreads out endlessly, backwards into their conditions, sideways in their coexistence, forwards in their consequences.—The conscientious consciousness is conscious of this nature of the Thing and of its own relationship to it, and knows that it is not acquainted with the case in which it acts in this required universality, and that its pretension to this conscientious assessment of all the circumstances is vain. However, this acquaintance with, and weighing of, all the circumstances are not altogether lacking; but only as a *moment*, as something that is only for *others*; and its incomplete knowledge, because it is *its* knowledge, counts for it as sufficient and complete knowledge.¹

¶643. It comports itself in a like manner with the universality of the *essence*, or with the determination of the content by pure consciousness.—The conscience proceeding to action is related to the many aspects of the case. The case splinters asunder, and so too does the relation of pure consciousness to it, with the result that the diversity of the case is a diversity of *duties*.—Conscience knows that it has to choose between them, and to make a decision; for none of them, in its determinacy or in its content, is absolute, but only *pure duty* is that. But in its reality this abstraction has attained the significance of the self-conscious I. The spirit certain of itself rests, as conscience, within itself, and its *real* universality or its duty lies in its pure *conviction* of duty. This *pure* conviction is, as such, as empty as pure *duty*, pure in the sense that nothing in it, no determinate content, is a duty. But action is called for, something must be *determined* by the individual; and the spirit certain of itself, in which the in-itself has attained the significance of the self-conscious I, knows that it has this determination and content in the immediate *certainty* of itself. This certainty, as determination and content, is the *natural* consciousness, i.e. the impulses and inclinations.—Conscience does not recognize any content as absolute for it, for it is the absolute negativity of everything determinate. It determines *from its own self*; but the sphere of the Self into which the determinacy as such falls is the so-called sensibility; to have a content from the immediate certainty of itself, nothing is found at hand except sensibility.—Everything that in previous shapes presented itself

as good or bad, as law and right, is something *other* than the immediate certainty of itself; it is a *universal* which is now a Being for another; or, looked at in another way, an object which, mediating consciousness with itself, comes between consciousness and its own truth, and instead of being the immediacy of consciousness, it rather cuts consciousness off from itself.—For conscience, however, certainty of itself is the pure, immediate truth; and this truth is thus its immediate certainty of itself, represented as *content*, i.e. in general the wilfulness of the singleton, and the contingency of his unconscious natural Being.¹

¶644. This content at the same time counts as moral *essentiality* or as *duty*. For pure duty, as already emerged in the testing of laws, is utterly indifferent to any content and tolerates any content. Here it has, at the same time, the essential form of *Being-for-itself*, and this form of individual conviction is nothing other than consciousness of the emptiness of pure duty and of the fact that pure duty is only a moment, that its substantiality is a predicate which has its subject in the individual, whose wilfulness gives it the content, can associate any content with this form and attach its conscientiousness to the content.—An individual increases his property in a certain way; it is a duty for every individual to care for the support of himself as well as his family, and no less for the *possibility* of being useful to his fellow men, and of doing good to those in need. The individual is conscious that this is a duty, for this content is immediately contained in his certainty of himself; furthermore, he realizes that he fulfils this duty in this case. Others, perhaps, regard this mode of certainty as humbug; *they* hold to other aspects of the concrete case, but *he* holds firmly to this aspect, because he is conscious of the increase of property as a pure duty.—In this way, what others call violence and wrongdoing, fulfils the duty to maintain his independence in the face of others; what they call cowardice, fulfils the duty of supporting his life and the possibility of being useful to his fellow men; but what they call courage really violates both duties. But cowardice should not be so inept as not to know that the preservation of life and the possibility of being useful to others are duties,—so inept as not to be *convinced* of its action's conformity with duty, and not to know that conformity with duty consists in *knowing*; otherwise it would commit the ineptitude of being immoral. Since morality lies in the consciousness of having fulfilled duty, this will not be lacking to the action when it is called cowardice any more than when it is called courage; the abstraction called duty, as it is capable of any content, is also capable of this content,—the doer, then, knows what he does to be a duty, and since he knows this, and the conviction of duty is the dutiful itself, he is thus recognized by the others; the action is thereby validated and has actual Being-there.¹

¶645. In the face of this freedom, which inserts any content one likes, just as well as any other, into the universal passive medium of pure duty and knowing, it is no use to maintain that another content should be inserted; for any content, whatever it may be, contains the *blemish of determinacy* from which pure knowing is free, a determinacy which pure knowing can disdainfully reject, or equally can accept. Every content, in that it is determinate, stands on a level with any other, even if it does seem to have the precise characteristic that the particular is sublated in it. It may seem that, since, in the actual case, duty is divided into *opposition* in general and thereby into the opposition of *singularity* and *universality*, the duty whose content is the universal itself thereby immediately contains the nature of pure duty, and form and content are

thus in complete accord; so that, then, e.g. action for the universal interest is to be preferred to action for the individual interest. However, this universal duty is in general what is *present* as substance that is in and for itself, as right and law, and is valid *independently* of the knowledge and conviction of the singleton, as well as of his immediate interest; it is, therefore, precisely that against whose *form* morality in general is directed. But as regards its *content*, that too is a *determinate* content, insofar as the universal interest is *opposed* to the singular interest; consequently, its law is a law from which conscience knows itself to be utterly free, and it assigns itself the absolute authority to add to it and subtract from it, to neglect as well as fulfil it.—Then, furthermore, this distinction between duty to the singular and duty to the universal is, in accordance with the nature of opposition in general, not anything fixed. On the contrary, what the singleton does for himself is also to the advantage of the universal; the more he has cared for himself, the greater is not only his *possibility* of his usefulness to *others*; but his *actuality* itself consists only in his being and living in cohesion with others; his singular enjoyment essentially has the significance of thereby surrendering what is his own to others and of helping them to obtain their enjoyment. Therefore, in the fulfilment of duty to the singleton and so to oneself, the duty to the universal is also fulfilled.—Any *assessment* and *comparison* of duties that comes into play here would amount to a calculation of the advantage which the universal derived from an action; but first, morality would thereby devolve on the necessary *contingency of insight*, and secondly, it is precisely the essence of conscience to *cut out* this *calculating* and assessment, and to make its decision by itself without any such reasons.¹

¶646. In this way, then, conscience acts and preserves itself in the unity of *Being-in-itself* and *Being-for itself*, in the unity of pure thinking and individuality, and is the spirit certain of itself, which has its truth within itself, in its Self, in its knowledge, and therein as knowledge of duty. This spirit maintains itself therein by the very fact that what is *positive* in the action, the content as well as the form of duty and the knowledge of it, belongs to the Self, to the certainty of itself; but what seeks to *confront* the Self as an *in-itself of its own* counts as something not true, only something sublated, only a moment. Consequently, what counts is not *universal knowing* in general, but *conscience's information* about the circumstances. Into duty, as the universal *Being-in-itself*, it inserts the content that it takes from its natural individuality; for the content is the content present within itself; this content becomes, in virtue of the universal medium it is in, the *duty* that conscience executes, and empty pure duty, just because of this, is posited as something sublated or as a moment; this content is the sublated emptiness of pure duty, or the filling.—But in this way conscience is free from any content whatever; it absolves itself from any determinate duty which is supposed to have the validity of a law; in the strength of certainty of itself it has the majesty of absolute autarky, to bind and to loose.—This *self-determination* is therefore immediately what is purely and simply conformable with duty; duty is the very knowing; but this simple selfhood is the in-itself; for the *in-itself* is pure equality-with-itself, and this equality is in this consciousness.¹

¶647. This pure knowing is immediately *Being for another*; for, as pure equality-with-itself, it is *immediacy*, or Being. But this Being is at the same time the pure

universal, the selfhood of all; or the action is recognized and therefore actual. This Being is the element whereby conscience stands immediately in a relation of equality with all self-consciousnesses; and the significance of this relation is not the selfless law, but the Self of conscience.¹

¶648. However, in that this right thing which conscience does is at the same time a *Being for another*, it seems that an inequality attaches to conscience. The duty which it fulfils is a *determinate* content; this content is indeed the *Self* of consciousness, and therein consciousness's *knowledge* of itself, its *equality* with itself. But once fulfilled, set in the universal medium of *Being*, this equality is no longer *knowledge*, no longer this differentiating which just as immediately sublates its differences; on the contrary, in *Being* the difference is posited as subsistent, and the action is a *determinate* action, not equal with the element of the self-consciousness of all, and so not necessarily recognized. Both sides, the acting conscience and the universal consciousness recognizing this action as duty, are equally *free* from the determinacy of this doing. On account of this freedom, the relation in the common medium of their connection is really a relationship of complete inequality; whereby the consciousness for which the action is, finds itself in complete uncertainty about the acting spirit certain of itself. This spirit acts, it posits a determinacy as in being; the others hold to this *Being* as this spirit's truth, and are therein certain of this spirit; it has declared therein *what* counts for it as duty. But it is free from any *determinate* duty whatsoever; it is beyond the point where the others opine that it actually is; and this medium of Being itself, and duty as being *in itself*, count for it only as a moment. Therefore, what it sets before them it also shifts again, or rather has immediately shifted. For its *actuality* is for it not this duty and this determination it has put forward, but the duty and the determination which it has in the absolute certainty of itself.¹

¶649. Others, therefore, do not know whether this conscience is morally good or whether it is evil, or rather they not only cannot know this, but they must also take it to be evil. For, just as it is free from the *determinacy* of duty, and from duty as being *in itself*, so likewise are they. What conscience places before them, they themselves know how to shift; it is something expressing only the *Self* of another, not their own Self: not only do they know themselves to be free from it, but they must dissolve it in their own consciousness, reducing it to nothing by judging and explaining, in order to preserve their own Self.

¶650. But the action of conscience is not only this *determination* of Being which is forsaken by the pure Self. What is supposed to be valid and to be recognized as duty, is so only through the knowledge and the conviction of it as duty, through the knowledge of oneself in the deed. If the deed ceases to have this Self within it, it ceases to be that which alone is its essence. Its Being-there, forsaken by this consciousness, would be a common actuality, and the action would appear to us as a fulfilling of one's pleasure and desire. What is supposed to *be there*, is here an essentiality solely by its being *known* as self-expressing individuality; and it is this *being-known* that is recognized, and which, *as such*, ought to have *Being-there*.¹

¶651. The Self enters into Being-there, *as Self*; the spirit certain of itself exists as such for others. Its *immediate* action is not what is valid and actual; what is recognized is not the *determinate*, not the *being-in-itself*, but solely the self-knowing

Self as such. The element of subsistence is the universal self-consciousness; what enters into this element cannot be the *effect* of the action: the effect does not endure in it, and acquires no permanence; it is only self-consciousness that is recognized and that obtains actuality.¹

¶652. Here again, then, we see *language* as the Being-there of spirit. Language is self-consciousness as being *for others*, self-consciousness which is immediately *present as such* and, as *this* self-consciousness, is universal self-consciousness. Language is the Self separating itself from itself, which as pure I=I becomes objective to itself, which in this objectivity equally preserves itself as *this* Self, just as it immediately flows together with the others and is *their* self-consciousness; it hears itself just as it is heard by the others, and the hearing is just *Being-there that has become a Self*.¹

¶653. The content which language has here acquired is no longer the perverted and perverting and dismembered Self of the world of culture, but the spirit that has reverted into itself, certain of itself, and certain in its Self of its truth or of its recognizing, and recognized as this knowing. The language of the ethical spirit is the law and the simple command and the complaint, which is more a tear shed over necessity; the moral consciousness, by contrast, is still *mute*, shut up together with itself in its interior, for in it the Self does not as yet have Being-there, but Being-there and the *Self* stand as yet only in external relation to each other. Language, however, only emerges as the middle term between independent and recognized self-consciousnesses; and the Self *that is-there* is immediately universal recognition, a recognition that is multiple, and in this multiplicity a simple recognition. The content of the language of conscience is *the Self that knows itself as essence*. This alone is what language declares, and this declaration is the true actuality of the doing and the validity of the action. Consciousness declares its *conviction*; it is in this conviction alone that the action is a duty; also it is *valid* as duty solely through the conviction's being *declared*. For the universal self-consciousness is free from the *determinate* action that *simply is*; the *action as Being-there* counts for nothing to this self-consciousness, what counts is the *conviction* that it is a duty, and this is actual in language.—To actualize the action does not mean here transposing its content from the form of *purpose* or of *Being-for-itself* into the form of *abstract* actuality, but transposing it from the form of immediate *certainty* of itself, which knows its knowledge or Being-for-itself as the essence, into the form of an *assurance* that consciousness is convinced of the duty and, as conscience, knows duty *from its own self*. This assurance thus assures that consciousness is convinced that its conviction is the essence.¹

¶654. Whether the assurance, of acting from conviction of duty, is *true*, whether what is done is *actually duty*,—these questions or doubts have no sense in the face of conscience.—The question whether the *assurance* is *true* would presuppose that the inner intention is different from the alleged intention, i.e. that the willing of the singular Self can be separated from duty, from the will of the universal and pure consciousness; the latter would be put into words, while the former would be strictly the true motive of the action. But it is just this distinction between the universal consciousness and the singular Self that has sublated itself, and whose sublation is conscience. The immediate knowing of the Self certain of itself is law and duty; its intention, just because it is its intention, is what is right; all that is required is that it

should know this, and should state its conviction that its knowing and willing are what is right. The declaration of this assurance in itself sublates the form of its particularity; it recognizes therein the *necessary universality of the Self*; in calling itself *conscience*, it calls itself pure self-knowing and pure abstract willing, i.e. it calls itself a universal knowing and willing that recognizes the others, is *like* them, for they are just this pure self-knowing and willing,—and which for that reason is also recognized by them. In the willing of the Self that is certain of itself, in this knowledge that the Self is essence, lies the essence of what is right.—Therefore, whoever says he acts thus from conscience, speaks truly, for his conscience is the Self that knows and wills. But it is essential that he should *say* this, for this Self must be at the same time the *universal* Self. It is not universal in the *content* of the act, for the content, owing to its *determinacy*, is in itself indifferent; it is in the form of the act that the universality lies; it is this form which is to be posited as actual; the form is the *Self*, which as such is actual in language, declares itself to be the true, and just in so doing recognizes all Selves and is recognized by them.¹

¶655. Conscience, then, in the majesty of its elevation above determinate law and every content of duty, puts whatever content it pleases into its knowing and willing; it is the moral genius which knows the inner voice of its immediate knowledge to be a divine voice, and since in this knowledge genius just as immediately knows Being-there, it is the divine creative force which has vitality in its concept. Equally, it is divine service within itself, for its action is the intuiting of this divinity of its own.¹

¶656. This solitary divine service is at the same time essentially the divine service of a *community*, and the pure inner *knowing* and perceiving of itself advances to become a moment of *consciousness*. The intuition of itself is its *objective* Being-there, and this objective element is the declaration of its knowing and willing as a *universal*. Through this declaration the Self acquires validity and the act becomes an accomplishing deed. The actuality and the subsistence of its doing is the universal self-consciousness; but the declaration of conscience posits the certainty of itself as a pure Self, and thereby as a universal Self; on account of this talk, in which the Self is expressed and recognized as essence, the others allow the act to be valid. The spirit and the substance of their union is thus the mutual assurance of their conscientiousness, of good intentions, the rejoicing over this reciprocal purity, and their basking in the splendour of knowing and declaring, of the care they lavish on such excellence.—Insofar as this conscience still distinguishes its *abstract* consciousness from its *self-consciousness*, it has only *hidden* its life in God; God is certainly *immediately* present to its mind and heart, to its Self; but what is manifest, its actual consciousness and the mediating movement of that consciousness, is for it something other than that hidden interior and the immediacy of the present essence. However, in the perfection of conscience the difference between its abstract consciousness and its self-consciousness is sublated. Conscience knows that the *abstract* consciousness is just *this Self*, this Being-for-itself that is certain of itself, knows that the *diversity* is *sublated* precisely in the *immediacy* of the *relation* of the Self to the in-itself, an in-itself which when posited outside the Self is the abstract essence and what is hidden from it. For that relation is a *mediating* relation, in which the related terms are not one and the same, but each is an *other* for the

other, and only in a third term are they one; but the *immediate* relation means in fact nothing other than unity. Consciousness, elevated above the thoughtlessness of still regarding these differences, which are none, as differences, knows the immediacy of the presence within it of the essence as the unity of the essence and its Self, it thus knows itself as the living in-itself, and knows this knowledge as religion, which, as knowledge intuited or being-there, is the speech of the community about its own spirit.¹

¶657. Here, then, we see self-consciousness withdrawn into the depths of its interior, for which all externality as such vanishes,—withdrawn into the intuition of the I=I, in which this I is the whole of essentiality and Being-there. It plunges into this concept of itself, for it is driven to the edge of its extremes, and in such a way, moreover, that the different moments, whereby it is real or is still *consciousness*, are not these pure extremes only for us, but on the contrary what it is for itself, and what is for it *in itself* and what is for it *Being-there*, have evaporated into abstractions which no longer have any stability, any substance, for this consciousness itself; and everything that hitherto was essence for consciousness has reverted into these abstractions.—Refined into this purity, consciousness is its poorest shape, and the poverty which constitutes its unique possession is itself a vanishing; this absolute *certainty* into which substance has dissolved is the absolute *untruth* which collapses internally; it is the absolute *self-consciousness* in which *consciousness is submerged*.¹

¶658. Looking at this submergence of consciousness in its interior, the *substance* that is-*in-itself* is, for consciousness, *knowledge as its knowledge*. As consciousness, it is separated into the opposition of itself and the object which is, for it, the essence; but it is just this object that is perfectly transparent, is *its own Self*, and its consciousness is only the knowledge of itself. All life and all spiritual essentiality have withdrawn into this Self and have lost diversity from the I itself. The moments of consciousness are, therefore, these extreme abstractions, none of which remains standing but loses itself in the other and engenders it. It is the exchange of the unhappy consciousness with itself, but here this exchange proceeds for consciousness itself in its interior, and is conscious of being the concept of reason, whereas the unhappy consciousness is that concept only *in itself*. The absolute certainty of itself thus finds itself, as consciousness, changed immediately into a sound dying away, into objectivity of its Being-for-itself; but this world created is its *talk*, which it has just as immediately heard and only the echo of which returns to it. This return, therefore, does not have the significance that the Self is *in* and *for itself* in it; for the essence is for it not *in-itself*, but only itself; just as little has consciousness *Being-there*, for the objective element does not get as far as being a negative of the actual Self, any more than this Self attains to actuality. It lacks the force of estrangement, the force to make itself into a thing, and to endure Being. It lives in dread of besmirching the splendour of its interior by action and Being-there; and, in order to preserve the purity of its heart, it shuns contact with actuality, and persists in its obstinate impotence, impotence to renounce its Self, whittled down to ultimate abstraction, and to give itself substantiality, or to transform its thinking into Being and put its trust in the absolute difference. The hollow object which it creates for itself now fills it, therefore, with the consciousness of emptiness; its doing is a yearning which merely loses itself in its

becoming an object devoid of essence, and, falling back into itself beyond this loss, only finds itself as lost;—in this transparent purity of its moments, it becomes an unhappy, so-called *beautiful soul*, its light fades away within it, and it vanishes like a shapeless vapour that dissolves into thin air.¹

¶659. This silent confluence of the pithless essentialities of the evaporated life has, however, still to be taken in the other significance of the *actuality* of conscience and in the *appearance* of its movement, and conscience has to be considered as acting.—The *objective* moment in this consciousness has determined itself above as universal consciousness; the knowledge that knows itself is, as *this* Self, distinct from other Selves; the language in which all reciprocally recognize each other as acting conscientiously, this universal likeness, falls apart into the unlikeness of singular Being-for-itself, each consciousness is just as much simply reflected out of its universality into itself; thereby the opposition of singularity to the other singletons, and to the universal, necessarily comes on the scene, and we have to consider this relationship and its movement.—Or this universality and duty have the very opposite significance, that of the determinate *singularity* exempting itself from the universal, a singularity for which pure duty is only universality that has come to the *surface* and is turned outwards; duty lies only in words and is valid as a Being for another. Conscience, which is initially directed only *negatively* against duty as this *given determinate* duty, knows itself free from it; but when it fills up the empty duty with a *determinate* content *from itself*, it has the positive consciousness of the fact that it, as *this* Self, makes its own content; its pure Self, as empty knowing, is something devoid of content and determination; the content which it gives to that knowing is drawn from its own Self, as *this* determinate Self, from itself as natural individuality, and, in speaking of the conscientiousness of its action, it may well be conscious of its pure Self, but in the *purpose* of its acting, a purpose as actual content, it is conscious of itself as this particular singleton, and conscious of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others, the opposition of universality or duty and its being-reflected out of universality.¹

¶660. If in this way the opposition, into which conscience enters when it *acts*, expresses itself in its interior, the opposition is at the same time an unlikeness outwardly in the element of Being-there, the unlikeness of its particular singularity to another singleton.—Its particularity consists in the fact that the two moments constituting its consciousness, the Self and the in-itself, are *unequal in value* within it, and more precisely with the determination that the certainty of itself is the essence, in contrast to the *in-itself* or the *universal*, which counts only as a moment. This internal determination is thus confronted by the element of Being-there or by the universal consciousness, for which the essence is rather universality, duty, whereas singularity, on the other hand, which in contrast to the universal is for itself, counts only as a sublated moment. For this tenacious adherence to duty, the first consciousness counts as *evil*, because it is the unlikeness of its *Being-within-itself* with the universal, and since, at the same time, this first consciousness declares its doing as likeness with itself, as duty and conscientiousness, it counts as *hypocrisy*.¹

¶661. The *movement* of this opposition is initially the formal establishment of likeness between what evil is within itself and what it declares; it must come to light that it is evil, and that its Being-there is thereby equal to its essence, the *hypocrisy*

must be *unmasked*.—This return of the unlikeness present in hypocrisy into likeness has not already come about in the fact that hypocrisy, as is commonly said, demonstrates its respect for duty and virtue just by adopting the *semblance* of them and using it as a mask for its own consciousness, no less than for the consciousness of others; a recognition in itself of the opposite in which likeness and agreement would be contained.—Only, hypocrisy is at the same time just as much reflected out of this verbal recognition and into itself; and the fact that it uses what is-in-itself only as a *Being for another* involves rather its own contempt for it, and the exposure to everyone of its lack of essence. For what lets itself be used as an external instrument shows itself to be a thing, which has within it no weight of its own.¹

¶662. Also, this likeness is not brought about either by the evil consciousness's sticking one-sidedly to its guns, or by the judgement of the universal.—If the evil consciousness disavows itself in face of the consciousness of duty, and asserts that what this declares to be wickedness, to be absolute unlikeness with the universal, is an action in accordance with inner law and conscience, then in this one-sided assurance of likeness its unlikeness with the other remains, since in fact this other does not believe the assurance or recognize it.—Or since the one-sided persistence in one extreme cancels itself out, evil would indeed thereby confess to being evil, but in so doing it would *immediately* sublimate itself and no longer be hypocrisy, nor would it unmask itself as such. It admits, in fact, to being evil by asserting that it acts, in opposition to the recognized universal, according to *its* inner law and conscience. For if this law and conscience were not the law of its *singularity* and *wilfulness*, it would not be something inner, something of its own, but what is universally recognized. Therefore, when anyone says that he acts towards others according to *his* law and conscience, he is saying, in fact, that he mistreats them. But *actual* conscience is not this persistence in the knowledge and will that opposes the universal, but on the contrary, the universal is the element of its *Being-there*, and its language declares its doing as *recognized* duty.¹

¶663. Just as little is the persistence of the universal consciousness in its judgement an unmasking and dissolution of hypocrisy.—In denouncing hypocrisy as bad, base, and so on, it appeals in such judgement to *its* law, just as the *evil* consciousness appeals to *its* law. For the former comes forward in opposition to the latter and thereby as a particular law. It has, therefore, no advantage over the other law, rather it legitimizes it; and this zeal does the very contrary of what it opines that it does—that is, it shows that what it calls true duty and what ought to be *universally* recognized, is something *unrecognized*, and it thereby concedes to the other an equal right of Being-for-itself.¹

¶664. This judgement has, however, at the same time another side from which it becomes the introduction to a resolution of the opposition present.—The consciousness of *the universal* does not conduct itself as *actual* and *acting* towards the first consciousness,—for the latter is rather the actual consciousness,—but in its opposition to it it behaves as a consciousness that is not entangled in the opposition of singularity and universality, an opposition that comes into play in action. It remains in the universality of *thought*, behaves as a consciousness that *apprehends*, and its first action is only judgement.—Now, through this judgement, it places itself, as we have just remarked, *alongside* the first consciousness, and the latter, *through this*

likeness, arrives at an intuition of itself in this other consciousness. For the consciousness of duty maintains an attitude of *apprehension, passivity*; but it is thereby in contradiction with itself as the absolute will of duty, with itself as a consciousness whose determining comes simply from itself. It has no difficulty in preserving its purity, for it *does not act*; it is the hypocrisy which wants to see its judging taken for an *actual* deed, and instead of proving its rectitude by action, it does so by uttering fine sentiments. It is constituted, then, in entirely the same way as the consciousness which is reproached with making duty a mere matter of talk. In both of them the side of actuality is equally distinct from the talk, in one of them, through the *self-serving purpose* of the action, in the other, through the *failure to act* at all, when the necessity of action is involved in the very fact of speaking of duty, for duty without deeds is utterly meaningless.¹

¶665. Judging, however, is also to be considered as a positive act of thought and has a positive content; through this aspect, the contradiction present in the apprehending consciousness, and its likeness with the first consciousness, become still more complete.—The consciousness that acts declares its determinate doing to be duty, and the consciousness that judges cannot gainsay this; for duty itself is the form which lacks all content but is capable of any,—or the concrete action, in all its many-sidedness and intrinsic diversity, has in it the universal aspect, the aspect that is taken as duty, just as much as the particular aspect which constitutes the share and the interest of the individual. Now, the judging consciousness does not stop short at the former aspect of duty and at the agent's knowledge of the fact that this is his duty, the situation and the status of his actuality. On the contrary, it holds to the other aspect, pursues the action into the interior, and explains it by its *intention* at variance with the action itself, and by selfish *motives*. Just as every action is capable of being considered in its conformity to duty, so too can it be considered in this other way, in its *particularity*; for, as action, it is the actuality of the individual.—This judging of the action thus takes it out of its Being-there and reflects it into the interior, or into the form of its own particularity.—If the act is attended by glory, then the judging knows this interior as *thirst* for glory;—if it is altogether in keeping with the station of the individual, without going beyond this station, and so constituted that the individuality does not have its station attached to it as an external determination, but through its own efforts gives filling to this universality, thereby showing itself capable of something higher, then judging knows the interior of the act as ambition, and so on. When, in the action in general, the agent attains to an intuition of *itself* in objectivity, or to self-feeling, a feeling of itself in its Being-there, and thus to enjoyment; then judgement knows the interior as an urge towards one's own happiness, even if this were to consist merely in an inner moral vanity, in the enjoyment of the consciousness of one's own excellence and in the foretaste of the hope of a future happiness.—No action can escape such judgement, for duty for duty's sake, this pure purpose, is nothing actual; it has its actuality in the doing of the individuality, and the action thereby has in it the aspect of particularity.—No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet—is a valet, whose dealings are with the man, not as a hero, but as one who eats, drinks, and wears clothes, in general in the singularity of needs and of representation. Thus, for judging, there is no action in which it could not oppose the aspect

of the individuality's singularity to the universal aspect of the action and, with regard to the agent, play the part of the valet of morality.¹

¶666. This judging consciousness is thus itself *base*, because it divides up the action, and produces and sticks firmly to the unlikeness of the action with itself. It is, moreover, *hypocrisy*, because it passes off such judging, not as *another manner* of being evil, but as the *just consciousness* of the action and, in this unactuality and vanity of knowing well and better, sets itself up above the deeds it runs down, and wants to have its deedless talk taken for a superior *actuality*.—By putting itself, then, on an equal footing with the agent, on which it passes judgement, it is recognized by the agent as the same as himself. The agent does not merely find himself apprehended by the other as something alien and unlike it, but rather finds the other, in its own constitution, like himself. Intuiting this likeness and *expressing* it, he *confesses* to the other, and equally expects that the other, as he has in fact put himself on a par with it, will also respond in *words* expressing its *likeness* with himself, and expects that the Being-there of recognition will now come into play. His confession is not an abasement, a humiliation, a degradation relatively to the other; for this utterance is not a one-sided affair, in which he posits his *unlikeness* with the other; on the contrary, he expresses himself solely on account of his intuition of the other's *likeness* with him; he, on his side, gives expression to *their likeness* in his confession, and he expresses it for the reason that language is the *Being-there* of spirit as immediate Self; he therefore expects that the other will make his contribution to this Being-there.¹

¶667. But the admission of the one who is evil, *It's me*, is not followed by the response of a like admission. This is not what the judging consciousness meant; quite the contrary! It repulses this community away from itself, and is the hard heart that is for itself and rejects continuity with the other.—As a result, the scene is reversed. The one who made the confession sees himself repulsed, and sees the other in the wrong when it refuses to let its interior come forth into the Being-there of speech, when the other opposes to evil the beauty of its own soul, opposes to the confession the stiff neck of the character that remains like itself and the silence in which it keeps to itself and refuses to humble itself before anyone else. Here there is posited the supreme rebellion of the spirit certain of itself; for it intuits itself, as this *simple knowledge of the Self*, in the other, and that too, in such a way that even the outer shape of this other is not, as in the case of wealth, what is lacking in essence, is not a thing, but it is rather the thought, the knowledge itself, that is pitted against it, it is this absolutely fluid continuity of pure *knowing* which refuses to enter into communication with the other,—with the other who, in its confession, already renounced *isolated Being-for-itself*, and posited itself as sublated particularity and thereby as continuity with the other, as a universal. But the other, *within itself*, keeps to itself its uncommunicative Being-for-itself; within the confessant, it nevertheless retains the very same thing that the penitent has already discarded. The judging consciousness thereby reveals itself as the spirit-forsaken and spirit-denying consciousness; for it does not recognize that spirit, in the absolute certainty of itself, is master over every deed and actuality, and can reject them and make them as if they had never happened. At the same time, it does not recognize the contradiction it falls into in not letting the rejection which has happened *in words*, count as a true rejection, while it itself has the certainty of its

spirit, not in an actual action, but in its interior, and has its Being-there in the *words* of its judgement. It is thus itself which hinders the other's return from the deed into the spiritual Being-there of speech and into the likeness of spirit, and by this harshness produces the unlikeness which is still present.¹

¶668. Now, insofar as the spirit certain of itself, as a beautiful soul, does not possess the force to estrange the knowledge of itself remaining in itself, it cannot attain to likeness with the repulsed consciousness, nor therefore to an intuited unity of itself in the other, cannot attain to Being-there; consequently, the likeness comes about only negatively, as a spiritless Being. The beautiful soul, devoid of actuality, in the contradiction between its pure Self and the necessity of that Self to estrange itself into Being and to change into actuality, in the *immediacy* of this entrenched opposition—an immediacy which alone is the middle term and reconciliation of the opposition, intensified to its pure abstraction, and is pure Being or empty nothing—this beautiful soul, then, as consciousness of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy, is disordered to the point of derangement, and wastes away in nostalgic consumption. Thereby it in fact abandons the tenacious grip on *its Being-for-itself*, and produces only the spiritless unity of Being.¹

¶669. The true equalization, viz. the equalization that is *self-conscious* and *is-there*, is already contained in the foregoing in accordance with its necessity. The breaking of the hard heart, and its elevation to universality, is the same movement which was expressed in the consciousness that made confession of itself. The wounds of the spirit heal, and leave no scars behind; the deed is not the imperishable, but is taken back by spirit into itself, and the aspect of singularity that is present in it, whether as intention or as negativity that-is-there and limitation of this negativity, is what immediately vanishes. The actualizing *Self*, the form of its action, is only a *moment* of the whole, and so likewise is the knowledge, that determines by judgement and establishes the distinction between the singular and universal aspects of the action. This evil posits this estrangement of itself or posits itself as a moment, being enticed into the Being-there of confession by the intuition of itself in the other. But just as the former had to have its one-sided, unrecognized Being-there of particular Being-for-itself broken, so too must this other have its one-sided, unrecognized judgement broken; and just as the former exhibits the power of spirit over its actuality, so does this other exhibit the power of spirit over its determinate concept.¹

¶670. The latter, however, renounces the dividing thought, and the hardness of the Being-for-itself which clings to it, because it in fact intuits itself in the first. This first consciousness, which discards its actuality and makes itself into a *sublated This*, in fact presents itself thereby as a universal; it returns from its external actuality back into itself as essence; the universal consciousness thus recognizes itself in it.—The forgiveness which it extends to the first consciousness is the renunciation of itself, of its *unactual* essence, the essence with which it equates that other consciousness which was *actual* action, and it recognizes as good that which, from the determination that the action received in thought, was called evil, or rather it abandons this distinction of the determinate thought as well as its determining judgement that is-for-itself, just as the other abandons its determining of the action, a determining that is-for-itself too.—The word of reconciliation is the spirit that *is-there*, the spirit that intuits the pure knowledge of itself as *universal essence* in its contrary, in the pure

knowledge of itself as the *singularity* that is absolutely within itself,—a reciprocal recognition which is the *absolute spirit*.¹

¶671. Absolute spirit enters into Being-there only at the highest point, where its pure knowledge about itself is the opposition and exchange with itself. Knowing that its *pure knowledge* is the abstract *essence*, absolute spirit is this duty that knows, in absolute opposition to the knowledge that knows itself, as absolute *singularity* of the Self, to be the essence. The former knowledge is the pure continuity of the universal, which knows as a nullity in itself, as *evil*, the singularity that knows itself as essence. The latter knowledge, however, is the absolute discretion which knows itself absolutely in its pure oneness, and knows that universal as what is unactual, which is only for *others*. Both sides are refined to the purity in which there is no longer in them any selfless Being-there, any negative of consciousness, but where the *duty* is the character, remaining equal to itself, of its knowing itself, and the evil equally has its purpose in its *Being-within-itself*, and its actuality in its talk; the content of this talk is the substance of its subsistence; it is the assurance of the certainty of spirit within itself.— Each of these two self-certain spirits has no other purpose than its pure Self, and no other reality and Being-there than just this pure Self. But they are still diverse; and the diversity is absolute diversity because it is posited in this element of the pure concept. It is absolute, too, not only for us, but for the concepts themselves which stand in this opposition. For these concepts are certainly *determinate* with regard to one another, but are at the same time in themselves universal, so that they fill out the whole range of the Self, and this Self has no other content than this its determinacy, which neither goes beyond it nor is more restricted than it; because one of them, the absolute universal, is just as much the pure knowing-of-itself as the other, the absolute discretion of singularity, and both are only this pure self-knowing. Both determinacies are thus the knowing pure concepts, whose determinacy is itself immediately a knowing, or whose *relationship* and opposition is the I. Consequently, they are these sheer opposites *for one another*; it is that which is perfectly *interior* which thus confronts itself and has entered into Being-there; they constitute *pure knowledge* which, through this opposition, is posited as *consciousness*. But it is still not yet *self-consciousness*. It has this actualization in the movement of this opposition. For this opposition is rather itself the *indiscrete continuity* and *equality* of the I=I; and each *for itself*, just through the contradiction of its pure universality, which at the same time still resists its equality with the other and cuts itself off from it, sublates itself within itself. Through this estrangement, this knowledge, divided in its Being-there, returns into the unity of the Self; it is the *actual* I, the universal knowing of *itself* in its *absolute contrary*, in the knowledge that is-*within-itself*, and which, on account of the purity of its isolated Being-within-self, is itself the perfectly universal. The reconciling *Yes*, in which the two I's desist from their opposed *Being-there*, is the *Being-there* of the I expanded into duality, an I which therein remains equal to itself and, in its complete estrangement and contrary, has the certainty of itself;—it is God appearing in the midst of those who know themselves as pure knowledge.¹

(CC.) Religion

VII. Religion

¶672. In the configurations so far, which are distinguished broadly as *consciousness*, *self-consciousness*, *reason*, and *spirit*, *religion* too as consciousness of the *absolute essence* in general, has indeed occurred,—but only from the *standpoint of the consciousness* that is conscious of the absolute essence; but the absolute essence *in and for itself*, the self-consciousness of spirit, has not appeared in those forms.¹

¶673. Even *consciousness*, insofar as it is *understanding*, becomes consciousness of the *supersensible* or the *interior* of objective Being-there. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever else we may call it, is *self-less*; to begin with it is only the *universal*, which is still far from being the spirit that knows itself as spirit.—And then *self-consciousness*, which reaches its completion in the shape of *unhappy* consciousness, was only the *pain* of the spirit fighting its way towards objectivity again, but failing to reach it. The unity of the *singular* self-consciousness and its changeless *essence*, a unity towards which self-consciousness proceeds, therefore remains a *Beyond* for it. The immediate Being-there of *reason*, which emerged for us from that pain, and its peculiar shapes, involve no religion, because their self-consciousness knows or seeks *itself* in the *immediate* present.¹

¶674. On the other hand, in the ethical world we did see a religion, namely, the *religion* of the *underworld*; it is the belief in the terrible, unknown night of *fate* and in the Eumenides of the *departed spirit*: the former is pure negativity in the form of universality, the latter the same negativity in the form of singularity. So in the latter form the absolute essence is in fact the *Self*, and *present*, since the Self cannot be other than present; but the *singular* Self is *this* singular shade which has separated from itself the universality which is fate. It is indeed a shade, a *sublated This*, and thus a universal Self; but its negative meaning has not yet turned into this positive meaning, and therefore the sublated Self still immediately signifies this particular and essenceless entity as well. But fate without the Self remains the unconscious night which does not attain to differentiation within itself, nor to the clarity of self-knowledge.¹

¶675. This belief in the nothing of necessity and in the underworld becomes *belief in heaven*, because the departed Self must unite with its universality, display what it contains within this universality, and so become clear to itself. But we saw this *realm* of faith unfold its content only in the element of thinking without the concept, and consequently perish in its fate, namely, in the *religion* of *enlightenment*. In this religion, the supersensible beyond of the understanding is restored, but in such a way that self-consciousness remains satisfied in this world and knows the supersensible beyond—the *empty*, impenetrable and innocuous beyond—neither as Self nor as power.¹

¶676. In the religion of morality, the absolute essence finally has a positive content restored to it; but this content is combined with the negativity of the enlightenment. It is a *Being* that is at the same time taken back into the Self and remains enclosed in it, and a *differentiated content* whose parts are immediately negated as soon as they are put in place. But the fate that engulfs this contradictory movement is the Self, conscious of itself as the fate of *essentiality* and *actuality*.¹

¶677. In religion the spirit that knows itself is immediately its own pure *self-consciousness*. The shapes of spirit that we have considered—the true spirit, the self-alienated spirit, and the spirit certain of itself—together constitute spirit in its *consciousness*, which, confronting its *world*, does not recognize itself in it. But in conscience it subjugates to itself its objective world in general as well as its representation and its determinate concepts, and is now self-consciousness that is at one with itself. In this self-consciousness, spirit has for itself, *represented* as *object*, the significance of being the universal spirit that contains within itself all essence and all actuality; but it is not in the form of free actuality or of nature appearing as independent. It does have *shape* or the form of Being, in that it is *object* of its own consciousness; but because in religion consciousness is posited in the essential determination of being *self-consciousness*, the shape is perfectly transparent to itself; and the actuality that spirit contains is enclosed within it and sublated within it, in just the same way as when we speak of *all actuality*; this is universal actuality, actuality in *thought*.¹

¶678. Since, then, in religion the determination of spirit's consciousness proper does not have the form of free *otherness*, the *Being-there* of spirit is distinct from its *self-consciousness*, and its actuality proper falls outside religion; there is indeed one spirit of both, but its consciousness does not embrace both together, and religion appears as a part of Being-there, of doing and dealing, whose other part is life in its actual world. As we now know that spirit in its world and spirit conscious of itself as spirit, or spirit in religion, are the same, the completion of religion consists in the two becoming equal to each other: it requires not only that spirit's actuality be embraced by religion, but, conversely, that spirit, as spirit conscious of itself, become actual to itself and *object of its own consciousness*.—Insofar as spirit in religion *represents* itself to itself, it is indeed consciousness, and the actuality enclosed within religion is the shape and the clothing of its representation. But, in this representation, actuality does not receive its full entitlement, its right to be not merely clothing but independent free Being-there; and, conversely, because actuality lacks completion within itself, it is a *determinate* shape which does not attain what it is supposed to display, viz. spirit conscious of itself. For its shape to express spirit itself, the shape would have to be nothing other than spirit, and spirit would have to appear to itself, or actually be, as it is in its essence. Only in this way could something else be achieved as well, something that may seem to be the requirement of the contrary, viz. that the *object* of its consciousness has at the same time the form of free actuality; but only the spirit that is object to itself as absolute spirit is aware of itself as free actuality while also remaining conscious of itself therein.¹

¶679. Since self-consciousness and consciousness proper, *religion* and spirit in its world, or the *Being-there* of spirit, are initially distinct, the Being-there of spirit consists in the whole of spirit insofar as its moments present themselves separately,

each for itself. But the moments are *consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit*,—spirit, that is, as immediate spirit, which is not yet consciousness of spirit. Their totality, *taken together*, constitutes spirit in its worldly Being-there in general; spirit as such contains the foregoing configurations in universal determinations, in the moments just mentioned. Religion presupposes the whole sequence of these moments and is their *simple* totality or absolute Self.—Incidentally, the course of these moments, in their relationship to religion, is not to be represented in time. Only the whole spirit is in time, and the shapes, which are shapes of the whole *spirit* as such, present themselves in a succession; for only the whole has proper actuality and therefore the form of pure freedom in face of another thing, a form that expresses itself as time. But the *moments* of this whole, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, just because they are moments, have no Being-there different from one another.—Just as spirit was distinguished from its moments, so again, in the third place, the singularized determination of these moments must be distinguished from the moments themselves. That is, we saw each of those moments differentiate itself again internally in a course of its own, and assume diverse shapes: as, e.g., in consciousness, sensory certainty and perception were distinct. These latter aspects separate from each other in time and belong to a *particular whole*.—For spirit descends from its *universality* through *determination* to *singularity*. The determination, or middle term, is *consciousness, self-consciousness*, and so on. But *singularity* is constituted by the shapes of these moments. These shapes therefore present spirit in its singularity or *actuality*, and are distinguished from one another in time, though in such a way that the succeeding shape retains its predecessors in it.¹

¶680. If, therefore, religion is the completion of spirit into which the singular moments of spirit—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—*return* and *have returned* as into their *ground*, together they constitute the *actuality that is-there* of the whole spirit, which only *is* as the movement of these aspects of itself, a movement that distinguishes them and returns into itself. The becoming of *religion in general* is contained in the movement of the universal moments. But since each of these attributes was presented, not only as it determines itself in general, but as it is *in and for itself*, i.e. as it runs its course within itself as a whole, what has arisen as a result is not only the becoming of religion *in general*, but those complete courses of the *singular* aspects also contain the *determinacies* of religion itself. The whole spirit, the spirit of religion, is again the movement by which it ascends from its immediacy to the *knowledge* of what it is *in itself* or immediately, and eventually ensures that the *shape* in which it appears for its consciousness is perfectly equal to its essence, and that it intuits itself as it is.—So in this becoming, spirit itself is in *determinate* shapes which constitute the differences of this movement; at the same time, the determinate religion thereby has a *determinate actual* spirit as well. Thus if consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit belong to self-knowing spirit in general, then to the *determinate* shapes of self-knowing spirit there belong the *determinate* forms which developed within consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, developed in each in its own particular way. From the shapes of each one of spirit's moments, the *determinate* shape of religion picks out for its actual spirit the one that corresponds to it. The *one* determinacy of the religion penetrates every aspect of its actual Being-there and impresses on them this common stamp.¹

¶681. In this way, the shapes that have arisen so far arrange themselves differently from the order in which they appeared in their sequence, and on this point we should briefly note in advance what is needed.—In the series we considered, each moment, delving into its own depths, cultivated itself into a whole within its own peculiar principle; and cognition was the depth, or the spirit, in which the moments, which for themselves have no subsistence, had their substance. But this substance has now come to light; it is the depth of spirit certain of itself, a depth that does not allow the singular principle to isolate itself and to make itself a whole within itself, but gathering and holding together all these moments within itself, it advances within this entire wealth of its actual spirit, and all the particular moments of this spirit take into themselves and receive in common the same determinacy of the whole.—This spirit certain of itself and the movement of this spirit is their genuine actuality and the *Being-in-and-for-itself* which pertains to each singular moment.—Thus while the previous single series in its advance marked the reversions in it by nodes, but continued on again from them in one direction, from now on it is, as it were, broken at these nodes, the universal moments, and split up into many lines which, gathered together into a single bundle, at the same time combine symmetrically, so that the similar differences, into which each particular line shaped itself inside itself, converge.—Incidentally, it is self-evident from the whole presentation how this co-ordination of the universal directions here represented is to be understood; so that it is superfluous to remark that these differences are to be conceived essentially only as moments of the becoming, not as parts; in the actual spirit, they are attributes of its substance, but in religion they are only predicates of the subject.—Similarly, *in themselves* or *for us* all forms in general are contained in spirit and in each spirit, but as regards spirit's actuality in general, all that matters is which determinacy is for it in its *consciousness*, in which determinacy it knows its Self expressed or in which shape it knows its essence.¹

¶682. The distinction which was drawn between *actual* spirit and spirit that knows itself as spirit, or between itself as consciousness and self-consciousness, is sublated in the spirit that knows itself according to its truth; its consciousness and its self-consciousness are equalized. But as religion here is at first *immediate*, this distinction has not yet returned into spirit. It is only the *concept* of religion that is posited; in this concept the essence is *self-consciousness*, which is to itself all truth and in this truth contains all actuality. This self-consciousness has, as consciousness, itself as object; spirit, which at first knows itself *immediately*, is thus to itself spirit in the *form* of *immediacy*, and the determinacy of the shape in which it appears to itself is that of *Being*. Certainly, this Being is *filled* neither with sensation or manifold material, nor with other one-sided moments, purposes, and determinations: it is filled with spirit and is known by itself as all truth and actuality. In this way this *filling* is not equal to its *shape*, spirit as essence is not equal to its consciousness. Spirit is actual only as absolute spirit, when it is also for itself in its *truth* as it is in the *certainty of itself*, or when the extremes into which it divides itself as consciousness are for each other in spirit's-shape. The configuration which spirit assumes as object of its consciousness remains filled by the certainty of spirit as by the substance; through this content, the degeneration of the object to pure objectivity, to the form of negativity of self-consciousness, is averted. The immediate unity of spirit with itself is the foundation,

or pure consciousness, *within* which consciousness splits asunder. Enclosed in this way in its pure self-consciousness, spirit does not exist in religion as the creator of a *nature* in general; what it produces in this movement are its shapes as spirits, which together constitute the entirety of its appearance; and this movement itself is the becoming of its complete actuality through the singular aspects of this actuality, or through the incomplete actualities of spirit.¹

¶683. The *first* actuality of spirit is the concept of religion itself, or religion as *immediate* and thus *natural religion*. In this religion, spirit knows itself as its object in a natural or immediate shape. The *second* actuality, however, is necessarily that in which spirit knows itself in the shape of *sublated naturalness* or of the *Self*. This, then, is the religion of *art*; for the shape raises itself to the form of the *Self* through the *productivity* of consciousness whereby consciousness intuits in its object its doing or the *Self*. Finally, the *third* actuality sublates the one-sidedness of the first two; the *Self* is just as much an *immediate Self*, as the *immediacy* is *Self*. If in the first actuality spirit in general is in the form of consciousness, and in the second, in the form of self-consciousness, then in the third it is in the form of the unity of both; it has the shape of *Being-in-and-for-itself*; and since it is thus represented as it is in and for itself, this is the *revealed religion*. But although in this religion spirit attains its true *shape*, yet the very *shape* itself and the *representation* are still the unsurmounted aspect from which spirit must pass over into the *concept*, in order wholly to dissolve the form of objectivity in it, in the concept which equally includes this contrary of itself. Then spirit has grasped the concept of itself, just as we have grasped it for the first time; and its shape or the element of its Being-there, since it is the concept, is spirit itself.¹

A. Natural religion

¶684. The spirit that knows spirit is consciousness of itself and is present to itself in the form of the objective; it *is*; and is at the same time *Being-for-itself*. *It is for itself*, it is the aspect of *self-consciousness*, and that too in contrast to the aspect of its consciousness, or of its relating to itself as *object*. In its consciousness there is opposition, and therefore the *determinacy* of the shape in which it appears to itself and knows itself. It is only this *determinacy* that concerns us in this treatment of religion; for the unshaped essence of spirit, or its pure concept, has already emerged. But at the same time the difference of consciousness and self-consciousness falls within the latter; the shape of religion does not contain the Being-there of spirit, as it is nature free of thought, nor as it is thought, free of Being-there; but the shape is Being-there maintained in thinking, as well as something thought that is there for it. One religion distinguishes itself from another by the *determinacy* of this shape in which spirit knows itself; but we should also note that the presentation of this knowledge of itself in accordance with this *singular determinacy* does not in fact exhaust the whole of an actual religion. The series of diverse religions that will emerge, just as much presents again only the diverse aspects of a single religion, and indeed of *every singular* religion, and the representations that seem to distinguish one actual religion from another occur in every religion. At the same time, however, the diversity must also be viewed as a diversity of religion. For since spirit is situated in the difference between its consciousness and its self-consciousness, the aim of the

movement is to sublimate this cardinal distinction and to give the form of self-consciousness to the shape that is object of consciousness. But this difference is not sublated simply by the fact that the shapes that consciousness contains have in them also the moment of the Self, and that God is *represented* as *self-consciousness*. The *represented* Self is not the *actual* Self; if the Self, like any other more specific determination of the shape, is to belong to this shape in truth, it must, first, be posited in the shape by the doing of self-consciousness and, secondly, the lower determination must show itself to be sublated and comprehended by the higher. For what is represented ceases to be something represented and alien to its knowledge, only because the Self has produced it and therefore intuits the determination of the object as *its own*, and so intuits itself in the object.—Through this activity, the lower determination has at the same time disappeared; for the doing is the negative that is realized at the expense of something else; insofar as the lower determination still occurs as well, it has withdrawn into inessentiality; just as, by contrast, where the lower determination is still dominant but the higher also occurs, the one determination resides selflessly alongside the other. Accordingly, if the various representations within a singular religion do indeed present the entire movement of the forms of the religion, then the character of each religion is determined by the particular unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, i.e. by the fact that self-consciousness has taken into itself the determination of the object of consciousness, has completely appropriated it by its doing, and knows it as the essential determination in contrast to the others.—The truth of the belief in a determination of the religious spirit is shown in the fact that the *actual* spirit is constituted like the shape in which the spirit intuits itself in the religion,—as, e.g., the incarnation of God which occurs in oriental religion has no truth, because the actual spirit of that religion is without this reconciliation.—This is not the place to return from the totality of determinations to the singular determination, and to show in which shape within this determination and its particular religion the others are contained in their entirety. The higher form downgraded beneath a lower has lost its meaning for the self-conscious spirit, belongs to it only superficially and belongs to its representation. The higher form is to be considered in its peculiar meaning and where it is the principle of this particular religion and is authenticated by its actual spirit.¹

A. THE LIGHT-ESSENCE

¶685. Spirit as the *essence* that is *self-consciousness*—or the self-conscious essence that is all truth and knows all actuality as its own self,—is at first only *its own concept* in contrast to the reality which it gives itself in the movement of its consciousness; and this concept is, in contrast to the day of this unfolding, the night of its essence; in contrast to the Being-there of its moments as independent shapes, it is the creative secret of its birth. This secret has its revelation within itself; for the Being-there has its necessity in this concept, because this concept is the spirit that knows itself and so it has in its essence the moment of being consciousness and of representing itself objectively.—It is the pure I, which in its estrangement has within itself as *universal object* the certainty of its own self, or this object is for the I the penetration of all thinking and all actuality.¹

¶686. In the immediate first bifurcation of the self-knowing absolute spirit its shape has the determination appropriate to *immediate consciousness* or to *sensory* certainty. Spirit intuits itself in the form of *Being*, though not the spiritless *Being* filled with the contingent determinations of sensation, the Being that pertains to sense-certainty, but it is the Being filled with spirit. This Being also includes within itself the form which occurred in immediate *self-consciousness*, the form of the *master* confronting the self-consciousness of spirit that retreats from its object.—This *Being* replete with the concept of spirit is thus the *shape* of the *simple* relation of spirit to itself, or the shape of shapelessness. In virtue of this determination, this shape is the pure, all-embracing and all-fulfilling *light-essence* of sunrise, which preserves itself in its formless substantiality. Its otherness is the equally simple negative, *darkness*; the movements of its own estrangement, its creations in the unresisting element of its otherness, are light-showers; in their simplicity, they are at the same time its becoming-for-itself and return from its Being-there, fire-streams consuming the configuration. The difference which this essence acquires proliferates exuberantly in the substance of Being-there and shapes itself into the forms of nature; yet the essential simplicity of its thinking roams about in them without stability and understanding, extends its limits beyond measure, and dissolves its beauty, heightened to splendour, in its sublimity.¹

¶687. The content that this pure *Being* develops, or its perceiving, is therefore an essenceless sideshow in this substance, which only *ascends*, without *descending* into itself, without becoming a subject and consolidating its differences by means of the Self. The determinations of this substance are only attributes which do not advance to independence, but remain merely names of the many-named One. This One is clothed with the manifold forces of Being-there and with the shapes of actuality as with a selfless adornment; they are merely messengers, with no will of their own, messengers of its power, visions of its glory, voices in its praise.¹

¶688. However, this reeling life must determine itself to *Being-for-itself* and give subsistence to its vanishing shapes. The *immediate Being* in which it confronts its consciousness is itself the *negative* power which dissolves its distinctions. It is thus in truth the *Self*; and spirit therefore passes on to know itself in the form of Self. Pure light disperses its simplicity as an infinity of forms, and offers itself as a sacrifice to Being-for-itself, so that in its substance the singular entity takes subsistence for itself.¹

B. THE PLANT AND THE ANIMAL

¶689. The self-conscious spirit, having withdrawn into itself from the shapeless essence or elevated its immediacy to the Self in general, determines its simplicity as a diversity of Being-for-itself, and is the religion of spiritual *perception*, in which spirit splinters into an innumerable multiplicity of weaker and stronger, richer and poorer spirits. This pantheism, initially the *peaceful* subsistence of these spiritual atoms, becomes a *hostile* movement within itself. The innocence of the *religion of flowers*, which is merely selfless representation of the Self, passes into the earnestness of the life of conflict, into the guilt of the *religion of animals*; the tranquillity and impotence of contemplative individuality passes into destructive Being-for-itself.—It is of no use to have taken from the things of perception the *death of abstraction* and to have

elevated them to essences of spiritual perception; the ensouling of this realm of spirits has this death in it owing to the determinacy and the negativity which encroach on its innocent indifference. Through determinacy and negativity, the dispersion into the multiplicity of peaceful shapes of plants becomes a hostile movement in which the hatred of their Being-for-self consumes them.—The *actual* self-consciousness of this dispersed spirit is a host of singularized, unsociable national spirits which in their hatred fight each other to the death and become conscious of determinate shapes of animals as their essence; for they are nothing other than animal-spirits, animal-lives separating from one another, and conscious of themselves without universality.¹

¶690. In this hatred, however, the determinacy of purely negative Being-for-self consumes itself, and through this movement of the concept spirit enters into another shape. *Sublated Being-for-itself* is the *form of the object*, a form which is produced by the Self, or rather which is the Self produced, the self-consuming Self, i.e. the Self becoming a thing. The worker therefore retains the upper hand over these merely rending animal spirits, and his doing is not only negative, but pacified and positive. So from now on the consciousness of spirit is the movement which is beyond immediate *Being-in-itself* and beyond abstract *Being-for-itself*. Since the in-itself is reduced, through opposition, to a determinacy, it is no longer the proper form of absolute spirit, but an actuality which its consciousness finds confronting it as common Being-there, and which it sublates; likewise, this consciousness is not just this sublating Being-for-self, but it also produces its representation, Being-for-self set forth in the form of an object. This production, however, is not perfect production, but a conditioned activity and the forming of something at hand.¹

C. THE ARTISAN

¶691. So spirit here appears as the *artisan*, and his doing, whereby he produces himself as object but without having yet grasped the thought of himself, is an instinctive labour, like that of bees building their cells.¹

¶692. The first form, since it is the immediate form, is the abstract form of the understanding, and the work is not yet within itself filled by spirit. The crystals of pyramids and obelisks, simple combinations of straight lines with plane surfaces and equal proportions of parts, in which the incommensurability of the curve is eliminated, these are the labours of this artisan of the austere form. Owing to the mere intelligibility of the form, this form is not its significance within itself, not the spiritual Self. Thus the works either receive spirit into themselves only as an alien, departed spirit that has abandoned its living saturation with actuality and, itself dead, takes up its abode in this lifeless crystal;—or they have an external relation to spirit, as to a spirit that is itself there externally and not as spirit—as to the dawning light, which casts its meaning on them.¹

¶693. The working spirit sets out from the separation between *Being-in-itself* which becomes the material it works on,—and *Being-for-itself*, which is *the side* of the self-consciousness at work. This separation has become objective to it in its artefact. Its further effort must aim at sublating this separation of soul and body: to clothe and give shape to the soul in its own self, and to ensoul the body. When the two sides are brought closer to each other, they still retain, with respect to each other, the determinacy of represented spirit and of its surrounding envelope; spirit's union

with itself contains this opposition of singularity and universality. While the artefact comes closer to itself in its two sides, something else happens at the same time as a result of this: the artefact comes closer to the working self-consciousness, and this self-consciousness, in the artefact, attains to knowledge of itself as it is in and for itself. But in this way, the artefact at first constitutes only the abstract side of the *activity* of spirit, an activity which does not yet know its content within itself, but in its artefact, which is a thing. The artisan himself, the spirit in its entirety, has not yet appeared, but is the still inner, hidden essence which, as a whole, is present only divided into active self-consciousness and the object it has produced.¹

¶694. So the surrounding abode, the outer actuality which is elevated at first only to the abstract form of understanding, is worked up by the artisan into a more animated form. For this purpose he employs plant-life, which is no longer sacred as it was to the earlier, impotent pantheism, but is taken by the artisan, who conceives himself as the essence that is for itself, as useful material and is reduced to an outer aspect and an ornament. But it is not used unaltered; for the worker of the self-conscious form at the same time obliterates the transience inherent in the immediate existence of this life and brings its organic forms closer to the more rigorous and more universal forms of thought. The organic form, when left to itself, proliferates wildly in particularity, but when it is on its side subjugated by the form of thought, then on the other side it elevates these rectilinear and plane shapes to a more animated curvature—a mixture that becomes the root of free architecture.¹

¶695. This dwelling, the side of the *universal element* or of the inorganic nature of spirit, now also encloses a shape of *singularity* which brings nearer to actuality the spirit that was previously cut off from Being-there, internal or external to it, and thereby makes the artefact more like the active self-consciousness. The worker at first resorts to the form of *Being-for-itself* in general, to the *animal shape*. That he is no longer conscious of himself immediately in animal life, he proves by constituting himself in face of it as the force producing it, and by knowing himself in this life as in *his* artefact; whereby the animal shape at the same time becomes a sublated shape and the hieroglyph of another meaning, of a thought. Hence too, the shape is no longer used alone and entirely by the worker, but blended with the shape of thought, with the human shape. But the artefact still lacks the shape and Being-there in which the Self exists as Self;—it still fails to proclaim within its own self that it contains within it an inner meaning, it lacks the language, the element, in which the fulfilling sense is itself present. Therefore even when the artefact is wholly purified of animality and wears only the shape of self-consciousness, it is the still soundless shape which needs the ray of the rising sun in order to have sound which, engendered by light, is even then only noise and not language, showing only an outer Self, not the inner Self.¹

¶696. In contrast to this outer Self of the shape stands the other shape which indicates that it has in it an *interior*. Nature, withdrawing into its essence, reduces its living diversity, singularizing itself and entangling itself in its movement, to an inessential shell, which is the *covering of the interior*; and this interior is initially still simple darkness, the motionless, the black, formless stone.¹

¶697. Both presentations contain *inwardness* and *Being-there*,—the two moments of spirit; and both presentations contain the two moments at once in a relationship of opposition, the Self as inner and the Self as outer. The two have to be united.—The

soul of the statue in human form does not yet come from the interior, is not yet language, the Being-there that is internal within its own self,—and the interior of multiform Being-there is still the soundless, does not differentiate itself within itself, and is still separated from its exterior, to which all differences belong.—The artisan therefore unites the two in blending the natural shape and the self-conscious shape, and these ambiguous essences, enigmatic to themselves, the conscious struggling with the unconscious, the simple inner struggling with the variously shaped outer, the darkness of the thought pairing with the clarity of expression, these break out into the language of a profound wisdom hard to understand.¹

¶698. In this work the instinctive labour that produced the unconscious work confronting self-consciousness, comes to end; for in this artefact, the activity of the artisan, which constitutes the self-consciousness, encounters an equally self-conscious, self-expressive interior. In it he has worked his way up to the division of his consciousness, where spirit meets spirit. In this unity of self-conscious spirit with itself, insofar as it is the shape and the object of its own consciousness, its mixtures with the unconscious mode purify themselves of the immediate natural shape. These monstrosities in shape, word, and deed dissolve into spiritual configuration,—into an exterior that has retreated into itself, into an interior that expresses itself out of itself and in its own self; they dissolve into a thought, which is a Being-there engendering itself and preserving its shape in conformity with thought and is a lucid reality. Spirit is *artist*.¹

B. Religion of art

¶699. Spirit has raised the shape in which it is for its own consciousness into the form of consciousness itself and it produces such a form before itself. The artisan has given up *synthetic* working, the *mixing* of the alien forms of thought and of nature; now that the shape has gained the form of self-conscious activity, he has become a spiritual worker.¹

¶700. If we ask, what is the *actual* spirit which has the consciousness of its absolute essence in the religion of art, then the answer is that it is the *ethical* or the *true* spirit. This spirit is not only the universal substance of all singletons; since this substance has for actual consciousness the shape of consciousness, this means, in addition, that this substance, which has individualization, is known by the singletons as their own essence and product. So for them it is not the light-essence in whose unity the Being-for-self of self-consciousness is contained only negatively, only in a transitory way, and beholds the master of its actuality,—nor is it the consuming and relentless hatred of hostile peoples,—nor their subjugation to castes which together constitute the semblance of organization of a completed whole, but a whole that lacks the universal freedom of the individuals. No, this spirit is the free people in which custom constitutes the substance of all, whose actuality and Being-there each and everyone knows as their own will and deed.¹

¶701. The religion of the ethical spirit is, however, the elevation of this spirit above its actuality, the withdrawal *from its truth* into the pure *knowledge of itself*. Since the ethical people lives in immediate unity with its substance and does not have in it the principle of the pure singularity of self-consciousness, its religion emerges in its

perfection only in its *detachment* from its *subsistence*. For the *actuality* of the ethical substance depends partly on its tranquil *immutability* in contrast to the absolute movement of self-consciousness, and consequently on the fact that this self-consciousness has not yet withdrawn into itself from its tranquil custom and from its firm trust;—partly, it depends on the organization of self-consciousness into a multiplicity of rights and duties, as well as into the distribution into the masses of the estates and their particular doings which work together to form the whole; and hence it depends on the fact that the singleton is contented with the limitation of his Being-there and has not yet grasped the boundless thought of his free Self. But that tranquil *immediate* trust in the substance turns back into trust *in oneself* and into the *certainty of oneself*, and the multiplicity of rights and duties, like the restricted doing, is the same dialectical movement of the ethical sphere as the multiplicity of things and their determinations—a movement which finds its rest and stability only in the simplicity of the spirit certain of itself.—The completion of the ethical sphere to free self-consciousness, and the fate of the ethical world, are therefore the individuality that has withdrawn into itself, the absolute levity of the ethical spirit which has dissolved within itself all firm distinctions of its subsistence and the masses of its organic articulation and, entirely sure of itself, has attained to boundless jubilation and the freest enjoyment of itself. This simple certainty of spirit within itself has a twofold significance: it is tranquil subsistence and settled truth, as well as absolute unrest and the expiry of the ethical order. But it changes round into the latter; for the truth of the ethical spirit is at first still only this substantial essence and trust, in which the Self does not know itself as free singularity, and which therefore goes to ruin in this inwardness or in the liberation of the Self. So when the trust is broken, when the substance of the people is crushed within itself, then spirit, which was the mean between the unstable extremes, has now come forth into an extreme, that of self-consciousness conceiving itself as essence. This is spirit certain within itself, which mourns the loss of its world and now produces its essence from the purity of the Self, an essence raised above actuality.¹

¶702. In such an epoch absolute art arises; before this, art is an instinctive type of labour, which, submerged in Being-there, works its way out of Being-there and into Being-there; it does not have its substance in the free ethical order and therefore does not have free spiritual activity for the Self at work either. Later on, spirit goes beyond art in order to gain its higher presentation;—in order to be, that is, not only the *substance* born of the Self, but to be, in its presentation as object, *this Self*, not only to give birth to itself from its concept, but to have its very concept for its shape, so that the concept and the work of art produced know each other mutually as one and the same.¹

¶703. Since the ethical substance has withdrawn from its Being-there back into its pure self-consciousness, this is the side of the concept or of the *activity* with which spirit produces itself as object. This activity is pure form, because the singleton, in ethical obedience and service, has worked off all unconscious Being-there and rigid determination, just as that substance itself has become this fluid essence. This form is the night in which substance was betrayed and made itself into subject; it is out of this night of pure certainty of itself that the ethical spirit is resurrected as the shape freed from nature and its own immediate Being-there.¹

¶704. The *existence* of the pure concept into which spirit has fled from its body is an individual which spirit chooses as the vessel of its grief. In this individual, spirit is as his universal and as his power from which he suffers violence,—as his pathos, by his surrender to which his self-consciousness loses its freedom. But this positive power of universality is subdued by the pure Self of the individual, the negative power. This pure activity, conscious of its inalienable force, struggles with the shapeless essence; becoming its master, it has made the pathos into its own material and given itself its content, and this unity emerges as a work, as universal spirit individualized and represented.¹

A. THE ABSTRACT WORK OF ART

¶705. The first work of art, as the immediate work of art, is the abstract and singular work. For its part, it has to move away from this immediate and objective mode towards self-consciousness, while on the other hand self-consciousness for itself aims, in the cult, at sublating the differentiation it at first adopts towards its spirit, and in this way at producing a work of art that is intrinsically animate.¹

¶706. The first way in which the artistic spirit keeps its shape and its active consciousness as far apart as possible is the immediate way: the shape *is there* as *thing* in general.—The shape divides within itself into the distinction between singularity, which has in it the shape of the Self,—and universality, which presents the inorganic essence in relation to the shape, as its environment and habitation. By the elevation of the whole into the pure concept, this shape acquires its pure form, appropriate to the spirit. It is neither the understanding-derived crystal, which houses what is dead or is illumined by the external soul,—nor the mixture, proceeding first from the plant, of the forms of nature and of thought, a thought whose activity here is still an *imitation*. No, the concept strips off the traces of root, branches, and leaves still adhering to the forms and purifies these forms into structures in which the straight line and plane surface of the crystal are elevated into incommensurable relationships, so that the ensouling of the organic is taken up into the abstract form of the understanding and at the same time the essence of this ensouling, incommensurability, is preserved for the understanding.¹

¶707. But the indwelling god is the black stone removed from its animal covering and now pervaded with the light of consciousness. The human shape strips off the animal shape with which it was mixed; the animal is for the god only a contingent disguise; it steps alongside its true shape and no longer has any worth for itself, but is reduced to the meaning of something other than itself, to a mere sign. For this very reason, the shape of the god within its own self strips off also the poverty of the natural conditions of animal Being-there, and hints at the internal dispositions of organic life fused into its surface and belonging only to this surface.—But the *essence* of the god is the unity of the universal Being-there of nature and the self-conscious spirit that in its actuality appears in opposition to nature. At the same time, being initially a *singular* shape, its Being-there is one of the elements of nature, just as its self-conscious actuality is a singular national spirit. But this Being-there is, in this unity, the element reflected into spirit, nature transfigured by thought, nature united with self-conscious life. The shape of the gods therefore has its nature-element within it as a sublated element, as a dim recollection. The chaotic essence and confused

struggle of the free Being-there of the elements, the unethical realm of the Titans, is conquered and banished to the border of an actuality that has become clear to itself, to the bleak boundaries of a world that finds itself in spirit and is there at peace. These ancient gods, into which the light-essence, procreating with darkness, initially particularizes itself, the heaven, the earth, the ocean, the sun, the earth's blind typhonic fire, and so on, are replaced by shapes that now have in them only a dimly reminiscent suggestion of those Titans, and which are no longer essences of nature, but lucid, ethical spirits of self-conscious peoples.¹

¶708. This simple shape has thus obliterated in itself the unrest of endless singularization—the singularization of the nature-element, which acts necessarily only as universal essence, but in its Being-there and movement acts contingently, as well as the singularization of the people which, dispersed into the particular masses of activity and into individual points of self-consciousness, has a Being-there of manifold sense and activity—and condensed it into tranquil individuality. This individuality is therefore confronted by the moment of unrest, it—the *essence*—is confronted by *self-consciousness*, for which, as the birthplace of that individuality, has nothing left for itself except to be *pure activity*. What belongs to the substance, the artist imparted entirely to his product, but to himself as a determinate individuality he gave no actuality in his product; he could confer perfection on his product only by discarding his particularity, by disembodying himself and ascending to the abstraction of pure activity.—In this first immediate production, the separation of the work from his self-conscious activity has not yet given way to their reunification; therefore the artefact is not for itself the actually ensouled artefact, it is a *whole* only together with its *becoming*. The common factor in the work of art, viz. that it is engendered in consciousness and made by human hands, is the moment of the concept existing as concept, which stands in contrast to the work. And if this concept, as artist or as spectator, is disinterested enough to declare the work of art as in its own self absolutely ensouled, and to forget himself, the agent or viewer, then we must offset this by insisting on the concept of spirit which cannot dispense with the moment of being conscious of itself. But this moment stands in opposition to the artefact because in this initial division of itself the concept gives the two sides their abstract, contrasting determinations of *doing* and of *being-a-thing*, and their return into the unity from which they set out has not yet come about.¹

¶709. The artist, then, learns from experience of his work that he did *not* produce an essence *equal to himself*. From it, no doubt, there comes back to him a consciousness, in that an admiring crowd reveres it as the spirit which is their own essence. But since this ensouling returns his self-consciousness to him only as admiration, it is rather a confession that this ensouling makes to the artist that it is not his equal. Since his product comes back to him as joyfulness in general, he does not find in it the pain of its fashioning and generation, nor the effort of his labour. They may well judge the work or bring it offerings, repose their consciousness in it, in any way whatsoever,—if they in their acquaintance with it set themselves above it, he knows how much more his *deed* is worth than their talk and understanding; if they place themselves *below it* and recognize in it the *essence* that dominates them, he knows himself as the master of this essence.¹

¶710. The work of art therefore requires another element of its Being-there, the god requires another mode of emergence than this, in which, out of the depths of his creative night, he descends into the contrary, into externality, into the determination of the unselfconscious *thing*. This higher element is *language*,—a Being-there that is immediately self-conscious existence. Just as the *singular* self-consciousness is there in language, so it is also immediately present as a *universal* contagion; the complete particularization of Being-for-itself is at the same time the fluidity and the universally communicated unity of the many Selves; language is the soul existing as soul. So the god, who has language as the element of his shape, is the intrinsically ensouled work of art which has immediately in its Being-there the pure activity that stood in contrast to the god, when he existed as a thing. Or self-consciousness, in the objectification of its essence, remains immediately together with itself. Being thus together with itself in its essence, it is *pure thinking*, or the devotion whose *inwardness* at the same time has *Being-there* in the hymn. The hymn retains within itself the singularity of self-consciousness, and, when heard, this singularity is at the same time there as universal; devotion, kindled in everyone, is the spiritual stream which, in the multiplicity of self-consciousness, is conscious of itself as a uniform *doing* of all, and as *simple Being*; spirit, as this universal self-consciousness of all, has in a single unity its pure inwardness, as well as Being for others and the Being-for-self of the singletons.¹

¶711. This language is distinct from another language of the god which is not the language of universal self-consciousness. The *oracle*, both of the god of the religions of art and of preceding religions, is his necessary first language; for it is implied in the *concept* of the god that he is the essence both of nature and of spirit, and therefore has not only natural but spiritual Being-there as well. Insofar as this moment is at first implied in his *concept* and not yet realized in religion, the language is, for the religious self-consciousness, language of an *alien* self-consciousness. The self-consciousness that is still alien to its community is not yet *there* in the way its concept requires. The Self is simple Being-for-itself and thereby a purely *universal* Being-for-itself; but the Self that is separated from the self-consciousness of the community is at first only a *singular* self-consciousness.—The content of this singular language of its own stems from the universal determinacy in which the absolute spirit in general is posited in its religion.—Thus the universal spirit of the sunrise, which has not yet particularized its Being-there, utters equally simple and universal statements about the essence; their substantial content is sublime in its simple truth, but because of this universality at the same time appears trivial to self-consciousness as it becomes more cultivated.¹

¶712. The more cultivated Self which rises to *Being-for-itself* is master over the pure pathos of substance, over the objectivity of the dawning light-essence, and knows this simplicity of truth as the *being-in-itself* that does not have the form of contingent Being-there through an alien tongue, but knows it *as the sure and unwritten law of the gods, a law that lives eternally and of which no one knows when it appeared*.—The universal truth that was revealed by the light-essence has here withdrawn into the interior or into the depths, and is thus released from the form of contingent appearance, but, on the other hand, in the religion of art, since the shape of the god has taken on consciousness and hence singularity in general, the god's own language—the god who is the spirit of the ethical people—is the oracle, which knows the particular affairs of the people and discloses what is useful in this

regard. The universal truths, however, because they are known as *what-is-in-itself*, are claimed by *thinking in its knowledge*, and the language of these truths is no longer a language alien to thinking but a language of its own. That wise man of antiquity searched in his own thinking for what is good and fine, whereas he left it to the daemon to know the petty contingent content of knowledge—whether it was good for him to associate with this or that person, or good for an acquaintance to go on a journey, and suchlike insignificant things; in the same way the universal consciousness derives knowledge of the contingent from birds or trees or the fermenting earth, whose vapour robs self-consciousness of its wits; for the contingent is the witless and alien, and therefore the ethical consciousness lets itself be determined in such matters too, as by a throw of dice, in a witless and alien manner. When the singleton determines himself by his understanding and chooses with deliberation what is useful for him, this self-determination is based on the determinacy of the particular character; this determinacy is itself the contingent, and therefore this knowledge supplied by the understanding as to what is useful for the singleton is knowledge of the same sort as knowledge derived from those oracles or from the lot; except that someone who consults the oracle or lot thereby expresses the ethical sentiment of indifference to contingency, whereas the knowledge of the understanding, by contrast, treats what is in itself contingent as an essential interest of its thinking and knowing. But there is something higher than both, and this is to make deliberation the oracle for contingent activity, but to know that this deliberated action is itself something contingent owing to its relation, on one side, to its utility and to the particular.¹

¶713. The true self-conscious Being-there that spirit acquires in speech, which is not the speech of an alien, and therefore contingent, non-universal self-consciousness, is the work of art we met with before. It stands in contrast to the thingly artwork of the statue. While the statue is a Being-there in repose, that of speech is a vanishing Being-there; while in the statue's Being-there the objectivity set free lacks an immediate Self of its own, in speech, by contrast, objectivity remains too much enclosed in the Self, falls too far short of a shaping and is, like time, no longer immediately there when it is there.¹

¶714. In the movement of the two sides, the divine shape *in motion* in the pure sensitive element of self-consciousness, and the divine shape *at rest* in the element of thinghood, mutually surrender their diverse determinations, and the unity which is the concept of their essence comes to Being-there. This movement is constituted by the *cult*. In the cult the Self assumes the consciousness of the descent of the divine essence from its other-worldliness to itself, and this divine essence, which before that is an essence lacking actuality and only objective, thereby acquires the genuine actuality of self-consciousness.¹

¶715. This concept of the cult is already implicitly contained and present in the stream of the hymnal song. This devotion is the immediate, pure satisfaction of the Self by and within itself. The Self is the purified soul which, in this purity, is immediately only essence and is one with the essence. Because it is abstract, the soul is not the consciousness that distinguishes its object from itself; it is thus only the night of its Being-there and the *site prepared* for its shape. The *abstract cult* therefore elevates the Self to being this pure *divine element*. The soul accomplishes this purification with consciousness; yet it is still not the Self that has descended into its

depths and knows itself as evil; it is something that *just is*, a soul that purifies its exterior by washing, clads it in white garments, and its interior passes along the represented path of labours, punishments, and rewards, the path of cultivation in general, the cultivation that sheds particularity; by this path it reaches the dwellings and the community of bliss.¹

¶716. This cult is, at first, only a *secret* accomplishment, i.e. an accomplishment that is only represented, not actual; it must be an *actual* action, for an action that is not actual contradicts itself. *Consciousness proper* thereby raises itself into its *pure* self-consciousness. The essence has in it the significance of a free object; through the actual cult this object returns into the Self—and insofar as the object has, in pure consciousness, the significance of the pure essence dwelling beyond actuality, this essence descends from its universality, through this mediation, to singularity, and thus joins together with actuality.¹

¶717. The entry of the two sides into the action determines itself in such a way that for the self-conscious side, insofar as it is *actual* consciousness, the essence presents itself as *actual nature*; on the one hand, nature belongs to consciousness as possession and property, and amounts to the Being-there that is not *in itself*; on the other hand, nature is *consciousness's own* immediate actuality and singularity, which it equally regards as inessential and sublates. But for its *pure* consciousness, this external nature has at the same time the *opposite* significance, the significance, namely, of being the essence that *is in itself*, to which the Self sacrifices its inessentiality, just as, conversely, it sacrifices the unessential aspect of nature to itself. The action is thereby a spiritual movement, because it is two-sided: on the one hand, it sublates the abstraction of the *essence* (in the way in which devotion determines the object) and makes it actual, while on the other hand, it sublates the *actual* (in the way in which the agent determines the object and himself) and elevates it to universality.¹

¶718. The action of the cult itself therefore begins with the pure *surrender* of a possession which the owner, seemingly with no profit at all to himself, pours away or lets rise up in smoke. In so doing, before the essence of his pure consciousness he renounces possession and right of property and of the enjoyment of it, renounces personality and the return of his doing into the Self; and he reflects the action into the universal or into the essence, rather than into himself.—But conversely the *essence that simply is* also perishes in this action. The animal that is sacrificed is the *sign* of a god; the fruits that are consumed are the *living* Ceres and Bacchus *themselves*;—in the animal, the powers of the higher right, which has blood and actual life, die; in the fruits, die the powers of the lower right, which bloodlessly possesses the secret cunning power.—The sacrifice of the divine substance, insofar as it is *doing*, belongs to the self-conscious side; for this actual doing to be possible, the essence must already have sacrificed itself *in itself*. This it has done by giving itself *Being-there* and making itself into a *singular animal* and into *fruit*. This renunciation, which the essence has thus already accomplished *in itself*, the acting Self displays in *Being-there* and for his consciousness, and replaces that *immediate* actuality of the essence by the higher actuality, viz. the actuality *of himself*. For the unity that has arisen, which is the result of the sublated singularity and separation of the two sides, is not merely a negative fate, but has a positive significance. It is only to the abstract subterranean essence that the sacrificial offering is wholly surrendered, and the reflection of the

possession and of Being-for-self into the universal is marked as distinct from the Self as such. But at the same time this is only a small *part*, and the rest of the sacrifice is merely the destruction of what cannot be used and rather the preparation of the offering for a meal, the feast that cheats the action out of its negative significance. At that first sacrifice, the person making the offering reserves the greatest share, and from the latter sacrifice he keeps what is useful *for his enjoyment*. This enjoyment is the negative power which sublates both the *essence* and the *singularity*, and it is at the same time the positive actuality in which the *objective* Being-there of the essence is transformed into *self-conscious* Being-there, and the Self has consciousness of its unity with the essence.¹

¶719. Incidentally, although this cult is an actual action, its significance lies mostly just in devotion; what pertains to devotion is not objectively produced, just as the result, in the *enjoyment*, divests itself of its Being-there. The cult, therefore, goes further and repairs this deficiency initially by giving its devotion an *objective subsistence*, since the cult is the common task or the singular task that everyone can do, a task that produces the dwelling and the adornment of the god in his honour.—In this way, on the one hand the objectivity of the statue is sublated; for by this dedication of his gifts and labours the labourer makes the god favourable to him, and contemplates his Self as belonging to the god; on the other hand too, this doing is not the singular labour of the artist: this particularity is dissolved in universality. But it is not only the honour of the god that comes about, and the blessing of his favour is not shed on the labourer only in *representation*: the labour has also a significance the reverse of the first, which was that of estrangement and of alien honour. The dwellings and halls of the god are for the use of man, the treasures stored in them are his own in time of need; the honour enjoyed by the god in his adornment is the honour of the artistic and magnanimous people. At the festival, this people also adorns its own dwellings and garments, as well as its performances, with graceful furnishings. In this way, it receives from the grateful god a return for their gifts and proofs of his favour, in which through their labour they became united with him, not in hope and in an actualization after the event, but rather, in witnessing to his honour and in offering gifts, the people has immediately the enjoyment of its own wealth and adornment.¹

B. THE LIVING WORK OF ART

¶720. The people that approaches its god in the cult of the religion of art is the ethical people that knows its State and the actions of the State as the will and the accomplishment of its own self. This spirit, confronting the self-conscious people, is therefore not the light-essence, which, devoid of Self, does not contain within it the certainty of the singletons, but is only their universal essence and the imperious power in which they disappear. The cult of the religion of this simple, shapeless essence gives back to its votaries, therefore, nothing at all except that they are the people of their god; the cult secures for them only their subsistence and their simple substance in general, not, however, their actual Self which, on the contrary, is rejected. For they revere their god as the empty depth, not as spirit. But the cult of the religion of art, on the other hand, lacks that abstract *simplicity* of the essence and therefore its *depth*. The *essence*, however, which is *immediately united with the Self*, is *in itself* the spirit and the *knowing truth*, though not yet the known truth, or the truth

that knows itself in its depth. So because the essence here contains the Self, its appearance is friendly to consciousness, and in the cult consciousness receives not only the universal justification of its subsistence, but also its conscious Being-there in the essence itself; just as, conversely, the essence does not have an actuality devoid of Self, in a rejected people whose substance alone is recognized, but in the people whose *Self* is recognized in its substance.¹

¶721. Self-consciousness, then, emerges from the cult satisfied in its essence, with the god lodged in it as its abode. For itself this *abode* is the night of substance or its pure individuality, but no longer the tense individuality of the artist, an individuality which has not yet reconciled itself with its essence that is becoming *objective*; it is the satisfied night which has its pathos within it and its needs fulfilled, because it returns from intuition, from sublated objectivity.—This *pathos* is, for itself, the essence of the *rising sun*, but this essence has now *descended* into itself, and has within itself its sundown, self-consciousness, and hence Being-there and actuality.—The essence has here run through the movement of its actualization. Descending from its pure essentiality to an objective force of nature and the expressions of that force, it is a Being-there for the other, for the Self, by which it is consumed. The silent essence of selfless nature reaches in its fruit the stage where, preparing itself and digested, it offers itself to selfish life; in its utility as food and drink nature attains its highest perfection; for in this it is the possibility of a higher existence and makes contact with spiritual Being-there;—in its metamorphosis, the earth-spirit has advanced partly to the silently powerful substance, but partly to spiritual fermentation, in the first case to the feminine principle of nourishment, in the other to the masculine principle of the self-impelling force of self-conscious Being-there.¹

¶722. In this enjoyment, then, that rising light-essence is exposed for what it is; enjoyment is the mystery of this essence. For the mystical is not concealment of a secret, or ignorance, but consists in the fact that the Self knows itself at one with the essence and that the essence is thus revealed. Only the Self is manifest to itself; or what is manifest is so only in the immediate certainty of itself. But it is in this immediate certainty that the simple essence has been posited by the cult; as a thing that can be used the essence not only has a Being-there that is seen, felt, smelt, tasted, but it is also an object of desire, and through the actual enjoyment becomes one with the Self and thereby completely exposed to the Self and manifest to it.—That which is said to be manifest to reason, to the heart, is in fact still secret, for the actual certainty of immediate Being-there is still lacking, objective certainty as well as the certainty of enjoyment, a certainty which in religion, however, is not merely thoughtless and immediate, but is at the same time the purely knowing certainty of the Self.¹

¶723. What has thus, through the cult, become manifest to self-conscious spirit within itself, is the *simple* essence, as the movement in which, on the one hand, it emerges from its nocturnal concealment up into consciousness, there to be its silently nourishing substance, while, on the other hand, it also loses itself again in the subterranean night, in the Self, and lingers above only with a silent maternal yearning.—But the lucid impulse is the many-named light-essence of the rising sun, and its tumultuous life which, likewise relinquished by its abstract Being, at first deals with the objective Being-there of the fruit, and then, surrendering to self-consciousness, attains

to genuine actuality in it,—and now roams about as a horde of frenzied women, the unrestrained revelry of nature in self-conscious shape.¹

§724. But what is disclosed to consciousness is still only absolute spirit, which is this simple essence, not spirit as the spirit within its own self; or it is only the *immediate* spirit, the spirit of nature. Its self-conscious life is therefore only the mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the other, the strictly higher, gods whose individuality includes, as an essential moment, self-consciousness as such. So spirit has not yet sacrificed itself as *self-conscious* spirit to self-consciousness, and the mystery of bread and wine is not yet the mystery of flesh and blood.¹

§725. This unruly revelry of the god must settle down to become an *object*, and the enthusiasm which did not attain to consciousness must produce a work confronting it, as the statue confronted the enthusiasm of the foregoing artist, a work that is equally complete of course, only not as an intrinsically lifeless Self, but as a *living* Self.—Such a cult is the festival which man presents to himself in his own honour, though not yet conferring on this sort of cult the significance of the absolute essence; for it is the *essence* that is manifest to him at first, not yet spirit; not as an essence that *essentially* takes on human shape. But this cult lays the foundation for this revelation and sets out its moments one by one. So here the *abstract* moment of the living *corporeality* of the essence, just as previously the unity of the two in unconscious enthusiasm. Man thus puts himself in the place of the statue as the shape that has been reared and elaborated for perfectly free *movement*, just as the statue is perfectly free *repose*. If each singleton knows how to play at least the part of a torch-bearer, then one of them comes forward who is the shaped movement, the smooth elaboration and fluid force of all the members;—an ensouled, living work of art that couples strength with its beauty; and on him is bestowed, as a reward for his force, the decoration with which the statue was honoured, and the honour, among his people, of being, in place of the god in stone, the highest bodily presentation of their essence.¹

§726. In both of the presentations that have just come before us there is present the unity of self-consciousness and the spiritual essence; but their equilibrium is still lacking. In Bacchic enthusiasm the Self is beside itself, but in corporeal beauty the spiritual essence is beside itself. The stupor of consciousness and its wild stammering in the former must be taken up into the clear Being-there of the latter, and the spiritless clarity of the latter must be taken up into the inwardness of the former. The perfect element in which inwardness is just as external as externality is inward is once again language, but neither the language of the oracle, wholly contingent and singular in its content, nor the sentimental hymn praising only the singular god, nor the stammering of Bacchic frenzy, devoid of content. No, it has acquired its lucid and universal content: its *lucid* content, because the artist has worked his way out of the initial, wholly substantial enthusiasm into a shape that is his own Being-there, permeated in all its vibrations by the self-conscious soul and living in harmony;—its *universal* content, for in this festival, which is the honour of man, the one-sidedness of the statues, which contain only a national spirit, only a determinate character of divinity, disappears. The handsome warrior is indeed the honour of his particular people, but he is a corporeal singularity, in which the fulness and seriousness of significance and the inner character of the spirit that bears the particular life, concerns, needs, and customs of his people, have disappeared. In this estrangement

into complete corporeality, spirit has discarded the particular impressions and resonances of nature that, as the actual spirit of the people, it encompassed. Its people is, therefore, no longer conscious in this spirit of its particularity but conscious rather of having laid this aside and of the universality of its human Being-there.¹

C. THE SPIRITUAL WORK OF ART

¶727. The national spirits which become conscious of the shape of their essence in a particular animal coalesce into one spirit; thus the particular beautiful national spirits unite into a single pantheon, the element and dwelling of which is language. The pure intuition of itself as *universal humanity* has, in the actuality of the national spirit, this form: the national spirit combines with the others, with which it constitutes through nature a single nation, for a common undertaking, and for this work forms a complete people and therewith a complete heaven. This universality, to which spirit in its Being-there attains, is, however, only this first universality which first issues from the individuality of the ethical, which has not yet overcome its immediacy, has not yet formed a single State out of these populations. The ethical life of the actual national spirit rests partly on the immediate trust of the singletons in their people as a whole, partly on the immediate share which all, regardless of differences of rank, take in the resolutions and actions of the government. In the union, which to begin with is not a permanent arrangement but only for a common action, that freedom of participation by each and everyone is, *for the time being*, put on one side. This first community is therefore more an assembly of individualities than the dominion of abstract thought, which would rob the singletons of their self-conscious participation in the will and deed of the whole.¹

¶728. The gathering of the national spirits constitutes a circle of shapes which now embraces the whole of nature as well as the whole ethical world. They stand, too, under the *supreme command* of the one, rather than under his *supreme dominion*. For themselves they are the universal substances of what the *self-conscious essence in itself* is and does. But this essence constitutes the force and initially at least the midpoint on which the endeavours of those universal essences turn, and which at first seems to combine their enterprises only contingently. But it is the return of the divine essence into self-consciousness that already contains the reason why this essence forms the midpoint for those divine forces and conceals the essential unity, initially, under the form of a friendly, external relation of the two worlds.¹

¶729. The form of the consciousness, in which the content arises, also necessarily has the same universality that pertains to this content itself. Consciousness is no longer the actual doing of the cult, but a doing that is elevated, not yet indeed into the concept, but at first into *representation*, into the synthetic linkage of self-conscious Being-there and external Being-there. The Being-there of this representation, *language*, is the first language, the *epos* as such, which contains the universal content, at least as *completeness* of the world, though not as the *universality of thought*. The *bard* is the singular and the actual entity, from which, as the subject of this world, the world is engendered and borne. His pathos is not the stupefying power of nature but Mnemosyne, reflection and the inwardness that has come about, the recollection of the formerly immediate essence. He is the organ that vanishes in its content; what counts is not his own Self but his Muse, his universal song. But what is in fact present

is the syllogism in which the extreme of universality, the world of gods, is linked with singularity, with the bard, through the middle term of particularity. The middle term is the people in its heroes, who are singular men like the bard, but only *represented*, and thereby at the same time *universal*, like the free extreme of universality, the gods.¹

¶730. In this epic, then, what comes about *in itself* in the cult, the relation of the divine to the human, *presents* itself in general to consciousness. The content is an *action* of the essence conscious of itself. The *acting* disturbs the tranquillity of the substance and excites the essence so that its simplicity is divided and opened up into the variegated world of natural and ethical forces. The action is the wound of the peaceful earth, the pit which, ensouled by blood, evokes the departed spirits, who, thirsting for life, obtain it in the doing of self-consciousness. The enterprise on which the universal endeavour turns has two sides: the *selfish* side, where the enterprise is accomplished by a totality of actual peoples and the individualities standing at their head, and the *universal* side, where it is accomplished by their substantial powers. But the *relation* of the two sides determined itself earlier like this: it is the *synthetic* combination of the universal and singular, or *representation*. On this determinacy the judgement of this world depends.—The relationship of the two is thus a mixture, which shares out the unity of the doing in an inconsistent way, and superfluously switches the action over from one side to the other. The universal powers have the shape of individuality and hence the principle of action in them; their operation appears, therefore, as a free doing, proceeding entirely from them, just as much as that of men. Consequently, one and the same thing has been done both by the gods and by men. The earnestness of those powers is a ridiculous superfluity, since these powers are in fact the force of the acting individuality;—and the exertion and labour of the individuality is an equally useless effort, since it is rather the powers who manage everything. Ephemeral mortals, who are nothing, are at the same time the powerful *Self* that subjugates the universal essences, offends the gods, and in general procures actuality for them and an interest in the doing; while conversely, these impotent universalities, who nourish themselves on the gifts of men and through them alone get something to do, are the natural essence and the stuff of all the events, and also the ethical matter and the pathos of the doing. If their elemental natures are first brought into actuality and activated relationship by the free *Self* of individuality, they are equally the universal that withdraws from this connection, that remains unrestricted in its determination, and through the invincible elasticity of its unity effaces the punctuality of the active party and its figurations, keeps itself pure and dissolves everything individual in its fluidity.¹

¶731. Just as the gods fall into this contradictory relation with the selfish nature opposed to their own, so too their universality comes into conflict with their own determination and its relationship to others. They are the eternal, beautiful individuals who, reposing in their own Being-there, are exempt from transience and alien power.—But at the same time they are *determinate* elements, *particular* gods, who therefore enter into relationship to others. But the relationship to others which, in virtue of its opposition, is a conflict with them, is a comical self-forgetfulness of their eternal nature.—The determinacy is rooted in the divine subsistence and has in its limitation the independence of the whole individuality; at the same time because

of this independence their characters lose the sharpness of peculiarity and blend together in their ambiguity.—One purpose of the activity, and their activity itself, since it is directed against an other, and hence against an invincible divine force, is a contingent and empty bravado, which at once melts away and transforms the seeming earnestness of the action into a risk-free, self-assured play, without result or outcome. But if in the nature of their divinity the negative or the determinacy of this nature appears merely as the inconsequence of their activity and the contradiction between purpose and outcome, and if that independent security retains the preponderance over the determinate, then by that very fact the *pure force* of the *negative* confronts it, and, moreover, as the ultimate power over them and about which they can do nothing. They are the universal and the positive over against the *singular Self* of mortals which does not hold out against their power; but the *universal Self*, for that reason, hovers over them and over this whole world of representation to which the entire content belongs, as the *unconceptual void of necessity*,—a happening which they face selflessly and sorrowfully, for these *determinate* natures do not find themselves in this purity.¹

¶732. But this necessity is the *unity* of the *concept*, to which the contradictory substantiality of the singular moments is subjugated, in which the inconsequence and contingency of their doing get in good order and the play of their actions acquires its earnestness and worth in the actions themselves. The content of the world of representation unrestrainedly plays its movement for itself in the *middle term*, assembled around the individuality of a hero who, however, in his strength and beauty feels his life broken and sorrowfully expects an early death. For the *intrinsically firm and actual singularity* is banished to the extremity and split up into its moments which have not yet found and unified themselves. One singleton, the *abstract* non-actual, is necessity, which does not participate in the life of the middle term, no more than the other does, the *actual* singleton, the bard, who keeps outside it and is lost in his representation. Both extremes must draw near to the content; one of them, the necessity, has to fill itself with the content, while the other, the language of the bard, must participate in it; and the content formerly left to itself must receive in it the certainty and the fixed determination of the negative.¹

¶733. This higher language, *tragedy*, thus brings closer together the dispersion of the moments of the essential world and the world of action; the *substance* of the divine sunders into its shapes *in accordance with the nature of the concept*, and their *movement* likewise conforms to the concept. In regard to form, the language ceases to be narrative because it enters into the content, and the content ceases to be an imaginatively represented content. The hero is himself the speaker, and the representation shows to the audience—who are also spectators—*self-conscious* human beings who *know* their right and their purpose, the power and the will of their determinacy, and know how to *say* it. They are artists, who do not express unconsciously, naturally and naively the *external* aspect of their resolution and undertaking, like the language accompanying ordinary doing in actual life: they give outward voice to the inner essence, they demonstrate the right of their actions, and they reflectively affirm and determinately express the pathos that possesses them, in its universal individuality, free from contingent circumstances and from the particularity of personalities. Finally, it is *actual* human beings who are the *Being-there* of these

characters, human beings who assume the personae of the heroes and portray them in actual speech, not narrative speech, but in their own speech. Just as it is essential for the statue to be the work of human hands, so the actor is essential to his mask,—not as an external condition from which we must abstract when viewing art;—or insofar as we nevertheless have to abstract from it in the art, this amounts to saying that the art does not yet contain the true authentic Self.¹

¶734. The *universal terrain* on which the movement of these shapes generated from the concept proceeds, is the consciousness of the first representational language and its selfless content, abandoned to its dispersion. It is the common people in general whose wisdom finds expression in the *chorus* of the *ancients*; in the weakness of the chorus the people has its representative, because the common people itself constitutes merely the positive and passive material of the individuality of the government confronting it. Lacking the power of the negative, it is unable to hold together and subdue the riches and varied abundance of the divine life, but lets it drift apart, and in its reverential hymns it extols each singular moment as an independent god, first one and then again another. But where it discerns the earnestness of the concept—how it smashes these shapes to pieces as it marches on above them—and comes to see how ill it fares with its venerated gods who venture onto this territory where the concept holds sway, then it is not itself the negative power that actively intervenes; it keeps to the selfless thought of such power, to the consciousness of an *alien fate*, and introduces the empty wish for tranquillity and feeble talk of appeasement. In its *fear* of the higher powers which are the immediate arms of the substance, its fear of their struggle among themselves, and of the simple Self of necessity which crushes them as well as the living beings linked with them;—in its *compassion* for these living beings which at the same time it knows to be the same as itself, there is for the people only the paralysing dread of this movement, only the equally helpless pity, and as the end of it all, the empty repose of submission to necessity, whose work is not grasped as the necessary action of the character, nor as the activity of the absolute essence within itself.¹

¶735. For this consciousness of the spectator, as the indifferent terrain of representation, spirit does not enter the scene in its dispersed multiplicity, but in the simple partition of the concept. Its substance therefore shows itself torn asunder merely into its two extreme powers. These elemental *universal* essences are at the same time self-conscious *individualities*,—heroes, who posit their consciousness in one of these powers, have in it determinacy of character and constitute the operation and actuality of these powers.—This universal individualization descends again, as we have mentioned, to the immediate actuality of authentic Being-there and presents itself to a crowd of spectators who have in the chorus their counterpart, or rather the expression of their own representation.¹

¶736. The content and movement of spirit, which here is object to itself, has already been considered as the nature and realization of the ethical substance. In its religion, this spirit attains to consciousness of itself, or presents itself to its consciousness in its purer form and simpler configuration. So if the ethical substance, in virtue of its concept and in accordance with its *content*, divided into the two powers which were determined as *divine* right and *human* right, or right of the nether world and right of the upper world—the former the *family*, the latter the *State power*,—and the

first of which was the *feminine* and the second the *masculine character*, then the previously multiform circle of gods, fluctuating in its determinations, confines itself to these powers which in virtue of this determination come closer to genuine individuality. For the earlier dispersion of the whole into manifold and abstract forces, which appear substantialized, is the *dissolution* of the *subject*, which comprehends them only as *moments* within its Self, and therefore individuality is merely the superficial form of these essences. Conversely, a further distinction of *characters*, in addition to the one we have mentioned, is to be attributed to contingent and in itself external personality.¹

¶737. At the same time, the essence divides with respect to its *form* or to *knowledge*. The *acting* spirit confronts as consciousness the object on which it is active and which is thus determined as the *negative* of the knower; the agent is thereby involved in the opposition of knowing and not-knowing. He derives his purpose from his character and knows it as the ethical essentiality; but in virtue of the determinacy of his character he knows only the *one* power of substance, the other remaining hidden from him. The actuality present is therefore one thing *in itself*, and another thing for consciousness; the upper right and the nether right in this connection acquire the meaning of the power that knows and reveals itself to consciousness, and the power that conceals itself and lurks in ambush. The *one* is the *side of light*, the god of the oracle who, in accordance with his natural moment, has sprung from the all-illuminating sun, knows all and reveals all,—*Phoebus*, and *Zeus* who is his father. But the commands of this truth-speaking god, and his proclamations of what *is*, are really deceptive.¹ For this knowing is, in its concept, immediately not-knowing, because *consciousness*, in acting, is in itself this opposition. He who was able to solve the riddle of the sphinx itself,² and he who trusted with childlike confidence,³ are therefore sent to destruction by what the god reveals to them. This priestess through whom the beautiful god speaks is in no way different from the equivocating sisters of fate who drive to crime by their promises and who by the double-tongued ambiguity of what they announced as a certainty deceive him who relied on the manifest sense.⁴ Therefore the consciousness that is purer than the latter, which believes the witches, and more prudent and profound than the former, which trusts the priestess and the beautiful god, hesitates over revenge on receiving a revelation from the spirit of his own father about the crime that murdered him, and still arranges other proofs,—for the reason that this revelatory spirit could also be the devil.⁵

¶738. The basis of this mistrust is that the knowing consciousness posits itself in the opposition between the certainty of itself and the objective essence. The right of the ethical law, that actuality is *in itself* nothing in opposition to the absolute law, learns by experience that its knowledge is one-sided, its law only a law of its character, that it latched onto only one of the powers of the substance. The action itself is this inversion of what is *known* into its *contrary*, into *Being*, the turnabout of the right of character and of knowledge into the right of the opposite with which the former is bound up in the essence of the substance—a turnabout into the Erinyes of the other power and character aroused to hostility. This *nether* right sits with *Zeus* on the throne and enjoys equal authority with the god who is revealed and who knows.¹

¶739. The world of the gods of the chorus is restricted to these three essences by the acting individuality. One of them is the *substance*, the power of the hearth and the

spirit of family piety, as well as the universal power of the State and the government. This distinction, since it belongs to the substance as such, does not individualize itself for representation into two distinct shapes, but has in actuality the two persons of its characters. On the other hand, the distinction between knowing and not-knowing falls within *each of the actual self-consciousnesses*—and only in abstraction, in the element of universality, does it apportion itself to two individual shapes. For the Self of the hero has Being-there only as a whole consciousness and is therefore essentially the *whole* of the distinction belonging to the form; but its substance is determinate and only one side of the distinction of the content belongs to him. Therefore, while in actuality neither of the two sides of consciousness has a separate individuality of its own, in the *representation* each of them receives its own particular shape, one the shape of the revelatory god, the other the shape of the Erinyes who keep themselves concealed. On the one hand, both enjoy equal honour, while on the other hand, the *shape* of the *substance*, Zeus, is the necessity of the *relation* of the two to each other. The substance is the relation where the knowledge is for itself, but has its truth in the simple; where the distinction, through which actual consciousness is, has its ground in the inner essence that annihilates the distinction; and where the clear *self-assurance of certainty* has its confirmation in *oblivion*.¹

¶740. Consciousness disclosed this opposition through action; acting in accordance with the revealed knowledge it learns by experience the deception of this knowledge, and being devoted as regards the content to one of the attributes of substance, it violated the other attribute and so gave it the right against itself. In following the god who knows, it instead got hold of what was not revealed, and atones for having trusted a knowledge whose ambiguity, since such is its nature, should have been present *for consciousness* as well, and should have been a *warning* against it. The frenzy of the priestess, the inhuman shape of the witches, the voice of the tree and the bird, the dream and so forth, are not the ways in which truth appears; they are warning signs of deception, of lack of self-possession, of the singularity and contingency of the knowledge. Or, what is the same thing, the opposite power which is violated by consciousness is present as express law and valid right, whether it be law of the family or of the State; consciousness, on the contrary, followed its own knowledge and concealed from itself what was revealed. The truth, however, of the antagonistic powers of the content and consciousness is the result that both are equally in the right, and therefore in their opposition, which is brought about by action, are equally in the wrong. The movement of the doing demonstrates their unity in the mutual downfall of the two powers and of the self-conscious characters. The reconciliation of the opposition with itself is the *Lethe* of the *underworld* in death,—or the *Lethe* of the *upper* world, as absolution, not from guilt (for consciousness, since it acted, cannot deny guilt), but absolution from crime, and its expiatory appeasement. Both are *oblivion*, the disappearance of the actuality and the doing of the powers of substance, of their individualities, and of the powers of the abstract thought of good and evil; for none of them for itself is the essence; the essence is rather the repose of the whole within itself, the immobile unity of fate, the calm Being-there and consequent inactivity and lack of vitality of family and government, and the equal honour and consequent indifferent unactuality of Apollo and the Erinyes, and the return of their spirituality and activity into simple Zeus.¹

¶741. This fate completes the depopulation of heaven,—of the thoughtless mingling of individuality and essence,—a mingling whereby the doing of the essence appears as inconsequent, contingent, unworthy of itself; for individuality that is only superficially attached to the essence is unessential individuality. The expulsion of such essenceless representations, which was demanded by the philosophers of antiquity, thus already begins in tragedy in general in virtue of the fact that the division of the substance is governed by the concept, and consequently individuality is essential individuality, and the determinations are the absolute characters. The self-consciousness that is represented in tragedy therefore knows and acknowledges only one supreme power, and knows and acknowledges this Zeus only as the power of the State or of the hearth, and, in the opposition pertaining to knowledge, only as the father of the knowledge of the *particular* that is taking shape,—and as the Zeus of the oath and of the Erinyes, of the *universal*, of the interior dwelling in concealment. On the other hand, the further moments dispersing from the concept into representation, moments which the chorus emphasizes one after the other, are not the pathos of the hero; they sink to the level of passion in him,—to contingent, essenceless moments which the selfless chorus praises, but are not capable of constituting the character of heroes, nor of being expressed and esteemed by them as their essence.¹

¶742. But also the persons of the divine essence itself, as well as the characters of its substance, coalesce into the simplicity of the unconscious. Vis-à-vis self-consciousness this necessity has the determination of being the negative power of all the shapes that arise, a power in which they do not recognize themselves but rather perish in it. The Self arises only as assigned to the *characters*, not as the centre of the movement. But self-consciousness, the simple *certainty* of oneself, is in fact the negative power, the unity of Zeus, of the *substantial* essence and of *abstract* necessity; it is the spiritual unity into which everything returns. Because actual self-consciousness is still distinguished from the substance and from fate, it is *on the one hand* the chorus, or rather the crowd of spectators, whom this movement of the divine life, as something *alien*, fills with fear, or in whom this movement, as something near to them, produces only the emotion of helpless *compassion*. On the other hand, insofar as consciousness joins in the action and belongs to the characters, this unification is an external unification, a *hypocrisy*, because the true unification, that of the Self, fate, and substance, is not yet present; the hero who appears before the spectator splits up into his mask and the actor, into the persona and the actual Self.¹

¶743. The self-consciousness of the heroes must step forth from its mask and display itself as knowing itself to be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powers themselves, and as being no longer separated from the chorus, from the universal consciousness.¹

¶744. Thus *comedy* has, first of all, the aspect that actual self-consciousness displays itself as the fate of the gods. These elemental essences, as *universal* moments, are not a Self and not actual. They are, indeed, invested with the form of individuality, but this is only imaginatively projected onto them and does not pertain to them in and for themselves; the actual Self does not have such an abstract moment for its substance and content. It, the subject, is raised above such a moment, as above a singular property, and attired in this mask it proclaims the irony of this property that purports to be something for itself. The pretension of universal essentiality is exposed to the

Self; the Self shows itself caught up in an actuality, and drops the mask just because it wants to be something straight. The Self, presenting itself here in its significance as something actual, plays with the mask which it once puts on in order to be its persona,—but it dispels this illusion right away and stands exposed in its own nakedness and ordinariness, which it shows to be not distinct from the Self proper, from the actor as well as the spectator.¹

§745. This universal dissolution of essentiality in general, when it takes the shape of individuality, becomes in its content more serious and thus more petulant and more bitter insofar as the content has its more serious and more necessary significance. The divine substance unites within it the significance of natural and ethical essentiality. As regards the natural element, actual self-consciousness already shows in its employment of it for its adornment, for its dwelling, etc., and in the feast of its sacrifice, that it is itself the fate to which is betrayed the secret about the case of the self-essentiality of nature; in the mystery of bread and wine, it makes this self-essentiality its own, along with the meaning of the inner essence, and in comedy, it is fully conscious of the irony of this meaning.—Now insofar as this meaning contains ethical essentiality, it is partly the people in its two aspects, that of the State or the *demos* proper, and that of family singularity, but partly it is self-conscious pure knowledge or the rational thinking of the universal.—This *demos*, the universal mass, which knows itself as master and regent, and also as the understanding and insight which demand respect, constrains and dupes itself through the particularity of its actuality, and exhibits the ludicrous contrast between its opinion of itself and its immediate Being-there, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and vulgarity. If the principle of its singularity, separated from the universal, thrusts forward in the authentic shape of actuality and openly usurps the commonwealth, whose secret bane it is, and administers it, then the contrast between the universal as a theory and what we have to deal with in practice betrays itself more immediately, the complete emancipation of the aims of immediate singularity from the universal order, and the contempt of singularity for that order.¹

§746. Rational *thinking* delivers the divine essence from its contingent shape and, in opposition to the unconceptual wisdom of the chorus which advances all sorts of ethical saws and gives currency to a host of laws and determinate concepts of duty and of right, raises them up into the simple Ideas of the *beautiful* and the *good*.—The movement of this abstraction is the consciousness of the dialectic that these maxims and laws have in them, and consequently the consciousness of the vanishing of the absolute validity in which they formerly appeared. With the vanishing of the contingent determination and superficial individuality which representation lent to the divine essentialities, all they still have on their *natural* side is the nakedness of their immediate Being-there; they are clouds, an evanescent mist, like those representations. When their essentialness has been refined by *thinking* and accordingly they have become the *simple* thoughts of the *beautiful* and the *good*, they tolerate being filled with any content whatsoever. The force of dialectical knowledge surrenders the determinate laws and maxims of action to the pleasure and frivolity of youth led astray—by it—and supplies weapons of deception to the anxiety and care of old age, restricted as it is to the singularity of life. The pure thoughts of the *beautiful* and the *good* thus display a comic spectacle: through their liberation from the opinion which

contains both their determinacy as content and also their absolute determinacy, the firm hold of consciousness, they become empty, and for that very reason the plaything of opinion and the wilfulness of contingent individuality.¹

¶747. So the formerly unconscious fate, which consists in empty repose and oblivion, and is separated from self-consciousness, is here united with self-consciousness. The *singular Self* is the negative force through which and in which the gods, and also their moments—nature as being-there and the thoughts of their determinations—disappear; at the same time, the singular Self is not the emptiness of disappearance, but preserves itself in this very nothingness, is at home with itself and is the sole actuality. The religion of art has consummated itself in it and has completely returned into itself. In virtue of the fact that it is the singular consciousness in the certainty of itself that presents itself as this absolute power, this power has lost the form of something *represented*, something altogether *separated* from *consciousness* and alien to it, as were the statue, also the living and beautiful corporeality, or the content of the epic and the powers and persons of tragedy;—the unity, too, is not the *unconscious* unity of the cult and the mysteries, but the authentic Self of the actor coincides with his persona, just like the spectator, who is completely at home in what is represented to him and sees himself playing in it. What this self-consciousness intuitively beholds is that what assumes the form of essentiality confronting it, instead dissolves in it and is surrendered to its mercy in its thinking, its Being-there, and its doing; it is the return of everything universal into the certainty of itself, and this certainty is, in consequence, this complete lack of terror, this complete lack of essence on the part of everything alien, and a well-being and contentment of consciousness, such as is no longer to be found outside this comedy.¹

C. The revealed religion

¶748. Through the religion of art, spirit has passed from the form of *substance* into the form of *subject*, for the religion of art *produces* the shape of the subject and thus posits in this shape the *activity* or the *self-consciousness* that, in the dreadful substance, simply vanishes and does not apprehend its own Self in its trust. This human incarnation of the divine essence starts from the statue which has in it only the *outer* shape of the Self, while the *interior*, its activity, falls outside it; but in the cult the two sides have become one; and in the result of the religion of art this unity, in its completion, has at the same time also passed over to the extreme of the Self; in spirit, which is completely certain of itself in the singularity of consciousness, all essentiality is submerged. The proposition that expresses this light-heartedness runs thus: *the Self is the absolute essence*; the essence, which was substance and in which the Self was accidentality, has sunk to the level of a predicate; and in *this self-consciousness*, which nothing confronts in the form of essence, spirit has lost its *consciousness*.¹

¶749. This proposition: *the Self is the absolute essence*, belongs, self-evidently, to the non-religious spirit, to the actual spirit; and we have to recall which is the shape of spirit that expresses it. This shape will contain at the same time the movement of the proposition and its inversion, which reduces the Self to the predicate and elevates substance to the subject. This happens in the following way: the inverse proposition does not *in itself* or *for us* make the substance into the subject or, to put it another

way, reinstate substance in such a manner that spirit's consciousness is led back to its beginning, to natural religion; on the contrary, this inversion is brought about *for* and *by self-consciousness* itself. Since self-consciousness abandons itself with consciousness, it is preserved in its estrangement and remains the subject of substance, but as it is also estranged from itself, it has consciousness of substance at the same time; or since self-consciousness by its sacrifice *produces* the substance as subject, this subject remains its own Self. This gives rise to the following result: if, in the two propositions,—in that of the first substantiality, the subject just vanishes,—and in the second, substance is only a predicate, and both sides are thus present in each proposition with an opposite inequality of value,—then the result is the union and interpenetration of the two natures, in which both are, with equal value, just as *essential* and both are only *moments* as well; in this way spirit is both *consciousness* of itself as its *objective* substance, and simple *self-consciousness* remaining within itself.¹

¶750. The religion of art belongs to the ethical spirit which we earlier saw perish in the *state of right*, i.e. in the proposition: *the Self as such, the abstract person, is absolute essence*. In the ethical life, the Self is submerged in the spirit of its people, it is universality *filled*. But *simple singularity* arises out of this content, and its levity refines it into a person, into the abstract universality of right. In this universality the *reality* of the ethical spirit is lost and, empty of content, the spirits of the national individuals are gathered into a single pantheon, not a pantheon of representation whose powerless form lets each spirit go its own way, but the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which disembodies them and assigns Being in- and for-itself to the spiritless Self, to the singular person.¹

¶751. But this Self has, through its emptiness, let the content go free; consciousness is the essence only *within itself*; its own *Being-there*, the juridical recognition of the person, is the unfilled abstraction; it possesses, therefore, rather only the thought of itself; or as it *is there* and knows itself as object, it is the consciousness that is *not actual*. Hence it is only the stoical *independence of thinking*, and this, passing through the movement of the sceptical consciousness, finds its truth in that shape which was called the *unhappy self-consciousness*.¹

¶752. This self-consciousness knows all about the actual validity of the abstract person and all about its validity in pure thought. It knows that such a validity is rather a complete loss; it is itself this conscious loss of itself and the estrangement of its knowledge of itself.—We see that this unhappy consciousness constitutes the counterpart and completion of the consciousness that is perfectly happy within itself, the comic consciousness. Into the latter consciousness all the divine essence returns, or it is the complete *estrangement of substance*. The unhappy consciousness, on the other hand, is conversely the tragic fate of the *certainty of itself* that is supposed to be in and for itself. It is the consciousness of the loss of all *essentiality in this certainty* of itself, and the loss in fact of this knowledge of itself—the loss of substance as well as of the Self, it is the grief that expresses itself in the harsh words: *God is dead*.¹

¶753. In the state of right, then, the ethical world and the religion of that world are submerged in the comic consciousness, and the unhappy consciousness is the knowledge of this *total* loss. It has lost the self-worth both of its immediate personality and of its mediated personality, its personality in *thought*. The oracles

that imparted knowledge of the particular have fallen silent, and so likewise has trust in the eternal laws of the gods. The statues are now corpses from which the animating soul has flown, just as the hymns are words which faith has deserted; the tables of the gods are without spiritual food and drink, and from its games and festivals consciousness does not get in return the joyful unity of itself with the essence. The works of the muse lack the force of the spirit, for which the certainty of itself sprang from the crushing of gods and men. They are now what they are for us,—beautiful fruit detached from the tree, a friendly fate offered it to us, as a girl presents the fruit; it does not give the actual life of their Being-there, not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements which constituted their substance, nor the climate that gave them their determinacy, or the alternation of the seasons that governed the process of their growth.—So fate does not give their world to us along with the works of this art, not the spring and summer of the ethical life in which they bloomed and ripened, but only the veiled recollection of this actuality.—Our doing in the enjoyment of them is therefore not the doing of divine worship which would secure for our consciousness its perfect truth to fill it up; it is the external doing that wipes some drops of rain, say, or specks of dust off these fruits and, in place of the inner elements of the surrounding, engendering, and inspiring actuality of the ethical, erects a vast scaffolding of the dead elements of their external existence, the language, the historical element, etc., not in order to enter into their life but only to represent them within oneself. But as the girl who offers the plucked fruits is more than their nature that immediately presented them—nature spread out into their conditions and elements, the tree, air, light, and so on—because she sums all this up in a higher mode, in the gleam of the self-conscious eye and in the offering gesture, so too the spirit of the fate that presents those works of art to us is more than the ethical life and actuality of that people, for it is the *re-collection* of the spirit that in them was still *externalized*,—it is the spirit of the tragic fate that gathers all those individual gods and attributes of the substance into the single pantheon, into spirit conscious of itself as spirit.¹

¶754. All the conditions for its emergence are present, and this totality of its conditions constitutes the *becoming*, the *concept* or the emergence of spirit, an emergence that *is in itself*.—The circle of the productions of art embraces the forms of the estrangements of the absolute substance; this substance is in the form of individuality, as a thing, as an object of sensory consciousness that simply *is*,—as the pure language or the becoming of the shape whose Being-there does not go outside the Self, and is a purely *vanishing* object;—as immediate *unity* with the universal *self-consciousness* in its inspiration, and as mediated unity in the doing of cult;—as beautiful, *selfish corporeality*; and lastly as the Being-there elevated into *representation* and the expansion of this Being-there into a world which at last collects itself together into the universality which is also *pure certainty of itself*.—These forms, and on the other side the *world* of the *person* and of right, the destructive savagery of the liberated elements of the content, also the person *as thought* in Stoicism and the unstable restlessness of sceptical consciousness, constitute the periphery of the shapes that stand, waiting and pressing, round the birthplace of spirit as it becomes self-consciousness. The grief and yearning of the unhappy self-consciousness, which permeates them all, is their centre and the common birth-pang of its emergence,—the simplicity of the pure concept, which contains those shapes as its moments.¹

¶755. The concept has in it the two sides which are represented above as the two converse propositions; one is this, that *substance* estranges itself from itself and becomes self-consciousness, the other is conversely, that *self-consciousness* estranges itself from itself and makes itself into thinghood or into the universal Self. The two sides have in this way come to meet each other, and their true union has thereby arisen. The estrangement of substance, its becoming self-consciousness, expresses the transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of *necessity*, or expresses the fact that substance is *in itself* self-consciousness. Conversely, the estrangement of self-consciousness expresses the fact that it is *in itself* the universal essence, or—since the Self is pure Being-for-itself which remains at home with itself in its contrary,—that it is *for self-consciousness* that substance is self-consciousness, and is spirit for that very reason. Of this spirit, which has abandoned the form of substance and enters into Being-there in the shape of self-consciousness, it may therefore be said—if we wish to employ relationships derived from natural generation,—that it has an *actual mother* but a father that is *in itself*; for *actuality* or self-consciousness, and the *in-itself* as substance, are its two moments through whose reciprocal estrangement, each becoming the other, spirit enters into Being-there as their unity.¹

¶756. Insofar as self-consciousness one-sidedly grasps only *its own* estrangement, even though its object is for it thus Being as well as Self and it knows all Being-there as spiritual essence, nevertheless the true spirit has not yet thereby come to be for it, insofar, that is, as Being in general, or substance, has not likewise, on its side, *in itself* estranged itself and become self-consciousness. For in this case all Being-there is spiritual essence *only from the standpoint of consciousness*, not in its own self. Spirit is in this way only *imaginatively projected* onto Being-there; this imagining is the *enthusiasm* which attributes to nature as well as to history, to the world as well as to the mythical representations of earlier religions, an inner sense other than that which they immediately present to consciousness in their appearance, and in the case of religions, a sense other than the one known in them by the self-consciousness whose religions they were. But this meaning is a borrowed meaning and a garment that does not cover the nakedness of the appearance and deserves no faith and reverence; it remains the murky night of consciousness and its own ecstasy.¹

¶757. So if this meaning of the objective is not to be mere imagination, it must be *in itself*, i.e. must, *in the first place*, arise for consciousness from the *concept* and emerge in its necessity. That is how the self-knowing *spirit* has arisen for us through the cognition of *immediate consciousness*, or of the consciousness of the object that simply *is*, through its necessary movement. This concept which, as immediate, had also the shape of *immediacy* for its consciousness, has, *in the second place*, assumed the shape of self-consciousness *in itself*, i.e. by just the same necessity of the concept by which *Being* or the *immediacy* which is the content-less object of sensory consciousness, estranges itself and becomes I for consciousness.—But the *immediate in-itself* or the *necessity that simply is*, is itself different from the *thinking in-itself* or the *cognition of necessity*,—a difference, however, that at the same time does not lie outside the concept, for the *simple unity* of the concept is *immediate Being* itself; the concept is at once what estranges itself or the becoming of *intuited necessity*, and it is also at home with itself in this necessity and knows and comprehends it.—The *immediate in-itself* of spirit that assumes the shape of self-consciousness means

nothing else than that the actual world-spirit has attained to this knowledge of itself; only then does this knowledge also enter its consciousness, and enter it as truth. How that came about we have already seen.¹

¶758. That the absolute spirit has assumed the shape of self-consciousness *in itself*, and therefore also for its *consciousness*, now appears thus: that it is the *faith of the world* that spirit *is there* as a self-consciousness, i.e. as an actual man, that it is for immediate certainty, that the believing consciousness *sees* and *feels* and *hears* this divinity. So this self-consciousness is not imagination, but is *actually in him*. Consciousness does not start then from *its* interior, setting out from thought, and combine *within itself* the thought of God with Being-there; on the contrary, it starts from immediate present Being-there and recognizes God in it.—The moment of *immediate Being* is present in the content of the concept in such a way that the religious spirit, in the return of all essentiality into consciousness, has become a *simple* positive Self, just as the actual spirit as such in the unhappy consciousness became just this *simple* self-conscious negativity. Because of this, the Self of the spirit that is there has the form of complete immediacy; it is posited neither as something thought or represented, nor as something produced, as is the case with the immediate Self both in natural religion and in the religion of art. On the contrary, this god is intuited sensorily, immediately as a Self, as an actual singular man; only so *is* he self-consciousness.¹

¶759. This incarnation of the divine essence, or the fact that it essentially and immediately has the shape of self-consciousness, is the simple content of the absolute religion. In the absolute religion the essence is known as spirit, or this religion is the consciousness of the essence about itself, consciousness that it is spirit. For spirit is the knowledge of itself in its estrangement; the essence that is the movement of retaining its equality with itself in its otherness. But this is the substance, insofar as in its accidentality substance is at the same time reflected into itself, not indifferent to it as something unessential and thus situated in it as in an alien element, but in it reflected *within itself*, i.e. substance insofar as it is *subject* or *Self*. Consequently, in this religion the divine essence is revealed. Its being revealed manifestly consists in this, that what it is, is known. But it is known precisely in its being known as spirit, as essence that is essentially *self-consciousness*.—For *consciousness* there is something secret in its object if the object is an *other* or something *alien* for it, and if it does not know it as *its own self*. This secrecy ceases when the absolute essence as spirit is object of consciousness; for then the object is as a *Self* in its relationship to consciousness, i.e. consciousness knows itself immediately in the object, or is manifest to itself in the object. Consciousness is manifest to itself only in its own certainty of itself; its object is the *Self*, but the *Self* is nothing alien; on the contrary, it is the indissoluble unity with itself, the immediately universal. The *Self* is the pure concept, pure thinking or *Being-for-itself*, which is immediately *Being*, and consequently *Being for an other*, and as this *Being for an other* has immediately returned into itself and is at home with itself; it is thus that which is genuinely and alone revealed. The good, the righteous, the holy, creator of heaven and earth, and so on, are *predicates* of a subject—universal moments which have their support in this point and are only in the return of consciousness into thinking.—When *they* are known, their ground and essence, the *subject* itself, is not yet revealed; and similarly the *determinations* of the universal are

revealed, not *this universal* itself. But the *subject* itself, and consequently *this pure universal* too, is revealed as *Self*, for this *Self* is just this interior reflected into itself, which is immediately there and is that *Self*'s own self-certainty, the *Self* for which it is there. To be what is revealed in accordance with its *concept*,—this is thus the true shape of spirit, and this shape, the concept, is likewise its sole essence and substance. Spirit is known as self-consciousness and to this self-consciousness it is immediately revealed, for spirit is this self-consciousness itself; the divine nature is the same as human nature, and it is this unity that is intuited.¹

¶760. So here consciousness, or the manner in which the essence is for consciousness itself, its shape, is in fact equal to its self-consciousness; this shape is itself a self-consciousness; it is thus at the same time an object *that simply is*, and this *Being* has, just as immediately, the meaning of *pure thinking*, of the absolute essence.—The absolute essence, which is there as an actual self-consciousness, seems to have *descended* from its eternal simplicity, but in fact it has thereby attained its *supreme* essence for the first time. For only when the concept of essence has reached its simple purity is it the absolute *abstraction* which is *pure thinking*, and hence the pure singularity of the *Self*, just as in virtue of its simplicity it is the *immediate* or *Being*.—What is called sensory consciousness is just this pure *abstraction*, it is this thinking for which *Being*, the *immediate*, is. Thus the lowest is at the same time the highest; the revealed that has emerged entirely on the *surface* is precisely therein the *most profound*. That the supreme essence is seen, heard, etc. as a self-consciousness that simply is, is thus in fact the completion of its concept; and through this completion the essence is immediately *there*, as much as it is the essence.¹

¶761. This immediate *Being-there* is at the same time not solely and simply immediate consciousness, it is religious consciousness; the immediacy has inseparably the meaning not only of a self-consciousness that *just is*, but of the *essence* purely in thought or the absolute *essence*. What we are conscious of in our concept—that *Being* is *essence*—the religious consciousness is conscious of too. This *unity* of *Being* and *essence*, of *thinking* which is immediately *Being-there*, is the *immediate knowledge of this religious consciousness, as well as its thought or its mediated knowledge*; for this unity of *Being* and *thinking* is *self-consciousness* and is itself *there*, or the unity *in thought* has at the same time this shape of what it is. Thus God is here revealed as *he is*; *he is there* just as he is *in himself*, he is there as spirit. God is attainable in pure speculative knowledge alone and is only in that knowledge, and is only that knowledge itself, for he is spirit, and this speculative knowledge is the knowledge of the revealed religion. Speculative knowledge knows God as *thinking* or pure essence, and knows this thinking as *Being* and as *Being-there*, and it knows *Being-there* as the negativity of itself, hence as *Self*, as *this Self* and universal *Self*; it is precisely this that the revealed religion knows.—The hopes and expectations of the preceding world pressed on towards this revelation alone, to intuit what absolute essence is, and in it to find itself; this *joy* enters self-consciousness and seizes the whole world, the joy of beholding itself in absolute knowledge; for it is spirit, it is the simple movement of those pure moments, which expresses this very fact: that only when the essence is intuited as *immediate* self-consciousness is it known as spirit.¹

¶762. This concept of spirit that knows itself as spirit is itself the immediate concept and is not yet developed. The essence is spirit, or it has appeared, it is

revealed; this first revelation is itself *immediate*; but the immediacy is equally pure mediation or thinking; it must therefore exhibit this in its own Self as such.—Looking at this more determinately, spirit, in the immediacy of self-consciousness, is *this singular* self-consciousness, in opposition to the *universal* self-consciousness; spirit is exclusive One, which has the still unresolved form of a *sensory other* for the consciousness *for which* it is there; this consciousness does not as yet know spirit as its own, or spirit, while it is there as *singular* Self, is not yet equally there as universal Self, as every Self. Or the shape has not yet the form of the *concept*, i.e. of the universal Self, of the Self that in its immediate actuality is equally a sublated Self, is thinking, universality, without losing its actuality in this universality.—But the proximate and itself immediate form of this universality is not yet the form of *thinking* itself, of the *concept as concept*, but the universality of actuality, the allness of the Selves, and the elevation of Being-there into representation; as everywhere, and to cite a determinate example, the sublated *sensory This* is at first the thing of *perception*, not yet the *universal* of the understanding.¹

¶763. This singular man, then, in whose form the absolute essence is revealed, accomplishes in himself as a singleton the movement of *sensory Being*. He is the *immediately* present god; in this way his *Being* passes over into *having-been-ness*. The consciousness, for which he has this sensory presence, ceases to see him, to hear him; it *has* seen and heard him; and only in virtue of the fact that it merely *has* seen and heard him does it become itself spiritual consciousness, or, as formerly he rose for consciousness as *sensory Being-there*, now he has risen *in the spirit*.—For as the sort of consciousness that sensorily sees and hears him, it is itself only immediate consciousness, which has not sublated the disparity of objectivity, has not taken it back into pure thinking: it knows this objective singleton as spirit, but not itself. In the vanishing of the immediate Being-there of what is known as absolute essence the immediate receives its negative moment; spirit remains immediate Self of actuality, but as *the universal self-consciousness* of the community, a self-consciousness which reposes in its own substance, just as in it this substance is universal subject; not the singleton for himself, but the singleton together with the consciousness of the community, and what he is for this community, is the complete whole of this spirit.¹

¶764. But *past* and *distance* are only the imperfect form in which the immediate mode is mediated or posited universally; the immediate mode is dipped only superficially in the element of thinking, it is preserved in it *as* sensory mode, and not made one with the nature of thinking itself. It is merely an elevation into *representation*, for this is the synthetic combination of sensory immediacy and its universality or thinking.¹

¶765. *This form*, that of *representation*, constitutes the determinacy in which spirit, in this its community, becomes conscious of itself. This form is not yet spirit's self-consciousness matured to its concept as concept: the mediation is still incomplete. Thus this combination of Being and thinking contains the defect that the spiritual essence is still burdened with an unreconciled bifurcation into a Here and a Beyond. The *content* is the true content, but all its moments, when posited in the element of representation, have the character of being uncomprehended, of appearing as completely independent sides which are related to each other *externally*. If the true content is to receive also its true form for consciousness, then the higher culture of

consciousness is necessary; it must elevate its intuition of the absolute substance into the concept, and equalize its consciousness with its self-consciousness *for itself*, just as this has happened for us or *in itself*.¹

¶766. This content is to be considered in the way in which it is in its consciousness.—The absolute spirit is *content*, and is thus in the shape of its *truth*. But its truth is not only to be the substance of the community or its *in-itself*, nor merely to emerge from this inwardness into the objectivity of representation, but to become an actual Self, to reflect itself into itself and to be subject. This, then, is the movement which it accomplishes in its community, or this is the life of the absolute spirit. Consequently, what this self-revealing spirit is *in and for itself*, is not elicited by, as it were, unravelling the rich life of spirit in the community and tracing it back to its first thread, to the representations, say, of the first imperfect community, or even to the utterances of the actual man. This tracing-back is based on the instinct to get to the concept; but it confuses the *origin* as the *immediate Being-there* of the first appearance with the *simplicity* of the *concept*. What results from this impoverishment of the life of the spirit, from removing the representation of the community and its action with regard to its representation, is not the concept, but rather bare externality and singularity, the historical manner of the immediate appearance, and the spiritless recollection of a supposed singular shape and of its past.¹

¶767. In the first place, spirit is content of its consciousness in the form of *pure substance*, or is content of its pure consciousness. This element of thinking is the movement of descending into Being-there or into singularity. The middle term between them is their synthetic combination, the consciousness of becoming-other, or representation as such.—The third term is the return from representation and otherness, or the element of self-consciousness itself.—These three moments constitute spirit; its dispersal in the representation consists in its being in a *determinate* mode; but this determinacy is nothing other than one of its moments. Its thorough-going movement is therefore this, to expand its nature in each of its moments as in an element; since each of these circles completes itself within itself, spirit's reflection into itself is at the same time the transition into the other circle. *Representation* constitutes the middle term between pure thinking and self-consciousness as such, and is only *one* of the determinacies; but at the same time, as we have seen, its character of being a synthetic combination is spread over all these elements and is their common determinacy.¹

¶768. The content itself which we have to consider has partly occurred already as the representation of the *unhappy* and the *faithful* consciousness,—but in the unhappy consciousness, it occurred in the determination of a content *produced* from *consciousness* and *longed for*, a content in which spirit cannot be satiated or find rest, because the content is not yet its content *in itself* or as its *substance*; in the faithful consciousness, on the other hand, the content was regarded as the selfless *essence* of the world, or as essentially *objective* content of representation,—of a representation that flees from actuality in general and is therefore without the *certainty of self-consciousness*, a certainty that separates from the content partly as vanity of knowledge, partly as pure insight.—The consciousness of the community, on the other hand, has the content for its *substance*, just as the content is the community's *certainty* of its own spirit.¹

§769. When spirit is at first *represented* as substance in the *element of pure thinking*, it is herewith immediately the eternal *essence*, simple and equal to itself, which does not, however, have this abstract *meaning* of the essence, but the meaning of absolute spirit. But spirit is this—not to be meaning, not the inner, but to be the actual. The simple, eternal essence would therefore be spirit in empty name only, if it went no further than the representation and the expression of the simple, eternal essence. But the simple essence, because it is the abstraction, is in fact the *negative in its own self* and indeed the negativity of thinking, or negativity as it is in the *essence* in itself; i.e. the simple essence is the absolute *difference* from itself, or its pure becoming-other. As *essence* it is only *in itself* or for us; but since this purity is precisely the abstraction or negativity, it is *for itself*, or is the *Self*, the *concept*.—It is thus *objective*; and since representation conceives and expresses the above-mentioned *necessity* of the concept as a *happening*, it will be said that the eternal essence *begets* its own other. But in this otherness it has just as immediately returned into itself; for the difference is the difference *in itself*; i.e. the difference is immediately differentiated only from itself, it is thus the unity that has returned into itself.¹

§770. There are thus three different moments: that of the *essence*, that of the *Being-for-itself* which is the otherness of essence and for which the essence is, and that of *Being-for-itself* or of knowing itself *in the other*. The essence intuits only its own Self in its Being-for-itself; in this estrangement of itself it is only at home with itself: the Being-for-itself that excludes itself from the essence is *essence's knowledge of its own self*; it is the word which, when uttered, estranges him who utters it and leaves him emptied behind, but which is just as immediately heard, and only this hearing of its own self is the Being-there of the word. Thus the distinctions that are made are just as immediately dissolved as they are made, and are just as immediately made as they are dissolved, and the true and actual is precisely this movement circling within itself.¹

§771. This movement within itself proclaims the absolute essence as *spirit*; the absolute essence that is not grasped as spirit is only the abstract void, just as the spirit that is not grasped as this movement is only an empty word. If its *moments* are grasped in their purity, then they are the restless concepts which are only insofar as they are in themselves their contrary and have their repose in the whole. But the community's *representation* is not this *conceptual* thinking; it has the content without its necessity, and instead of the form of the concept it brings into the realm of pure consciousness the natural relationships of father and son. Since this consciousness thus comports itself in a *representational* way even in its thinking, the essence is indeed revealed to it, but the moments of the essence, owing to this synthetic representation, partly themselves fall asunder for it, so that they are not related to one another through their own concept, and partly this consciousness withdraws from this its pure object, relating to it only externally; the object is revealed to it by an alien source, and in this thought of the spirit it does not recognize itself, does not recognize the nature of pure self-consciousness. Insofar as the form of representation and of those relationships that are derived from the natural must be transcended, and particularly also the way of taking the moments of the movement, which is spirit, as isolated unyielding substances or subjects, instead of transient moments—this transcending is to be regarded as an impulsion of the concept, as we remarked earlier in the case of another aspect; but since this impulsion is only instinct, it

misunderstands itself, rejects the content as well as the form and, what amounts to the same thing, reduces the content to a historical representation and to an heirloom of tradition; in this, only the pure externality of faith is retained and so retained as something dead and non-cognitive; but its *interior* has vanished, because this would be the concept that knows itself as concept.¹

¶772. The absolute spirit, represented in the pure essence, is not indeed the *abstract* pure essence; on the contrary, the abstract essence has been reduced to an *element*, precisely because it is only a moment in the spirit. But the presentation of spirit in this element has in itself, with regard to form, the same defect that the *essence* as essence has. The essence is the abstract and therefore the negative of its simplicity, an other; similarly, *spirit* in the element of essence is the *form* of *simple unity*, which is therefore equally essentially a becoming-other.—Or, what is the same thing, the relation of the eternal essence to its Being-for-itself is the immediately-simple relation of pure thinking; in this *simple* intuition of itself in the other, the *otherness* is therefore not posited as such; it is the difference which, in pure thinking, is immediately *no difference*; a recognition of *the love* in which, as regards their essence, the two did not *oppose* to each other.—The spirit that is expressed in the element of pure thinking is itself essentially this: to be not merely in this element, but to be *actual* spirit, for in its concept lies *otherness* itself, i.e. the sublation of the pure concept that is only in thought.¹

¶773. The element of pure thinking, because it is the abstract element, is itself rather the *other* of its simplicity, and therefore passes over into the authentic element of *representation*—the element in which the moments of the pure concept obtain a *substantial* Being-there in the face of each other, and are also *subjects* which do not have for a third party the indifference of Being towards each other but, reflected into themselves, separate from each other themselves and oppose each other.¹

¶774. Thus the merely eternal or abstract spirit becomes *an other* to itself, or enters into Being-there, and immediately into *immediate Being-there*. Accordingly, it *creates* a world. This *creating* is representation's word for the *concept* itself in its absolute movement or for the fact that the simple declared as absolute, or pure thinking, because it is the abstract, is rather the negative, and hence what is opposed to itself or *other*;—or because, to say the same thing in another form, that which is posited as *essence* is simple *immediacy* or *Being*, but as immediacy or Being lacks the Self and so, deficient in inwardness, is *passive* or *Being for another*.—This *Being for another* is at the same time *a world*; spirit in the determination of *Being for another* is the calm subsistence of the moments formerly enclosed in pure thinking, hence the dissolution of their simple universality and their divergence into their own particularity.¹

¶775. However, the world is not only this spirit cast asunder out into the great whole and its external order, but since spirit is essentially the simple Self, this Self is equally present in the world: the *spirit that is there*, which is the singular Self that has consciousness and distinguishes itself as other, or as world, from itself.—This singular Self, as it is thus posited at first in an immediate way, is not yet *spirit for itself*; so it is not *as* spirit; it can be called *innocent* but can hardly be called *good*. For it in fact to be Self and spirit, it must first of all become an *other* to its own self, just as the eternal essence presents itself as the movement of being equal to itself in its otherness. Since this spirit is determined as first immediately being-there or as

dispersed into the multiplicity of its consciousness, its becoming-other is the withdrawal-into-itself of knowledge in general. Immediate Being-there turns into thought, or mere sensory consciousness turns into consciousness of the thought; and, moreover, because it is thought stemming from immediacy or *conditioned* thought, it is not pure knowledge, but the thought that has otherness in it and thus the self-opposed thought of *good* and *evil*. Man is represented like this: it *happened* as something not necessary,—that he lost the form of equality-with-himself through plucking the fruit of the tree of the cognition of *good* and *evil*, and was expelled from the state of innocent consciousness, from nature offering itself without toil and from paradise, from the garden of animals.¹

§776. Since this withdrawal-into-itself of the consciousness that is there immediately determines itself as becoming-*unequal* to itself, *Evil* appears as the first Being-there of the consciousness that has withdrawn into itself; and because the thoughts of *Good* and *Evil* are straightforwardly opposed and this opposition is not yet resolved, this consciousness is essentially only *Evil*. But at the same time, just because of this opposition, the *good* consciousness is also present in the face of it, and so too is their relationship to each other.—Insofar as the immediate Being-there turns into *thought*, and the *Being-within-itself* is on the one hand itself a thinking, while on the other hand the moment of the *becoming-other* of the essence is thereby more precisely determined by it, the becoming-evil can be transferred further back out of the world that is there and into the first realm of thinking. It can thus be said that it was already the first-born son of light who fell, by withdrawing into himself, but in his place another was at once produced. Such a form as *falling*, belongs, like *son*, merely to representation, not to the concept; they equally distort the moments of the concept, by reducing them to representation or, conversely, by transferring representation over into the realm of thought.—Likewise it makes no difference if we assign a multiplicity of other shapes to the simple thought of *otherness* in the eternal essence and transfer the *withdrawal-into-itself* into them. This assignment must at the same time be approved, since by means of it this moment of *otherness* at the same time expresses diversity, as it should, and indeed not as plurality in general, but at the same time as determinate diversity, so that the one part, the son, is the simple element that knows itself as essence, while the other part is the estrangement of Being-for-itself, which lives only in adoration of the essence; in this part, then, we can place the recovery of the estranged Being-for-itself and the withdrawal-into-itself of *Evil*. Insofar as the otherness divides into two, spirit would be expressed in its moments more determinately and, if they are counted, expressed as a quartet or, because the quantity itself again divides into two parts, namely those that have remained good and those that have become evil, even as a quintet.—But to *count* the moments can be reckoned as altogether useless, since on the one hand what is differentiated is itself only *one* thing, viz. the *thought* of the difference, which is only *one* thought, just as much as this thought is *this* differentiation, the second in contrast to the first,—but, on the other hand, because the thought that encompasses the many in unity must be dissolved out of its universality and differentiated into more than three or four distinct components,—and this universality, in contrast to the absolute determinacy of the abstract unit, of the principle of number, appears as indeterminacy in relation to number itself, so that we could speak only of *numbers* in general, i.e.

not of a *specific number* of differences. Thus here it is entirely superfluous to think of number and counting at all, just as in other respects the mere difference of quantity and amount is unconceptual and insignificant.¹

¶777. *Good and Evil* emerged as the determinate differences of the thought. Since their opposition has not yet been resolved and they are represented as essences of thought, each of which is independent for itself, man is the essence-less Self and the synthetic terrain of their Being-there and conflict. But these universal powers belong just as much to the Self, or the Self is their actuality. In accordance with this moment, it therefore happens that, just as Evil is nothing other than the withdrawal-into-itself of the natural Being-there of spirit, conversely the Good enters into actuality and appears as a self-consciousness that is there.—That which, in the pure thought of spirit, is only indicated as the becoming-*other* of the divine essence in general, here comes nearer to its realization for representation; this realization consists for representation in the self-abasement of the divine essence which renounces its abstraction and non-actuality.—As for the other aspect, Evil, representation takes it to be a happening alien to the divine essence; to grasp Evil in the essence itself, *as its wrath*, is the highest, hardest effort of representation struggling with itself, an effort which, since it lacks the concept, remains fruitless.¹

¶778. The alienation of the divine essence is thus posited in its twofold manner; the Self of the spirit and its simple thought are the two moments whose absolute unity is spirit itself; its alienation consists in the fact that the moments separate and one of them has an unequal value compared with the other. This inequality is therefore the twofold inequality, and there arise two combinations whose common moments are those specified. In one of them, the *divine essence* counts as the essential, while the natural Being-there and the Self count as the inessential and as what is to be sublated; in the other, by contrast, *Being-for-itself* counts as the essential and the simple divinity as the inessential. Their still empty middle term is *Being-there* in general, the bare communality of the two moments of the combinations.¹

¶779. The resolution of this opposition happens not so much through the conflict between the two moments which are represented as separate and independent essences. It is involved in their *independence* that *in itself*, through its concept, each of them must dissolve itself within its own self; the conflict first comes to pass where both cease to be these mixtures of thought and independent Being-there, and where they confront each other only as thoughts. For then they are, as determinate concepts, essentially only in the relation of opposition; as independent, by contrast, they have their essentiality outside of the opposition; their movement is thus their own free movement. As, then, the movement of the two sides is the movement *in itself*, since it is to be considered in the sides themselves, it is initiated by the side that is determined as that-which-is-in-itself as contrasted with the other. This is represented as a freely willed doing; but the necessity of its estrangement lies in the concept, according to which that-which-is-in-itself, which is so determined only in the opposition, for that very reason does not have genuine subsistence;—so it is the one for which the Simple, and not Being-for-itself, counts as the essence, that estranges itself, goes to its death, and thereby reconciles the absolute essence with itself. For, in this movement, it displays itself as *spirit*; the abstract essence is alienated from itself, it has natural Being-there and selfish actuality; this its otherness, or its

sensory presence, is taken back by the second becoming-other and posited as sublated, as *universal*; the essence has thereby come to be itself in its sensory presence; the immediate Being-there of actuality has ceased to be a Being-there alien and external to it, since that Being-there is sublated, universal; this death is therefore its arising as spirit.¹

¶780. The sublated immediate presence of the self-conscious essence is the essence as universal self-consciousness; this concept of the sublated singular Self, which is absolute essence, therefore immediately expresses the establishing of a community which, lingering so far in representation, now returns into itself, as into the Self; and thus the spirit passes over from the second element of its determination, representation, into the *third*, self-consciousness as such.—If we go on to consider how that representation behaves in its progression, first of all we see it expressed that the divine essence takes on human nature. In this it is already *declared* that *in themselves* the two are not separate;—likewise in the fact that *from the beginning* the essence estranges itself, that its Being-there withdraws into itself and becomes evil, it is there *implied*, though not declared, that *in itself* this evil Being-there is not something alien to the essence; the absolute essence would have only this empty name, if in truth there were something *other* for it, if there were a *fall* from it;—on the contrary, the moment of *Being-within-itself* constitutes the essential moment of the *Self* of the spirit.—That *Being-within-itself* and, only thereby, *actuality* belong to the essence itself, this, which is for us the concept and insofar as it is concept, appears to the representational consciousness as an incomprehensible *happening*; the *in-itself* assumes for it the form of *indifferent Being*. But the thought that those moments that seem to flee each other, the absolute essence and the Self that-is-for-itself, are not separate, *also* appears to this representation—for it possesses the true content—, but later,—in the estrangement of the essence that becomes flesh. This representation is in this way still *immediate* and therefore not spiritual, or it knows the human shape of the essence at first only as a particular shape, not yet universal shape; it becomes spiritual for this consciousness in the movement of the shaped essence, whereby it sacrifices its immediate Being-there again and returns to the essence: only the essence as *reflected into itself* is the spirit.—The *reconciliation* of the divine essence with the *other* in general, and specifically with the *thought* of this other, *Evil*, is thus represented in this.—If this reconciliation is expressed in accordance with *its concept* by saying that it consists in the fact that *Evil is in itself the same thing* as the *Good*, or again that the divine essence is the *same thing* as nature in its whole extent, just as nature separated from the divine essence is only the *nothing*,—then we must regard this as an unspiritual mode of expression that must necessarily give rise to misunderstandings.—Insofar as Evil is the *same thing* as the Good, Evil is precisely not Evil, nor the Good Good, but rather both are sublated, Evil in general the Being-for-itself that is within-itself; and the Good the selfless Simple. Insofar as both are thus expressed in terms of their concept, their unity is at once evident; for the Being-for-itself that is within-itself is simple knowledge, and the selfless Simple is likewise pure Being-for-itself that is within itself.—Therefore, although it must be said that, according to this concept of theirs, Good and Evil, i.e. insofar as they are not Good and Evil, are the *same*, it must equally be said that they are *not* the same, but simply *different*, for simple Being-for-itself, or again pure knowledge, are in like

manner pure negativity or the absolute difference within themselves.—Only these two propositions complete the whole, and the assertion and affirmation of the first must be confronted by adherence to the other with invincible stubbornness; since both are equally right, they are both equally wrong, and their wrongness consists in taking such abstract forms as *the same* and *not the same*, *identity* and *non-identity*, to be something true, fixed, actual, and in relying on them. Neither the one nor the other has truth, but precisely their movement, in which the simple ‘the same’ is abstraction and hence absolute difference, but this, as difference in itself, differentiated from itself, is therefore equality-to-itself. Precisely this is the case with the *sameness* of the divine essence and of nature in general, and of human nature in particular; the former is nature insofar as it is not essence; the latter is divine according to its essence; but it is the spirit in which the two abstract sides are posited as they are in truth, namely as *sublated*, a positing that cannot be expressed by the judgement and the spiritless ‘is’, the copula of the judgement.—Similarly, nature is *nothing apart from* its essence; but this nothing itself just as much *is*; it is the absolute abstraction, and thus pure thinking or Being-within-itself, and with the moment of its opposition to the spiritual unity it is *Evil*. The difficulty that arises in these concepts is solely the adherence to the ‘is’ and forgetting the thinking of the concepts in which the moments just as much *are* as *are not*,—are only the movement which is spirit.—It is this spiritual unity, or the unity in which the differences are present only as moments or as sublated, that has come to be for the representational consciousness in this reconciliation; and since this unity is the universality of self-consciousness, self-consciousness has ceased to be representational; the movement has returned into self-consciousness.¹

¶781. Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in *universal self-consciousness*; it is its own *community*. The movement of the community as the movement of the self-consciousness that differentiates itself from its representation is the movement of *bringing to light* what has come about *in itself*. The dead divine man or human god is *in himself* the universal self-consciousness; he has to become this *for this self-consciousness*. Or, since this self-consciousness constitutes *one* side of the opposition of the representation, namely the evil side, for which natural Being-there and the singular Being-for-itself count as the essence, this side, which is represented as independent, not yet as a moment, has, because of its independence, to raise itself in and for itself to spirit, or to present within itself the movement of spirit.¹

¶782. This side of the opposition is the *natural spirit*; the Self has to withdraw from this naturalness and retreat into itself, which would mean to become *evil*. But this side is already *in itself* evil; its retreat-into-itself consists, therefore, in *convincing itself* that natural Being-there is Evil. The world’s becoming-evil and its being-evil, *as being-there*, fall within representational consciousness, and so does the reconciliation, *as being-there*, of the absolute essence; but to *self-consciousness* as such, what is thus represented belongs, with regard to form, only as a sublated moment, since the Self is the negative; and so it is *knowledge*,—a knowledge that is a pure activity of consciousness within itself.—This moment of the *negative* must likewise express itself in the content. That is to say, since the essence is already reconciled with itself *in itself* and is a spiritual unity in which the parts of representation are *sublated* or *moments*, what presents itself is that each part of the representation here receives the

opposite meaning to what it had before; each meaning thereby completes itself in the other, and only in this way is the content a spiritual content; since the determinacy is just as much its opposite, unity in otherness, the spiritual, is accomplished: just as for us or *in itself* the opposite meanings became united previously, and even the abstract forms of *the same* and *not the same*, of *identity* and *non-identity* sublated themselves.¹

¶783. Thus if in the representational consciousness the becoming-*internal* of natural self-consciousness was the *Being-there of Evil*, then in the element of self-consciousness *becoming-internal* is the *knowledge of Evil* as an Evil that is *in itself* in Being-there. This knowledge is of course a becoming-of-Evil, but only a becoming of the *thought of Evil*, and is therefore recognized as the first moment of reconciliation. For as a return into itself from the immediacy of nature which is determined as Evil, it is an abandonment of nature and a dying away to sin. It is not natural Being-there as such that is abandoned by consciousness, but natural Being-there insofar as it is at the same time known as Evil. The immediate movement of *withdrawal-into-itself* is just as much a mediated movement;—it presupposes itself, or is its own ground; that is to say, the ground of the withdrawal-into-itself is that in itself nature has already withdrawn into itself; on account of Evil, man must withdraw into himself; but *Evil* is itself the withdrawal-into-itself.—This first movement is for that very reason itself only the immediate movement, or its *simple concept*, because it is the same thing as its ground. The movement or the becoming-other therefore still has to take place in its more authentic form.¹

¶784. Besides this immediacy therefore the *mediation* of the representation is necessary. *In itself* the *knowledge* of nature as the untrue Being-there of spirit, and this universality of the Self that has come about within itself, is the reconciliation of the spirit with itself. For the non-conceptualizing self-consciousness this *in-itself* receives the form of a *being* and of something *represented to it*. Thus for it comprehension is not a grasping of this concept which knows sublated naturalness as universal, therefore as reconciled with itself, but rather a grasping of this *representation*, according to which through the *happening* of the divine essence's own estrangement, through the happening of its incarnation and death, the essence has been reconciled with its Being-there.—The grasping of this representation now expresses more determinately what was previously called, in this representation, the spiritual resurrection, or the development of its singular self-consciousness into the universal or into the community.—The *death* of the divine man, *as death*, is *abstract negativity*, the immediate result of the movement which ends only in *natural* universality. Death loses this natural meaning in spiritual self-consciousness, or it becomes its concept mentioned just now; death is transfigured from what it means immediately, from the non-Being of *this singleton*, into the *universality* of the spirit that lives in its community, dies and is resurrected in it every day.¹

¶785. What belongs to the element of *representation*—that absolute spirit as a *singular* spirit, or rather as a *particular* spirit, represents in its Being-there the nature of spirit—is thus here transposed into self-consciousness itself, into the knowledge that preserves itself in its *otherness*; this self-consciousness therefore does not actually *die*, as the *particular* is *represented* as being *actually* dead, but its particularity dies away in its universality, i.e. in its *knowledge*, which is the essence reconciling itself

with itself. The immediately preceding *element of representation* is thus here posited as sublated, or it has returned into the Self, into its concept; what was there only a being has become the subject. By this very fact, the *first element* too, *pure thinking* and the eternal spirit in it, is no longer beyond the representational consciousness nor beyond the Self, but the return of the whole into itself is just this, to contain all moments within itself. The death of the mediator grasped by the Self is the sublation of his *objectivity* or of his *particular Being-for-self*: this *particular* Being-for-self has become universal self-consciousness.—On the other side, the *universal* has become self-consciousness just because of this, and the pure or non-actual spirit of mere thinking has become *actual*. The death of the mediator is the death not only of his *natural aspect* or of his particular Being-for-self; what dies is not only the already dead husk removed from the essence, but also the *abstraction* of the divine essence. For the mediator, insofar as his death has not yet completed the reconciliation, is the one-sidedness which knows the simplicity of thinking as the *essence* in contrast to actuality; this extreme of the Self does not yet have equal value with the essence; the Self has this only in the spirit. The death of this representation thus contains at the same time the death of the *abstraction of the divine essence* which is not posited as Self. This death is the painful feeling of the unhappy consciousness that *God himself* is *dead*. This hard expression is the expression of the innermost simple self-knowledge, it is the return of consciousness into the depth of the night of the I=I, a night that no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside it. Thus this feeling is in fact the loss of the *substance* and of its confrontation with consciousness; but it is at the same time the pure *subjectivity* of substance, or the pure certainty of itself which it lacked when it was the object, or the immediate, or pure essence. This knowledge is thus the *spiritualization*, whereby the substance has become subject, by which its abstraction and lifelessness have died, and by which substance has thus become *actual*, and simple and universal self-consciousness.¹

¶786. In this way, then, the spirit is spirit knowing *itself*; it knows *itself*; that which is object for it, *is*, or its representation is the true absolute *content*; it expresses, as we saw, the spirit itself. It is at the same time not only *content* of self-consciousness, and not only object *for it*, but it is also *actual spirit*. It is this because it runs through the three elements of its nature; this movement through itself constitutes its actuality;—what is moving is the spirit, it is the subject of the movement, and is equally *the moving* itself, or the substance that the subject passes through. Just as the concept of spirit had arisen for us when we entered into religion, namely as the movement of the self-certain spirit which pardons Evil and in so doing at the same time abandons its own simplicity and hard unchangeability, or as the movement in which what is absolutely *opposed* recognizes itself as *the same thing*, and this recognition bursts forth as the *Yes* between these extremes,—this concept is *intuited* by the religious consciousness to which the absolute essence is revealed, and this consciousness sublates the *difference* between its *Self* and *what it intuits*; just as it is the subject, so also it is the substance, and hence it is itself the spirit, just because and insofar as it is this movement.¹

¶787. But this community is not yet perfected in this its self-consciousness; in general, its content is for it in the form of *representation*, and the *actual spirituality* of the community, its return from its representation, still has this disharmony in it too,

just as the element of pure thinking itself was affected with it. The community also does not have the consciousness of what it is; it is spiritual self-consciousness which is not an object to itself as this self-consciousness, or which does not open itself up into consciousness of itself; but rather, insofar as it is consciousness, it has representations that we have considered.—We see self-consciousness at its last turning-point become *internal* to itself and attain to *knowledge* of its *Being-within-itself*; we see it estrange its natural Being-there and acquire pure negativity. But the *positive* meaning, namely that this negativity or pure *inwardness* of *knowledge* is just as much the *essence equal-to-itself*,—or that the substance has here succeeded in becoming absolute self-consciousness, this is an *other* for the devotional consciousness. It grasps this aspect, in which the pure internalization of knowledge is *in itself* absolute simplicity or the substance, as the representation of something which is so, not in virtue of the *concept*, but as the action of an *alien* satisfaction. Or it is not for this consciousness that this depth of the pure Self is the force by which the *abstract essence* is drawn down from its abstraction and elevated to the Self by the power of this pure devotion.—The activity of the Self thereby retains this negative meaning in the face of the devout consciousness, because the estrangement of substance, for its part, is for this consciousness an *in-itself*, which it neither grasps nor comprehends, or which it does not find in *its* own activity as such.—Since this unity of the essence and the Self has come about *in itself*, consciousness too still has this *representation* of its reconciliation, but as representation. It obtains satisfaction by *externally* adding to its pure negativity the positive meaning of the unity of itself with the essence; its satisfaction thus itself remains burdened with the opposition of a beyond. Its own reconciliation therefore enters its consciousness as something *distant*, as a distance of the *future*, just as the reconciliation which the other *Self* accomplished appears as a distance of the *past*. Just as the *singular* divine man has a father who *is-in-himself* and only an *actual* mother, so too the universal divine man, the community, has for its father its *own activity* and *knowing*, but for its mother the *eternal love* which it only *feels*, but does not intuit in its consciousness as an actual, immediate *object*. Its reconciliation is therefore in its heart, but still split with its consciousness and its actuality still broken. What enters its consciousness as the *in-itself* or the side of *pure mediation*, is a reconciliation that lies beyond: but what enters it as *present*, as the side of *immediacy* and *Being-there*, is the world which has still to await its transfiguration. The world is indeed reconciled *in itself* with the essence; and regarding the *essence* it is known, of course, that it no longer recognizes the object as alienated from it but as equal to it in its love. But for self-consciousness this immediate presence does not yet have the shape-of-spirit. The spirit of the community is thus in its immediate consciousness separated from its religious consciousness, which declares, it is true, that *in themselves* they are not separated, but an *in-itself* that has not been realized, or has not yet become an equally absolute Being-for-itself.¹

(DD.) Absolute Knowledge

VIII. Absolute Knowledge

¶788. The spirit of revealed religion has not yet overcome its consciousness as such, or, what amounts to the same thing, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness; the spirit itself in general, and the self-differentiating moments within it, fall into representation and into the form of objectivity. The *content* of the representation is the absolute spirit; and all that still needs to be dealt with is the sublation of this mere form, or rather, since this form belongs to *consciousness as such*, its truth must already have emerged in the configurations of consciousness.—This overcoming of the object of consciousness is not to be taken as the one-sided process in which the object shows itself as returning into the Self, but is to be taken in a more determinate way, thus: the object as such presents itself to the Self as vanishing, but, more than this, it is the estrangement of self-consciousness that posits thinghood, and this estrangement has not only a negative but a positive meaning, and has it not only for us or in itself, but for self-consciousness itself. *For self-consciousness* the negative of the object, or its self-sublation, thereby has a positive meaning, or self-consciousness *knows* this nullity of the object, on the one hand, because it estranges its own self,—for in this estrangement it posits *itself* as object, or, in virtue of the inseparable unity of *Being-for-itself*, posits the object as itself. On the other hand, this positing contains another moment as well, namely, that self-consciousness has equally sublated this estrangement and objectivity too, and taken it back into itself, so that in *its* otherness as such it is at one with itself.—This is the movement of *consciousness*, and in this movement consciousness is the totality of its moments.—Equally, consciousness must have entered into relationship with the object in accordance with the totality of its determinations and have thus grasped it in accordance with each of them. This totality of its determinations makes *the object in itself* into the spiritual essence, and it becomes this in truth for consciousness through the apprehension of each of its singular determinations as a determination of the Self, or through the aforesaid spiritual relationship to them.¹

¶789. Thus the object is first *immediate* Being, or a thing in general—which corresponds to immediate consciousness; secondly, it is a becoming-other of itself, its relationship or its *Being for another*, and *Being-for-itself*, the determinacy—corresponding to perception,—and thirdly it is *essence*, or as a universal—corresponding to the understanding. The object is, as a whole, the syllogism or the movement of the universal through determination to singularity, as also the reverse movement from singularity, through singularity as sublated, or determination, and back to the universal.—It is, therefore, in accordance with these three determinations that consciousness must

know the object as itself. However, it is not knowledge as pure comprehension of the object that is in question; this knowledge is to be indicated only in its becoming, or in its moments on the side that belongs to consciousness as such, and the moments of the concept proper or of pure knowledge are to be indicated in the form of configurations of consciousness. For this reason the object does not yet appear in consciousness as such as the spiritual essentiality we have just affirmed it to be, and the attitude of consciousness towards it is not the consideration of it in this totality as such nor in its pure conceptual-form, but is in part a shape of consciousness in general, in part a number of such shapes which *we* bring together, and in which the totality of the moments of the object and of the attitude of consciousness can be indicated only when resolved into its moments.¹

¶790. So for this aspect of the apprehension of the object, as it is in the shape of consciousness, we have only to recall the earlier shapes of consciousness that have already come up.—Thus, in regard to the object insofar as it is immediate, an *indifferent Being*, we saw observing reason *seek* and *find* itself in this indifferent thing, i.e. we saw it to be equally conscious of its activity as an external activity, as it is conscious of the object only as an immediate object.—We also saw observing reason at its peak express its determination in the infinite judgement that the *Being of the I is a thing*.—And in fact a sensory immediate thing: when the I is called *soul*, it is of course also represented as a thing, but as an invisible, intangible, etc., thing, therefore in fact not as immediate Being and not as what is meant by a thing.—That judgement, taken as it immediately stands, is spiritless or rather the very absence of spirit. But in its *concept* it is in fact the height of spirit, and this *interior* of the judgement, which is not yet *present* in it, is what is expressed in the two other moments to be considered.¹

¶791. *The thing is I*; in fact, in this infinite judgement the thing is sublated; in itself it is nothing; it has meaning only in the relationship, only *through the I* and its *relation* to it.—This moment has emerged for consciousness in pure insight and enlightenment. Things are simply *useful* and to be considered only in their utility. The *cultivated* self-consciousness which has traversed the world of self-alienated spirit has, through its estrangement, generated the thing as its own self; therefore, it still retains its own self in it and knows the dependence of the thing, or it knows that the thing is *essentially* only *Being for another*; or, to give complete expression to the *relationship*, i.e. to what alone constitutes the nature of the object here, the thing counts for it as a *being-for-itself*, it proclaims sensory certainty as absolute truth, but it proclaims this very *Being-for-itself* as a moment that merely vanishes and passes over into its contrary, into the surrendered Being for another.¹

¶792. In this, however, knowledge of the thing is still not complete; the thing must be known not only in the immediacy of its Being and in its determinacy, but also as *essence* or *interior*, as the Self. This occurs in *moral self-consciousness*. Moral self-consciousness knows its own knowledge as the *absolute essentiality*, or it knows *Being* simply as pure will or knowledge; it *is* nothing but this will and knowledge; anything else has only unessential Being, i.e. not Being that is-*in-itself*, only its empty husk. Insofar as in its world-representation moral self-consciousness releases *Being-there* from the Self, it takes it back again into itself in equal measure. Finally, as conscience, it is no longer this incessantly alternating placing and shifting of Being-there and of

the Self; it knows that its *Being-there* as such is this pure certainty of itself; the objective element into which it ventures forth when it acts, is nothing other than the Self's pure knowledge of itself.¹

¶793. These are the moments of which the reconciliation of spirit with its own consciousness proper is composed; for themselves they are singular, and it is solely their spiritual unity that constitutes the force of this reconciliation. The last of these moments is, however, necessarily this unity itself and, as is evident, in fact it combines them all in itself. The spirit that, in its *Being-there*, is certain of itself, has for the element of *Being-there* nothing else but this knowledge of itself; the proclamation that it does what it does in accordance with conviction of duty, this language is the *validity* of its *action*.—Action is the first separation, a separation that is *in-itself*, of the simplicity of the concept, and the return out of this separation. This first movement veers round into the second, since the element of recognition posits itself, as *simple* knowledge of duty, in the face of the *difference* and *division* that lie in action as such, and in this way it forms an ironclad actuality confronting action. But in pardon, we saw how this harshness relents and estranges itself. Here, therefore, actuality, as well as *immediate Being-there*, has for self-consciousness no other significance than that of being pure knowing;—similarly, as *determinate* *Being-there*, or as relationship, what stands opposed to itself is a knowing, partly of this purely singular Self, partly of knowledge as universal. In this there is posited at the same time that the *third* moment, the *universality* or *essence*, counts for each of the two opposed sides only as *knowledge*; and finally these two sides equally sublimate the empty opposition still remaining and are the knowledge of I=I, this *singular* Self that is immediately pure knowledge or universal.¹

¶794. This reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness thus shows itself as brought about from two sides, once in the religious spirit, and again in consciousness itself as such. The difference between them is that the former is this reconciliation in the form of *Being-in-itself*, the latter in the form of *Being-for-itself*. In our consideration of them they at first fall apart; in the order in which the shapes of consciousness came before us, consciousness arrived at the single moments of those shapes, and at their unification, long before religion too gave its object the shape of actual self-consciousness. The unification of the two sides has not yet been exhibited; it is this that closes the series of the configurations of spirit, for in it spirit reaches the point of knowing itself, not only as it is *in itself* or according to its absolute *content*, nor only as it is *for itself* in its form devoid of content or on the side of self-consciousness, but as it is *in and for itself*.¹

¶795. This unification has, however, already happened *in itself* and that, too, in religion, in the return of representation into self-consciousness, but not in the proper form, for the religious side is the side of the *in-itself* which stands over against the movement of self-consciousness. Consequently, the unification belongs to this other side which, by contrast, is the side of reflection into itself, and therefore the side that contains both itself and its contrary, and not only *in itself* or in a universal way, but *for itself* or in a developed and differentiated way. The content, as well as the other side of self-consciousness, insofar as it is the *other* side, has been present and exhibited in its completeness; the unification that is still lacking is the simple unity of the concept. The concept, too, is itself already present on the side of

self-consciousness; but as it has come before us thus far, it has, like all the other moments, the form of being a *particular shape of consciousness*.—It is, therefore, that part of the shape of spirit certain of itself that remains within its concept and was called the *beautiful soul*. That is to say, the beautiful soul is its own knowledge of itself in its pure, transparent unity,—the self-consciousness that knows as spirit this pure knowledge of *pure Being-within-itself*,—not only the intuition of the divine, but the divine's intuition of itself.—Since this concept remains firmly opposed to its realization, it is the one-sided shape which we saw vanish into thin air, but we also saw its positive estrangement and progression. Through this realization, the self-absorption of this objectless self-consciousness, the *determinacy* of the concept in the face of its *fulfilment*, sublates itself; its self-consciousness acquires the form of universality, and what remains to self-consciousness is its genuine concept, or the concept that has acquired its realization; it is the concept in its truth, that is, in unity with its estrangement,—the knowledge of pure knowledge, not as the abstract *essence* that is duty,—but of knowledge as the essence that is *this* knowledge, *this* pure self-consciousness, that is therefore at the same time a genuine *object*, for the object is the Self that is-for-itself.¹

¶796. This concept gained its fulfilment on the one hand in the *action* of spirit certain of itself, and on the other, in *religion*: in religion the concept acquired the absolute *content as content* or content in the form of *representation*, in the form of otherness for consciousness; in the shape of the acting spirit, by contrast, the form is the Self itself, for it contains the self-certain spirit in *action*; the Self accomplishes the life of absolute spirit. This shape is, as we see, that simple concept which, however, abandons its eternal *essence, is there*, or acts. The *division* or emergence stems from the *purity* of the concept, for this purity is the absolute abstraction or negativity. Similarly, the concept has the element of its actuality, or of the Being it contains, in pure knowledge itself, for this pure knowledge is the simple *immediacy* that is *Being* and *Being-there* as well as *essence*, the former, negative thinking, the latter, positive thinking itself. Finally, this Being-there is just as much the reflectedness into itself out of pure knowledge—both as Being-there and as duty—or the state of *evil*. This withdrawal-into-itself constitutes the *opposition* of the *concept*, and is thus the emergence of the pure knowledge of the essence, a knowing *without action* and *without actuality*. But its emergence in this opposition is participation in it; the pure knowledge of essence has *in itself* estranged its simple unity, for it is the *division*, or the negativity that the concept is; insofar as this division is the *becoming-for-itself*, it is Evil; insofar as it is the *in-itself*, it is what remains good.—Now, what at first happens *in itself* is at the same time *for consciousness*, and is likewise itself duplicated: it is both *for consciousness* and also its *Being-for-itself* or its own doing. The same thing that is already posited *in itself* now therefore repeats itself as consciousness's knowledge of it and as conscious doing. Each party abandons for the other the independence of the determinacy in which it enters the lists against it. This abandonment is the same renunciation of the one-sidedness of the concept that *in itself* constituted the beginning; but it is now *its own* renunciation, just as the concept which it renounces is its own concept.—This *in-itself* of the beginning is in truth, as negativity, equally the mediated in-itself, and so it now *posits* itself as it is in truth, and the *negative* is as *determinacy* of each for the other and is in itself the

self-sublating in-itself. One of the two parts of the opposition is the disparity between the Being-*within-itself* in its *singularity*, and the universality,—the other is the disparity between its abstract universality and the Self. The former dies away to its Being-for-itself, and estranges itself, makes its confession; the latter renounces the harshness of its abstract universality, and in so doing dies away to its lifeless Self and to its unmoved universality; the former has thus completed itself through the moment of universality that is essence, and the latter through the universality that is Self. Through this movement of action, spirit—which is only spirit in *being there*, in elevating its Being-there into *thought* and thereby into absolute *opposition*, and in returning from this opposition through and in this opposition itself,—spirit has emerged as pure universality of knowing, which is self-consciousness,—as self-consciousness that is the simple unity of knowing.¹

¶797. Thus what in religion was *content* or form of the representation of an *other*, this is here the *Self's* own *doing*; the concept is the bond that makes the *content* the *Self's* own *doing*;—for this concept is, as we see, the knowledge of the *Self's* doing within itself as knowledge of all essentiality and all Being-there, the knowledge of *this subject as the substance* and of the substance as this knowledge of its doing.—What we have added here is only, on the one hand, the *assemblage* of the singular moments, each of which in its principle presents the life of spirit in its entirety, and on the other hand the firm hold on the concept in the form of the concept, the content of which had already emerged in these moments and which had already emerged itself in the form of a *shape of consciousness*.¹

¶798. This last shape of spirit—the spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the Self and thereby realizes its concept while remaining in its concept in this realization—is absolute knowing; it is spirit knowing itself in the spirit-shape, or *conceptual knowing*. The truth is not only *in itself* completely equal to certainty, but it also has the *shape* of certainty of itself, or it is in its Being-there, i.e. for the knowing spirit, in the *form* of knowledge of itself. The truth is the *content*, which in religion is still unequal to its certainty. But this equality consists in the content's having received the shape of the Self. As a result, that which is the very essence, viz. the *concept*, has become the element of Being-there, or has become the *form of objectivity* for consciousness. Spirit, *appearing* to consciousness in this element, or what is here the same thing, produced in it by consciousness, is *science*.¹

¶799. The nature, moments and movement of this knowing have, then, shown themselves to be such that this knowing is the pure *Being-for-itself* of self-consciousness; it is I, that is *this I* and no other I, and which is just as immediately *mediated* or is a sublated *universal I*.—It has a *content* which it *differentiates* from itself; for it is pure negativity or self-division; it is *consciousness*. This content is, in its difference, itself the I, for the content is the movement of sublating itself, or the same pure negativity that the I is. In it, as differentiated, the I is reflected into itself; the content is *comprehended* only in virtue of the fact that I is together with itself in its otherness. This content, specified more determinately, is nothing other than the very movement just spoken of; for the content is the spirit that traverses its own self and does so *for itself* as spirit by the fact that it has the shape of the concept in its objectivity.¹

¶800. But as regards the *Being-there* of this concept, *science* does not appear in time and in actuality until spirit has arrived at this consciousness about itself. As the

spirit that knows what it is, it does not exist earlier, and nowhere else, than after completion of the labour of mastering its imperfect configuration, of securing for its consciousness the shape of its essence, and in this way equalizing its *self-consciousness* with its *consciousness*.—The spirit that is in and for itself, differentiated into its moments, is knowledge that is-*for-itself*, a *comprehension* in general that, as such, has not yet attained the *substance* or is not in its own self absolute knowledge.¹

¶801. Now, in actuality, the knowing substance is there earlier than its form or its conceptual-shape. For substance is the as yet undeveloped *in-itself*, or the ground and concept in its still unmoved simplicity, and therefore the *inwardness* or the Self of the spirit, a Self that is not yet *there*. What is *there*, is as the still undeveloped simple and immediate, or as the object of *representational* consciousness in general. Cognition, because it is the spiritual consciousness for which what is *in itself* only is, insofar as it is *Being for the Self*, and Being of the *Self* or concept,—cognition has for this reason at first only a meagre object, in contrast to which the substance and the consciousness of this substance are richer. The manifestation which the substance has in this consciousness is in fact concealment, for substance is still *selfless Being* and only the certainty of itself is manifest to itself. At first, therefore, only the *abstract moments* of substance belong to *self-consciousness*; but since these, as the pure movements, propel themselves onward, self-consciousness enriches itself until it has wrested from consciousness the entire substance and has absorbed into itself the entire edifice of the essentialities of substance, and—since this negative attitude to objectivity is just as much positive, just as much a positing,—until it has generated them out of itself, and in so doing has at the same time restored them for consciousness. In the *concept* that knows itself as concept, the *moments* thus enter the scene earlier than the *filled whole* whose coming-to-be is the movement of these moments. In *consciousness*, on the other hand, the whole, though uncomprehended, is earlier than the moments.¹—*Time* is the *concept* itself that is *there*, and represents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason, spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time just so long as it has not *grasped* its pure concept, i.e. has not annulled time. Time is the *outer* intuited pure Self which is *not grasped* by the Self, the merely intuited concept; when this concept grasps itself it sublates its time-form, comprehends this intuiting, and is a comprehended and comprehending intuiting.—Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and the necessity of spirit that is not yet complete within itself,—the necessity to enrich the share which self-consciousness has in consciousness, to set in motion the *immediacy of the in-itself*—the form in which substance is in consciousness,—or conversely, if the in-itself is taken as the *internal*, the necessity to realize and reveal what is at first only *internal*, i.e. to claim it for certainty of itself.²

¶802. For this reason it must be said that nothing is *known* that is not in *experience*, or, to put the same thing in another way, that is not present as *felt truth*, as the Eternal *inwardly revealed*, as a sacred article of *faith*, or whatever other expressions are used. For experience is just this, that *in itself* the content—and that is the spirit—is the substance, and therefore an *object of consciousness*. But this substance, which is spirit, is spirit's *becoming* what it is *in itself*; and only as this becoming that reflects itself into itself is it in itself *spirit* in truth. Spirit is in itself the movement which is cognition—the transformation of that *in-itself* into the *for-itself*, of the *substance* into the *subject*, of the object of *consciousness* into an object of

self-consciousness, i.e. into an object that is just as much sublated, or into the *concept*. This movement is the circle that returns into itself, the circle that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the end.—Hence, insofar as spirit is necessarily this differentiation within itself, its intuited whole confronts its simple self-consciousness, and since, then, this whole is what is differentiated, it is differentiated into its intuited pure concept, *into time*, and into the content or into the *in-itself*; the substance has within it, as subject, the *at first inner* necessity of presenting itself within itself as what it is *in itself, as spirit*. Only when the objective presentation is complete is it at the same time the reflection of substance or the substance's becoming a Self.—Consequently, until spirit has completed itself *in itself*, until it has completed itself as world-spirit, it cannot reach its consummation as *self-conscious* spirit. Therefore, the content of religion proclaims what *spirit is* earlier in time than science does; but only science is spirit's true knowledge of itself.¹

§803. The movement of bringing forth the form of its self-knowledge is the labour which spirit accomplishes as *actual history*.¹ The religious community, insofar as it is at first the substance of absolute spirit, is the uncultivated consciousness whose Being-there is all the harsher and more barbarous the deeper its inner spirit is, and the deeper its spirit is, the harder the labour that its torpid Self has with its essence, with the alien content of its consciousness. It is only after consciousness has given up hope of sublating that alienness in an external, i.e. alien, manner that it turns to itself, because the sublation of that alien mode is the return into self-consciousness; only then does it turn to its own world and present, discover it as its property, and has thereby taken the first step towards coming down out of the *intellectual world*, or rather towards inspiriting the abstract element of that world with the actual Self. Through observation it finds,² on the one hand, Being-there as thought and comprehends it, and, conversely, it finds Being-there in its thinking.³ When, to begin with, this consciousness has thus expressed abstractly the immediate *unity* of thinking and Being, the unity of the abstract essence and the Self, and when it has revived the first light-essence in a *purser* way, viz. as unity of extension and Being,—for extension is a simplicity more like pure thinking than light is,—and has thereby revived in thought the *substance* of the Orient,⁴ then spirit at once recoils in horror from this abstract unity, from this *selfless* substantiality, and against it affirms individuality.⁵ But only after spirit has estranged this individuality in culture, thereby making it into Being-there and establishing it in all Being-there,—only after spirit has arrived at the thought of utility, and in its absolute freedom has grasped Being-there as its will, only then does it parade the thought of its inmost depths and enunciate the essence as I=I.⁶ But this I=I is the movement which reflects itself into itself; for since this equality, as absolute negativity, is absolute difference, the self-equality of the I stands over against this pure difference which, as difference that is pure and at the same time objective to the self-knowing Self, has to be expressed as *time*, so that, just as previously the essence was declared to be the unity of thinking and extension, it would now have to be grasped as the unity of thinking and time. But the difference left to itself, unresting and unhalting time, collapses instead within itself; time is the objective repose of *extension*, while extension is pure equality with itself, the I.⁷—Or the I is not merely the Self, but the *equality of the Self with itself*; but this equality is complete and immediate unity with itself, or *this subject* is just as much the *substance*.

The substance, just for itself, would be intuition devoid of content, or the intuition of a content which, as determinate, would have only accidentality and would lack necessity; the substance would count as the absolute only insofar as it was thought or intuited as *absolute unity*; and all content would, as regards its diversity, have to fall outside of it into reflection; and reflection does not pertain to substance, because substance would not be subject, would not be that which reflects on itself and reflects itself into itself, or would not be comprehended as spirit. If a content were to be spoken of nevertheless, it would, on the one hand, only be spoken of in order to cast it into the empty abyss of the absolute, and on the other, it would be a content picked up externally from sense-perception; knowledge would seem to have come upon things, upon the difference from itself, and the difference of a variety of things, in a way and from a source that are beyond comprehension.⁸

¶804. Spirit, however, has shown itself to us to be neither merely the withdrawal of self-consciousness into its pure inwardness, nor the mere submergence of self-consciousness into substance, and the non-Being of its difference; but rather *this movement* of the Self which estranges itself from itself and submerges itself into its substance and, as subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an object and a content, as well as sublating this difference between objectivity and content. That first reflection out of immediacy is the subject's differentiation of itself from its substance, or the self-dividing concept, the withdrawal-into-itself and becoming of the pure I. Since this difference is the pure doing of the I=I, the concept is the necessity and the dawning of *Being-there*, which has the substance for its essence and subsists for itself. But the subsistence of Being-there for itself is the concept posited in determinacy and thereby also its movement *within itself*, that of going down into the simple substance, which is subject only as this negativity and movement.—The I has neither to cling to itself in the *form of self-consciousness* as against the form of substantiality and objectivity, as if it were in dread of the estrangement of itself;—the force of spirit lies rather in remaining equal to itself in its estrangement and, as that which is *in-itself* and *for-itself*, in positing its *Being-for-itself* merely as a moment, as well as its *Being-in-itself*,—nor is the I a tertium quid that casts the differences back into the abyss of the absolute and declares their equality therein; on the contrary, knowing consists in this seeming inactivity which merely considers how what is differentiated moves within itself, and returns into its unity.¹

¶805. In knowledge, then, spirit has concluded the movement of giving shape to itself, insofar as this shaping is burdened with the unsurmounted difference of consciousness. Spirit has won the pure element of its Being-there, the concept. The content, in accordance with the *freedom* of its *Being*, is the self-estranging Self, or the *immediate* unity of self-knowledge. The pure movement of this estrangement, considered in the content, constitutes the *necessity* of the content. The diverse content, as *determinate*, is in relationship, not in itself, and its restlessness consists in sublating itself, or it is *negativity*; therefore, the negativity or diversity, just as it is free Being, is also the Self; and in this selfish *form* in which the Being-there is immediately a thought, the content is *concept*. So, having won the concept, spirit unfolds the Being-there and the movement in this aether of its life, and is *science*. In science, the moments of spirit's movement no longer present themselves as determinate

shapes of consciousness, but—since the difference of consciousness has returned into the Self—as *determinate concepts* and as the organic movement of these concepts, a movement grounded in itself. Whereas in the Phenomenology of Spirit each moment is the difference of knowledge and truth, and is the movement in which that difference sublates itself, science by contrast does not contain this difference and the sublation of it; on the contrary, since the moment has the form of the concept, it unites the objective form of truth and the form of the knowing Self in immediate unity. The moment does not enter the scene as this movement of passing back and forth, from consciousness or representation into self-consciousness, and vice versa; on the contrary, its pure shape, freed from its appearance in consciousness, that is to say, the pure concept and its onward movement, depends solely on its pure *determinacy*. Conversely, to each abstract moment of science corresponds a shape of appearing spirit in general. Just as the spirit that is there is not richer than science, so too it is not poorer in its content either. To cognize the pure concepts of science in this form of shapes of consciousness constitutes the side of their reality, on which their essence, the concept, which is posited in them in its *simple* mediation as *thinking*, breaks asunder the moments of this mediation and presents itself in accordance with the inner opposition.¹

¶806. Science contains within itself this necessity of estranging from itself the form of the pure concept, and it contains the passage of the concept into *consciousness*. For the self-knowing spirit, just because it grasps its concept, is the immediate equality with itself which, in its difference, is the *certainty of the immediate*, or is *sensory consciousness*,—the beginning from which we set out; this release of itself from the form of its Self is the supreme freedom and the assurance of its knowledge of itself.¹

¶807. Yet this estrangement is still incomplete; it expresses the *relation* of its self-certainty to the object, an object which, just because it is thus related, has not yet won its complete freedom. Knowledge is aware not only of itself but also of the negative of itself, or its limit. To know one's limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice is the estrangement in which spirit displays its becoming spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*, intuiting its pure *Self as time* outside of it, and equally its *Being as space*. This latter becoming of spirit, *nature*, is its living immediate becoming; *nature*, the estranged spirit, is in its Being-there nothing but this eternal estrangement of its *subsistence* and the movement which establishes the *subject*.¹

¶808. But the other side of spirit's becoming, *history*, is a *knowing*, *self-mediating* becoming—spirit estranged into time; but this estrangement is equally an estrangement of itself; the negative is the negative of itself. This becoming presents a slow movement and succession of spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of spirit, moves so slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance. As the fulfilment of spirit consists in perfectly *knowing what it is*, in knowing its substance, this knowing is its *withdrawal-into-itself* in which it abandons its Being-there and hands its shape over to recollection. In its withdrawal-into-itself spirit is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness, but in that night its vanished Being-there is preserved; and this sublated Being-there—the former one, but now reborn of knowledge—is the new Being-there, a new world and a new shape of spirit. In this new shape the spirit has to make a new beginning with its immediacy, as naively as before, and expand to maturity again, as if, for it, all

that preceded were lost and it had learned nothing from the experience of the earlier spirits. But *re-collection* has preserved them and is the interior and in fact the higher form of the substance. So although this spirit begins its cultivation afresh, seeming to set out only from itself, it is nonetheless at a higher stage that it begins. The realm of spirits which has formed itself in this way in Being-there constitutes a succession in which one spirit superseded another and each took over the realm of the world from its predecessor. The goal of this succession is the revelation of the depth, and this is *the absolute concept*; this revelation is thereby the sublation of the depth of the concept, or the *expansion* of it, the negativity of this I withdrawn-into-itself, a negativity which is its estrangement or substance,—and this revelation is also the *time* of the concept, the time in which this estrangement estranges itself within itself, and so in its expansion it is equally in its depth, in the Self. *The goal*, absolute knowledge, or spirit that knows itself as spirit, has for its path the recollection of the spirits as they are within themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm. Their preservation, on the side of their free Being-there appearing in the form of contingency, is history, while on the side of their conceptually comprehended organization, it is the *science of appearing knowledge*; the two together, comprehended history, form the recollection and the calvary of absolute spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of its throne, without which it would be lifeless solitude; only—

from the chalice of this realm of spirits
foams forth for Him his own infinitude.¹

Glossary of Some Key Terms

Action: *Handlung, Handeln*. **Doing(s):** *Tun*. **Deed:** *Tat*. *Handlung* is ‘a conscious expression of the will. It is only possible in statements which describe, judge or by implication draw attention to the motives of “acts” or “actions”’ (Farrell, 1977, p.3). *Handeln* is ‘“action” as opposed to inactivity, thought, words’ (ibid., p.6). *Tun*, the nominalization of the verb *tun* (‘do’), is ‘used in the sense of the general conduct, actions, or doings of an individual. It is vaguer than the other terms’ (ibid.). I usually translate *Tun* as ‘doing(s)’, but occasionally resort to ‘activity’, ‘operation’, etc. *Tat* ‘refers to the completed act or action, the result, which is seen plastically and as a whole’ (ibid., p.4.).

Actual(ity): *wirklich, Wirklichkeit*. **Real, reality:** *real, reell, Realität*. For Hegel, *wirklich* is a more weighty term than *real* or *reell*. Everything actual is real, but not everything real is actual. *Wirklich* ‘means “existing in actuality and effect” as opposed to something which exists in name or in mere possibility’ (Farrell, 1977, p.271). It is thus similar to *wahr*, ‘true’, in the sense of ‘“corresponding to the prototype” and “conforming with the real idea of the thing as it should be”, opposed to the false and apparent’ (ibid.). In PS ¶47 ‘the actual’ (*das Wirkliche*) is equated with the ‘Being-there’ of a concept. Thus, e.g., an acorn is not actual, since although it involves the concept of an oak-tree, the concept is not yet realized, but merely potential. Equally, a deformed or stunted tree is not actual, since it is not an adequate realization of the concept. A stray piece of wood or speck of dust is not actual, even though it is there, since it does not realize anything that Hegel would recognize as a concept.

Alienate, alienation: *entfremden, Entfremdung*. **Estrange, estrangement:** (*sich*) *entäußern, Entäußerung*. These are near synonyms, and are used synonymously in, e.g., ¶488. But they are not exact synonyms. To alienate something is to make it strange or alien. Thus in alienation something becomes a stranger to itself. To estrange something is simply to part with it or dispose of it. It might also be translated as ‘externalize, exteriorize’, and sometimes it is the counterpart of (*sich*) *erinnern, Erinnerung*, ‘recollect(ion), internaliz-e, -ation.’

Appear, appearance: *erscheinen, Erscheinung*. These words, like their English counterparts, have two main senses: (1) ‘emerge, come into view, become manifest’, where there is no contrast with reality; (2) ‘seem, look (as if)’, where something may appear to be other than it really is. *Erscheinung* can sometimes be translated as ‘phenomenon’, which, like the word ‘Phenomenology’, comes from the Greek word for ‘appear’, *phainomai*, which has the same ambiguity.

Being: (*das*) *Sein*. The infinitive of the verb ‘to be’ is *sein*. Hegel often uses it as a noun and then it is capitalized as *Sein*. I have retained the capital in order to distinguish it from the present participle, *seiend*, especially when it is nominalized as *das Seiende*, ‘the being’, ‘beings’, or ‘that which is’, as in ¶53. A special problem is the use of the participle *seiend* as an attributive adjective, as in *das seiende Wesen* (¶718), where English does not allow ‘the being essence’ and *seiende* cannot be translated as ‘existing’, since *Sein*, in Hegel’s usage, indicates the bare minimum of reality and is quite distinct from *Existenz* and from *Dasein*, ‘Being-there’. In ¶718 I resort to a paraphrase, ‘the essence that simply is’, and I adopt similar devices elsewhere.

Being-there: *Dasein*. This word was coined, from *da* (‘there’) and *sein* (‘being, to be’), as a Germanic alternative to the Latinate *Existenz*. Heidegger used it to mean roughly ‘human being’ and ‘being human’, and also stressed its derivation from *da* and *sein*. Hegel does not use it in Heidegger’s way, but he nevertheless differentiates it from *Sein* and *Existenz*, which

in Hegel (as in Heidegger) retains the flavour of its Latin ancestor, *existere*, 'step forth, arise, emerge'. In Hegel, *Dasein* might also be translated as 'determinate Being' or, sometimes, as 'embodiment'. In ¶47 it is the embodiment or realization of a *Begriff*, 'concept', and the combination of a concept and its *Dasein* is *das Wirkliche*, 'the actual'. But in ¶187 the *Dasein* from which self-consciousness displays its detachment does not correspond to any particular concept. Hegel also uses *dasein* as a verb, especially its present participle as an attributive adjective, and also the combination *da ist*, 'is there'. The latter gives some licence for my hyphenated rendering.

Comprehend, conceptual(ize): *begreifen*. This verb has the same ambiguity as 'comprehend', meaning both 'understand' and 'include', but is also associated with *Begriff*, 'concept'. It denotes what is, for Hegel, the highest level of thought, grasping things in terms of pure concepts. It contrasts, in particular, with *Vorstellung*, pictorial 'representation'. Whereas *Vorstellung* tends to separate things, *Begreifen* brings them together as interacting activities or processes, and hence combines inclusion with abstraction.

Concept: *Begriff*. A concept, for Hegel, is abstract and non-empirical. Thus, e.g., Being is a concept, but redness is not. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider a concept in terms of Hegel's botanical analogy. A concept is comparable to the plan or programme embodied in a seed. Thus the concept of something is often just the undeveloped beginning of it, as in ¶78. But this concept generates and controls the subsequent growth of the plant. Hence the concept is not simply our way of looking at things, but is an active force within them, a 'subject'. When the plant is fully grown, its concept is fulfilled. Hence the concept of something is often its fully developed state. A concept is an active process, interconnecting and embracing different stages of a plant's growth. Hegel's concepts are similarly interconnected, moving from one to the other. Hence concepts form one overall concept, *the* concept. Cf. *the* category in ¶235.

Conscious, consciousness: *bewusst, Bewusstsein*. In Hegel's usage to be conscious is not simply to be awake and vaguely aware of one's surroundings, but to have a reflective conception of objects conceived as distinct from oneself. Hence he does not attribute consciousness to animals, or to logicians. The logician is thinking about thoughts that are not distinct from himself.

Desire: *Begierde*. This 'refers only to strongly emotional desires and is thus more restricted in application than "desire". *Begierde* concentrates attention on the subject'. The corresponding adjective, *begierig*, means 'desirous of getting possession of something which satisfies an appetite or insistent desire, for oneself, not for others. It rarely refers to the desires of the higher self, although an intellectual interest may be involved' (Farrell, 1977, p.18). In ¶¶167ff., it is restricted to desire for living entities that are not self-conscious. Its connection with self-consciousness depends on its being a desire to eliminate things other than oneself and also to get them, i.e. consume them, oneself. A desire is essentially self-interested: a desire for X is a desire that I should get X. In desire the Self is thus more salient than in the theoretical shapes of chapters I–III.

Determine, determination, determinacy: *bestimmen, Bestimmung, Bestimmtheit*. *Bestimmung* has two broad senses. First, it is 'determination' in such senses as 'delimitation, definition'; adding features to a thing or a concept; or the features so added. Secondly, it may refer not to the present condition of something, but to its 'destination, destiny, vocation, calling'. (It never means 'determination' in the sense of 'resoluteness' or 'fixity of purpose'.) *Bestimmtheit* is less dynamic and denotes the state resulting from a process of *Bestimmung*.

Devotion: *Andacht*. Not thought, but on the way to thought, as its derivation from *denken* suggests. See ¶¶217, 571, and 711.

Element: *Element*. Hegel generally uses this word in the sense of 'surroundings, habitat, environment', not in the sense of a component or a chemical element, though he sometimes has in mind the four ancient Greek elements: earth, air, fire, and water.

Equal(ity) (like(ness)): *gleich, Gleichheit*. **Unequal (unlike), inequality (unlikeness):** *ungleich, Ungleichheit*. Hegel sometimes uses these words in ordinary ways. In ¶1, e.g., *Ungleichheit* is simply ‘incongruity’. However, he often uses them reflexively to indicate that something is equal to, or unequal to, itself, i.e. in harmony or disharmony with itself. See e.g. ‘equality-to-itself’ (*Sichselbstgleichheit*) in ¶21. This usage seems to be influenced by the polarity of the magnet: see ¶¶156ff.

In itself: *an sich*. **For itself, for self:** *für sich*. These expressions, often together with *Sein*, as in e.g. ‘Being-for-itself’, are usually contrasted with each other. They express three ideas, first that of mere potentiality (*an sich*) in contrast to actuality (*für sich*), secondly that of self-awareness or self-consciousness (*für sich*) in contrast to unawares (*an sich*) (as in ¶186), and thirdly that of separation (*für sich*) from its context (the in-itself or what is *an sich*). In the latter sense *für sich* might often be translated as ‘by itself’ or ‘on its own’: e.g. in ¶130 ‘Being-for-itself’ amounts to Being by itself, independence. I sometimes translate ‘*Für-sich-sein*’ as ‘Being-for-self’ instead of ‘Being-for-itself’, especially when the gender of the reflexive pronoun is indeterminate.

Infinite, infinity: *unendlich, Unendlichkeit*. In later works, e.g. *Enc. I*, ¶¶94f., Hegel explicitly distinguishes between true or good infinity and spurious or bad infinity. True infinity differs from bad infinity in two respects: first, bad infinity excludes and contrasts with the finite and is *bounded by* the finite and therefore not really infinite or ‘unbounded’, while true infinity embraces the finite. Secondly, bad infinity proceeds in a straight line in an endless progression or regress, while true infinity is self-enclosed and comparable to a circle rather than a straight line. It is, we might say, finite but unbounded. Hegel does not explicitly draw this distinction in PS, but he tacitly operates with true, rather than bad, infinity: see e.g. the final sentence of ¶161. The infinite is therefore akin to the absolute, which must also be all-embracing and include its finite manifestations.

Intuit, intuition: *anschauen, Anschauung*. It is immediate awareness, usually sensory, as in ¶104, but sometimes amounts to ‘behold’, or ‘view’, as in ‘world-view’, *Weltanschauung*, ¶599. It does not have the flavour of instinctive knowledge or belief, as the English words do.

Invert, inversion: *verkehren, Verkehrung*. Also translated as ‘reverse, reversal’ and ‘pervert, perversion’ or ‘conversion’, as in ¶391. Science is the inversion of ‘immediate self-consciousness’: ¶26. The inversion of something into its opposite begins in earnest with the inverted world of ¶157, but it is a persistent theme throughout the *Phenomenology*. The passing of any shape of consciousness involves a reversal of sorts, since what it takes to be true turns out otherwise. But see especially ¶171 on life, ¶230 on the unhappy consciousness, ¶306 on the individual and his environment, ¶¶312 and 322 on the perversion of one’s words and actions by others, ¶340 on the inversion of what is wholly bad into something good, and also ¶¶364f., 376, 467, 497ff. (the good and bad switch sides), 521ff. (the inversion of good and bad in the inverted world of Rameau’s nephew), 738 (reversal in tragedy), and 782.

Immediate: *unmittelbar*; **mediate, mediation:** *vermitteln, Vermittlung*. Both things and thoughts may be mediated. Things are mediated causally, whereas thoughts are mediated epistemically and/or logically. An oak tree and an acorn are mediated causally, the tree by the acorn from which it grew, the acorn by the tree on which it grew. By contrast, my belief in, say, God may be either immediate—depending on no proof or evidence—or mediated by proofs or evidence. The immediacy and mediation here are epistemic or logical, since an *epistemically* immediate belief can hardly be *causally* unmediated. As with all sharp distinctions, Hegel sublates the distinction between causal and logico-epistemic mediation. He does so, because in his view reason and concepts are immanent in things, and the relations and development of things are the actualization of their logical content. He

systematically transposes logical forms, notably the mediating syllogism, into the world. Nothing, in Hegel's view, is purely immediate or purely mediated. Logical mediation does not, as it does in traditional logic, relate items whose content is fixed independently of their mediation. Hence, an 'immediate' belief in God owes such content as it has to its residual mediation; but its content remains thin and indeterminate without mediating proofs. Conversely, the determinate content that something has acquired from mediation can be considered in its concrete immediacy: I can contemplate an oak tree without thinking of the acorn. See PS ¶¶21f., 189, 597.

Know, -ing, -ledge: *wissen, Wissen. Cognize, cognizing, cognition:* *erkennen, Erkennen, Erkenntnis*. The most general term for 'know' is *wissen*, while *erkennen* and its cognates are more weighty terms, applied to philosophical and scientific knowledge. In accordance with its derivation from a defunct verb for 'see', *Wissen* tends to be immediate, whereas *Erkennen* is based on reasoning and involves a process of getting to know something. However, W.A. Suchting, in *Enc. I*, pp.xl–xlii, argues that Hegel uses *wissen* in a lower and a higher sense. In the lower sense *Wissen* is simply immediate, while in the higher sense, it is mediated, but its mediation has been 'sublated' or overcome. *Erkennen* lies between the two, still burdened with mediation and still only on the way to ultimate truth. Hence chapter VIII can be entitled *Das absolute Wissen*, a bird's-eye view of the truth that has left its mediation behind. *Wissen* is a close relative of *Bewusstsein*, 'consciousness', and of *gewiss(heit)*, 'certain(ly)', but distinct from both. In Hegel's usage certainty is subjective and may be at odds with the truth: see ¶798 and note. *Wissen* aims at truth, but this does not entail its truth in the ordinary sense, or in Hegel's sense(s): see ¶¶39, 76, and 83. This coheres with Hegel's view that truth and falsity are not sharply distinct from each other: see ¶¶38f. There is a further ambiguity in *Wissen* when it is used as a noun. Like the word 'knowledge', it may refer either to what is known (as in 'His knowledge is inexhaustible') or to the knowing of it (as in 'He did it without my knowledge'): see ¶85.

Mean, meaning: *meinen, Meinen, Meinung*. The verb *meinen* has two senses: 'believe, opine' and 'intend, mean to say'. *Meinung* usually means 'opinion', but Hegel also gives it the sense of 'meaning'. Here 'mean' and 'meaning' are quite different from 'mean' and 'meaning' in the sense of 'signify' (*bedeuten*) and 'signification, significance' (*Bedeutung*). I sometimes translate *meinen*-words as 'opine, opining, opinion' when Hegel's word-play requires it. See ¶¶63, 97–110, esp. 100, 297, 319, and 424.

Moment: *Moment*. A 'moment' is a moving force or impetus. In SL, p.82, Hegel illustrates this with the lever, a rigid bar rotating about a fixed point, a fulcrum or pivot. In lifting a weight on one end of the lever, there are two relevant factors or 'moments': the force applied to the other end of the lever, and the distance between the application of this force and the fulcrum. If either of these is decreased, then the other needs to be proportionately increased. Either alone is ineffectual. This explains why moments taken separately are 'static': see PS ¶32. Hegel uses this idea widely. In logic, for example, pure being and pure nothing are moments of becoming: becoming would not occur if there were only pure being or only pure nothing. In particular, it applies to the shapes of consciousness in PS. A shape collapses because it consists of different moments that enter into conflict with each other.

Morality: *Moralität; Ethical life, order, etc.:* *Sittlichkeit*. Hegel's distinction between these is comparable, though not identical with, with Bertrand Russell's distinction between 'positive morality', a 'social institution analogous to law' (*Sittlichkeit*), and 'personal morality', which is a 'matter for the individual conscience' (*Moralität*) in Russell (2004), p.186, and also to the distinction drawn by Strawson (1961) between 'social morality' and 'individual ideal'. *Sittlich* and *Sittlichkeit* come from *Sitte*, 'custom', and for Hegel have the flavour of 'customary morality'. He associates *Sittlichkeit* especially with the ancient Greeks, who, he said, 'had no

conscience', and *Moralität* with Kant and his successors, but a modern society must accommodate both.

Object, objective, objectivity: *Gegenstand*, *gegenständlich*, *Gegenständlichkeit* (*Objekt*, *objektiv*, *Objektivität*). Hegel uses *Objekt*, etc. only in the Preface and once in the Introduction, and always in explicit contrast to *Subjekt*, *subjektiv* or *Subjektivität*. *Objekt* is a technical logical term, while *Gegenstand* is an everyday term, sometimes amounting to 'subject-matter', 'topic', or even 'subject', as in the first sentence of ¶1. But usually a *Gegenstand* is an intentional object of *Bewusstsein* (consciousness), as its etymology ('standing against') suggests.

Reason: Vernunft; understanding: Verstand; reason(s), ground(s): Grund, Gründe. Understanding and reason (*Vernunft*) are different ways of thinking. Understanding sets up clear-cut and stable distinctions between things and between concepts, between e.g. truth and falsity (see ¶39), while reason, in its negatively rational form, shows how the distinction breaks down, and, in its 'speculative' or positively rational form, displays the emergence of a unity that 'sublates' the understanding's initial distinction. See esp. *Enc. I*, ¶¶79–82. 'Reason' as *Vernunft* is quite different from 'reason' as *Grund*. *Vernunft* is the reason or rationality immanent in concepts or things, and only needs to be brought to light by the philosopher. A *Grund*, in one of its several senses, is a reason, or one's reason, for doing or believing something, and may be quite extraneous to what is done or believed. Moreover, appeal to reasons, or *Räsonnement*, is generally inconclusive: there are, in Hegel's view, reasons for, and reasons against, doing or believing almost anything. See PS ¶¶48, 58ff. In view of this, the connection sometimes drawn between Hegel's *Vernunft* and Wilfred Sellars's conception of the 'space of reasons' is problematic.

Recognize: anerkennen. This might more appropriately be translated as 'acknowledge', whose meaning overlaps that of 'recognize', but does not coincide with it, since acknowledgement is invariably overt, whereas recognition need not be: one can recognize a person or one's mistake without acknowledging him or it.

Recollect(ion), internaliz-e, -ation: (sich) erinnern, Erinnerung. In ordinary German, *erinnern* means 'remind', and the reflexive, *sich erinnern*, 'remind oneself, remember, recollect'. However, Hegel often uses the verb in accordance with what he takes to be its root meaning, 'to internalize, interiorize', often combining this with its standard meaning. So e.g. in ¶47 the reflexive *sich erinnert* means not simply 'recollects, remembers', but 'recollects/internalizes itself'. Especially in ¶¶753 and 808 *Erinnerung* is the converse of *Enttäusserung*, 'estrangement, externalization'. It is tempting to hyphenate the words as 're-collect(ion)'. But this is excluded by the fact that while in ¶¶753 and 808 Hegel writes *Er-innerung* to emphasize its novel sense, he usually leaves the word unhyphenated.

Relation: Beziehung. Relationship: Verhältnis. 'Verhältnis means primarily "ratio" and "proportion". Applied to a "relation" between things, it can only mean that they stand in a certain ratio to each other, i.e. that the relation is fixed in this way. It is not used in a general way to indicate a vague connection. . . . *Beziehung* is a relationship in which one thing influences the other, or where there is interaction, therefore often in reference to two events' (Farrell, 1977, p.278).

Represent; representation, idea: vorstellen, Vorstellung. Idea: Idee. A *Vorstellung* is a 'mental picture of a thing. It draws attention less to the thing in its objective aspects than to the state of mind of the subject, particularly with regard to the intensity, vividness, clarity, persistence or otherwise of the image' (Farrell, 1977, p.156). Moreover, in Hegel's view, *Vorstellung* tends to separate things, while *Begreifen* brings them together in a comprehensive movement. In ordinary German *Idee* is often used, like *Vorstellung*, for an idea in the mind, but Hegel normally uses it for an objective 'Idea' in something like Plato's sense: see e.g. ¶55. (Contrast 'Plato had some bright ideas [*Vorstellungen*]' with 'Plato worshipped the Idea [*Idee*] of the Good'.) However, Hegel differs from Plato in regarding an Idea not

simply as a concept, but as a concept realized, together, that is, with its Being-there or objectivity. But this becomes explicit only in later works: see e.g. *Enc.* I, ¶213. In PS ¶47, the combination of a concept and its Being-there is equated with ‘the actual’, not with the Idea. The contrast between *Vorstellung* and *Idee* gives rise to two different senses of ‘idealism’. Kant and Schopenhauer are *Vorstellung*-idealists, while Hegel is an *Idee*-idealist. I translate *Vorstellung* as ‘representation’, especially when it contrasts with ‘concept’, ‘thought’, etc., but occasionally as ‘idea’, when it is used informally. I capitalize ‘Idea’ when it renders *Idee*.

Singular, singleton, singularity: *einzel*n, (*der*) *Einzelne*, *Einzelheit*. **Individual (adj.), individual, individuality:** *individuell*, (*das*) *Individuum*, *Individualität*. These groups of words are near-synonyms, but they are not exact synonyms. *Individuell*, etc. are more weighty terms than *einzel*n, etc. *Einzel*n ‘translates “separate(ly)” in reference to the individual parts of a whole or a group’ (Farrell, 1977, p.296) and ‘means “individual”, i.e. taken separately, by itself, in relation to the parts of a whole or to a number’ (ibid., p.315), while *der Einzelne* is ‘the general term for “the individual”’. *Das Individuum* is used in more strictly philosophical contexts, and not like English “individual” in the sense of “person”’ (ibid., p.297). By contrast, *individuell*, etc. cannot be applied to the parts of a whole, only to a complete whole: see e.g. ¶266, where a whole organism is an ‘individual’, while its parts are ‘singular’. The three moments of the concept in Hegel (see *Enc.* I, ¶¶163ff.) are the universal (i.e. generic), the particular (i.e. specific), and the individual or singular. But here ‘individual’ is *Einzelne*. It cannot be *Individuelle*, since in PS ¶28, and often elsewhere, Hegel speaks of *das allgemeine Individuum* (‘the universal individual’), where *das allgemeine Einzelne* would make no sense. *Individualität* does not contrast with universality and particularity, but may embrace them. When Hegel, in his lectures on history, speaks of the ‘world-historical individual’ (such as Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon), this must be an *Individuum*, not an *Einzelner*.

Self: (*das*) *Selbst*. I: (*das*) *Ich*. ‘The Self’ is *das Selbst*, the nominalization of the pronoun *selbst*, which means ‘itself, myself’, etc., used for emphasis, as in ‘I did it myself’. It is distinct from the reflexive pronoun, *sich*, etc., though it is often used to strengthen the reflexive pronoun, *sich selbst*, ‘its, one’s, etc. own self’. (Thus, e.g., ‘for itself’ is *für sich*, and often *für sich selbst*, but never *für selbst*, and ‘relate itself to itself’ is *sich auf sich beziehen*.) As pronouns, ‘self’, *selbst*, and *sich* can apply to almost any entity: ‘The city itself is beautiful, but the people are not’, ‘It shows itself at its best in the winter’, and so on. Moreover, nouns with the reflexive prefix ‘self’, or *selbst*, such as ‘self-preservation’ (*Selbsterhaltung*), also apply to a wide range of entities. But as free-standing nouns, ‘Self’ and *Selbst* are closely related to ‘the I’ and are restricted to humans or more generally to spiritual things. I have capitalized ‘Self’ when Hegel uses (*das*) *Selbst* as a noun.

Selfish, selfless: *selbstisch*, *selbstlos*. *Selbstisch*, like ‘selfish’, ordinarily means ‘egotistical, concerned with one’s own desires and interests, regardless of others’. But Hegel reverts to its literal meaning of ‘pertaining to the Self, oneself’ or ‘self-like’. Correspondingly, *selbstlos* normally means ‘self-effacing, self-sacrificing’, but Hegel uses it in the sense of ‘lacking, devoid of, a Self’, as in ¶602, where nature is ‘selfless’. Hegel likes to use words in a literal sense without the accretions that they acquire in informal discourse. I have followed him in my translation in order to preserve his tendency to use words in unusual, literal, ways.

Self-essence: *Selbstwesen*. This often contrasts with *Gemeinwesen*, ‘commonwealth’, but literally ‘common-essence’. See ¶¶249, 447, 472, and 477.

Speculation, speculative: *Spekulation*, *spekulativ*. These words derive from the Latin *speculari*, ‘to spy out, examine, explore’. In philosophy they originally referred to theoretical philosophy in contrast to practical philosophy. But Hegel appropriates them to characterize to his own dialectical method, especially the third, ‘positively rational’, stage of it, where the ‘fixed

determinacies' set up by the analytical understanding (*Enc. I*, ¶80), which have been broken down by the dialectical, or negative, reason (*Enc. I*, ¶81), are restored in a satisfying unity-in-difference (*Enc. I*, ¶82). The words occur frequently in the Preface, but rarely in the rest of PS, since they are associated primarily with Hegel's logic. The Latin verb also gave rise to *speculum*, 'mirror', and Hegel's usage is often said to involve mirroring: see e.g. *Enc. I*, ¶82, n.41. But *speculum* is only a minor member of the *specul*-family, and there is no trace in Hegel of a link between 'speculation' and mirrors. *Enc. I*, ¶112 Addition associates mirrors with 'reflection' rather than speculation.

Spirit: *Geist*. In *Enc. III*, Hegel explicitly distinguishes three stages of spirit: 'subjective spirit' (roughly, the individual mind), 'objective spirit' (the collective social life of a people), and 'absolute spirit' (art, religion, and philosophy). He does not draw this distinction explicitly in PS, and tends to call the individual mind the 'soul' (*Seele*) rather than the 'spirit': see ¶77. *Geist*'s wide range of senses (including the 'holy spirit') and its tendency develop from one to the other, as well as its tendency to embrace what is other than Geist, make it an especially suitable candidate for the status of the absolute.

State: *Staat*. I capitalize 'State' in the political sense in order to distinguish it from 'state' in the sense of 'condition' (*Zustand*), as in ¶477, where 'state of right' is *Rechtszustand*, not *Rechtsstaat*.

Sublate, sublation: *aufheben*, *Aufhebung*. *Aufheben* has three distinct senses: 'to pick up, raise', 'to preserve', and 'to eliminate'. In ordinary German, *aufheben* has only one of these senses on any given occasion of its use. However, in his later works, Hegel often uses it in at least two of its senses at once, 'preserve' and 'eliminate', and sometimes in all three senses. The idea is conveyed by our expression 'kick somebody upstairs', that is, to promote them to a rank or position that is officially superior but in fact carries less power and influence. The Latin verb *tollo* has a similar ambiguity and its irregular past participle *sublatus* gave rise to the coinage 'sublate' in translations of Hegel. In PS, Hegel's later usage is not yet fully developed and he often uses *Aufhebung* in the sense of 'elimination' alone. But in ¶113 he explicitly uses it in his later sense.

Substance: *Substanz*. **Subject:** *Subjekt*. Sometimes in the Preface, and once in the Introduction, *Subjekt* is the counterpart to *Objekt*. But the central contrast, even in the Preface, is between *Subjekt* and *Substanz*, as in ¶17. Here Hegel has in mind Spinoza's substance and his supposed neglect of the subject, but he also applies the contrast to social orders, ancient Greece having a predominance of substance over subject, while the French revolutionary order has a predominance of subject over substance: see e.g. ¶587 on the alternating interplay between substance and subject. Substance is the cultural background from which individuals emerge, while the subject is the active individual(s) emerging from it. Substance is comparable to *langue* and subject to *parole*: as there can be no speakers without an underlying language, and no language without speakers, so there can be no coherent agents without an underlying culture and no culture without agents to create and sustain it. Hegel explores and exploits different aspects of the word 'subject', especially the grammatical subject, which is a passive recipient of predicates, but which may also be a dynamic subject, performing the activity denoted by a verb and so converging with the human subject: see e.g. ¶66.

Syllogism: *Schluss*. Hegel's conception of 'extremes' united by a 'middle term' derives from his conception of a syllogism. A simple traditional syllogism is:

Major premise: *All men are mortal*

Minor premise: *All Greeks are men*

Conclusion: *All Greeks are mortal*

The middle term is the term that appears in both premises, but not in the conclusion, in this case 'man/men'. It is called the 'middle term', because it links together the two 'end terms' or 'extremes' appearing in the conclusion. Hegel applies this terminology to the link between any two opposites, which need not be, and usually are not, terms in propositions, though he does not hesitate to refer to their relationship as a 'syllogism', a move facilitated by the fact that the Germanic word for 'syllogism' is (*logischer*) *Schluss*, which also means 'conclusion' or 'closure'. In Chapter III, the middle term is often little more than the unity or contact between two opposing forces (§§136, 141). For example, a balloon retains its size and shape owing to the interplay between the air pressure within the balloon (which tends to expand the balloon so as to become equal to the pressure of the air outside) and the elasticity of the material from which the balloon is made (which tends to contract the balloon). The stable balloon itself is then the middle term. In §146 the middle term is more substantial: it is the 'appearance' between the understanding and the 'interior', that is, the scientifically postulated laws and entities underlying perceptible appearance. See also §184, where the middle term is self-consciousness, which links together the two self-consciousnesses that emerge from it.

Thing, thing: *Sache, Ding*: German has two words for 'thing', *Ding* and *Sache*. They are often used interchangeably, as in §73. But this is not always so. *Ding* is as neutral as the English 'thing', though in Hegel it often has the derogatory flavour of a *mere* thing, in contrast to higher entities such as the mind, as in 'He treats me as a thing!' The thing with properties in §§111ff. is a *Ding*. *Sache*, by contrast, suggests objectivity and importance. It is the thing at issue or at stake, somewhat as in 'That's the thing!' and 'The thing is that . . .' or 'The play's the thing!' Hegel often stresses this by speaking of *die Sache selbst*, 'the Thing itself', e.g. in §1. *Sache* resists any single, consistent rendering in English, but is readily translatable into French as '*Chose*' and Italian as '*Cosa*' (as in '*cosa nostra*'). In some contexts, such as §1, *Sache* is roughly equivalent to '(subject-)matter', but not in all. In §409 *Sache* is used in two ways: *die Sache selbst* is the thing that matters, while the simple *Sache* does not matter, and is roughly equivalent to *Ding*. I have therefore chosen to capitalize *Sache* as 'Thing', in order to differentiate it from *Ding* ('thing'), while preserving its semantic affinity to it. The word *Sache* is sufficiently potent in Hegel's usage to require a uniform translation throughout.

Thinking: *Denken*. **Thought:** *Gedanke*. In English 'thought' has a similar ambiguity to that of 'work': it means both the activity or process of thinking (as in 'I was absorbed in thought') and its product (as in 'I have had a brilliant thought'). I have translated the verbal noun *Denken* as 'thinking', even where 'thought' would be a more natural rendering, and reserved 'thought' for its object or product, *Gedanke*. See also §30 and note, for a narrower sense of 'thinking', where it contrasts with 'representation', and a wider sense, in which it includes representation.

True, truth: *wahr, Wahrheit*: Hegel uses these words in a variety of ways, and not only, or even primarily, in the sense of 'corresponding to the facts'. In the Preface, *das Wahre*, 'the true', is generally something like the absolute, the complete and undiluted truth (e.g. §17), while elsewhere it is often what is regarded as the truth by a particular shape of consciousness. The truth of something is often its fulfilment or what it amounts to. The 'truth of' any given stage in the growth of a plant is the immediately following stage, e.g. the truth of a bud is the leaf or flower. The truth simpliciter is the fully-grown plant. Similarly, the truth of any given shape of consciousness is its immediate successor, but only at the final stage do we get undiluted truth. See note to §798. '(Un)true' sometimes amounts to '(un)real', as in §§76 and 78.

Work: *Werk*. **Labour:** *Arbeit*. 'Work' in English applies both to the activity and to its product. I have translated *Arbeit* as 'labour', where 'work' would result in ambiguity, and *Werk* as 'work', but occasionally as 'artefact' or 'product'.

Commentary

Preface

- ¶1. 1. The capitalized ‘Thing’ translates *Sache*, in contrast to *Ding*, ‘thing’, which Hegel uses in A.II for the ‘thing’ that has ‘properties’ and is the object of ‘perception’. *Sache* means ‘thing’, but also ‘affair, business, (subject-)matter’. While *Ding* is often pejorative, in Hegel’s usage *Sache* carries a suggestion of the thing ‘at stake/issue’, as does ‘thing’ in such expressions as ‘The thing is . . .’, ‘That’s just the thing (for . . .)’, ‘do one’s own thing’, ‘make a thing of it’, ‘have a thing about . . .’.
2. Hegel invariably uses the word *Element* in the sense of a ‘milieu’ or ‘environment’ (as in being ‘in your element’), not in the sense of a simple principle or constituent.
3. Here, and elsewhere, ‘idea’ translates *Vorstellung*, when Hegel uses the word informally, and not in his technical sense of ‘representation’ in contrast to ‘thought’, ‘concept’, etc. The lower case ‘idea’ is quite distinct from the capitalized ‘Idea’, which stands for *Idee* rather than *Vorstellung*.
4. Hegel objects to two main features of the customary preface, its inclusion of material irrelevant to the philosophical work itself (the Thing)—such as the author’s reasons for writing it—and its tendency to summarize the main conclusions of the work, while omitting the systematic argumentation and the elaboration of details.
- ¶2. 1. ‘Opinion’ here translates *Meinung*. Later, especially in ¶¶90ff., it is translated as ‘meaning’, in accordance with one of the senses of its parent verb, *meinen*, which means both ‘opine, believe’ and ‘mean, intend’.
2. ‘Being-there’ is a literal translation of the German *Dasein*, which normally means ‘existence’ (and sometimes ‘life’). But since Hegel also uses *Existenz*, and differentiates it from *Dasein*, ‘existence’ needs to be reserved for the former. *Dasein* is the determinate Being of something, its concrete and tangible expression or embodiment.
3. Hegel deploys two distinct conceptions of truth and falsity: one concerns the extent to which an entity fulfils or realizes the concept of an entity of that type, asking e.g. whether a sapling is true (or ‘real’) tree, so-and-so is a true friend, or this is a true work of art; the other concerns the extent to which an entity, such as a proposition, a theory, or a philosophical system accurately represents reality or the way things really are. Only the first conception applies to a plant. Both conceptions apply to a philosophy. We can ask both ‘Is Hegel a true philosopher?’ and ‘Is Hegel’s philosophy true?’ The answers to these questions need not be the same.
- ¶3. 1. Hegel has two main arguments: first, a philosopher’s aim is a ‘lifeless universal’ unless we know his arguments for it and the applications made of it or the conclusions drawn from it; secondly, to focus on the respects in which one thing differs from others implies a superficial view of it, since the difference between one thing and another lies at the boundary or ‘limit’ (*Grenze*) of the thing. The first argument is acceptable: to say simply that Kant is a ‘transcendental idealist’, while Hegel is an ‘objective idealist’ is uninformative. The second argument is unacceptable. Differences can be superficial (such as the difference between white and black swans) or significant (such as that between vertebrates and invertebrates). To ask ‘What is the difference between Kant and Hegel?’ may lead to the heart of their thought.
- ¶4. 1. Life involves three stages: (1) The ‘immediacy of substantial life’; (2) the beginning of education or ‘culture’ (*Bildung*); (3) the serious business of ‘life in its fullness’. Stage (1) is

life that is simply lived, unreflectively. Hegel's opponents have ascended to stage (2), but only to an imperfect version of it: they have not fully mastered the 'Thing' (*Sache*) or subject-matter. Stage (2) initially separates us from 'substantial life', but at stage (3) we apply the culture we have acquired to 'life'. This gives us a deeper insight into, an 'experience' of, the 'Thing'. It also enriches life. Even if we pursue conceptual thought, probing the 'depths' of the Thing, the 'information' and capacity for 'assessment' acquired at stage (2) still have a place in informal philosophical conversation, as long as they are excluded from serious philosophy itself and preceded by a rigorous initiation into 'culture'. Hegel's triad follows the pattern of (1) immediate absorption in life; (2) separation from life; and (3) a sophisticated reunification with life.

- ¶5. 1. The word 'philosophy' derives from Greek words for 'love' and 'wisdom', and thus originally meant 'love (*philo-*) of wisdom (*sophia*)', rather than simply 'wisdom' or knowledge.
2. The 'inner necessity' that knowledge should become science is the atemporal logical structure of the Thing itself, which (like the plan embedded in an acorn) requires that a true philosophy (like a true oak-tree) develop into an expansive and diversified, but coherent system, and prescribes the stages of this development. The 'external necessity' is the realization of this plan by one or more philosophers, which, apart from personal contingencies, follows the same order in time as the logical order in the atemporal plan. Hegel's adoption and fulfilment of this systematic aim will show the necessity of them (rather than their mere possibility), analogously to the way in which the growth of an oak-tree from an acorn shows, given favourable circumstances, the necessity of its doing so. To the objection that the existence of substantial *unsystematic* philosophers, such as Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) and, later, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, shows that systematic philosophy is not inevitable; Hegel might reply that unsystematic philosophies cannot incorporate their philosophical predecessors in the way that Hegel purports to do and that they therefore resist inclusion in the philosophical canon.
- ¶6. 1 Hegel's opponents deny that 'the absolute' can be conceptually defined, as, say, a triangle can, or its existence and nature inferred, in the way that we infer that the angles of a triangle make two right angles. Although the absolute, i.e. that which does not depend on anything else for its existence or nature, need not amount to God in the traditional sense, Hegel's opponents usually applied this to God: see *Enc. I*, ¶¶61–78 on Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819). God, or God's existence, can, they argued, be intuited, felt, etc. but not analysed and proven. The claim that, on this view, 'the true', i.e. God or the absolute, exists 'as' intuition, etc., not simply 'in' intuition, etc. reflects the doctrine that such 'immediate' mental states, unlike conceptual knowledge, become identical with their object. On this view, the believer is not only 'in the centre of divine love', but is 'the Being of this centre itself'; the believer has become identical with God. The reference to 'love' is perhaps inspired by Spinoza, who played an important role in Jacobi's thought and who, at the climax of his *Ethics*, advocates an 'intellectual love of God' that is identical with, or at least a part of, God's love of himself: 'the mind's intellectual love of God is part of the love by which God loves himself' (*Ethics*, V, proposition 36). In *Enc. I*, ¶86 Hegel quotes Jacobi's remark that Spinoza's God is the 'principium of Being [*des Seins*] in all Being-there [*Dasein*]', adding that 'Being' (*das Sein*) is a supremely thin concept. The reference to 'Being' in this Preface may also be intended to imply that if God is accessible only to intuition, etc., we can say no more about God than that he 'is' or 'is Being', an all but empty characterization of God.
- ¶7. 1. Spirit's former 'substantial life' is the traditional religious faith that has been undermined, at least among the educated classes, by 'insubstantial reflection of itself into itself', i.e. by the enlightenment. Spirit, i.e. the educated classes, wants to regain its substantial life. There are two ways in which this might be achieved. There is, first, the rigorous

philosophical thinking that Hegel recommends, thinking the enlightenment through conceptually. Secondly, there is the mush of feeling, etc. offered by the romantics.

- ¶8. 1. 'Singular, singularity, singleton, etc.' translate *einzel*, and its variants. 'Individual(ity)' would be a more appropriate translation, were it not for the fact that Hegel also uses *individuell*, *Individualität*, and *Individuum*, and differentiates them from *einzel*, etc.
2. There are three stages: (1) Before the enlightenment, there was a rich and elaborate religious faith. Heaven had a lot in it, but worldly things were neglected. (2) The enlightenment (Voltaire, Diderot, Kant, etc.) turned us away from heaven to worldly things and affairs. Religion is neglected. (3) As the enlightenment waned, attempts were made to revive religion. A prime example is Friedrich Schleiermacher's *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799, 3rd edition 1821), proclaiming that religion is 'feeling and intuition of the universe', a 'sense for the infinite in the finite', and so on. Schleiermacher was a member of the romantic circle (the Schlegels, Novalis, etc.), who were the most prominent of religion's cultivated despisers, and his interpretation of religion bears traces of romantic philosophy. His account of religion is thin and unappetizing, as compared with pre-enlightenment faith. If we had not lost so much, we would not be satisfied with so little.
- ¶10. 1. *Horos* is Greek for a 'boundary stone', hence a symbol for determinacy and distinctness. Finite things are determinate and determinate things are finite, bounded by other things distinct from them. In the view of Hegel's adversaries, concepts apply only to finite things, marking off one thing, or type of thing, from another. Necessity too is characteristic of finite things: one finite thing necessitates another. *Reflection* is here the consideration of something distinct from oneself. It implies the finitude of its object: what is distinct from oneself is ipso facto finite or bounded, at least bounded by and exclusive of oneself. Hegel's adversaries want to go beyond finite things to God or the 'essence' underlying them all. God is not determinate, not just one thing among others, not distinct even from the philosophizing Self. So they propose to abandon concepts, necessity, and reflection, and to submerge themselves in the essence.
- ¶11. 1. 'Physiognomy' denotes the features of someone's face that enable us to discern their character, and also the art of interpreting them: see PS ¶¶ 309ff. Here it applies more generally to the overall character of the world. A steady quantitative change (e.g. a decrease in temperature) does not produce a corresponding qualitative change in the physiognomy of water, until at a certain point the water turns to ice: *Enc. I*, ¶¶107f. The new world has, it seems, just been born.
- ¶12. 1. The new world has emerged but is still only comparable to an infant or an acorn. It embodies the concept of the new world, but the concept is not actualized or realized as a full-grown adult or oak. Science follows the same course as the world. When the new world is complete it will be crowned by a science that is also complete. But as yet science is only at the acorn stage, corresponding to the acorn stage of the society it adorns. This acorn society is the result of a long and expansive process, rather as the literal acorn is the product of the growth of an expansive oak. The long process of the oak-tree's growth is now concentrated in the simple acorn. But this acorn will now grow into an oak, regurgitating the elements and stages that entered into its formation. Similarly, the new society will also develop, regurgitating in an altered form the 'configurations' or 'moments' that went to make it up.
- ¶13. 1. Science, like society as a whole, is still at the acorn stage. Before an idea is worked out in detail it can be understood by a few cognoscenti. But once it is expanded into an intelligible form everyone can understand it, since everyone can think and everyone is an I or ego, which is just what understanding is. Hegel's optimistic egalitarianism depends on his conviction that people understand the abstract, the 'intelligible', more readily than the concrete, that, for example, they understand 'a+b=b+a' more easily than '5+7=7+5', and this more easily than 'If I start with 5 apples and then acquire 7 more apples, I end up with

the same number of apples as someone who starts with 7 apples and then acquires 5 more apples'. We should note, however, Aristotle's distinction between what is more intelligible *intrinsically* and what is more intelligible *to us*: e.g. *Posterior Analytics* I, 2, 71b33–72a8.

- ¶14. 1. The two sides are: innovators who propose a new science or theory which is still in an inchoate form, and their critics who demand articulation and elaboration. The critics point to the material that the new theory does not yet accommodate and make intelligible. The innovators insist that their theory is guaranteed by 'immediate rationality'. The critics are browbeaten by the innovators, but also get bored by their failure to elaborate and articulate their theory. Hegel has a foot in both camps. He wants a big idea, a large unifying theory, not just a mass of details, but he also wants to accommodate empirical material.
- ¶15. 1. The 'others' are the innovators of ¶14, viz. proponents of a new theory that is undeveloped to accommodate empirical material, but who sometimes make inadequate attempts to accommodate it. The material is already 'well ordered', 'prepared', and 'familiar', not discovered, classified, etc. by the new theory, but simply taken over from previous theories and observations. By stressing 'oddities and curiosities' the new theorist can appear to know more than he really does, even material not yet organized by other theories. The material is incorporated in the new theory by applying the same 'principle' or 'formula'. The formula explains nothing, since it is applied to everything in exactly the same way. (Hegel's thought is akin to Karl Popper's criticism of theories whose attempt to explain anything and everything in the same way renders them unfalsifiable.) Hegel refers to theories that postulate the 'absolute Idea' (*absolute Idee*) and implies that this Idea is 'true' 'for itself', roughly that it is valid or genuine—apart from its underdevelopment and misapplication. Since he himself later endorsed a theory in which the absolute Idea is central—though the expression 'absolute Idea' occurs in PS only here—he is presumably criticizing theories that are impoverished versions of his own theory or can plausibly be interpreted as such. This suggests that the implicit target of his criticism is his friend Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling.
- ¶16. 1. The 'absolute' is the fundamental reality on which everything else depends, but is itself independent of anything else. Schelling evacuated the absolute of any determinate character, allegedly by a procedure akin to that of refuting any idea by imagining the contrary: on 'empty possibility', e.g. 'The moon will fall to the earth tonight', see *Enc.* I, ¶143. A determinate character contrasts with and excludes other determinate characters. If the absolute is spirit, it contrasts with what is other than mind, viz. nature. This has unwelcome consequences: the absolute is dependent on nature, since a determinate character owes its determinacy to what it contrasts with. The absolute does not explain the existence of spirit, nor why the world bifurcates into spirit and nature; spirit is already presupposed. The absolute is arbitrarily lopsided, assigning priority to one aspect of the world over the other. Schelling tried to derive spirit from nature, just as, conversely, he tried to derive nature from spirit. But if the two derivations are of equal status, then spirit and nature are of equal status. This suggests that the absolute underlying both is neither spirit nor nature, but neutral and indeterminate. The formula 'A=A' expresses such indeterminacy, implying that the absolute's only characteristic is self-identity.
- ¶17. 1. The 'true' or absolute is, in Hegel's view, both substance and subject. The doctrine that the true (or 'God') is substance and not subject is implicitly ascribed to Spinoza,—and *explicitly* in e.g. the Preface to the second, 1827, edition of *Enc.*I. The word 'subject' has several meanings, at least two of which are in play here. First, a subject is the individual human (or possibly divine) subject, in particular the knowing subject in contrast to the object known, but also an agent, especially a moral agent. Secondly, it is the subject of a predicate, especially a verb: sometimes, though not invariably, the subject is said to perform the action expressed by the verb. In these respects 'subject' contrasts with 'substance', which

is conceived by Spinoza as undifferentiated rather than individualized, as prior to the knowing subject, and as intrinsically inactive, requiring (in Hegel's interpretation) the intervention of the human intellect for its differentiation and individualization.

Hegel sets out three responses to Spinoza: (1) To accept that self-consciousness is 'submerged' in the substance, primarily because the Self is not an independent entity, but an accident or 'mode' of substance, merely a blush on the cheek of the absolute. (2) To insist on the independence of the thinking Self. For Hegel a philosophy is not fixed and unequivocal, so he may regard this move as sanctioned by Spinoza himself. His second sentence: 'substantiality includes...for knowledge' perhaps refers to Spinoza's view that thought as well as extension is an attribute of substance. This does not satisfy Hegel, since in Spinoza's account both knowledge, or the 'universal', and its object, 'Being', are *immediate*, not mediated by each other nor by substance itself, but just postulated as inexplicable facts. Moreover, according to Spinoza, in its usual condition the human mind is, like the human body, buffeted and determined by the entities surrounding it, though a philosopher can, by his understanding of God or nature, break free of his immediate surroundings, attaining the 'intellectual love of God'. There are, however, more wholehearted proponents of (2), such as Kant and Fichte. They regard the I or ego as primary and its object, nature, as partly (Kant) or wholly (Fichte) derivative from it. Hegel implies, however, that the I, or at least 'thinking as thinking', is as uniform and inert as Spinoza's substance: cf. *Enc. I*, ¶86.

Position (3) is presented as a combination of positions (1) and (2), and said in *Enc. I*, ¶86 to give primacy to a 'definition or intuition of the absolutely true' and to 'intellectual intuition'. The absolute is substance, as for Spinoza, but with two differences. First, 'thinking' is not simply one of the attributes of substance and therefore subordinate to it: thinking is united with substance and therefore on a par with it. Secondly, substance is accessible to 'intellectual intuition'. This accords with Spinoza's idea of 'intuitive knowledge', which 'proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to adequate cognition of the essence of things' (*Ethics*, II, 40, scholium 2). But (3) is more obviously the position of Schelling. Hegel rejects it, owing to his aversion to sheer immediacy. Rather than simply asserting that substance is also subject, we must derive the idea of the subject from that of substance. Rather than simply accepting that the 'actual', i.e. concrete reality, develops out of the absolute, we must characterize the absolute in such a way that it is able to generate the actual, and characterize our knowledge of the absolute in such a way that we are able to show how it generates it. A mere substance cannot create, and intellectual intuition cannot explain creation. The absolute must be an active, creative subject. It does not follow that it must also be a knowing and willing subject. Hegel generally neglects the distinction between these two senses of 'subject'. This may be because he links together three ways in which Spinoza allegedly neglected the 'subject': Spinoza's God is not a knowing or purposive subject; Spinoza's God is not sufficiently active to create concrete reality; and Spinoza did not allow for a unitary human subject, but regarded the human mind as a conglomerate of 'ideas'—in a manner similar to Hume's 'bundle' theory of the Self. Then Hegel has some difficulty in seeing how an absolute that is not a knowing, purposive subject could generate concrete reality, in particular unitary human selves. He also has difficulty in seeing how unitary human subjects can be entirely distinct from God, that is, how, given the existence of human subjects, God can fail to be some sort of knowing, willing subject.

- ¶18. 1. Substance is 'living' in that it is self-actualizing. It is 'Being' (*das Sein*), not simply one being among others. It is the 'movement of self-positing' rather than something that moves or posits itself since it cannot be distinguished from its activity. It is 'self-positing' in that it actualizes or manifests itself in concrete reality, trees, rocks, rivers, etc. It acts as an intermediary between itself and 'becoming-other-to-itself', generating the concrete reality that expresses or manifests it, because it is 'pure simple negativity': the simple subject

negates *itself*, so that it bifurcates or splits in two. Initially, the two parties of the ‘opposing duplication’ resulting from the bifurcation, the subject itself and concrete reality, are different from, and ‘indifferent’ to, each other, but the indifferent diversity is negated, the original ‘equality’ of the subject to itself is restored, and in ‘otherness’ the subject is reflected back into itself: it sees its own reflection in the mirror it has created. ‘Duplication’ (*Verdopplung*) also occurs in the encounter of two self-consciousnesses, in PS ¶¶176ff.: at first, the I is confronted by an alien world, the objects of its ‘consciousness’, but when it meets another self-consciousness it sees a duplicate of itself. The development of the absolute follows the same pattern: the original unity (the subject) splits in two (the subject and concrete reality), and then finds itself again in the world confronting it (human beings). The ‘true’ is not just the first stage of this process; it is the whole process in which God (the beginning) creates a world other than himself and then finds himself (the end) in the world. However, Hegel need not claim that the *active* subject is also a knowing, purposive subject. Even if the subject is blind energy, it still generates a diversified world different from itself, which eventually provides a sort of duplicate of blind energy—in the form, say, of human beings who experiment with it, write about it, etc.—though we shall be less inclined to say that this ‘equality’ is the ‘goal’ of blind energy. It remains the case that the true is the whole process, not just the energy that initiates it.

¶19. 1. ‘Love’s play with itself’ does not refer to solitary masturbation, but to the idea that each of two lovers identifies him- or herself with the other. Thus each of the pair, in playing with the other, is in a way playing with him- or herself. Because of this identity in difference, love is an appropriate metaphor for God’s relationship both with other members of the Trinity and with the world he creates. In Hegel (1895) III, pp.11 and 35, Hegel applies the metaphor to the eternal (or atemporal) triplicity within God, while PS ¶19 applies it to God’s creation, and subsequent redemption, of the world, which, in contrast to God’s inner triune life, requires ‘alienation’ (*Entfremdung*) of himself, and then the labour of rediscovering himself in the world. However, God as the ‘essence’, i.e. the atemporal triune God, involves the ‘form’ in which the essence is to develop, and so also involves temporal creation and redemption, whereby the ‘in-itself’, God as merely potential, becomes ‘for itself’, fully actual, and also self-aware.

Hegel prefers discursive cognition to immediate intuition, but blurs the distinction between God’s cognition of himself and man’s cognition of God. This is because he tends to equate them: it is in man’s cognition that God recognizes himself in his creation and overcomes his alienation.

¶20. 1. An acorn is essentially the germ of an oak-tree. Similarly, the absolute is essentially the germ of the world. This might seem contradictory. First, it seems impossible that the absolute (or an acorn) should *become* itself; surely anything is already *itself*, at whatever stage it has reached, and has no need or tendency to become itself. (This difficulty might be resolved if, instead of saying ‘The absolute (or an acorn) becomes itself’ we say ‘The absolute (or acorn) actualizes its potential(ity)’. This leaves the absolute in itself potential rather than actual.) Secondly, the absolute is the ultimate that does not depend on anything else; but if it is only the absolute if and insofar as it generates a world that is other than itself, then it depends on what it creates. Thirdly, Hegel’s zoological analogy suggests that his opponents (under the influence of neo-Platonism) generalized this to a prohibition on *all* predications of the absolute, not only on predications that introduce its creation. The phrase ‘All animals’ not only neglects different types of animal, it says nothing about animals at all. Thus Plotinus argued that the ‘One’ that generates everything cannot share any property with its products or allow any predicate to mar its simplicity (*Enneads*, VI. 8.8; VI.9.3, 5, 6, 8). Naturally Plotinus does say things about the One, but we are supposed to ‘take them away’, i.e. add that we should not really have said it. Aquinas was equally

concerned to preserve God's simplicity, but 'took away' predications of him in a different manner: God can be said to be wise, just, etc., but whereas Socrates's wisdom and justice are distinct from Socrates himself, God's wisdom and justice are identical with God.

Yovel (2005, p.103) plausibly suggests that Hegel effected 'a becoming-other that must be taken back' in yet another way, retracting the initial predication by further predications. The subject 'becomes other' when a predicate is ascribed to it: e.g. if we say 'Man is an animal', man becomes other than himself, namely an animal. But if we add a further predicate, 'rational', we restore man to his original status, only on a higher, more explicit plane: 'Man is a rational animal'. The absolute is more complex, but the principle is the same. We start by saying, e.g. 'The absolute is pure Being', which makes it other than itself, and eventually (by the end of Hegel's Logic, at least by the end of his system) we arrive at a way of speaking about the absolute that is adequate to it and restores it to its initial grandeur. Hegel's Logic can be seen initially as a series of predications of the absolute or God. Here Hegel agrees with Aquinas and disagrees with Plotinus. But he disagrees with Aquinas in at least two respects. First, the subject-term, 'God' or 'the absolute' is, in Hegel's view, dispensable: whatever content it has is supplied by the 'predicate': see PS ¶23. Secondly, the predicates or, as they are now more appropriately called, the 'thought-determinations' are systematically derived from, and interconnected with, each other. So the absolute is not simple, but nor is it a mere bearer of predicates: it is a network of systematically interrelated concepts. That is the absolute itself. The next step is the realization of this absolute in the world, the world of nature and the world of mind. Here too Hegel disagrees with Plotinus and Aquinas. He believes that the absolute is essentially incomplete without the world. In religious terms, God becomes conscious of himself in mankind; in philosophical terms, the thought-determinations constituting the absolute must become *our* thoughts in order to reach their full actualization. So 'mediation' enters into Hegel's thought in two ways. It is involved in both what is said about the absolute itself and in the absolute's realization of itself in the world.

- ¶21. 1. Hegel's stress on simplicity suggests that his adversaries' aversion to 'mediation' depends on their belief that the absolute is entirely simple. If the absolute were complex, would it not require something else to explain its cohesion and therefore be dependent rather than absolute? His reply is that mediation preserves, rather than destroys, simplicity and immediacy. Something is mediated if it results from or depends on some process, whether a logical or a causal process. Something is immediate if it does not result from or depend on any such process. However, nothing is entirely immediate and nothing is entirely mediated. Whether something is immediate or mediated depends on the point of view from which we consider it. An acorn, e.g., is immediate in comparison with the tree that grows from it, but mediated in comparison with the tree it grew on. It is mediated owing to the process that gives rise to it, but immediate because this mediating process is reflected 'into itself', bent back into the concentrated simplicity of the acorn. Hegel's own example is more complicated, since the result of the mediation (the self-conscious I) is of a higher grade than the immediate starting-point (the embryo). (A closer analogue of the acorn–tree–acorn sequence is the embryo–adult–embryo sequence, the conception of a new embryo by a human adult. But this would not serve Hegel's purpose here.) The embryo is human 'in itself', i.e. intrinsically and potentially, but not 'for itself', i.e. consciously and actually. A rational adult has made itself into an actual human being, aware of its own humanity, not simple and immediate in the way that an embryo, let alone an acorn, is. But it is reflected into itself (and also reflects *on* itself) as 'self-conscious freedom', a simple I or ego that can distinguish itself from any, even all, of its bodily states. (We might think here of Descartes, doubting the very existence of his body and forgetting the mediating intellectual processes that led up to his thought 'I am'.) There is thus 'opposition' between the simple I and the

diverse physical and mental processes giving rise to it. But the I 'sublates' this opposition, is 'reconciled' with its opposite: it instils habits into its body, making it conform to its will, and it discerns a rational order in the world, finding it a suitable abode; it comes to see the diverse processes leading up to it as converging on itself. Then the I is 'at rest', not at war with its surroundings or its becoming—rather like the embryo in the womb.

- ¶22. 1. Kant distinguished between internal and external teleology or 'purposiveness': see *Critique of Judgement*, ¶66. External teleology explains one type of thing by the purpose it serves for another type of thing, e.g. the sheep's wool by our need for clothes: *Enc.* II, ¶245Z. Hegel, along with his scientifically educated contemporaries, rejected external teleology, but (like Aristotle and Kant) accepted *internal* teleology (*Enc.* I, ¶204; *Enc.* II, ¶¶245, 360; Hegel (1895) II, pp. 148–65; and PS ¶44). This is the purposiveness that is immanent in a single entity, usually a living organism, and accounts for its growth and structure. The organism is its own end or an end in itself, not a means to some further end: sheep's wool is to be explained by what it does for the sheep, not what it does for us. (But the distinction is muddled by cases of symbiosis between different plant and animal species.) The purpose need not be conscious, not God's purpose or the purpose of any conscious being. (Aristotle believes in a god, an 'unmoved mover', but it is not immediately involved in the growth of natural organisms, except insofar as it stimulates them to actualize their potentiality.) There are three stages in the development of a purpose (*Enc.* I, ¶¶206–12). At first it is unrealized and 'subjective': it is, e.g., merely implicit in the acorn. Next, it is in the course of realizing itself and is then 'objective': at this stage the objective purpose does not fully correspond to the subjective purpose. Finally, the purpose is fully realized in the full-grown tree. Throughout this whole sequence the purpose itself, or 'concept', remains constant: it makes the tree grow, but it does not itself move or change. It is not a stick, but a carrot, which is independent ('being-for-itself') of the current stage of the organism's growth and negates it.

Internal teleology does not, in Aristotle's and Kant's view, require consciousness. So why does Hegel introduce the 'Self' here? The Self is what persists throughout change; it makes the organism a single, developing entity rather than a series of successive entities. An organism aims at its own self-preservation, and an animal, if not a plant, is relatively self-contained and independent of its surroundings. However, Hegel may have in mind the knowing and willing Self, rather as in ¶17 he moves easily from the active subject to the knowing and willing subject.

- ¶23. 1. The 'ancients' in question are primarily Plato and his followers, who postulated 'forms' or 'Ideas', such as goodness and beauty, but did not regard them as predicates of God or as requiring the support of a deity in any other way.

2. Several senses of 'subject' are in play. The sense needed by Hegel's opponents to present the absolute as subject is that of an independent entity, a bearer of predicates, not a predicate of anything else or a free-floating 'universal'. That 'the absolute' is replaced by the word 'God' might suggest that the 'subject' is a knowing, willing subject. But that cannot be what Hegel has in mind, since he regards 'God' as a 'senseless sound': knowing, willing, and whatever else God may be have to be assigned to him by predicates. In a proposition such as 'God is love' (cf. 1 John 4:16; Hegel (1895) II, p.221) 'God' is the *grammatical* subject, while '(is) love' is the predicate. That 'God' is a 'senseless sound' could mean any of four things: (1) 'God' is *intrinsically* senseless; we could have assigned it no meaning at all, or an entirely different meaning. This is true, but since it applies to *every* word, it cannot be what Hegel has in mind. 'Love', etc. are also senseless in this respect and could not therefore confer meaning on the word 'God' if they shared its disqualification. (2) 'God is love', etc. are putative definitions of 'God'. When a word is defined, its meaning is held in abeyance until it is supplied or restored by the *definiens*. Again, however, this applies not simply to 'God', but to any word up for

definition. So it is not what Hegel mainly has in mind, though it may play a part in his argument. (3) There are constraints on the significant use of 'God'. We cannot say 'God is the London transport system' or 'God is a prime number', except in jest or irreverence. But 'God' is indeterminate in meaning in a way that 'horse' or 'Napoleon' are not. We engage in significant and radical disagreements about his (or her or its) existence, number, and nature. The three propositions 'God is the eternal' (Jakob Böhme?), 'God is the moral world-order' (Fichte), and 'God is love' illustrate this indeterminacy. (4) Such meaning as the word 'God' has, apart from and prior to these metaphysical predications—e.g. the supreme being who created the universe,—should not be presupposed in philosophical inquiry. It derives from the *Vorstellung*, pictorial imagination or 'representation', of ordinary believers and has no place in philosophy. This is also true of predicates, such as 'love', and even of 'being', 'one', etc. Philosophers may refine the meanings of such terms but they do not introduce them from scratch. At some point they must use words as non-philosophers do. Hegel has to 'analyse' the notion of love before applying it to God (Hegel (1895) II, p. 221), but what he analyses and refines is the ordinary meaning of the word. So although this line of thought plays a part in Hegel's qualms about 'God', we cannot dispense with (3), the relative indeterminacy of its meaning in comparison with 'love', etc.

If 'God' is a senseless sound why do Hegel's targets not simply speak of 'the eternal', etc. or 'Being' (*Sein*) or 'the One', omitting the word 'God' altogether? If 'God is love', etc. were straightforward definitions it would be hard to find an answer. If 'The horse is a four-legged herbivorous mammal with solid hooves, etc.' correctly defines the word 'horse', then the word 'horse' can be replaced by its *definiens*. (Hegel might object that the word 'horse' is unitary, and presents the horse as unitary, unlike the composite definition: see e.g. *Enc.* III, ¶462 on the name, e.g. 'lion'.) However, 'God is love' is obviously not a definition of this type. It is closer to what Charles L. Stevenson called a 'persuasive definition', where the word defined retains its evaluative quality but acquires a different denotation. 'God' characteristically has a high evaluative quality in virtue of its core meaning, say, 'the supreme being responsible for the creation of the universe'. 'Love' has a high evaluative quality too, but not so high as 'God', since it competes for supremacy with other words, such as 'morality', 'happiness', etc. So 'love' cannot supplant 'God', unless we radically alter its meaning. The definition of 'horse' is generally accepted and is unlikely to be revised. The definition of 'God' is contested and historically evolving. Moreover, the definitions of God that Hegel presents are mutually compatible. Someone might say that God is all these things—the eternal, the moral world-order, and love. What then? We cannot plausibly replace 'God' by the expression 'the eternal, the moral world-order, and love'. The conjunction of these concepts is baffling unless they are all epithets of a single entity, namely God. This is where Hegel's own response to the eliminability of 'God' comes in. If 'God' is eliminated, it will look as if what is 'posited' is 'a Being' (*ein Sein*) or a sort of being, 'essence' or 'universal', that is, a property or set of properties, an abstract entity rather than a real entity. But Hegel, or at least his targets, believe that God is a real entity, a bearer of properties, not simply properties. He is not simply eternity, moral world-order, or love, but *something that is* eternal and/or moral world-order and/or love. Even if God is ultimately identical with his attributes in the way that Aquinas proposed, he is not flatly identical with his properties, so as to exclude any distinction between God and his properties. He is, that is, 'reflected into' himself as a subject. However, he does not, as he is presented here, reflect *himself* into himself. God is static and passive; all his predicates ('eternal', etc.) are applied to him by us. If we say 'God is eternal', and then 'God is loving', the order in which these propositions are advanced does not match any corresponding order in God himself. When, by contrast, we say of a human being: 'It is an embryo; then a foetus; then an infant; . . . ; and then a rational adult', our propositions match the order in which the human being itself develops, finally

becoming explicitly what it had to be implicitly all along in order to power this development, namely a subject. God may not develop over time, but there is at least *logical* order of his development, analogous to the development of a human from embryo to rational adult. Hegel requires God to be presented in this logical order. When the supposed predicates are presented in their intrinsic logical order, God's unity as a subject is attained without the need for a grammatical subject, 'God', to hold them all together. Theology is converted into logic.

¶24. 1. To present the development of something in its logical order and, where relevant, in its temporal order is 'science' (*Wissenschaft*) or 'system'. There may be 'knowledge' (*Wissen*) that is not scientific or systematic, either of things that lack any system (e.g. heraldic devices: *Enc.* I, ¶16) or of things that do, such as God. But this knowledge is not 'actual', not fully developed knowledge. This 'flows from' what Hegel has already said: the absolute needs to be tracked in its logical development. That a 'basic proposition' (*Grundsatz*) is, taken on its own, 'false', at least in the sense that it is not yet 'actual' knowledge, also seems to flow therefrom. But the claim is ambiguous. Such axiomatized systems as Spinoza's *Ethics* or of Euclidean geometry illustrate a part of Hegel's case. They are systematic and 'scientific', rather than random collections of thoughts. Moreover, it is not enough to state the axioms (and definitions) on their own. We have to derive theorems from them. The significance of the axioms does not become clear to us until we know what can be derived from them. However, the systems that Hegel has in mind differ from these in two respects. First, in Spinoza's and Euclid's systems there are several axioms and also several definitions. This impairs their scientific, systematic character. What is the relationship between the several axioms? In what order should we present them? If one of the axioms is selected as the first, then that is really the first principle of the system, which now has only one basic principle. The sort of system that Hegel has in mind has only one first principle: 'Our task is to discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge. This can be neither *proved* nor *defined*, if it is to be an absolutely primary principle' (Fichte, 1993, p.18). Secondly, in Spinoza's and Euclid's systems, the axioms and definitions are never retracted, modified or 'refuted': they persist unchallenged throughout the course of the system. All that happens is that theorems are derived from the axioms, which no doubt shows that the axioms on their own are incomplete, but does not impair them in any other respect. In the systems that Hegel is thinking of, by contrast, the first principle is modified or restricted by what succeeds it. Fichte's system begins with the pure I or ego. The first principle expressing this is the law of identity, 'A=A', which soon becomes 'I=I'. (Fichte is trying to base traditional logic on transcendental philosophy.) The next step is the introduction of the non-I, by way of the equally 'unconditioned' principle 'Non-A is not A'. But this new principle restricts the first: 'Insofar as the not-self is posited, the Self is not posited; for the not-self completely nullifies the Self' (*ibid.*, p.55). By the first principle the I is established (or establishes itself) as the unrestricted lord of the universe, but it has to 'posit' an opponent, and this contracts its domain. The simple models that Hegel has presented earlier have a similar structure. In PS ¶2 successive philosophies are related to each other like the stages in the growth of a plant, each 'refuted' by its successor. In ¶¶18 and 19, God first becomes other than himself, in a way refuting himself, and then recovers himself in the world. Here Hegel is primarily referring to the treatment of abstract concepts in his logic. But his procedure in the body of PS follows the same pattern. Each shape of consciousness (including the opening one, sensory certainty) is supplanted by its successor; it does not persist unmodified in the way that a traditional axiom, premise, or theorem does. Hegel's method perhaps bears comparison with Plato's claim that philosophy proceeds by 'canceling hypotheses' (*Rep.* 533c: *tas hupotheseis anairousa*). However, he emphasizes three points that Plato does not explicitly stress. First, what is wrong with the 'principle' is not

that it is especially contentious, but that it is 'universal', i.e. indeterminate, 'immediate', i.e. not justified or analysed, and as yet unrealized 'purpose'. Secondly, the principle is to be refuted by developing it, not by bringing in extraneous material; it is to be *self*-refuting. Thirdly, because the principle is self-refuting, its refutation is positive as well as negative, an enhancement of it as well as a refutation, a 'sublation'. In these respects the principle resembles the rough first draft of a book—thin and sketchy, but promising—that is to be worked up into, and supplanted by, the final version.

- ¶25. 1. Hegel seems to identify the propositions (i) 'The true is actual only as system' and (ii) 'Substance is essentially subject'. An initial obstacle to this is that while (ii) implicitly refers to the absolute, (i) apparently refers to our knowledge of the absolute. So far Hegel has used the word 'system' only in the subjective sense, applying it to our knowledge, not to the object of our knowledge. But the word 'system' also has an objective sense, for any organized structure. So perhaps (i) means 'The true (i.e. the absolute, since 'true' here is also used in its objective sense) is only actual (i.e. complete) when it develops into a system (i.e. an organized structure)'. Then the connection with proposition (ii) is this: if the absolute is only substance, it cannot develop into a system; it can only do so if it is also an active, purposive subject. However, Hegel may instead, or even *also*, be continuing his subjective use of 'system', which also makes decent sense of (ii): 'The true or absolute is only completely actualized when it is presented in a system by us, for only then does it fully recover itself in its creation.' This suggests that the 'subject' in (ii) is not only an active subject, but also a knowing, system-building subject. This eases the introduction of *spirit*.

Here Hegel speaks of 'the spiritual' (*das Geistige*) as well as of 'spirit' (*Geist*), perhaps because he is discussing the emergence and development of spirit, which begins not from fully fledged spirit, but the spiritual aspect of ordinary life. This is initially embedded in substance, rather than free and independent ('in-and-for-itself'): it is 'spiritual substance' (*geistige Substanz*), an expression that recurs in PS ¶¶26 and 36 as well as in chapter VI. That 'the spiritual alone is the actual' means that only the spiritual has the power to undertake the following process: (1) It is the 'essence' or 'in itself', it has an intrinsic nature that does not depend on its relationships to other things or, more specifically, on its being revealed to itself or to others. (2) It encounters itself in a determinate form, as if it sees itself in a mirror. Then it is 'interrelating', it relates itself to what is other than itself. It may not recognize itself in the mirror, but it is nevertheless for itself, no longer merely in itself. (3) Now it is both in itself and for itself, that is, it remains 'within itself' despite being determinate and 'outside itself'. We might take this to mean that spirit now recognizes itself in its other-being, recognizes itself in the mirror. But the following sentence seems to deny this. *We* are aware that spirit is in and for itself, and *in itself*, intrinsically, spirit is in and for itself. But spirit itself is not yet aware of this: it does not recognize itself in the mirror. Although spiritual, it is unreflective 'substance' rather than subject. (4) Spirit is not yet fully self-aware, but 'must' become so, must become its own 'object', not an object that remains distinct from it, but an object that is 'sublated' in virtue of spirit's recognition of it as itself. This happens in the following way: Spirit generates its own content. So when it is aware of this content, it is 'for itself', aware of itself. But if it is not aware that it generates its own content, it is not aware that it is aware of itself. It is for itself 'only for us', who *are* aware that it generates its own content. This is where we left spirit at stage (3). At stage (4), however, spirit generates not simply more content of the same sort; it generates or projects its own self-generation, namely, the 'pure concept' that enabled it to generate particular contents, but which is itself no particular content, but rather the abstract plan underlying them. Then spirit knows itself inside out; it has become the equal of 'us', and begins to construct 'science', the 'system' that completes the actualization of the absolute. The distinction between the subjective system and the objective system, has been sublated.

The completion of the subjective system (by Hegel himself) is also the completion of the objective system.

- ¶26. 1. 'Pure self-cognition' is Hegelian logic, into which PS is intended to lead and with which Hegel's system proper begins. It is *self-cognition* in that what is known by thought is not distinct from thought, but the universal thoughts that constitute the essential core of spirit or the mind—the 'pure concept' of ¶25. 'In absolute otherness' refers to the fact that logic requires the abandonment of one's everyday engagement with objects distinct from oneself and is like the pure and intangible 'aether'. Its 'becoming' is primarily its gradual emergence from everyday consciousness, though also the development within the system of thoughts itself. It is *simple* in contrast to nature and mind (or 'spirit') itself, which involve an empirical embodiment, not just pure thoughts. For the same reason it is immediate, not mediated by the empirical aspects either of nature or of the concrete mind. Thoughts, i.e. concepts, have 'existence as such', i.e. independent existence, when we think about and/or in terms of them. 'Essentiality' is that which constitutes the essence of something. Thoughts or the pure concept constitute the essence of things, both of natural entities and especially of the mind itself. It is 'transfigured' in the sense of 'illuminated', when it thinks about itself or is reflected into itself. This reflection is 'simple', i.e. direct, not mediated by any detours through the empirical world, hence a sort of 'Being' (*Sein*): it just *is*, with no hidden depths.

The requirement to engage in pure thinking is addressed to 'self-consciousness' rather than to 'consciousness' because consciousness, in Hegel's sense, is essentially consciousness of objects other than itself, and cannot extricate itself from them without ceasing to be consciousness. Self-consciousness, by contrast, stands above any particular range of objects and can decide which, if any, it will acknowledge and consider. This is why the 'individual' is entitled to ask why he should adopt the philosophical standpoint and how he can do so. Hegel's answer is to provide a 'ladder', an account of the way in which one might ascend by easy stages from one's present 'standpoint', whatever that may be, to the philosophical standpoint. One can ascend or descend an ordinary ladder as one pleases or stay on any particular rung: the ladder enables one to ascend if one wants to, but it does not oblige one to ascend it or even provide a reason for doing so. Hegel's ladder too does not oblige one to ascend: not everyone need be a philosopher. But it does at each stage give one a reason to ascend to the next stage, owing to some problem at each stage that one will discover if one thinks hard enough and that one can resolve only by going up a stage. Hence one's ascent up the ladder does not require on one's part a desire to reach the philosophical standpoint. Once one is on the ladder, one has reason to continue one's ascent. But what motivates someone to get onto the ladder in the first place? Or to think hard enough at each stage to find the problem in it? That can only be one's desire to reach the top of the ladder, either because one wants to reach the philosophical standpoint or a least to satisfy one's curiosity about the view from the top.

There is, however, a difficulty. Self-consciousness is also generally consciousness. As well as being aware of itself, it is also aware of a range of objects distinct from itself. In fact, at most of the stages of Hegel's ladder, we are conscious of objects distinct from ourselves. Because of its self-awareness and its relative independence of its objects, self-consciousness can envisage the philosophical standpoint and ask for a ladder up to it. But because of its usual dependence on objects, its ascent to the philosophical standpoint involves a reversal. In science or at least its first phase, logic, the individual does not deal with objects distinct from the mind itself, but with the thoughts that form the core of the mind. Nor does science accommodate the self-conscious individual. Within the realm of pure thought the individual cannot refer to himself as a particular individual; the individual is wholly absorbed in the thoughts that he thinks about; the view he is obliged to adopt, even when he emerges from

logic, is the view from nowhere. Hegel thus speaks of science as an apparent ‘inversion’ of ‘immediate self-consciousness’. (In 1802, Hegel had said that in relation to sound common sense, the world of philosophy is an inverted world: cf. ¶69.) Inversion is a recurrent theme in PS. But here Hegel hardly establishes a strict inversion. In natural consciousness the conscious Self is opposed to its objects. In a strict inversion the Self and its objects would switch sides, the Self becoming the object and the object becoming the Self. But whatever this might mean, it is not what happens when we turn to science. Rather the opposition between the Self and its object fades away as the two sides converge. Nevertheless, science and self-consciousness are at odds with one another. But science needs self-conscious individuals to develop it. Otherwise it remains the ‘in-itself’: the thoughts remain implicit in the mind (and also in our unscientific activity and discourse) but not considered for themselves, ‘spiritual substance’, but not yet spirit; hence the need for a ladder.

- ¶27. 1. ‘Sensory consciousness’ is here equivalent to ‘sensory certainty’, Hegel’s usual expression for the first ‘shape’ of consciousness, which is ‘immediate’ both because it is not derived from any more primitive stage of spirit and because it is putatively not mediated by thoughts or concepts. It is not identical with the ‘natural consciousness’ described in ¶26: Hegel’s readers are more advanced, having conceptual resources not available to sensory consciousness. The ‘element [i.e. the domain] of science’ is its ‘pure concept’, not science as such, since it is not yet developed.

‘Foundation’ (*Begründung*) is ambiguous: it could mean the ‘establishment’ of science, or the ‘justification’ of science. Probably, it here means the latter. A foundation in this sense, involving, say, axioms and definitions from which theorems are deduced, is clearly different from an introduction for the uninitiated, who may well understand some of the theorems better than the axioms. It is not clear what Hegel’s readers would expect of an ‘introduction’ (*Anleitung*) to science. Perhaps it would a simplified summary, of the sort that Hegel presented to his high-school pupils in Nuremberg. Hegel’s PS is different from both these enterprises, though it has something in common with each. It bears comparison with Descartes’s introduction to his mathematico-physical world-view in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*. At all events it is quite different from the pistol-shot method and its contempt for other views. Hegel is less like, say, Bentham, who regards opposing views as ‘nonsense on stilts’ than J.S. Mill, who tried to reconcile and incorporate the opposing views of Bentham and Coleridge.

- ¶28. 1. A connection is drawn between the education of an individual and the education of the human race. (Cf. G.E. Lessing, *The Education of the Human Race*, 1780.) Humanity is conceived as ‘the universal individual, self-conscious spirit’. (The first, 1807, edition of PS had ‘the universal individual, the world-spirit’, which probably expresses Hegel’s meaning more explicitly.) The universal individual is introduced surreptitiously. We are to see the education of the individual ‘in its universal sense’. That looks as if it means that we are not concerned only with the education of some definite particular individual, but with the education of any and every individual. But any and every individual is a definite, particular individual, not a universal individual. But Hegel’s point is clear enough: human culture varies over time, and in fact advances, so that the culture of a later epoch is in general superior to that of an earlier epoch. Humanity undergoes what we might call its ‘primary education’. So too a particular individual goes through various stages of education and in general a later stage is superior to an earlier stage. Moreover, any particular individual belongs to some stage or other of the universal individual. Thus an early 19th-century German belongs to a fairly high stage of the universal individual, with all the wealth of German religion, philosophy, etc. available to him. However, this predominantly German individual also contains the earlier stages of the universal individual—Egyptian, Greek, Roman, medieval—‘in blurred outline’. The particular individual undergoes a ‘secondary

education' into German culture. It is introduced successively to the stages through which the universal individual has passed in roughly the order in which they occurred over historical time. This 'past Being-there' of the universal individual constitutes the 'inorganic nature' of the child only in the sense that it is present in the child's parents and its social environment. It is not yet present in the infant itself, which does not differ *intrinsically* from an infant belonging to any previous stage of human culture. It appears to it 'externally'. But Hegel also has in mind the 'tertiary education' whereby an educated adult reading PS or attending Hegel's lectures 'revives the recollection' of the stages of his own past education and therefore the past stages of the universal individual that he absorbed in his primary education. These two types of education are easily confused, since Hegel's readers are completing their primary education as well as receiving a secondary education: they are learning about 'science', an aspect of the universal individual or spirit, for the first time, as well as retrieving their past education. It is not clear why the particular individual is the 'incomplete spirit'. That it is dominated by 'one determinacy', if this means that it is dominated by one culture (such as 19th-century German culture), is also true of the universal individual, at least in the sense that in the 19th century it is dominated by 19th-century culture, containing other, earlier, cultures only in 'blurred outline'. Perhaps Hegel is ignoring the temporal development of the universal individual and supposing that all its stages are present in it in equal intensity. Or perhaps he is noting that no particular individual ever absorbs the whole culture of his age, so that he falls short of the stage of the universal individual to which he belongs.

The parallelism between (1) the primary education of the universal individual or spirit, (2) the secondary education of a particular individual, and (3) the tertiary education of a particular individual, is overstretched. If there were a close parallel between (1) and (2), then a 19th-century German child would learn, say, the Chinese and Egyptian languages and religions before learning German. If there were a close parallel between (1) and (3), then PS would not begin with sensory certainty, for, as Hegel later learnt from Wilhelm von Humboldt, 'it seems that the language of the most civilized peoples has the less complete grammar, and the same language has a more complete grammar when the people is in a more uncivilized state than in a more highly civilized state' (*Enc.* III, ¶459). Moreover, Hegel shows no sign of believing, even in 1806, that sensory certainty was the dominant shape of consciousness of some early culture. In fact, PS does not present a single, continuous historical narrative. Some chapters are not significantly historical: I, II, III, and V. Others are historical, but they present not one historical sequence, but three: from the state of nature to medieval Christianity (IV), from the Greek city-state to the French revolution and its aftermath (VI), and from ancient Persia to Lutheran Christianity (VII). The order in which shapes of consciousness are presented is primarily logical; only occasionally does this coincide with the real historical order.

Here as before 'substance' is contrasted with 'self-consciousness' and 'reflection into itself' and implicitly with 'subject'. But 'substance' has now lost its Spinozist connotation and has become the evolving culture of humanity.

On 'acquired property' see ¶29.

¶29. 1. As in ¶28, we need to distinguish between (1) the primary education of the universal individual or the world-spirit; (2) the secondary education of a particular individual into his own culture; and (3) the tertiary education of Hegel's students. Each of them presupposes the occurrence of its predecessor:

- (1) Both the occurrence of primary education and the sequence of its stages are necessary. When a given stage of it, e.g. the Roman Empire, is immediately present, it is not 'in itself': it is not merely potential and implicit, but actual and explicit; it is also intertwined with other events and encumbered by details. It awaits conversion into 'the form of

Being-in-itself' by thought and memory—both in later stages of primary education and perhaps in secondary education. Primary education requires much time and labour.

- (2) Hegel says little about secondary education here, but it is clear that it must, with few exceptions, occur and that it must follow a certain sequence. It too requires time and labour, but far less than primary education.
- (3) Tertiary education need not follow the fixed sequence of (1) and (2). One can, e.g., study Rome before going back to Greece. But one must follow the historical sequence if the goal of this education is to be attained. In ¶28 a culturally advanced individual revived snippets of his past education without dwelling on them. Now we have to dwell on each stage or 'moment', regarding it as a comprehensive way of viewing the world and viewing the world itself through its lenses. This is less troublesome than (1) and (2). The Roman Empire, e.g., has already been subjected to thought, converted into an in-itself, and recollected—especially by unphilosophical historians. As in ¶28, when something has receded into the past and become an object of thought rather than occurrent, it becomes the 'property' or possession of 'substance' or 'universal spirit'. All we have to do now is convert this preprocessed event into the form of Being-for itself, to restore to the event something like the living vitality it had on its original occurrence, re-establishing its relations to other events, etc: cf. ¶30. The overall goal of this education is to attain 'insight into what knowledge is'. In ¶83 to investigate the 'truth' of knowledge, i.e. of what we classify as knowledge, is to investigate what knowledge is 'in itself'. It is to reach a synoptic view of human knowledge, together with its truth-status and logical underpinnings. At the end, knowledge circles back on itself, becoming knowledge of knowledge, not just knowledge of other things. From a theological point of view, the attainment of this meta-knowledge is not only the goal of tertiary education, but also of primary education. It is the goal of the world-spirit.

¶30. 1. An event, culture, etc. goes through three stages: (i) It occurs as concrete reality or 'Being-there'. Hegel does not need to 'sublate' this Being-there. That has already been done for us, at least by the passage of time. (ii) By a 'negation' of it, Being-there is taken back into the substance, and turned into a 'representation' or conception of the 'Self'. This occurs 'immediately': the representation portrays, say, the Roman Empire just as it occurred, with no conceptual structuring or refinement. We are finished and done with the Roman Empire; we are familiar with it, though we do not have knowledge of it. Familiarity is the business of the 'particular', uncomprehending Self, the everyday Self that concentrates on the present and insofar as it thinks about the past at all, thinks about it from its own point of view. (iii) Knowledge and thinking are the province of the 'universal Self', which, by a second 'negation', transforms the representation into a thought. The universal Self is not the same as the world-spirit, the substance of the individual, the universal individual, or the universal spirit of ¶¶28 and 29. The latter are collective or communal rather than individual, whereas the universal Self is the individual Self operating at a universal and impersonal level. The particular Self produces particular speech performances (*parole*), as it were, while the universal Self has the underlying linguistic competence (*langue*).

These three stages correspond to the three stages of ¶29: (1) the actual occurrent event; (2) its conversion into the in-itself by the advance of the world-spirit; and (3) the prospective conversion of this in-itself into Being-for-itself. However, stage (ii) of ¶30 is described differently from stage (2) of ¶29. At stage (2) of ¶29 the past Being-there is 'thought' (*Gedachtes*), while at stage (ii) of ¶30 it has passed into 'representation', which is explicitly contrasted with 'thinking'. 'Thinking' and 'thought' are used in two ways. In ¶29 they contrast primarily with 'actuality' and 'Being-there', while in ¶30 they contrast with other mental operations, especially the more pictorial 'representation'. Moreover, in

¶29, stage (2) focuses on the appropriation of the past by the communal ‘substance’, while in ¶30 stage (ii) focuses on the appropriation of the past by the individual ‘Self’. It would be less appropriate to attribute subjective ‘representation’ to substance. Nevertheless Hegel clearly exaggerates in implying that the individual Self simply reproduces the past pictorially. Whereas in ¶29 he was trying to minimize the difficulty that his readers face by stressing the preparatory work already done for them, in ¶30 he is stressing how much more remains to be done.

¶31. 1. Hegel establishes a link between familiarity and ‘representation’, which he regularly contrasts with conceptual thought. ‘Familiar’ and ‘well-known’ both translate *bekannt*, while ‘known’ is *erkannt*; I have sacrificed the distinction between *wissen* (‘know, -ledge’) and *erkennen* (‘(re)cognize’, ‘(re)cognition’) to reproduce Hegel’s pun. Hegel’s complaint resembles Plato’s criticism of mathematics, in *Republic* 510d2–3, for relying on unexamined ‘hypotheses’ such as the odd and the even, etc. The complaint would also extend to the characters in Plato’s early dialogues, who speak about virtue, etc. but do not, until prodded by Socrates, ask ‘What is virtue?’ Yovel (2005), p.126, identifies Fichte as Hegel’s main target, but since the failing is ‘common’, it is unlikely that Hegel has any particular person in his sights. What is familiar is a concept, ‘subject and object’, etc. What it requires is not ‘apprehending and testing’, by checking one’s own intuitions against those of others, but conceptual analysis: cf. ¶32 and *Enc. I*, ¶¶19, 63.

¶32. 1. *Analysieren* comes from the Greek *analuein*, ‘to break up, dissolve’. Hence Hegel associates it with death. (See also *Enc. I*, ¶38 Addition, which associates analysis with empiricism, and *Enc. I*, ¶¶227–31.) There are three stages: (1) The concrete substance or the familiar representation of it, the self-enclosed ‘circle’. This is ‘abstract immediacy, etc.’; it is just there and involves no relevant mediation or negation. (2) The subject, or the understanding, dismembers this substance by extracting its accidents one by one and giving them a new, independent life ‘in its own element’, i.e. in thought and the Self. (3) The subject reconstitutes substance, now a ‘genuine’ substance. It is still appropriately described as ‘Being’ (*Sein*) and ‘immediacy’, since it is there before us quite apart from the mediating process that gave rise to it, having incorporated this process into itself.

The constituents or moments into which the substance is dismembered are static or dead, taken on their own. But together they produce the movement in (3), rather as (Hegel explains in SL, p.82) the force applied to a lever and its distance from the fulcrum lifts a weight that neither could lift on its own. This is what happens to the shapes of consciousness that Hegel examines. One shape collapses and gives way to another because it consists of different moments that enter into conflict with each other. Romantics such as Novalis were averse to the analysing understanding, believing it to dissolve the beauty of concrete wholes. This is ‘beauty without force’. But another sort of beauty can reconstruct itself from the fragments left by the understanding.

Hegel says *both* that ‘the concrete . . . divides itself’ *and* that such ‘division’ is the work of the ‘understanding’. This stems from his tendency to objectify what are primarily subjective, mental, or logical, concepts, treating them as intrinsic to things as well as to our thought. He perhaps thinks of the analytical ‘understanding’ as at work in things themselves. The transition from subjective to objective understanding is eased by the fact that his primary objects of analysis are shapes of consciousness, which do, in his view, analyse and refute themselves. However, death and ‘freedom’ suggest that he also had in mind the French revolution. There the three stages are: (1) the *ancien regime*, a self-enclosed substance; (2) its disintegration into separate, liberated individuals, facing death in the terror; and (3) the (prospective) restoration of order that restrains, while yet acknowledging, individual liberty: see PS ¶¶582ff., esp. ¶590: ‘The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death.’

¶33. 1. It is unclear whether Hegel means that what is represented becomes 'property' of self-consciousness just in virtue of our having a representation of it or that it becomes its property owing to the analysis described in ¶32. But either way there are now four stages of education: (1) 'sensory immediacy'; (2) representations; (3) 'fixed thoughts'; and (4) fluid thoughts or 'concepts'. The transition from (1) to (2) does not concern Hegel here: both ancients and moderns acquire sensory, but universal representations, in the same way. The difference between 'antiquity' (primarily Athens and, in particular, Socrates) and modernity is that the ancient had to develop thoughts from (1)/(2). This eased the transition from (3), fixed thoughts, to (4), fluid thoughts. By contrast, the modern is presented with thoughts prefabricated by past philosophers. This hampers the transition from (3) to (4). The ancient, since he starts from scratch, lacks the firm, self-aware ego that we have inherited from Descartes. He develops his conception of himself along with his development of universal thoughts. So he can follow the thoughts where they lead, with no resistance from the ego. The modern, by contrast, already has a firmly developed ego by the time he receives universal thoughts; in fact the thought of the I, in contrast to its content, is one of the thoughts he has received. This I is 'fixed'. It does not change or develop as it acquires new thoughts, but remains opposed to and unaffected by the thoughts it thinks. The thoughts tend to be as fixed as the I that thinks them: they derive unconditionality from the I, and become unconditional themselves, i.e. independent of each other and even, perhaps, of the I itself. A fixed I cannot have fluid thoughts. Thoughts are fluid only if the I or 'pure thinking' engages with them and does not just view them from the sidelines. Then it sees itself as a 'moment' in the development of thoughts. It develops along with the thoughts, changing throughout the course of PS.

'Essence' is *Wesen* and 'essentiality' is *Wesenheit*, i.e. that which constitutes the essence of something. Here Hegel is thinking of the Logic rather than PS itself. SL equates essentialities with 'determinations of reflection', i.e. pairs of concepts that are 'reflected' into each other and thus constitute each other, such as identity/difference, positive/negative, subject/object. These concepts are 'circles', since each of the pair directs us to the other, which then returns us to the first again. Essentialities are more prominent in the second part of the Logic, the 'Doctrine of Essence', but similar relations between thoughts obtain in the rest of the Logic.

¶34. 1. Hegel regards an 'organic whole' as consisting of organs each of which depends on the operation of the others, and none of which can be subtracted without undermining the whole. Thus, the brain requires the heart to supply blood to it, but conversely the heart requires the brain to regulate its beating. If we consider the heart, this directs us to the brain, liver, kidneys, etc., and each of these directs us back to the heart and the other organs. The whole organism is governed by its 'concept', the plan embodied in the seed. In Hegel's system thoughts are similarly interconnected. If we explore the implications of any one thought, we end up with a complete system of thoughts governed by a single concept that emerges at the end. This is the 'concept of knowledge', the master plan that generates and governs all our knowledge. One difference between a natural organism and Hegel's thought-system is this. If I am considering, say, the human body, there is no obvious uniquely appropriate starting-point and no obvious uniquely appropriate continuation. I may start with the brain and proceed to the heart, or start with the stomach and proceed to the brain. (But cf. *Enc.* II, ¶¶350ff., where Hegel's account of an animal organism proceeds in what he regards as a non-arbitrary, even necessary, order.) In the case of thoughts, by contrast, there is, in Hegel's view, a uniquely appropriate starting-point and a uniquely appropriate continuation. In fact, Hegel claims that it is not *we*, Hegel and his readers, who move through the thoughts; rather the thoughts or the concept move of their own accord and 'we' simply follow their movement. Here Hegel is influenced by a different though complementary account of an organism: that in its growth it develops from relative simplicity to relative

complexity until finally the whole organism is complete: cf. ¶2. Thus PS begins with sensory certainty, the simplest shape of consciousness, and the Logic begins with Being, the simplest of all thoughts. As in the case of a living organism, the system develops in a fixed order and must pass through all the stages prescribed by the ‘concept’.

The references to ‘consciousness’ suggest that Hegel is here speaking about PS in particular, whereas ‘pure essentialities’ belong more properly to Logic. He believes that logical thoughts underlie everything else, including the shapes of consciousness. Hence the sequence of shapes of consciousness is determined by and mirrors that of the pure essentialities. The ‘worldliness’ of consciousness contrasts it with pure thinking or logic: consciousness apprehends the world, whereas logic deals only with pure thoughts. There is also a claim of completeness: PS will cover all the shapes of consciousness.

‘Determinate’ thoughts here contrast with ‘fluid’ thoughts. ‘Contingent’ philosophizing makes do with ‘fixed’ thoughts; with fluid thoughts we can dispense with it.

¶35. 1. PS is a ‘preparation’ for science (¶34), but because it is systematic, and underpinned by logic, also a part of science. But Hegel’s claim that PS is the *first* part of science is questionable. When Hegel presents the fundamental outline of his system in *Enc.*, he begins with Logic, and ‘phenomenology’ comes later, in *Enc.* III, ¶¶413–39. He there presents his system as circular, even as a ‘circle of circles’, implying that there is no fixed, unique beginning; this is less explicit in PS than in *Enc.*, but there are hints of it in PS ¶¶18 and 802. Logic and nature can claim priority over spirit: nature is simpler, while logical thoughts underpin both nature and spirit. According to *Enc.* III, consciousness is not the ‘outset’ of spirit: there are more primitive phases of spirit, such as that of the embryo or the infant, which do not involve consciousness in Hegel’s sense. That spirit does not in PS ‘return into itself’ is neither obviously true nor obviously relevant: the idea of spirit’s returning into itself is not clear enough to disqualify its attainment of the ‘concept of knowledge’ (¶34) by the end of PS and, even if it is true, it shows only that PS is not the final part of science, not that it is the first part. Hegel’s best reason for beginning with PS is that it makes a better introduction to his system, not because it is logically prior to other parts, but because its content is more familiar. Hegel’s procedure is comparable to Descartes’s. In one sense, Descartes’s system begins with the *cogito*, the firm foundation on which he erects his edifice. However, to see Descartes’s motivation for adopting the *cogito* as his starting-point, the tyro needs to be guided along the very route by which he arrived at the *cogito*, the successively more acute and wider-ranging sceptical doubts that preceded it; a starting-point presupposes an account of one’s reasons for adopting it. But Hegel hankers for an all-embracing system, leaving no loose ends or beginnings, and incorporating any informal introduction to it.

¶36. 1. In Hegel’s usage one is always conscious *of* something, never simply conscious (as when one loses, recovers, or returns to consciousness). What one is conscious of is an ‘object’, *Gegenstand*, ‘what stands [*stand*] against [*gegen*]', and is thus an intentional object, the object or focus of some mental state or attitude. Correspondingly, ‘objectivity’ is *Gegenständlichkeit*. Objectivity is ‘negative’ to knowledge, in that while neither can occur without the other, they are distinct from each other, as are, say, the poles of a magnet or wife and husband: see also ¶37.

On ‘moments’, cf. ¶32. The moments that spirit ‘unfolds’ are not the same as the moments of consciousness, viz. knowledge and objectivity. They are rather the stages of spirit’s development, while knowledge and objectivity are the ‘opposition’ that inheres in each stage. Hegel’s argument is: spirit unfolds its spirit-moments in consciousness, so the opposition involved in consciousness-moments inheres in every spirit-moment and every spirit-moment becomes a ‘shape’ or form of consciousness.

On substance and its ‘movement’, cf. ¶18; on ‘spiritual substance’, cf. ¶26. Substance moves, in virtue of being ‘subject’ as well as substance. But there is not invariably

consciousness of substance and its movement. The development of logic, for example, does not involve consciousness in Hegel's sense, since it is thought about thought, not about an object distinct from itself. Again, the (non-temporal) development of nature does not involve consciousness, nor do the early stages of the development of the human mind. When consciousness does surface, why does it have in its experience only *spiritual* substance? Why not also sticks and stones? Hegel's argument is: insofar as we are conscious of substance, this must be because substance itself bifurcates into consciousness and its object: cf. ¶¶16, 18, 19. We cannot reasonably suppose that consciousness comes to substance from outside. So substance must be its own object. But if substance can bifurcate in this way, it must be 'spiritual'.

It is unclear what is involved in spirit's becoming other to itself and sublating its otherness. There are several possibilities: (1) Consciousness itself involves both becoming other than oneself and a simultaneous sublation of this otherness, since an object of one's consciousness must be both other than oneself, yet also within one's consciousness and so, to that extent, not other than oneself. (2) The final sentence implies a 3-stage process: (i) the immediate that is 'not experienced'; (ii) its 'alienation'; and (iii) its return from alienation. It is tempting to take 'not experienced' to mean 'not an object of consciousness', and the alienation as the bifurcation of the immediate into itself and consciousness of it—as, say, a sleeper awakes to feel a pain that he would have felt earlier, if he had been awake, the pain being dormant until he awoke. Then stage (iii) is the actual consciousness of the object and this alone reveals the object in its 'actuality', etc. This interpretation is, then, similar to (1). However, 'what is not experienced' (*das Unerfahrene*) probably does not mean 'what one is not conscious of'. *Erfahren*, 'to experience' comes from *fahren*, 'to fare, go, journey, etc.', and its root meaning is 'to set out on a journey to explore or get to know something'. If Hegel uses *erfahren* in this sense, then the 'immediate', our starting-point, is not experienced, not a part of our journey, even if we are conscious of it. Our experience is rather what we make of this starting-point. As we proceed on our journey, this immediate becomes alienated, i.e. a problem arises in our consciousness of it, but then the problem is resolved and we see the immediate as it really is. Then it becomes the 'property', i.e. possession or belonging of consciousness. Something like this happens with every 'shape of consciousness' in PS. (3) The movement from immediate to alienation and then return from alienation might be located in a longer stretch of PS rather than in a single shape of consciousness. Yovel (2005), p.135, interprets the penultimate sentence as follows: in the first three chapters of PS ('A. Consciousness') spirit becomes 'other to', i.e. 'object of' itself. This otherness is sublated in chapter IV ('B. Self-consciousness'), when 'as its own object, consciousness has its other within itself and is the overcoming of that otherness'. Alternatively, we might locate spirit's return from alienation at the end of PS ('Absolute Knowledge'), where spirit ceases to be consciousness and begins to think exclusively about its own thoughts. It is this culmination of PS that is described in ¶37. Whether this tells in favour or against a similar interpretation of ¶36 depends on how likely it is that ¶37 expands the point made in ¶36 or makes a different point.

An initial problem is whether the penultimate sentence and the final sentence describe the same movement. Hegel says they do. If so, (2) or (3) look better than (1)—because of the sequence—though Hegel may also have (1) in mind, since he is trying to answer two questions: 'How does spirit become conscious at all?' and 'What does spirit do given that it is conscious?'

- ¶37. 1. The ancients are the Greek atomists, especially Democritus and Epicurus, who believed that motion would be impossible without a void for atoms to move in, i.e. that the void is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition of motion. This doctrine is hardly relevant to Hegel's theme.

2. On the 'negative', cf. ¶¶32 and 33 on the negativity of the I, and ¶36, where, however, 'objectivity' is negative to 'knowledge'. It is not clear whether the 'negative' is the I or the distinction between the I and its object. Perhaps it is both. The I and the object are each distinct from, and therefore negative to, the other. It is in virtue of this distinction that they both move or develop. But the I is negative in a special way, and is thus the prime mover, though it needs an object to work on. (The artist is distinct from the canvas, so each negates the other. But it is the artist who decides what will go on the canvas and who paints over or 'negates' early drafts.) 'Disparity' (*Ungleichheit*) is ambiguous. It could mean that the I and its object are numerically distinct (as are Tweedledum and Tweedledee), that they are unlike each other (as are the artist and the painting), or that they are out of accord with each other (as are the artist and the painting that does not satisfy him). Hegel probably has all three senses in mind. Development is unlikely to occur unless there is some sort of mismatch between the I and its object. An artist who is entirely satisfied with the painting does not alter it.

'Substance' is the absolute, the rock-bottom reality. The I that is conscious of substance seems initially to be quite distinct from substance. But this, Hegel believes, is incoherent. The conscious I must itself be an offshoot of ultimate reality: cf. ¶17. Thus when the I is conscious of substance, this must be because substance is conscious of itself. So substance is also 'subject', not simply in the sense that it is active, but also in the sense that it is conscious, etc: cf. ¶17. Throughout most of PS, consciousness, and indeed 'we' (Hegel's readers) are unaware of this. So the 'essence' of 'spirit' (viz. of substance now conceived as a subject), which is that it is its own object, is not in accord with its 'Being-there', i.e. with the various shapes of consciousness of it, in which substance looks quite distinct from consciousness. But as we reach the end of PS it becomes apparent to consciousness itself that substance is its own object, because it becomes its own object 'just as it is', i.e. manifestly. Then the 'immediacy' of consciousness's objects, their sheer givenness, and the gulf between knowledge and its object, truth, is overcome. What Hegel has in mind is that consciousness of objects has culminated in logic, thought about thoughts, where 'Being', i.e. the object, is no longer simply given and apparently independent of the I, immediate, but is excavated from the I itself and therefore 'mediated' by the I—'absolutely', with no residual core of immediacy—yet nevertheless immediately in the I's possession in a way in which its previous objects were not.

'Selfish' translates *selbstisch*, 'pertaining to the Self', but with little, if any, suggestion of egotism.

'The concept' is the integrated system of pure (i.e. non-empirical) thoughts that form the core of the mind and that also structure the world. It is the cosmic version of the concept embedded in an acorn that controls the growth and structure of the oak tree: cf. ¶12, etc.

Traditionally 'speculative' amounts to 'theoretical', in contrast to 'practical'. Its force here seems to be 'non-empirical', in contrast to PS itself. In PS, when spirit is conscious of itself as an object, spirit is alienated from itself, but returns to itself once more in Logic: cf. ¶19.

¶38. 1. The 'system of spirit's experience' is presented in PS, while 'science of the true . . . in the shape of the true' is Logic. What seems negative and false is not so much the transition from PS to logic, but the whole advance presented in PS. Kant, like Hegel, believed that the method of mathematics is inapplicable to philosophy: see CPR, A713/B741ff. and Broad (1941–1942). Kant is, however, arguing against a strong philosophical tradition, including Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff, that did see mathematics as the appropriate model for philosophy. 'Unphilosophical knowledge' refers to a host of lesser philosophers who held the same view.

'Appearance' is *Erscheinung*. Like Kant (CPR, B69f., A293/B349f.), Hegel distinguishes *Erscheinung* from *Schein*, 'semblance, illusion', which implies a clear opposition to reality.

Erscheinung has most of the senses of ‘appearance’. In ¶13 it amounts to ‘emergence’ or ‘coming into existence’, while in ¶76 it occurs both in this sense and in the sense of ‘illusion, semblance’ (‘empty appearance’). In ¶38 it seems to combine two senses: (1) the emergence or becoming of spirit; and (2) the way or ways in which it appears to consciousness, in contrast to its essential nature. Appearances in sense (2) are not wholly at odds with reality, but are comparable to, say, the varying aspects of a table that present themselves to me as I walk around it, none of which convey its three-dimensional shape but eventually enable me to infer it, or to successive conjectures about the shape of the earth (flat, spherical, oblate with a bulge at the equator and the north pole, but a depression at the south pole) that approximate more and more to its actual shape. ‘Appearance’ is an important word in PS, since the word ‘phenomenology’—from the Greek *phainomai*, ‘appear, be manifest’, and *logos*, ‘account, study, etc.’—means something like the ‘doctrine of the appearance(s) [of spirit]’.

Hegel regards negativity and falsity as an essential preliminary to, even an ingredient in, the truth. He rejects Descartes’s professed policy of avoiding error at all costs. Errors are stepping-stones to truth. For more on ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘negative’, see ¶¶39ff.

¶39. 1. Hegel uses ‘true’ in diverse ways. Sometimes ‘the true’ means ‘God’ or ‘rock-bottom reality’; then ‘true’ amounts to ‘real’ and has no obvious contrast with ‘false’. Here Hegel is using ‘true’ and ‘false’ for the truth-values of propositions or theories. However, he rejects the principle of bivalence, whereby there are just two truth-values, truth and falsity, and any proposition has one, and only one, truth-value; truth and falsity do not admit of degrees: the conjunction of a false proposition and any number of truths is itself plain false. For Hegel, by contrast, two (relatively) false philosophies may, when appropriately combined, constitute a (relatively) true philosophy, and no philosophy can be true unless it combines two or more philosophies each of which, taken alone, is false: cf. ¶2.

‘Minted coin’ perhaps alludes to Lessing’s *Nathan the Wise* (1779), III.6, where the Jew Nathan, when asked by Saladin whether Judaism, Islam, or Christianity is true, reflects that truth is not ‘a new coin, known by the stamp at once’. Nathan (and Lessing) believes that none of these religions presents the unvarnished truth and that what matters is not the religion itself but the conduct it inspires in its adherents. For Hegel, none of these religions is unqualifiedly true, but Christianity is closer to the truth. He rejects Lessing’s exclusively moral assessment of religions. But Lessing’s metaphor suits Hegel’s view: truth is not a clear-cut, all-or-nothing matter.

Denial that there is ‘a false’ or ‘an evil’ may amount to (1) the traditional claim that falsity and evil are negations or privations, a deficiency or lack of positive truth or positive goodness; (2) denial that falsity and evil are individual entities; or (3) denial that any entity is purely false or purely evil. (1) entails (2) and (3): if falsity and evil are simply privations, then anything *purely* false or evil would be nothing at all. But (1) is not entailed by (2) and/or (3): falsity and evil might be just as positive as truth and goodness, yet not individual entities nor capable of pure instances. It is unclear whether Hegel is differentiating falsity and evil from truth and goodness or whether the same remarks apply to them. (1) does not apply to truth and goodness: they are positive, not privations. As for (2) and (3), he often uses ‘the true’ as if it denoted an entity, viz. the absolute, or something purely and exclusively true: cf. ¶¶17 and 39 on substance. But he does deny that anything is purely true or purely good: falsity and evil are ingredients, albeit ‘sublated’, in the true and the good. At any rate, falsity and evil are ‘universals’, each with its own distinctive essentiality. His failure to mention truth and goodness with respect to (2) and (3) may owe something to his conflation of them with (1), which does not apply to truth and goodness.

If the view that Hegel is attacking were correct, then ‘substance’, what we know about, would be ‘the true’, and the false would be the negative of substance. But as we have seen,

substance involves its own negation. It presents itself to us in different ways, which are negations of each other and also of substance itself. Again, the very fact that it bifurcates into the substance known and the knowing Self is also a negation. This in itself might not convince us that substance involves falsity. There is, after all, no reason to suppose that all negation, even in the sense of privation, amounts to falsity: blindness is a privation, negative rather than positive, but it is not falsity. However, one can 'know falsely' (*falsch wissen*). In German, as in English, this is paradoxical. What Hegel has in mind is not sheer error, but ultimately inadequate, preliminary attempts to grasp reality: 'shapes of consciousness'. The knowledge that is in 'disparity' or inequality with 'its substance' is not piecemeal knowledge but knowledge of rock-bottom reality. This cannot be absorbed in one gulp, but only gradually by way of 'shapes of consciousness' that capture only fragmentary aspects of it. In fact, consciousness as such cannot capture the whole of reality, since it essentially focuses on the object and neglects the 'subject', consciousness itself, which is a dimension of substance, not an external addition to it: cf. ¶37. Because of its incompleteness, each shape of consciousness is inadequate not only to substance as a whole but also intrinsically, failing to give a coherent account even of the restricted aspect of substance that it addresses. Nevertheless, these shapes are still 'knowledge', owing in part to the affinity of *Wissen* to *Bewusstsein*, 'consciousness', and also because it is natural to include the imperfect past theories in the 'advance (or 'growth') of scientific (or 'human') knowledge'.

When does parity emerge? After the collapse of each shape of consciousness a sort of parity, albeit temporary, is restored between consciousness and its objects. In each case the process by which a result is reached is taken up into the result itself. So the truth, when we reach it, absorbs whatever negativity is involved in the preceding process. But global parity, parity between knowledge and substance as a whole, is not attained until we reach logic. Why is such disparity present 'as the Self'? Two possibilities are: (1) The Self is the persistent, innermost core of the truth: cf. ¶22. So the disparity is inherent in the true, not external to it. In that case, 'as the Self' performs a different role from 'as the negative': the latter characterizes the disparity, the former tells us where it is located. (2) The Self is the thinker in contrast to his thoughts. This contrast remains even in Logic. There is disparity between thoughts and the thinking about them: the thinker thinks about his own thoughts, but the thought that he thinks about is for the most part not the same as his thought about it. But if this is what Hegel means, why is this disparity within logic presented as a remnant of the disparity within PS? Perhaps his idea is that the Self of logic bears the scars of its journey towards logic.

The transformation undergone by the true and the false when they are combined is exemplified by past philosophies integrated into Hegelianism: cf. ¶2. In isolation each preceding philosophy is false, if only because it is 'one-sided'. This type of falsity is remedied by its integration into a more comprehensive philosophy. But for this integration a philosophy needs further modification or defalsification. Hegel's own examples illustrate his aversion to unmediated opposition. A subject is not properly unified with an object, unless the object is seen to be, or to embody, the subject's own thoughts; an infinite that excludes the finite is *bounded* by the finite and therefore not truly infinite; thinking *is* and Being is a *thought*. Truth and falsity are more like an acid and an alkali than oil and water: a salt is a compound of an acid and an alkali, but it would not satisfy a request for an acid *and* an alkali.

¶40. 1. 'Dogmatism' claims that 'of *two opposed assertions* ... one must be *true* and the other *false*' (*Enc. I*, ¶32). Greek sceptics contrasted it with 'scepticism', suspension of belief. But Hegel contrasts it with 'speculative philosophy'. A dogmatist insists that *either* (it is true that) the soul is finite *or* (it is true that) the soul is infinite; it cannot be both or neither. (Dogmatism is similar to bivalence (cf. ¶39), though not identical to it, since dogmatism

applies to ‘opposed’ propositions rather than a proposition and its negation.) By contrast, speculative philosophy says that the soul is both finite and infinite, and that it is neither finite nor infinite (*Enc. I*, ¶32 Addition). Dogmatism is appropriate to many questions. Once we specify which Caesar we mean, and which calendar, we can say when he was born. Once we specify which stadium we mean (Greek and Roman stadia ranged between 180 and 200 metres) and which ‘yard’ (the French *toise*, which was altered from about 1.949 metres to 2 metres in 1799), we can say how many there are in a stadium. But philosophical questions cannot be so easily disambiguated.

¶41. 1. As in ¶1 ‘historical’ is *historisch(en)*, i.e. ‘unsystematic, descriptive, in the manner of a chronicle’. It includes trivial historical facts, but is not confined to them, since in ¶1 Hegel also applies it to anatomy. Significant historical events and writing about them are *geschichtlich*. That Caesar ended the Roman republic is a *geschichtliche* truth; that he was born in 100 BC is a *historische* truth. Nevertheless research is required to establish that he was born in 100 BC. Such research requires ‘self-consciousness’ in that one does not simply accept the received answer to the question, but works it out for oneself. Even if one does not need to work it out, but has an ‘immediate intuition’, just knows it, it is only the ‘grounds’, i.e. the evidence, that gives the intuition ‘true value’. However, *Anschauung* has a wider range of meaning than ‘intuition’ and could mean direct observation of an event. So Hegel may also have in mind truths established by observation.

¶42. 1. Hegel’s criticisms of Euclid’s proofs for their ‘externality’ recur in his *Lectures on the Proofs of God’s Existence*, II; and *Enc. I*, ¶231. Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation*, I, ¶15 offers similar criticisms of Euclid’s ‘mouse-trap proofs’: they show *that* something so, but not *why* it is so; they are hard to follow, the reason for each step, e.g. the drawing of a line, being unclear at the time when it is taken; they do not explain why the theorems are believed, even by their original discoverers; they operate with concepts rather than with the spatial intuition appropriate to geometry. Hegel agrees, except that he shows no sign of hoping for an alternative, intuitive geometry, as Schopenhauer did.

In *Enc. I*, ¶231 Hegel says that Kant ‘brought into vogue the phrase that mathematics “constructs” its concepts’. To learn the properties of a right angled triangle, we must construct a diagram or a mental image of it: see CPR, Bxii, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, ¶7, and *Critique of Judgement* ¶¶138 and 241. (What we can construct also reveals the nature of space. We can construct a 2- or 3-dimensional sphere, but not a 15-dimensional sphere, not because the latter is contradictory, but because space has only 3 dimensions: see Körner (1960, p.28).) In doing this, one is primarily *constructing* a right angled triangle, but there is also a suggestion that one is *construing* or analysing the concept of a right angled triangle. But PS ¶¶42–4 deal with the construction not of a right angled triangle, but of additional lines and figures needed for the proof of the theorem. (See ¶51 for an apparently different type of ‘construction’.) The theorem as such does not bear on its face the fact that it can be proved, proved by this particular construction, or even that it can be proved at all. One might well understand and believe it without knowing any proof or even suspecting that it can be proved. The proof (or *a* proof, since there are alternative proofs) has to be found by trial and error. The right angled triangle does not ‘divide itself up’ in the way needed for its proof.

Cognition involves two processes, the ‘becoming of the Being-there as Being-there’ and the ‘becoming of the essence or the inner nature of the Thing’. Mathematics presents only the former, the ‘becoming of the Being of the nature of the Thing in *cognition*’. Being(-there) is the outer surface of things, while essence is their inner nature. Mathematics shows how the nature of, say, a right-angled triangle surfaces in our cognition, how we get to know it. But the way in which we get to know it has nothing to do with the nature of the Thing, with why it is as it is, e.g. why the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on

the other two sides. Philosophy, by contrast, expounds both processes. PS's arguments for and against a 'shape of consciousness' are not 'external' to it. The first shape, 'sensory certainty', refutes itself by arguments that emerge from its own attempts to develop this position. The second shape, perception, is not simply plucked out of the air (in the way that Pythagoras's theorem supposedly is) but emerges automatically from the collapse of sensory certainty, retaining the sensory particularity involved in sensory certainty from the start and also the universality that emerged within sensory certainty as a result of its self-criticism. Perception has to emerge from sensory certainty and the arguments against it; and it could not arise by any other route. A similar case, on a larger scale, is the proof of God's existence. Even in their traditional form the arguments are not 'external' to what they attempt to prove. That is, 'God' and 'God exists' have no definite meaning that is presupposed independently of the proof. Their meaning is conferred by the proof. If we argue that God (or 'the essence') exists from the existence of *contingent* entities, then God is conceived as a *necessary* being. If we prove God's existence from the apparent design in the world, then God is conceived as a purposive designer. This in itself differentiates these proofs from Euclid's proofs, but Hegel takes a further step (*Enc. I*, ¶50): when we infer the existence of God from the 'finite' world, we alter our conception of the world (or 'Being-there'). The world is no longer conceived as, say, an aggregate of contingent entities or as merely orderly. It is a world governed by universal laws and is an organic purposive whole. To infer the existence of God is not, in Hegel's view, to infer the existence of an entity distinct from the world. It is to ascend from 'Being' to 'thought' and thus to elevate the world to thought. By contrast, the 'ontological proof' proceeds in the reverse direction, from thought to Being (*Enc. I*, ¶51). In Hegel's system it corresponds to the transition from Logic to the philosophy of nature, showing how the logical 'Idea' necessarily burgeons into a world of space, time, matter, etc. and eventually into the human mind itself. The 'becoming of Being-there as Being-there' is associated with (among other things) this process, the transition from logic to nature, while the 'becoming of the essence' is presented in the Logic itself, the extraction of the logical essence of the world and the passage to higher and higher logical categories. The becoming of the 'substance', i.e. of the logical 'essence', passes over into 'externality', i.e. nature, where it is 'for another', i.e. known to us. The becoming of Being-there is the 'withdrawal into essence', perhaps in the sense that nature leads on to mind, the culminating phase of which is philosophy, i.e. logic.

- ¶43. 1. The externality of 'insight' alters the 'true Thing', the original figure, if it requires further construction. Then insight does not follow the intrinsic articulation of the 'Thing'. On falsity and negativity, see ¶¶31f. Hegel's parallel between the dismemberment of a geometrical figure and the 'disappearance' of 'purportedly fixed' (*festgemeinten*) thoughts is not exact. The dismemberment of a triangle is not intrinsic to the triangle itself, but undertaken externally, while the disappearance of fixed thoughts results from the nature of the thoughts themselves: the philosopher, unlike the geometer, follows the intrinsic articulation of the subject-matter or 'Thing'. However, both cases involve negativity and falsity. Proof and construction dismember the triangle, but later restore it, rather as the 'concept' demolishes fixed thoughts, but moves on to refurbished thoughts.
- ¶44. 1. ¶43 primarily dealt with the deficiency of geometrical cognition, but it implied, especially in its final sentence, that the 'material' lends itself to this deficient treatment. By contrast, ¶44 will deal with cognition itself. 'External' purposiveness contrasts with 'inner' purposiveness: cf. ¶22. If one entity, a human being say, has a purpose which it realizes with respect to another entity, then the purposiveness is external. One difficulty with the distinction lies in deciding whether what appear to be two entities should be treated as a single entity or system. When animals of different species are associated with each other to their mutual benefit (when e.g. a small fish eats the parasites on a big fish or, for that matter,

a doctor makes a living by curing patients) the two entities can reasonably be regarded as a single system characterized by inner purposiveness. When, by contrast, as in antagonistic symbiosis or parasitism, one animal benefits from the relationship to the detriment of the other, they should perhaps be counted as distinct entities and the purposiveness as external. But Hegel hardly establishes that the geometer is in antagonistic symbiosis with the right-angled triangle. After all, the point of the treatment imposed by a doctor may become apparent to the patient only retrospectively, after the patient is cured—rather as the triangle is eventually restored again.

Hegel implicitly contrasts mathematical cognition with his own ‘scientific’ method, where it is supposedly apparent both that the starting point is intrinsically necessary (or at least justified) and that each subsequent step in the argument is necessitated (or at least justified) by its predecessor, not simply by the conclusion we are aiming at. Standard deduction does not supply the necessity that Hegel requires: the choice of a premise and the decision which, of the indefinitely many propositions it entails, to deduce from it, depend on the conclusion aimed at. Hegel tries to repair this apparent arbitrariness in philosophy and in logic, if not in mathematics.

¶45. 1. ‘Purpose’ is glossed as ‘concept’ both in ironical contrast to ‘unconceptual’ magnitude and because a purpose involves a concept of what is aimed at. ‘Purpose’ is here the point of view from which mathematics considers its ‘material’. (Mathematics is not exclusively concerned with magnitude. Topological problems were current in Hegel’s day. There were seven bridges over the river Pregel in Königsberg, linking two islands and the mainland: was it possible to cross every bridge without crossing any of them twice? The answer (shown to be negative by Leonhard Euler (1707–1783)) does not depend on the size or the shape of the river or the bridges.)

Why is magnitude an ‘inessential, unconceptual relationship’, even though it is an essential, conceptual feature of geometrical figures? Hegel is here thinking of magnitude in relation to concrete entities, such as houses, rocks, trees, people, etc. Their magnitude does not affect their essence: a house remains a house even if its size is altered (*Enc. I*, ¶99). *Big* changes in size do alter the nature of a house, making it a mansion or a doll’s house or, especially if the relative magnitudes of its parts are changed, altering its shape beyond any recognizable dwelling: cf. *Enc. I*, ¶108. But in the geometer’s space, changes in size, however great, need not affect the shape. Another argument for the superficiality of magnitude is that it becomes less important as the ontological hierarchy ascends from inorganic natural entities, through plants, animals, humanity, along with ‘freedom, law, morality, or even God himself’: ‘in speaking of God as a Trinity, the number three has by no means the same prominence as when we consider the three dimensions of space or the three sides of a triangle’ (*Enc. I*, ¶99 Addition). Higher levels are not to be excluded from science (or reduced to arrangements of matter, as the proponent of quantity prefers). They are even the ‘essence’ or ‘concept’ of lower levels: the purpose of nature is to give rise to and accommodate mind.

The ‘material’ of mathematics is distinct from its ‘purpose’. Other things, such as time, can be quantified (cf. ¶46), but are not material for pure mathematics. Conversely, space and the unit may be treated non-quantitatively, as in Hegel’s *Logic* (e.g. *Enc. I*, ¶¶96–8 on the one and many) and *Philosophy of Nature* (*Enc. II*, ¶¶254–6 on space). In what follows it is unclear whether Hegel is describing space as such or space as mathematics conceives it. Thus it is uncertain whether his claim that the ‘concept inscribes its distinctions’ in space refers to the mathematician’s construction of figures or to the conceptual necessity of three spatial dimensions (as in the final sentence of ¶45 and in *Enc. II*, ¶255). The following sentence implies that he has the geometer’s space in mind, both because he specifies that the ‘actual’ is not ‘spatial, as it [viz. the spatial] is considered in mathematics’ and because he distinguishes mathematical objects from the objects of ‘concrete sensory intuition’.

The geometer's space and objects differ from real space and objects. Geometrical objects are unaffected by the proximity of other objects. They exert no force of attraction or repulsion, and one object can be removed without affecting the other—unlike the poles of a magnet, Hegel's favourite model of 'essential opposition'. A change in the position of a geometrical object will not alter its size or its shape, and a change in its size will not require any change in its shape.

Mathematical propositions are 'dead'. They entail, and are entailed by, other propositions, but any proposition has a clear and definite sense regardless of its entailments, and the deduction of one from another leaves the sense and truth-value of both unchanged. There is no problem impelling them to link up with other such propositions, except the mathematician's external purpose of reaching a certain conclusion. This applies to standard deduction generally. In PS, by contrast, we start with a shape of consciousness, such as sensory certainty, which at first seems acceptable, but on further consideration reveals flaws and an intrinsic tendency to metamorphose into perception; there is only one route for it to take, it does not have alternative destinations open to it.

- ¶46. 1. The first sentence is a criticism of pure mathematics: it should consider time, but it does not. After an interlude on 'applied mathematics', Hegel returns to the topic, *apparently* saying that, since time is the 'counterpart' to space, it is a deficiency of pure mathematics that it does not deal with it alongside space. In CPR Kant regarded space and time as two co-ordinate 'forms of sensibility' enabling us to order our sensory 'intuitions'; he even suggests, albeit tentatively, that time plays a similar role in arithmetic as space does in geometry. However, later in CPR he gives time priority over space in our conceptual apprehension of the world. While Hegel disputes much in Kant's account of time, he seems to accept that time is 'in juxtaposition to' or the 'counterpart of' space and that it therefore requires explanation if pure mathematics ignores it. But time, Hegel says, is the 'concept itself being-there' (*der daseiende Begriff selbst*). He makes no such parallel claim about space; he did say, in ¶45, that the concept 'divides space into its dimensions', but this only means that there is a conceptual necessity for the three-dimensionality of space, not that space is the concept itself being-there. In ¶801 he again says: '*Time is the concept itself that is there [der Begriff selbst, der da ist],...*' Before spirit or the Self has mastered itself conceptually, it 'appears in time', that is, phases of spirit, such as historical epochs, appear successively. But the claim that time is the concept that is there, is not equivalent to the claim that spirit appears in time. The former is rather the reason for the latter: spirit appears in time *because* time is the concept that is there, a seemingly 'empty intuition' that is an appropriate vehicle for immature spirit. Spirit also 'estranges', or externalizes, itself in space, but that is primarily in the form of nature rather than mind (¶807). The 'unrest' of time makes it an appropriate vehicle for spirit, but how is this related to its being the concept that is there? Hegel may mean simply that time is an appropriate vehicle for the implicitly conceptual spirit, before it is mastered by logic and is just 'there', not that time is the concept that is there *independently* of its housing spirit. However, he does not follow Kant in distinguishing between time and its contents. *Enc. II*, ¶¶200–3 suggests that time depends on the conceptually driven changes in its contents: time flows *because* finite entities change and perish. To combine this with his claim that time accommodates spirit *because* it is the concept that is there, we might say that time is the concept that is there *because* of the small-scale changes that occur—the growth of trees, the death of animals, etc.—and it is *because of that* that it can accommodate the large-scale changes of spirit. 'Quantity' and 'equality', the principles deployed by mathematics, are intrinsically 'unconceptual': they cannot differentiate the stages of spirit or reflect the logical relations between them. Hence the other branch of 'pure' mathematics, arithmetic with its static 'unit', cannot do justice to the unrest of time and temporal things, and is only loosely related to time, if at all. Time is considered by applied mathematics, but only as a variable, not

intrinsically, and not to Hegel's satisfaction. His strictures on Galileo's law of falling bodies are developed in *Enc. II*, ¶267 and in PS ¶¶153ff. He speaks of 'synthetic' propositions not in Kant's sense, of a judgement whose predicate is not contained in the concept of the subject: the 'relationships' of the variables are determined by their concept, in Hegel's more generous use of 'concept'. Hegel's synthetic propositions concern the relationships between two variables. See also Inwood (1987) and Inwood (2012).

¶47. 1. 'Concept' (*Begriff*) is contrasted with 'Being-there' (*Dasein*), the realization or embodiment of the concept. Mathematics presents only an inessential determination of things, neither their concept nor their Being-there. 'Historical' truths present the Being-there of things but not their concept: cf. ¶41. Philosophy presents both. In later works this combination is often called 'Idea' (*Idee*), but this word occurs only rarely in PS. None of these occurrences are linked with the *Begriff-Dasein* combination, which is here equated with 'the actual' (*das Wirkliche*).

The 'process' constitutes e.g. the whole course of PS. Its 'moments' are the successive shapes of consciousness. PS as a whole is positive and true, but it contains also the negative, that is, each shape of consciousness as it turns out to be inadequate. On Hegel's reluctance to conclude that such a shape is 'false'—since it is impossible to 'abstract' from it, i.e. do without it—see ¶¶ 2, 24, 39: to describe it as false would be like saying that a sapling is false because it is not a full-grown tree. The 'evanescent', i.e. an inadequate and therefore negative shape of consciousness, is not separable from the 'true', i.e. the whole sequence of shapes, and so is not strictly false. What appears is the 'true', and presumably the 'concept', while its 'appearance' consists in the evanescent shapes of consciousness, which also amount to the 'Being-there' of the concept. The shapes of consciousness come and go, but the coming and going itself does not: there can be no concept without appearance. This explains why appearance constitutes the 'actuality, etc.'. The shapes of consciousness are like the participants in a 'frenzy' or revel in honour of the god Bacchus or Dionysus. Each in turn breaks loose from the other revellers, but in doing so, dissolves or collapses and gives way to another reveller, who undergoes the same fate. Because of this, the revel is also a 'repose', as well as a movement. This may explain why the coming and going of the shapes is characterized as 'in itself' (*an sich*). When a reveller or shape of consciousness breaks loose, it becomes for itself rather than simply in itself: it passes from mere potentiality into actuality and becomes conscious of itself. But the coming and going itself is in itself: it does not break loose in the way that particular shapes do. The shapes, like the 'determinate thoughts' that underpin them and that resurface in their purity in Logic, are each condemned before a 'court of judgement' for their breakaway, but are still necessary to the whole.

In the final sentence 'recollects itself' translates '*sich erinnert*'. *Erinnern* normally means 'remind', and the reflexive, *sich erinnern*, 'remind oneself, remember, recollect'. However, Hegel often uses the word in accordance with what he takes to be its root meaning, 'to internalize, interiorize', often combining this with its standard meaning. Recollection occurs at a variety of levels: cf. ¶¶13, 28, 29. But the closest parallel to this passage is ¶808, where *Erinnerung* is distinguished from 'withdrawal-into-itself' (*Insichgehen*), i.e. interiorization, but closely connected with it. In ¶47 two types of recollection are in play: (1) Each shape of consciousness is recollected immediately after its demise and is incorporated into its successor. As Yovel (2005) notes, this is connected with, and perhaps a necessary condition for, the fact that Hegelian negation of negation does not simply revert to the starting-point (p.155). It is more like a couple who marry, then divorce, then remarry each other, carrying with them the memory of their first marriage and intervening separation. Hegelian negation may involve emotions, etc., not only propositions: naive love—indifference/hostility—sophisticated love. Moreover, Hegelian negation is determinate—unlike standard negation, where 'It's not green' does not tell us what colour it is. Hegelian negation is not *sheer*

negation, as in standard logic, but determinate also in the sense that it is powered by internal defects in the position negated, and these internal defects place restrictions on the outcome of the negation. (2) At the conclusion of the series of shapes of consciousness, there is a global 'recollection' of the whole series on the part of Hegel and his readers, a recollection that constitutes at least a part of 'absolute knowledge' and which, Hegel hoped, leads on to Logic.

Both types of recollection involve 'self-knowledge'. In taking the centre of the stage (its Being-there) and working through its difficulties, a shape of consciousness discovers what it amounts to; in surveying the whole course of PS, *we* discover what we amount to.

- ¶48. 1. A method is a way of doing something, e.g. a way of making plants grow by fertilizers, etc. One might have no method, but just let plants grow of their own accord. In that case, if there is any method 'of' their growth, it is simply the 'concept' of the plants, immanent in each seed. Analogously, Hegel has no method that he applies to the 'movement' or to 'science', no way of his own for generating them. It is the 'concept', their intrinsic structure, that accounts for them; Hegel simply lets them emerge of their own accord and watches their development: cf. *Enc. I*, ¶79–82 on external and internal dialectic. One 'external' method that philosophers, such as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Christian Wolff, applied to philosophy was mathematics. A remnant of this is the tendency to support or refute propositions with 'reasons' (*Gründe*, literally 'grounds'). Reasons of this type are quite different from 'reason', *Vernunft*. A *Grund* may be external to that for which it is the reason. Thus Euclid's reason for Pythagoras's theorem is external to the theorem itself and shows only *that* it is true, not *why* it is true. Unlike *Vernunft*, *Gründe* are not immanent in the Thing. Moreover, reasons for believing or doing something are rarely conclusive. They select only one aspect of a complex concrete phenomenon. There are reasons for stealing or for deserting one's post in battle, and reasons against, but *Vernunft* settles the matter in a way that *Gründe* cannot. It might be objected that Hegel's preference for *Vernunft* over *Gründe* does not entail the exclusion of mathematics from philosophy. It might, after all, be the case that mathematical methods mirror the intrinsic structure or movement of the subject-matter. However, Hegel is deeply averse to the application of quantitative concepts and methods beyond the realm of mathematics itself. Like many of his contemporaries, such as Goethe, Hegel turned to biology. The appropriate model for philosophy was the living organism, with some assistance from the equally non-mathematical phenomena of electricity and magnetism. The 'truth' develops like a living organism, each part of which is connected with every other part, while Hegel himself simply watches. There is no place in this development for the application of numbers, reason-giving, or 'free wilfulness'. Every organ has its allotted place, allowing no free decision on the philosopher's part.
- ¶49. 1. For Hegel, 'ratiocination' (*räsonnieren*, *Räsonnement*) is invariably pejorative and associated with reasoning from grounds, giving reasons for a belief or a course of action.
- ¶50. 1. Kant rediscovered triplicity, since the triadic schema was favoured by such Neoplatonists as Plotinus and Proclus, especially in the form of remaining–procession–return. Kant's most explicit triplicity occurs in his table of forms of judgement (CPR, A70, B95) and of the categories derived from them (CPR, A80, B106). The third term is in each case a 'synthesis' or 'combination' of the first two: e.g. the three forms of judgement of 'relation'—categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive, are respectively thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and give rise to three corresponding categories: substance, causality, and reciprocal interaction. Hegel regards this use of triplicity as 'dead' and 'unconceptualized', because it involves no movement immanent in the Thing. If anyone, apart from Hegel himself, elevated triplicity to its 'absolute meaning', it was Fichte, who made liberal use of the terms 'thesis', 'antithesis', 'synthesis' and also of triadic movement. Fichte's first triad is: the self-positing I, the counter-positing of the non-I, and the positing of a divisible non-I over against the divisible I. If

anyone degraded it to a 'lifeless schema', it was Schelling. Schelling's absolute manifests itself in two *Potenzen* ('powers', especially in mathematics), the real (nature) and the ideal (spirit), while the absolute itself is the 'indifference' between the two. Nature, in turn, involves a real *Potenz* (matter), an ideal *Potenz* (light), and a *Potenz* of indifference (the organism); spirit is similarly split into knowledge, action, and art. Each of these terms is again divided and subdivided into three. Cf. ¶15 on formalism, and ¶¶20 and 23 on predication.

Hegel began by discussing triplicity, but now seems to turn to dualism, since the offending predicates are either polar phenomena (magnetism, electricity) or pairs of opposites (subjectivity/objectivity, contraction/expansion, East/West, etc.). The dualities have, however, a point of 'indifference' between two extremes. Schelling's absolute, e.g., is the indifference between nature and spirit. This arrangement was inspired by magnetism and electricity, with their point of indifference between the opposite poles of a bar magnet and the neutral state between a positive and a negative electric charge. But the focus of Hegel's interest is no longer the schema's triplicity, but the arbitrariness of the 'predicates' deployed in its application. Triplicity and fanciful predication are distinct. Kant regards three items as respectively thesis, antithesis, and synthesis without applying any extraneous predicates. Conversely, Hegel's criticism of 'formalism' in ¶15 does not mention triplicity. Thus Hegel has two distinct objections to formalistic triplicity. First, the triad must emerge naturally from the terms and not be arbitrarily imposed; this requires a logical development on the part of the terms themselves, not simply in the mind of the philosopher. Secondly, the triadic movement must be genuinely explanatory of the terms and not require additional analogies. If we say, e.g., 'Love is a magnetic attraction between a positive pole and a negative pole', this tells us little about either love or magnetism. If we go on to say that magnetic attraction and repulsion are (somewhat like) love and hatred, we are entering a never-ending 'circle of reciprocity', where each 'shape' takes in the washing of the other.

¶51. 1. On 'construction', see ¶42. But here *Konstruktion* is more akin to 'construing' or 'interpreting' than to 'constructing'. Abstract, non-sensory concepts are assigned sensory counterparts, e.g. the intellect is electricity. This looks like the patter of a bingo-caller, who assigns to the number 88 the sensory idea of 'two fat ladies'. But it does have some affinity to Kant's procedure of assigning a sensory idea to a non-sensory one. It may even have some similarity to the additional lines drawn by the geometer, if the association with electricity enables us to draw significant conclusions about the intellect that we could otherwise reach either with difficulty or not at all.

More generally, Hegel derides simplistic classifications, such as that of diseases into asthenic and sthenic (diseases arising from or characterized by weakness and diseases characterized by abnormal or excessive energy), or that of plants into herbs, shrubs, and trees. He prefers a taxonomy based on the interconnectedness of nature, where each animal and plant species depends on and supports others, as implied by his reference to the 'organism of the universe', in contrast to the skeleton or set of boxes to which formalism reduces it. Hegel runs together different criticisms of formalism: (1) Static classification that neglects the 'organic' structure of the universe. (2) Classification in terms of too few alternatives, as painting with only two colours. (3) The introduction of superficial analogies. (4) Its inability to find an adequate relationship between the terms of the schema and the absolute or the Idea (cf. ¶15), so that it ends up with only one colour on its palette.

¶52. 1. As usual, Hegel takes his criticism of a theory not as a need to make a new beginning, but as containing the material from which a new and better theory will emerge. 'Excellence' might refer to triplicity, or to the general aim of establishing a universal system. But order must emerge from the material itself, not just be 'stuck onto' it: cf. ¶53.

¶53. 1. 'That which is' (*des Seienden*) has a wide scope, applying both to the 'concept' and to the concrete 'Being-there' into which it unfolds. As in ¶2, the concept is something like the

plan in a seed that unfolds into a plant or the screenplay that unfolds into a film. This concept first becomes 'other' than itself, that is, no longer a mere concept, but the Being-there of the 'content' immanent in it, the actual plant or film. This is a sort of negation of itself. Then there is a converse movement, whereby the concept withdraws its Being-there into itself again and becomes a 'determinate simplicity' and itself a 'moment' of the whole: the organizing principle of that which is, is itself a moment or constituent of it and not something supplied from outside. This applies not only to temporal processes, such as the growth of a plant or a film. It also applies, say, to the structure of the human body and the study of it by anatomy. One might simply list the parts of the body (a 'table of contents') or, more adventurously, study its structure in descriptive morphology. But at a more advanced stage we learn the functions of the various organs and how they interact with each other to form a system, in fact a system of systems, e.g. the muscular system, the nervous system, and so on. That this overall system in biological organisms is regarded by Hegel as deriving from a concept owes much to Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. It applies more properly to a system such as Hegel's, where it is obviously inadequate simply to list its contents, when the overall conception and the movement from one stage to another is integral to the system. This explains the aversion to prefaces expressed in ¶¶1f., along with a comparison with anatomy. Hegel has in mind the development of his own system rather than the human body, when he speaks of the becoming of a 'determinate simplicity', e.g. the shape of consciousness that emerges from the ruins of its predecessor, and of its passing over into a 'higher truth', e.g. the more advanced shape of consciousness.

¶54. 1. On substance as subject, see ¶¶17f. In ¶18 the reflection into itself is that of the substance-subject, and so it must be here too, though grammatically (*seine eigene reflexion*) it could be that of the 'content': the content is the 'Being-there' that the substance-subject generates. Hegel is now trying to show that its generation of Being-there and the subsequent dissolution of that Being-there and its replacement by another is a deep conceptual necessity. He is also trying to show that his own knowledge of this process is not an additional supplement that comes to substance from outside, but is involved in the very logic of substance itself. The first aim is approached by way of a brief replay of the dialectic of Being-there and quality, as found e.g. in *Enc. I*, ¶¶86–95. A particular 'Being-there' has a quality with which it is indissolubly associated and which differentiates it from any other Being-there: see *Enc. I*, ¶90. It starts off as 'equal-to-itself', self-contained and self-consistent. But in virtue of its essential relationship to other Being-theres it inevitably loses its equality-to-itself and succumbs to dissolution. This happens because equality-with-self is a pure 'abstraction', it is a thought that 'abstracts from' the concrete details such as the specific quality the Being-there has; so the Being-there abstracts itself from itself, from its own equality-to-itself, and thus becomes unequal-to-itself and dissolves. This is why Being is thinking: the fundamental natures of things correspond to our own pure or abstract thoughts, and things must undergo changes that mirror the development of our thoughts. It is because of this isomorphism between things and thoughts that our knowledge of things can be both fully absorbed in them and watch them develop without intervening. It need not interfere and make things dissolve; they dissolve of their own accord, because they share the nature of thinking.

¶55. 1. Cf. ¶17 on Spinoza. The self-consciousness of substance is contrasted with substance 'as it simply is' (*als seiender*). Because Being-there has or 'is' a quality, and quality is a 'determinate thought', Being-there has or involves 'understanding'. (The genitive in 'the understanding of Being-there' is objective, not subjective, and 'understanding' is not verbal, but *Verstand*, roughly 'intellect'.) Anaxagoras (c.500–428 BC) believed that an all-pervasive cosmic *nous*, mind or intellect, brings order into the chaos of material particles. An *eidōs* or *idea* is a 'form' or 'Idea', postulated by Plato and accepted, though in a different sense, by

Aristotle. In Plato's *Phaedo*, 97b8ff., Socrates gives an account of his disillusionment with Anaxagoras and of his own turn to forms or Ideas. An *Art* is a 'kind, sort, species'. One reason for resisting its application to Platonic forms is that a form is often regarded as an ideal exemplar, not simply as a general kind. E.g. the form of beauty in Plato's *Phaedo* and *Symposium* is supremely beautiful, far exceeding the beauty of the things that 'participate' in it, and an object of adoration. But this is less likely to be the case with more lowly forms, and elsewhere Plato thinks of a form as simply 'one over many', a solution to the problem of universals. Hegel is concerned with such lesser forms as quality and Being-there. But he also retains *nous*, in the sense of 'understanding', as the stable substance underlying the Being-there that it generates.

A kind is a thought. So since Being-there falls into kinds, it is governed by thought, not human thinking, but the thought immanent in Being-there. Hence *nous* or understanding is the underlying substance of Being-there. To the extent that something, whether a thing or a thought, is 'equal-to-itself' it is internally harmonious and does not change or perish. *Nous* is 'simple' and because of this it seems equal-to-itself and thus stable. The understanding is, in Hegel's view, a rigid way of thinking that deals in stable concepts and clear-cut distinctions. Its very simplicity seems to exclude internal discord. However, as a mode of thinking, the understanding involves negativity: it transcends and negates the current object of its thought. Being-there seems to depend for its determinacy on its contrast with and relation to other Being-there (cf. ¶16): plant and animal species are what they are because of their contrast and interaction with each other. And the dissolution of a Being-there seems to come from the encroachment on it of other Being-there, the death of an antelope, e.g., from the claws and teeth of a lion. But in fact it is because of the thought involved in it that any finite entity is doomed to perish. It is because of thought that the entity contains its 'otherness' in it and changes and perishes even without the intervention of external forces. Thought inevitably develops and differentiates itself, even though it is self-contained ('its own inwardness') and it is because the things of the world involve thought that they too develop, differentiate themselves and perish. When we distinguish the rigid 'intellectuality of the understanding' (*Verständigkeit*) from the fluid, developing 'rationality' (*Vernünftigkeit*) of reason, we should not suppose that they belong in separate, water-tight compartments. (This would in itself contravene the requirements of reason.) Understanding, the postulation of distinctness and 'equality-to-itself', is an essential feature of thinking, as well as of the structure of the world. But because understanding is thinking, its distinctions and putatively stable thoughts inevitably break down and succumb to the negativity of reason. Understanding veers over into reason.

¶56. 1. See ¶¶34 and 53 on the human body. We must respect its intrinsic systematic structure and not impose our own schematism on the bodily organs as if they were a random aggregate of items such as we find in a butcher's shop or an auction room. Such a structure depends on its conceptual or logical underpinning. Hegel exaggerates, however, in claiming that *all* entities are systematically structured. *Enc.* I, ¶16 concedes that some areas of learning, especially heraldry, deal with phenomena that are wholly arbitrary. Other sciences, such as jurisprudence, natural history, geography, medicine, etc. have a rational basis, but soon descend into details with no rational explanation. Similarly, history is determined in its broad outlines by the 'concept' or the 'Idea', but involves contingency, deriving especially from our free choices. 'Logical necessity' holds sway only at a high level of abstraction. Hegel provides no clear criterion for deciding where necessity ends and contingency begins, nor is it always clear where he locates the boundary between them. There also remains the question whether the 'movement' is only logical (as in logic itself and—on Hegel's view—in nature) or also temporal (as in history). Hegel clearly regards the order in which the terms occur as logical, both in his Logic and in PS, and this logical order is mirrored in a corresponding temporal sequence in the minds of Hegel and his readers. But to what extent

does Hegel regard the logical order as mirrored in the historical development of humanity? He makes some attempt to correlate early stages of his Logic with stages in the history of philosophy, the concept of pure Being corresponding to Parmenides and that of becoming to Heraclitus, but thereafter his attempt to correlate the two orders becomes piecemeal and arbitrary. On the face of it, much of PS is not correlated with history, and those parts of it that are fall into three distinct historical sequences: from early Greece and/or the state of nature down to medieval Christianity (Self-consciousness: the struggle for recognition—Stoicism—Scepticism—the Unhappy Consciousness), from the Greek city-state to the French revolution and Kantian morality (Spirit), and from ancient Persia or thereabouts down to the Reformation (Religion). Critics of Hegel, such as Adolf Trendelenberg (1802–1872) and Hermann Lotze (1816–1881), have long argued that Hegel's belief that concepts are embedded in extra-logical things and determine their structure as well as, in some cases, their development over time, is fallacious. On their view the dialectic that is supposed to power the transition from one concept to another, relies on a confusion between logical negation and physical concepts such as repulsion. Hegel tends to equate the structure of reality (the order of Being) with the structure of our thoughts about reality (the order of knowing), as if abstract concepts were objective forces, not only driving us on from one concept to the next, but also at work causally within the world. He did not regard concepts such as Being as simply abstractions; concepts are embedded in things in something like the way in which the genetic code of a plant is embedded in a seed: cf. ¶47. The temporal development of such things as do develop over time—philosophy, history, shapes of consciousness—should therefore correspond to the logical order in which thoughts develop. However, he gives no clear criterion for deciding when a logical sequence gives rise to a corresponding temporal sequence, and when it does not, and again it is unclear where he locates the boundary between the two cases.

- ¶57. 1. Hegel's belief that his subject-matter has an intrinsic logical structure of its own accounts for his claim that he is simply watching the subject-matter develop and not imposing his own views on it. 'Speculative philosophy' originally meant 'theoretical philosophy' in contrast to 'practical philosophy'. However, Hegel uses it to mean his own dialectical philosophy and, more specifically, the third stage of the dialectical movement, in which the opposed categories that are initially fixed (*Enc. I*, ¶80) and dialectically broken down at the second stage (*Enc. I*, ¶81), are sublated into a new 'totality' at the third stage (*Enc. I*, ¶82). Approval of novelty has the same motivation as aversion to it: to save one's freedom, etc. It is analogous to the ill-considered support for French revolutionaries. Hegel's own view is that a new proposal, such as his own, should be judged by the arguments for it and by its concrete working out, not rejected thoughtlessly, nor thoughtlessly accepted.
- ¶58. 1. The concept is the logical underpinning responsible for the 'movement' of things and ideas. Here the concept encompasses all the 'determinations' of a logical sort. They are 'self-movements' in that they both lead into other determinations and also account for the movement of other things. In the latter respect they are like 'souls', since they animate the bodies that they inhabit. Thought-determinations are, however, higher than the soul in that, while the soul merely makes the body alive and enables it to move, conceptual thought constitutes the intellectual and rational core of the mind. 'Representations' (*Vorstellungen*) are ideas with empirical content, either ordinary ideas such as that of a tiger, or pictorial, especially religious, ideas, such as God the Father, standing in for properly conceptual thoughts, such as the absolute Idea. 'Ratiocination' (*Räsonnieren*) is thinking that ignores the intrinsic structure of the subject-matter. 'Material thinking' is too absorbed in the subject-matter, while ratiocination is too remote from it.
- ¶59. 1. The first aspect is considered in ¶59 and the second in ¶60. Hegel's characterization of ratiocination in ¶58 does not entail that it is negative and refutative. Thinking that neglects

the intrinsic nature of the subject-matter might express its freedom by interpreting it in an arbitrary or perverse way rather than by refuting it. But Hegel now introduces a recurrent theme in his account of traditional scepticism, viz. that its refutation of a position does not lead to a new position. Nor does the Socratic elenchus: Socrates refutes various answers to the question ‘What is virtue (courage, piety, etc.)?’ but the refutation of one answer does not give rise to the next answer, let alone the *correct* answer. Hence the sceptic (or Socrates) has to look elsewhere for another position to consider and refute; it does not automatically emerge from the remnants of the position previously negated. The ratiocinator is therefore an ‘empty I’, with no accumulated knowledge or beliefs of his own, but simply refuting the putative knowledge of others. Socrates claims to know nothing himself, but simply refutes his interlocutor’s claim by revealing its inconsistency with the interlocutor’s other beliefs. Hegel probably also has in mind such romantics as Friedrich von Schlegel, who acknowledged a debt to Socrates’s ‘irony’, or ‘feigned ignorance’: cf. Hegel (1993), pp.69ff. ‘Vanity’, *Eitelkeit*, from *eitel*, ‘vain’, here combines the meanings of ‘excessive pride, futility/failure, emptiness’.

Hegel differs in two respects. First, the negation of one term—such as a thought-determination, an aspect of nature, or, in PS, a shape of consciousness—leads directly into another term. Secondly, the first term is not simply rejected and entirely replaced by its successor. It is ‘sublated’, that is, retained and elevated, as well as negated: it is both incorporated into its successor and retained in the overall system of nature, logic, shapes of consciousness, or whatever. Hence the philosophizing I, Hegel and his readers, is not an empty I, but accumulates, and deploys, progressively richer knowledge.

- ¶60. 1. Hegel now turns to the second aspect of ratiocination heralded in ¶59. The difficulty of ¶60 is alleviated by what follows, especially by the examples in ¶62: ‘God is Being’ and ‘The actual is the universal’. The former is a ‘mixture’ of representations and thoughts, since ‘God’ is a representation, while ‘Being’ is a thought; the second consists of thoughts only. The reference to the ‘Idea’ is relatively unspecific, but it may point to the account of ‘scientific method’ in ¶¶56 and 57. One difficulty is that Hegel uses the word ‘subject’ to mean both the thinking subject, the ‘Self’, and the grammatical and/or logical subject of predication: cf. ¶17. This is more than a simple confusion. In an ordinary subject-predicate proposition such as ‘God is worshipped by many’ or ‘The cat is black’, the grammatical subject, God, the cat (or ‘God’, ‘the cat’) is fixed and stable. It is not sublated into the predicate (term), since the predicate does not exhaust the subject and is not identical with it, not even partially, because the predicate is a universal that applies to other entities too. Because of this disparity between the grammatical subject and its predicate, the thinking subject (the ‘second subject’), basing itself on the fixed grammatical subject (the ‘first subject’), goes beyond the predicate and decides what further predicates to ascribe to it. This second subject is the ‘nexus’ binding together the first subject with its predicates. By contrast, in a conceptual or essential identity proposition, such as ‘God is Being’, Being is the substance or essence of the first subject, and so the second subject cannot go beyond it, since no further predicates of the same kind can be assigned to the first subject. Moreover, the second subject does not even have a firm foothold for its movement between the subject and its predicate, since the first subject is no longer fixed and stable, but is sublated in its predicate. There may be a grammatical nexus between the word ‘God’ and the word ‘Being’, but there is no nexus between God and Being: God simply is Being, and the representation of God has ‘become’ the thought of Being. The ratiocination of the second subject is not required to effect this movement. Instead of operating freely, ‘for itself’ or by itself, it simply has to go along, ‘cooperate’, with the intrinsic movement of the concept and its content. The two subjects, the knowing and the grammatical subject, thus converge.

¶61. 1. In a proposition such as ‘The cat is black’, the subject is distinct from the predicate. The cat is not identical with blackness, since blackness applies to other things too, the cat has other properties apart from blackness, and it could be or become some other colour while remaining the same cat. Hence the cat is not even identical with the trope, *its* blackness, the particular blackness of this particular cat that does not belong to anything else. The proposition ‘God is Being’ *seems* to have the same logical structure as ‘The cat is black’, as if God is distinct from Being in the way that the cat is distinct from blackness. But this ‘formal’ appearance is delusive. God is not distinct from Being in this way. Some of Hegel’s claims about the proposition ‘God is Being’ would also apply to such an identity proposition as ‘Tully is Cicero’, except that the latter claim is not reductive: Tully is not sublated in Cicero, he exists just as fully as Cicero. By contrast, identity propositions such as ‘Dame Edna Everage is Barry Humphries’, ‘Ali G is Sacha Baron Cohen’, or ‘Flying saucers are lenticular clouds’ are reductive. They entail that Dame Edna Everage, Ali G, and flying saucers do not (really) exist. Reductive identity statements are not reversible *salva veritate*: while it is true that Dame Edna Everage is Barry Humphries, it is not true that Barry Humphries is Dame Edna Everage, not at least in the sense in which it is equivalent to saying ‘Barry Humphries is just (only, nothing more than) Dame Edna Everage’, implying that Barry Humphries does not (really) exist or is not a real person. ‘God is Being’, as Hegel understands it, shares some, but not all, of the properties of both these types of identity proposition. On the one hand, it is somewhat reductive, yet on the other hand it does not entail ‘God does not exist’. It looks as if it should be reversible *salva veritate*: if God is Being, then Being is God. On the other hand, Hegel clearly does not think that ‘Being is God’ has the same force as ‘God is Being’. To say ‘Being is God’ is to move in the wrong direction. We might compare ‘Tully is Cicero’ as said to someone who knows who Cicero is but not who Tully is. Unless a special stress is placed on the word ‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero is Tully’ is not the appropriate answer to his query. A better analogy might be the Frege-Russell definition of, say, the number 3 as the class of all classes containing exactly 3 members. The identity proposition to which this gives rise (‘The number 3 is the class of all classes, etc.’) is reversible *salva veritate*, but again the reversal (‘The class of all classes . . . is the number 3’) moves in the wrong direction.

The propositional form suggests that God and Being are distinct, like the cat and blackness. This suggestion is foiled by the ‘unity of the concept’, the unity of God and Being. In the ‘philosophical proposition’ the ‘subject’ and the ‘predicate’ are identical, but this does not eliminate the ‘difference’ between them. The proposition does not express a trivial identity, such as ‘God is God’ or, indeed, simply ‘God’, in which no ‘movement’ occurs at all. God and Being are different, despite their identity. (Yovel, 2005, p.183, says: ‘The predicates must have distinctive differences which add specificity and filling to the subject, rather than simply repeating it in general terms (as in “God is Being”).’ Hegel does believe ‘God is Being’ to be an impoverished account of God, which needs ‘specificity and filling’. But he is not saying this here. His point is that God and Being *do* have the required difference.) In expressing the difference between God and Being the propositional form plays a vital service. ‘God is Being’ looks like a subject-predicate proposition, which conveys the difference between God and Being, though not their identity, whereas ‘God is God’ or simply ‘God’, do not look like propositions at all. It is therefore the tension and interplay between the propositional form and the speculative content that gives rise to the ‘speculative proposition’. Since the quasi-predicate, ‘Being’, expresses the substance, and the subject, ‘God’, ‘falls into the universal’ (i.e. is or becomes universal, though not the sort of universal that applies to several things), they form a ‘unity’ or ‘harmony’ (like a pleasing combination of musical sounds) rather than a sheer identity.

‘Metre’ is a regular pattern of syllables in poetry. ‘Accent’ is the stress placed on some syllables, but not others. There may be ‘conflict’ between metre and accent, if the number

and length of syllables in a line, and the pattern of accentuation in a line give different ways of determining the rhythm. Hegel's preferred rhythm is the accentual-syllabic, where the syllables and the accentuation harmonize. Analogously, there is a conflict between the propositional form ('accent'), which expresses the difference between God and Being, and the content of the proposition, which involves their identity ('metre'). This conflict gives rise to a harmony between God and Being.

- ¶62. 1. Hegel uses italics to insist that in 'God is Being', the predicate, 'Being [*das Sein*]', is a singular, not a universal term, hence that the proposition is an identity statement. Because of this, ratiocination cannot exercise its freedom in going beyond the predicate in search of further predicates; it has to focus on Being. 'God' expresses a pictorial representation rather than a thought; hence 'God is Being' is a 'metaphysical definition of God', which expresses 'his nature in thoughts' (*Enc. I*, ¶85). By contrast, 'the actual' and 'the universal' both express thoughts; hence 'The actual is the universal' is a proposition within logic, not a linkage between logic and representations. My use of capital letters reflects Hegel's distinction between '*das Wirkliche ist das Allgemeine*' and '*das Wirkliche ist allgemein*', the latter being an ordinary subject-predicate proposition, while the former is a speculative proposition.
- ¶63. 1. Hegel underrates the difficulty of his language. Identity statements such as 'Tully is Cicero', 'Water is H₂O', or 'Jehovah is God', do not present the same, or as much, difficulty as 'God is Being' and 'The actual is the universal'. In explaining the 'philosophical proposition' he plays with the words '*Meinung*' ('opinion') and '*meinen*', which means both 'opine, think, believe' and 'mean, intend, mean to say'.
- ¶64. 1. On this difficulty, see ¶66. Hegel says that it should be avoided, but he does not claim to have done so, and the subjunctives in the second sentence suggest that he has not. Plastic is stuff that can be moulded. It can be stretched, bent, or squeezed into a different shape while remaining the same substance. This seems an appropriate way of describing what happens to God when he is equated with Being.
- ¶65. 1. Hegel's concession to 'non-speculative' thinking is a prelude to his further move away from it. We must not rest content with such a proposition as 'God is Being' or 'The actual is the universal', relying on the internal 'inhibition' to interpret the sentence, nor appeal to 'inner intuition' to certify its truth. Nor, again, are we to prove or demonstrate the proposition by deducing it from premises. The 'return of the concept into itself' must be 'presented'. *Enc. I*, ¶17 expands on this: instead of going back to the rear and proving the proposition from supposed first premises, we are to go forwards, deriving further propositions from our starting-point (such as 'God is Being'); then, the 'first act' will circle back on itself and 'make itself into the result, . . . in which it reaches its beginning again and returns into itself'; the 'concept of the Science and therefore the first concept . . . must be grasped by the Science itself', which thus arrives at the 'Concept of its concept and . . . at its return [into itself] . . .'. (Cf. T.S. Eliot: 'The token that a philosophy is true is, I think, the fact that it brings us to the exact point from where we started'.) Another idea is that this progressive movement does not involve a series of propositions, not at least of subject-predicate propositions. For the subject, whether it be God or the absolute, is not a substratum that has a character of its own, independently of the predicate; what God or the absolute is is known only through the predicate and all the content of the proposition thus falls into the predicate. Hence 'the propositional form, as well as the subject [of the proposition], is something completely superfluous' (*Enc. I*, ¶31. Cf. ¶85). So Hegel, in his *Logic*, goes forward, proceeding from Being to nothing and from there to becoming, not by way of such propositions as 'God/the absolute is nothing/becoming', but by claims such as '[P]ure Being is . . . nothing' (*Enc. I*, ¶87), '[N]othing . . . is the same as Being', and '[T]he truth of Being and nothing alike is the unity of both of them; this unity is becoming' (*Enc. I*, ¶88). These look much like propositions, though not propositions of the same type as 'God/the

absolute is Being', let alone 'The cat is black'. Nevertheless, Hegel's idea is that the essential elements in this progression are the 'thought-determinations', Being, nothing, becoming, etc.—or, in PS, the 'shapes of consciousness'. The other words in the sentences in which they figure are simply the explanatory framework, explaining in particular why each thought-determination moves on into the next. 'The true is the subject', not in the sense of 'subject' in which it is correlative with a predicate, but in the sense of the subject of activity, as in ¶¶17 and 18.

¶66. 1. Hegel has mentioned only one difficulty in the vicinity of this paragraph, viz. 'mixing together the speculative mode and the ratiocinative mode, when what is said of the subject at one time has the meaning of its concept, while at another time it has only the meaning of its predicate or accidental property' (¶64). One would be mixing genres in this way, if one said, e.g., 'God is Being' and 'God is worshipped'; the former expresses the essence or 'concept' of God, while the latter predicates of it a property that it shares with other things. However, in ¶66 Hegel mentions only the occurrence of propositions, not specifically subject-predicate propositions. Hence it is unclear whether the difficulty involves his use of propositions in general, including identity statements such as 'Being is nothing' or whether it concerns only subject-predicate propositions. To compound the problem, his comparison with 'ordinary proof' concerns a different difficulty altogether, the infinite regress threatened by the procedure of 'grounding' and 'conditioning'—an 'external cognition' that ignores the natural rhythm of the subject-matter. However, the point of this comparison is simply that both difficulties—the need to ground a proposition and Hegel's need to use propositions at all—keep cropping up.

In his account of the 'dialectical movement', Hegel uses the word 'subject' in at least two ways. In its first and third occurrences it designates the 'pure subject', the active subject that keeps on the move, continually unfolding its essence; in its second occurrence it designates the 'underlying' or 'static' subject, which retains its meaning throughout a variety of predications. The pure subject is designated by a 'name as name'. A 'name' usually involves two features. First, it refers to or identifies something, whether an individual or a species. Secondly, it achieves this identification by means of a 'content' or an explicit or implicit characterization of the item referred to. A 'name as name' is a name with only the first of these features, not the second: it identifies something without presupposing or implying that it has any definite characteristics. The word 'I' is of this sort, since its use identifies the Self without presupposing or implying anything else about him (or her or it), apart from a capacity to use the word 'I'. The word 'God' is a name, but an 'authentic name', not a 'name as name', since it carries too much representational and 'edifying' baggage with it. If the word 'God' does involve a 'concept', it does not do so 'immediately' but only in such a way that it needs to be unearthed from the representational trappings. Hegel seems to admit only two types of term into Logic: first, dummy subjects designating the 'pure subject' or 'the empty unconceptual One [*das leere begrifflose Eins*]', somewhat like 'It' in 'It is raining', and secondly, terms that immediately indicate concepts, such as 'Being', etc. It is mildly disconcerting to find 'the One [*das Eine*]' and 'subject' occurring in both these lists. If this is not to be explained by the difference between '*Eins*' and '*Eine*', and between a 'subject' and a 'pure subject', it might be explained in terms of the distinction between 'use' and 'mention': the 'It' in 'It's raining' or terms used to designate the pure subject or the unconceptual One do not involve a concept, but the concept of the 'weather "it"' is a perfectly good concept, and so is the concept of the subject and that of the unconceptual One. But 'speculative' truths about God are marred by having a static rather than a conceptual content. Hegel often prefers to speak of 'the absolute' rather than 'God', and he sometimes presents the various stages of the 'logical Idea' as progressively more adequate definitions of the absolute, especially at significant turning-points in the Logic. In *Enc. I*, the

absolute is successively defined as Being (§85ff.), problematically as pure quantity (§99), as essence (§112), as the concept (§160 Z), as the syllogism (§181), as the object (§194 Z), and finally as the Idea (§213). However, most of the propositions of Logic dispense with a dummy subject. 'Being is nothing', for example, or 'The actual is the universal' have no explicit dummy subject.

- ¶67. 1. This returns to the 'inner intuition' mentioned in §65, etc., which clearly requires no philosophical training (though inferences from this 'foundation' may well do so). On the comparison of philosophy with crafts, see also *Enc. I*, §5. The difference between a craft such as shoe-making and philosophy to which Hegel obliquely alludes is that one needs special training in order to make shoes, but not in order to assess them, whereas special training is required both for philosophizing and for evaluating philosophy. Hegel's own philosophical training was deficient, albeit supplemented by genius and wide reading. There was a good logician at the Tübingen theological seminary he attended (1788–1793)—Gottfried Ploucquet (1716–1790)—but a recent heart attack prevented him from lecturing. Cf. Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, §10: 'One need merely say "Tübingen Stift" to understand what German philosophy is at bottom—an insidious theology'.

Philosophizing requires not only training, but 'information' (*Kenntnissen*), since philosophy is not the purely formal discipline it is often taken to be, but also provides the rational or conceptual basis for the other sciences. In *Enc. I*, §16, Hegel explains that philosophy 'forms one science, but it can also be considered as a whole made up of several particular sciences', not as a mere 'aggregate' put together 'contingently and empirically', as they are in ordinary encyclopaedias, and excluding mere aggregates of information, such as possibly philology and certainly heraldry. But other sciences, such as jurisprudence, fiscal policy, natural history, geography, medicine, and history itself, all fall within the scope of philosophy, as far as their 'rational beginning' is concerned. Sooner or later, however, these sciences lapse into contingency. Precise decisions need to be made in jurisprudence and fiscal policy that can only be based on 'grounds' or reasons (*Gründe*), not on 'reason' (*Vernunft*) or the concept. Nature eventually disperses into 'isolated contingencies' and so too does history. But their rational foundation is enough to give them life, spirit, and truth. Hegel's denial of a sharp distinction between philosophy and science helps to account for his use of the word 'science' for philosophy. Cf. PS §56.

- ¶68. 1. Education (*Bildung*) involves not only the education of the individual philosopher, but also the historical development of philosophy and other disciplines in which the individual must immerse himself before he can produce 'genuine' philosophy: see e.g. §2. Hegel considers two alternatives to it: 'common sense', which is 'common' to most people, and 'genius', which is the preserve of a few. They have in common that neither, supposedly, requires any special education, and so they both qualify as 'natural' philosophizing. He turns to common sense in §69. §68 and focuses on genius, which includes the 'immediate revelation of the divine'. Kant wrote: 'Genius is a talent for producing something for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition consisting of a skill for something that can be learned by following some rule or other' (*Critique of Judgement*, §46). For Kant it remained an aesthetic concept, applicable to artists who had imaginative and intuitive access to aesthetic 'Ideas', but not e.g. to scientists, who are regarded as following rules. Genius displaced 'taste' as the source and criterion of aesthetic merit, especially in the *Sturm und Drang*, and later the romantic movements. Both were in revolt against the rationalism of the enlightenment. See also Hegel (1993), pp.69ff. Schelling, as a close associate of the late 18th-century romantics, linked art with genius and made such declarations as that 'art is paramount to the philosopher, precisely because it opens to him, as it were, the holy of holies, where burns in eternal and original unity, as if in a single flame, that which in nature and history is rent asunder, and in life and action, no less than in thought, must forever fly apart' (Schelling, 1978, p.231).

¶69. 1. Hegel now turns to the common sense philosophy mentioned in ¶68. Among others, he has in mind Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770–1842), whom he attacked during his Jena period in the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* that he edited with Schelling. In the Introduction to the journal, Hegel wrote: ‘Philosophy is, by its very nature, something esoteric, neither made for the vulgar as it stands, nor capable of being got up to suit the vulgar taste; it only is philosophy in virtue of being directly opposed to the understanding and hence even more opposed to healthy common sense, under which label we understand the limitedness in space and time of a race of men; in its relationship to common sense the world of philosophy is in and for itself an inverted world’ (Di Giovanni and Harris, 1985, pp.282f.) His limitation of common sense to a particular time and place suggests that he is aware of the variability of common sense, but he overlooks the difference between common sense itself and a sophisticated defence of common sense, which need not be as naive as common sense itself. Kant himself, despite his criticisms of Thomas Reid, etc., aligned himself with common sense in his ‘open letter’ of 1799 against Fichte: ‘the Critique . . . is to be understood exclusively from the point of view of common sense, which only needs to be sufficiently cultivated for such abstract investigations’ (ibid., p.293). Common sense philosophy was especially associated with the Scottish philosophers, Thomas Reid (1710–1796), James Oswald (1703–1793), and James Beattie (1735–1803), whose works were translated into German by the mid-18th century. Reid appealed to sound ‘common sense’, even to the opinions of the ‘vulgar’, against such philosophical innovations as the ‘way of ideas’ that began with Locke and culminated in Hume’s scepticism. Reid’s *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785) was reviewed more favourably than Kant’s CPR by Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740–1821), who called Reid’s work ‘one of the most important products of speculative philosophy’. In return Kant, in his *Prolegomena*, attacked Reid, Beattie, and Oswald for their misunderstanding of Hume. Hegel’s objections to common sense philosophy are less than decisive: (1) If the doctrines defended by the philosopher are indeed generally accepted by commonsensical people, then they are in some sense ‘trivial’ and ‘insignificant’. The ‘effort of advancing’ such truths may be worthwhile, however, if, first, they have been disputed, plausibly, if not conclusively, by other philosophers, and, secondly, if the reader is not self-consciously aware of his commonsensical beliefs, and especially if he is inclined to accept the plausible attacks on them. It may come as a surprise to a reader of Locke to learn from Reid that the ordinary person really believes that he perceives objects directly, that he has believed this all along, and that his belief is tenable. (2) The common sense philosopher does hold that the beliefs he espouses are for the most part tacitly accepted by mankind. Hegel is also right to say that the ‘opposed truths’, e.g. that we directly perceive only ideas, etc., can also be ‘disclosed’ within commonsensical consciousness: otherwise the sceptic’s arguments would lack force for common sense consciousness. But he is wrong to imply that the appeal to common sense is the common sense philosopher’s only defence of his beliefs. Reid’s approach is two-pronged. He attempts to dismantle the sceptic’s arguments, hoping for victory, but in the case of a draw, common sense wins. (3) Common sense beliefs are for the most part held tacitly, located in the ‘heart’ or ‘feeling’ rather than rationally worked out. This does not entail that they are false, but—as Hegel says—they should be brought into the light of day. This, however, is surely what the common sense philosopher does. Making the beliefs explicit and defending them against sceptical attacks is not to leave them in the dark; to believe something after a sophisticated defence of it is an achievement of ‘cultivated reason’, and not the same as believing it unthinkingly. (4) It is not true that the common sense philosopher has nothing to say to his opponents. At the very least he can say, as G.E. Moore did, in ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, that no philosophical argument could be more certain than his common sense conviction that e.g. he has two hands. He can also pick holes in the argument itself as well as doubting its soundness in general.

A common sense philosopher is no more debarred from communicating with others and seeking agreement with them than any other philosopher. In fact it is not obvious that the existence of humanity requires as much 'agreement' as Hegel suggests. (5) The appeal to common sense alone, however, is not universally valid. At one time it was only common sense that the earth was flat, and in Reid's day the existence of God was a matter of common sense. The appeal to common sense needs at least an additional criticism of sceptical arguments if it is to have force. (6) It is not obvious that Hegel's own philosophy is wholly opposed to common sense. He often appeals to the wisdom stored up in ordinary language: 'The forms of thought are first set out and stored in human language . . . So much is logic *natural* to the human being, is indeed his very *nature*. . . [T]he German language has many advantages over other modern languages, for many of its words also have peculiarity of carrying, not just different meanings, but opposite ones, and in this one cannot fail to recognize the language's speculative spirit' (SL, p.12). Again, he often appeals to the affinity between his own idealism and religion: 'This applies to philosophy just as much as to religion, for religion also . . . will not admit finitude as a true being, an ultimate, an absolute, or as something non-positated, uncreated, eternal' (SL, p.124. Cf. SL, pp.508, 528). In PS itself he is far more respectful of ordinary morality and of ordinary religion than he is of attempts to justify and refine them by philosophers and theologians inspired by understanding rather than reason. Hegel intended to arrive at this view of such matters that was in accord with the common sense of his day, but took a very un-commonsensual and roundabout route to get there. His achievement is not so much to dispose of common sense, but to unearth the logical complexity underpinning common sense. See also ¶131.

¶70. 1. The original 'royal road' was constructed from Susa to Sardis by Darius the Great in the 5th century B.C. to expedite transport across the Persian Empire. In his *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements*, 68, Proclus says that when Euclid was asked if there was no shorter route to geometry than through the *Elements*, he replied that there was no royal road to geometry.

2. The 'empyrean' was the highest region of heaven, believed in Graeco-Roman times to contain pure fire or light and regarded by some Christians as the abode of God.

3. Hegel again attacks the two approaches to philosophy introduced in ¶68, each of which seeks a royal road to philosophy. As Yovel (2005), p.193, notes, Hegel exploits the ambiguity *gemein* ('common', i.e. 'ordinary, vulgar', but also 'shared, common to all') and *ungemein* ('uncommon', i.e. 'extraordinary, not vulgar', but also 'not shared in common'). Common sense is common or 'ordinary', i.e. vulgar, while intuitive flashes of genius are uncommon or 'extraordinary', i.e. not common to all.

It is clear enough why there is no royal road to geometry. Euclidean geometry begins with axioms and postulates. But unlike a journey along Darius's royal road, it does not simply aim to reach a certain single conclusion or theorem from this starting-point. There are many theorems, arranged in a single logical framework, each established by a rigorous proof, ultimately based on the axioms and postulates. For the purposes of an architect it may be enough to know only one, or several, of the theorems, ignoring the proofs and the logical order of the theorems. But that will not make him a geometer, only an architect. *Mutatis mutandis* the same is true of Hegelian 'science', or indeed of any science. It is not simply the result that matters, but the way in which it is reached and the way in which it coheres with other results. This applies especially to the common sense philosophy. If Reid had listed only a series of commonsensual truths, such as 'There is a world external to ourselves and it is roughly as we suppose it to be', his work would be trivial. It is his arguments for such truths and his rebuttal of arguments against them that makes it worthwhile. This applies even more so to Hegel, believing as he did that concepts, shapes of consciousness, and

aspects of the world form an orderly system such that our understanding of any one stage presupposes our understanding of its predecessors.

¶71. 1. In his dialogues Plato often illustrated the philosophical arguments (*logos*) of his interlocutors with a myth (*muthos*), often, though not invariably, a myth about the fate of the soul after death. Because these myths are pictorial and go beyond anything that could be established by rational argument, Hegel regards them as ‘scientifically worthless’. However, they were valued by Neoplatonists such as Proclus, who produced elaborate allegorical accounts of some of Plato’s myths. Hegel may also have had in mind such romantics as Friedrich Schlegel, who hoped for the creation of a ‘new mythology’ as a remedy for Germany’s cultural ills and said that ‘Plato’s philosophy is a dignified preface to future religion’. In an age when myths are preferred to conceptual thought, Hegel’s work is unlikely to appeal to many readers. However, there have been other ages when conceptual thought, as it is found in Aristotle and in Plato’s *Parmenides* (a dialogue of immense difficulty but lacking in myth) were appreciated, especially by Proclus (412–485 AD), who wrote a commentary on the *Parmenides*, as well as on others of Plato’s works. Proclus might well be accused of ‘enthusiasm’ (*Schwärmerei*), given his interest in the theology of the Orphic and Chaldean oracles and his practice of theurgy. Hegel is hard put to it to distinguish the ‘enthusiasm’ and ‘ecstasy’ he condemns in ¶7—in philosophers such as Schelling who were themselves influenced by Neoplatonism—from the ‘misunderstood’ ecstasy that is the ‘pure concept’. The Greek word *ekstasis*, literally ‘standing outside (oneself)’, was applied to any abrupt change of emotion or mood, as in being ‘beside oneself’ with joy, etc. However, it was later applied by Philo, etc. to religious experience, and by Plotinus to the mystical return of the Self to the One from which the world has descended. Hence Hegel regards genuine ecstasy as self-transcendence or absorption in conceptual thought.

2. Cf. Matthew 8:22.

3. Cf. Acts 5:9.

¶72. 1. In former times, a single individual, such as Plato or Aristotle, could master almost all significant knowledge and make significant contributions to several spheres. Now that immensely more knowledge has been accumulated, the role of any single individual is less significant. This suggests that Hegel is presenting himself as a narrow specialist, which of course he was not. His role is rather that of an encyclopaedic generalist, presenting the achievements of others—past philosophies, shapes of consciousness, general concepts, etc.—in a logically rigorous system. This is one reason why the individual Hegel must ‘forget’ himself: he is just putting the finishing touches on an edifice built by many hands. The other is that a scientist, unlike, say, a poet, is simply following the intrinsic grain of his subject-matter.

Introduction

¶73. 1. The implicit completion of this thought is given at the end of the sentence: ‘we shall get hold of clouds of error, etc.’

2. The ‘absolute’ is equivalent to ‘what in truth is’ and to ‘that which is in itself’, i.e. independently of its being cognized by us. Here it carries no peculiarly Hegelian presuppositions, but alludes obliquely to Kant’s ‘things in themselves’, as does the idea that our ‘cognition’ or cognitive equipment is an instrument or medium. (Cf. *Enc.* I, ¶10.) If cognition is an instrument or medium, it is reasonable to wonder whether it distorts our vision of the absolute, but not to conclude that it inevitably does so. An instrument or medium need not alter or distort the object to which it is applied: spectacles do not distort our vision, but enhance it. However, we cannot know whether such distortion has occurred,

since we cannot remove our cognitive equipment to compare its findings with the object as it is 'in itself'. The instrument-hypothesis and the medium-hypothesis may correspond respectively to Kant's view of the understanding as an active faculty that imposes concepts on our sensory input and to his view of sensibility as a passive faculty that receives sensory input through the media of space and time. But this distinction is of little importance here. In either case the anxiety (or 'conviction') is that cognition distorts reality, like a camera that produces distorted photographs.

Kant offered no prospect of gaining access to the absolute by removing the distortion. This idea was proposed in Johann Heinrich Lambert's *New Organon, or Thoughts on the Investigation and Designation of the Truth and its Discrimination from Error and Illusion* (1764). In a section entitled 'Phänomenologie' Lambert aimed to 'avoid semblance (*Schein*) in order to penetrate to the truth'. Optics discovers laws of perspective enabling us to determine a thing's nature from its visual appearance. This procedure can be extended to other appearances: sensory, psychological, moral, and 'the probable'. Phenomenology is a 'transcendent optics' which discovers the 'transcendent perspective' by which each type of semblance is related to the truth, thus enabling us to determine the truth from the semblance and acquire a complete system of 'scientific cognition'. Hegel objects that we cannot remove the distortion, the contribution of the instrument or the medium, without removing cognition altogether. This is problematic. It is easy to subtract *mentally* the perspectival distortions of paintings and photos. But we can do so only because we have, in general, *direct* access to objects and can compare them with their pictures. If our cognition gives rise to *global* distortion, then we cannot compare our 'representations' with the objects themselves to discover the laws of its 'refraction' and allow for any distortion.

The correction of a distortion in our cognition also presupposes that we have an *undistorted* view of the distorted 'representation' of the absolute and can form the undistorted thought that, say, the absolute is not spatio-temporal, even though our representations portray it as such. Our knowledge of our representations, and our thoughts, must remain free of distortion. But why should they be, if in other respects our cognition is unreliable? This problem is connected with Hegel's claim, in §74, that this scepticism 'presupposes... a distinction between ourselves and this cognition'.

§74. 1. If our cognition is wholly unreliable, then our belief that it is unreliable is also unreliable, since this belief is itself a product of it: cf. Hume, *Enquiries* I, §116. The scepticism Hegel is attacking makes controversial assumptions. First, the '*representations*' of cognition as an instrument or a medium are not the only, or the obvious, way of viewing cognition. Secondly, these representations entail that I am distinct from my cognition, as a photographer is distinct both from the camera and the photos. Thirdly, cognition is separated from the absolute, as the camera and photos are distinct from the objects photographed. Hegel explicitly criticizes only the third of these. He may mean that since cognition is 'real', it must (like everything else) be an offshoot of the absolute. This does not entail that cognition is true or veridical. If Hegel suggests otherwise, he perhaps exploits the ambiguity 'true' (*wahr*) and 'genuine' (*wahrhaft*), which can mean 'real, genuine' as well as 'veridical, correct', as in 'He truly believes that the earth is flat'. Illusions and errors, insofar as they are real, are also offshoots of the absolute, but that does not make them veridical. But see also §75.

§75. 1. The 'conclusion' is the claim that his opponents have a 'fear of truth', that they have given up on truth and settle for a satisfying fiction. They reply that they allow for a distinction between truth and falsity within the realm of appearances. The Kantian or transcendental idealist affirms the truth of the proposition that the earth revolves around the sun, despite the fact that the sun and the earth, like everything else of which we have knowledge, are appearances, not things in themselves. The dependence of appearances on

human cognitive equipment (especially space and time) does not mean that they are merely illusions: see *CPR*, B69: 'When I say that the intuition of our objects and the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear [*erscheint*], I do not mean to say that these objects are a mere illusion [*Schein*].' Compare the way in which within fiction we can distinguish true statements, such as 'Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe', from false ones, such as 'Sherlock Holmes is a non-smoker'. Whatever the merits of transcendental idealism, however, Hegel does not accept it without more ado.

¶76. 1. Hegel considers four alternatives: (1) To accept that cognition is cut off from the absolute (Kant). (2) To 'struggle for answers' within the terms of the problem itself (e.g. Lambert). (3) To disarm the problem by dismantling its confusions and obscurities. (4) To ignore the problem and proceed with 'science', in the hope that this will dispel it. Hegel rejects (1) and (2), but it is not clear which of (3) and (4) he favours. In *PS* he toys with (3): he examines the notion of the absolute in VI.B.II.a, 'The struggle of enlightenment with superstition'. But examination of such notions in *PS* is for the most part oblique. It is conducted explicitly in *Logic*, which is a part of science proper, so that (3) converges with (4). However, procedure (4) faces the problem of equipollence—roughly, that if I say that *p* and you say that not-*p*, it is only my word against yours and your word against mine. In developing science we are confronted by its spurious rivals, 'untrue knowledge'. How are we to establish the superiority of science over its competitors? It is no use simply confronting them with science in its finished form. This would be to pull rank on them, appealing to the sheer 'Being' of science; the rivals can do the same. Hegel's response is to treat untrue knowledge not as rivals to science, but as incipient versions of it. Here he exploits the ambiguity of *erscheinen*, which corresponds closely to that of 'appear': 'to seem' (in potential contrast with reality), 'to come to light, begin to exist', etc. The 'ideas and locutions' opposed to science are only an 'empty appearance [*Erscheinung*] of knowing', i.e. appear to be knowledge but are not really knowledge. When, by contrast, science comes 'on the scene', it is an 'appearance' in the sense of something that puts in an appearance; the contrast here is not with reality, but with the expansion of science 'in its truth', between science on its first appearance and science when it works itself out and justifies itself. When Hegel suggests that untrue knowledge might be called 'its [*viz.* science's] appearing' (*ihr Erscheinen*), this is because untrue knowledge can be regarded as an incipient form of science, its first 'appearance'. Whether we regard untrue knowledge in this way or, alternatively, regard science as the appearance because it appears alongside a rival, the problem is the same: science must shed this 'semblance', *Schein*, a word that unequivocally implies a contrast to reality. If untrue knowledge is regarded as simply an alternative to science, then science might simply reject it. But this does not work, since untrue knowledge can do the same. If untrue knowledge is regarded as an incipient form of science, as 'its appearing', science might appeal to the better 'intimation' in untrue knowledge, which is now called 'cognition', *Erkennen*, albeit not 'genuine' (*wahrhaften*), marking the fact that it is now regarded as an incipient form of science. It is harder to see why this alternative fails, especially since it resembles Hegel's own procedure in *PS*. But this appeal is again to 'a Being', to a claim or a theory that simply happens to have been proposed. There is no guarantee that the theory is a fertile one and that the development of it will yield significant fruit. Moreover, an earlier version of a theory may be better than its successor. It is less clear why Hegel rejects an appeal to a 'form' of itself that is explicitly characterized as 'inferior', etc. He may fear that such an appeal will encourage us to relapse into this inferior mode rather than to develop our theory further, i.e. to advance to science as it is 'in and for itself'. For Hegel has clearly shifted from the view that science is trying to establish its superiority over competitors to the view that science emerges from inferior versions of itself. It is this relegation of rivals of

science to the status of incipient versions of science that licenses Hegel's enterprise, the presentation of 'knowledge as it appears [*des erscheinenden Wissens*]'. The shift is facilitated by the ambiguity of *erscheinen*. Competitors of science are appearances in the sense of illusions, contrasting with reality. Incipient forms of science are appearances in the sense of science on its 'first appearance', contrasting not with 'reality' but with science in its developed form, as it is 'in and for itself'. Hegel's own procedure is not the procedure that he began by criticizing. He does not first present science in its fully fledged form and then try to defend it against its rivals, either by arguing for it and against them, or by appealing to the ways in which they point in the direction of science. He rather exploits procedure (4), as he now interprets it, to justify his own different procedure. Since (4) appeals to intimations of science in other views, these other views are regarded as incipient versions of science. This appeal is illegitimate, but it shows us what we need to do. We should show how science emerges from more primitive modes of thought.

¶77. 1. Three types of knowledge are in play: 'knowledge as it appears', Hegel's 'presentation' of this knowledge, and science. Science, or at least Logic, is 'free' in the sense of self-determining, free of external, especially empirical, constraints. 'Natural consciousness' is not free in this sense. It is also confined, at any given stage, to a particular way of looking at things, to the exclusion of other ways. Science, by contrast, is not so one-sided, but incorporates and surveys all possible ways of looking things. 'Knowledge as it appears', the knowledge that natural consciousness has, is therefore distinct from science. This does not entail that the *presentation* of knowledge as it appears is distinct from science. Hegel and his readers are not confined to a particular viewpoint in the way that natural consciousness is.

The 'soul' (*Seele*) is here roughly equivalent to 'natural consciousness' and carries no special metaphysical baggage. In *Enc. III*, the 'soul' denotes our lower vital and psychological capacities, while 'spirit' (*Geist*) denotes our intellectual and rational capacities. In *Enc. III*, three phases of spirit are distinguished: 'subjective spirit' (the individual mind), 'objective spirit' (our collective social and political life), and 'absolute spirit' (art, religion, and philosophy). This tripartite division does not explicitly occur in PS, where 'spirit' generally covers the realms later assigned to objective and absolute spirit, and excludes the realm of subjective spirit, which, insofar as it figures in PS, is reassigned to the soul. The soul is correspondingly more intellectual than it is in *Enc. III*, since it traverses various 'configurations' (*Gestaltungen*), general ways of looking at things, before it becomes spirit and acquires complete self-knowledge. It remains unclear whether the journey of natural consciousness or the soul is a journey made by human beings over the course of history, a journey made by an individual over the course of its life, or a journey made by Hegel's readers.

¶78. 1. Natural consciousness is the 'concept' of knowledge because it is only potential knowledge, not 'real' or actual, i.e. fully fledged knowledge. (It is similar to 'untrue knowledge' in ¶76, where *unwahr* means 'untrue', in the sense of 'not real', as well as 'incorrect'.) The concept in a seed or in a craftsman's mind still awaits realization. Analogously, knowledge develops from a mere concept into real knowledge, science, and this requires the refutation and replacement of each stage of its growth by another, higher, stage—or, as Hegel sees it, by the self-refutation of an earlier stage and its metamorphosis into a later stage.

Hegel considers three approaches: (1) Ordinary 'doubt' (*Zweifel*), where belief is eventually restored. This is not at issue, since science regards 'knowledge as it appears' as untrue and does not propose to resurrect it. (2) The (enlightenment) 'resolution' to make up one's own mind and accept nothing on authority, i.e. the 'consciousness that gets down to its investigation *right away*': cf. *Enc. I*, ¶38 Remark. This makes little difference, since it need not alter the content of one's opinions, and this will be the same as the untrue content of

'knowledge as it appears', unless the 'education of consciousness . . . to science' is complete. Only then can one find the truth on one's own. (3) The way of doubt in the sense of 'despair' (*Verzweiflung*), in which the supposed truths of 'knowledge as it appears' are unmasked as the 'unrealized concept', not the concept realized. It is a 'self-accomplishing' scepticism, since, in contrast to (2), the sceptical stance is not adopted by an individual external to the opinions under assessment, but by the opinions themselves, whose adherents come to see their intrinsic inadequacy. On scepticism, see also *Enc. I*, ¶39 Remark and ¶81 Addition 2.

¶79. 1. That the series of 'forms of consciousness' is complete, i.e. that no form of consciousness is omitted from Hegel's survey, is supposedly guaranteed as follows. Each form of consciousness is refuted or negated, but this results in a new form of consciousness. Each form of consciousness (except the first and the last) has one, and only one, immediate successor, and one, and only one, immediate predecessor. The forms are thus arranged like the natural numbers: 1, 2, 3, . . . n, except that the series ends in 'absolute knowledge'. In counting, one might of course omit a number, but this cannot happen in the case of forms of consciousness, since each form metamorphoses into its successor of its own accord. This does not exclude the possibility of other forms of consciousness outside the series, or even of a whole series of forms related to each other in this way, but not so related to the forms that Hegel considers. Hegel needs other arguments if he is to exclude this possibility.

Hegel said, in ¶78, that natural consciousness regards its fate as merely negative, when in fact it is positive too. Natural consciousness regards its opinions as true, when in fact they are untrue and their refutation is a necessary step on the way to truth. But the fact that refutation of error is necessary for the discovery of truth does not entail that the refutation of one error automatically generates the next error to be refuted, or the truth itself. So now Hegel adds that the negation of a form of consciousness is positive in that it immediately results in a new form of consciousness not yet negated. To regard a refutation as *only* negative is 'one-sided' and every form of consciousness is one-sided in this way. But the 'knowledge which makes this one-sidedness its essence' is the scepticism considered in ¶¶202–6, which does not regard the upshot of its negation of one position as the emergence of a new position. Hegel's argument for the view that negation is, or can be, determinate is that negation is negation of something determinate and is therefore itself determinate. This does not apply to standard negation. If we negate the determinate proposition 'God is yellow', we obtain the relatively indeterminate proposition, 'God is not yellow' leaving a wide range of possibilities: that God has some other colour, that God is not coloured, or that God does not exist. Our negation does not tell us how to choose among these possibilities. So far, however, we have considered negation simply as a logical operation without regard to our actual negatings or denials. We usually have a reason for our denials and the reason often narrows the range of possible alternatives to the state of affairs denied: e.g. 'God cannot be yellow, because he's obviously white' or 'because God isn't the sort of thing that can have a colour' or 'because God doesn't exist'. Similarly when a philosopher denies the truth of a doctrine, he usually advances some other doctrine in its place, which is determined by his reasons for rejecting the first doctrine. Even a resolute sceptic has a doctrine: refusal to take a definite stance is a definite stance of refusal. However, even if negation is determinate in this sense, this still does not secure the 'necessity' of the progression. A proposition or a doctrine can be denied for a variety of reasons. To establish not only that each form of consciousness necessarily has one, and only one, immediate successor, but also that it could not possibly have a *different* immediate successor, Hegel would need to show that there can be only one reason for negating it.

¶80. 1. Sartre wrote: 'the waiter in the café can not be immediately a café waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell, or the glass is a glass' (p.83). But in ¶2 Hegel compares the succession of philosophies to the growth of a plant, which is quite different from a glass or

an inkwell. So it is not clear why, here, a natural entity cannot go beyond its immediate Being-there. Perhaps it is because a sapling cannot look ahead to what lies beyond its current stage of growth or because an acorn cannot become a beech. Unlike an acorn, consciousness is 'for itself its own *concept*'. Consciousness always has an object, the 'singular' (*dem Einzelnen*). Consciousness itself is not singular in this sense, but universal. It is not essentially restricted to any given object, but can have any one of a range of objects. At any given stage it has a definite object, something 'limited', which fulfils the concept only inadequately, since consciousness is not intrinsically limited. Consciousness is not blinkered, exclusively focused on its current object. It glimpses what lies beyond, if only beyond in space. Its concept impels it beyond its current object.

Its 'goal' is the stage where concept and object 'correspond' to each other and where, therefore, consciousness need not go beyond its object, 'beyond itself', because the object, as well as consciousness, is unlimited. This suggests that the goal is Hegel's own standpoint, from which the whole series of earlier stages can be surveyed, both the forms of consciousness and their limited objects, objects which, collectively, are no longer limited, but cover the whole range of possible objects. But the goal also seems to include Logic, in which the mind confronts the logical structure that is the core of the mind itself, so that there is no longer any disparity between the mind ('concept') and its object.

There are two sophisticated ways of avoiding the conceptually driven advance of consciousness. One is to find everything 'good of its kind', and so to opt for one form of consciousness and stick with it: cf. *Enc. I*, ¶13 on the problem of choosing a philosophy. But to be of one kind among others, i.e. limited, is itself a defect. The other way is to remain vainly, i.e. proudly but emptily, aloof from all forms of consciousness, as does the Romantic ironist, who 'surveys everything, raises himself infinitely above everything conditioned, even above one's own art, virtue or genius' (Schlegel, p.148, translation modified).

¶81. 1. Knowledge as it appears is correct if, and only if, it conforms to the essence or the in-itself. The essence or in-itself is science itself. Hegel here tends to assume that the essence or in-itself is also the 'standard', yardstick or criterion (*Maßstab*), whose application to knowledge as it appears will enable us to tell whether it is correct. (This assumption is mistaken—our criterion for diagnosing measles is not the essence of the disease itself—and Hegel later retracts, or at least qualifies, it.) The problem is that any such a standard will be a 'presupposition', a *Voraussetzung*, something posited 'in advance' (*voraus*) and not as yet justified. Science itself is available to us, or at least to Hegel, independently of its appearances, but it cannot yet justify its claim to be the essence rather than simply another appearance. Hence it cannot be used, without question-begging, as a standard for assessing knowledge as it appears, nor can it certify any other standard we might adopt.

¶82. 1. Consciousness is both distinct from and related ('relates itself') to its object. Consciousness also (the active verbs seem to imply) regards itself as distinct from and related to the object. This relating is 'knowing' (*Wissen*, a word cognate with *Bewusstsein*, 'consciousness'). But 'we' also believe that the object exists outside its relation to consciousness, as the 'in-itself', and this is 'truth', what the object really is independently of its relation to consciousness. 'We' refers not only to Hegel and his readers, but to natural consciousness itself. The final sentence indicates that consciousness itself conceives its object in this way. It has a twofold conception of the object, as it is for consciousness and as it is in itself. These may well differ. Consciousness itself cannot be aware of any particular discrepancy, but it is aware of the *possibility* of a discrepancy.

¶83. 1. The model outlined in ¶82 is now applied to our investigation of knowledge itself. Knowledge has a view of its object that may not accord with the object in itself, the 'truth'. 'We' (now Hegel and his readers) have a view of knowledge that may not accord with knowledge in itself, with the truth 'of' knowledge. But Hegel seems to use the word 'truth'

equivocally. The object of knowledge, say, atoms, is not usually true or false in the way that knowledge or beliefs are. What knowledge aims for is not the truth (or falsity) *of* atoms, but the truth *about* atoms, what atoms really are. Hegel, by contrast, wants to investigate not only the truth *about* knowledge, but the truth *of* knowledge, whether it is true or false. The truth or falsity of knowledge is a part of the truth about knowledge, but not the whole of the truth about it nor is it obviously the ‘essence’ of the knowledge. The ‘standard’ and the ‘essence’ or ‘in-itself’ here diverge: the essence or in-itself is apt for the truth *about* knowledge, a standard is appropriate for the assessment of the truth *of* knowledge. As in the case of first-order consciousness and its object, there may be a discrepancy between second-order knowledge and its object, first-order knowledge. But what worries Hegel is not that we might misconceive the truth *about* knowledge, but that we might wrongly assess the truth *of* knowledge or at least be unable to justify our assessment in the face of knowledge’s own assessment. We have our own standard of assessment, and knowledge may reject it.

- ¶84. 1. The ‘separation’ is between the object itself and the standard in the investigator. The ‘presupposition’ is the investigator’s standard. Both are a ‘semblance’ (*Schein*), because they can be avoided. Consciousness has two conceptions of its object, first as it is for consciousness and secondly as it is in itself. There are two contrasting pairs of terms. First, ‘knowledge’ contrasts with ‘the essence’ or ‘the true’. Secondly, the essence or in-itself of the ‘object’ contrasts with the ‘object as object’, i.e. the object ‘as it is for an other’, viz. for consciousness. There is little difference between the questions: (1) ‘Does knowledge correspond to the essence or the true?’ and (2) ‘Does the object as it is for consciousness correspond to the essence or the in-itself of the object?’ They both amount to (3) ‘Does knowledge correspond to the object as it really is?’ In each of the contrasting pairs, Hegel regards one term as ‘the concept’ and the other as ‘the object’. In the first pair, knowledge is the concept, while the essence is the object, viz. the object in itself, or ‘that which is’. In the second pair, the order is reversed: the object as object is the object, while its essence or in-itself is the concept. So questions (1) and (2) can be rephrased respectively as (1a) ‘Does the concept correspond to the object?’ and (2a) ‘Does the object correspond to its concept?’ These look much like the same question—apart from the direction-of-fit. But Hegel’s superimposition of the object-concept model on (1) and (2) is not pointless and innocuous. (1a) seems to ask whether a concept fits its object in something like the correspondence sense of truth. But this is not all, or even primarily, what Hegel means in calling knowledge the concept. In ¶78, ‘natural consciousness’ is said to be ‘the concept of knowledge’, viz. only potential knowledge, the concept of knowledge in the sense in which an acorn is only the concept of an oak. In ¶80 consciousness is said to be ‘for itself its own concept’, which therefore goes beyond its ‘limited’ object in order to find an object that is adequate to itself. It is initially tempting to take (1) and (1a) as implying: knowledge is the concept of an object, O_1 , and the question is whether this concept corresponds to O_1 as O_1 really is. But according to ¶78, such knowledge is only the concept of knowledge. In order to realize itself as fully fledged knowledge it needs not only to find out what O_1 is really like, but to move on to the next stage, where its object is O_2 , and, according to ¶¶78 and 80, to continue the process until it eventually acquires an object that is no longer limited, but universal and adequate to itself. Each successive object is, like all such objects, limited, but also has an intrinsic defect that can be resolved only by advancing to the next object in the sequence. It is still unclear what standard consciousness uses to detect this defect.
- ¶85. 1. What is to be assessed is the object as it is for knowledge or consciousness. The concept that is the standard is not knowledge, but the essence or in-itself of the object, i.e. the object as it is in itself. So Hegel is here relying on questions (2) and (2a) implicit in ¶84. But two sentences on he gives a different account. Here he seems to have in mind questions (1) and

(1a). What are to be compared now are the ‘object’ and consciousness ‘itself’, which are equated respectively with ‘what to it is the true’ and ‘its knowledge of the true’. If ‘object’ and ‘what to it is the true’ refer to the object as it is for knowledge, then the comparison is futile, since the knowledge and the object as it is for knowledge are made to measure. So the object must be the object in itself and knowledge of the true must be knowledge of this object as it is for consciousness. Then the result of the comparison is not a forgone conclusion. The two items may correspond to each other or they may not. But now Hegel notes that the object as it is in itself is not accessible to us: we cannot get ‘behind the scenes’. In response he insists that consciousness draws a distinction between the object as it is in itself and as it is for consciousness. This is so. But it is hard to see how a significant comparison between them can be made if, as Hegel admits, consciousness cannot get behind the scenes. The mistake is too obvious to be attributed without more ado to Hegel himself. So another interpretation might be this. The object is ‘for’ consciousness in two distinct ways. First, it has a conception of the object as it is known. Secondly, it has a conception of the object as it is in itself, independently of its being known. This second conception is now determinate, not empty. Suppose that consciousness believes that things in themselves consist of atoms too small to be perceived individually. Things as they are known by us, are quite different. They are perceptible, coloured, smelly, noisy, etc. in a way in which (as consciousness here views it) they cannot be in themselves. So consciousness has two (as it were) objects before it and can compare them. The result of the comparison is that the two objects differ. But so what? Why should we suppose that the way things present themselves to us is exactly the way they are in themselves? No doubt atomists need to explain, or at least leave open the possibility of explaining, how things can appear so different to us than they are in themselves and also how, given that this is so, we can nevertheless know, or have good reason to believe, that atomism is true. If it turned out that, if atomism were true, then we could not know it to be true or that, if atomism were true, then objects would not appear to us as they do, then atomism would have to be abandoned.

This suggests that Hegel can appeal to an ambiguity in *Wissen* and ‘knowledge’. They may signify what is known, or alternatively the knowing of it. (Compare ‘The knowledge I have will convict him’ with ‘It happened without my knowledge’.) Our (way of) knowing may be at odds with our conception of the object. When Hegel speaks of testing our knowledge, he may have in mind, not testing what we claim to know, but testing our claim to know it, and thus generating arguments of the form ‘If p, then I/we cannot know that p’. This appears most conspicuously in his account of sensory certainty (§§90–110). Sensory certainty has a determinate view of how objects are in themselves. They are individual. It therefore attempts to pick them out as sheer immediately knowable individuals, with no universal intermediary. It cannot do this, however. The terms it employs (‘this’, ‘here’, ‘now’, etc.) to pick out the supposed individuals turn out to be universal terms and, for this reason, unable to pick out an individual. It also becomes clear from this case that both sides of the equation must be abandoned, immediately knowable individuals, along with the immediate knowing of them. The standard changes along with the knowing.

§86. 1. This is the first occurrence of the word ‘dialectic(al)’ in PS, outside the Preface. As in the Preface, dialectic is associated with movement. The word originated from the Greek for ‘discussion’ or ‘dialogue’, and in Plato’s early works, dialectic essentially involves a dialogue between two or more persons. However, in Plato’s later works, interpersonal dialogue becomes more perfunctory and inessential. Hegelian dialectic does not involve interpersonal dialogue, in particular not a dialogue between Hegel and the shape of consciousness under consideration. If any dialogue is involved it is a dialogue between a shape of consciousness and itself. As Hegel implies, his main point here is not new, but a clarification of what he has said earlier. Consciousness has two objects, the in-itself and the ‘Being-for-

consciousness of this in-itself', i.e. its own knowledge of the in-itself. If this second object is taken simply as the 'reflection of consciousness into itself', then it does not represent an object, but only 'its knowledge' of the first object. Suppose, for example, that the first object is a world of immediately apprehended sensory individuals, then the second object will be my knowledge of (what I know about) a world of immediately apprehended sensory individuals. No correction, no advance, can be made, because there is no tension between the first and the second object; they fit together like a hand and a glove. The tension arises if I realize that my knowledge (my knowing) of such individuals is conducted in universal terms, and therefore conflicts with my original conception of the first object and of the way in which it can be known. Then the second object, my knowing, can take its place as the in-itself, that is, as the first or primary object of the next shape of consciousness. Whether it is fit for this purpose is a distinct question, but at least it is different from the first object: my knowing of X is different from X in a way that my knowledge of X (in the sense of what I know about X) is not different from X.

¶87. 1. On the usual view of experience (cf. ¶79 on traditional scepticism) we discover the falsity of our belief or theory by encountering a different state of affairs with no intrinsic connection with the belief or theory that it falsifies. Nothing is left to consciousness but the 'pure apprehension' of its new object. When, e.g., my conviction that all swans are white is falsified by the black swan I happen to see, I do nothing except 'apprehend' the black swan and realize that it falsifies my previous belief. On Hegel's account, by contrast, the new object is simply our knowledge of the first object. Hegel is mistaken in suggesting that the correctness of his conception is guaranteed by the fact that the falsification and abandonment of a belief is a 'result' of the belief itself. After all, my belief that not all swans are white is, at least in part, the result of my prior belief that all swans are white. But the result of the falsification may leave me with no definite view of the colours that swans might have. I now know that some are white and some are black, but for all I know there may be others that are green, red, and so on. The most that Hegel is entitled to claim is that the result of a falsified belief is itself a definite belief in cases where the falsification stems from a mismatch between my belief and my knowing.

Here, for the first time, Hegel draws the important distinction between what is known by 'us', Hegel and his readers, and what is known by the shape of consciousness under consideration at any given stage. Any given shape of consciousness is aware of its object and of its way of knowing its object. It also becomes aware of the tension between its object and its way of knowing the object, and of the consequent collapse of its object. But it is not aware of the transformation of its object (or rather of its way of knowing this object) into a new object. Equally, the new shape of consciousness that emerges from it is not aware of the manner of its emergence or of the fact that its object has emerged from its predecessor's way of knowing. The knowledge of each shape of consciousness is confined to itself and does not extend to the movement from one shape to another or the engine that drives this movement. This limitation of each shape of consciousness is not based on empirical observation, but on Hegel's stipulative restriction of the intellectual resources of each shape of consciousness. This is essential, if there are to be distinct shapes of consciousness at all. If each shape knew everything that Hegel knows, then it would not be distinct from its successor, since it would know its successor's object as well as its own; it would have to be in possession of much, if not all, of Hegel's philosophical equipment and therefore be close to the end of PS right at the beginning.

The 'necessity' of the sequence of shapes (cf. ¶79) is stronger than deductive necessity in that any given shape, S^n , can be immediately followed only by a particular successor, S^{n+1} , and by no other, whereas a proposition entails any of infinitely many propositions, none of which has priority over the others. It is more like the necessity of the sequence of natural numbers, where, if we begin with 1 and repeatedly apply the operation '+1', each term in the

series is guaranteed to have a specific immediate successor. This does not guarantee the necessity of any temporal or historical sequence. An individual or group that is currently at the stage of, say, sensory certainty, may well remain at this stage or pass on to a different shape than perception, owing to weariness, intellectual deficiency or whatever, just as someone may miscount or stop counting altogether.

¶88. 1. Heidegger (1970) argues that PS is not only an introduction to science for the uninitiated, but is science itself. However, he bases this on his (incorrect) belief that in the Introduction Hegel presupposes the view of the absolute with which he believes PS to conclude: cf. ¶73 and Inwood (2013). Hegel agrees that PS is not only an introduction to science, but science itself. However, he does so for the quite different reason that the transitions from one shape of consciousness to the next are 'necessary'. This does not entail that a glimpse of the absolute, of the conclusion of the whole sequence, is presupposed by Hegel's account of the movement of the sequence. Hegel's conviction that PS is science, as well as an introduction to science, helps to account for its inclusion in *Enc.* III, ¶¶413–39: if PS is science it must appear within the exposition of science. This is facilitated by the new 'introduction' with which Hegel begins his *Encyclopaedia*.

¶89. 1. See also ¶¶77 and 80. Hegel uses 'experience' not in the sense in which it signifies the acquisition of knowledge, or the knowledge acquired, through sense-perception in contrast to reasoning. It has more the flavour of a 'voyage of discovery', the encounter with new places, events, and people. PS has often been compared with a *Bildungsroman*, such as Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, a novel about the formative years of a person in which his character, knowledge, and wisdom develop owing to his experiences. As in ¶79, Hegel claims that his account of consciousness or of spirit will be *complete*, but only in the form of 'shapes of consciousness', not in the form of such abstract concepts as Being, etc. which will constitute the subject-matter of Logic. 'Consciousness' in Hegel's usage, is essentially consciousness of an object which it conceives as distinct from itself. Thus he tends not to regard our thought about abstract concepts as consciousness, since such concepts are not distinct from the thinker. In contrast to 'consciousness' in the narrower sense, in the usage of PS, 'spirit' is collective and interpersonal, 'I that is We, and We that is I' (¶177). It comes into its own in chapter VI, whereas consciousness in the narrower sense is confined to chapters I–III. In a wider sense, however, 'consciousness' also includes the realm of spirit, since it is consciousness that arrives at the culmination of PS. Hegel describes this culmination in various ways:

- (1) Knowledge finds itself and does not need to go beyond itself (¶80).
- (2) The concept and the object correspond to each other (¶80).
- (3) Consciousness is its own concept and it goes beyond what is limited, i.e. beyond itself (¶80).
- (4) Consciousness sheds its alien material, i.e. the object that is conceived as distinct from itself (¶89).
- (5) The appearance becomes equal to the essence and so the presentation of it intersects the authentic 'science of spirit' (viz. the science to which PS is an introduction) at this point (¶89).
- (6) Consciousness grasps this essence of itself and signifies the nature of absolute knowledge (¶89).

According to Hegel's prospectus, PS was to be followed by a work on logic, nature, and mind (*Geist*). It is not clear whether his descriptions of the culmination of PS refer to the Logic alone or to science proper as a whole, in particular the ultimate conclusion of his enterprise, the end of his account of mind, which is an account of philosophy itself. Even when consciousness has shed its alien object (4) and embarked on (or given way to) science proper, the study of logic, nature, and mind, it is still the case that knowledge needs

to 'go beyond itself', since it proceeds through logic, nature, and mind by a dialectic similar to that by which consciousness proceeds through the various shapes of consciousness. It may be, therefore, that when Hegel speaks of the 'goal' in ¶80 he has in mind the ultimate conclusion of his system, where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself (1). But in ¶89 he seems to focus on the transition to logic, since it is in this transition that consciousness sheds its alien object (4). Moreover, he speaks of PS as coinciding with the science of spirit at a certain point (5), a point which is presumably not the final conclusion of science. However, since claim (6) is marked as distinct from claims (4) and (5) by the word 'finally', claim (6) may pertain to the conclusion of the system as a whole. What seems indisputable is that by the end of PS consciousness is, first, no longer 'limited' to a particular object or to a particular shape and that it can range over all the objects and shapes that have appeared in PS, and, secondly, that it is in a position to embark on logic and to consider the abstract concepts that rarely figure explicitly in PS but which underpin its movement.

A. Consciousness

I. Sensory Certainty: *The This and Meaning*

¶90. In the subtitle 'Meaning' translates *das Meinen*, the nominalized infinitive of the verb *meinen*, which means both 'to believe, think, opine' and also 'to mean' in such phrases as 'to mean well' and 'did you really mean it?'. Thus *meinen* and its derivatives might equally well be translated as 'opine, etc.'. But 'mean(ing)' has the advantage of capturing Hegel's pun on the similarity between *mein*, 'my', and *meinen* in ¶100, though the disadvantage of being easily confused with other, quite different senses of 'mean(ing)'. No translation of *meinen*-words can keep pace with Hegel's wordplay. See also ¶63.

1. In this paragraph Hegel makes three claims: (1) Sensory certainty is the immediate, i.e. first, object of the philosopher. (2) Sensory certainty's knowledge is immediate and un-conceptual. (3) The philosopher's account of sensory certainty should be un-conceptual and/or keep conceptualization out of sensory certainty. (1) Does not entail (2). (3) Is ambiguous. It might mean that we should not attribute to sensory certainty a conceptualization that is not available to it. (This applies to all shapes of consciousness: we should describe them as they are, without alteration.) Or it might mean: we should not deploy concepts in our examination of it—a prohibition that Hegel flouts, when he mentions 'Being', the first concept of his Logic.

¶91. 1. Why does consciousness need to individuate singular entities rather than simply gesture towards its surroundings as a whole? It is only when consciousness focuses on a singular entity that it can regard itself as a singular I, distinct from and parallel to, rather than absorbed in, its surroundings. Throughout chapters I–III, the Self is harnessed to a specific type of object, and views itself in terms of its specific type of object. Its conception of itself changes with its conception of its object. The Self and its object play complementary roles, like dancing partners.

¶92. 1. 'Exemplifying by-play' translates '*Beispiel*', which ordinarily means 'example, model', but Hegel exploits its supposed derivation from '*bei*' and '*Spiel*' ('play'). The byplay is the complex 'mediation' from which the simple indexicals emerge.

2. The I and its object are interdependent, i.e. each is mediated by the other.

¶93. 1. But sensory certainty does not regard the I and its object as of equal status. It begins by taking the object to be the essential thing, the active party. The object would exist even if I did not. It would exist even if it were not known by me. I know the object *because of* what the object is; the object is not as it is *because* I know it.

- ¶95. 1. Hegel here conflates 'now' (*jetzt*) as an adverb with 'the Now' (*das Jetzt*) as a noun-phrase. To the question 'What (time) is it now?' an appropriate answer might be 'Now it is night-time'. To the question 'What is the Now?' an appropriate answer would be 'The Now is the present time (or instant)'. A similar conflation occurs in his treatment of 'I', 'this', and 'here'. But Hegel is also intrigued by the deeper, less obviously linguistic, problems about time and the persistent present raised by Aristotle (*Physics*, IV.10–14): see Inwood (1991).
- ¶96. 1. Indexical or demonstrative terms, such as 'this', 'now', 'here', and 'I' may, in appropriate circumstances, be applied to anything, any time, any place, etc., and are in this sense universal. The sense of such a term is dependent on and thus 'mediated' by the variety of its applications. Since indexicals are indispensable for referring to singular entities or individuals, at least in the meagre vocabulary assigned to sensory certainty, singular entities can only be referred to in universal terms.
- ¶97. 1. Here *meinen* and *Meinung* are in play. Hegel does not simply *presuppose* the truthfulness of language. If he were to do that, it would be open to sensory certainty to reply that the fault lies with language, since it is an inadequate vehicle for our 'meaning'. He has tried to establish the truthfulness of language by his experiment with the underlying logic of time in ¶95f. It is unclear, however, what conclusion he draws from this. Here he seems to say that we can never refer to a singular entity. But the most he is entitled to claim is that we cannot refer to a singular entity in the meagre vocabulary at the disposal of sensory certainty.
- ¶98. 1. 'Here', like 'now', is an indexical. There is a sense in which everywhere is here, just as it is always now. But this does not give rise to problems of space and the ubiquitous Here, comparable to those of time and the persisting Now. The problem with 'here' seems more obviously linguistic than the problem with 'now', and therefore less apt for confirming the truthfulness of language.
- ¶99. 1. The upshot of sensory certainty's experience so far is pure Being, an abstraction emerging from the negation and mediation involved in the Now and the Here, rather than the immediate Being that sensory certainty *meant*. Pure Being is the first category of Hegel's Logic, where it is shown to veer into pure Nothing: see *Enc. I*, ¶86f.
- ¶100. 1. Sensory certainty is now driven to reverse the relative positions assigned to knowing and the object in ¶93. The knowing I is now the essential, active party.
- ¶101. 1. This reversal acknowledges all the work done by the I in its attempt to pick out the object, and provides another way of picking it out, viz. by reference to the I itself. Then Hegel notes that 'I' is itself an indexical, applicable to everyone, and so cannot be used to refer to anyone in particular. However, 'I' is different from 'this', 'here', and 'now'. Once we know who is using the word 'this', we still may not know what is referred to. But once we know who is using the word 'I', we know who is referred to. On the peculiarity of 'I', see further Chisholm (1981).
- ¶102. 1. The *I* (or the word 'I') is 'universal' in two distinct ways. First, the I is not inseparably attached to any particular state or object: one and the same I can see a house, a tree, or neither. Secondly, everyone is an I: the word 'I' is applicable by everyone to him- or herself. The first sentence seems to refer to the first type of universality, but Hegel's primary concern is the second. The final sentence refers obliquely to Wilhelm Traugott Krug's challenge to the new idealists to deduce the pen he is writing with: see Di Giovanni and Harris (1985), pp.292–310. The challenge would be illegitimate if it were impossible to refer to Krug's pen, and even for Krug to refer to himself.
- ¶103. 1. The I and the object are now in the same boat. I can only refer to the object by way of referring to myself. And I can refer to myself, if at all, only by referring to something in my vicinity. So the I and the object have to go together, neither more essential than the other.
- ¶104. 1. Sensory certainty now focuses exclusively on the sensory situation of me-here-now, refusing to consider any other I, Here, or Now. The collaboration of all three indexicals

facilitates this: sensory certainty need not turn away from a tree here and now to see a house, since the house will be seen later, not now; it need not consider any other I, since any other I will be not here now, but elsewhere.

- ¶105. 1. Self-certainty is now pointing or showing, rather than speaking the language that got it into trouble earlier. Hegel must assume its own first-person standpoint here and now, not describe its situation later or from somewhere else. Once he has assumed this standpoint, however, the Now must be pointed out to him, so that he can focus on it as well as sensory certainty does.
- ¶106. 1. Hegel is here playing with the cognate words 'gewesen', the past participle of 'sein' ('to be'), hence also 'having been, former, ex-'), and 'Wesen' ('essence', but also a 'being'). The present moment is fleeting and disappears as soon as one points it out.
- ¶107. 1. The momentary Now, first pointed out, has passed or is sublated. But sensory certainty sublates this sublation and insists that it is still Now now. This is because 'now' does not only, or even usually, designate the present instant, but a period of time, of variable length, that includes the present instant but much else besides. Any extended period that counts as Now consists of many shorter Nows, and each of the shorter Nows consists of even shorter Nows, and so on. Hence any Now pointed out is a complex of Nows reduced to simplicity. In ¶¶95f. the Now was universal because any time is now when it is present. Here the Now is universal because the Now or the present is indefinitely expandable and contractable. (This point does not depend on the indexicality of 'now': it is equally true of a 'thing' or 'object' that it consists of many things or objects.)
- ¶108. 1. What is true of the Now also applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Here.
- ¶109. 1. Sensory certainty may be its 'history' (*Geschichte*), but it is clear from this ¶ that Hegel does not associate it with any particular phase of the history of humanity. It is rather an artificial construct, but approximates to an outlook that we, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, are constantly tempted to adopt. Hegel's conclusion here, that sensory things are intrinsically nothing and deserve only to be consumed, goes way beyond his arguments so far, even if we regard these arguments as sound. Our inability to refer to a singular sensory thing has little bearing on the reality of *types* of sensory thing. Wordsworth marvelled at a host of golden daffodils, and no doubt at any other daffodils he came across, not at any singular daffodil in particular; a dog eats a singular bone, but not as *this* bone, only as some bone or other. See also ¶110.
- ¶110. 1. It is unclear what Hegel thinks he has shown. Some of the alternatives, in order of descending strength, are these:
- (1) There are no singular (sensory) entities/Sensory entities are nothing (cf. ¶109).
 - (2) We cannot pick out or refer to a singular entity. (This is implied by our inability to refer to this bit of paper in ¶110.)
 - (3) We cannot pick out or refer to any singular entities using only the limited resources assigned to sensory certainty. (This may be true, but does not account for our inability to refer to this bit of paper.)
 - (4) We, even sensory certainty, can pick out a singular entity, but only by using, among other things, universal terms. (This is quite likely true, but it conflicts with Hegel's disparagement of *Meinung*.)
- (4) Is the most reasonable conclusion to be drawn from Hegel's arguments and it also supplies what he needs to 'sublate' sensory certainty. Its object *in itself* is (conceived as) a set of singular entities. Its knowledge of the object, by contrast, depends on *universals*. So there is a mismatch between the object in itself and the knowledge of it, and this mismatch is present to consciousness. So sensory certainty cannot fulfil its own requirement that its knowledge be immediate, with nothing, let alone anything universal, intruding between

itself and the object. This modest (and charitable) interpretation leads naturally into the next shape of consciousness, perception, if we add that for an object to be identifiable in universal terms it must have an intrinsic universal aspect, not being only a *This*, but also having properties that are potentially shareable by an indefinite number of objects. 'To perceive' is '*wahrnehmen*', which Hegel treats as a compound of '*wahr*' ('true(ly)') and '*nehmen*' ('to take'), and thus as meaning 'to take [something] truly, as it truly is'. His eulogy of language is hyperbolic. His arguments are not exclusively linguistic: cf. ¶97. Nor, presumably, did he recognize his wife from a unique definite description of her.

II. Perception: The Thing and Illusion

- ¶111. 1. Hegel has two points in mind: (i) In sensory certainty, the two moments, the I and its object, do not develop out of something else, whereas in perception they do. ('Appear, appearance' here have the flavour of 'appearing out of the blue', in contrast to 'emerge, emergence' (*entstehen*) from something else.) (ii) In sensory certainty the I and its object fall outside *each other*, whereas in perception they emerge from the same thing, the pointing-out.
2. As in the case of sensory certainty, the object and subject are viewed in corresponding terms (see ¶91), and initially the object is essential, and the subject inessential (cf. ¶93).
- ¶112. 1. Hegel uses 'universal' liberally: the object of perception is universal in that it has many properties. Perception does not simply supplant sensory certainty. It incorporates the sensory 'wealth' that sensory certainty gestured towards but could not digest. Hegel has the *concept* expressed by his later use of *aufheben* ('abolish–preserve–elevate'), even if he does not often use the *word* in this way yet: but see ¶113.
- ¶113. 1. A thing is a universal medium for many properties, e.g. salt that is white, tart, etc. Each property is itself universal, since it is potentially shareable with other things. But until the end of ¶114, Hegel speaks of 'thinghood' (*Dingheit*) rather than 'thing' (*Ding*), since it is only in the context of other things that thinghood is individuated into a thing. The properties are 'indifferent' to each other, related only by an 'Also' (the nominalization of *auch*, 'also'). They do not compete for space in the thing: salt is white and tart throughout, whereas it could not be white and black throughout.
- ¶114. 1. To be a determinate property, e.g. white rather than simply colour, a property must negate and be negated by different properties, e.g. black. Hegel is here influenced by Spinoza's dictum, *omnis determinatio est negatio* (Letter 50). This cannot take place within a single thing, since properties that negate each other are incompatible: nothing can be black and white throughout. So another thing is needed with properties incompatible with those of the first thing, but similarly compatible with each other, e.g. sweet, brown chocolate. Owing to the presence of other things, the first thing ceases to be merely thinghood, a medium for properties, and becomes a unitary thing, excluding other things and their opposing properties.
- ¶115. 1. Within the passive universality or medium, properties are relatively independent and loosely related to each other. In the science of Hegel's time, they are regarded as 'matters', such as heat-matter, electrical-matter, etc., that occupy pores in the thing: see *Enc. I*, ¶¶125–30. In the unitary thing, by contrast, properties are tightly integrated into the thing, enabling it to exclude other things with their competing properties. There is a tension between these two views of the thing and its properties. Somehow the unity of the thing needs to be maintained along with the diversity of its properties.
- ¶116. 1. The illusion to which perceiving is susceptible is not primarily ordinary perceptual illusions (such as seeing a stick in water look bent, when it is really straight), but an intellectual apprehension that fails to maintain its internal coherence or the 'equality-to-itself' (*Sichselbstgleichheit*) of the thing. However, perception is susceptible to ordinary

perceptual illusions of a sort that sensory certainty was not, since perception opens up a gap between itself and its object that was not present in sensory certainty.

¶117. 1. That is, *ein Meinen*, a relic of sensory certainty.

2. Hegel replays the tensions that *he* discerned in perception in ¶¶113–15, but now as they present themselves to consciousness itself. It vacillates between regarding the thing as a medium or ‘community’ for its properties and regarding it as an intrinsic unity, whose properties are shared with and/or contrast with those of other things. It attributes its difficulties not to the internal incoherence of the thing, but to its own misapprehensions. It is in danger of lapsing back into the unarticulated ‘sensory Being’ of sensory certainty.

¶118. 1. In ¶100 sensory certainty tried to resolve its difficulties with the object by bringing itself, the I, into the equation. Perception now does the same, only in a different way. In its initial apprehension of the thing it finds two conflicting aspects, the unity of the thing and the diversity of its properties. It therefore unloads one of these aspects onto itself, the perceiver, and thereby removes the conflict from the thing. It corrects its initial view of the thing and arrives at a reflective, coherent view of it.

¶119. 1. Consciousness can effect this manoeuvre because the subject, the perceiver, is constituted as the mirror-image of the object, the thing. As the thing was initially seen as a medium for diverse properties, so the subject is now seen as medium for diverse sense-organs, each of which perceives the thing in a different way. The thing is now an intrinsic unity, apparently diversified only by our sense-organs.

¶120. 1. However, the thing needs its diverse properties in order to differentiate itself from other things. So it lapses back into being a medium for diverse properties.

¶121. 1. Consciousness is aware that, like the thing, it too is a single unity as well as a collection of sense-organs. This unity of its own enables it to reverse its previous procedure. Instead of assigning the thing’s diversity to itself and allowing it to retain its unity, it now unloads the unity of the thing onto the perceiving subject and allows the thing to retain its diversity. To ensure that the properties really are diverse, it regards them as ‘free matters’: cf. ¶115.

¶122. 1. Consciousness alternates, taking itself as an ‘Also’ and the thing as ‘One’ and, contrariwise, itself as ‘One’ and the thing as an ‘Also’. It then realizes that the thing really is both diversity (Also) and reflection into itself (One) and that neither aspect can be unloaded onto consciousness itself.

¶123. 1. Consciousness abandons its earlier strategy (¶¶116, 118f.) of preserving the thing’s coherence or ‘equality-with-itself’ by taking one of its contradictory aspects upon itself, regarding it as an illusion it imposes on the thing. It now regards the thing as intrinsically unitary, while its apparent diversity is inflicted on it by its relations with other things.

¶124. 1. However, the second thing, which supposedly has this effect on the first thing, is not simply an external irritant. It is in the same position as the first thing; it too is a One whose Also is to be aroused by the first thing. So where does this Also, within each thing, come from? It can only arise if each thing has, in addition to its unity, an intrinsic susceptibility to diversification as a result of its relations with another thing. Each thing therefore involves an internal distinction between its unity and its diversifiability. It is thus not the harmonious unity consciousness postulated. The claim that while its unity is *essential* to it, its diversity is *inessential*, is effectively withdrawn, if we add that the diversification or ‘manifoldness’ is *necessarily* in the thing.

¶125. 1. A thing has an ‘absolute character’ (cf. ¶124) in virtue of which it is independent (‘for itself’) and opposed to other things. But this opposition to other things means that it is essentially related to them and thereby loses its independence. (E.g. a human body would explode if the surrounding atmosphere were removed.)

- ¶126. 1. A thing negates other things, but it cannot eliminate them entirely without eliminating itself (like the bird that thinks it could fly faster if the atmosphere that impedes it were removed altogether).
- ¶127. 1. To regard a thing's diversity as 'necessary' but not 'essential' is to draw an empty distinction.
- ¶128. 1. The expression 'insofar' (*insofern*) is used—much like 'also'—to separate one feature from another: cf. ¶121 ('insofar as it is white, it is not cubical') and ¶124. But the device fails. It is impossible to distinguish between a thing's intrinsic character and its relations to other things.
- ¶129. 1. The thing collapses because of the residue of sensory certainty it contains. Its universality stems directly from the sensory and is therefore conditioned by it and not harmonious but divided into a singular unity and the universal Also. These amount to Being-for-itself and Being for others. They are essentially unified and thus constitute a universality that has broken free of dependence on the sensory and therefore belongs to the realm of the understanding rather than perception.
- ¶130. 1. A summary of the preceding ¶¶.
- ¶131. 1. Hegel is not recommending that we give up perceiving things and making perceptual claims about them. The expression 'perceptual understanding' rather indicates that he is concerned with the philosophical difficulties that arise when we reflect upon perception, in particular the relationship between a thing and its properties. In the hands of bluff common sense 'Being', 'singularity', 'universality', etc. are indeed mere abstractions, *Gedankendinge*, but such thoughts, properly conceived, form the underlying structure of our everyday attitudes towards things. If we do not submit them to a proper logical investigation, their interconnections and permutations play fast and loose with us. His achievement is not so much to refute common sense, but rather to expose the immense logical complexity underlying it. Cf. ¶69.

III. Force and Understanding: Appearance and Supersensible World

- ¶132. 1. Consciousness has reduced the unity of a thing and the diversity of its properties to two thoughts, respectively Being-for itself, or singularity, and Being for an other, or universality. If Being-for-itself were taken as the essence of the thing and contrasted with its inessential Being for an other, then Being-for-itself would be conditioned by Being for an other and, therefore, itself inessential. But consciousness combines the two thoughts, as each involving the other, so that together they constitute a self-contained, unconditioned universal, a universal that does not depend for its nature on anything else. This universal is *in itself* the mirror-image of consciousness itself, for consciousness has undergone the same conceptual process as its object and has in fact produced the object by its own movement. But consciousness has not yet become a logician and does not see that the unconditioned universal is its own Self: cf. ¶165. It still regards the object as *its* object, distinct from itself.
- ¶133. 1. In sensory certainty and perception, consciousness itself intervened in the development of its object. It did so, in part because it recognized its own structural affinity to the object. To the understanding, by contrast, its object seems quite different from itself, since it fails to recognize its conceptual nature. Hence it leaves the object to its own devices. It does not develop the 'concept' it inherits from perception. Hegel has to do this himself, and when he presents the result to consciousness it will become a 'comprehending' or conceptual consciousness, rather than merely one with understanding: cf. ¶165.
- ¶134. 1. We are tempted to suppose that the unconditioned universal, the unity of Being-for-itself and Being for another, is only a *form*, and that some *content* needs to be added to them in order to fully portray the current state of affairs; that we need to specify e.g. whether the

form applies to salt or to, say, chocolate. But this is not so. The form itself generates its own content. Whether something is salt or chocolate is determined by its formal relations to surrounding entities. Such specific content, therefore, does not concern us here.

- ¶135. 1. Nevertheless, a sort of form–content distinction emerges. The form is Being for another in unity with Being-for-itself, while the content is the universal medium and the One, to which they respectively correspond. But it is clear that the latter two moments will be integrated into each other, as are the formal moments that constitute their essence.
- ¶136. 1. Understanding conceives the object as a simple unitary force, which, however, manifests or expresses itself as a diversity of properties. A force of the type with which Hegel was familiar, does not account for an object as a whole but only for certain features of its behaviour. A magnet, e.g., has a magnetic force, which expresses itself in the attraction of iron filings; but the magnetic force requires a bar of metal if it is to exist, and it does not account for the existence of this bar of metal. Hegel assumes, for the sake of the argument, that a whole bar of metal, with all its properties, is the expression of a single force. A force is sometimes latent or dormant, and sometimes expressed or manifest. The understanding, true to its partitive nature, separates these aspects, but they are equally essential to force. Hegel links the movement of force with the movement of perceiving, in which the perceiver and the perceived each has the structure of a force, a simple unity that burgeons into a diverse sensory array. Beneath this ‘objective’, i.e. observable, array the unconditioned universal is the unobservable ‘interior’. Two opposing forces are like the extremes of a syllogism. A balloon, e.g., is the middle term. It retains its size and shape owing to the interplay between the air pressure within the balloon (which tends to expand the balloon so as to become equal to the pressure of the air outside) and the elasticity of the material from which the balloon is made (which tends to contract the balloon).
- ¶137. 1. In treating the force as the ‘interior’, we neglected the expression of force. The diverse properties of a thing are equally a part of force itself. To explain why the force expresses itself we postulate something external to it that ‘solicits’ or stimulates it to do so. Similarly, when the force withdraws into latency something external is needed to explain why it does so. However, since a force *necessarily* expresses itself, and *necessarily* withdraws into latency, this second force is really only an essential aspect of force itself. Hence the external stimulant is itself a force. (It is unclear why a force *must* express itself, rather than simply be such that it *would* express itself, *if* certain circumstances were to obtain.)
- ¶138. 1. The force thus splits up into two forces, one solicited and the other soliciting. The forces look independent of each other (or, at least the second looks independent of the first). But soliciting cuts both ways. The second force needs to be solicited to expression and to withdrawal as much as the first. So the forces reciprocally ‘exchange determinacies’: when one is latent, the other is manifest, and vice versa. (A latent force can only be solicited to express itself by a manifest force; it is less clear why both could not be manifest.)
- ¶139. 1. Force A is manifest (a universal medium) and solicits force B, which is latent (repressed). But A is manifest only because B is latent. Hence it is B that solicits A and makes A manifest. A is manifest only through B and solicits B only because B solicits A to solicit B. A immediately ceases to be manifest and B becomes manifest instead, but only because A solicits B to become so. So A posits the soliciting force B *because* A is *essentially* a universal medium. B’s manifestation is really A’s alter ego. The play of forces is a play within a single force.
- ¶140. 1. The forces have two distinguishing features: in *content*, one is a universal medium, the other latent; in *form*, one is actively soliciting, the other passively solicited. The difference of content is *our* way of distinguishing the two forces, while by the difference of form the two forces differentiate themselves. Consciousness itself sees that the features differentiating the forces are ‘vanishing’, in that the forces keep switching sides. We phenomenological

observers see even more: each force, whatever its content, can be seen as soliciting, and being solicited by, the other at the very same time.

- ¶141. 1. We tend to think of the two forces as existing independently of each other and of their expression—like two boxers who have a life outside the boxing ring and may, or may not, choose to enter it. But this is not so. Neither force can exist without the other and without expressing itself—since even its latency is a mode of its expression. Because of this, nothing remains of force apart from the ‘thought’ of force. In the case of a substance, such as an oak-tree, we can distinguish between its concept, embedded in the seed, and its realization. But there is no concept of a force, apart from its realization.
- ¶142. 1. There are two ways of looking at force, in both of which it is universal. It is regarded, first, as a *concrete* entity playing an active causal role in things and, secondly, as an *abstract* or conceptual entity, accounting for, but not physically causing, the structure and behaviour of things. Both of these views play a part in ¶143, the first as the ‘intermediary play of forces’ and the second as the ‘interior’ beneath it.
- ¶143. 1. Hegel is here playing with the similarity of the words *Schein* (‘semblance, etc.’) and *Sein* (‘Being’), as well as the difference between the cognate words *Schein* and *Erscheinung* (‘appearance’).
2. The two extremes, understanding and the ‘interior’, are linked by a middle term, which is the ‘play of forces’ (cf. first view of force in ¶142) now reduced to a superficial status, in comparison with the interior (cf. the second view of force in ¶142). The play of forces is ‘semblance’, but when taken as a whole, ‘appearance’: see also *Enc. I*, ¶131. The permutations of appearance on the sensory level are underpinned by, and provide a view of, the corresponding permutations on the interior, conceptual level. The concepts and their permutations are, in reality, the very same as those that constitute the innermost core of consciousness. Consciousness does not, however, recognize them as such, but regards them as an object distinct from itself.
- ¶144. 1. The universal is ‘absolute’ because it is self-contained, depending on no contrast with a singularity outside it. For all its imperfection, this Beyond opens up the space or element in which the truth may be located.
- ¶145. 1. A syllogism is an argument consisting of three propositions, a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion: e.g. ‘All men are mortal, All Greeks are men, Therefore all Greeks are mortal’. It also contains three terms, e.g. ‘men’, ‘Greeks’, and ‘mortal’. Of these ‘men’ is the middle term, since it appears in both premises, but not in the conclusion, and serves to link up the other two terms. With some help from the word *Schluss*, his word for ‘syllogism’, but literally ‘closure, closing’, Hegel regards a syllogism as consisting not of propositions, but of terms. The middle term, here appearance, links up the two extremes, understanding and interior. See also *Enc. I*, ¶¶181ff.
- ¶146. 1. Hegel may be thinking of Kant’s unknowable thing-in-itself. But elsewhere (e.g. *Enc. I*, ¶140), when he discusses the interior, he quotes a poem (*The Human Virtues*) by a scientist and poet, Albrecht von Haller: ‘Into the inwardness of nature/No created spirit penetrates./Most fortunate, if it knows but the outer shell.’ Goethe replied to this in another poem: ‘Nature has no core nor crust,/Here everything comes all at once.’ Goethe’s response is close to Hegel’s own view.
- ¶147. 1. ‘X is the truth of Y’ means ‘X is the fulfilment of Y, X is what Y really amounts to’. Hence the truth of the sensory is appearance, and the truth of appearance is the supersensible. Hence the supersensible is ‘appearance as appearance’, i.e. appearance as it is in truth. So the supersensible is not vacuous. Its content is a transformed version of appearance.
- ¶148. 1. The differences initially postulated between the two forces have collapsed. Each force is both soliciting and solicited. As for the difference between a universal medium and a

unity, the forces keep switching sides. Even the difference between these relationships, soliciting/solicited and universal medium/unity, has collapsed. All that remains is the swirling activity of undifferentiated force. There is still difference in general, however. Force is still in play, and the understanding needs to give an account of this. It does so by resorting to the simple law of force.

- ¶149. 1. Appearance changes, but the law, though it is present in appearance, does not change. Since the law results from the universal difference in the play of force, the law too must involve difference and ‘exchange’ in order to account for this, but without itself succumbing to change or exchange.
- ¶150. 1. A law does not fully account for appearance, but only for what happens given certain initial conditions: Galileo’s law of free fall says that if a body falls to the earth, it does so with such and such an acceleration, but does not tell us why there is a body at all, why it is above the earth or why it falls. Again, there are many different laws. This makes it hard to account for a given phenomenon. If two or more laws bear on the same phenomenon, how are we to know what their relative contributions are and what the final outcome will be? At a deeper level we now face the problem of the relationship between different laws, of what makes one law different from another. Newton tried to unify the law of falling bodies and Kepler’s laws of planetary motion in a single theory. But the result of this is not a determinate law, but simply the *concept* of a law, a declaration that the movement of bodies is law-governed, giving no precise information as to what the law is. (Hegel’s hostility to Newton is one of those embarrassing facts about him that we just have to accept: cf. *Enc.* II ¶¶269f.)
- ¶151. 1. Since universal attraction (gravity) is just the concept of law, the determinacy of law is relegated to appearance or the sensory. But universal attraction also subverts law itself. It concentrates the difference that law is supposed to contain into a simple universal and leaves the different moments dangling as mutually indifferent and merely implicit. Hence the differences return into the interior as a unity. Hegel’s general problem is that underlying the differences in a law there is a single universal force. He is obscure here, because he is trying to make a transition to electricity in ¶152. His conception of the difference or distinction within a law undergoes a transformation. As it was introduced in ¶149, it seemed to be simply the difference between the phenomena related by the law, between X and Y in ‘Whenever X happens, Y happens’. The force underlying such a law need not be a polar force, such as electricity, but may be a non-polar force, such as gravity. But now Hegel is moving towards the idea that the force underlying a reputable law must be polar, such that the difference is a difference within the force.
- ¶152. 1. Underlying a law is a single force, such as gravity or electricity. But a law involves difference. The laws of motion involve a distinction between space and time, between the distance covered and the time taken. Electricity involves a distinction between positive and negative electricity. Now the problem is: why does a single force bifurcate into two distinct things, into space and time or into positive and negative? Hegel is more or less aware that, while electricity is a polar force, gravity is not. Bodies with the same electrical charge repel each other, while bodies with opposite charges attract each other. But gravity only attracts, it does not repel; space and time are not two different manifestations of gravity, but simply presupposed by the operations of gravity. That still leaves the question: why does electricity take two forms, which we, for convenience, label positive and negative? Hegel does not know the answer, but he wisely resists the temptation to make the polarity of electricity an analytic truth.
- ¶153. 1. Motion necessarily involves space and time: a body moves through a certain distance during a certain time and with a certain velocity. Conversely, however, space and time do not necessarily coalesce to give rise to motion. There could, on Newton’s view, be space without time, or time without space, and distance without velocity. There is no essential connection between space and time. So there is really nothing necessary about motion, as

thus conceived: it is just the contingent convergence of two quite distinct things, space and time. Hegel's own implied view is that motion is not only analysable into space and time, but is presupposed by space and time: 'It is in motion that space and time first acquire actuality' (*Enc. II*, ¶261 Addition).

- ¶154. 1. There is no intrinsic differentiation within the force or the law. There is no necessity for the force, e.g. electricity, to bifurcate into positive and negative, and no necessity for the parts of the law, e.g. space and time, to coalesce in the law. Because of this, the understanding regards the differentiations as something it postulates, but which do not inhere in the Thing (*Sache*) itself. A single lightning flash is taken as an instance of a universal law, to the effect that whenever a cloud is in a certain observable condition, a lighting flash occurs. We attribute this to a build-up of opposite electrical charges in different parts of the cloud, which then discharge themselves. We assign to the force exactly the properties required to fulfil the law. But this is only how we need to view the matter, not how it really is. Such 'explanation' is tautological: it redescribes phenomena without properly explaining them. Cf. Molière: 'Why opium produces sleep... Because there is in it dormitive power.' However, such tautological explanation later plays a positive role in ¶163, where Hegel argues that the interior is in fact the mirror-image of the understanding's own movement.
- ¶155. 1. Understanding regards its object as static, and locates the movement of differentiation in the understanding itself. The movement is one whereby a difference is established, then sublated again. It was intended to apply to such differences as that between positive and negative electricity. But it also applies to the distinction between the understanding and the interior. That is yet another distinction in need of sublation. The understanding, or consciousness, cannot restrict the movement to understanding alone and keep it out of the interior.
- ¶156. 1. Hegel has in mind magnetism, where like, or 'like-named', poles repel each other, and unlike poles attract each other. Moreover, the distinction between a north and a south pole is a distinction without a difference. There is no discernible difference between them; they are differentiated only by their behaviour. If all north poles were to become south poles, and all south poles north poles, there would be no discernible difference, as long as they continued to attract and repel each other in the same way. Hegel implies, somewhat fancifully, that when a north pole repels another north pole, it repels itself and therefore *becomes* a south pole, just as it does when it attracts a south pole. The self-repelling behaviour of magnets is again applied to the relationship between the understanding and the Thing or interior.
- ¶157. 1. Magnetism supplies a law that accords better with appearance than its static inverse did. The difference involved in the second law is now essential to the law itself: there cannot be a north pole without a south pole, or a south pole without a north pole. Change is intrinsic to the law itself: poles essentially attract and repel each other.
- ¶158. 1. The pole of a magnet that is attracted to the north pole of the earth is regarded as the north pole of the magnet. But since it is *unlike* poles that attract each other, the 'north pole' of the earth must have the opposite polarity, i.e. it must really be the south pole.
2. The inversion is now extended beyond magnetism to the idea of a world that is the inverse of our world in every respect, not only in its sensory qualities, but in its evaluations. Unlike a north-south switch, such a global inversion would be detectable: we would notice if white things became black and black things white. The evaluative inversions echo the Sermon on the Mount. But the account of crime and punishment expressed in ¶159 represents Hegel's own view of punishment as it is in this world rather than in heaven. See also PR ¶¶99–103 on punishment and PS ¶¶667ff. on pardon. (Hegel anticipates Nietzsche's conception of the transvaluation of values.)
- ¶159. 1. This world and its inversion are not two distinct worlds. There is only one world constituted by the dynamic interplay between various pairs of opposites. Within this world

inversion already occurs, not always in the sense that opposites turn into each other, but in the sense that opposites require each other. If a magnet is cut in half, the result is two magnets each with two opposite poles: a south pole essentially requires a north pole; so the essence of a south pole is a north pole; so the in-itself or intrinsic nature of a south pole is its opposite, a north pole. Not all opposites are like this: e.g. something may be entirely black with no white in it. So the inversion of opposites takes different forms. But Hegel views the world as constituted by a system of mutually dependent opposites, each pair of which involves some sort of inversion.

- ¶160. 1. This is infinity in the sense of what Hegel calls 'good' or 'true' infinity. It does not, like 'bad' infinity, go on forever, but is self-enclosed or what we might call 'finite but unbounded'.
- ¶161. 1. The first, static laws are reinterpreted on the model of magnetism. We begin with (a) a unitary phenomenon or force, such as motion, gravity, or electricity. This is not cobbled together from disparate phenomena, but divides up, by a process of self-repulsion, into (b) such pairs of phenomena as space and time, positive and negative electricity, etc., the members of which are seemingly unconnected both with each other and with the unitary phenomenon from which they emerged. But (c) in reality the members of these pairs are related by a sort of magnetic polarity, such that each is essentially connected with the other and with their unitary source. See also ¶153 on motion, space, and time.
- ¶162. 1. Hegel's problem is to explain how a simple, self-contained unity that is not merely a composite of other entities (as e.g. motion is commonly supposed to be) can engender 'difference or otherness'. His answer is illuminated by considering magnetism, which he clearly has in mind. A magnet involves differences which are not really differences, both because there is no discernible *intrinsic* difference between its two poles and because each pole essentially requires the other: each is intrinsically related to the other as its opposite, and generates a replica of it if the magnet is sawn in half. (Hegel assumes that the non-existence of a *monopolar* magnet requires no explanation.) A magnet is therefore *both* uniformly 'like itself' *and* divided. The magnet-model also applies to electricity, whose close relation to magnetism became known in the 1820s. Whether it applies equally well to motion, space, and time is another question.
- ¶163. 1. It becomes increasingly clear, as we survey this summary of understanding's attempts to fill out the interior underlying appearance, that the interior is really the mirror-image of the understanding's own movement. This was intimated, albeit inadequately, by the scientific anti-realism of 'explanation': cf. ¶154. Understanding's consciousness of the interior, therefore, is in fact consciousness of itself, self-consciousness, even if the understanding is not yet aware of this.
- ¶164. 1. On infinity, see e.g. *Enc. I*, ¶94: 'But this infinite progression is not the genuine Infinite, which consists rather in remaining at home with itself in its other, or (when it is expressed as a process) in coming to itself in its other.' This concept of infinity readily applies to minimal self-consciousness, the I that is aware of the I, the two I's being, like magnetic poles, both different and the same. But why does it follow that when consciousness is conscious of the *interior*, it is really conscious only of itself? It is because the self-inverting infinity that the understanding has located in the interior applies not only to items within the interior, but also to the relation between the understanding and the interior. They too are analogous to self-repelling, other-attracting, undifferentiated, but self-differentiating magnetic poles. That consciousness of an object is necessarily self-consciousness does not mean that *whenever* one is conscious of an object, that object is oneself, but only that if one is conscious of an object, then one is conscious of oneself as well. It is only the interior of objects that is oneself in this strong sense. Earlier shapes of consciousness did refer to the I or subject, but the subject was only a correlate of the specific object to which it was harnessed: cf. ¶91. Now the Self emerges as a player in its own right.

¶165. 1. This view of the world is more or less Hegel's own view. He does not sublimate it as he did the earlier shapes of consciousness. It may be his response to Schelling's problem: how can a simple neutral absolute differentiate itself into a diverse world, in particular into the realms of nature and mind? The problem arises out of Kant's doctrine that the world of appearances emerges from interaction between the I, or Self, and things-in-themselves. The I is not just an appearance. It is what appearances appear *to*, what, in collaboration with other things-in-themselves, *produces* appearances. So the I is a thing-in-itself, existing prior to its interaction with other things in themselves. Things-in-themselves divide into two realms: the I, or mind, and the non-I, the natural objects it produces in interaction with other things-in-themselves. Unlike Kant, his successors tried to explain this division. Hegel's preliminary answer is that the absolute, things-in-themselves, is like a magnet and inevitably generates two opposites, mind and nature. The upshot is that the I or Self is no longer an inessential observer of the world. It is an essential part of the cosmic setup. It is one pole of the magnet, whose other pole is the inner nature of things, and between them they generate the world of appearance.

B. Self-Consciousness

IV. *The Truth of Certainty of Oneself*

¶166. 1. The object of *consciousness* is distinct from consciousness and from the conscious subject. So there may be a discrepancy between the object as it really is and the object as it is for me. The object as it really is is the object 'in itself', while the object as it seems to me is the concept of the object or the object as it is for another. However, no such discrepancy can arise in *self-consciousness*, where certainty is its own object, or consciousness is the 'true' to itself. As in ¶84, Hegel does not mind which side we call the 'concept' and which the 'object'. If knowing is the concept and the I the object, the I 'corresponds to' the knowing, the object to the concept. If, conversely, the I as object in itself is the concept, while the object as known by another is the object, then equally there can be no discrepancy. That 'concept' can play these two contrasting roles, depends partly on a distinction between a thin conception of the object and a thick conception of it, partly on a distinction between *my* conception of an object and *the* concept of an object, in the sense of its inner nature which needs to manifest itself. This minimal self-consciousness is Cartesian. Descartes cannot be mistaken when he thinks 'I think, I am'—but only because his self-knowledge is vanishingly thin: his claims about his identity, capacities, motives, and behaviour, are open to error. Descartes's and Hegel's use of 'I' might seem illicit, since it lacks its usual contrasts with 'you', 'he', 'she', and 'it'. Moreover, in ¶¶101f., Hegel said that since the word 'I' is self-applicable, it cannot individuate anyone in particular. (Descartes does not know *who* he is.) In the remainder of this chapter, Hegel confronts these difficulties.

¶167. 1. The problem here is the continued persistence of sensory objects alongside self-consciousness. In the first three shapes of consciousness the object of one shape is 'sublated' and its remnants are incorporated into the object of its successor. To an extent, the objects of consciousness are absorbed into self-consciousness, but only in the form of abstract categories underlying them: Being, singularity, universality, and 'empty interior'. But, in addition, sensory and perceptible objects persist in their unredeemed form alongside self-consciousness. Self-consciousness cannot live without them. Its very emergence depends on its differentiation from them. If it simply kicks them away and breaks free of them, it lapses into a 'motionless tautology: I am I'. It would be like a political party that completely demolishes all its opponents. It would lose its determinate character as a party, since this depended on its contrast with its opponents. Political parties manage to live with their

opponents. They want to win elections, but not so overwhelmingly that they eliminate the opposition and thereby their own distinctive character. But self-consciousness cannot accept a similar peaceful coexistence with the perceptible world, because it wants to be the master, the essence. This may owe something to the colloquial meaning of *Selbstbewusst (sein)* as 'self-confident, self-confidence, self-assertive(ness)'. But to allow this to control his train of thought would be as arbitrary of Hegel, as if we were to allow our thought about self-consciousness to be guided by the colloquial meaning of its English counterpart. One problem may be that the sensory world has not acquired independence or objectivity, such that it is *the* world, and not simply *my* world. In the absence of other Selves, even of the concept of other Selves, who view the world from different angles, the world can hardly be regarded as objective and placed at a safe distance from myself. It is like a persistent illusion that follows me wherever I go and competes with me for mastery of myself. I am a divided Self, not fully in control. There is some evidence Hegel has this problem in mind: the claim that the sensory world lacks Being, that it is 'appearance', etc. Self-consciousness's first attempt to solve its problem is to try to eliminate the sensory world altogether. It is *desire*—the desire to establish itself as the essence, the dominant limb of the opposition. (Self-)consciousness now has two objects, the sensory object marked as negative, and itself. Self-consciousness itself is the essence, but initially it occurs only in opposition to the sensory object. What it desires is to sublimate this opposition and establish its own self-equality. However, in ¶182, desire is explicitly restricted to self-consciousness's stance towards objects that are not themselves self-conscious.

¶168. 1. On the distinction between what is 'for us' (viz. Hegel and/or his audience) or 'in itself' and what is for the shape of consciousness under consideration, see ¶¶25, 82f., 111, etc.: in considering some lower form of consciousness, e.g. a child or a dog, we must distinguish between what we know and what is available to the form of consciousness under consideration. Hegel introduces life, if only 'for us', for several reasons. Humans are themselves alive and they desire to eat living things, not minerals. Life did not feature in chapters I–III, but III laid the conceptual foundations for it. Like self-consciousness, life involves a self-contained 'infinity', and withdrawal, or 'reflection', into itself. Somewhat like a magnet, the concept, or 'the universal result with which we enter this sphere' (¶169), divides into two poles, self-consciousness and life. These are not, however, as undifferentiated as the poles of a magnet: self-consciousness is aware of itself, of life, and of the conflictual 'infinite' unity between them, while life is simply the unity and therefore in itself, not for itself. Life enters in two ways. Hegel points in two directions at once, to self-consciousness's own life and the life outside it. His talk of unity suggests the life of self-consciousness, since this is most obviously unified with self-consciousness: self-consciousness is one pole of the magnet and *its* life is the other pole. But the life that is the object of self-consciousness's desire, and displays its independence must be external life. Probably life is initially undifferentiated. It begins as the opposite pole to self-consciousness, intimately associated with it, but then becomes independent. Life is not initially individuated into living creatures. The living creature (*Lebendiges*) does not emerge until ¶171. As yet life is something like a vital force. It is hard however to resist thinking of 'shapes' and 'members' except as organs or organisms.

¶169. 1. 'Infinity', as in ¶168, is 'self-containment', or what Hegel later calls 'good' or 'true' infinity, not endless succession ('bad infinity'). Hegel's image of good infinity is a circle, in contrast to the straight line of bad infinity. It is unclear whether he is thinking here of a single living organism or of the whole system of living organisms. His account might fit either or both, since each organ of an organism is related to every other organ in something like the way in which different organisms are related to each other, relations of dependency and relative independency. Both an organism and a system of organisms have a circular structure. The brain makes the heart beat, and in return the heart supplies blood to the

- brain. Plants provide food for animals, which in turn distribute seeds that enable plants to propagate. The ‘differences’ are, respectively, the different organs of an organism and the different plant and animal species. Infinity is both in repose and restless, characterized, that is, both by the maintenance of the organism or the ecological system and by the continual change within them. Within such a system ‘time’, or the temporal sequence, is repetitive and circular, and follows a circular course through the organs, or organisms, arrayed in space.
- ¶170. 1. ‘For themselves’ (*für sich*) here means ‘by themselves’, much the same as ‘independent’ (*selbständigen*, lit. ‘self-standing’). The ‘shapes’ are the ‘members’, independent parts of an organic unity. A pebble is a unity, but a homogeneous unity, since it is not a negative unity, repelling itself into different organs, nor ‘infinite’, forming a self-enclosed, interlocking system. A heart and a brain are independent, but cannot survive outside the organism. Their independence is not intrinsic to them, like the independence of a pebble, but determined by ‘an other’, the system to which it belongs and the other members of that system. (What is said about organs of a single creature might also be said of animal or plant species.) This other also sublates the division, bringing each organ back into the organic system. This sublation is equally the work of the organ itself. The organ is not recaptured like a truant schoolboy, who could very well survive on his own; it cannot survive or function outside the organism. Life is a dynamic system, as if each organ is repelled by the organism and itself strives to escape, but is then brought back, attracted by its familiar abode. Cf. Schelling II.540: ‘As walking is a constantly prevented falling, so life is a constantly prevented extinction of the vital process.’
- ¶171. 1. ‘Inorganic nature’ is not used in the strict sense, but refers to the life outside the organism, the fluid medium that has not congealed into separate organisms. It is the life outside, the ‘fluid medium’, that began as the essence, but now the tables are turned; there is an inversion, whereby an individual shape asserts its independence and becomes the essence, treating the fluid medium as the ‘other’. Presumably Hegel has in mind the three aspects of life which he derived from Albrecht von Haller (1707–1777): sensibility, irritability and reproduction. He discusses them in PS ¶¶ 265–89, *Enc. I*, ¶¶218–20 and *Enc. II*, ¶¶355f. Von Haller gave priority to irritability, the tendency to contract when touched, since it is a feature of all living tissue, whereas sensibility belongs only to tissue with nerves. But Hegel gives priority to sensibility, because it occurs within the organism, regardless of what is happening outside. Reproduction refers both to the constant regeneration that an organism undergoes in its struggle to remain alive and to the procreation of new organisms of the same kind or genus to replace the original organism after it loses its battle against the elements encroaching on it.
- ¶172. 1. The ‘immediate unity’ is the initial organism, while the ‘reflected unity’ is the new organism generated by it, an organism of the same kind or ‘genus’ (*Gattung*). (A kind is a species rather than a genus, but Hegel uses the word *Gattung*, because of its association with procreation. The usual word for a ‘species’, *Art*, has no special connection with procreation. However, he draws the *Gattung-Art* distinction in PS ¶¶254, 295.) *Enc. I*, ¶220 mentions also sexual reproduction, involving an affinity between organisms of the same kind. Presumably this lurked somewhere beneath the abstract vocabulary of PS ¶171. Hegel makes a suspect transition from the genus to consciousness, parallel to the similarly suspect transition to ‘cognition’ in *Enc. I*, ¶223. Generic life is ‘for’ consciousness, but so is everything else. A genus or species does not require consciousness for its demarcation. But Hegel points to an affinity between the biological genus and the generic I.
- ¶173. 1. Self-consciousness is also life, i.e. embedded in a living creature, and also involving a difference that is no difference, similar to those in external life. It is ‘genus for its own Self’ not because human beings are one animal genus (or species) among others, but because the I itself is purely generic, too thin to be the I of anyone in particular: cf. ¶102. Self-consciousness

is, and perhaps sees itself, mirrored in generic life and undergoes a similar ‘unfolding’ and enrichment. The poverty of the generic I is one problem that self-consciousness needs to resolve.

- ¶174. 1. The ‘shaped independent moments’ are the living creatures that have emerged from the fluid medium. The ‘differences’ that are for the I ‘no differences’ may be the differences within life or the differences within the I itself. The plural suggests the former. But then why does the I’s awareness of this depend on its being the ‘negative essence’ of the living creatures? Perhaps Hegel means that if the living creatures retain their independence, then the differences are real differences and so, that the I has to eliminate them in order to maintain its view of the unreality of the differences. But why must it do that? Perhaps to secure the affinity of life to itself, since the I does involve such a non-difference. This implies that what self-consciousness wants is not to sublimate life as such, but (as Hegel says) independent life, the stubborn little pockets that are independent not only of self-consciousness but of the fluid medium of life itself. As ‘certainty’ was introduced in ¶166, it seemed to be a cognitive or theoretical concept: to be certain of an object was, roughly, to have convictions about it, albeit convictions that are undermined as their implications are worked out. But it cannot have only this meaning in the case of ‘self-certainty’ or ‘certain of itself’. How could one’s sheer self-awareness depend on ‘sublating’ things other than oneself? It must have the flavour of ‘self-assurance’, perhaps even of ‘self-centredness’.
- ¶175. 1. The natural object resists self-consciousness’s assault for two reasons. First, self-consciousness derives its self-certainty from the act of sublating the object. If the object were the only one available and self-consciousness succeeded in sublating it, so that it had no other opponent to sublimate, then its success would amount to failure. It would find itself in the hapless position of an overwhelmingly successful political party: cf. ¶167. Secondly, however, the object sublated is not the only object available. Self-consciousness ‘generates it again’. What Hegel has in mind is simply another natural object, which self-consciousness in turn sublates, i.e. devours—as the word ‘desire’ (*Begierde*) suggests. Self-consciousness might then embark on a ‘bad infinite’ progression and proceed indefinitely, consuming one thing after another. But this will not give it the satisfaction it requires. The object cannot be sublated or negated by self-consciousness, so it must be something that sublates itself. At first sight, it is not clear why this would solve the original problem(s). If it is the act of sublating that self-consciousness requires, an act of self-sublating would defeat its purpose as much as an act of sublating conducted by itself. Analogously, if a party’s political opponents were to dissolve their party voluntarily, this would deprive the remaining party of the opposition it requires as much as would its overwhelming victory. Again, why should a self-sublating object get self-consciousness off the treadmill of endless sublation? There might be an endless series of self-sublating objects just as much as an endless series of other-sublated objects. But it is the fact that the self-sublating object is a self-consciousness that terminates the infinite progression. The conclusion that it is a self-consciousness is reached by two steps. First, a self-negating, yet independent object, must be a consciousness. Secondly, the negation involved can only be life’s ‘inorganic universal nature’, and this is the genus as such, and therefore self-consciousness. It is clear that Hegel believes there to be a rational route from life to self-consciousness, and equally clear that, however plausible the transition may be as a narrative, he has not found such a route.
- ¶176. 1. There are three stages or aspects to self-consciousness. The first is the I’s awareness of itself, without any apparent intermediary. Secondly, however, this involves desire, a desire to sublimate an independent object. The satisfaction of this desire makes self-consciousness rebound back into itself, fulfilling its aim of certainty of itself and consolidating the first stage. (In ¶175 this second stage seemed to be a complete failure, but now it is seen as a partial success.) But thirdly, there is a second rebound, not only into the original self-

consciousness but into a duplicate of it. Self-consciousness's object now nullifies its otherness or difference, while remaining independent; that is, it becomes a self-consciousness itself and therefore not other than or different from the first self-consciousness, yet still independent of it. The 'merely living shape' is said 'also' to sublimate its independence—as if this were a point of similarity with the second self-consciousness. Perhaps Hegel's train of thought is this: in a way the second self-consciousness sublimes its own independence in nullifying its otherness or difference, but in reality this secures its independence. The shape too sublimes its independence, and thereby its difference, but in doing so it ceases to exist.

¶177. 1. Often, when Hegel says something of the form 'X is for Y', he means roughly 'Y is aware of X'. Thus here he means that a self-consciousness is aware of a self-consciousness, and that only in this way does self-consciousness become aware of the unity of itself in its otherness. As in ¶176, it is unclear what its otherness is. There are at least four ways in which self-consciousness is 'other': (1) It is quasi-divided into the I that is (self-)conscious and the I of which it is conscious. (2) It is both conscious of sensory things and self-conscious. (3) It is both a unitary I and a differentiated living creature. (4) It is other than the second self-consciousness. Otherness (1) does not seem to be affected by the presence of another self-consciousness. It has been aware of this bifurcation all along. Otherness (4) makes it aware of its being one among several self-consciousnesses. But this is just what is required to resolve some *other* otherness. We are left then with the related othernesses (2) and (3). Self-consciousness is both a living creature, conscious of and desiring other living creatures surrounding it, and a unitary self-conscious ego. In its solitude it could not see how to fit these two aspects together, but now it has a visible example of a creature similar to itself that seems to have performed this task. Now it has an 'object' (*Gegenstand*) appropriate to itself. Its own I is not a proper object. It does not *stand over against* (*gegen*) it as independent. The object of desire, life, is independent but not an I. Another self-consciousness fulfils both requirements. The memorable phrase '*I* that is *We*, and *We* that is *I*' refers not to the present stage of self-consciousness, but to spirit proper, where individual I's share a form of life and recognize each other mutually. At the present stage self-consciousness is egocentric or selfish, somewhat like an infant, or for that matter an adolescent, who wants to be recognized by others but not to recognize them in turn. Self-consciousness at the present stage is merely the 'concept' of spirit, that is, the initial stage of it which will, in virtue of its inner dynamic, eventually become fully fledged spirit.

A. INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE

¶178. 1. The verb *anerkennen* might sometimes be translated as 'acknowledge', whose meaning overlaps that of 'recognize', but does not coincide with it, since acknowledgement is invariably overt, whereas recognition need not be: one can recognize a person or one's mistake without acknowledging him or it. That self-consciousness is in and for itself, with the implication of independence, only if it is recognized by others and is to that extent dependent on them, is itself an instance of the ambiguity and opposition that Hegel goes on to summarize. On 'infinity' as self-containment, see ¶¶168f. What is infinite here is the unity constituted by the interplay between a self-consciousness and its *doppelgänger*.

¶179. 1. This is an instance of ambiguity. One might compare the case of two lovers: X sees Y as the 'essence' ('You are everything to me!'), but in doing so claims Y as his own and thereby sees himself in Y—a relatively benign way of 'sublating' the other. In at least one sense of 'recognition', self-consciousness X already recognizes self-consciousness Y in virtue of seeing, or recognizing Y as another self-consciousness, rather than just another edible animal. Insofar as X goes on to treat Y as a self-consciousness, X also recognizes Y in the

sense of ‘acknowledging’. However, both X and Y require more than such minimal recognition or acknowledgement from each other.

¶180. 1. The first double sense occurred in ¶179. Compare lover X who abandons Y in order to regain his independence and self-sufficiency, but then finds that he has lost what gave meaning and substance to his life. X’s ‘sublation’ of Y is here a near reversal of his sublation of Y in ¶179. In what follows, X (and Y) attempts to find a solution to this dilemma, that whether X loves Y or leaves Y, in either case he sublates both Y and himself.

¶181. 1. X’s sublation of Y and of itself in ¶180 also amounts to a liberation of each of them. In sublating its ‘otherness’, i.e. abandoning Y, it becomes independent and self-sufficient (‘equal to itself’), and it equally makes Y independent and self-sufficient.

¶182. 1. The other, Y, is in exactly the same position as X. Everything said so far about X applies equally to Y. The claim that whatever X does is ‘both its own doing and the doing of the other’ might mean:

- (1) *For any action-token that X performs, Y performs an action-token distinct from X’s, but of the same type as X’s.* E.g. if X sublates Y or shakes his fist at Y, then Y sublates X or shakes his fist at X. X and Y are mirror-images of each other.
- (2) *For any action-token that X performs, Y collaborates with X in the performance of that very same action-token.* If, e.g., X sublates Y or shakes his fist at Y, then this sublating or fist-shaking is Y’s doing as well as X’s. X’s sublating or fist-shaking cannot have its effect unless Y plays his part in the performance.

The ambiguity arises because in some cases the actions that Y performs in collaboration with X are also actions of the same type as X’s. When e.g. X sublates Y simply by viewing him as another self-consciousness (¶179), this only works if Y also views X as another self-consciousness. Unless Y shows signs of viewing X as another self-consciousness, X has little reason to regard X as a self-consciousness like himself, rather than simply one more edible animal. But this is not true of every action that X might perform. If X shakes his fist at Y, Y need not shake his fist at X in return. Y may cringe or run away instead. But if the fist-shaking is to have its effect, Y must do something to show that he recognizes it as a threatening gesture. Y collaborates in X’s action without reproducing it. Probably Hegel has both of these meanings in mind without clearly distinguishing them. Desire does not pervade self-consciousness’s relations to its self-conscious other. ‘Desire’ is here restricted to self-consciousness’s stance toward living objects that are not self-conscious: cf. ¶169.

¶183. 1. I do what I do *both* to the other *and* to myself. What I do is done *both* by myself *and* by the other. Thus in ¶187, I put the other and myself at risk of death, and I can only do this if the other does likewise, by engaging in combat.

¶184. 1. Like ‘play of forces’, the movement of self-consciousness is syllogistic: cf. ¶¶136, 141, and 146. Here the middle term is initially self-consciousness itself. Since neither X nor Y can be a proper self-consciousness without the other, their interplay results from a bifurcation of self-consciousness rather than from their coming together. As forces in ¶138 exchange their determinacies of ‘soliciting’ and ‘being solicited’, in ¶179 each self-consciousness both sublates the other and is sublated by it. Consciousness is of an object distinct from itself, in contrast to the simple self-aware I of minimal self-consciousness (¶167). Hence each self-consciousness comes outside itself (cf. ¶179), while nevertheless remaining aware of itself and of its being outside itself, and to that extent within itself. In this sense each is aware of both being and not being another consciousness, and equally aware that the other is independent (‘for itself’) only by sublating its own independence and depending on the independence of the other. (The expression ‘for itself’ wavers between self-awareness and independence.) Thus, whereas initially the middle term between X and Y was the self-

consciousness common to both, each is now the middle term to the other. Each joins together with itself, or fulfils itself, in virtue of its relationship with the other; each is, both in its own eyes and in those of the other, an immediate, self-aware and independent essence—‘immediate’ in that the process of mediation has been left behind. It follows from this that X and Y recognize each other, and that each recognizes that the other recognizes it. However, ‘recognize’ here does not entail acknowledgement: X recognizes Y and recognizes that Y recognizes X, but X may not signal this recognition to Y.

¶185. 1. It is unclear whether this ¶ and what follows describe a continuation of the process presented in ¶184 or is, alternatively, an account of how the reciprocal recognition with which ¶184 concludes is reached. From the point of view of either party, there is an ‘inequality’. But how is this to be analysed in terms of recognition? If we look at the situation from X’s point of view, is it the case that X recognizes Y, but is not recognized by Y? Or is it conversely the case that X is recognized by Y, but does not recognize Y? If either of these is the case, it must be the first. For if X does not recognize Y as a self-consciousness, then the dyadic situation, and therefore the inequality, cannot arise. Similarly, from Y’s point of view, Y recognizes X, but is not recognized by X. So from a neutral point of view, there is no inequality. Perhaps Hegel means that there is an inequality from the neutral viewpoint, but if so, there must be some difference between X and Y that he has not yet revealed. A clearer asymmetry, from the point of view of each party, emerges in ¶186: each is certain of itself, but not of the other. But what is the role of recognition in this?

¶186. 1. Hegel here replays the process whereby self-consciousness emerges from life. X is aware of itself as I, distinguishing itself from everything other than itself, and therefore an individual in the way that no other living thing is an individual. X encounters Y, another self-consciousness on a par with itself. But initially neither X nor Y sees the other as a self-consciousness even of this minimal sort. They view each other as consciousnesses, but as conscious in the way that animals are conscious, not yet having disentangled its pure I or ego from the motley paraphernalia of life. Each is ‘certain of itself’ but this has no ‘truth’, unless its own ‘Being-for-itself’ is presented as an ‘independent object’, i.e. unless the other is presented as certain of itself as well. This is only possible if each party, in collaboration with the other, reveals itself as performing the required ego-abstraction by the process described in ¶184.

In the case of many properties that we might attribute to ourselves—being a professor, a genius, beautiful, etc.—one might be ‘certain’ of possessing that property, yet the attribution will lack ‘truth’ unless it is recognized by others. The others need not themselves have the property in question. One need not be a professor, a genius, or beautiful, in order to recognize someone else as a professor, a genius, or beautiful. However, the others must have certain qualifications if they are to give me appropriate recognition. They must be self-conscious in Hegel’s sense: a dog or a cat cannot properly confirm my own self-image. They must have further qualifications: they must, for example, be sane and be competent judges of the properties in question. In addition, I must know or believe that they possess these qualifications, if I am to be assured of my self-image. But they need not have, and I need not believe them to have, the same properties as I ascribe to myself. The case of self-consciousness is different. If anything is to recognize and confirm my sheer self-certainty, then it must itself be self-certain and I must be aware that it is self-certain; my recognizer must have, and be recognized as having, exactly the same property as I have. They do not need any other special qualifications, except perhaps sanity. But why, it might be asked, does my self-certainty need confirmation by others? I might believe that I am a professor, a genius, a beauty, yet not be any of these in reality. But if I think I am self-certain, then surely I am self-certain. Others may believe that I am dead or a zombie, but despite that I can be

sure that I am self-certain. However, Hegel's point here is not that my self-certainty requires recognition by others in order to be confirmed, but that I need to be presented with an objective case of self-certainty, self-certainty as seen from a 2nd or 3rd person viewpoint, not simply from the 1st person viewpoint that is all that is available to me at present. Recognition is required for me to attain to this viewpoint and thereby upgrade my self-certainty to self-consciousness. But why do I need to ascend to this viewpoint and what good will it do me if I do? If I think I am a genius, it may be some use for me to encounter another genius to measure myself against—as long as he is a certified genius and we are not involved in a *folie à deux*. It will also show me what a genius looks like from the outside and enable me to locate myself on the map of human variability. Something similar comes from a self-certain ego's encounter with another self-certain ego. It shows me that I belong to a class of entities, only one of which is accessible to me in the 1st person, the others in the 2nd or 3rd person. In doing so, it clips the wings of my egocentricity, revealing that the world I see around me is not *my* world, but *a* world, an *objective* world, that is shared with others of my kind and accessible from different viewpoints. (Descartes, though bereft of human others, is released from his subjective world by invoking God.) This enables me to draw a boundary round myself and to see myself as one consciousness within the world, not the bearer of the world.

¶187. 1. One might show that one is not attached to one's money either by giving it away or by staking it as a bet on some non-monetary prize. Similarly, one might show that one is not attached to one's life either by committing suicide or by risking one's life for a prize, in this case the death or defeat of another. See Inwood (1986) on Hegel's ambivalence about suicide. Hegel endorses the Stoic doctrine that the possibility of it confers freedom on us, but in PR ¶70 Addition argues that one has no right to kill oneself, since 'he does not stand over himself and he cannot pass judgement on himself'. This argument, if is sound, might also tell against risking one's life: if I am identical with my life and I have no right over myself, how can I have a right to risk my life? However, while the suicide passes, or attempts to pass judgement on himself (such as that his life is not worth living), the risk-taker need pass no such judgement, his primary purpose being not to end his life but to win the prize. Moreover, while in PR Hegel is tackling the question whether one is entitled to kill oneself, in PS he is not concerned with whether the combatants are entitled to risk their lives, but only with the significance of their actions if they do take the risk. Mortal combat is required if self-consciousness is to dissociate itself from its 'Being-there', i.e. the world surrounding self-consciousness ('universal singularity') and self-consciousness's own biological life, in contrast to the ego itself. Sex will not do, since it does not detach one from Being-there, nor will solitary risk-taking, since it lacks the presence and recognition of another. Hegel shares Hobbes's belief that natural men are combative—though he differs from Hobbes in believing that the combat is motivated by a desire for recognition rather than by fear of others, and also in believing that modern men are quite different from natural men: see *Enc.* III, ¶432 Addition. The combat requires the collaboration of both parties: X aims at the death of Y, but X can only achieve this aim if Y risks his life by aiming at the death of X. It is unclear whether and why X aims at the death of Y. There are 3 possibilities: (1) X wants to display its detachment from Being-there by risking death and can only do this if it provokes Y by aiming at his death. Even if X kills Y, he will still display his detachment from life, even though Y will be unable to recognize this achievement except fleetingly. But surely X and Y could risk death without actually *aiming* at each other's deaths; they might engage in a combat that involves a *risk* of death, without *aiming* to kill. In fact, X's requirement would be met if Y wore protective clothing, minimizing his risk of death, while still threatening to kill X; the problem with that is that Y would then be deprived of the opportunity of displaying *his* detachment from Being-there. (2) X wants Y's recognition and the only way to get this is by fighting Y, if need be, to the death. X's desire for Y's recognition will be

frustrated if he actually kills Y. So Y's death, since it would deprive him of what he really wants, is not his primary aim. He is ready kill Y if Y refuses to recognize him, but his first preference is for Y to surrender and recognize him. (3) X aims at Y's death, because he wants above all to eliminate Y. This is suggested by the final sentence of the paragraph. X wants to kill Y because he sees Y as an external mirror-image of his own inadequate Self, a 'manifoldly entangled consciousness that simply is', which it (X?) must come to see as 'pure Being-for-itself'. This takes up the earlier point that X wants to sublimate Y. But sublimation need not amount to killing. Killing Y is only one way in which X can sublimate Y. He can also sublimate Y by transforming him into 'pure Being-for-itself' and he can do that not by killing him, but by threatening to kill him. If he really wants to kill Y, why does he refrain from doing so when Y surrenders? Perhaps Hegel's idea is that X begins by simply wanting to kill Y, but as the fight proceeds and Y displays his mettle, it occurs to him that it would be better to get his recognition. In the combat Y, and also X, are transformed into someone whose recognition is worth obtaining and not simply eliminated. (If 'as each stakes its life, so each must aim at the other's death' is intended as an inference, it is invalid. Each may risk death without either *aiming* at the other's death.)

In PR, 'person' applies to someone who owns property recognized by others. There is no suggestion that such a person risks, or has risked, death. It is unclear whether Hegel is here using '*Person*' in this sense. He may just mean that someone can be recognized as a human being without his having risked death. This is not only a possibility. X must recognize Y as a person in a minimal sense if he is to regard him as a worthy combatant in the first place rather than another edible creature.

- ¶188. 1. This is an elaborate way of saying that if one or both of the combatants actually dies, then the game is up. A dead person cannot be fully self-conscious ('the truth'), nor even self-certain, nor give recognition. Death is 'abstract negation', in contrast to the 'negation of consciousness', where the genitive is subjective, that is, the negation is undertaken by consciousness, not undergone by it. Abstract negation sublates something in the sense of simply eliminating it, whereas the negation conducted by consciousness also preserves it, by e.g. reducing it to servitude.
- ¶189. 1. In the situation envisaged, at least one of the combatants remains alive, since otherwise there would be no self-consciousness for the essentiality of life to 'dawn' on. 'Immediate self-consciousness' is the first stage mentioned in ¶176, with the 'pure undifferentiated I' as its object. This is what the combatant invokes when he puts his life at risk. The trappings of life are not regarded as essential to the 'simple I'. 'For us' or 'in itself', though not yet for self-consciousness itself, this I is not simply 'immediate', but involves 'absolute mediation', that is, it is the sublation of objects other than itself in the form of desire. (This process has some affinity to the way in which Descartes arrives at the *cogito* by successively doubting the existence of all external objects: the immediacy of the ego is mediated by doubt, though not, of course, by consumption. See also ¶167.) It interacts with the world around it in a way that a pure I cannot. However, as a simple I it still retains a 'subsistent independence', it stands on its own two feet, even though in its interaction with objects around it, it still depends on these objects. This is the second stage of ¶176. The experience leading to it, the 'first experience', dissolves the simple unity of the I, and there are now two sides to self-consciousness: 'pure self-consciousness', the residue of the simple I—which still persists, because self-consciousness can, after all, risk its life—and 'consciousness', which involves the face that it turns towards the outside world and that makes it into a 'thing' accessible to others as well as itself. 'Consciousness' is essentially consciousness *of* an object distinct from oneself. Hence a conscious being is necessarily environed by other objects and, if it is to interact with them, must be a 'thing' in the way that they are, whatever other features it may have. These two aspects have not yet been unified; that doesn't happen until the third stage of ¶176, and perhaps not even there. They are unlike, or 'unequal', and

opposed to each other. They take the form, therefore, of two opposed shapes of consciousness: a consciousness that stands on its own two feet with Being-for-itself as the essence, i.e. the residue of pure self-consciousness (the lord), and a dependent consciousness with Being for another, or life, as the essence (the bondsman).

This passage lends support to interpretations that locate the lord and the bondsman within a single (self-)consciousness. There is within each of us a lord-self and a bondsman-self. It is not implausible to view an individual human mind as hierarchical. We are not only conscious of, or represent, other things. We are also conscious of our own consciousnesses and represent our own representations, think about our own thoughts and perhaps introspectively perceive our own perceptions, are aware of, and sometimes desire or censure, our own desires. We are not only sentient or conscious of things, but also self-conscious, a Self and a meta-self. Animals lack such a capacity to step back from their perceptions and desires, and to monitor or supervise them, asking whether they are veridical or appropriate. So the bondsman within us can reasonably be associated with the life we share with lower animals. Hegel quite likely viewed the mind in this way. It does not follow, however, that he located the lord and bondsman only within the single mind. As seen in ¶184, he views the two self-consciousnesses not as a chance encounter between them, but as the bifurcation of a single self-consciousness, in something like the way in which a magnet bifurcates into two poles. Like more recent philosophers, such as Heidegger and Sartre, he believes that an individual human being has an inbuilt requirement for another human being, in order to complete itself. More specifically, when he introduces a concept, he attempts to motivate its introduction by showing how it develops intelligibly from the concepts he has deployed so far. Everything is, in Hegel's view, rationally connected. There are no sudden leaps in thought or reality. Hence it is only natural that he should introduce the concepts of lord and bondsman in terms of the concepts that he has been applying to the individual mind. Moreover, the drama he describes cannot be only an external drama. Self-consciousness is not simply fighting, defeating, and bonding another self-consciousness. It is also undergoing an internal transformation, in which his bifurcated Self is integrated into a unity. This internal drama is described in terms of the external drama correlated with it. So each of the combatants has a lord and bondsman within itself. This does not entail that their application is restricted to the individual mind, that the lord and bondsman are only in the mind. The description of them as 'two opposed shapes of consciousness' prepares the way for their emergence outside the individual mind.

- ¶190. 1. The internal lord and bondsman are transformed into the external lord and bondsman, located in different people. Hegel does not describe the combat or explain why one of the combatants submits to the other; he leaves that to our imagination. Initially the lord was only the 'concept' of, only potentially, a consciousness for itself, but now it is actually such, since it is now mediated with itself by 'another consciousness', the bondsman consciousness. Is this other consciousness the bondsman within a single mind or is it another individual? It must be the latter. From at least the second stage of ¶176 the individual has had a bondsman consciousness within itself. Why only now does it fulfil its potentiality as a consciousness for itself? It can only be because it has a bondsman outside itself. There are two items besides the lord himself, a desired thing and the bondsman consciousness. It relates to each of these in two ways, immediately and mediately, (a) and (b). It is tempting to regard (a) not simply as self-consciousness's immediate awareness of a thing and a person outside him, but as his relation to the bondsman within him and to the things that, as a bondsman, he desires. That is, the drama is played out in two theatres, one internal, the other external. That the lord is 'concept of self-consciousness, immediate relation of *Being-for-Self*' seems a better reason for saying that it is immediately related to aspects of itself than for saying that it is so related to external things. By contrast, (b) describes the external

drama, as is indicated by ‘from now on’ (*nunmehr*). The other combatant has surrendered and thereby shown himself to be fitting material for bondage. The bondsman is dependent on ‘independent Being’, on life and the things that life involves. When it came to the crunch he could not bring himself to sacrifice his life. By contrast, the lord risked his life to the end, showing that he sets no store by the things of life and therefore has them in his power, using them to subject the bondsman to himself. This is a ‘syllogism’: the lord relates to the bondsman by way of things. See also ¶184. In another syllogism, the lord relates to things by way of the bondsman. He makes the bondsman work on things and then consumes them. The bondsman is not only a bondsman, but also a self-consciousness of sorts. So he is sufficiently negative towards things to work on them, though not to annihilate them. The lord, by contrast, goes the whole hog: he negates or sublates things entirely by consuming the bondsman’s finished product. In this way the lord apparently solves the problem faced by desire in ¶¶167 and 175. That problem, the object’s ‘independence’, is transferred to the bondsman, while the lord enjoys its dependence. Hegel’s solution is as obscure as the original problem, but at least the solution is best supplied by a real, external bondsman than by an internal bondsman within the mind. It may be, however, that the process is mirrored in the internal drama too: the meta-self may be better off dealing with an object presented to it by the Self than dealing with it directly.

¶191. 1. The two moments should be the thing as object of desire and the bondsman, for whom ‘thinghood’ is essential—as in ¶190. They are now paraphrased as the bondsman’s ‘working on the thing’ and his ‘dependency on a determinate Being-there’, presumably his attachment to life and its goods. He cannot shed these encumbrances and reach ‘absolute negation’, the total independence of Being-for-itself (see also ¶¶175, 187). He regards himself as unessential in comparison with the thing and, presumably, with the lord. The bondsman therefore abases himself before the lord and recognizes him—in the specific sense of one-sided recognition. Since the lord treats him like dirt, the bondsman is doing to himself what the lord does to him already. In this respect the lord and bondsman act in parallel and are equal collaborators in the act of recognition. In another respect, however, the act of recognition is the lord’s doing, not the bondsman’s. The lord has the whip hand. Since their relationship is so unequal, the lord being the essence, etc. and the bondsman unessential, the bondsman is merely a puppet whose strings are pulled by the lord. If Y gives ‘proper’ recognition to X, then (1) what X does to Y, X also does to himself (X), and (2) what Y does to himself (Y), Y also does to X. These conditions are not fulfilled in this case. Therefore, this is not a case of proper recognition: it is one-sided and unequal.

This conclusion raises three questions: (i) What are the two conditions of proper recognition? (ii) Why are they not fulfilled? (iii) What is wrong with this improper recognition? The answers are as follows: (i) It is unclear whether (1) and (2) are meant to be the same condition applied to each party or a different condition for each party. They seem to be different if we rewrite (1) as ‘If X does (act) A to Y, then X does A to X’ and (2) ‘If Y does A to Y, then Y does A to X’. But it is likely that Hegel didn’t notice this difference and meant the same condition to apply to each party, viz. that each of them should perform the very same acts (of the relevant type) both to the other and to himself. Thus, for example, if X despises Y, then X should despise himself, and if Y abases himself, he should also abase X. (ii) These conditions are not met, because neither X (the lord) nor Y (the bondsman) act in these reciprocal ways. (The fact that the bondsman, being a mere puppet, does not really act at all is not relevant. Y simply does not do anything.) (iii) The non-fulfilment of these conditions implies that if there is any recognition, then it is ‘one-sided and unequal’. But this alone does not mean that it is not ‘proper’ recognition. Recognition, in more than one sense, need not be reciprocal. I may recognize (identify) someone in a line-up or

identification parade, when he does not recognize me. My creditor may recognize (acknowledge) me in passing, when I do not recognize him. A general may recognize someone as a hero by pinning a medal on him, while the hero does not similarly recognize him. However, Hegel probably has an additional point in mind. Being a mere puppet, the bondsman cannot really do anything, and therefore cannot properly recognize the lord. If he is so despised and abased by the lord, his recognition of the lord is a sham. It is as if the general who gives me a medal for my heroism is an impostor, a cowardly incompetent, or a puppet manipulated by myself. There is a near reversal of the roles of the lord and bondsman, reminiscent of the reversal of the poles of a magnet (cf. ¶168) and of the old joke: ‘Policeman: “I’m the boss, and you’re nothing.” Suspect: “That’s a good job, boss over nothing!”’

¶192. 1. Here the ‘unessentiality’ of the bondsman comes into play. The claim that the bondsman constitutes the ‘truth’ of the lord’s self-certainty means something like: this is the upshot or fulfilment of his self-certainty, or what it amounts to. What the lord is, and what the bondsman should be—its ‘concept’—is an independent consciousness. But the bondsman is dependent. So the lord cannot get confirmation of his Being-for-himself from the bondsman. Hegel seems to make a move from: ‘The lord does not get confirmation of his Being-for-himself’ to ‘The lord ceases to have Being-for-himself’. If so, the move is illicit. The fact that the general is an impostor, does not imply that I am not a hero, only that my heroism is not duly recognized. As we see in following ¶¶, the bondsman’s elevation is more substantial than the lord’s demotion.

¶193. 1. This ¶ raises three questions: (i) What is it for the servile consciousness to appear ‘outside of itself’? (ii) What is it to be ‘truth of self-consciousness’ and how is its not appearing as this related to its being outside itself? (iii) Why do the claims in (i) and (ii) contrast (‘But’) with the inversion that the lord and bondsman both undergo? The answers are as follows: (i) Its appearing ‘outside of itself’ is echoed by ‘in relationship to lordship’ in ¶194 and contrasts with ‘driven back into itself’ below and also with ‘within itself’ in ¶194. (ii) Servile consciousness is the truth of the independent consciousness but it does not appear as the truth of self-consciousness. This looks contradictory but really is not. It is the truth of independent consciousness in relation to the lord and, as such, it is unessential, not the truth of, viz. fully fledged, self-consciousness. The grammar of ‘truth of’ is not the same in both phrases. The ‘truth of self-consciousness’ might be paraphrased as ‘true self-consciousness’ or the ‘truth consisting in self-consciousness’, whereas the ‘truth of the independent consciousness’ might be paraphrased as the ‘upshot of the independent consciousness’. (iii) Hence the contrast with the inversion is genuine: servile consciousness did not initially appear as the truth of self-consciousness, but it will be converted into ‘true independence’, i.e. approximately the ‘truth of self-consciousness’.

¶194. 1. Just as the truth of the independent consciousness is the servile consciousness, so the truth of the servile consciousness is the independent consciousness. However, the latter occurrence of ‘truth’ cannot be paraphrased as ‘upshot’, since servile consciousness is not yet aware (‘for it’) that it has this ‘truth of [i.e. consisting in] pure negativity, etc.’ within it. Two experiences bring this truth out: (1) A generalized ‘anxiety’, fear of death, fear of the lord. This thoroughly shakes it up and focuses its attention on its Self, in a similar way to that in which the risk of death in combat focused the attention of the victor. It is aware of (‘for it’) this Being-for-Self, because it has the model of the lord’s Being-for-Self before it as its ‘object’. (2) In its service to the lord, it actualizes its new-found Being-for-Self by working on natural things: it gets rid of them and its attachment to them.

¶195. 1. Factors (1) and (2), anxiety and release from natural things, do not complete the transformation of the bondsman. It is now aware of its Self, but not yet of its Being-for-Self. This emerges in factor (3). The bondsman’s work has not only the negative effect of

relieving him of natural objects and his attachment to them. It also gives a 'permanence' both to the object and to the bondsman himself. For the lord, his desires, the objects and his enjoyment of them are fleeting and evanescent. For the bondsman, by contrast, desire is 'held in check'. This 'cultivates' the bondsman, giving him a self-discipline and a long-term perspective that the lord lacks. It also cultivates and forms the object, conferring on it a permanence and independence that it lacks when it enters the lord's hands and gullet. It therefore provides the bondsman with a model of his own independent Self.

- ¶196. 1. In working on an object, the bondsman cultivates something that presents him with a model of his own Being-for-Self. This is the 'positive meaning' of his activity. But cultivating or forming an object not only imposes a new form, it also removes or 'sublates' its previous form, the form that is a sheer 'being'. (There are two forms in play, the natural form of the unworked object and the form with which the bondsman replaces it.) This is its 'negative meaning'. It is this previous, unrefined form that gave rise to his fear, for it is the 'chain' that holds him in dependence on the lord. But now he destroys this form and comes to realize that he himself is a permanent Being-for-Self. This comes about in three steps. In the figure of the lord, he has an alien Being-for-Self before him. In fear he has the Being-for-Self inside him. Finally, in cultivating an object he becomes aware of his own Being-for-Self. The new, refined form he imposes on the object is located outside him, but it is his own handiwork and testifies that he has a mind of his own and is not just a puppet of the lord. All three factors are needed for this result. (1) Service and obedience ensure that the fear spreads over the 'conscious actuality of Being-there' and is not simply free-floating. (2) Cultivation gives the fear an external expression in which he can discern himself. (3) Absolute fear, consuming his whole 'natural consciousness', is needed to ensure that he retains no residue of attachment to 'determinate Being', i.e. Being-there, that the form he imposes is not a vain whim, still enmeshed in servitude, but expresses the essence of himself, and that his forming is not simply an isolated skill, but displays his mastery over the 'universal power' (Being-there in general?) and whole 'objective essence' (his own essence as seen in the newly formed object?).

B. FREEDOM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: STOICISM, SCEPTICISM,
AND THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS

- ¶197. 1. The 'independent consciousness' is the lord. He suffers from an inability to become a differentiated, yet unitary and persistent ego. This refers back to ¶195, where his desires and satisfactions are said to be fleeting and, presumably, unconnected with each other. The bondsman, by contrast, is 'driven back' into himself (cf. ¶193) and therefore does not suffer from the dispersion of the lord. However, he does have a defect that is surprising in view of ¶196. He has before him both the object he has formed ('itself as independent object') and Being-for-itself in the lord ('this object as a consciousness'). He does not realize, as *we* do, that *in themselves* this form and the Being-for-itself are the same. In cultivating or forming the object, the bondsman has cultivated *himself* and thereby reached, unbeknown to himself, the level of Being-for-Self. A new form of self-consciousness develops out of this, primarily from the servile consciousness, though the lord also plays a part in it. Hegel notices an affinity between, on the one hand, the sameness of Being-for-Self and the formed object, and, on the other hand, the sameness of the I and the concepts about, or in terms of, which it thinks. The thinking consciousness is infinite, in the sense of 'self-contained' (cf. ¶¶168, 169): in thinking concepts, it does not go outside itself, but remains self-enclosed. It is also 'free', because it is wholly self-determined and not dependent on anything external. A 'concept' is distinct from a 'representation' and a 'shape', and similarly a content 'conceptualized' is distinct from something 'represented' or 'shaped'. (Hegel introduces 'shape' here to retain a connection with the object that is shaped by the bondsman, though

he may also have in mind a link with a 'shape' or form of consciousness.) A concept is more general and abstract than a representation. 'Causality' or 'life', for example, qualify as concepts, whereas 'heating' or 'elephant' are merely representations. The meaning and application of representations depend on our sensory input, whereas that of concepts have a minimal dependence on it and, in Hegel's view, none at all. Concepts are a priori, embedded in the core of the human mind. So a concept is 'mine' in a more intimate way than a representation is 'mine'. Hence when I think in terms of concepts I am interacting only with myself. Hegel distinguishes between the intrinsic meaning or content of a representation and its application, but he is less forthcoming about the distinction between a concept and its application. A representation is 'mine' only with qualification, since it depends on sensory input; correspondingly, what is represented is characteristically distinct from myself, a 'being'. (This would be true even of my aches and pains, etc., since they too depend on sensations and do not lie at the core of my mind.) A concept is intrinsically and entirely mine, but it is not clear that its application is similarly independent of sensory input or that an object to which the concept is applied is not distinct from myself: 'Jumbo is alive' seems little different in this respect from 'Jumbo is an elephant'. Hence Hegel is somewhat hazy about whether 'thinking' is *about* concepts or, alternatively, *in terms of* concepts, applying them to things that are conceptualized, but not themselves concepts. Probably he has in mind thinking *about* concepts, since in the final sentence he says that this 'element' (viz. the concepts) does not engage in the 'development and movement of its manifold Being'. Hegel applies to consciousness the expression that in ¶¶156ff. he applied to the like poles of a magnet: *sich gleichnamige*, literally 'like-named to itself' or 'homonymous with itself'. Consciousness repels itself, as two like poles repel each other, and thus bifurcates into the thinking I and the concepts it thinks.

- ¶198. 1. Stoicism is so-called from the *Stoa poikilē*, the 'painted porch', a colonnade in Athens, where Zeno of Citium opened his school c.399 BC. From Greece, it spread to Rome and became especially influential in the Roman Empire. Ethics was central for the Stoics, but they also underpinned it with theories of logic and natural science. For the Stoics, all reality is material, but there is also a more active principle, 'logos', conceived both as the divine reason and as a finer type of all-pervasive matter. The human soul is a manifestation of the logos, and we should live in accordance with nature or reason, in conformity, that is, with the divine order of the universe. Since all human beings are a manifestation of a single logos, the Stoics endorsed cosmopolitanism and the natural equality of all human beings, regardless of wealth and status. This coheres with their belief that the good lies not in external things, but in the state of the soul itself. No evil can afflict one as long as one has the wisdom and restraint to extirpate unruly passions and desires.
- ¶199. 1. The 'manifold expansion of life' includes such matters as whether I am a lord or a bondsman. Normally, one would care about that. A lord would 'have its truth in', roughly derive his significance from, the bondsman, while the bondsman would derive his significance from the will and service of the lord. But if both of them are Stoics, neither of them cares whether they are on the throne (like the Stoic emperor, Marcus Aurelius) or in chains (like, for a time, the Stoic Epictetus). They escape from 'self-will', which is supposed to be freedom but is really a type of bondage, both for the lord and for the bondsman. The Stoic withdraws into his own thought, into 'lifelessness', inactivity, and freedom from suffering. The 'time of universal fear and bondage' in which Stoicism became a 'universal form of the world-spirit' is the Roman Empire, from 27 BC when Octavianus adopted the title 'Augustus' and became the first emperor, until the rise of Christianity, culminating in the conversion of the emperor Constantine in 312 AD. (On the empire and the relation of Stoicism to it see also ¶¶477–80.) Hegel wrongly implies that Stoics withdrew from 'activity'. The Stoic Seneca (c.4 BC–65 AD) became the tutor of Nero, who became emperor in 54 AD

and whose first five years in office were marked by clemency and moderation, under Seneca's guidance. Similarly the reign of Marcus Aurelius (121–80 AD) was marked by clemency and charitable work for the poor as well as defensive wars to protect the empire. A Stoic did engage in activity, but did so in the spirit of an actor, distancing himself from his activity and, presumably, not too elated by the success of his enterprise nor troubled by its failure. Activity in this spirit is consistent with Stoic doctrines. Hegel might object, however, that there lurks an inconsistency between choosing to act in one way rather than another, while remaining *totally* indifferent to the outcome. Even an actor needs to care about the success of his performance.

- ¶200. 1. The 'otherness' in the I is that between the I itself and the concepts it thinks. On the 'double reflection', cf. ¶176, where it involves a duplication of self-consciousness. Here the duplication is between self-consciousness, which withdraws into itself, and 'natural Being-there', which goes free. In order to act and to make claims about the world beyond thought, the Stoic needs some criterion for deciding what is good and what is true. But the answer to this question must either remain within the realm of pure thought and therefore have no bearing on the world beyond, or be arbitrary and disconnected from thought and rationality. Stoicism fails to bridge the gulf between its pure thought (logic) and the needs of practical conduct and empirical knowledge. In fact, Stoics were not quite as helpless in the face of the world as Hegel implies. Despite their belief that worldly things are indifferent, they nevertheless argued that some things and some courses of action are preferable to others.
- ¶201. 1. Because it has withdrawn into itself away from Being-there, Stoicism fails to negate Being-there completely. Hence the content of Being-there reappears within it as a determinate thought that is disconnected from its underlying logic.
- ¶202. 1. Some Greek sophists were sceptics, but as a formal school scepticism began with Pyrrho of Elis (c.360–c.272 BC) who taught that we can never know the real nature of things, that the appropriate response to this is suspension of judgement, and this will lead to tranquillity. His follower, Timon of Phlius, claimed that equally good reasons can be given both for and against any philosophical claim. Scepticism realizes the Stoic project ('concept') in that whereas Stoicism withdrew from the external world and left it 'outside the infinitude [viz. of thought]', scepticism tackles it head on and doubts its reality. Following his tendency to see repeated patterns in different shapes of consciousness, Hegel finds an analogy between the relation of Stoicism to Scepticism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the relation of the 'concept of independent consciousness' in lordship and bondage, to the realization of this concept in desire and labour. Desire was destructive, while labour was formative, but both negated natural entities, as scepticism does. Before this, the combatants, or at least the victor, perform an inner withdrawal in their indifference to life and its external goods. But the sceptic's negation of externality is more effective, because he is already a 'free self-consciousness' and armed with a battery of concepts. In 'pure thinking of itself'—presumably that of the Stoic, but possibly of 'independent consciousness'—the differences between things could be considered only in an abstract way, but the sceptic can consider these differences in their concrete reality.
- ¶203. 1. Hegel acknowledges his debt to scepticism by attributing to it his dialectical unravelling of sensory certainty, perception, and understanding in chapters I–III, or, as he conceives it, revealing the dialectical movement of which they consist. Scepticism now turns its fire on the lord–bondsman relationship and on Stoicism, in particular their ethical prescriptions. 'Abstract thinking' refers to Stoicism; what it counts as determinate is clearly inadequate. The lord–bondsman relationship involves a genuine determinacy in its presentation of ethical laws as 'commands of mastery'. The determinate concepts deployed by Stoicism, by contrast, are 'pure abstractions' and applied unsystematically to the Being outside thought.

- ¶204. 1. The first sentence expresses Hegel's own view of dialectic, that the collapse of a shape of consciousness is not knowingly brought about either by consciousness itself or by the observing philosopher. The scepticism that he goes on to describe is the ancient scepticism which, though it contains Hegelian ingredients, is not his own: e.g. the 'true and the real [do not] vanish without [his] knowing how'. ('Vanish' should mean 'vanish for thinking', but this qualification is often omitted. In fact, the ancient sceptic does not even make things vanish for thinking. He simply doubts their reality; he does not claim to know that they are not real, since he denies that he knows anything at all.) The interventionism of ancient scepticism is marked by the shift from 'consciousness' to the more active and aggressive 'self-consciousness'. The third sentence raises problems. What does Hegel mean by saying that 'self-consciousness causes to vanish not only the objective as such, but its own attitude to it, etc.'? He might simply mean that, as well as doubting the reality of something and thus, in a way, making it vanish, the sceptic also causes to vanish his own previous unsceptical belief in it, including the perception on which this belief was based. However, he is more likely to mean that the sceptic casts doubt on his own sceptical reasoning on which his doubt is based. After all, if one doubts everything, one should surely doubt not only the truth of a claim or the existence of something, but also one's reasons for doubting and even the very fact of one's doubting. 'Sophistry' for Hegel a derogatory term (cf. PS ¶¶130f., where perception engages in sophistry to defend its position), following the Platonic Socrates's criticisms of the sophists. The final two sentences introduce a specifically Hegelian idea: that anything determinate, whether a thing or a concept, owes its determinacy to its difference from something else, as e.g. conservatism depends on a contrast with liberalism, socialism, etc. Hence it is not 'self-contained', but depends on something else. It is therefore vulnerable to encroachment by this other. By contrast ('but'), thinking is implicitly exempted from this dependence on something different from itself; it is 'simple', the insight into the nature of difference, not itself entangled in the network of differences. This is not obviously true. 'Thinking' contrasts with 'sleeping', 'day-dreaming', etc., and although Descartes did not doubt that he was thinking, an ancient sceptic perhaps ought to doubt that he is thinking: after all, one of his strategies is the method of 'equipollence' (cf. ¶¶76 and 83), that if I say *p* and you say not-*p*, your word is as good as mine. Hegel might object, however, first, that when we consider the range of differences to which the concept of thinking belongs, the thinking in which we consider this range transcends the range itself, and secondly that if I say I'm thinking, you cannot produce a good reason for denying it and that any reason you do produce must be thought by me if I am to be moved by it. On Hegel and scepticism, see also Forster (1989).
- ¶205. 1. Hegel now turns to criticism of ancient scepticism. *Ataraxia* is peace of mind, which the ancient sceptics claimed as their goal; Hegel paraphrases it as 'certainty of itself', in view of his stress on the connection of scepticism with self-consciousness. However, this condition is not produced once and for all, leaving its 'coming-to-be' behind. The sceptic has to strive continually for his ataraxia. He tries to maintain an equilibrium between his sensory representations and the representations in his thought, for example, by doubting the reality of whatever he perceives and doubting the truth of any proposition presented to him. Sometimes these representations coincide or are 'equal' to each other, but then this equality dissolves again—succumbing to the fact that equality contrasts with inequality and is thus vulnerable to its encroachment: cf. ¶204. The sceptic is aware of this and admits to it. He admits to being a singular, contingent consciousness, on whom the practicalities of everyday life take their intellectual toll. He stops at a cliff-edge, even though officially he doubts its reality, doubts whether he will fall if he walks over it and whether he will come to any harm if he does. He obeys a law whose existence he officially doubts, and writes a book whose merit and very existence he doubts. He is like an 'animal life': a dog stops at a cliff edge,

though it could hardly be said to *know* anything about it. This is the sceptic as a singular, contingent consciousness. On the other hand, he also is a universal consciousness, entirely at ease and in harmony with itself. He oscillates between these two conditions, his ordinary perceptual, active life and his elevated sceptical stance. The sceptic's position is an intensified form of the Stoic's. The Stoic performs tasks in society, but does not believe that they really matter. He is distanced from the roles he plays like an actor. The sceptic similarly performs tasks, but he does so like an animal. It is not obvious that either position involves a strict contradiction. On a smaller scale we all make decisions, such as which side of the road to walk on, where it does not matter which we opt for, as long as we opt for one or the other. In making such a decision, I might think of myself as an actor or, alternatively, as an animal. If this does not involve an intolerable contradiction, why should there be an intolerable contradiction in the generalization of this predicament?

¶206. 1. In ¶205 the contradiction was between the sceptical attitude of universal doubt and the practical attitude of acting on everyday beliefs and norms. The sceptic was not explicitly aware of the contradiction, but flitted from one limb to the other in order to evade criticism. But now he puts two and two together and becomes aware of the two contradictory thoughts. He morphs into a double consciousness of itself as 'self-liberating, etc.', and itself as 'self-confusing, etc.'. It is not clear whether these two consciousnesses correspond to the sceptical and the everyday attitude respectively, or, if so, how they do so. After all, the confusion and inversion do not stem from either the sceptical or the practical attitude alone, but from their coexistence. It looks as if what is needed is a third consciousness, or aspect of consciousness—an overseer consciousness that is aware of the tension between the first two and conducts the contradiction-evading oscillation. But it is the 'self-confusing' consciousness, or 'the changeable', that has to deal with all the confusions, and the drama is presented from its point of view. So it tends to be an overseer as well.

Hegel gives no hint here that Stoicism too is also a divided consciousness; its self-consciousness is 'simple freedom'. Scepticism realizes this freedom by annihilating the 'Being-there' that threatens it, not simply retreating from it. It is this that leads to its duplication of self-consciousness. Duplication is a recurrent theme in PS: e.g. ¶486 on the duplication into the world of 'actuality' and the world of the 'aether of pure consciousness'. Especially memorable is the description of 'faith' in ¶572: 'The faithful consciousness weighs and measures by a twofold standard, it has two sorts of eyes, two sorts of ears, two sorts of tongue and language, etc.'. See also ¶¶468, 525, and 583, and, for references to unhappy consciousness, ¶¶483 and 528. However, what Hegel probably has in mind in the later paragraphs is that spirit involves an equal partnership of two or more self-consciousnesses, 'I that is We, and We that is I', as in ¶177, rather than the unsatisfactory duplications referred to in the earlier paragraphs.

¶207. 1. If the two consciousnesses were completely severed from each other, then 'it', the overseer consciousness, might settle down in one of them and find 'repose'. But it cannot do that, because each of the consciousnesses contains the other, and so the contradiction between them drives it from one to the other. What would really satisfy it and bring about its self-reconciliation is fully fledged spirit, an equal partnership of two or more self-consciousnesses, 'I that is We, and We that is I', as in ¶177. It already contains the germ of this, involving as it does one undivided, yet duplicated consciousness, where two self-consciousnesses gaze into each other. When it becomes the unity of both self-consciousnesses its problem will be solved. This is presumably why Hegel implies that this unhappy consciousness is closer to spirit than the lord and bondsman were.

¶208. 1. The overseer consciousness is the immediate unity of two different and opposed consciousnesses. They cannot be of the same status therefore: one of them must be regarded as peripheral and inessential. (They could be of equal status, Hegel implies, if there were a

mediated unity of them.) Hegel now says something about the status of the overseer consciousness, a problem that emerged in ¶206. Because it is aware of the contradiction between the two consciousnesses, and is therefore a contradictory or, at least, unstable consciousness itself, it associates itself with the changeable, but it has an ambivalent relationship with the unchangeable. It is also aware of unchangeableness, so it must free itself from the changeable, i.e. from itself. We are to think of a religious man attempting to free himself from his worldly encumbrances, to make himself fit for union with God: ascent to the unchangeable by an unredeemed changeable infects the unchangeable (see ¶209). *For itself* it is *only* the changeable, while the unchangeable is foreign to it. On the other hand, it is simple consciousness and to that extent unchangeable. It is aware of this unchangeable consciousness as its essence, though again it is not this essence. It cannot regard the changeable and unchangeable as living in a peaceful coexistence of mutual indifference. So, being changeable, it cannot be indifferent to the unchangeable. It is shuttled back and forth from the one to the other, driven by its own contradictions as well as theirs. This reminds us of Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard.

- ¶209. 1. The enemy is the changeable. In attaining one of the opposites, the unchangeable, the overseer consciousness loses it in its opposite, the changeable. It is discontented with its worldly life, regarding itself as nothing in contrast with the essence. So it ascends to the unchangeable, focuses its consciousness on it. But the ascent is performed by itself as singularity, and this infects the unchangeable. Singularity cannot be eliminated from its consciousness of the unchangeable. Hence the victory is Pyrrhic. Why the switch from ‘changeable’ to ‘singularity’? Perhaps because it is more obvious that in its ascent it must remain singular than that it must remain changeable, but also to prepare the way for ¶210.
- ¶210. 1. The defeat of ¶209 turns into victory. Unhappy consciousness sees an affinity between its own singularity and the singularity that has emerged in the unchangeable. The transformation of defeat into victory has three stages: (1) it finds itself opposed to the unchangeable again. It regards its conception of, and approach to, the unchangeable as marred by its own singularity. The unchangeable is alien to it and condemns singularity. This is defeat. (2) It sees that the unchangeable itself contains singularity, like itself. So the ‘whole mode of existence’ passes across to the unchangeable. It is not, as in (1), only its conception of, and approach to, the unchangeable that involves singularity, but the unchangeable itself. (3) It realizes that this singular in the unchangeable is, or approximates to, itself. So consciousness becomes spirit. It is overjoyed to find itself in the unchangeable, and its singularity reconciled with the universal.

This threefold movement alludes to the Father–Son–Spirit triad. Stage (1) is the God of Abraham, unapproachable by unworthy man. (2) Introduces genuine individuality into God, the son. (3) Is spirit, the stage of joy (symbolized by tongues of fire in Acts 2) and reconciliation (symbolized by the dove in Mark 1:10).

- ¶211. 1. What was described in ¶210 is the experience of the divided self-consciousness. But since this self-consciousness is also the unchangeable consciousness, this is singular consciousness too and it plays a part in the movement. As far as consciousness’s experience goes, the unchangeable is first opposed to singularity altogether, then singular itself, though still opposed to the other, then finally united with it. But we need to distinguish between unchangeableness of consciousness, which is still laden with an opposite, and true unchangeableness, the unchangeable independently. We don’t know how this behaves, only how it appears to consciousness.
- ¶212. 1. This ¶ alludes to the incarnation. The ‘shaping’, i.e. appearance in human shape, of the unchangeable consciousness remains separated and aloof from the singular consciousness, because we do not know how the unchangeable will behave. Its assuming human shape is a sheer ‘happening’, not the doing of singular consciousness. Even when it ‘finds itself’ in

- this unchangeable, this is in part the unchangeable's doing and still involves opposition. The sensory presence of the unchangeable is itself a barrier to unification with it. Moreover, it inevitably lasts only for a time and is remote in space.
- ¶213. 1. The divided consciousness abandons its original project of sublating its singularity and becoming the unchangeable consciousness. Instead, it tries to sever its relationship to the *unshaped* unchangeable and to relate only to the *shaped* unchangeable. It now wants to unite with the unchangeable without losing its singularity. In this way it hopes to circumvent the insuperable absolute dividedness that stood in the way of its original project. However, it still has to overcome the alienness of the *shaped* unchangeable. In referring to the 'shapeless abstract unchangeable', both here and in the preceding ¶¶, Hegel uses the neuter gender (*das*), but the 'shaped unchangeable' is masculine, both here and in ¶215 (*den, der*).
- ¶214. 1. The first of these relationships is dealt with in ¶¶215, 216, and 217, the second in ¶¶218ff., and the third in ¶¶223ff.
- ¶215. 1. The shaped unchangeable is again masculine, hence 'he', etc. Hegel refers back to ¶211, where he said that we do not know how the unchangeable *in and for itself* 'will behave'. It is not quite clear what 'pure consciousness' is, nor whether it refers to Christ's contemporary followers or to later attempts to make sense of him. Subsequent ¶¶ give some clues about this. Without the cooperation of the unchangeable himself, consciousness of him cannot be complete and free of intrusive opposition.
- ¶216. 1. The unhappy consciousness now engages in pure and abstract thinking. So Hegel now has in mind attempts to make sense of Christ after his death. Unlike Stoicism, it brings its pure thinking to bear on singularity. It does not, however, get as far as 'reconciling' the singularity of consciousness with pure thinking. What it misses is that 'the unchangeable' (Hegel here reverts to the neuter) which appears 'in the shape of singularity, is *consciousness itself*'. This seems to mean that the unchangeable is not a distinct entity from consciousness and that Christ is no more, but no less, than a human being. Unhappy consciousness does not realize this, however.
- ¶217. 1. Pure consciousness is 'in itself pure thinking singularity' and the unchangeable is pure thinking. But the relation between them is not pure thinking, since pure consciousness does not approach the unchangeable 'thinkingly' (*denkend*). It goes 'towards thinking' (*an das Denken hin*) and is thus 'devotion' (*Andacht*, a close relative of '*denken*' with its past participle '*gedacht*'). Its approach to the object is now feeling rather than proper thinking. The object is not 'conceptualized' and therefore appears alien. In effect, therefore, consciousness has retreated into the narcissism of the pure 'heart', which feels itself, but as painfully divided. It is certain of its essence as this pure heart, thinking itself as singularity, and this certainty is recognized by the object, because the object thinks itself as singularity. But this essence (presumably the object rather than the pure heart) still eludes it. When it tries to reach itself in the essence, which, like itself, thinks itself as singularity, it only ever finds its inessential Self as opposed to the unchangeable. It cannot grasp the unchangeable as a singular, since it regards it not as a concept, but as a sensory object that has inevitably vanished. It therefore seeks it in its grave, but finds it empty. (This alludes to the crusaders: cf. PH, p.393: 'At this sepulchre the Christian world received a second time the response given to the disciples when they sought the body of the Lord there: "Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, but is risen."'). So consciousness abandons the quest for the unchangeable as actual and begins to find its way to singularity as universal, in thought.
- ¶218. 1. This is the second of the stages mentioned in ¶214: desire and work. PH, p.395, gives the general idea: 'Spirit, disappointed with regard to its craving for the sensuous presence of Deity, fell back upon itself. . . . From this time forward we witness religious and intellectual movements in which Spirit—transcending the repulsive and irrational existence by which it is surrounded—either finds its sphere of exercise within itself, and draws upon its own

resources for satisfaction, or throws its energies into an actual world of general and morally justified aims, . . .’ As instances of this change, Hegel mentions the establishment of monastic and chivalric orders, and the flourishing of theology, philosophy, science, and even art. ‘Desire’ and ‘enjoyment’ hark back to the lord in ¶190, but may also allude to the Eucharist. In reality, or ‘for us’, this worldly success is man’s own doing, stemming from the ‘self-feeling’ he has now reached. But to the unhappy consciousness itself it seems like a mysterious gift from the unattainable essence, and it is therefore divided between this world and a world beyond.

- ¶219. 1. Owing to the incarnation, the singular objects of desire and work are, like unhappy consciousness itself, internally divided. On one side they are worthless, on the other they embody the unchangeable essence. Because the unchangeable is universal, it constitutes one side not only of each single entity, but of the world as a whole.
- ¶220. 1. Actuality is now a shape of God. So consciousness can no longer regard it as intrinsically worthless, as it did in ¶174. It can only alter and enjoy actuality because God surrenders himself to it (especially in the Eucharist). Consciousness itself is correspondingly divided. On the surface, it is Being-for-itself, an independent agent. But *in itself* it owes all its power of activity to God.
- ¶221. 1. Active consciousness, and the passive actuality on which it operates, confront each other as two extremes. Underlying each extreme, however, is God himself. He freely supplies the power that enables consciousness to act and, at the other extreme, freely bends actuality to the will of consciousness. God thereby repels himself from himself in a way that recalls the behaviour of a magnet. So consciousness does not attribute its success to itself, but rather to the grace of God.
- ¶222. 1. The universal God renounces his shape and the singular consciousness renounces its independence by giving thanks. So it looks as if they have achieved unification. But this is illusory. Consciousness really did get satisfaction from its activity, despite its show of renouncing it. Its thanks-giving is its own action (seemingly exempt from the absolute power of God, so that God is not ventriloquistically thanking himself); it outweighs God’s renunciation of a mere surface of himself, since it renounces consciousness’s own action, its very essence. Singular consciousness has turned the tables on God. Not only has it gained satisfaction from what it renounces, but its renunciation has trumped God’s. By a ‘double reflection’ it re-emerges as an independent singularity in contrast to God.
- ¶223. 1. This is the third of the relationships heralded in ¶214, ‘consciousness of its Being-for-itself’. The enemy that now lies in wait for it is sin.
- ¶225. 1. Because of its retreat into singularity, its activities lack universal content and significance. Consciousness therefore attempts to sublimate this distressing singularity and accordingly focuses on the most conspicuously singular aspect of a human being, its animal, primarily sexual, functions. This is self-defeating, however, since if we pay excessive attention to our animal functions, especially if we try to suppress them, they come to seem far more important than they really are.
- ¶226. 1. Things are not as bad as they seem, however. Alongside unhappiness and impoverishment, consciousness also has the thought of God, which is needed to mediate, or motivate, its assault on its singularity. In time this will make consciousness aware of its unity with God.
- ¶227. 1. Singularity therefore constitutes one extreme over against another, God. But owing to its sinfulness, consciousness can approach God only by way of a middle term, a priest or confessor. With the aid of the priest, consciousness continues its battle against singularity.
- ¶228. 1. All action involves guilt, Hegel believes, since in choosing one course of action one inevitably excludes other worthy alternatives: see e.g. ¶468. But consciousness can relieve itself of guilt by accepting the divinely inspired advice of the priest. It makes other sacrifices

too: it speaks and listens to Latin, which it does not understand; it gives away its goods; and it fasts.

¶229. 1. The renunciation described in ¶222 was a deception. It left consciousness with the outer freedom to act and enjoy its property, and with the inner freedom to make its own decisions. By the renunciation described in ¶228 it gives up these remaining freedoms and turns itself into a thing rather than an I.

¶230. 1. Unhappy consciousness has shed everything it has, including its own singular will, and transferred it onto the universal essence or God. Even this transferral is not its own act, but imposed upon it by God via the mediating priest. All that remains is a universal, impersonal will and reason. Implicitly, the singular consciousness has become identical with this universal. From being nothing it has in effect become everything. Consciousness is not aware of all this and retains a remnant of unhappiness, but it has at least acquired the idea of impersonal reason. This reason is no longer the reason of Stoicism, detached from the singularity of the world. It embraces the singularity that consciousness transferred to it. 'Reason' in Hegel's sense is different from 'understanding'. Understanding is analytical and separates things and concepts, while reason brings them together. See e.g. *Enc. I*, ¶¶79–82. God has now come down to earth.

C. (AA.) Reason

V. *Certainty and Truth of Reason*

¶231. 1. For unhappy consciousness there were two extremes, the singular consciousness (Being-for-itself) and God (Being-in-itself), with no obvious link between them. But because singular consciousness has renounced itself and transferred itself to God, God is no longer exclusively universal, but incorporates worldly singularity. Consciousness has discarded its Being-for-itself and converted it into Being, the worldly Being that is now the other extreme to God. Consciousness is therefore no longer this other extreme, but the mediator between Being and the refurbished God, announcing to each their unity. The status of the mediating consciousness is unclear. Hyppolite, I, p.195, identifies it with the medieval Church, on the basis of ¶230. But it is more likely to be enlightenment reason, as yet undeveloped.

¶232. 1. So far consciousness has been hostile to the world and to its own position ('actuality') in it. Now it becomes reconciled to the world and adopts an idealist attitude towards it. Despite initial appearances, 'idealism' here does not mean that it regards material things as constructions of the mind rather than existing independently, but that it discerns objective rationality in the world mirroring its own subjective rationality. The distinction between these two types of idealism corresponds to the distinction between two German words for 'idea': *Vorstellung* ('representation'), a subjective idea in the mind, and *Idee* ('Idea'), an objective idea or ideal in Plato's and, especially, Aristotle's sense. In PS, the word *Idee* occurs rarely outside the Preface, but see ¶¶269 and 276, and also *Enc.I*, ¶¶213–44 for Hegel's later use of the word.

¶233. 1. The formula 'I am I' suggests that Hegel has in mind the quasi-Kantian idealism of Fichte, who argued that the external world is a product of the I, which projects the external world as a non-I in opposition to itself. The formula 'I am I' might express simply 'self-consciousness in general' (cf. ¶167) or the 'free self-consciousness' of Stoicism (¶197) and Scepticism (¶202). But in Fichte's sense it expresses the simple self-equality of the I from which everything else can be derived. However, the point and motivation of this idealism is incomprehensible unless we take into account the preparatory stages presented in chapters I–IV of PS. Chapters I–III have, by their demolition of attempts to give coherent accounts of reality independently of consciousness, shown that self-consciousness is all reality 'in itself',

while IV has shown how it becomes aware of this. Chapter V will now cover this ground again from the point of view of reason. Section A., ‘Observing reason’ (§§240ff.) corresponds to chapters I–III; section B., ‘The actualization of rational self-consciousness through itself’ (§§347ff.) corresponds to chapter IV; while section C., ‘Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself’ (§§394ff.) expounds the single truth on which I–III (A) and IV (B) converge, viz. that whatever is (in itself) is for consciousness and whatever is for consciousness is in itself.

- ¶234. 1. Idealism faces the problem of equipollence, that a sheer assertion is no better than its contrary: cf. ¶76. Hegel’s primary response to this problem is to take on board both assertions, albeit in a modified form. This is how he treats seemingly competing philosophies: cf. ¶2. So when he says that reason sanctions the denial of idealism, he does not mean only that reason’s dogmatism entitles anti-idealists to be equally dogmatic, even though they are quite mistaken. He is implying that the claims of anti-idealism should be incorporated into a doctrine which, though it still remains an idealism, is quite different from the one-sided idealism of Fichte. Thus the ‘reflection from’ the opposite certainty does not result in its sheer dismissal. The idea that the concept of something involves the process by which it came about echoes the dictum that ‘The true is the whole’: see ¶20. The final sentence anticipates Nietzsche’s genealogy, especially his claim that ‘all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has no history is definable’ (*On the Genealogy of Morals*, II.13). There is a parallelism between changing views of the I-object relation over history and the rational development of consciousness. In contrast to Nietzsche, Hegel regards both developments as progressive.
- ¶235. 1. In the Aristotelian tradition, categories are very general ways of classifying beings into substances, qualities, quantities, relations, etc. with no obvious connection to idealism. Kant transposed categories into an idealist mode. Categories are no longer ways of classifying objective beings, but very general concepts that we must apply to all beings in order to have knowledge of beings at all: substance, causality, etc. Our application of these categories makes reality known to us as a differentiated orderly system. The idea that the I is a single, simple category, converting reality into such a system coincident with our consciousness, is an innovation of Hegel’s, not found in Kant or Fichte. Kant’s was a ‘bad idealism’, leaving unknowable things-in-themselves beneath knowable reality; Hegel, in the spirit of Fichte, wants the whole of reality to be accessible to, even coincident with, consciousness. On Hegel’s own view, the negativity and difference that still remain between self-consciousness and reality (see ¶234) implies (somewhat mysteriously) that the single category must differentiate itself into a plurality of categories, as in Hegel’s *Logic*. Since Kant (and Fichte) overlooks this negativity, he can give no satisfactory account of the plurality of categories that it nevertheless imposes on him. He simply ‘finds’ them in the forms of judgement, which (on Hegel’s view) are not to be presupposed, but derived within the categorical system itself (Hegel’s *Logic*).
- ¶236. 1. There are four types of item in play: (1) The simple category—the I or consciousness; (2) the categories or species into which (1) diversifies; (3) the category of singularity (roughly ‘individuality’), which takes its place among (2); and (4) actual singular things, which are (or would be) the sheer ‘negative of consciousness’. The categories, (2), are not really ‘things’, i.e. (4), because (1) is their genus or essence. But (1) must overcome their, (2)’s, contradicting plurality by incorporating them in ‘negative unity’, a unity that takes account of their differences (like Hegel’s *Logic*). In doing this, (1) becomes not a singular entity (4), but the category of singularity (3). Singularity points towards an external reality, an other than itself. But this other turns out not to be real singulars (4), but simply other categories, so that consciousness remains enclosed within itself: each category refers

only to other categories, not to anything beyond categories. The categories are involved in a merry-go-round of transition into each other. (Hegel will attempt to find an exit from this enclosure.)

- ¶237. 1. Consciousness oscillates between participating in the merry-go-round of the categories and stepping back from them while surveying their movement from a distance.
- ¶238. 1. 'Mine' translates *Mein*, the nominalized form of the first person possessive determiner, *mein*, 'my, mine'. There is the same pun on 'meaning' (*Meinen*) as in ¶117.
2. The I of Kantian idealism claims to be all reality. But it cannot fill out this proclamation, and the reality that it claims to be, from its own resources, since it is trapped within its categorical system. It therefore resorts to external sensations, in a thoroughly empiricist manner. Sensations are supposed to stem from an 'impulse' (Fichte) or from the unknowable 'thing in itself' (Kant), alien imports designed only to do the work that the I cannot do for itself. These sensations run on in 'bad', endless infinity. Idealism has ended up in the same position as 'meaning' (i.e. sensory certainty), perception, and understanding. It regards its knowledge, which is knowledge only of appearances, as untrue, since true knowledge is found only in the 'unity of apperception' (a Kantian expression meaning the coherent experience of a unitary Self, hence here the I itself), but counts it as knowledge nonetheless: cf. ¶75.
- ¶239. 1. Kantian-Fichtean idealism does not fulfil the promise implicit in its espousal of the *abstract concept* of reason. This type of reason cannot handle the reality that confronts it. *Actual* reason, by contrast, begins with a more modest claim: that it is the certainty of being all reality, but not yet in truth, and therefore needs to fulfil its promise by providing a rational account of nature. On Kant, see also *Enc. I*, ¶¶40ff., esp. ¶60.

A. OBSERVING REASON

- ¶240. 1. Hegel plays with the homonyms *Sein*, 'Being', the nominalized infinitive of *sein*, 'to be', and *Seinen*, the nominalized genitive of the third person possessive determiner, *sein*, 'its, his'.
2. Consciousness revisits the content of 'meaning' (*Meinen*) and perceiving to reinterpret it in terms of the unity of being and self-consciousness. It is now more active than previously: it approaches the world in order to find reason in things and its own (good) infinitude. Hegel has by now transformed the idealism of Kant and Fichte into an idealism closer to his own.
- ¶241. 1. The pure I, or abstract reason, can see itself in the world in general, but it requires the complexity and depth of developed reason to digest fully the complex differentiation of the world. The final sentence heralds the tripartite division of chapter V: in section A reason excavates the entrails of things, in B it completes itself within itself, and in C it experiences its own completion. Cf. ¶233.
- ¶242. 1. Reason forms, in Hegel's view, the core of the human mind as well as the fundamental structure of the external world. In the mind reason has in a purer 'shape', while in the world it is entangled with sensory details. Thus Hegel's developed system, to which PS is an intended introduction, begins with Logic, where concepts are considered in their own right. Only in the second part of the system are these concepts found embedded in natural phenomena and, in the third part, in the mind or spirit itself. Phenomenology, however, follows a different order. Reason begins not by considering itself, but by observing the natural world and attempting to find itself in it. It takes its unity with Being to be immediate, rather than mediated by a prior examination of itself in its pure form. Nevertheless, in cognizing things, it transforms them into concepts, and regards these as the essence of things. Consciousness sees what things are, but not yet that it is itself a system of concepts. Eventually it will come to know what we already know.
- ¶243. 1. Observing reason is tripartite, considering nature in ¶¶244–97, spirit (logical and psychological laws) in ¶¶298–308, and the relation between nature and spirit (physiognomy

and phrenology) in ¶¶309–47). Reason is in search of itself, not just as an external observer, but as an actuality within the world, and hopes to find itself in ¶¶309ff.

a. Observation of nature

- ¶244. 1. Observation is not concerned only with sensations, nor even with the objects of perception that have been determined from sensations, but with objects regarded as instantiating a universal.
- ¶245. 1. The universals that reason first considers are static. Entities are classified into universal types by the observer, not by the entities themselves. See, by contrast, the procedure recommended in ¶246, and also in *Enc. I*, ¶230 Addition: ‘the principle of division must be taken from the very nature of the object that is to be subdivided, so that the division is made naturally and is not merely artificial, i.e. arbitrary. Hence, for example, the division of mammals in zoology is mainly based on the teeth and claws, and this makes sense, because the mammals distinguish themselves from one another through these parts of their bodies, and the universal type of the various classes can be traced back to them.’ In lieu of some such principle of classification (though preferably one that licenses the distinction between mammals and non-mammals as well) reason resorts to endless description, a movement of itself rather than of the objects themselves, with no way of distinguishing between what is essential and what is accidental.
- ¶246. 1. On the sexual differentiation of plants, noted especially by Linnaeus, see *Enc. II*, ¶348 Addition.
2. We can tell, e.g., that something is an acid when it is put into relation with litmus and turns it red, but that tells us little about its chemical composition when it is ‘at rest’.
3. Here, and in ¶247, ‘stable’ translates *gleichbleibend(es)*, literally ‘remaining-equal’. When an acid, e.g., is put into relation with its opposite, an alkali, it does not differentiate itself from the alkali, but turns into a neutral salt.
- ¶247. 1. Vagueness, borderline cases, and hybrids bedevil classificatory systems. A horse, e.g., belongs to the genus *equus*, while its determinacy is *caballus*. A donkey also belongs to the horse family, but is by contrast *equus asinus*. But how are we to classify the infertile offspring of a female horse and a male donkey, the mule? Here we are reduced to mere description to supplement our classificatory system.
- ¶248. 1. To handle the mutability and essential interrelatedness of differentiae or determinacies, reason ascends from the domain of perception to that of the understanding, in search of the laws that govern their changes and relationships. It does so instinctively, driven by the exigencies of its subject-matter, not by a programme planned in advance. Such laws are not manifest in sensory reality, but must be extracted from it by experimentation, which detaches the law from specific sensory phenomena and renders it conceptual: cf. ¶251.
- ¶249. 1. A law must satisfy two requirements. First, it must be found in ‘experience’, which here has the flavour of ‘experiment’. Reason has no time for hypotheses that ought to be the case but are not confirmed in experience. (An implicit criticism of Fichte, but see also ¶337.) Secondly, it must have an intrinsic necessity and intelligibility, and not simply be a contingent succession or correlation. These two requirements are implied in the unusual word ‘self-essence’ (*Selbstwesen*), an essence that appears of its own accord.
- ¶250. 1. Reason regards its laws not as intrinsically rational, but as sheer alien facts. But if it really believed this, it would not accept such a generalization as ‘All stones fall when raised above the Earth and let go’ before testing it with every stone. In practice, it tests it with several stones and then claims to infer by ‘analogy’, or induction, that it applies to all stones: see *Enc. I*, ¶190. However, reasoning by analogy fails so often that it tells us not to trust reasoning by analogy. Moreover, it justifies only an assignment of probability, not of truth. In fact, reason accepts the unquestionable truth of this law; it speaks of probability only to

indicate its lack of conceptual insight into the law. But it is also aware of the weight of the stone: the stone's weight explains why it falls. Both factors are required for its acceptance of the law: experiential confirmation of the correlation and an explanation of it. (The introduction of weight would not withstand a scepticism as radical as Hume's. How do we know that all stones are heavy, without lifting them all? How can we be sure that a stone that requires effort to lift will also fall when we let it go? Reason's scepticism here is more easily satisfied than Hume's.)

- ¶251. 1. Experiments extricate universals from the specific empirical material with which they are initially associated. This is especially the case with polar phenomena such as electricity, and acids and bases, which depend for their existence on their relationship to each other. The universal predicates are detached from the specific subjects in which they originally inhered. Because of this they tend to be regarded as distinct 'matters', though not exactly as 'bodies': cf. ¶115. The word 'synsomaties' was coined by a Hungarian chemist, J.J. Winterl (1732–1802). He postulated two fundamental substances, which he named 'Andronia' and 'Thelycke' (from the Greek for 'male' and 'female') that were the essences of acidity and alkalinity, or basicity, respectively and could inform any material substrate regardless of its other properties. In *Enc.* II, ¶327, *synsomaties* are combinations of substances that do not interact chemically. The theory is obscure, but Hegel's aim in PS ¶251 is to suggest that acidity and basicity are, like positive and negative electricity, essentially related to each other and indifferent to the material they inhabit.
- ¶252. 1. A matter, unlike a body, is not a thing, but a universal and therefore entirely appropriate for a law.
- ¶253. 1. Consciousness rises to the level of the law liberated from sensory material, then to the concept of law. But it sees this concept as a new type of object. The concept of law is the differentiated unity of determinacies, which keep passing into each other. The object that has this structure is the organic being.
- ¶254. 1. An organic thing is not dependent on and vulnerable to other things in the way that inorganic things are. It is a relatively closed system, with its parts unified and regulated by its concept. It maintains itself in the face of its surroundings.
- ¶255. 1. Organic entities are unified 'individualities', 'reflected into themselves', not simply 'singularities', which inorganic things (apart from the planet in ¶245) tend to be. Inorganic things shed aspects of themselves onto organisms, while the latter remain relatively self-enclosed. So laws relating them concern the influence of the elements on organic entities rather than the other way round. These laws leave unexplained the wealth of organic life, and they are approximate rules, rather than exceptionless laws, especially since there is no conceptual relationship between organic entities and the elements as there is between positive and negative electricity or an acid and a base. In lieu of strict laws, reason resorts to teleological explanation, e.g. that a bear's fur serves the purpose of protecting it from the cold. But this does not explain how this purpose gives rise to the fur. The thought floats freely above the organic and inorganic processes.
- ¶256. 1. On internal teleology, see ¶22. An organism maintains itself in the face of its environment. It integrates into a single system the relations of cause and effect, agent and patient, that are, in inorganic nature, separated from each other. Since its internal process is circular, e.g. the heart pumps blood to the brain, while the brain in turn keeps the heart working, no distinction can be drawn between what is first and what is the result. (The distinction between internal and external teleology is unclear, however. Hegel assumes that an organism's environment is simply external to it. But if e.g. an animal lives off fruit and in its excrement distributes seeds that give rise to more fruit, the animal and the fruit seem to form a single symbiotic system rather than two systems external to each other. The distinction looks plausible because in ¶255 the causal traffic is one-way: the weather affects polar bears, but polar bears do not affect the weather.)

- ¶257. 1. 'End' translates 'Ende', which does not mean 'aim' or 'purpose' (*Zweck*), but only 'finish, termination'. The purpose-concept is not simply the free-floating thought of ¶255, but is at work within the actual organism. An organism is related to and affected by its external environment. Suppose e.g. that its fur grows thicker in the winter. External teleology is content to say that the fur is explained by the purpose it serves, that what initiates its growth is the cold weather. But that does not explain why the weather has just this effect rather than its more natural effect of freezing the creature to death. What explains this is the underlying internal teleology of the organism's self-maintenance. The survival of the organism is the end or result. But it is also what comes first: the cold would not have this effect if the animal had no tendency to maintain itself, by e.g. regulating its own temperature. In a sense, then, no change has taken place.
- ¶258. 1. Self-consciousness involves a (non-)distinction between I and myself, and accordingly it has found here a (non-)distinction between an animal and itself. The analogy between an animal's consumption of food and reason's approach to external reality is clear enough, but the analogue of the animal's self-maintenance is obscure, because it is unclear what reason is in quest of. Is it simply trying to show that external reality is rationally intelligible, or to find a structural similarity (as here) between itself and external reality, or to locate rational humanity in the order of things? Presumably its quest would not be fulfilled even if it *were* to recognize this structural similarity between itself and the animal, since its account of reality would remain incomplete unless it could locate itself in reality as whole, which requires, among other things, explaining the difference between itself and an animal. However, while an animal finds repose in self-feeling after its meal, self-consciousness, since it is also consciousness, fails to recognize itself in the purpose as a thing, i.e. an animal. This is because it persists in taking the purpose to be an external purpose, external both to the animal and to consciousness itself, whose object it is. The purpose can only be located in 'another understanding', presumably God's.
- ¶259. 1. Reason's failure to recognize an organism's inner purpose stems from the very fact that it is an inner purpose and so not manifest to observation. The organism presents its self-maintenance as if it were a contingent fact of its Being, not determined by its 'purpose-concept', i.e. the concept that constitutes its purpose. Hence reason locates that concept in 'an understanding', viz. God's. Correspondingly, reason needs to view its *own* concept outside itself, as a thing. Since it has no adequate conception of inner purposiveness, it cannot form an adequate conception of itself.
- ¶260. 1. On the view accepted by reason in ¶259, that the purpose-concept (i.e. the concept in which the organism's purpose consists) is distinct from the organism's self-maintenance, the organism's activity is the middle term between the concept and the self-maintained organism. The activity is just individual bits of behaviour. (If the activity is taken as universal, then it belongs to the purpose-concept and not to the organism itself, since reason is unable to combine the universal with the changing individual.) In that case, however, the activity is entirely lawless. The concept requires only that the organism preserve itself; being external to the organism, it does not regulate the way in which it does so. For all we know, bears might light fires or knit themselves sweaters to fend off the cold. If, by contrast, the concept is immanent in the organism, its activity is regulated lawfully.
- ¶261. 1. The unity of the universal purpose and the activity realizing it is an inner movement that can only be conceived conceptually, whereby moments continually pass into each other. But observation cannot conceive them in this way, but only as fixed and permanent. Hence it keeps universality and singularity apart from each other.
- ¶262. 1. On the inner and the outer, see *Enc. I*, ¶¶138–41.

- ¶263. 1. This type of law is quite different from the preceding laws. The differentiated unity of the two sides is conveyed by the term ‘expression’.
- ¶264. 1. Since the inner is an object of observation, it must have a character of its own and not simply be whatever is expressed by the outer. The inner must have an outer of its own, apart from the exterior of the organism.
- ¶265. 1. ‘Soul’ is used in its Aristotelian sense of the animating principle of the body: see also *Enc.* III, ¶¶378 and 388ff. On the soul’s partition into sensibility, irritability, and reproduction, see ¶172 and note. Plants reproduce themselves but lack sensibility and have only feeble irritability.
- ¶266. 1. All three functions concern the organism as a *Selbstzweck*, an ‘end-in-itself’. Consequently all involve a ‘reflection into itself’, the constitution of itself as a unitary object that has sensations of its own states and of other entities, reacts to external invasions, and produces both its own parts (‘singular’, rather than ‘individual’, since they lack independence) and other individuals like itself.
- ¶267. 1. These organic systems are the outer side of the inner, mentioned in ¶264. The functions themselves, sensibility, etc., are not restricted to a particular location as their anatomical systems are, but pervade the whole organism.
- ¶268. 1. Specifically, organic laws relate all these items to one another. E.g. such and such a sensibility is expressed in such and such a nervous system or is correlated with such and such a reproductive function. The inner side, sensibility, etc., has its own outer side, e.g. the nervous system, which is distinct from the primary outer side—the body as a whole. Sensibility, e.g., is observable both in the nervous system and in the comportment of the whole body—since like the other functions, it is not confined to the location of its anatomical system.
- ¶270. 1. The psychic functions, sensibility, etc., are quite different from their anatomical bases, the nervous system, etc. They spread throughout the whole organism. Moreover, they are conceptually intertwined. There cannot be sensibility without irritability or irritability without sensibility. They cannot therefore vary in quantity. (Hyppolite, I, p.226, cites Karl Friedrich Kiemeyer’s dictum: ‘Sensibility and irritability vary in inverse proportion’.) A given reaction might equally be explained by high sensibility and lower irritability, or by high irritability and lower sensibility. The assignment of relative quantities is thus arbitrary. (It is less clear how Hegel’s point applies to reproduction, especially as plants have it without the other functions.)
- ¶271. 1. Hegel’s generalized attack on quantification is unjustified. His examples concerning size, holes, and the number three are tautologies, but those concerning magnets, electricity, and acids and bases are not. The opposite poles of a magnet are in fact of equal strength, but there is no obvious contradiction in the idea of a monopolar magnet or of a magnet, one of whose poles is stronger than the other. Acids and bases need not be of the same strength. A certain quantity of strong alkali might be neutralized either by a similar quantity of strong acid or by a larger quantity of weak acid. On intensive and extensive magnitude, see *Enc.* I, ¶¶99, 103. Temperature is an intensive quantity whose degree can be measured by an extensive quantity, the height to which mercury rises in a thermometer. The strength of an acid is an intensive quantity and might be measured by the amount of it (extensive quantity) needed to neutralize a given amount of an alkali whose strength is also given. But it does not follow that intension and extension are equal. A large amount of a weak acid might, if I drink it, have a similar effect on me as a small amount of strong acid.
- ¶272. 1. Hegel seems to be mistaken. Intension and extension would be relevant, if e.g. we tried to measure the intensity of someone’s sensitivity to a stimulus by the speed of their irritable reaction to it.

- ¶274. 1. These supposed laws focus on the immediate outer or externality of the inner psychic functions, their anatomical bases, not on the functions themselves nor on the outer shape of the whole organism. They neglect the a priori relationships between the functions themselves. Hegel turns to the outer of the organism as a whole in ¶¶283ff.
- ¶275. 1. If we turn to the manifestation of the psychic functions in the outer behaviour of organisms ('Being-there'), then they become just like ordinary properties, such as weight, hardness, and colour, and their occurrence conforms to no law. Nature is not determined conceptually all the way down.
- ¶276. 1. On the deficiency of anatomy, see ¶53.
- ¶278. 1. The sides of a law are supposed (as Hume argued) to be stable and to be 'indifferent' to each other, i.e. not conceptually interrelated. But an organism does not satisfy these requirements. The relevant determinations will not stay fixed, but continually pass into each other. The 'representation' of a law, which gets lost, contrasts with the 'thought' of the law in ¶279.
- ¶279. 1. This law-giving is different from the law-giving of the understanding in ¶¶149ff. The understanding was aware of the sides of the law, but not of the relation between them. It had to make the transition from one side to the other for itself. Here, by contrast, the sides make the transition themselves before the very eyes of the understanding. The law that the outer is the expression of the inner (cf. ¶262) conveys the idea of this transition. It is a conceptual rather than an empirical truth and is the *thought* of law, not simply a *representation* of the specific laws which the understanding sought previously and still hankers for here. But now the understanding can no longer get a grip on intrinsically static sides needed for a law. The sides immediately succumb to the unrest of the concept.
- ¶280. 1. To find a side that engages with another side in a lawful manner, the understanding must invoke the organic functions as they are reflected into themselves, i.e. as they are in themselves, apart from their transitions into each other. But then they have no such determinate quality as redness or acidity that can enter into a contrast with other qualities. Their only determinacy is to continually exchange their determinacies, and then they slither out of understanding's grasp. All that remains in them for the understanding to get hold of is their supposed difference in magnitude.
- ¶281. 1. Since the object is now seen as organic and governed by its concept, this understanding differs from the purely perceptual understanding of chapter III. However, it relapses into this earlier mode of understanding, just because, in deference to the exigencies of law-giving, it makes what it apprehends into fixtures, susceptible to quantification. Nothing is gained by the conversion, in ¶280, of perceptible features into organic features reflected into themselves.
- ¶282. 1. 'Exponentiation' (*Potenzierung*), the multiplication of a number by itself a given number of times, is a clear reference to Schelling, who had based his philosophy of nature on the idea of 'powers'.
- ¶283. 1. This takes up the promise at the end of ¶274.
- ¶284. 1. The absence of law in the relation between an organism and its environment was seen in ¶255.
- ¶285. 1. There are three syllogistically related terms, (1) the shaped organism, which points outwards to (2) the Being-in-itself of its inorganic environment, and inwards to (3) its own inner Being-for-itself. (3) Is no longer conceived as a process involving the psychic functions and their anatomical bases, as it was earlier. It is entirely simple, an infinite 'One' (which has no quantitative significance, but expresses only the unity of an organism). There is, however, another factor, (4) undifferentiated life itself. It is not enough to ask why, given that there are polar bears at the north pole, their fur is thick and white. We also need

to ask why there are any polar bears at all and why they are at the north pole while penguins are at the south pole. A number is the best answer we can give to this question: it is the middle term between undifferentiated life and the unitary shaped organism that emerges from it. (This number is distinct from the 'infinite One': it looks ahead to specific gravity in ¶288.) There are no laws here: 'it is a matter of indifference to this stream of life what kind of mills it drives'. It could have made no polar bears at all, it could have made them black and penguins white, and it could have reversed their habitats.

¶286. 1. The inner of the inner of the organism is undifferentiated life, the 'unrest of abstraction'. The inner of the outer of the organism is a 'quiescent universality', mere unity. Any hope of laws offered by the relation between the organism and undifferentiated life is shattered by the inert numerical simplicity of this second inner.

¶287. 1. The mutual indifference of the two sides and our loss of the organism's reflection into itself means that we have not differentiated it from the inorganic. The essence of an inorganic entity is hidden inside it, or (as we may as well say) lies in our self-consciousness. The essence of an organism, by contrast, is accessible to us and not simply projected by us. We must therefore examine the inner-outer relation in the sphere where it really belongs, in the inorganic.

¶288. 1. Specific gravity is the ratio of the density of a substance relative to that of a standard substance, usually water at 4°C. So if water is assigned specific gravity of 1, substances with, e.g., a higher density are assigned a higher number than 1 and will sink in water. Specific gravity is observable, so it looks as if it could form one side of a law in which the other, outer, properties are correlated with it.

¶289. 1. See *Enc. II*, ¶¶293f. on specific gravity, and ¶¶295–9 on cohesion.

¶290. 1. The attempt to establish a series of bodies correlating their cohesion, or their specific gravity, with the rest of their properties is not only a failure, but also unduly selective, in view of the status of cohesion and specific gravity as ordinary properties. In fairness, we should take each of the other properties in turn as the representative of the essence and correlate *it* with the remaining properties, which would now include specific gravity and cohesion. Hegel rightly disputes the possibility of a systematic classification of empirically encountered substances, but overlooks the possibility of a significant classification of chemical elements based on their atomic weights, such as Dmitri Mendeleev's periodic table produced long after Hegel's death. Hegel was in general averse to chemical elements (see *Enc. II*, ¶¶281 and 328) and to atomism (see *Enc. II*, ¶333).

¶291. 1. Reason's earlier attempt to explain the organic likened it to the inorganic. But now we see that the inner-outer relationship is quite different in the two cases. The supposed inner of an inorganic entity, its specific gravity, has no special status in it. It does not, for example, enable the entity to preserve itself: a fragment removed from the entity has the same specific gravity as the rest of it. An inorganic entity does not preserve itself in the face of other entities in the way that organisms do and, insofar as they are preserved, it is their cohesion rather than their specific gravity that makes this possible. The freedom of specific gravity consists only in its independence of a thing's other properties and of other things. The self-maintenance of an organism, by contrast, is secured by its universal genus, not simply the type to which it belongs, but a universal form or plan that freely adapts the outer of the organism to face its environment. Such properties as specific gravity, and its numbers, now fall under the controlling power of the genus.

¶292. 1. There are three main items in play: (1) the *genus* is not just a category in a taxonomic classification, but a real universal inherent in singular organisms that powers and steers their development and their response to their environment. (2) *Singular organisms* cannot, however, be only generic. They must belong to a particular species and present generic

features in a determinate form. Singular organisms also have features (including their number) that belong neither to the genus nor to the species. Such features are often adaptations to the organism's particular environment and therefore depend on the free adaptive power of the genus, without being generic themselves. Such adaptations are governed by no law. (3) The *species* is a subdivision of a genus, mediating between this and singulars. Members of the same species resemble each other and interbreed. (Members of the same genus, but of different species, can interbreed but their offspring are infertile.) Hegel also introduces (4) the universal individual, such as air or earth: see *Enc. II*, ¶¶274–9, but only to deny that consciousness can be found there. The question how the genus relates to consciousness (full-scale human consciousness, not merely animal consciousness) arises because conscious reason is looking for itself, or its own position, in the natural world. The genus does not attain consciousness, because it has to pass through the particularizing sieve of the species. Cf. *Enc. II*, ¶370 on genus and species, esp. pp.421f: 'It is this one-sidedness which makes one animal stand lower in the scale than another... In man, who is the fundamental type of organism, since he is the instrument of spirit, all sides attain their most perfect development.'

- ¶293. 1. In the Preface, ¶28, the 'universal individual' is 'self-conscious spirit'. But here, as in ¶292, it is the inorganic environment, primarily earth. It forms one extreme of a syllogism. The other extreme is the genus, now promoted to 'universal life'. (Hegel neglects the 'family', a higher category in taxonomic classification, comprising one or more genera.) As often, to preserve the triadic structure, two terms are combined to form a single middle term: the species and singular members of it.
- ¶294. 1. The genus has an intrinsic tendency to particularize itself into a series ordered numerically or perhaps in terms of shape, colour, etc. This does not do justice to the singular organism. But now we have another problem, the universal individual, the Earth. This has a share in deciding what species there are, the locations and number of their members, and their peculiar features.
- ¶295. 1. Species and their members stem directly from generic life in no rational order. Therefore generic life's differentiation into them cannot be a self-systematizing development such as would allow it to have a coherent history. Determinate organisms do form a coherent contemporaneous system, but they are arrayed in it like points in space, each of which plays its part but none of which has priority over the others or monitors the whole system. The middle term of the syllogism of ¶294 is the species and singularity. If, by contrast, the middle term also contained the universal extremes, both the generic and the individual, it would be a self-systematizing development, powered by the concept rather than simply observed. This happens in the case of consciousness. The middle term between universal spirit and singularity is the shapes of consciousness, which implicitly involve both extremes and thus develop into an orderly system and into world-history. *Enc. II*, ¶249 also argues that species do not have a rational order such that lower, simple species could be supposed to have evolved into higher, complex species. The most that Hegel's premises establish is that nature has no systematic, rational 'history' (*Geschichte*). But random change (*Historie*) does not interest him.
- ¶296. 1. Reason does not find itself in nature, except in the inadequate form of an intuition (rather than a conceptual comprehension) of universal life. Moreover, it sees the development of this life only in very general terms, since the specific and singular details are controlled by the Earth.
- ¶297. 1. Hegel here plays fast and loose with the words 'meinen' ('mean, opine') and 'Meinung' ('meaning, opinion'). They oscillate between referring to what life *means*, i.e. roughly *intends*, to do, but cannot quite manage, and reason's *opinions* about nature.

**b. Observation of self-consciousness in its purity and in its relation to external actuality.
Logical and psychological laws**

- ¶298. 1. Inorganic nature supplies laws, but the laws are mere correlations, with no conceptual connection between the things correlated. Accordingly, it does not present a genuine individual, only correlated abstractions. By contrast, organic nature provides conceptual connection and genuine individuality, but the moments of life are not sufficiently differentiated to form the basis of laws. The satisfaction of both requirements—the concept existing freely and therefore constituting a self-contained individual, yet with enough articulation to develop lawfully—is found in self-consciousness itself.
- ¶299. 1. The laws of thought or ‘thinking’ (*Denkens*) are the laws of identity, of non-contradiction, etc.: see e.g. *Enc. I*, ¶20 Addition, and ¶115. In one sense, they lack truth, since they are purely formal and lack content. On the other hand, they essentially govern everything, and so have everything as their content. In another sense, too, they have content. Not only is our thinking governed by these laws, but we also think *about* the laws. Thinking, or the concept, essentially bifurcates and thinks about its own thoughts. So the formal laws become their own content.
- ¶300. 1. ‘Knowledge’ (*Wissen*) means both what is known and the ‘knowing’ of it. Here, and below, it should probably be taken in the latter sense, as ‘knowing’ in parallel with ‘thinking’. However, Hegel draws no sharp distinction between what is known and our (way of) knowing it: what is known is always affected by our way of knowing it. See also ¶85.
2. Observation just accepts these laws as it finds them. It treats them as sheer facts, quite separate from each other and from other thoughts. The unexplained plurality of laws contradicts the unity of self-consciousness and makes them an inadequate counterpart to reason itself. In fact, what deprives these laws of truth is not their lack of *content*, but the withdrawal of their *form*, the form that underpins their passage into each other and into other thoughts. Observation does not see this. It becomes clear only in speculative philosophy, i.e. Hegel’s *Logic*.
- ¶301. 1. Observing consciousness is drawn towards active consciousness, since it must consider the consciousness governed by logical laws, and not leave them in limbo. But it doesn’t conceive active consciousness as the negative unity that dissolves the laws in the logical movement constituting the core of active consciousness. It leaves thinking with its static laws on one side and turns to a new object, consciousness as an active agent in the world, a consciousness that is also negative, but in a different way.
- ¶302. 1. In ¶301, consciousness was ‘active’ (*tuende(s)*, the present participle of *tun*), while here it is ‘acting’ (*handelnden*, the present participle of *handeln*), which suggests practical activity rather than merely thinking. Psychological laws concern spirit’s reaction to the customs, etc. of its environment. On the one hand, it conforms to them as conferring universal actuality on itself. On the other hand, spirit selects from them what suits it. In both cases it is negative, first against itself as uncultivated singularity, then against itself as cultivated by the universal. In the first case, it gives to its cultural environment only its own individuality, the *form*, while it takes all its *content* from the environment. The second case has various degrees: it may simply modify customs, etc., without contradicting them; or it may rebel against them, either in a singular way, as a criminal, or in a universal way, as a radical reformer (such as Napoleon).
- ¶303. 1. The ‘universal modes’ are spirit’s reactions to the surrounding culture in ¶302. (These were presumably not mutually exclusive. No one can be *only* a reflection of their culture with no idiosyncrasies, and any rebel must imbibe some of the culture he rebels against.) One of Hegel’s aims in *Enc. III* is to explain how a seemingly disparate collection of faculties, etc. are coherently unified in a single mind.

- ¶304. 1. Observation aligns itself with universal customs, etc. (It does not think of itself as simply a bundle of faculties.) On the other side is the human individual with its diverse faculties. To recount differences between individuals with respect to these faculties (e.g. by IQ tests) is misconceived, both because of the interconnections of the faculties within a unified mind and because of the surrounding customs, etc. But reason now proposes to find a law explaining the characteristics of individuals by their cultural environment.
- ¶305. 1. The environment is not inorganic in the sense of consisting only of minerals or containing no carbon, nor in the sense of not being alive as in e.g. ¶254, but in the metaphorical sense of an *unindividualized* environment, as in e.g. ¶175.
- ¶306. 1. The general state of the world explains the existence of individuals, but not, in any lawful way, the character of each individual. For first, given the individual's ability to react to his environment in different ways, how he is influenced by the environment depends on the individual himself. He can only become such-and-such if he was such-and-such already (or at least had a tendency to become such-and-such). Secondly, to comprehend how the environment formed a particular individual in a very definite way, we would need to see how his immediate environment took a very particular form, as particular and definite as the individual himself. Then we would have a duplicate of the individual himself, matching him as closely as the exterior and the interior of a sphere match each other. The 'gallery of images' or pictures (*Galerie von Bildern*) recurs in ¶808, as the unfolding of historical stages, but not in duplicate.
- ¶307. 1. The exterior of the sphere, i.e. the particularized immediate environment of the individual, is *both* the world of the individual *and* the worldly situation as it is intrinsically, apart from the individual. The individual can either absorb the worldly situation or invert it: cf. ¶302. The world of the individual, therefore, can be comprehended only from the individual, not from the objective worldly situation. This combines the two objections of ¶306: the individual is as free in its reaction to its particularized environment as it is in its reaction to its environment in general.
- ¶308. 1. The law required two sides: the objective world present in itself (Being in and for itself, Being that is present) and the individual for itself (Being that is made). But the individual has now absorbed these two sides into its own world, the closed circle of its own activity, leaving the objective world out in the cold. The two putative sides are too closely intertwined in the individual to constitute a law. If we do try to separate them by locating the world outside the individual, then there is no necessary relationship between this objective world and the individual.

c. Observation of the relation of self-consciousness to its immediate actuality. Physiognomy and phrenology

- ¶309. 1. The 'immediate actuality' mentioned in the sub-title is now the individual's body, not his environment. Being-for-itself was the individual and Being-in-itself his environment, but they are now fused together in the autonomous individual.
- ¶310. 1. A distinction between Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself arises, parallel to that between the individual and its environment, but now within the individual. As *for itself*, the individual is free activity and consciousness; as *in itself*, it is its own body, prior to and presupposed by its activity. However the individual is only what it has done. So besides being its original nature, the body is an expression of the individual, produced by its past activity. The body is not just a 'Thing' (*Sache*, but here equivalent to *Ding*), but a sign, revealing what the individual is by the use it has made (and will presumably continue to make) of its body. That the individual is *only* what it has done is close to Hegel's own belief that a man's true Being or actuality is his deed: see ¶322. But here it is an essential premise of the doctrines he is about to criticize. Their claim that someone's character is infallibly

- revealed by his body, or a part of it, presupposes that this part is entirely shaped by his past actions, with nothing left to the vagaries of nature.
- ¶311. 1. Here the human bodily shape (or the bodily shape of a particular human group) is analogous to the customs, etc. of ¶¶305f., while the particular shape of an individual is analogous to the particular cultural environment of an individual in ¶306. Corresponding to the individual's free activity in the face of its environment, the individual now expresses its character and consciousness in its shape. Now each of the two sides forms the whole individual, seen from one side. The outer body comprises both the fixed parts and the effects on them of the individual's past and present doings. It expresses the inner side, which is no longer indeterminate as before, but has a definite character, which—unlike the body—is not produced by the individual itself.
- ¶312. 1. An individual's use of its bodily organs does not serve our purpose. We should distinguish between the doing and the deed, the activity and its product or 'work'. The doing expresses the inner too much: it is the inner itself rather than the expression of it. The deed expresses the inner too little, since it is open to manipulation by the agent and misinterpretation by others.
- ¶313. 1. What we need is some aspect of the bodily shape that is not an organ or its doing nor an external product. It should be static, but with features that, while intrinsically meaningless, are a sign of the inner. It would be like a language, whose sounds are intrinsically meaningless and unconnected with the Thing signified, but are linked with it contingently by our free conventions. On the comparison with language, see also ¶¶323, 342, and 343.
- ¶314. 1. Astrology, palmistry, etc. are such quasi-linguistic sciences, but they provide no essential connection between the signs and what they signify. The assignment of meanings to the signs is arbitrary. Physiognomy purports to have overcome this difficulty by finding a necessary connection between the inner character and the bodily expressed character. Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741–1801) published *Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe* [*Physiognomic Fragments for the Promotion of Knowledge and Love of Humanity*] (1775–1778).
- ¶315. 1. The Athenian statesman, Solon, is reputed to have said 'Count no man happy until he is dead', meaning that one needs to consider a whole life before pronouncing a verdict on it. Hegel does not accept the palmist's short cut, but nevertheless regards the hand, which, after the tongue, is the main instrument of one's activity, as closely linked with the inner nature responsible for one's fate.
- ¶316. 1. In ¶312 we considered an organ only with respect to what it does and what it produces. But now we have found an aspect of it that is its Being rather than its doing or deed. The lines on hands, the sound of a voice, and the style of handwriting are relatively constant features of these organs, distinct *both* from the individual's inner character, which is innate but also moulded by culture, *and* from the external doings and deeds leading to his fate. They might therefore be an observable middle term between these two extremes.
- ¶317. 1. This idea is extended beyond the hand and the voice to the face and the posture, even though they are not involved in the doing. Their movements indicate externally the individual's reflection on his own doings and deeds, his inner speech about them. 'Supervision' translates *Beaufsichtigen*, a close relative of *Beabsichtigen* ('intending') in ¶319. Hegel here moves beyond strict physiognomy, which, in Lavater's view, is concerned only with fixed features of the face, not with temporary facial gestures and expressions. The latter belong to 'pathognomy' rather than physiognomy. Later, in *Enc.* III, ¶¶401 and 411, Hegel draws this distinction. In PS he conflates them, especially in order to sharpen the contrast between physiognomy and phrenology, which provides no counterpart to pathognomy: see ¶¶325ff. See also Inwood (2016).

¶318. 1. Hegel's quotations are from *Über Physiognomik* (1778), a response by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799) to Lavater. This quotation is from p.35 of the 1778 second edition of Lichtenberg's work.

2. A facial expression is different from the deed and may show that the agent is not serious. But it is related as a sign only contingently to what it signifies and may, like any other sign, be manipulated as a mask. In that case, the individual locates his essence in his will and in the action or deed, which, in Hegel's view, is where it was all along.

¶319. 1. In ¶318 the individual had a choice over where to locate its essence and, in order to defeat the physiognomist, decided to locate it in his 'work' [*Werk*]. The physiognomist, by contrast, believes that what is essential is the inner intention rather than the deed. We have here an opposition between the practical, action, and the theoretical, reflection on the action. Theoretical reflection on the deed is really intending (*Beabsichtigen*), since intending is the agent's *opinion* about his action: cf. 'supervision' (*Beaufsichtigen*) of one's doing in ¶317. The shape or gesture of the individual conveys his intention, and together they are spirit *opined* or *meant*. In this *opined* or *meant* Being-there, the physiognomist looks for laws. Hegel is here playing with the verb *meinen*, which means both 'opine, suppose' and 'mean, intend', as in chapter I. He is suggesting that physiognomy elevates intentions above overt actions and also that it deals in unsubstantiated opinions. Thus the intention is what the agent means by, or his opinion about, his action (this equation is surely false: my intention to write a great book is not the same as my opinion that I am writing a great book). Spirit and Being-there are opined by the physiognomist rather than by the agent under observation.

¶320. 1. We practise *natural* physiognomy when we make snap judgements of people's characters on the basis of their appearance. We do not first see their appearance in a neutral, purely sensory way and then infer their character, e.g. their arrogance, from it. We immediately see someone as arrogant. Their appearance for us is saturated with their inner nature and is the visibility of the invisible. Observation, by contrast, focuses on sheer sensory appearance and tries to infer the inner from it. It does not risk falsification by classifying people as murderers, etc., but simply postulates a 'capacity' to murder, an inner tendency or disposition that will, in favourable circumstances, be actualized. It needs far more elaborate descriptions to capture the complexity of an individual character, just as it does to capture the complexity of a human face. Despite its pretensions to knowledge it remains opinion throughout.

¶321. 1. Physiognomy relies on the fact that spirit reflects itself into itself out of itself, or distances itself from its sensory Being-there, such as its speech and actions, yet inconsistently denies that it can distance itself from its facial structure and gestures. The concluding quotation is from Lichtenberg (1778), p.72.

¶322. 1. The quotation is from p.6 of the 1778 edition of Lichtenberg's work. The gallant fellow's response shows that a man's face is not his actuality, since it is alterable: cf. ¶339 on smashing the skull of a phrenologist. This does not entail that a man's true Being is his deed, but Hegel gives reasons, of varying merit, for this claim: (1) a deed is dynamic, rather than static, and essentially negates Being, e.g. the physiognomist's face; (2) a deed is clear-cut and describable in terms available to all; (3) a deed is not a mere sign: if a man commits a murder, it follows that he is a murderer. He also dismisses two objections: (i) a deed is external: it does not reveal the man's mind. Nevertheless, if a man's deed or work (*Werk*) conflicts with his professed intentions, etc. or with their supposed bodily expression, priority should be given to the deed or work. (ii) A deed or work may be altered or misinterpreted by others: cf. ¶312. But this only shows what the work was all along: the significance of e.g. a poem depends on its readers' responses to it, not on the poet's intentions. Hegel here moves from a critique of physiognomy to

- a critique of the (e.g. Kantian) view that intentions matter more than actions: cf. ¶319. See also Inwood (2016).
- ¶323. 1. In physiognomy (which Hegel conflates with pathognomy: see ¶317) the winks and nods that express someone's character are a sort of speech, revealing his inner self-monitoring and conversation with himself; even his fixed features have been affected by his past inner speech. In phrenology, by contrast, no such inner or outer speech is involved, because the bumps and hollows on a skull are immobile. They are therefore not a *talking* sign of someone's character, but simply a correlate of it.
- ¶324. 1. Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828) developed phrenology, or craniology, in lectures from the 1790s. Gall argued that the brain is the organ of the mind; that it is not homogeneous, but contains different organs, with different functions and situated in different places; that the size of a brain-organ indicates its relative strength; and that these organs causally affect the shape of the skull.
- ¶325. 1. To causally affect the body spirit must be, or have, an internal bodily organ (a brain), in which spirit is reflected into itself and keeps to itself. In physiognomy the organ (the face) is also an organ reflected into itself and commenting on the individual's activity, but it is a visible object; the individual is indifferent to its actuality (its face) and can manipulate it. This indifference ceases when the inward reflectedness is *causally* effective. It is then necessarily related to Being-there (the skull) via the brain. Phrenology repairs a defect in physiognomy. If the outer is just a quasi-linguistic sign it can be overridden and exploited. But causal power cannot be overridden. (Pathognomy is more easily exploited than strict physiognomy. But even the latter can be overridden: e.g. a man diagnosed by a physiognomist as a pacifist might freely commit murder just to defeat him. A phrenologist would say that, if his diagnosis is correct, he would be physically incapable of murder.)
- ¶326. 1. See Plato's *Timaeus*, 71c–e.
- ¶327. 1. There are three terms in play: (1) the *mind* or spirit, as Being-within-itself, is complex and differentiates itself into moments. But it is fluid and moving, not segmented into separate compartments. In accordance with its complexity, it articulates (2) the *whole body* into different parts, each with its own function. It does this by way of the middle term, (3) the *brain*. The brain does not go outward. Insofar as it does so and becomes Being-there, Being-for-another (in contrast to mere Being), it becomes dead Being (the skull). Since the brain mediates between (1) and (2), it must have something in common with both and therefore contain the moments of (1), but articulated into separate compartments, somewhat in the manner of (2). (Some, but not all, of these claims represent Hegel's own views. He is giving the motivation of a doctrine he goes on to reject.)
- ¶328. 1. An example of Hegel's humour, suggesting that the genitals might equally be regarded as the location of spirit.
2. There is now another syllogistic triad. The spiritual-organic Being, i.e. the mind or spirit, causally affects an inert Being-there (the skull) by way of a middle term, the brain, which is the corporeal Being-for-itself of spirit. (This is quite different from the syllogism of ¶327, where the bodily extreme was the *whole* body, with no mention of the skull.) After some playful mockery of the way in which it is decided that the second two terms are the brain and the skull (rather than the spinal cord and the vertebral column), Hegel denies that the skull is an organ, since we do not murder, etc. with the skull as we see with the eye. This denial is irrelevant for two reasons. First, in ¶325, when it was suggested that the brain is an organ, a distinction was drawn between an organ of this type and an organ used as an external instrument. Secondly, the phrenologist claims not that the *skull* is an organ—it obviously is not, apart from serving to protect the brain—but that the *brain* is an organ, but an organ of a special type, which does not entail that we murder, etc. with the brain. A *caput mortuum* is a 'dead head' or useless remnants.

¶329. 1. What causes what? Do spiritual motions and modes of the brain cause the shape of skull? Or is it the other way round? In whichever direction the causal arrow points, there would be same correlation of skull-shape with spiritual features. But if the skull were the cause, this would make it Being-for-itself and the immediate organ of self-consciousness. Other alternatives are that the causal action is reciprocal or that the development of each is determined by some third factor (a pre-established harmony) or even that each develops independently, so that there is no correlation whatsoever. (Gall argued that the skull hardens over the brain during infancy and is then subject to the causal influence of the brain.)

¶330. 1. Cantharadin is a chemical compound secreted by several species of beetle, notably the Spanish fly, once used as an aphrodisiac: another example of Hegel's earthy humour.

2. Hegel rightly doubts Gall's claims about the causal influence of the brain on the skull and about the correlation of brain-functions with skull features. However, he wrongly denies that the brain is an aggregate of spatially located organs. His argument is that 'nature' already gives the moments of the concept, which as such are 'fluid simplicity' and not spatially located, a Being-there of their own in the articulation of the whole body. He invokes the articulated body of the syllogism in ¶327, but neglects the articulated brain that was there the middle term between spirit and the whole body. In ¶327, there were three sides, not only two: (1) spirit, with different moments, but not spatially located or separate; (2) the whole body with diverse organs with different functions; and (3) the brain whose diverse functions are localized, but not in the same way as the functions of bodily organs. The brain is not just a small-scale model of the body. Then the phrenologist adds (4), the skull whose bumps and hollows mirror the distribution of functions in the brain, but not in the whole body. Hegel tends to elide the distinction between the mind and the brain. This was heralded in ¶328 when he spoke of 'the spiritual-organic Being', and again in ¶329 when he combined 'spiritual moments and the determinate modes of the brain', as well as by his refusal to call the *brain* the organ of spirit.

¶331. 1. 'Meaning' here, and in ¶332, is *Bedeutung*, not *Meinung*. *Bedeutung* is the normal word for 'meaning' or 'significance'.

2. In ¶330 Hegel contracted the triad of ¶327 into a dyad. Here he performs the same operation on the triad of ¶328. Instead of three terms, spirit-brain-skull, we now have only two: the brain as the Being of the self-conscious individuality and the Being-there of the skull. The brain as an animal part drops out in favour of a spiritualized brain, that combines brain and spirit, and thereby elides the distinction between them. We might expect Hegel to say that the *brain* is the 'actuality and Being-there' of a man. But instead he says it is the *skull*. This is both because the brain in question is conflated with spirit and because neither type of brain *actualizes* a man and constitutes his Being-there, his presence in the outside world.

¶333. 1. *Hamlet*, V.1.

2. Hegel repeats that we do not murder, etc. with the skull: cf. ¶328. This is only relevant insofar as it bears on the claim that the skull is a man's *actuality*, a claim that Hegel foists on the phrenologist. Something, such as a frown, counts as a sign if there is no apparent reason for its occurrence unless it indicates something else. It may be *intentionally* produced in order to indicate something else (e.g. a knot in a handkerchief) or it may not (e.g. a frown, a smile). There is, however, another sense of 'sign' in which something is a sign, or indication, of something else (e.g. 'a high forehead is a sign of intelligence') even if its occurrence does not need to be accounted for in this way. The phrenologist regards skull-bumps as signs in this latter sense, not in Hegel's sense.

¶335. 1. Genesis 22:17; Isaiah 10:22; Hosea 1:10; Romans 9:27; Hebrews 11:12.

2. There is no necessary relationship between skull-features and spiritual features, not even a clear correlation, let alone any speech. If we have an impoverished conception of

spirit, it becomes easier, since there are fewer spiritual features and they are separate and rigid, like skull-features. But there are still very many and the assignment of a skull-area to each is arbitrary. A murderer is not just an abstraction. He has many other spiritual and skull features; the assignment of murder to a specific bump is impossible. A murderous tendency can be counteracted by another spiritual feature; if spiritual features were detached and ossified, a potential murderer would be bound to murder, but that is not so. Murder may be committed for diverse reasons; there is no specific murderous function. Correlating skull features to spiritual functions leads to an ossified conception of spirit. (Gall's simple moralizing account of spiritual and brain functions exposes him to Hegel's critique.)

- ¶336. 1. Phrenological correlations are an abstract logical and imaginable possibility, as is the belief of natural phrenology that a cuckold has bumps on his head. But it is not a real, inner possibility. On this distinction see *Enc. I*, ¶143.
- ¶337. 1. The phrenologist tries to accommodate freedom by allowing that spirit is not originally fixed, but consists of predispositions which are in the individual's own power and need favourable circumstances to develop, as well as to be actualized. E.g. one might suppress one's murderous predisposition or find no occasion to actualize it. So if observations contradict the supposed law, and it does not rain on washday (cf. ¶321), they say it really *ought* to rain, the disposition to rain is there, or that someone *ought* to be as his skull indicates, he has the original disposition, only it hasn't developed. But in fact Being, both the original spirit and the developed skull, is irrelevant to the freedom of the individual and to circumstances. One is free to override one's original internal endowment, let alone one's skull. (Hegel stresses that the housewife's generalization is based on observation of actual rainfall, but avoids saying what role observations of people's *actions*—the analogue of rainfall—play, or should play, in the generalizations of the phrenologist.)
- ¶339. 1. Phrenology's acknowledgement of freedom and its resort to dispositions in ¶337 implicitly concedes that spiritless Being cannot be the truth of consciousness, since consciousness only actualizes itself by negating Being. A bone cannot be the actual Being—there of consciousness. But if it were the *exterior* of consciousness, it would also be its actual Being—there, since the exterior is just 'the actuality that is' (*die seiende Wirklichkeit*). The skull cannot just be the evidence or expression of a man's interior. Once we accept that the skull expresses his interior, we must accept, erroneously, that it is his actuality, since it is the only actualization of his interior available.

It is unclear why the phrenologist cannot maintain that the skull is simply *evidence* of a man's interior. There are, after all, three sides involved, not just inner thinking and the skull, but also the man's actions. Why could a phrenologist not agree with Hegel that only a man's actions actualize his interior fully—since a man is not a murderer unless he actually commits murder, and observation of actual murders, etc. is surely needed in order to support phrenological generalizations—yet argue that the skull gives evidence of a man's likely actions? Unless Hegel is simply suppressing the role of actions in the phrenologist's calculations (cf. ¶337), it is perhaps because he assumes that if the evidence of the skull conflicts with that of overt behaviour, the phrenologist will always find a way of favouring the evidence of the skull (cf. 'ought' in ¶337). On smashing the skull, cf. ¶322.

- ¶340. 1. Instinctively reason will reject the result it has reached in its observation, viz. phrenology, though, unlike us, it may not see where it has gone astray. But here, at its lowest point, observing reason is also close to its highest point: it has glimpsed cognition, but misconceived it unspiritually. In converting spirit's interior into an ossified unspiritual Being expressed by a mere thing, self-conscious reason has reached its nadir and must go into reverse, i.e. move to a new position which is, in a sense, a return to its starting-point, but now on a higher level. The new position will be the opposite of its present one: see *Enc. I*,

¶81 Addition for Hegel's view that the 'extreme of a state or action tends to overturn into its opposite'. On Jews, see Hegel (1948), pp.177–205.

¶341. 1. This and the two following ¶¶ recapitulate the whole experience of observing reason. Its progression through the inorganic and organic involved a gradual detachment of things from sensory Being and the emergence of the universal concept. The purpose-concept, introduced in ¶256, led away from the mere freedom in itself of the organic to the freedom for itself of spirit, where the concept is finally extricated from its sensory integument and reason has found itself. However, as we shall see in ¶343, reason ended up reducing self-consciousness to a dead physical thing and thus returning to its beginning in a circular movement.

¶342. 1. This ¶ recapitulates ¶¶298ff. on logical and psychological laws. Glossing over the latter, it passes on to physiognomy, in combination, as usual, with pathognomy: cf. ¶319.

¶343. 1. Phrenology turns from the inconstant language of physiognomy-cum-pathognomy to the security of fixed Being. The immediate actuality of spirit is not an organ, language, or a sign, but a dead bone, a mere thing. This is not what the phrenologist 'means' (*meint*); he does not *mean* to advocate materialism. But that is what he *says*. Observing reason has thereby returned full circle to its beginning. Hegel suggests that not only phrenology, but also ordinary ways of speaking about spirit imply an unwitting materialism.

¶344. 1. In Kant's CPR, A71/B96, an 'infinite judgement', in contrast to an affirmative judgement (e.g. 'The soul is mortal') and a negative judgement (e.g. 'The soul is not mortal'), has an affirmative form, but a negative sense (e.g. 'The soul is non-mortal'). Such judgements are infinite, because their status is indefinite, wavering between positivity and negativity. Hegel gives a different, and more interesting, account of infinite judgements. His examples, in *Enc. I*, ¶173, are 'The spirit is not an elephant' and 'A lion is not a table', which he says are 'correct, but absurd'. These are negative infinite judgements, whereas 'The Self is a thing' is a positive infinite judgement, and presumably incorrect, as well as absurd. Both types of judgement are regarded as 'infinite', because the predicates affirmed or denied lie beyond the (finite) range of predicates categorically compatible with the subject.

2. This ¶ considers the result from Hegel's own conceptual point of view. It involves a re-examination of the course of PS. The original unhappy consciousness of ¶¶207ff. projected itself as a thing, thereby ceasing to be self-consciousness and becoming merely consciousness of a thing. In its modern counterpart, phrenology, the thing is not simply an object of consciousness, but self-consciousness itself. So this thing is the *category*, the unity of the I and Being. In ¶235 the category was simply the I, but it combined with sensory Being to form objective beings. Here it combines with Being in a different way, becoming just a thingly being itself. Since the category is the object of consciousness, consciousness *has* reason; in itself it *is* reason, but for now it only *has* reason: see also ¶440 on the distinction between *having* reason and *being* reason. The category must pass through the two forms it combines—Being and one's own, the I. For observing consciousness it takes the form of Being. But this immediate relation between the two is severed by an infinite judgement and the thing is now regarded as an object to be overcome, not just accepted; consciousness now becomes proper self-consciousness: see ¶¶347ff. That is, the category now passes from the form of Being, into that of Being-for-itself, the I or one's own. Instead of hoping just to find itself, consciousness now aims to produce itself, as in ¶¶347ff. (This ¶ is difficult, since Hegel is sketching the future course of PS. Although Kant was not a phrenologist, it may help to compare his CPR, where the I or 'I think' deploys categories to transform sensations into beings, but is not itself subject to categorization nor an entity within the world formed by the categories. Such an I *has* reason, but *is* not reason. The I more fully enters into the world in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, which considers morality, as does PS ¶¶347ff.)

¶346. 1. The proposition that spirit is a bone is a representation. Underlying it is the conceptual proposition that reason is all thinghood, etc., but it is this only in the concept, and if the conceptual version is turned into a representation, it becomes absurd. To avoid this we must take the proposition 'The Self is a thing' in its self-sublating infinitude, and then it contains the truth of idealism; but it is absurd if the subject and predicate are taken as fixed. That is, the proposition can be interpreted in three ways: (i) a straightforward identification of the two; (ii) a reduction of the Self to a thing; or (iii) a reduction (or perhaps elevation) of a thing to the Self or spirit. (These three propositions might be presented schematically as, respectively: $S = T$, $S \Rightarrow T$, and $T \Rightarrow S$.) Proposition (i) is just absurd, equating items that are presupposed as different, (ii) expresses a crude materialism that is also absurd, while (iii) expresses an inchoate but respectable idealism. See also ¶¶790ff., where Hegel summarizes the phrenologist's infinite judgement and its subsequent fate. However, Hegel's own idealism is more dynamic than that expressed in (iii) and might be more appropriately formalized as $S \Leftrightarrow T$, suggesting a reciprocal movement between the Self, or the concept, and things. Things are real for Hegel, and not simply absorbed into the Self.

B. THE ACTUALIZATION OF RATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH ITSELF

¶347. 1. This transition was heralded in the latter part of ¶344. Reason ceases to regard the thing as simply immediate. It is rather a surface beneath which lies self-consciousness itself. Since the object is still a thing and therefore independent, it is another self-consciousness, which recognizes, and is recognized by, itself. Self-consciousness is now on the way to spirit proper, the 'I that is We, and We that is I' of ¶177. In this and the following ¶¶ the words 'thing' and 'thinghood' shed the pejorative flavour they had earlier and now suggest independence and objectivity, no longer dead Being.

¶348. 1. Observing reason corresponds to sensory certainty in description (¶245), to perception in the classification of organisms, and to understanding in its search for laws. Active reason will similarly repeat the two sections of chapter IV: A. 'Independence and dependence of self-consciousness' (¶¶178ff.) and B. 'Freedom of self-consciousness' (¶¶197ff.) This section of chapter V will correspond to the former, and the third section of V (¶¶394ff.) will correspond to the latter. At first the journey will be undertaken by the individual consciousness, but later by the collective consciousness. The singular self-consciousness moves gradually towards spirit proper, the real substance that underlies all the earlier shapes of consciousness.

¶349. 1. The concept of spirit as a system of mutually recognizing self-consciousnesses has 'arisen for us' in 'I that is We, and We that is I' of ¶177, and in ¶¶206f. 'Ethical life' translates *Sittlichkeit*, customary social morality, in contrast to individual *Moralität*, morality in the Kantian sense. The word is derived from *Sitte*, 'custom'. '*Moralität*' also derives from a word for custom, the Latin '*mos, mores*', and so too does the word 'ethic(al)', from the Greek '*ethos*', but the etymology of '*Sittlichkeit*' is more noticeable in German. The 'law in thought' (das *gedachte Gesetz*) does not measure up to its actual reality, as is seen in the inadequate quasi-Kantian attempts to formalize it in ¶¶419ff. and 429ff. Custom and ethical life are not an extraneous addition to the individual, but permeate its whole Being.

¶350. 1. The relation between ethical life and individuals is comparable to that between '*langue*' and '*parole*'. As there could be no individual speakers without a language and, conversely, no language without individual speakers, so ethical life and individuals are interdependent. Individuals are more or less conscious of this interdependency and of the sacrifice it involves of their idiosyncrasy. We might be reminded here of Hegel's conception of 'the true not as substance, but just as much as subject' (¶17).

¶351. 1. The individual can only satisfy his own needs in virtue of belonging to a universal medium that enables him to work to satisfy the needs of others, who in return work to

satisfy his needs. This is the system that, in PR, Hegel calls ‘civil society’. He was deeply influenced by Adam Smith and other British economists. The single individual is not fully aware of the economic system in which he participates, but he is aware of the overall social project to which he contributes, since in its customs and laws the universal substance, that combines one’s Being for another and one’s Being-for-oneself, speaks a universal language intelligible to all.

- ¶352. 1. As often, ‘determination’ here means ‘destination’. In ethical life the individual has reached his destination. It is not something that he merely *ought* to attain but that continually eludes his grasp, as in Kantian morality.
- ¶353. 1. ¶¶351 and 352 sketched the goal, but in the main course of this section self-consciousness has not yet reached it, only the concept of it. We need to consider the stages by which it arrives at the goal. We can consider this from two points of view, supposing, first, that self-consciousness has withdrawn from a fulfilled spirit that it once had (see ¶¶354 and 355) and, secondly, that it is has not yet reached it (see ¶356). To do so we will have to explore the permutations of morality, not only ethical life.
- ¶354. 1. In immediate ethical life people simply accept their customs and laws. They do not analyse or reflect on them—until someone like Socrates or Plato comes on the scene. The ethical order is therefore only in itself, not for itself, and is limited. When they do become aware of the nature of their society, it loses this limitation. Such reflection is inevitable, since reason can accept no impassable limit (cf. ¶80) and thereby withdraws from this simple order.
- ¶355. 1. The growth of individualism is inevitable, since the independent singleton is still a factor in simple ethical life, even if he emerges only fleetingly. But, like every moment of the essence, the singleton must sooner or later assert himself as the essence itself, free not only to reflect on laws and customs, but to accept or reject them at will. This dissolves the solid trust that bound him to his society and transforms him from a ‘singleton’ into a full ‘individual’.
- ¶356. 1. Hegel now turns to the other supposition of ¶353. Spirit emerges from observing reason as a singular consciousness, in search of the happiness it expects to find, or produce, in unity with other self-consciousnesses. Unlike the preceding supposition this does not correspond to any obvious historical occurrence, but to the logical sequence of Hegel’s thoughts. This suggests a tension between the historical and logical sequences. However, Hegel also has in mind an alienated modern individual, seeking a restoration of the secure order lost in the French revolution, Kantian morality, etc.
- ¶357. 1. Hegel’s text has only the pronoun *derselben*, which might refer either to the ethical substance (Miller, Hyppolite) or to the impulses (Jarczyk–Labarrière). The former is a more natural reading of the German, but the latter makes better sense of the introduction of morality.
2. On both suppositions of ¶353, self-consciousness proceeds from an individualism, for which the essence lies in one’s own natural impulses and their satisfaction, to an integration into ethical substance. Hegel inverts the order in which the suppositions were presented in ¶¶353–6, now considering, first, the supposition that individualism precedes ethical life and, secondly, the supposition that ethical life precedes individualism. In both cases the individual follows a similar path, gradually overcoming his attachment to unrefined impulses, and the ‘shapes’ in which they figure, and subordinating them to an ethical order. The second case is more complex. The individual sheds his illusions about impulses and rises to the level of ethical substance. He does so in part by invoking morality, not the morality that emerged from the ethical substance itself, but morality as it results from individual self-consciousness. Morality is a higher stage than ethical life, since it involves reflection and self-consciousness. Hence the ethical substance restored is not the primitive version that was lost, but is combined with reflection and self-consciousness. Hegel describes the second

case in such a way as to make it a more fitting model of modern individualism. His reason for preferring it may be that it fits the course of history better.

- ¶359. 1. This sketches the overall plan of section B. Self-consciousness is bent on realizing itself. It regards actuality, primarily other self-consciousnesses, as a field on which it can impose its own purpose. In subsection a) 'Pleasure and necessity', it treats another self-consciousness as itself, i.e. it attempts to reduce the other to an appendage of itself. In b) 'The law of the heart' (¶¶367ff.), it abandons this self-centred individualism in favour of a universal project of moral reform that takes account of other individuals as well as itself, but is still only its own project. In c) 'Virtue' (¶¶381ff.), it sacrifices its residual self-centredness and abandons its universal project, focusing instead on the cultivation of virtue. Its experience of this project leads into section C (¶¶394ff.), where an attempt is made to close the gap between self-consciousness and external actuality, and especially to its first subsection, 'The spiritual animal kingdom' (¶¶397ff.), where the individual sets out to express himself in an unresisting actuality.

a. *Pleasure and necessity*

- ¶360. 1. A free quotation from Goethe's *Faust*, Part I of 1790, which inspires this whole section. The reference to 'theory' as a grey shadow alludes to Mephistopheles's words: 'My worthy friend, grey are all theories/And green alone life's golden tree'. Self-consciousness has, like Faust himself, abandoned observing reason's theoretical approach to Being and now exploits it for its own pleasure.
- ¶361. 1. As ¶364 reveals, the expression '*es nimmt sich das Leben*', translated as 'it takes hold of life', can also mean 'it takes its own life', i.e. kills itself.
- ¶362. 1. Desire here does not, as it did in ¶¶167ff., aim at the destruction of its object, but only at removing its semblance of independence. The independence of the two, unlike that of desiring self-consciousness and its object in chapter IV, is underpinned by the category, not just by living Being-there. Each party is conscious of its independence, whether it be by the representation of simple natural consciousness or by a more rational lawful consciousness. Self-consciousness is ambivalent. On the one hand, it regards the other self-consciousness as an appendage of itself. On the other hand, its pleasure depends on the other's perceived independence. Once it achieves its aim of union with the other, it is no longer just itself, but merged together with the other, hence no longer a mere singleton but a universal. (Goethe's Faust seduces Margaret, who then has a child; she drowns it and is condemned to death. Hegel may have this episode in mind. One possibility is that the singleton must pass from one hapless victim to the next, becoming a universal seducer. Alternatively, or additionally, Hegel may have in mind a marriage, in which the victim of seduction later becomes a wife, reasserts her independence, and puts the former singleton in his place.)
- ¶363. 1. The object of self-consciousness's pleasure negates it rather than fulfils it. This empty, yet overpowering object, is an incipient form of self-consciousness itself, which instantiates only an abstract category uniting Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself. Yet since self-consciousness is no longer the simple Being of phrenology, other categories of thinghood come into play. They are extruded from self-consciousness itself and cast out into the world. The categories of unity, difference, and their relation form a conceptually interconnected circle. Together they constitute a blind fate or necessity, which is, like themselves, empty, but irresistible. Self-consciousness now conceives of itself as a lifeless thing, driven on by an empty and alien necessity. (This sounds more like Don Juan's endless seductions than Hegel's premonition of his future marriage.)
- ¶364. 1. The One is the singular self-consciousness, while the universality is its fate, which drives it on without a break. Self-consciousness itself is ambivalent about its predicament, corresponding to the ambiguity of 'taking (one's) life': cf. ¶361.

¶365. 1. Consciousness has passed abruptly from staunch individualism to subjection to blind fate. In fact this is the result of its own essence and doing. But there is no mediating link, available to consciousness itself, between the two factors, nothing to combine them both and explain their connection.

¶366. 1. Self-consciousness accepts this alien necessity as its own essence. It thereby removes the sting from it and survives as a new shape of consciousness.

b. *The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit*

¶368. 1. The law of the heart represents the sentimental romanticism associated with Rousseau and Goethe's *Werther*. However, Hyppolite I, p.303, suggests that Hegel's model was Karl Moor, the hero of Schiller's play, *The Robbers*. Cheated of his inheritance by his brother, Karl forms a band of brigands to right the wrongs of feudal corruption. He despises the conventions of organized society and represents the primitive power of nature. He is a criminal, but (like Robin Hood) a criminal inspired by high ideals and a law of his own.

¶369. 1. The unsatisfactory world confronting the heart stems from the fate or necessity that confronted the pleasure-seeker. But as a new shape, unconscious of its origin, the heart simply finds this positive world confronting its own negativity, unaware that it is a necessary accompaniment of itself.

¶370. 1. The aim of the heart is the same as that of Faust, to gain pleasure by uniting with the world. But the heart derives its pleasure from promoting the pleasure of all. It sees its own pleasure and universal pleasure as inseparable. It sees the law of its own heart as the necessary law of the world. What it needs is discipline, mediating between itself and necessity, between the law of the heart and the law of the world.

¶371. 1. The world goes its own way, governed by its own law, and most people just put up with it. But they should be jolted from their deference to human and even divine authority. (Karl Moor protests against divine as well as human authority.) The law of the world is just a sham. It may on occasion agree with the law of the heart. But what matters is that the law should satisfy the heart, not such coincidental agreement with the heart.

¶372. 1. If the individual actualizes the law of his heart, he faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the new universal order ceases to be the law of his own heart. He has thereby shed his singularity and acquired a part, however small, in what is now an objective universal order independent of himself. On the other hand, he cannot simply reject the new order, since it is what he wanted and results from his own doing.

¶373. 1. The heart is both singular and universal. It is singular in that it wants its own law to be actualized, and actualized by itself, not by anyone else. It is universal in that it aims at the pleasure of everyone. But in consistency, it should universalize the nature of its own project and say that everyone has a right to fulfil the law of their own heart or, at least, that every heart should recognize itself in the established order. But other hearts may differ from mine. They may not find satisfaction in the new order I have established. Even if they want the same order as I do, they want to set it up themselves, not simply accept what I have done. So I am now in conflict not only with the law of the world, but with other hearts on a par with my own.

¶374. 1. Owing to its exclusive focus on itself, the heart misconceives the nature of a society and the way in which it operates. A society is not like a block of marble to be chiselled by an individual at will. It is a universal that engulfs the singular individual, alienating him from himself and transforming him into an integrated part of itself. He is just one of the many individuals who animate society and have as much consciousness and heart as he does. He hardly recognizes his former Self when he sees himself integrated into this universal order.

¶375. 1. Consciousness has two perspectives on itself. In the first, it is an idealistic reformer, above and outside the society it aspires to create. In the second, it occupies a role within this

society, as only one of many individuals on a par with itself. It is divided in its allegiance between these contradictory visions of itself.

- ¶376. 1. Self-consciousness is now deranged, internally torn between two conflicting visions of itself. Derangement is not just ordinary madness. If I believe that pigs have wings or that the world is coming to an end tomorrow, then I am mad, because of the conflict between my beliefs and the beliefs of most others. I may feel some discomfort at my isolation, since for most of my beliefs I depend on the agreement of others. But since I am not in any other respect torn internally, and not with regard to my very essence, I am only mad, not deranged. 'Derangement' is *Verrücktheit*, from the verb *verrücken*, 'to displace, (re)move, dislocate'. For more on the varieties of madness, see *Enc.* III, ¶408 Addition.
- ¶377. 1. Consciousness displaces its own perversion and projects it onto priests and despots: cf. ¶¶542 and 550. But this does not solve its problem. The law of the heart, and the heart itself, is what matters, but rather than merely 'opined' or meant (*gemeintes*), it ought to be actualized. Then this actuality is what really matters. But the heart can accept no universal order as an adequate actualization of itself and its law. It thus comes to see that it itself is perverted and perverting, though with less success than priests and despots.
- ¶378. 1. Since individuals are generally perverse and perverting, this universal order is also perverted. It is, however, ambivalent. It is, on the one hand, the law of all hearts. Despite their complaints, individuals cling to it and resist radical changes. They fear the threat of anarchy that Karl Moor presents, and decline to follow him to a life of crime in the forest. On the other hand, it is perverted, as ¶379 will show.
- ¶379. 1. The moral individualism of the heart is not confined to one heart. It has now spread to society as a whole, and each individual has his own view about how society should be. Society is therefore a relatively stable equilibrium maintained by the reciprocal resistance of competing interests counterbalancing each other.
- ¶380. 1. In ¶379, the actuality of society consisted in the competing, and alternating, actualities of diverse hearts. In ¶378 it was an ideal tranquil order, but not one that could be actualized without sublating self-assertive individuality. Consciousness now sets out to actualize this second ideal and it begins by sacrificing its own noxious singularity and devoting itself to what is really true and good. Hyppolite, I, p.311, compares Don Quixote, the knight of virtue: cf. ¶386.

c. *Virtue and the course of the world*

- ¶381. 1. Each subsection of section B involves two sides and also a contrast between individuality and universality. In 'Pleasure and necessity', each side instantiated only one of these moments. In 'The law of the heart', each side involved both, but as unity on one side, and in opposition on the other. This new shape of consciousness also has two sides, virtue and the course of the world, and each involves the moments both in unity and in opposition. For virtue, universal law is what matters; individuality must be sublating on both sides. Virtuous consciousness must subjugate its own individuality to the universal, but it retains a residue of personal consciousness (since the good is *its* good), which can be removed only by sacrificing its whole personality, thereby eradicating individuality in the course of the world too: see ¶¶383ff. In the course of the world, conversely, individuality is the essence and universality subordinate. For virtue, however, this universal is not perverted by individuality (as it was for the heart). It is the unactualized essence of the course of the world and will emerge when individuality is sublating, without requiring virtue to have enough individuality to *produce* it.
- ¶382. 1. The course of the world has two aspects, deriving from pleasure and necessity, and from the law of the heart, respectively. First, there is singular individuality, seeking its own pleasure. Many individuals acting self-interestedly constitute a stable universal order, as in

¶351 and 379, but in a perverted way, since singular pleasure is the essence, and the universal only its contingent outcome. Secondly, there is individuality that aspires to be the law in its own right. It thereby disturbs the universal law that is contingent on selfish interests, but does not subvert it, since it does not regard it as simply raw material for its own designs, but as the type of order that virtue itself hopes for, only as the result of virtue rather than of pleasure and perversion. When virtue becomes conscious of its ambivalent attitude, it is derangement. Otherwise it sees only perversion.

¶383. 1. If virtue succeeds in actualizing the in-itself of the course of the world, it will not enjoy the fruits of its success, since it will have eradicated all individuality, including its own. It must be an individual in its *doing*, but once it succeeds there will be no self-conscious individual to do or enjoy anything. The conflict is a battle of ideas; the combatants bear no other weapons than their own essence.

¶384. 1. Virtue has a conception of the good, as yet unactualized, that it aims to actualize in the world. In the world it discerns an inner disposition to actualize the good. There is no point or substance to this conception of the good, except insofar as it is for an other, that is, essentially dependent on the world in which it is to be actualized. The conception of the good is not only abstract in being as yet unactualized, but also in being thin and unsubstantial except insofar as it derives its content from the actual course of the world. Virtue wants the world to be good, but it only knows what this amounts to from the dispositions already inherent in the world.

¶385. 1. The weapons that virtue wields are gifts (such as courage, energy, intelligence). They need to be used by individuals to have any effect, and may be used either rightly or wrongly. The same weapons are wielded by the way of the world, in virtue of its inner potentiality.

¶386. 1. Virtue's combat against the world is a sham-fight, for various reasons: its belief that the world essentially involves the good, which will therefore actualize itself, means that it cannot take its own activity seriously. If it were to fight seriously, it would damage the world's gifts, and also its own; these gifts are an intrinsic part of the good. In the conflict itself the world shows its mettle and displays its gifts in action; whenever virtue finds a weak spot in the world, the world's reaction displays its goodness. Virtue is pushing at an open door or tilting at windmills.

¶387. 1. Virtue is hamstrung by its own commitments, to goodness as the in-itself and to the suppression of individuality. The course of the world, by contrast, has no such sacrosanct commitments. Its essence is individuality, the power that wields the weapons that it shares with virtue. The good and its moments are at its disposal, to be respected or overridden as it pleases.

¶388. 1. Virtue cannot outsmart the world by exploiting its potential goodness. The world is not blinkered, as virtue is. It has already encountered goodness in the conflict. To the extent that it has not encountered it, it is entirely dormant and can be activated only by the gifts and capacities of individuals.

¶389. 1. Virtue's project is incoherent, sustained only by empty distinctions. It distinguishes between actuality and individuality, aiming to actualize the good, while sacrificing individuality, when individuality is the lifeblood of actuality; and between the good in-itself and Being, when the in-itself is nothing unless it is actualized as Being. It is individuality that enables the course of the world to 'pervert', or invert, a static ideal into a living reality.

¶390. 1. This modern virtue, associated with the romantics and with Kant's and Fichte's morality of 'Ought', is quite different from the virtue of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Ancient virtue was rooted in the whole people and their ethical life, deriving a substantial content from them. It did not aim to change society, but to maintain it as an ongoing system. Modern virtue is, by contrast, an empty cry of anguish against the wicked world, from those who purport to stand outside the social order and demand its radical overhaul.

- ¶391. 1. 'Perversion' and 'conversion' both translate *Verkehrung*.
- ¶392. 1. An untranslatable pun on the similarity of *Ansich* ('in-itself') and *Ansicht* ('view, point of view'), an approximate synonym of *Meinung*, 'opinion'.
2. Hegel seems to affirm two logically independent propositions: (1) 'When someone acts in a social context, he does not promote only his own interest'; and (2) 'When someone acts in a social context, he is not motivated only by his own interest'.
- ¶393. 1. The final unification of the in-itself and individuality or Being-for-itself leads to section C.

C. INDIVIDUALITY WHICH TAKES ITSELF TO BE REAL IN AND FOR ITSELF

- ¶394. 1. Self-consciousness has now regained the certainty of being all reality (in one sense of this fluid expression: cf. ¶¶150 and 230ff.), a certainty that it had lost in ¶347. It now combines the universal, the gifts and capacities, with individuality, their driving force. The rift that opened up in section B between its purpose and actuality is now closed, and reason (which was temporarily replaced by heart, imagination, and rhetoric) is aware of the category, the unity of self-consciousness and Being. In section A too, where reason first appeared, self-consciousness was conceived as Being-for-itself, whose mission was to negate the actuality confronting it in order to actualize its own purpose. Now the purpose, or Being-for-itself, and Being-in-itself, or actuality, have coalesced, since the purpose is no longer a private matter but is on show for others and therefore integrated in actuality. There is now no gulf between certainty and truth. Previously, the purpose was the certainty and its actualization, or its failure to actualize itself, the truth. But now that the two sides have coalesced, we can equally say that the purpose is the truth and its actualization the certainty.
- ¶395. 1. Observing reason (A) and active reason (B) each focused on one aspect of the category, respectively Being and self-consciousness, or the in-itself and the for-itself. Now self-consciousness is aware of the category in both aspects. Or, since it is itself one aspect of the category, it is the category conscious of itself. It has forgotten these previous shapes of consciousness, but they resurface within it, as distinct moments of its own development. But it sticks to the unity of Being and the Self through thick and thin.
- ¶396. 1. Consciousness is now wholly self-contained. Its activity is not opposed to anything else and does not depend on anything else. Its activity has no other material or purpose than itself. The envioning element in which it acts is simply the daylight in which it displays itself and its activity for what it is. Its activity thus has two forms: as in itself, it is the thought that unifies it, while as actual it is a unitary being exposed to the daylight. The content of the activity is just its simple Self; it is not in transit to anywhere else.

a. The spiritual animal kingdom and deceit, or the Thing itself

- ¶397. 1. The animals are intellectuals—scholars, professors, and artists, each of whom attributes an overriding importance to his own work. Each of them is enclosed in his own specialized activity. The cause or 'Thing' (*Sache*) that they purport to serve is an empty abstraction. Later it will become spirit, when the relationship between consciousnesses is reciprocal.
- ¶398. 1. Before it becomes active, individuality is just in itself and as such has an original determinate nature. Since all determination is negation, this nature involves negation, though not the sort of negation that one entity exerts on another and that generates movement. It has a quality and a determinate range, within which it has to operate, (as, e.g., a tadpole can only become a frog, even if it is not hampered by anything external). This limits the Being of consciousness, but not its doing, since it is not related to anything else that could impose a limit on it. Analogously, indeterminate animal life vivifies a particular elemental environment, which imposes a limitation on what species it can form. Nevertheless, it maintains its unity in these elements and remains one universal animal-life amid the

diversity of animals. (Indeterminate animal-life corresponds to individuality in general. Diverse animal species correspond to different human individuals, which differ from each other more than the members of an animal species do. The different 'elements' correspond to the worlds of art, science, literature, philosophy, etc.)

- ¶399. 1. An individual has a determinate talent, e.g. for writing philosophy books or repairing boilers. (So far Hegel gives no reason for restricting his claims to professors and artists.) This talent determines the individual's purpose, which is thus limited in its content. But it only looks like this when we consider it in isolation and before consciousness begins to act. In fact, the purpose has a universal significance: it is reality or actuality as it meshes with that singular consciousness. When it gets to work, consciousness does not feel its determinacy as a limit to be overcome. Its purpose fits its immediate environment like a glove. There are two types of negativity, one constituting determinacy and another involved in all activity: cf. ¶398. In his activity the individual merges with the whole system of negating determinacies. He discovers universality in his limited task.
- ¶400. 1. There are three terms in the syllogistic triad of doing: the original purpose, the means of its execution, and the actualized purpose. These terms also figure in consciousness's reflection on its activity. These distinctions should be purely formal, with no difference in their content, no loss of content as we pass from one to the next. This identity of content extends also to the distinctions between individuality and Being in general, between the individual's purpose and his original nature, and between the means employed and 'actuality as absolute purpose', i.e. the means must not undermine the environment in which the individual's purpose is to be actualized.
- ¶401. 1. The individual must abide by its original nature, its capacities, etc. But this original nature is not only a stick urging him to fulfil his purpose in actuality. It is also a carrot in actuality itself, luring him on to activity: he views the actuality facing him not in a neutral way, but as requiring a certain contribution from himself. So his activity only draws out what is already implicit in Being, though not 'presented'. Actuality itself prescribes the course he must follow.—The individual can only know what he is in himself, and therefore what his purpose is, by actualizing himself. But conversely, he must know his purpose beforehand in order to act. He escapes from this circle by acting immediately, without dividing his doing into a beginning, means (or middle), and end. His original nature is all three at once. It is the beginning: the circumstances of the action, permeated by his *interest*, that tells him what to do. It is the middle: as *talent*, which is a sort of means, it tells him how to do it. His interest together with his talent gives him all he needs to go into action, which the means then do by converting themselves from inner to outer and actualizing the individual. The whole action is thus a self-contained circle. Purpose, means, circumstances, and even the 'work' (*Werk*) produced, as the actualization of the individual, are all integrated in the action.
- ¶402. 1. So far the individual's performance has been self-enclosed, unrelated to those of other individuals. But the work emerges from this enclosure and raises the question of differences between individuals. A work is determinate in virtue of two types of negation, one involved in activity, the other congealed in the determinacy of its product: cf. ¶¶398f. Consciousness thus distinguishes itself as the negativity of activity, which may result in alternative determinacies, from the static determinacy involved in a particular work. Thus it can compare different works and their creators.
- ¶403. 1. The comparisons between works in ¶402 were only quantitative, saying e.g. that one work is less energetic than another and thus that its author is less energetic. It does not follow, however, that this work is bad and the other good. (Nor, presumably, does it follow that one work is *better* than another.) There is no standard here for assessing the goodness or badness of a work apart from whether it is an apt expression of its author's original

nature, and no standard for assessing the goodness and badness of original natures other than the works they produce. Since a work inevitably expresses its author's original nature exactly, any work is good or, rather, neither good nor bad; it cannot be appropriately compared with the works of others in respect of its merit. (This claim is more applicable to, say, poetry than to boiler repairs.)

- ¶404. 1. Neither the author of a work nor others should assess it either favourably or unfavourably, since the work inevitably matches the author's nature and activity. This does involve a comparison between the in-itself and the work, but since these are made to measure the result of the comparison is a foregone conclusion. The author should say, like Shakespeare's *Touchstone*, that his work is 'an ill-favoured thing, sir, but mine own'. We might also compare Browning's *Andrea del Sarto*, e.g.: 'I, painting from myself and to myself,/Know what I do, am unmoved by men's blame/Or their praise either. . . ./Speak as they please, what does the mountain care?'
- ¶405. 1. Can consciousness's conception of itself in ¶404 be sustained in the face of reality? The individual has put his heart and soul into the work, and now he is exposed, in his work, to the critical gaze not only of his own particular consciousness, but of the universal consciousness. In fact he himself has become universal consciousness by focusing on the negativity of doing rather than the determinacy of his work (cf. ¶402) and ventures out into the public space to survey his work with a disinterested eye. It is not enough for him to savour his work in private. He needs to see how it fares in the open space of Being. When the work enters this space, everything that went into its creation is left behind and only the determinate original nature, embodied in the determinate work, enters into competition with other determinate natures and gets lost in the melee. Within the individual's enclosure, his original nature counts as universal, able to do whatever it likes, but in the work its non-universal determinacy is exposed to daylight and dissolves. That is, this work in which the individual actualized himself is not only determinate in content, it has also detached itself from its author and become alien. Other individuals find it alien too. They want to replace it with their own actuality. Their interest in it is different from that inscribed in it by its author, and they interpret it quite differently. The work gets lost, along with its author.
- ¶406. 1. In the shapes of consciousness of section B (pleasure and necessity, etc.) self-consciousness (doing) began in opposition to actuality (Being). Here in C it began in unity with actuality, but ends up opposed to it. There are three terms in play: the original nature, the doing, and the work. The original nature and the work are both Being, in contrast to the doing. The doing is at odds with the determinacy of the original nature and especially of the work. Doing, as movement and becoming, is never satisfied with its fixation in a determinate work and always feels that it could have produced, and could go on to produce, something different. The disparity is between the concept and reality. It doesn't matter whether we regard Being (*qua* original nature) as the concept, with doing as the reality, or Being (*qua* original nature and work) as the reality, with doing as the concept. In either case their disparity gives a negative answer to the question raised in ¶405: consciousness's conception of itself in ¶404 cannot be sustained in the face of reality.
- ¶407. 1. The individual's doing was the concept that held together all the factors involved. But now that the work has emerged into public space, they come apart. The author need not have expressed his original nature in any aim or purpose at all, or might have expressed it differently. He could have chosen different means to express his purpose. And whether these factors hang together or not, the public reception of the work depends on luck, not on the intrinsic merit of the purpose or its execution.
- ¶408. 1. Consciousness need not accept wholeheartedly the disintegration of its performance in ¶407. It can insist on the unity and necessity of its doing. It did at least perform an action,

expressing its purpose in actuality and, from its own point of view, its performance was coherently unified. What does it matter if its work vanishes in the public sphere? The very fact of its vanishing shows that the actual work does not matter and nor, therefore, does its vanishing. The vanishing is just as contingent and irrelevant as, in ¶407, its own doing was supposed to be.

- ¶409. 1. The individual has in effect produced two works. One of them disintegrates in objective actuality, in the public space. The other is the work he intended to produce, which remains as enduring as ever, unaffected by its public fate. The disintegration of the first work in actuality affects not only the work it demolishes, but actuality itself. If actuality cannot do justice to his intended work, then so much the worse for actuality. It is now only one factor in the individual's consideration, and not a very important one. What really matters, 'the Thing itself' (*die Sache selbst*), is the ideal work he intended, not the disintegrating work and the actuality in which it disintegrates, which is only the 'Thing' (*Sache*), not 'the Thing itself'. *Sache* is here used in two senses: first, it is what really matters, and secondly it approximates to *Ding*, the 'thing' of perception: cf. ¶410.
- ¶410. 1. The work as it disintegrates in actuality is just a 'thing' (*Ding*), a small fragment of reality with no special significance. The work as the individual now views it is, by contrast, a 'Thing', a thing to which self-consciousness attributes spiritual significance. All the factors involved in the work—individuality, actuality, doing, purpose, and the transition into actuality—are united in the Thing. It is an actual object, but an object in which self-consciousness invests its identity. It is, however, a somewhat abstract entity and will be subject to the dialectic of sensory certainty and perception.
- ¶411. 1. The Thing itself, in combining individuality with objectivity, presents self-consciousness with its substance. But it is only an inchoate form of spiritual substance and so not an adequate model of self-consciousness. The Thing itself runs through the factors involved in it as a predicate, as the genus of their species, and is only an abstract universal, loosely holding them together. It is not the subject, since it does not constitute or generate these factors. Cf. ¶641, where, in a summary of this episode, the Thing itself is said to have been a predicate, whereas conscience is a subject.
- ¶412. 1. Hegel is influenced by French moralists, whose concept of *honnêteté* wavers between probity and good manners. *Honnêteté* requires consciousness to be able to respond appropriately to any situation, as well as to deal with the Thing that matters. Consciousness can do this applying the predicate 'Thing itself' to each moment of its performance in turn.
- ¶413. 1. Whatever happens, *honnêteté* interprets so as to show consciousness in a good light. It can apply the predicate 'Thing itself' to the work or its absence, to its success or its failure, even to its interest in events in which it played no part.
- ¶414. 1. In order to get its satisfaction, as well as to remain honest, consciousness must avoid bringing together its various uses of the Thing itself. Otherwise it would see that it is just an abstraction, only the *thought* of a unity of willing and achieving.
- ¶415. 1. This supposed honesty must see that the moments it separates are intrinsically related to each other. Any one that the individual aligns himself with brings the others in its train. Each of these moments is linked with the individual and so can be regarded either as the Thing in its own right, independently of the individual's role in it, or as *his* Thing. Thus he wavers between concern about the Thing as such and concern about himself. He purports to be concerned only about the Thing as such, when really he is concerned about his own doing or his own work; or vice versa. Both are needed in fact. Nothing would get done if no one cared about his own performance, but conversely the performance is pointless unless there is a Thing to be realized that has independent value.
- ¶416. 1. In ¶¶412–15, consciousness switched its allegiance from one moment of its performance to another for its own benefit, and so the Thing itself kept changing its content. Now

Hegel brings in others and turns to the play of individualities. So the various moments of the Thing itself differ in their form as well. The individual presents one of these moments to others, but keeps back its opposite for himself. But he also alternates between them, now keeping back the first moment for himself, and presenting the second to others. His allegiance is to the Thing itself, but as an abstraction this can only be exhausted by running through all the moments it embraces. (One might think here of Don Juan, whose allegiance to womanhood can only be exhausted by successive seductions. He declares his love to each woman in turn while always harbouring a passion for another. But cf. ¶417.)

- ¶417. 1. Here Hegel has intellectuals, philosophers, etc. in mind. The individual purports, when he writes a book, to be concerned only with the Thing as such. But he wants to write it himself, not have it done by others. The others pretend that their offer of help was motivated only by concern for the Thing as such, but they too are concerned with their own doing. The same is true of book reviewers. They are concerned not with the Thing as such, but with their own generosity or their critical acumen and with the public display of it. On the other hand, the submission of a work and of assessments of it to the public realm implies that they are not solely concerned with their own private doings but want their own products to become available to others. To withstand this exposure they must have some intrinsic merit, apart from the egocentricity of their authors. The individual is thus mercurial and elusive.
- ¶418. 1. The result of the self-interested doings of these reciprocally deceiving individuals is similar to the universal social order created by self-interested individuals in ¶315. It is the creation of an objective, impersonal cultural order that depends on the self-interested doings of everyone and is of concern to everyone, but is not in the possession of any single individual. This Thing itself is no longer simply a predicate, a conglomerate of distinct moments. It is a substance, but also a subject, which incorporates individuals and converts them into a universal individual: cf. ¶17. It is therefore the category, which combines the individual I with objective Being: cf. ¶¶235ff. Earlier the category did this only in thought, but now it integrates all the disparate moments of self-consciousness.

b. Reason as lawgiver

- ¶419. 1. Self-consciousness is no longer a particular self-seeking individual. It has adopted an impersonal, disinterested stance, so that it is a universal Self common to all individuals. It is united with the Thing itself, which is therefore the category. However, the Thing itself is as yet only an abstraction and needs to acquire content from the doings of individuals.
- ¶420. 1. The Thing itself is now the be all and end all of consciousness. It heals all the oppositions that plagued consciousness earlier. Consciousness is here the consciousness of the ethical substance, and self-consciousness is only one moment of it, while the other is Being. But self-consciousness cannot transcend, and does not want to transcend, this ethical substance, since it is entirely at home in it. The ethical substance differentiates itself into ‘masses’ (*Massen*)—a term that occurs frequently in chapter VI for the divisions of substance, and here applies to different laws—but these divisions do not impair its conceptual unity.
- ¶421. 1. The ethical substance incorporates both the pure consciousness of it and self-consciousness. So self-consciousness is identified with ethical substance and is therefore not in a position to ask for a justification of its laws or to suggest an alternative.
- ¶423. 1. This ethical intuitionism is comparable to the sensory certainty of ¶¶90ff., and we must similarly consider it and its laws immediately, without introducing any extraneous reflections of our own. The immediacy of ethical intuitionism requires an equally immediate consideration of it.

- ¶424. 1. This law, supposedly known immediately, dies the death of a thousand qualifications. It ends up either as entirely contingent, universal only in form ('Everyone ought to speak what he believes to be the truth') or properly universal, but empty of content and unfulfillable ('Everyone ought to know the truth'). The law is not immediate at all, but subject to a complex dialectic. As in his treatment of sensory certainty in chapter I, Hegel plays with the word '*meinen*'.
- ¶425. 1. Unlike truth-telling, this is a Judaeo-Christian commandment rather than a Kantian duty. Kant criticized it, since a convicted criminal could appeal to it to secure his release, though he did acknowledge a more modest duty of charity. Hegel had great confidence in the State, despite examples, in and before his own time, of broken or malevolent States, and might be accused of the same high-minded idealism as his opponents. But he would reply that if the State fails then individual charity can only be marginal and uncertain of success; good intentions count for nothing. Here he disparages the very idea of 'Ought' (*das Sollen*) more trenchantly than in ¶424. He does not mean that a law is invariably obeyed, like a law of nature, but that it can form part of a socially accepted code, whereas a commandment is just a high-minded ideal.
- ¶426. 1. A command has the universal form 'Everyone ought to x', where 'x' stands for some determinate content, such as 'tell the truth' or 'love their neighbour'. But any replacement for 'x' is inadequate for the simple ethical substance. It amounts to no content at all, since it requires nothing definite of the individual. In its universal *form* the command expresses the ethical substance, but the content with which it replaces 'x' must be abandoned. What we are then left with is the *form* 'Everyone ought to x', and the most we can require of this is that it should not be contradictory, e.g. that it not be logically impossible for everyone to do 'x'.
- ¶428. 1. Reason no longer attempts to formulate and prescribe laws itself, but confines itself to testing existing and proposed laws for logical consistency.

c. Reason as law-testing

- ¶429. 1. Earlier we, Hegel and his readers, tested the laws submitted by law-giving reason. Those laws proved inadequate to the ethical substance, and we were left with formal universality, which now becomes a powerful weapon when consciousness confronts determinate laws. For it is not *we* who now test laws, but consciousness itself. Its testing differs from ours. We measured a law against the ethical substance and found that its content dwindled away into contingency or vacuity. Consciousness, by contrast, ignores the ethical substance and its requirements. It accepts the content presented to it in a law and tests it for logical consistency only, leaving aside its other defects. (Hegel seems to confuse a non-contradictory law with a 'tautology', but he means that the principle of non-contradiction is a tautology.)
- ¶430. 1. Hegel is mistaken in supposing that because the principle of non-contradiction is tautologous, any and every content would be self-consistent. 'No one ought to own an unpropertied slave' is consistent, while its opposite 'Everyone ought to own an unpropertied slave' is not, since it is logically impossible for everyone, including the slaves, to own such a slave. But apart from such concocted examples, he is right to suppose that any and every content can be made self-consistent. Neither the institution of private property nor its absence is contradictory. When examined in detail, the absence of property reveals what Hegel regards as contradictions, but are really only conflicts between absence of property and other requirements, such as the satisfaction of needs, long-term security, and equality. Distribution according to needs and equal distribution are not logically incompatible, but are likely to be incompatible in practice.
- ¶431. 1. When a concept such as property or non-property is treated as a simple determinacy, it is not contradictory. But when it is analysed, or at least considered as it works in practice,

it reveals contradictions, all stemming, in these cases, from a contradiction between universality and singularity, e.g. between the permanence of my property and my consumption of it, between the equality implicit in reciprocal recognition and my exclusive ownership, and between the universality of a thing and my possession of it.—None of these are in fact strict contradictions, nor do they raise practical difficulties comparable to those of non-property. The principle of non-contradiction is not *wholly* ‘indifferent to truth and falsehood’: a contradictory proposition is unquestionably false, while a consistent proposition may be true or false.

- ¶432. 1. The two moments are law-giving and law-testing. Their failure does not mean that the difference within ethical substance (between the masses: cf. ¶420) or knowledge of it must be abandoned. Substance essentially involves consciousness of itself and thus requires such knowledge. Taken on their own, law-giving and law-testing are unstable, but they indicate that ethical substance is becoming ethical consciousness.
- ¶433. 1. See ¶412 on honesty. A ‘supposed’ (*seinsollenden*) content is more literally a content ‘that ought to be’ and thus remains in the realm of the Ought rather than of practical reality.
- ¶434. 1. Without honesty, law-giving and law-testing may lapse into immorality. Law-giving sets up laws that look arbitrary and tyrannical. They are only ‘laws’ (*Gesetze*), not ‘commands’ (*Gebote*), which here has the flavour of ‘commandments’, prescriptions with an aura of divine authority. Law-testing looks at the laws from outside and undermines their authority with its nit-picking criticism.
- ¶435. 1. Law-giving and law-testing do not get to the heart of ethical substance. In its depths substance is still immediate and accepted unreflectively, while on its surface it is turned into an individual’s willing, etc. But now law-giving and law-testing become merely moments of the Self of consciousness, which combines with the spiritual essence. That is, we are no longer concerned with the individual consciousness, but with spirit, the collective consciousness or mentality of the whole community, as will emerge in ¶438.
- ¶436. 1. ‘First of all’ (*vors erste*), i.e. in the Greek city-state (see §§ 444ff.), the spiritual essence is simply accepted as given and is subject to no testing. Individuals have entirely absorbed the norms of their society and accept them without question. The individual has become a universal I, united with the world as the category prefigured: cf. ¶235. His acceptance of the norms is a childlike acceptance, not sophisticated *belief* or ‘faith’ (*Glaube*), which is a stance of a single individual towards something that seems alien and requires the overcoming of doubts. The individual is now entirely at one with the ethical substance and no doubts or reservations have yet arisen.
- ¶437. 1. Sophocles’s *Antigone*, lines 456f.
2. The difference between self-consciousness and the essence is ‘transparent’ in the sense that there is no opaque barrier between them. The articulation of the essence into different masses (see ¶420), between e.g. the law of the family and the law of the State in Greece, is no longer the work of individuals, but of the essence itself. If self-consciousness’s relationship to the law is a variety of ethical intuitionism, it is quite different from the ethical intuitionism of law-giving in ¶423. The law-giver was an individual who stepped back from his society and asked ‘What laws should there be?’ and ‘Why should they be of one sort rather than another?’ Now the ethical individual is so integrated in his society that he cannot even ask such questions. Even if he were to ask them, there is no answer to be given in the terms of law-giving and law-testing. To steal the property that someone has deposited with me is wrong just because it is wrong. No contradiction is involved in stealing it. It may be contradictory to say that it is permissible for me to take someone *else’s* property, but I can avoid that by redesignating it as my *own* property. There is no contradiction in this redesignation. It is, after all, just what I do if I give someone a gift: it is now his property, not mine. But this is just a passing shot at Kant. Self-consciousness is no longer in a position to raise such questions.

(BB.) Spirit

VI. Spirit

- ¶438. 1. In PS, spirit is primarily the collective spirit of a people. It is the *truth* of reason in that it fulfils what was initially only reason's subjective *certainty* of being all reality. Hegel then summarizes the stages by which this truth was reached. Observing reason (¶¶240–346) hoped to find the unity of itself and reality, the category, in the realm of objective Being, but found itself only as a dead skull. In ¶¶347–93 reason abandons the ambition of *finding* itself and adopts a more creative approach. The Self attempts to make its mark actively on the alien world. This fails too, as do all one-sided approaches. So in ¶¶394–437 it tries to enter into a fruitful partnership with the world, creating works, proposing laws, and testing laws. It is, however, still distinct from the world, surveying it from outside and skimming its surface rather than penetrating its depths. On the other side, the world is left without a consciousness of itself. Now this rift is finally closed: the Self and the world merge together.
- ¶439. 1. Spirit has been called 'ethical substance' since ¶420, but that was before it was fully actualized by merging with the Self. As ethical substance, spirit contrasts with individuals and is far greater than they are. As ethical actuality, it has absorbed individuals and they are entirely at home in it. As substance, it is the permanent framework in which all their activity takes place. But insofar as it also involves the Being-for-self of individuals, it lets them take bits off it for their sustenance. Conversely, it is sustained by the activities of individuals. It is the movement and activity of self-consciousness that keeps the substance alive. Cf. ¶17 on substance and subject.
- ¶440. 1. Spirit differs in status from all the previous shapes of consciousness. Spirit is not simply one fleeting shape among others. It is never sublated, and it has been at work all along in various guises, seeking to actualize itself, as the title of PS indicates. The isolation and analyses of the previous shapes were conducted by spirit, focusing on particular aspects of itself in order to discover and develop its true nature. These aspects are only abstractions from spirit, whereas spirit itself is 'existence', a word that has the flavour of 'stepping-forth', in accordance with its Latin etymology. This may be why (as Hyppolite, II, p.16, n.6 suggests) the dialectical development of spirit corresponds to a coherent temporal and historical development, which is, in the preceding shapes, dimly discernible in the development of self-consciousness, but not elsewhere. Moreover, while each of the previous shapes left its predecessors behind, spirit incorporates these shapes as aspects of itself. It is an objective being, as the objects of consciousness are. It is Being-for-itself, as self-consciousness is. It is the unity of both, an object which reason determines in accordance with the category. But at that stage spirit did not see that reason is more than an onlooker and is actualized in spirit itself. Now it does, and so does not only *have* reason, but *is* reason.
- ¶441. 1. Spirit proceeds through various shapes that are themselves spirits, the Greek spirit, the spirit of the Roman Empire, etc. Only the first of these, the Greek spirit, is genuine ethical life. Spirit must become conscious of this immediate ethical life, thereby undermining it. Passing in this way from shape to shape, spirit advances to self-knowledge. These shapes are shapes of a world, located in time and space. The previous shapes, even if they presupposed a background culture, were primarily shapes of individual consciousness.
- ¶442. 1. Hegel summarizes the whole development of spirit. It begins with the tightly knit ethical life of the Greek city-state. This is rent apart by its self-knowledge, leading to the abstract 'right' of the Roman Empire, which sets the Self in opposition to the substance. Division persists in the history of Europe down to the French revolution: there are two realms, that of culture (the hither side) and that of faith (the beyond). These realms are

shattered by the 'insight' of the enlightenment, the conceptual penetration of an object that results in its dissolution. The two realms thus coalesce into morality, where the Self is all-important, culminating in conscience.

- ¶443. 1. Spirit follows the Hegelian pattern of immediate unity-division-restoration of unity on a higher level. The actual self-consciousness of absolute spirit is religion, the subject of chapter VII, while chapter VI presents the consciousness of absolute spirit: see Jarczyk and Labarrière I, pp.749f., n.12.

A. THE TRUE SPIRIT, THE ETHICAL ORDER

- ¶444. 1. This is an abstract account of what will be explained more concretely in ¶445. Action breaks up the simple unity of the ethical world. Since the agent must be conscious of the ethical substance in whose interests he is acting, he opens up a gap between substance and the consciousness of it. He also opens a gap within substance and within consciousness, because in acting he must opt for one aspect of substance rather than another. This substance contrasts with the singular action. Self-consciousness is the all-embracing middle term between substance and the agent. Implicitly the agent is unified with the substance. Now he becomes so explicitly, by acting ethically, but he thereby reduces substance to his action, which actualizes only one aspect of substance at the expense of others.

- ¶445. 1. Consciousness has a tendency to introduce division. Hence, as well as the existing opposition between substance and self-conscious individuals, it also splits substance into two 'masses' (cf. ¶420), the human law of the State and the divine law of the family. The self-conscious individual devotes him- or herself to one of these laws and neglects the other. This introduces a new division, between what the individual knows and what s/he does not know, when s/he acts. These conflicts destroy the individual agents and the ethical order itself, but give rise to a fully self-conscious individual, detached from social norms. On the contrast between knowing and not knowing, see also ¶¶467, 469.

a. *The ethical world. Human and divine law: man and woman*

- ¶446. 1. Structural patterns recur at different levels. In ¶¶110ff., the certainty of simple Being passed into perception of a thing with many properties, but these reduced to the contrast of singularity and universality. Analogously, ethical perception finds many relations, such as society/individual, man/woman, State/family, life/death, but these reduce to the two laws of singularity and universality. In the case of ethical perception, however, 'singularity' and 'universality' do not adequately express the two sides. Each side is championed by an *individual* who appeals to a *universal* law, respectively human and divine, and each individual equates their chosen law with spirit as a whole.

- ¶447. 1. 'Commonwealth' translates '*Gemeinwesen*', which ordinarily means 'community', but is literally 'common essence', i.e. the essence of all individuals. 'Configuration' translates '*Gestaltung*', literally 'shaping', but in PS the word denotes not a particular 'shape' of consciousness, but a whole section containing several related shapes. Here it refers to the beginning of section B of chapter V, especially ¶¶350f., where the commonwealth was only an object *for us*, whereas now it is an object for itself, i.e. for the consciousness of its own citizens. 'Counter-glow' translates '*Gegenschein*', both words now applied to the faint glow in the night sky opposite the setting sun, owing to the reflection of sunlight by dust in space. Hegel is probably not alluding to this phenomenon, but the idea is similar, that the commonwealth is reflected in individuals. The commonwealth as a unitary people is a real entity, comparable to the English language reflected in its speakers.

- ¶448. 1. What ¶447 described is the human law, embracing the people, citizens, and government. It is known to and accepted by everyone, and sets them free in the public space it opens up.

- ¶449. 1. The State-power emerges from its opposite, the family governed by divine law. It sets limits to the individual Being-for-self (viz. independence) of the family, but is nevertheless rooted in it.
- ¶450. 1. Both laws involve the whole of ethical substance, only in a different form: cf. ¶446. Thus, although the divine law is only the inner concept or germ of the developed ethical order, it still involves self-consciousness, and a *natural* commonwealth, with interpersonal relations of its own, in contrast to that of the people. The gods of the household (Penates) stand opposed to the public order.
- ¶451. 1. Since the family is an aspect of the ethical substance, it must have a universal ethical significance over and above the natural relationship of its members. By a series of eliminations Hegel locates its ethical significance in a cult of the dead. It cannot lie in love between particular members, since this is not universal. So it must lie in a relation of the individual to the whole family. This relation cannot consist in the individual's acquiring power and wealth, since, although this helps the family, its primary significance lies in his departure from the family and his indirect contribution, as a citizen, to the commonwealth. Equally, it cannot consist in some service that the whole family performs for the living individual, since either the need for it and its actual performance is entirely contingent (such as help in need) or, like education, only prepares him for his exit from the family. The concern of the family is not the contingent individual nor the prospective citizen, but the deceased individual. With burial rites it makes his death a spiritual event rather than a merely natural event.
- ¶452. 1. Burial rites have the aim of giving a spiritual significance to death, making it a conscious deed rather than a merely natural event.
- ¶453. 1. The 'elemental individual' is the earth, as a metaphor for the family. When the individual breaks loose from the family to become a leading citizen, the earth-family draws him back into the abstraction of death. He still has power, as we shall see.
- ¶454. 1. The differences and gradations of human law are dealt with in ¶455, those of divine law in ¶456.
- ¶455. 1. The commonwealth is concentrated in the government, which is the Self of the whole ethical substance, including families. But it expands outwards into other systems, all based on the family, such as personal freedom, property, and economic activity, while keeping them under its sway. When these systems become too isolated and absorbed in their own business, the government engages in warfare, which shakes up the institutions, puts the fear of death into individuals, and restores their allegiance to the whole. This stops their ethical Being-there from descending into natural Being-there, viz. the family. So death, the special preserve of divine law, is a powerful instrument in the hands of human law. (This view of warfare was held by Hegel throughout his career, and has little to do with the Greek city-state in particular.)
- ¶456. 1. The marital and parental relationships are unsatisfactory ethical relationships, since they are governed by emotion and piety, natural rather than ethical attitudes. See also PR ¶¶173ff.
- ¶457. 1. The brother-sister relationship is not confined to the transition from one generation to the next (like the parental relationship) nor are the parties unequal (as in the marital and parental relationships). Their natural ties are looser: neither produced the other and they do not desire each other. Antigone's claim that while a dead husband or a dead child is replaceable, a dead brother is not (Sophocles, *Antigone*, lines 904–20) explains why Hegel says that a wife is not concerned with a particular husband or children, but only with a husband and children in general. Her role in the household thus has universal ethical significance, while her husband acquires universal significance *as a citizen*, and finds in the family only the singularity of desire. The brother-sister relationship is not unequal in this way.

- ¶459. 1. Hegel refers back to ¶¶394ff., the beginning of chapter V, section C, where the individual depended on its original determinate nature, its predispositions and capacities, but without any sexual differentiation. Here the determinate nature involves sexual differentiation, but this is transcended to become the ethical difference between the human law, represented by the brother, and the divine law, represented by the sister, who may incidentally also be a wife.
- ¶460. 1. Human and divine law depend on each other. Neither the commonwealth nor the family could survive without the other. Ultimately the authority of human law derives from and is buttressed by divine law, and the citizens of human law return to it in death. However, divine law makes its power felt in worldly life, when it finds an agent to champion it.
- ¶461. 1. The ethical life of the Greek city-state fulfils all the aspirations of the preceding shapes of consciousness, mainly those of sections B and C of chapter V, with none of their disadvantages.
- ¶462. 1. The ethical world is a stable equilibrium in which each part is satisfied. When its order is disturbed—as it inevitably will be, since it is a living, not a static, system—it restores its equilibrium by the justice immanent in it, not an alien cosmic justice or blind revenge, but a rationally planned justice. There are two types of justice: human justice dispensed by the government, when individuals or groups become too independent (cf. ¶455), and divine justice dispensed by the ‘Erinyes’ of the individual. Hegel is thinking of Aeschylus’s *Oresteia*, in which Orestes kills his mother, Clytemnestra, because, together with her lover, she has murdered his father, Agamemnon, on his return from the Trojan war; Orestes is then pursued by the Erinyes or Furies, avenging goddesses who punish wrongdoing, especially within families; eventually Orestes is acquitted by the Athenian law-court, chaired by the goddess Athena. Hegel assigns the Erinyes (in the singular) to Orestes himself, censoring the ‘alien essence’ that appears in Aeschylus. The individual is never wronged by the commonwealth, but only by Being, which inflicts death on us all. Death is transformed from a sheer happening into a human achievement by the family: cf. ¶¶ 451f.
- ¶463. 1. Hegel finds a twofold syllogistic structure in the ethical realm. One syllogism is the movement from the extreme of conscious spirit, by way of the middle term, man, to the other extreme, unconscious spirit (or death). The other is the movement from unconscious spirit, by way of the middle term woman, into the conscious realm. The man–woman relationship is the middle term linking these two syllogisms, i.e. linking divine law and human law. The exact form taken by this joint syllogism is unclear, mainly because it is unclear whether the emergence of divine law into daylight consists simply in the woman burying the man or in her performing (as Antigone does) a combative part in the public realm.

b. The ethical action. Human and divine knowledge. Guilt and destiny.

- ¶464. 1. A decisive deed will bring to a head the implicit opposition of the two laws. This will destroy both laws, as well as their protagonists. But a new self-conscious individualist will emerge from the rubble.
- ¶465. 1. This is not a conflict of duty and passion, or of different duties. When someone steps back to reflect on his duty, the notion of duty becomes so thin that it can accommodate almost anything, including the content of a passion: cf. ¶¶427ff. on law-testing. Conflict of duties is comic, because two incompatible courses of action cannot both be the binding duty of one and the same person: on conflict of duties, see *Enc.* III, ¶¶508–11. But here the duties are duties of different people. Each protagonist is unwaveringly certain of what s/he has to do, since each is inexorably bound to one of the two laws by nature, their sex. The protagonists are Creon, who has forbidden the burial of the defeated rebels, and Antigone, whose duty it is to bury her brother, Polynices. (It is not obvious that Creon has a *duty* to forbid the burial of his enemies; he no doubt has a duty to restore order; that does not entail the denial of burial, though it may imply a duty to enforce obedience to his commands. If

Antigone were less decisive, she might see her situation as a conflict between a duty to bury her brother and a duty to obey her ruler; but in her total commitment to divine law, she does not see the matter in this way.)

- ¶466. 1. In the ordinary ethical realm the two laws are only implicit. Their conflict emerges explicitly only when they are championed by two decisive self-consciousnesses. Each protagonist has character or backbone. S/he is not wavering between different alternatives or even respectful of the opponent's case. S/he regards the opposition as sheer violence or obstinacy. Hence each suffers from the combination of knowledge and ignorance mentioned in ¶445. (Neither Creon nor Antigone would have proposed a *referendum* to settle their dispute. Such blinkered obstinacy seems a more likely cause of warfare than the one suggested by Hegel in ¶455, which is an *effect* of war rather than its *cause*.)
- ¶467. 1. Hegel primarily has in mind Creon, the champion of the right of ethical self-consciousness against the divine right of the essence. Since it is conscious of the substance, ethical self-consciousness is not opposed to actuality. It does not have a purpose of its own which it seeks to impose on the world, as did the shapes of consciousness considered in section B of chapter V. It believes that it is simply following the prescriptions of the substance itself, with which it completely identifies itself. It is not devious and perverting, like some of its forebears, and pursues its mission steadfastly without deviation. It asserts its right to actualize what it knows. However, its knowledge of the substance or essence is deficient and one-sided.
- ¶468. 1. The ethical essence involves two laws, but the agent aligns himself with only one, seemingly unaware of the other. In acting, however, he opens up a division between himself and the actuality that he proposes to alter. This alone incurs guilt, whether because any action excludes other alternatives or because one can never be sure how it will turn out: 'A flung stone is the devil's' (PR ¶119 Addition). To make matters worse, violation of the other law is a crime. He cannot be absolved of guilt by drawing a distinction between the deed and the doing, such that the actual deed results in part from extraneous factors and is not his own doing. He definitely sets himself up in opposition to actuality: this is a formal presupposition of any human action. The act's content involved a crime: siding with one law and violating the other. Later Hegel will consider this in more detail—in ¶473 (Hyppolite, II, p.35, n.32) or ¶659 (Jarczyk and Labarrière, I, p.755, n.57)—but it is clear for now that this is not the individual's personal guilt. He is only a representative of his society, sex, or class. He is a generic Self, and also a specific Self, but not yet a fully individual Self, which will not appear until later.
- ¶469. 1. A reference to Oedipus, who unknowingly killed his father and married his mother. Hegel is implying that not-knowing or ignorance plays a similar role in both tragedies. This is false. Creon and Antigone were not unaware of the laws they contravened in the way that Oedipus failed to recognize his parents. Conversely, Oedipus was entirely aware of the divine laws against patricide and incest, but contravened them unwittingly.
2. Any deed involves the actualization of a possibility, etc., and therefore guilt in Hegel's sense. But it is unclear what bearing this has on Oedipus's specific guilt, viz. that he was guilty of a crime even though he did not knowingly commit it.
- ¶470. 1. Sophocles's *Antigone*, line 926. Antigone knew in advance the force of the law she violated and this compounds her guilt. Her action commits her to the view that an ethical purpose must be actualized in reality. However, this implies that the ethical purpose of the law she violates must also be actualized. In frustrating the actualization of this other purpose, she must therefore recognize her guilt.
- ¶471. 1. Recognizing the force of the law it violates, the agent (*das Handelnde*) retreats from purposive action to a mere disposition. This removes the *character* of the agent, and sets it

adrift. S/he cannot endure without an unequivocal allegiance to his or her law. Even without effective action, the hero(ine) has a pathos, an emotional commitment to the substance as s/he conceives it, and cannot survive the destruction of the value s/he championed.

¶472. 1. Given the parity of the two laws, they must suffer the same fate. Ordinarily they exist peacefully alongside each other. But the deed transforms each of them into a 'self-essence' (*Selbstwesen*, a term that contrasts with *Gemeinwesen*: cf. ¶447), an essence endowed with a Self. Each self-essence is internally divided, not with respect to its pathos, since each self-essence has only one pathos, but with respect to its division into knowing and not-knowing, the not-knowing that leads to its guilt and destruction. Right requires the destruction of both parties. (Hegel may mean, alternatively, that the laws together become a *single* self-essence, which would be more obviously diverse than each taken separately.)

¶473. 1. 'True spirit' means approximately 'objective spirit', as in ¶477.

2. Since divine and human law play no obvious part in the quarrel between Eteocles and Polynices, which forms the background to the conflict between Creon and Antigone, Hegel presents it as a conflict between the self-conscious human order and the contingency of unconscious nature. Nature plays fast and loose with the ethical order rooted in it. It does so by blessing the incestuous union of Oedipus and Jocasta with two sons, Eteocles and Polynices (presumably twins with Eteocles born first—there were various versions of the story), when only one could become king. Because of a curse that Oedipus had cast on them, they quarrelled over which of them was to succeed him as king of Thebes. They came to an agreement to rule Thebes in alternate years, but Eteocles refused to abdicate after his first year in office. He sent Polynices into exile, but Polynices attacked Thebes in order to regain power. The brothers killed each other in the ensuing battle. The new king, Creon, forbade the burial of Polynices's body.

¶474. 1. In general, the conflict is between the ethical community and nature. The defeat and subsequent treatment of Polynices who, as a solitary rebel, represents the family, offends the divine law, which is the ultimate source of the power of the community. The divine law enlists other communities to its cause. Thebes is later attacked and defeated by the 'epigoni', the sons of Polynices's allies.

¶475. 1. What is represented in Greek tragedies looks like a sheer contingency, stemming from the pathos and doings of particular individuals. But in fact it signifies a deep conflict within ethical life between divine and human law, between the singularity characteristic of the family and the universality of the community. The community needs young men both to renew its ranks and to fight in the wars resulting from its position as only one community among others. But behind every young man there stands a woman, nurturing his individuality and diverting him from the universal purpose of the community. Warfare is a solution to the dispersion this threatens; it represses individualism and secures the cohesion of the community. On the other hand, warfare gives prominence and power to young men, reinforcing their individualism. The community both represses and depends on the individualism rooted in the family. Initially, the familial gods of the household (the 'Penates') were absorbed into the community, but now the spirits of the city-states are absorbed into a vast empire (the Alexandrian and later the Roman Empire) in which individualism reigns supreme.

¶476. 1. The ethical substance collapses for two reasons, both stemming from its immediacy, its unmediated and unstructured relation to nature. First, it cannot reconcile unconscious nature with the self-consciousness of spirit. Secondly, it is inevitably limited and vulnerable to encroachment by other individual substances. Its naturalness is its limitation, but also its very essence or Self. Hence when it perishes, so does the living spirit that animates everyone. They cease to be a compact body of citizens and become a collection of separate individuals.

c. *The state of right*

¶477. 1. ‘True’ (*wahre*) is here close to ‘objective’. It contrasts with subjective ‘certainty’, which is no longer the subjective identification with ‘substance’ that characterized the city-state and is now directed elsewhere.

2. On ‘self-essence’, see ¶472. On ‘persons’, see PR ¶¶35f, and PH, p.317: “Person”, which involves the recognition of the independent dignity of the social unit—not on the ground of the display of the life which he possesses—in his complete individuality—but as the abstract *individuum*.’ The individual is now as empty and solitary as the dead individual in the ethical order, only he has now come to life as a mere self-conscious I.

¶479. 1. ‘State of right’ is *Rechtszustand*. ‘State’ has the sense of ‘condition’, not of ‘political State’. Thus ‘state of right’ contrasts with ‘state of nature’, but here it contrasts primarily with the ethical order. *Recht* is ‘right’ or ‘law’, not in the sense of a legal code, but roughly that of ‘justice’. This stage corresponds to the Roman Empire: cf. PH, pp.314–18.

2. Stoicism emerged from lordship and bondage in ¶¶197ff. Similarly, the state of right emerges from the ethical order which dominates the individuals in it (and also the conflict between human and divine laws). Hegel attempts to draw parallels between phases of spirit and earlier shapes of consciousness. Cf. ¶440, on sensory certainty, perception, and understanding, and ¶¶480 and 483 on scepticism and unhappy consciousness.

¶480. 1. The independent self-consciousness of stoicism passed into scepticism: cf. ¶¶202ff. Scepticism was in utter disarray, e.g. doubting the reliability of sense-perception and ethical laws, yet dependent on them: cf. ¶205. Scepticism responded to this problem by insisting that it still has semblance or appearances in its possession. The state of right falls into an analogue of scepticism; ethical substance held individuals together in a coherent order, but empty persons are in disarray. The state of right responds to this by turning what it possesses into private property assigned to individuals and recognized as legitimate. It does not matter what the property is: it can be anything, as long as, *formally*, it is *mine*. Its content is all at the mercy of the emperor: ‘the whole empire was subject to the pressure of taxation and plunder’ (PH, p.316). Hence ‘person’ is often pejorative, expressing the lowest common denominator of human beings. On property and persons, see PR ¶¶34–70.

¶481. 1. PH, p.317 gives a similarly jaundiced account: ‘As, when the physical body suffers dissolution, each point gains a life of its own, but which is only the miserable life of worms; so the political organism is here dissolved into atoms—viz., private persons. Such a condition is Roman life at this epoch: on the one side Fate and the abstract universality of sovereignty; on the other, the individual abstraction.’ A Roman emperor was usually declared to have been divine by his successor.

¶483. 1. On the parallel with the transition from Stoicism to scepticism, and from there to unhappy consciousness, see ¶480. Earlier, unhappy consciousness was something like a thought experiment, but now it has become a historical reality. The Self had not emerged in the Greek ethical world; it was absorbed in the ethical substance. Now it has emerged as the be-all and end-all, but it is thin and insubstantial, and at the mercy of caprice. It is therefore alienated from reality, i.e. from its own Self. Alienation will persist until the French revolution.

B. SELF-ALIENATED SPIRIT. CULTURE

¶484. 1. Hegel uses two verbs, *entfremden* (‘alienate, estrange’) and (*sich*) *entäussern* (‘estrange, part with, dispose of, externalize’), which are approximate synonyms, but not exact synonyms. Hence I translate the words differently, *entfremden* as ‘alienate’ and *entäussern* as ‘estrange’. (Hyppolite reverses this, while Jarczyk and Labarrière render *entfremden* as

‘aliéner’ and *entäussern* as ‘exterioriser’.) In the ethical world the Self is in immediate unity with the customs, etc. of its society. It does not have to alienate itself from itself in order unite with its society and at the same time create that society. But that is just what the new discrete Self has to do. It faces a world that seems entirely alien to it. In fact, this world is its own product, not of its conscious doing, but of its abandonment of its own essence. If it does not alienate itself, it remains a self-enclosed person at the mercy of the external elements. So it alienates its status as a person in favour of a new social order that will arise from the rubble of the empire.

¶485. 1. With the coming of Christianity, the world divides into two worlds, the actual world here and now and the world beyond. In the actual world self-consciousness estranges itself and merges with a world that it nevertheless finds alien. But in a second alienation, *pure* consciousness projects a world beyond, which is the opposite of the world of the present and is a world constructed in thought. From now on, until the French revolution, spirit lives in one world but projects its essence into another.

¶486. 1. A summary of the whole of chapter VI. The actual world accommodates the two powers, the family and the State, in equilibrium, but each moment in it has its essence in the world beyond. Its stability therefore depends on alienation. The Greek world was divided into two laws, one knowing and the other unconscious, but it became a unitary Self in the Roman Empire. Analogously, these two worlds will be transformed by *insight* into single Self, but a universal Self that comprehends everything conceptually: cf. ¶¶527ff. Insight disrupts the social order and also the world of faith. It confounds faith’s house-keeping by interpreting this realm in secular terms: cf. ¶572. It replaces the two worlds with its own dualism of an unknowable god and a world governed by utility. This loss of substance results in absolute freedom, which repairs the alienation of spirit: cf. ¶¶582ff. Then spirit leaves the land of culture (France) and goes to the land of (Kantian) morality (Germany).

I. The World of self-alienated spirit

¶487. 1. The actual world is intrinsically self-alienated, since it involves the estrangement of self-consciousness: cf. ¶485. In response to this first alienation, spirit sets up the world of faith. But since the world of faith is a flight from the actual world, it is conditioned by the actual world and itself a second alienation. Faith is not religion. Faith is the stance of an individual which takes into account only one side of the equation, while religion is a society’s consideration of the whole development by which absolute spirit expresses itself: on faith cf. ¶¶7, 8, and 436. Since it is one-sided, faith confronts another opponent besides the actual world, for pure consciousness gives rise not only to faith but also to conceptual thought.

a. Culture and its realm of actuality

¶488. 1. ‘Culture’ (*Bildung*) here covers every aspect of social life—political, economic, intellectual, etc.—and also suggests the idea of ‘forming, cultivating’ (*bilden*), since self-consciousness needs to give up its individual personality, cultivate itself and become universal. In contrast to the Roman world, where everyone acquired equality just by existing, self-consciousness attains equality and recognition only by its alienating integration into culture.

¶489. 1. ‘Alienation’ and ‘estrangement’ are more or less synonymous in the first two sentences, and elsewhere in the section on culture. The culture in which the individual counts only as a universal type is that of 17th-century (and, as the quotation indicates, 18th-century) France, where the monarch attempted to cultivate the nobility and turn them into uniform Frenchmen. The quotation is from *Rameau’s Nephew*, a dialogue by Denis Diderot

(1713–1784), translated by Goethe in 1805: see ¶¶521ff. The French ‘*espèce*’ (‘species, sort, kind’) is often pejorative, and Hegel associates this with the French aversion to particularity or specificity. ‘Kind’ translates the German *Art*, also ‘sort, species’, but with no pejorative flavour, indicating that the Germans have no such addiction to a homogenizing culture. All three occurrences of ‘meant’ translate *gemeint*, from *meinen*.

- ¶490. 1. Because the individual can make his mark in the world only by appropriating a uniform culture and conforming to its institutions, in doing so he also elevates this cultural substance to actuality. It is the product of individuals even though it looks to them like an alien fixture. The development of individuals and of society go hand in hand.
- ¶491. 1. This ¶ becomes clearer in the light of those that follow. The Self no longer regards itself as an individual, but is concerned only with the culture it has entered. The Self is like the soul of its society and articulates it into opposite moments or masses, such as State-power and wealth. These moments are not related immediately like the two laws of Greek ethical life, but each breathes life into the other, while they nevertheless remain separate. One of these moments is characterized as good and the other as bad. At first, it is State-power (or the public sector) that is good and wealth (or the private sector) that is bad: ¶495. But then the predicates switch sides and wealth becomes good, while State-power becomes bad: ¶497. Because of the interdependence of these masses, this alienating inversion is inevitable. But eventually the alternating alienation is overcome and we gain a conceptual mastery of the situation: ¶527.
- ¶492. 1. On the four elements, see *Enc. II*, ¶¶281–6. (1) The analogue of air is the spiritual essence universal in itself; (2) that of water, the essence that is for itself; and (3) that of fire, the essence as self-consciousness in and for itself, which embraces the other two. (1) is the State-power, which imposes uniformity on individuals, while (2) is the open arena where individuals, let go by (1), freely produce wealth. (3) is self-consciousness as a whole, which divides into (1) and (2) and controls them both. (1) will be dealt with in ¶493, (2) in ¶494, and (3) in ¶495. (1) and (2) correspond respectively to the commonwealth and the family in the Greek world, only they do not arise spontaneously from the earth, and are under the sway of self-consciousness. As Napoleon said to Goethe, politics has replaced fate: ‘*La politique est la fatalité*’ (PH, p. 278).
- ¶493. 1. Pure and actual consciousness correspond respectively to the world of faith and the actual world of ¶¶486f. Faith provides a commentary on the actual world. As represented by pure consciousness, as thoughts, the homogenizing power (State-power) is good, while the individualizing element is bad. This dissolution of universal uniformity is irremediable. Individuals are left to their own devices and inevitably pursue their own interests. How the situation is represented objectively, by actual consciousness, will be considered in ¶494.
- ¶494. 1. The thoughts of pure consciousness, which sees things only in terms of good and bad, are alienated into State-power and wealth as they appear to actual consciousness: cf. ¶493. State-power is the product of individuals, but they forget this and it becomes the basis of all their activity. It is, however, a pure abstraction when taken on its own. It can only be something determinate, State-power, if it has something else, an opposite, contrasting with it: wealth. The pursuit of wealth looks like a purely individual concern, but in fact it is as universal and spiritual as State-power. Like it or not, and believe it or not, in working for himself the individual works for everyone and everyone works for him. ‘Opine’ translates *meinen*.
- ¶495. 1. The self-conscious subject is the third element of ¶492. He is not inextricably linked with either of the first two elements, since he is both Being-in-itself (as State-power is) and Being-for-itself (as wealth is), and supposes that he can choose between them. For this purpose he adopts from *pure* consciousness the thoughts of good and bad. But as *actual* consciousness he must attach these thoughts to real entities to form a judgement. It seems a

- foregone conclusion that he will judge State-power to be good and wealth bad. But matters are more complex in reality. The subject has a foot in each camp. The two elements interpenetrate, and each, like the subject itself, involves both Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. So he must consider them from both points of view.
- ¶496. 1. Self-consciousness first considers the object in the light of its own Being-for-itself. An object is good if, and only if, it conforms to self-consciousness. Equally, if an object is good, it is good in itself. An object's being good in itself and its being good for self-consciousness amount to the same thing; self-consciousness is a power that makes an object good in itself. Initially, an object, such as State-power, was in itself, and good in itself, independently of how self-consciousness rated it. But this second in-itself, mediated by self-consciousness, must be different from the first, immediate in-itself of ¶495, just because it is mediated by spirit. This implies that self-consciousness is on the brink of changing its judgement of the object.
- ¶497. 1. State-power satisfies one side of consciousness, its Being-in-itself, but it does not satisfy its Being-for-itself, its individuality. Wealth, by contrast, does. So the initial judgement is reversed: State-power is bad and wealth is good.
- ¶498. 1. The two judgements are those of ¶497, that State-power is bad and wealth is good, which reverse those of ¶495, but are now reversed in turn. Now self-consciousness considers the question in the light of its own Being-in-itself. By this standard State-power is judged to be good, since it fulfils the essence or in-itself of consciousness. (This was acknowledged in ¶497, but overridden by Being-for-itself.) Wealth is bad, since it gives only individual enjoyment.
- ¶499. 1. All these judgements fall into two types. To judge something good is to find it like oneself, to judge something bad is to find it unlike oneself. These two types of judging characterize consciousness itself and divide it into two shapes. If we apply the same standard to the judgings as they applied to their objects, we see that like-finding judging is good, and unlike-finding judging is bad. (It is unclear why this is so. To apply the *same* standard to a judging would be to ask not whether the judgement is like- or unlike-finding, but whether I find the judgement like or unlike myself. A judgement that something is bad (good) need not be a bad (good) judgement. Hegel tacitly assumes that neither State-power nor wealth is intrinsically bad and that the unlike-finder is a malcontent or misfit.)
- ¶500. 1. There are now two types of consciousness, the noble and the base or ignoble. The noble consciousness is satisfied both with State-power and with the economic system.
- ¶501. 1. The base consciousness finds both elements unlike. State-power is unlike consciousness itself, suppressing its Being-for-itself, while wealth is unlike the permanent in-itself. Overtly the base consciousness conforms to both, but hates State-power and despises wealth.
- ¶502. 1. Hegel intertwines logic with practical reality. These conflicting judgements are brought together by us philosophers, and seen to be suspect, but not by consciousness itself. From the logical point of view, they require deduction by a syllogism, so that consciousness itself can see which, if any of them, is correct. From the point of view of reality, the essences themselves are so far treated only as objects of judgement, as passive 'predicates'. We have not seen how they manage their own development, as active 'subjects'. This is why consciousness remains split into two one-sided judges, surveying the essences from outside. The syllogism will remedy this. It will amount to an actual linkage between the judges and the essences, putting the judgements into practical effect and showing how the noble consciousness cultivates itself and thereby generates the spiritual power of the State. This corresponds to the transition from feudalism to absolute monarchy: see PH, pp.398ff.
- ¶503. 1. State-power is not yet a Self. Cf. PH, p.403: 'For many centuries the Kings of France possessed only a very small domain, so that many of their vassals were more powerful than

themselves;...But that which essentially secured respect for royalty, even among the powerful vassals, was the increasing personal power of the sovereign.’

- ¶504. 1. The self-estrangement of the nobility syllogistically links the abstract State-power with concrete reality. In its service the nobility estranges itself. In so doing, it alienates its immersion in Being-there, i.e. its own particular local power. But this Being that it alienates has become the in-itself, i.e. the central State-power, and, conversely, the newly acquired value of the nobility.
- ¶505. 1. The nobility now obey the law, but not a supreme individual. They have estranged their way of life, but not their status as individuals. They serve the general will, not the will of an individual, and receive their honour from public opinion, not from a grateful individual. If there were a single individual for it to address, its language would be nothing more deferential than advice.
- ¶506. 1. The three ‘estates’ that structured feudal society were the noble warriors, the agricultural class, and the clergy. Since they retain their particular interest, their advice and conduct is equivocal and often at odds with the State and the universal interest. The noble consciousness is therefore not so different from the base consciousness.
- ¶507. 1. In ¶506 nobles who died in battle made the ultimate sacrifice, but those who survived were as haughty and independent as before. To solve the problem of Being-for-self’s disparity with the State, we need to find a form of estrangement that is as complete as death, yet leaves its victim alive and well. If the bare Self, purely in itself and stripped of all Being-for-self, alienates itself, then the State will become a Self.
- ¶508. 1. In laws, commands, and advice, the content of what is said matters. But all that matters here is language itself. It brings the singular Self into existence, or emergence, before others. Nothing else I do expresses the pure Self or I. It contains too much—it expresses a particular sort of Self, not the pure Self—or too little—I can always disown what I do. (If I say anything definite, that also contains too much and too little. Hegel may mean that I only say ‘I’. But it is not clear that this is proper speaking unless I go on to say something definite; otherwise ‘I’ might be mistaken for ‘eye’, ‘aye’, or a groan. However, what matters here is the sheer fact of my speaking. I cannot disown that—except by further speaking. It is unclear how Hegel would deal with parrots and Mynah birds.) The I that speaks is this singular I, but also the universal I, since everyone can apply ‘I’ to himself: everyone is an I: cf. ¶102. The fact that language is heard and dies away enables us to distinguish between a fleeting acoustic sound in the fugitive present (cf. ¶95), and the enduring universal Self available to other Selves.
- ¶509. 1. Spirit needs the actuality of language as a middle term between these two rigidly separated extremes, State-power and the nobility. Spiritual substance emerges only when it has got both extremes to appreciate the importance of language and the pure Self, and also to recognize that they involve alienation. Through language, each extreme becomes the self-knowing category (cf. ¶235), combining Being, or the abstract universal, with the Self, and thereby becomes a fitting moment of spirit, which, through the alienating mediation, emerges as a spiritual reality. The extremes are already implicitly united in spirit, since although spirit depends on them, it creates them in their inchoate form. Thus spirit only actualizes their concept when it unites them by means of language.
- ¶510. 1. As noble consciousness sees it, each extreme has a good side and a bad side. Thus State-power is (G1) the abstract universal to be obeyed and (B1) a will for itself and at odds with (G1). Noble consciousness is (G2) an obedient and honoured side, and (B2) a will still ready to disobey. The good sides, (G1) and (G2), become moments of language, respectively the universal interest and the purified Self, and are, at bottom, the same. But only at bottom, since at first only the nobility has an actual Self, while only State-power is the in-itself. The nobility needs not just honour, but to get State-power in its hands, while

State-power needs to be obeyed as the deciding Self, not just as the universal interest. That is, each extreme needs to accommodate its bad side. State-power needs to become a will for itself, and the nobility is on the brink of rebellion. This unifying concept is accepted by both extremes, and it is actualized by means of language. This requires both extremes to be Selves, which means that State-power must be spiritually elevated into a Self, viz. a monarch. Hence the language used is transitional, not that of fully developed spirit. (Hegel does not explicitly call the sides 'good' and 'bad', but it looks as if good and bad have undergone a reversal.)

- ¶511. 1. Flattery is heroism because the flatterer sacrifices his very Self. The language of flattery is the middle term between the nobility and the State-power, and reflects each extreme back into itself, altering their nature in complementary ways. That is, the nobles abase and estrange themselves, while the State-power is elevated to an unlimited monarch. He is given a name, 'Louis XIV', to emphasize his singularity, and identifies himself with the State: '*L'État, c'est Moi*'.
- ¶512. 1. Nominally all power has been estranged by the nobles and passed over to the monarch. But in reality the power of the monarch depends entirely on the self-alienation of the nobility and they exact a quid pro quo. The monarch is just a figurehead. Real power is in the hands of the nobility. But since State-power has been consigned to a figurehead, it is transformed into wealth. The nobles want pensions and the monarch becomes a helpless dispenser of wealth.
- ¶513. 1. Initially the noble consciousness characterized itself by its conformity to power: cf. ¶500. Now it is doing its best to dismember it by getting a share of its wealth. It is riddled with incongruity. In giving up its will, it becomes unlike itself. In subjugating the substance, it makes the substance unlike itself, viz. unlike substance. The distinction between noble and base consciousness has disappeared.
- ¶514. 1. Wealth is dispensed by the monarch. But wealth has not yet become a Self, an independent power in its own right. It is simply a perversion of State-power. The noble Self just gratefully accepts the monarch's gifts. It has not yet recognized wealth as an independent power that might be at odds with itself.
- ¶515. 1. Wealth involves conscious individuals, the monarch and the nobles whom he keeps at bay with it. But it is not an independent power, only a spin-off from the battered remnants of the State. Given its importance to its recipients, however, it needs to become a power in its own right, a central part of society, animated by a spirit of its own. We have seen movements of this form before, as the nobles gradually changed their attitude towards State-power.
- ¶516. 1. The nobles find their position humiliating and alienating. They do not receive wealth from an independent essence, deriving an income from shares on the stock market. They depend on an individual like themselves, another individual with a will of its own.
- ¶517. 1. A self-conscious individual has various aspects, its appearance, for example, its property, and its social status. But whatever its dependence on such aspects, it can abstract from them and insist on its worth simply as an I or Self. But now its very Self, its personality, is dependent on someone else. Whatever else the Roman Empire did, it recognized the pure Self. But the Self is now 'outside itself' (*ausser sich*), i.e. in the sway of external forces, but also 'beside itself', in a very agitated state.
- ¶518. 1. The Self does in a way get recognition from wealth. The Self is handed back to itself on a plate. But this is not enough for it. That the Self should be in the gift of another contradicts the very essence of an I or Self. The Self is versatile. It survives and transcends this contradictory dismemberment of itself. It accepts the gift of itself with outward gratitude, but inwardly rebels against its treatment.
- ¶519. 1. The noble consciousness is now the same as the base consciousness, and this applies to the dispenser of wealth as well as its recipients. It is no longer just a beneficent individual

but an established institution, dominating the whole lives of its clients. It is not an impersonal charity, however, but a wilful individual that has the Self in its power and knows it. Wealth is arrogant rather than rebellious, but otherwise as base as its clientele. It is too arrogant to notice the seething rebellion among the bare egos it has bought with its handouts, and the ubiquitous disharmony underlying the calm surface. This account is inspired by *Rameau's Nephew*, by Diderot: see ¶¶489 and 521.

- ¶520. 1. Self-consciousness adopts two types of language in its approach to wealth. One is a language of flattery, which differs from the noble flattery of ¶511, where the Self, refined to a pure I by service, and State-power were essentially the same. Here, by contrast, the Self and the object of flattery are at variance. The other is the language of dismemberment, which aptly expresses the Self preserving itself in its alienation. In wealth the Self finds itself objectified in a certain way, as, say, a waiter. But the Self transcends and rejects this characterization of itself and insists on the identical judgement 'I am me'. Equally it acknowledges the identity that wealth imposes on it and expresses an infinite judgement, such as 'I am (just) a waiter', whose terms are entirely incompatible: cf. ¶344 on 'The Self is a thing'. This spirit is a divided personality, yet more fully self-aware than the noble flatterer. (My allusion to J.-P. Sartre's example in *Being and Nothingness* is not entirely in bad faith.)
- ¶521. 1. The consciousness of pure culture, the quintessence of 18th-century France, becomes aware of the inversion that we philosophers noted earlier. All realities and thoughts —good/bad, State-power/wealth, etc.—lack any independent substance, depending only on their opposites and continually switching sides. The universal power, the monarch, is now no more than a name: cf. ¶511. 'Enculturates itself' translates *sich einbildet*, which usually means 'imagine, fancy, pride oneself', but is here used literally to mean something like 'insinuates itself'. It also suggests 'culture' (*Bildung*), however, as well as imagination and conceit. The true spirit of this alienated world is the witty conversation of pre-revolutionary France, which does no more than purvey this perversion. Hegel's account is reminiscent of Thucydides's account of the perversion of language during the revolution in Corfu (III, 69–85), but is inspired rather by *Rameau's Nephew*, a dialogue between 'Moi', an honest consciousness who vainly strives to maintain order and stability, and 'Lui', the nephew of the composer and a dismembered consciousness, who embroils *Moi* in his subversive dialectic: see ¶¶489 and 519.
- ¶522. 1. The first quotation is from Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew*, XXI, Music. The second is put together by Hegel from various bits of the work. Despite *Moi's* rebuke, Rameau's frankness offers hope of a restoration of spirit.
- ¶523. 1. *Lui* already knows everything that *Moi* can tell it. When *Moi* links together the good and bad, it is stating the obvious, that good and bad are conditions of each other. Immorality has good consequences. Criminals create employment for police, judges, and lawyers. Jack the Ripper inspired housing reforms in the East End of London. Iniquity calls forth heroism, generosity, and forgiveness. But even these are usually mixed with selfish motives.
- ¶524. 1. Examples of unmixed goodness are anecdotal and occasional. (If it were wholly disinterested, it would not be widely advertised, and so we might not know about it.) Removal from this perverse world is no solution. Even Diogenes (who is also mentioned in *Rameau's Nephew*) depended on it, and such self-concern is itself bad. A Rousseauesque return to nature would eliminate the benefits of culture along with its defects. But it does suggest the true solution, that spirit must develop further and not retreat backwards.
- ¶525. 1. The onward advance of spirit is already underway in conscious awareness of the dismemberment and vanity of the world. The sniggering is that of Rameau. The first reflection is the worldly dismembered consciousness that retreats into the Self; it is described in ¶526. The second reflection is the world of faith: cf. ¶¶442 and 486.

¶526. 1. *Eitelkeit, eitel* ('vanity, vain') combine the ideas of emptiness, futility, and conceit. This dismembered consciousness expresses to perfection the total vanity of its culture, including the power and wealth that it seeks. However, it rises above the vanity surrounding it and, dissociating itself from any particular side in the conflict, withdraws into itself and thereby emerges as a unified Self, a new stage of spirit that will soon become pure insight.

b. Faith and pure insight

¶527. 1. The world of faith stems from the alienation of the world of culture. In reality, and for us, it is a world constructed in and by thought. But faith doesn't realize this; it deals in pictorial representations, because, having ascended immediately from the sensory world of culture, it populates the Beyond with sensory images derived from the world it has left. Thus its in-itself, unlike that of Stoicism, is not in the form of thought: cf. ¶¶198ff. Unlike the in-itself of virtue and of law-giving and law-testing, faith's in-itself is actualized, albeit in the Beyond: cf. ¶¶381ff., 419ff., 429ff. As compared with the faith that supplied the standard of good and bad to culture, it is greatly enriched by culture's later development: cf. ¶493. Here, Hegel is trying to explain why faith is considered in detail only now, when it has been around since the beginning of culture; the real reason is that only now does it come into explicit conflict with secular thought.

¶528. 1. On the distinction between faith and religion, see also ¶¶487 and 675. Religion proper is knowledge, not just faith, and knowledge of the world as a whole, not a flight from the world. This faith differs from unhappy consciousness, which was just the subjective faith of a socially and historically unlocated individual, and also from Greek faith, which was directed towards the family, not the beyond. This faith has a social and historical location, but is opposed to the actual world and its self-consciousness, whereas religion proper unites the two worlds.

¶529. 1. Faith is pure consciousness, alienated from the actual world. It is thus intrinsically alienated and brings with it from the world a secular opposition to itself, intellectual insight: cf. ¶¶442 and 486. Faith is not blind; it has acquired intellectual sophistication from the world of culture and is therefore responsive to its free-thinking internal critic. Pure consciousness in general has retreated from the chaotic inversions of the actual world and into the Self, not the singular egoistic Self, but the universal rational Self, that surveys the world from a distance, both attacking it and finding repose in the world of thought. But then it splits in two, into negative insight, which is purely negative and critical, regarding everything that does not meet with its rational approval as worthless, and, on the other hand, positive faith, which projects an objective world beyond this world and beyond the Self. This world is a product of thought, though not of conceptual thought, and it therefore degenerates into a static pictorial representation: cf. ¶527. It thus has a content, whereas insight has only its negating Self.

¶531. 1. Here, and in the next two ¶¶, Hegel considers faith apart from its relations. The world of faith is supposed to be an ideal version of the real world. So it is articulated in the same way, only without alienation and inversion. *For us* conceptual thinkers, the Trinity is a logically necessary sequence involving alienation, but for faith it is just one event after another.

¶532. 1. God the Father corresponds to State-power, the good. (Unsurprisingly, Hegel does not complete this analogy.) He passes over into Christ, an alienated Self. The holy spirit restores the unity of God and Christ.

¶533. 1. God, Christ, and holy spirit are removed from the actual world by thought and are thus immutable. They nevertheless have an effect on worldly self-consciousness. If God were not incarnated, He would remain alien. But Christ and holy spirit make Him

accessible and allow the believer to participate in the world and not remain fixated on an unknowable God.

- ¶534. 1. This ¶ concerns faith's relation to the world: cf. ¶530. Faith regards the world as vain, but does not engage in the equally vain high spirits of Rameau, and with cult and adoration it transcends the sensory world in order to achieve union with God. The individual does not attain this union, though the community of believers does, since in the Lutheran tradition God reveals Himself in the community. But for the individual the sacred events remain incomprehensible, as well as remote in space and time. The final sentence is a brief answer to the third question of ¶530: faith does not venture forth to do battle with insight.
- ¶535. 1. Insight is more intellectually combative than faith. It is nothing but intellectually combative.
- ¶537. 1. Insight has not yet fulfilled its mission and still appears only in isolated individuals. What it proposes is, first, to subject everything to conceptual comprehension, i.e. to reduce it to the Self, and, secondly, to awaken this comprehension in everyone, i.e. to make the Self universal, not a collection of singular Selves, each with its own particular nature. Social and intrinsic differences between individuals have been erased by culture. Genius, etc. may still occur, but they count only in the conflict-riven spiritual animal kingdom (cf. ¶¶397ff.) and the remnants of this will soon disappear. Individuals will no longer have their own particular purposes. They will all be devoted to the same enterprise, the conceptual conquest of the world. No doubt some will have more energy than others. But even this difference succumbs to the judgement: 'I am my object'. This judgement is both identical, because the I and its object are the same, and infinite, owing to the initial disparity between the object and the I that comprehends it.

II. *The enlightenment*

- ¶539. 1. The tranquil consciousness was mentioned in ¶522. It is the calm philosopher surveying the dismemberment of culture. The philosopher puts together all the scattered gossip and presents it to the public.
- ¶540. 1. The whole confusion of this society is sustained by idle chatter. When someone, such as Montesquieu in his *Persian Letters*, records it, he is still a singleton, not a universal Self, but he is on the way to becoming one by showing the vanity of such gossip and of its purveyors. Then someone else comes along, such as Voltaire in his *Philosophical Dictionary*, who collects the best bits of it together, thereby showing that this knowing-all is not an isolated phenomenon, and putting a universal stamp on it. This is insight's battle against the world; now it turns against faith.

a. *The struggle of the enlightenment with superstition*

- ¶541. 1. We have seen negative movements before: scepticism (¶¶202ff.) and idealism (¶¶232ff., esp. 238, where idealism is compared with scepticism), but they had no specific historical and social context, and were not as comprehensive and as persistent as insight. Faith and insight are related, but while faith objectifies its unconceptual thoughts, setting them at odds with the Self, for insight the Self is all-important. Thus initially insight is entirely critical, but it acquires a content from its struggle against faith and becomes a substantial philosophy.
- ¶542. 1. Faith involves three elements: the duped masses, the priests who reserve insight for themselves and deceive the masses, and a despotism with one foot in the real world and the other in the ideal world of faith. Despotism maintains its power by exploiting the first two elements. On the intrigues of priests and despots, cf. ¶377.
- ¶543. 1. Enlightenment first turns its attention to enlightening the duped masses, because intellectual clarification is an aim it shares with faith. It cannot do much against deceiving

- priests and despotism, because its skills are intellectual rather than political. If it can enlighten the masses, it will break the hold that priests and despotism have on them. It can surely do this, since the masses are intrinsically rational, even if this concept has not yet been realized.
- ¶544. 1. In itself the naive mass is as rational as insight; faith involves thought. But it makes God, and His various accompaniments, into entities independent of itself, and regards them as its in-itself, disowning its own self-conscious rationality. However, the intrinsic rationality of the masses and their faith gives insight a foothold for realizing their rationality.
- ¶545. 1. Since insight and religious believers are on the same wavelength, insight has no difficulty in getting its message across. Thus slowly and imperceptibly it transforms the spirit of the age. Only later will faith notice that it has been penetrated by its opponent, and then it will be too late to do much about it. Symptoms of the infection may be noticed earlier and combated by ad hoc measures, but these only help insight to concentrate its forces more effectively. The quotation is from *Rameau's Nephew*, where it concerns the preaching of Jesuits to convert the Chinese and Indians to Christianity, but now it is turned against Christianity itself.
- ¶546. 1. There are two sides to insight: first, its silent weaving, whereby it changes the spirit of the age inconspicuously, as in ¶545, and secondly its noisy entry into open combat with faith, as in ¶¶547ff.
- ¶547. 1. Pure insight is now also pure intention, since it will accuse its opponent of insincerity as well as error. It is inevitably negative, since it has no content of its own. But it has no opponent outside itself, since it includes everything in its conceptual embrace, everything, that is, except itself. So it has to pick a quarrel with itself, turning itself into unreason and insincerity. That is, insight gives a distorted account of faith.
- ¶548. 1. Unwittingly, insight is shadow-boxing. This must be so, since insight claims to subject everything to conceptual comprehension and therefore make it rational. So if faith were quite other than insight, faith would be rational. Since it is irrational, it can only be the dark side of insight itself. (Hegel here seems to conflate different senses of 'rational': someone's belief might be rational in the sense of 'rationally explicable or comprehensible', yet not rational in the sense of 'based on good evidence'.) The real significance of the conflict is reason's development of itself, its becoming its own content. One phase of this is its objectification of itself as God, etc. What it should do is recognize this as its own content and transform it conceptually. But at first it finds it quite alien and approaches it negatively. For us, or in itself, enlightenment is combating its own errors. But at first it appears to faith as purely negative, and a tissue of errors and lies. And that is how enlightenment views faith, while faith is really its own unacknowledged content.
- ¶549. 1. Enlightenment levels two charges against faith: that God is only a product of its own thought, and that God is alien to it. Faith accepts the first charge, but insists that it does not follow that God is a fiction; God is the essence of man's self-consciousness. Faith only does what insight in general does: it permeates objects with its own consciousness. Consequently, faith is not simply belief. It is also trust or the *fiducia* of Lutheran theology. The believer trusts God as he trusts himself—or even more, since, seen through God's eyes, he sheds his singularity and becomes pure insight, while retaining his self-consciousness. Like insight in general, the believer not only recognizes himself in his object, but also sees that his unity with the object results from his own doing. God is the spirit of the faithful community and He can only be this owing to communal worship. However, man's doing is only a necessary condition of his relationship to God, not a sufficient condition. God still remains an objective entity in His own right.
- ¶550. 1. Enlightenment contradicts itself when it claims that God is entirely alien to the believer, while admitting that he locates his very essence in God. The question whether it

is permissible to deceive a people was proposed in 1778 by Frederick the Great as the subject for an essay competition run by the Berlin Academy of Sciences.

- ¶551. 1. The three moments are God, the justification of faith, and worship. It emerges in ¶554, where the second moment is considered, that the three moments correspond to the three persons of the Trinity.
- ¶552. 1. Faith represents God in sensory objects, in the stone or wood from which it carves an image, and in the wafer made from corn which faith supposes to be Christ's body. Pure insight perversely interprets this to mean that faith worships a stone, etc., which surely is alien to self-consciousness. An alternative would be to say that faith worships pure thinking congealed into an in-itself that is merely represented by stone, etc. But since insight acknowledges no such in-itself, it foists on faith the sensory object. Insight and faith are both contemptuous of finite sensory objects, but each in their own way. (In his *Philosophical Dictionary*, p. 239, Voltaire avoids this error, distinguishing between worship of a stone and worship of a divinity, albeit false, represented by it.)
- ¶553. 1. Enlightenment's profession of purity includes its contempt for transitory sensory things, which it seeks to transform into thoughts. But it will not acknowledge that faith is doing something similar. Faith knows, as well as insight does, that a stone is *also* a stone, but it does not worship a stone *as* a stone. It does not even regard such things as stones as the rock-bottom reality. That is rather pure thinking or God.
- ¶554. 1. In ¶552 enlightenment reduced faith's relation to God to a relation to sensory objects. It now reduces faith's knowledge to reliance on dubious reports of contingent events. This is something that enlightenment itself is prone to, but unaware as ever of its own nature, it projects this onto faith. In reality, faith's relation to God is immediate, but like all immediacy it also involves mediation, a thoughtful attempt to convert inner certainty into knowledge of the truth. This is what enlightenment itself primarily does, but it does not recognize its own affinity to faith. The true basis of faith is the direct witness of the divine spirit to the human spirit (a feature of Lutheranism), and also the presence of this spirit in the community, the Christian tradition (a feature of Catholicism, to which Hegel is usually hostile). If faith does appeal to historical evidence it is because it has been corrupted by enlightenment in trying to defend itself against it.
- ¶555. 1. The activity of the faithful, such as abstention from enjoyment and giving up property (see ¶556), is intended to eliminate the individual's particularity and to unite him with God. Insight adopts a negative attitude towards this activity and, as in the other cases, fails to recognize the affinity of faith to itself. So although faith's activity is an appropriate means for achieving its purpose, insight has to deny this and view faith's intention as lacking in insight or means-ends rationality. To make this plausible it also has to reject faith's purpose and make pleasure and property the purpose instead.
- ¶556. 1. Enlightenment believes that faith has chosen inappropriate means for its purpose. Abstinence does not show one's freedom from pleasure. It is foolish to give up one's property, ignoring one's obligation to maintain an individual presence in the community. Pure insight claims to share faith's aim of rising above pleasure and property, but since it opposes the pursuit and expression of this aim in deeds, it ends up by regarding pleasure and possession as an end-in-itself and endorsing the world of utility.
- ¶557. 1. Enlightenment presented itself to faith in a negative way, though pure insight and intention had to come in too, for otherwise they would not have become apparent. Now the question is: what is pure insight positively? In its combat with error it revealed that it regards all determinacy as finitude and therefore removes it from God. So God becomes a vacuum which takes no predicates. To join God together with sensory things and predicates would give rise to superstition. So enlightenment is left with an unbridgeable chasm between the realm of finite things and a remote and unknowable God. It derives a

wealth of material from its opposite, faith, viz. all the finite things that it must keep away from God.

- ¶558. 1. Consciousness has reverted to its most primitive shape, sensory certainty. 'Meaning' translates *Meinung*, as in the account of sensory certainty: see chapter I. But sensory certainty is now enriched by the previous experience from which it has emerged. It is no longer simply *meaning*, an exclusive focus on a particular individual, nor is it just *opinion*. It is a general doctrine, justified by the demolition of alternative shapes of consciousness and by the removal of anything beyond the sensory world. Consciousness is certain not only of its own existence, but also that every consciousness is certain of its own existence and of the existence of things outside it.
- ¶559. 1. Insight needs to encompass everything in a balanced equilibrium. But the *finite* world is *bounded* and therefore restricted by something beyond it. But now it is left hanging without support. An appropriate relation to God might solve this problem, except that the God of 18th-century deism is a void without content. This relation can therefore be conceived in different ways. It can be regarded in a positive light, such that God, as the in-itself, confers real Being-in-itself on finite things. Or it can be viewed negatively, so that they have no reality of their own but exist only in the eyes of God or, more abstractly, for an other. Insight has thus replaced culture's dichotomy of good and bad with its own dichotomy of Being-in-itself and Being-for-another: cf. ¶491. However, given the reversion to sensory certainty in ¶558, there is also an implicit reference to the transition from sensory certainty to perception in ¶111.
- ¶560. 1. God has served the purpose of introducing the concepts of Being-in-itself and Being-for-another, and now these concepts are brought down to earth. Everything is now both in itself and for an other, i.e. useful. Man is a natural creature and enjoys things, as animals do. But unlike them, he is endowed with reason which deters him from consuming more than is good for him. Reason restricts his present consumption but enables him to save for the future, so that the variety and duration of his pleasure is not curtailed. On measure and measurelessness, see *Enc. I*, ¶¶107–11.
- ¶561. 1. Enlightenment believes that, in its conflict with faith, it has acquired a religion, a religion of utility. It conceives utility in religious terms, as a fall from grace.
- ¶562. 1. The quasi-Christian cult of the supreme Being was introduced by Robespierre in 1794 in opposition to the atheistic cult of reason.
- ¶563. 1. As faith sees it, enlightenment distorts all the elements of its coherent system of thought. While faith's right is divine, enlightenment's is merely human, the right of self-consciousness to pick holes in an elaborate construction of thought. However, enlightenment is not simply taking a position in opposition to faith. It is exploiting elements that are present within faith itself and conducting an internal critique of faith. Faith is vulnerable to enlightenment's attack because it is already half in agreement with it.
- ¶564. 1. Enlightenment assembles, and conceptually knits together, thoughts that are present in faith, but some of which it forgets. For example, the idea that things are useful for each other concerns faith as well as enlightenment.
- ¶565. 1. Faith does not bring all its thoughts together. But nor does enlightenment. For it regards faith as the sheer negation of itself, and does not recognize itself in faith. What needs to be done in such cases is to bring the seemingly contradictory thoughts together so as to form a single conception. This is what enlightenment expects faith to do. But it should also do the same itself, integrating the two opposites into a coherent whole. In fact, such a coherent concept does emerge from the conflict, but enlightenment is not aware of producing it, nor of the nature of the concept itself, viz. that it is what split into faith and enlightenment in the first place. It is enlightenment that produces this concept, because enlightenment is the active party, bringing out and together the disparate thoughts of faith. But it is faith that supplies the raw material from which the concept is constructed.

- ¶566. 1. Faith and enlightenment are both involved in contradictions that need to be unravelled. Faith maintains that (1) God is the in-itself and not produced by its own thought, but (2) faith's service makes God into the believer's *own* absolute essence, and (3) God is inscrutable and inaccessible. There is tension between (1) and (2) and between (2) and (3). Enlightenment maintains that (4) God is nothing but a product of faith's activity and consciousness, relying on the images and representations to which enlightenment reduces faith's God, but (5) faith's God is alien and unknowable, which is equivalent to (3). The final sentence recalls St Paul: 'How unsearchable are His judgements, and His ways past finding out!' (Romans 11:33).
- ¶567. 1. Faith is ambivalent towards sensory things. It does not regard stone, etc. as wholly unconnected with God. To deface a religious image is sacrilegious, not simply destructive. Faith represents the supersensory realm in a sequence of sensory events. Enlightenment is ambivalent in a different way. For it sensory things are finite and devoid of spirit, not nothing, but not exactly something either.
- ¶568. 1. Faith involves two types of knowledge; one depends on contingencies, such as sacred texts and images; even knowledge of God, as a represented entity, is of this sort. The other depends on the spirit that gives the certainty and truth of itself. In the latter type there is immediate communication between the Self and God. Faith tends to forget the first type of knowledge, while enlightenment forgets the second.
- ¶569. 1. Faith itself acknowledges the importance of property and enjoyment. In its cult it makes a symbolic sacrifice of both, but in its daily life it retains them.
- ¶570. 1. The symbolic sacrifice in the cult is supposed to elevate the believer entirely above his sensory nature. But a single sacrifice cannot have this universal effect. Not even the (alleged) self-castration of Origen (184/5–253/4), inspired by Matthew 19:12, was enough.
- ¶571. 1. Enlightenment isolates the internal, the intention, just as previously it isolated the external, the mere wood and stone, failing to acknowledge their significance for faith. Faith does not intend to rid itself entirely of natural functions. The aim of its symbolic sacrifice is to give them spiritual significance and keep them in their proper place. For enlightenment, by contrast, these functions are purely natural and this is their justification.
- ¶572. 1. Faith cannot resist enlightenment's attack because it is in half agreement with enlightenment. Faith lives in two worlds, one mundane and one heavenly. Even its heaven is populated with representations derived from the sensory world. Faith's thought is non-conceptual, so that it cannot coherently integrate its two worlds. But since it is a single self-consciousness, it cannot deny the disparity of its two lives once it is pointed out.
- ¶573. 1. Deprived of its content, faith is now the same as enlightenment. Heaven has gone, and all it has left is earth, its own singular Self along with finite things with no spiritual significance. Beyond there is emptiness, at most a remote and unknowable deity, which cannot be described without illegitimately plagiarizing the sensory language of the earth. Enlightenment is satisfied with this, but faith is not. However, enlightenment is less satisfied than it seems. There is trouble afoot in its gesture towards an empty god, in its movement beyond its singular Self, and its lurch into disinterested utility.

b. The truth of enlightenment

- ¶574. 1. Faith has established an empty god beyond itself. Meanwhile, pure insight is more active and attempts to realize itself. It does so by postulating an equally pure negation of itself, viz. pure matter, underlying everything else but with no determinacy of its own. The indeterminacy of matter corresponds to the thinking by which insight arrives at it, the drawing of distinctions without a difference, which then subside from pure thinking to a pure thing. (Here, and elsewhere, Hegel sees an affinity between *denken*, 'think(ing)' and *Ding*, 'thing'.) Featureless matter is really just a projection of self-consciousness itself, the

opposite pole of the magnet, as it were: cf. ¶¶158ff. It is thus the same as the unknowable God that emerged from faith's unconscious weaving. But insight does not recognize any of this. It regards its absolute, whether matter or God, as an objective Beyond, and consciousness itself as simply finite.

- ¶575. 1. Enlightenment now splits into two parties over the nature of the absolute essence. One regards it as God, the other as matter. This is good for enlightenment, since it removes its one-sidedness, and also for faith, since it purifies itself and joins the victorious side.
- ¶576. 1. The absolute essence begins as pure thinking, but it becomes matter in the following way. It is the negative of self-consciousness, therefore it is Being, and Being related to self-consciousness. Self-consciousness contains tastes, colours, smells, etc., and these are transferred to the absolute essence. So the absolute essence becomes matter, the outer Being which produces tastes, etc. Hence self-consciousness is related to the essence by sensory certainty and perception.
- ¶577. 1. We can also go in the reverse direction, from sensory Being to pure thinking. If we abstract from seeing, etc., we are left with sheer matter, which is not what is seen, tasted, etc. It is a pure abstraction.
- ¶578. 1. Deism or idealism starts from pure thinking and projects God beyond finite consciousness. It stops there and so misses out nature. It should go on to say that the negative of consciousness is nevertheless related to it. Then God would turn out to be a being external to consciousness, and much the same as pure matter. That would bring deism into contact with nature. Materialism starts from sensory Being, abstracts from seeing, etc., and makes sensory Being into pure matter. Materialism stops there, and so misses out spirit or self-differentiating consciousness. It should go on to note that in becoming a predicateless simple, this Being has become the essence of consciousness; and that a being, when refined to purity, becomes the same as its pure negative, viz. a thought. Thus if deism and materialism think their positions through to the end, they amount to the same. They both neglect Descartes's doctrine, that Being and thinking are at bottom that same, that pure Being is an abstraction and that, conversely, pure thinking entails the Being of a thinker and is, in any case, the same abstraction as pure Being. (The reference is to Descartes's *cogito sum*, which does not entail that thinking and Being are the same. In any case, Hegel's own argument implies only that *pure* Being is the same as *pure* thinking, not that thinking and Being *in general* are the same.)
- ¶579. 1. For the image of axial rotation, cf. ¶169 on life. Pure thinking of itself involves two moments, Being and the negative. These rotate around an axis, each succeeding, and succeeded by, the other. This rotation bursts asunder, leaving on one side sheer Being, whether God or matter, and, on the other, utility, which is the upshot of both deism and materialism. Utility also involves alternating moments, but three rather than two. But this alternation does not return into itself in the way that the other returned into pure Being. It continues endlessly from one thing to another.
- ¶580. 1. We saw that pure insight actualizes and differentiates itself at the beginning of ¶574. To be useful an entity must have a definite nature of its own or be something in itself, such as grass. But grass is for an other, since it is eaten by a cow. Then the grass is for itself, having actualized its potential in the cow. However, the cow does not remain for itself for long. It too is in itself, with a nature that is *for* a human being, who then actualizes the potential of the cow by eating it. The human being is also in itself, but then for another too, since he is useful in turn, perhaps for sowing the grass that feeds the cow that feeds himself, thereby coming back in a circle, perhaps for working in a factory and thereby extending the alternating chain of in itself/for another/for itself. A human being is also 'for itself' in another sense, that is, it is a conscious Self. But this sense of 'Being-for-itself' is not relevant to the process of utility. Insofar as he is useful, a human being is simply one link in the chain, not a Self that overarches the other links. This role is reserved for pure insight itself, which is aware

of all the links and how they hang together. But pure insight is not itself a member of the alternating chain. It surveys it from a distance. So insight now has a world, but a world that has two defects, first that none of the entities in it is self-supporting, but each is propped up by something else, and secondly that it has no place in it for the Self that surveys it.

- ¶581. 1. So far we have seen three worlds and three types of Self in chapter VI.B: (1) In the dispersed world of culture there was no single type of Self, but a great variety of them, united only by the vanity in which they end up. (2) In the world of faith, the Self withdraws into itself and acquires a generic unity. But it degenerates into a world dominated by the absolute essence, either as a pure thought, God, or as matter. Neither of these give it a secure position in the world and the subjective self-certainty that the Self of (1) had. (3) The world of utility combines the advantages of (1) and (2) without their disadvantages. The Self has subjective self-certainty as it did in (1), but without the rootless chaos that came with it. It knows the truth as well: it has a thorough insight into the complexity of the world it inhabits. Unlike the Self in (2) it has an assured place in that world: it is useful to others and others are useful to it. So far, so good.

III. *Absolute freedom and terror*

- ¶582. 1. So far utility is still accepted only as a predicate of objects, and the world of utility is regarded as an object which requires no intervention from the subject that surveys it. The Self's position in this world is that of something that uses other things and is used by them in turn. The next step, however, is already implicit in this. It is for the Self to be not simply a link in the utility chain but to regard utility as only utility for the Self. It then asks what is useful for itself and may well decide that, for example, such institutions as the monarchy are not useful for itself. Utility then will be not simply objective but something that requires the Self's practical intervention.
- ¶583. 1. There are now two Selves. One is the particular Self within the network of utility, a Self for which things are useful and which is, in turn, useful for other Selves and other things. The other is the universal Self that surveys and comprehends this system as its object. This is the Self as metaphysician. This Self is no longer content with its subordinate role in the network of utility. It wants to enter the network itself, to take possession of it, and to reorder the whole system in its own image. Cf. PH, p.446: 'The consciousness of the Spiritual is now the essential basis of the political fabric, and *Philosophy* has thereby become dominant.'
- ¶584. 1. Cf. PH, p.443: 'Rationality of Will is none other than the maintaining one's self in pure Freedom—willing this and this alone—Right purely for the sake of Right, Duty purely for the sake of Duty. Among the Germans this view assumed no other form than that of tranquil theory; but the French wished to give it practical effect.' On the uniformity of rational will, cf. PR ¶15 Addition: 'The rational is the high road where everyone travels, where no one is conspicuous.' On the controversial relation of Hegel to Rousseau, whom Hegel has in mind here, see Stern (2002), pp.157–62.
- ¶585. 1. The conceptual articulation of society into 'masses' or 'members', distinct groups and estates with different functions, depends on people's conscious acceptance of them. Once they no longer tolerate such limitation, but regard sheer self-consciousness as all that matters, the ordered system collapses and becomes a mere concept without embodiment.
- ¶586. 1. There is no question of utility any more, since there is no longer any diversity. Consciousness is not faced with an objective system which it might find alien. Its only object is consciousness itself. The only opposition is between the singular individual and the universal consciousness. But the individual knows that though he *seemed* to have a mind and a will of his own before, that was only apparent and he has now merged with the

universal consciousness and will. A vacuous god hovers over the ruins. On the *être suprême* and Robespierre's institution of its worship, see ¶562.

- ¶588. 1. The revolutionary consciousness cannot tolerate anything independent of itself. To do so would involve articulating society into stable masses, whether into legislative, judicial, and executive powers (recommended by Montesquieu, but derided by Rousseau) or, more realistically, into occupational groups, the estates. Individuals would then be detached from the universal will and become limited specialists. The universal Self must make and carry out the law itself. It is not enough just to represent or imagine it as obeying laws it has given itself. Representation-by-proxy is a fraud: the Self is not really there, only represented or imagined as such. 'Representation' and 'represented' translate *Vorstellung* and *vorgestellt*, while 'representation/represented-by-proxy' translates the French-derived *Repräsentation* and *repräsentiert*.
- ¶589. 1. A single individual is not adequately fulfilled in the creation of an articulated social order, as we saw in ¶588. But nor is it in the acts of the executive or government. Positive actions can only be performed by a single individual, and that excludes other individuals. The joint work of everyone together can only be negative and destructive.
- ¶590. 1. The sole remaining opposition to universal freedom, now that it has demolished all other institutions, are the free individuals of which it consists. They lack any attachment or status apart from their bare individuality, but are nevertheless not totally absorbed into the homogeneous mass. They persist as rigid points. (Hegel generally uses *Punktualität*, 'punctuality', in its root meaning, connecting it with geometrical or atomic points.) The only thing to do with them is to kill them. The death chosen for them, beheading by the guillotine, is entirely appropriate to their bare, punctual nature. In lectures of 1805–1806 Hegel called this the 'despotism of liberty'.
- ¶591. 1. The syllable is 'death' (*Tod*). The government represents the universal will in its actions. But since it performs positive acts, it can only consist of definite individuals, excluding other individuals. Hence it is a faction and thereby at odds with the universal will, against which it has thus committed a crime. In return the government has no definite charge to level against the faction opposed to it, since this faction is not in power and has not done anything definite. What it can accuse it of, however, is its intention, what it *would* do if it *could*, which since it is directed against a government identifying itself with the universal will, is directed against the universal will itself. So the opposing faction falls under suspicion and therefore deserves to die. The government itself will fall victim to this logic when it loses power to the other faction.
- ¶592. 1. Things have not turned out as self-consciousness expected. In its fear of death it sees the downside of freedom: cf. the bondsman in ¶194. It now faces the concrete reality of its essence, pure thinking as positive and matter as negative: pure thinking makes the transition to pure matter, i.e. it dies.
- ¶593. 1. The negation within absolute freedom, viz. death, enables it to establish a substance of sorts, namely a graveyard populated by the material remains of its victims. Since this does not appeal to individuals, they arrange themselves in a social order articulated into masses once more. Like the bondsman in ¶194 they have been disciplined by their fear of death and willingly submit to their limited role in what has become a deferential society once more. This recasting of society was largely the work of Napoleon.
- ¶594. 1. We might expect spirit to be embarked on a cyclical history, reverting to the ethical world and, refreshed by its fear of the master, death, merging the individual into substance, then proceeding to culture, then to revolution again. This would be so, if the result of revolution were the complete interpenetration of substance and the individual, characteristic of ethical life. But it is not. Absolute freedom does not involve interaction between a determinate, substantial individual and a determinate external world, but between the

universal will and a Self stripped of all definite characteristics, of honour, wealth, even of heaven, and facing only death. This is negative, but it veers round into something positive, into a Self that withdraws into itself and becomes pure knowing and pure will. Its knowing and willing are only formal (as they are in Kant's ethics). It is unconcerned with politics and economics. That sphere too is purely formal and something it no longer knows about. What matters is just knowing itself. This is comparable to the bondsman's retreat into Stoicism in ¶¶197ff., only greatly enriched by the intervening experience. In ¶593 absolute freedom subsided into a restored social order. But that was in France. Spirit has now migrated to Germany.

¶595. 1. In reducing the opposition between universal and singular will to a transparent form, spirit overcomes its alienation. The other land into which absolute freedom passes over is Germany. There spirit is and remains 'thought' (*Gedanke*). It does not actualize itself in a new social order.

C. SPIRIT CERTAIN OF ITSELF. MORALITY

¶596. 1. The individual had no special status in the ethical world, except in death. He resurfaced as the abstract person of the Roman world. This Self became concrete in culture and faith, but so alienated that substance turned into universal will, and now at last this has become knowledge and passed into the individual Self. Hitherto there has always been a gulf between the Self's certainty of itself and its truth, between what the Self thinks it is at bottom and ought to be in reality, on the one hand, and, on the other, the world that it set up and that did not meet its requirements. But now there is no opposition between the Self and the world. The Self is just pure knowing, with no private purposes, and its object is pure knowing too. It is oblivious to the world outside it. It seems that certainty and truth now coincide and that nothing can go wrong.

¶597. 1. The Greek ethical spirit was immediate. It knew its duty and just did it. But it had a definite character and was duty-bound to only one side of the ethical whole and oblivious to the other. Culture and faith involved mediation. They were consciously aware of the whole complexity of their world and developed it themselves. But they were racked by alienation. The moral consciousness combines immediacy and mediation, only without their disadvantages. It is immediate, since it just knows its duty and does it. It is mediated, since it too has developed itself out of the alien world and has an understanding of what it is up to. It is immediate, again, in the sense that it has no substance except its own knowledge and self-certainty. It has extracted itself from alien Being and is now all the Being there is.

¶598. 1. Knowledge is all Being or actuality, because only what it knows counts for the moral consciousness. Oedipus came to grief, from his not knowing that the man he killed was his father and the woman he married was his mother. But the moral consciousness would excuse him for what he did unknowingly.

a. *The moral world-view*

¶599. 1. For moral consciousness as self-consciousness, all that matters is duty, which is not at all alien to it. However, as mediation and negativity, it essentially involves otherness, of which it is therefore conscious. This otherness is nature, which consciousness ignores in favour of an exclusive focus on duty. It leaves nature, Being-there, to its own devices. Nature has its own laws and is entirely indifferent to morality. Nature's freedom increases along with that of moral consciousness.

¶600. 1. Morality and nature are each independent and self-sufficient. The moral consciousness has two conflicting views of their relationship. One is that morality and nature have nothing to do with each other. The other is that duty is all-important, nature is dependent and must conform to the requirements of duty. The moral world-view develops through an attempt to deal with this conflict.

- ¶601. 1. This concerns Kant's postulate of a necessary harmony between morality and nature or happiness, with God as the intermediary: *Critique of Practical Reason*, IV. On the first of the presuppositions of ¶600, that morality and nature each go their own way, the moral consciousness just does its duty regardless of whether this brings it happiness. On the second presupposition, that nature is dependent, it complains if it does not win happiness. This is morally suboptimal, introducing a factor other than duty and implying not only that nature should ensure the success of the dutiful deed, but that it should make the agent happy as his reward.
- ¶602. 1. Morality requires dutiful agents and therefore their happiness. The happiness it requires is the pleasure the singular agent derives from the success of his deed, e.g. that the coin he gives to a beggar should benefit the beggar and not fall down a drain or get him mugged. (As far as Hegel's argument goes, it does not require that the agent should be happy in other respects, e.g. that he should not suffer from migraine, except insofar as this might interfere with his performance of duties.) That the agent should enjoy the success of his deed is a conceptual requirement of morality. Even as a disposition, morality is necessarily a disposition to do something that actualizes the disposition. Even though nature does not invariably harmonize with morality, the requirement of it is not just a wish, but a necessary demand or postulate of reason.
- ¶603. 1. Nature also appears within moral consciousness in the form of natural urges, sensibility. Like external nature, sensibility goes its own way and may not be in harmony with duty. In fact it is a presupposition of morality that sensibility should not be subservient to it, since there is no moral merit in simply doing what one wants to do anyway. However, it is also a requirement of morality that sensibility should be brought into harmony with duty. This is not, as in ¶602, simply a demand, but a task to be striven for by the moral consciousness itself. If this task were completed, however, morality would be eliminated entirely, since it would no longer have any recalcitrant urges to resist. The moral consciousness solves this problem by postponing its completion to infinity. It is a goal to be approached asymptotically but never reached. This is like someone whose purpose in life is to reach the number 1 by counting $0, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{4}, \dots$. He wants to reach 1, but equally he doesn't, because if he did, he would have to stop counting.
- ¶604. 1. The postulate of ¶602 concerns a problem about external nature that the moral consciousness cannot manage itself, only God. That of ¶603 concerns a problem about our internal nature that we have to deal with, assuming that we survive long enough. Both of them involve action on our part, but the harmonies and their moments are only in our thought. They do not actually confront us in the situation in which we act. The postulate that follows concerns a conflict presented to us by external nature, but intruding into consciousness itself and such that we have to deal with it in the moral situation.
- ¶605. 1. The moral agent wants to do his *pure* duty, what it *really* ought to do. But situations are complex and often present one with a variety of duties, of things that one *prima facie* ought to do. There is also a problem about what the agent knows and what he does not, but that will come up in ¶608. Only pure duty is sacrosanct. None of the various duties is itself sacrosanct. Nevertheless, they are an essential feature of the moral situation and must exist. But where? It can only be in another moral consciousness, namely, God.
- ¶606. 1. Human moral consciousness wills pure duty, regardless of its determinate content. The divine consciousness sustains and sanctifies determinate duties. It thus combines the universal pure duty and particular duties in much the way that morality and happiness were combined, except that happiness lay outside moral consciousness, while duties, both pure and determinate, can only lie within it. Determinate duties are necessary, since the agent must eventually opt for one of them. Therefore a god in whose consciousness they lie is a necessity of moral thinking.

- ¶607. 1. Consciousness has to do something if it is to fulfil its pure duty. At first the problem was that in doing so, it was likely to override other valid determinate duties. Now the problem is that it does not know what its pure duty is. Only God knows that. So pure duty lies in God, not in itself. The determinate duties which consciousness performs now lie in consciousness itself. This is thus a reversal of the position in ¶606.
- ¶609. 1. However imperfect its actions, the moral consciousness still postulates perfect conformity to duty in its thought. It thinks of its imperfection as counting as perfect in the eyes of God, who values knowing and willing, rather than action, and rewards it accordingly with happiness.
- ¶610. 1. In the real world pure duty and actuality are at odds with each other. Hence in ¶606, determinate duties were located in God, while the moral agent retained only pure duty. In ¶607, this position was reversed: pure duty went to God, while the moral agent retained determinate duties. Ideally they should go together in harmony. So consciousness projects its moral ideal of a perfect harmony between its actions and pure duty onto God. The world of morality is only a representation, in which imperfect actuality is enhanced to perfection. For an insightful, if controversial interpretation of this and the immediately preceding ¶¶, see Stern (2002), pp.172–5.
- ¶611. 1. Like faith in ¶529, moral consciousness thinks, but does not think conceptually and therefore lapses into representation. It does not connect up conceptually the opposed moments, morality and nature, and duty and actuality, but remains enclosed in thinking and therefore lets the content go free as an imaginary god, who is relied on to do all the hard work of ensuring that everything turns out for the best. It is split between pure thinking and actuality and does not know how to integrate them. What is needed is thinking of a higher order, that reflects on its own first-order thinking.
- ¶612. 1. The moral consciousness was presupposed in ¶601. Moral consciousness's ideal is the complete conformity of the world with morality. It considers this state of affairs as the final purpose or end of the world. However, it projects this ideal outside itself into the remote future. Until this purpose is attained actuality remains out of accord with morality. This casts doubt on our earlier assumption that there really is such a thing as moral consciousness.
- ¶614. 1. It is one Self, not two, one devoted only to duty, the other aware only of imperfect actuality. So *in itself*, or in principle, the Self is a unity of duty and actuality. But since it is admittedly unable to put this unity into practice, it projects it into the Beyond, as something that only *ought* to be.
- ¶615. 1. In ¶615 the seemingly conflicting propositions of ¶601 and ¶614 are put together in a 'synthetic' unity, i.e. an artificial unity that does not result from conceptual analysis. Duty and actuality are independent of each other, yet geared to each other. So in representation each can pass as the other.

b. Shifting

- ¶616. 1. Consciousness has an ambivalent relationship with the moral world as it has presented it in its postulates. On the one hand, it has created this world and is aware of having done so. On the other hand, it has placed this world beyond itself, even though it came about through and for self-consciousness.
- I have borrowed the word 'shifting' from Kainz (1994) to translate *Verstellung*, which means 'dissimulation, dissemblance', but comes from the verb *verstellen*, 'to move objects thought of as standing', and *sich verstellen*, 'to dissimulate' (Farrell, 1977, p.225), and so also suggests 'shifting, displacing'. The verb 'shift' is similarly ambiguous.
- ¶617. 1. In CPR, B637, Kant calls the cosmological proof 'a whole nest of dialectical presumptions'.
2. Kant's description of the cosmological proof as 'a whole nest of dialectical presumptions' applies equally to his own moral world-view. It deals with its contradictions by

- hopping from one foot to the other. First it sets up one limb of the contradiction, treating it as all-important. Then it forgets this aspect and presents it as merely a disguise for the other limb. Then it goes back to the first limb again. It is fully aware of what it is up to. It does it only to avoid a confrontation with actuality and to save its contradictory position from collapse.
- ¶618. 1. Suppose that I perform a moral act, such as repaying a debt. Before I act, morality and external nature are not in accord, since the debt is unredeemed, but in repaying the debt I bring them into harmony. I am aware of this and gain my happiness in surveying the result of my action. What need is there then for a postulated harmony of morality and nature? It is perhaps needed before I act. I would not act at all, if I were not convinced of my ability to bring morality and nature into accord. But once I act, I produce this accord myself. There is no reason at all for projecting this harmony into the remote Beyond. (This objection assumes that the happiness in question is simply the happiness I gain from seeing the achievement of my immediate purpose. If Kant were to reply that what he had in mind was a more extensive overall happiness of the agent, Hegel can respond that this conflicts with our assumption that there is such a thing as moral consciousness (cf. ¶601): if I need to be motivated to repay my debts by the prospect of overall happiness, then I am not purely moral.)
- ¶619. 1. An action is singular, while the end is universal, the moral perfection of the world—to which my contribution is negligible. But to say this is to fail to take duty seriously; a single moral action is pure duty, and it does not matter to it what the rest of the world gets up to. We then shift to a different interpretation of the postulate, that it concerns not the single dutiful act, but the imperfection of nature, which goes its own way, but should conform to the moral law. However, this move really spells the end of morality. If nature and morality were in complete accord, why should we bother to do our duty rather than sit back and let God do all the work?
- ¶620. 1. If the highest good is realized, moral action is superfluous, even an interference with the 'ethical law' (*Sittengesetz*—Hegel's use of this term rather than 'moral law' marks an intrusion of his own non-Kantian view). It is not obvious that Hegel's objection is sound. If the harmony of nature and morality is a future prospect, especially a prospect to be attained only at infinity, moral actions will still be required for the foreseeable future. Even if, e.g., charitable acts are motivated by the prospect of the ultimate elimination of poverty—which would make charitable acts superfluous, that does not remove the point of charitable acts now, since charitable acts are needed in order to bring about the elimination of poverty. In any case, there would, even in a perfect world, still be a need for some moral acts; their performance would be part of what is involved in the world's perfection. Hegel might reply that if we take duty seriously, then we shouldn't worry about or be inspired, let alone motivated, by the ultimate state of the world: it is irrelevant to action here and now.
- ¶621. 1. Even if it were the case that in a perfect world all moral action, and not only charitable acts, would be superfluous, there is no obvious contradiction in claiming that moral actions are only a means to the realization of a state of affairs in which moral action is superfluous. There are, however, two problems with it. First, could Kant concede that actions performed in this spirit are really moral actions? Secondly, in what does the goodness of the highest good consist, if not in moral actions? (Even secular revolutionaries have difficulty in saying what is so good about their ideal society, once the need for revolutionary activity has disappeared.)
- ¶622. 1. Kant's second postulate concerned the conflict between duty and sensibility and its eventual reconciliation. Hegel raises two difficulties. First, whereas Kant (like Plato) distinguished sharply between our inclinations and urges, on the one hand, and our rational motivation to duty on the other, Hegel (like Aristotle) does not. He believes that dutiful action requires the power of inclinations for its performance. In Hegel's view, our

inclinations need to be refined rather than suppressed or eliminated, since without them we would do nothing at all. (Whether this is true is a moot point. One might eat out of duty even if one never felt hungry, e.g. to please one's host or to stay alive. But it is less clear whether one could be motivated to do anything by reason alone, if one had no desires whatsoever.) Secondly, if inclinations were eliminated or harmonized with reason, morality would lose its point, since (on Kant's view, but not Hegel's) it essentially involves a struggle against recalcitrant inclinations. Someone with paedophilic urges (such as Thomas Mann) can display great moral merit by resisting them, while someone who is free of them cannot. Kant resolves these problems by postponing the reconciliation to infinity.

- ¶623. 1. What Kant wants is the intermediate state of moral progress. But that will not do either, since it implies that one is getting morally better, or rather morally worse, since one is advancing towards a state in which morality will be eliminated. However, for Kant (like the Stoics, but unlike Hegel—despite his denigration of quantity) morality is an all or nothing matter. Morality is indivisible: it depends on the pure will alone, and once this succumbs to temptation, it has failed completely, whether one is a serial killer or merely a liar. (Kant says that murderers should be hung, but he really has no idea whether they have a *good will* or not.)
- ¶624. 1. Morality is always incomplete, or perhaps non-existent. So the demand for happiness in ¶602 is really unrelated to morality. Morality is unmasked as a demand for happiness regardless of one's moral merit.
- ¶625. 1. The complaint that morality often fares badly and immorality well is just an expression of envy disguised as morality. Since there is no such thing as perfect morality, and not even degrees of morality and immorality, happiness cannot possibly be distributed according to desert. It is just a matter of luck. We should try to spread it as widely as possible.
- ¶626. 1. Given the imperfection of human morality, the imperfect moral consciousness ascribes perfect morality to God. In trying to resolve the conflict between pure duty and specific duties, it shunted off first specific duties, and then pure duty, onto God. This is a dereliction of its own moral responsibility. Moral consciousness is autonomous. Nothing is sacrosanct for it unless it sanctifies it itself. It cannot expect God to do its work for it.
- ¶627. 1. God was postulated in order to accommodate specific duties. But pure duty must be transferred to Him too. The human will is subject to sensory temptations, so prone to evil, and also limited in its knowledge, so prone to error. Hence pure morality can only be found in God.
- ¶628. 1. However, God cannot struggle against sensibility, as we do, nor can he simply succumb to it, as we sometimes do, since that implies imperfection. So He must be entirely free of it. But such a conflict-free robotic state is not morality at all.
- ¶629. 1. This artificial representation of God, and the conceptually unconnected Also's (cf. ¶¶113ff. on perception) are simply makeshift expedients to stave off overt contradiction and they have now run out.
- ¶630. 1. There are two moral consciousnesses, one human and one divine. The human one recognizes its imperfection: its morality is a figment of thought and not carried out. It therefore projects morality into the divine consciousness, where it sees a morality that is both that of a consciousness and is actually put into practice. But to do that the divine consciousness has to have within it nature and sensibility, i.e. precisely what, in the human case, was regarded as detrimental to morality. The moral world-view keeps shifting its position. Morality is first supposed to be valid as a construction of thought, then this validity is withdrawn. It is first supposed to be essentially opposed to concrete reality and free of it, then it is united with reality.
- ¶631. 1. Nature is regarded both as necessary for duty and as inessential. Duty, and knowledge of it, are located both in consciousness only and only in the Beyond. There is an uneasy relationship between the Self and the in-itself, pure morality. Does morality lie within the Self or in the transcendent Beyond? The moral world-view keeps shifting from one position

to the other. Aware of this hypocrisy, consciousness now retreats into itself, discards all these fanciful representations, and becomes *conscience*, certain of itself and finding its fulfilment in immediate conscientious action. This will not solve the problem, however. Moral self-consciousness developed its reality by all this shifting, and carries it along with it into its inner retreat. All it has achieved is consciousness of its own duplicity, not integrity. Its contempt for shifting is sheer hypocrisy.

c. Conscience. The beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness

- ¶632. 1. Moral consciousness projected itself beyond itself, whether as pure duty or as actuality. This was the moralism of Kant and Fichte. Now this becomes, in the hands of the German Romantics, an aesthetic or religious world-view rather than a moral one. It begins with conscience, which reconciles the antinomies of reason and sensibility, duty and inclination, and so on. This in turn becomes the beautiful soul, which is self-certain but ineffectual. Finally, in *evil and its forgiveness* Hegel develops his own reconciliation of the tension between the singular and the universal, which troubled the earlier views.
- ¶633. 1. *Gewissen*, 'conscience', is closely related to *gewiss*, 'certain'. Each of the three main stages of spirit—the ethical world, culture, and morality—culminates in an all-important Self: (1) the person of the Roman Empire, the empty instantiation of an undifferentiated universal, in a world containing nothing but bare Selves; (2) the Self of the French revolution, in which the singular and the universal come apart, but the ethereal universal will cannot establish a stable social order; and (3) the Self that has emerged from moral consciousness. This Self has overcome the oscillation between singularity and universality that characterized moral consciousness, has reconciled this dualism, and has, owing to its development, acquired a content for duty and established its presence in the world.
- ¶634. 1. The Self of conscience sublates the separations that plagued moral consciousness, and is now concrete and unified moral spirit. It does not apply some abstract standard to its decisions. It takes no account of pure duty and nature or sensibility. It simply does what seems to it the right thing to do in the circumstances.
- ¶635. 1. Conscience does not worry about a possible discrepancy between its knowledge of a given situation and the situation as it actually is. All that matters is the situation as consciousness knows, or believes, it to be. Conscience is certain of its duty when it acts. It is not troubled by ifs and buts, like those that made the previous moral consciousness unable to act. Like sensory certainty in ¶90ff., it immediately knows the content of the situation from the interest it has in it and converts it into the form of duty. It does not serve as a universal medium (cf. ¶113 on perception) embracing all the specific conflicting duties into which a situation might be split up and which would paralyse the agent or force him to violate one of them. It focuses single-mindedly and exclusively on what is right. In any situation there are always reasons for doing different things if we analyse it. But action requires immediacy: 'Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise' (Luther).
- ¶637. 1. The gulf between duty and reality that Kant opens up makes action, or at least moral action, impossible. Hyppolite II, p.173, n.64, compares Hegel's praise of F.H. Jacobi (1743–1819), who replaced Kant's moral law with certainty of what a particular situation requires. See Hegel (1977), pp.143–50. One might do what one regards as the right thing to do in a situation without believing that one's so regarding it entails that it is right. But not only is conscience immediately certain of itself. It is also aware that it is, and regards its self-certainty as what really matters and as the conclusive justification of its act. This is its conviction. It has the effect of making one's own individual Self, to the exclusion of others, into the content of the action.
- ¶638. 1. Moral consciousness did take account of itself, but only insofar as it conformed to an objective standard, viz. pure duty. Conscience, by contrast, focuses exclusively on its own

Self. The contradiction between the Self and reality has been resolved, because all that matters now is the Self, which negates everything else. It is pure knowing, as the moral consciousness was, and also knowledge of the content, since the content is supplied by its singular consciousness. These two types of knowledge can no longer diverge. The Self no longer has any tendency to go its own way regardless of what really matters. The Self alone is the final authority on what is right.

- ¶639. 1. Duty no longer confronts the Self as something about which it might be mistaken. So what the Self does out of conviction is not just what it believes to be its duty, not even just *this* Self's duty; it is duty *simpliciter*, and thus the in-itself. However, this duty also detaches itself from the Self that conscientiously performs it, insofar as it is no longer the private possession of the Self but displays itself to other Selves. This Being-for-another is an essential feature of consciousness. What it is and does also has a public presence.
- ¶640. 1. We are to assume that the other Selves to which the conscientious Self displays its action are also conscientious Selves. They therefore recognize his action not only as an act of a particular type, such as repaying a debt, but also as an action inspired by conviction. They believe that, given his conviction, the Self did the right thing in the circumstances, even if they, in the same circumstances, would have acted otherwise from their own conviction. A Kantian moral consciousness cannot have such recognition, since it cannot be sure that it has done its duty. But the conscientious Self has done its duty, by simply transposing its dutiful content into reality. We can no longer say that good intentions go awry or that the good fare badly. The Self has done its duty and gained recognition for it, and that is all that matters. This all depends on taking the action together with the Self and its content. Taken on its own, the action is negligible. But now all the relevant factors—substantiality, external reality, and thought—are integrated into the Self.
- ¶641. 1. The reference is to chapter V, ¶¶394ff., esp. ¶¶412–18. For the honest consciousness the Thing itself, what really matters, lacked intrinsic content and was applied as a predicate to anything whatsoever. Its content was gradually enriched as spirit progressed. In Greece it was the social substance of State and family; in culture it was the external world of power and wealth; in morality it was thinking about pure duty. But now it is the subject, and embraces all these other factors: substantiality, external reality, and thought. Conscience has them all in its control.
- ¶642. 1. In order to act dutifully conscience needs to know about the situation in which it acts. The acquisition of such knowledge is essentially required by conscientiousness. Strictly speaking, it should know everything about its situation. But it could only do this if its situation were within its own consciousness, not, as it is, an objective situation of infinite complexity. So in practice it has to stop somewhere and content itself with incomplete knowledge. However, it is up to conscience itself to decide how much investigation it needs to undertake. Others may know, or want to know, more than it does. But that is their business. For conscience itself its limited knowledge is complete, since it has decided that it is all that duty requires.
- ¶643. 1. Like the moral consciousness, conscience is faced with a variety of specific duties implicit in its situation. None of them is sacrosanct, only pure duty, which has now turned into the pure conviction of duty. This conviction has no intrinsic content, but a content must be found for it, so that action can take place. None of the general moral considerations that figured in previous shapes of consciousness has any authority for it. To accept them would impair the autonomy of the conscientious Self. So all it has to fall back on is its own sensibility, its urges, and inclinations. The conscientious Self thus ends up as an arbitrary and wilful singular Self. On this line of argument, cf. Wolff (1970).
- ¶644. 1. On law-testing, see ¶¶429ff. Pure duty is empty and can accommodate any content whatsoever. The morality or immorality of the action does not depend on any of its

objective features, but solely on the strength of the agent's conviction. Others may condemn the action as fraudulent, violent, or cowardly. But as long as these others, along with the agent himself, adhere to the morality of conscience, these charges have no force. They must recognize the agent as conscientious and dutiful.

- ¶645. 1. Any content inserted into the empty frame of pure duty will be as determinate and exclusive as any other. There is no conclusive reason for preferring one content to another. In particular there is no reason for preferring the universal interest to one's own. Morality in general, in contrast to ethics, is averse to any law that presents itself as authoritative in opposition to the conviction and interests of the individual. It treats such a law as just something to be taken into consideration alongside other factors. Utilitarianism is no use either. It is anybody's guess how the calculations would turn out, even if conscience were willing to engage in calculation.
- ¶646. 1. The conscientious Self is both for itself and in itself. It accepts nothing else as in itself. So it does not worry about universal knowing, whether complete knowledge of this particular case or general laws applying to all cases of its type. All that matters is the information it has available about its particular situation. This is enough to make it all-powerful. It is less like Kant's moral consciousness, and more like Kant's god. It is not simply singular any longer. It is selfhood (*Selbstheit*) rather than just a Self.
- ¶647. 1. The conscientious act is out in the open and on display to other conscientious agents. It is an immediate physical presence, but also the act of one Self among a community of Selves. The action is recognized by others not as an act in conformity with a law, but as an act inspired by conviction of duty.
- ¶648. 1. Others recognize the agent as a conscientious Self, but they may not recognize the act as rightful. The act is determinate in a way that the conscientious Self is not. The Self might have performed any one of indefinitely many other acts instead; its potentiality is not exhausted by this particular act. This affects the response to the act not only of other Selves, but of the agent himself. He is a free self-consciousness and not bound to endorse his own previous action. Others take him to be committed to the rightness of his action. But he is not; he can survey his action critically from the outside just as others can. He has shifted from the position that others take him to occupy. Conscience does not involve long-term commitment. To take an analogy from the spiritual animal kingdom (¶¶397ff.)—which Hegel clearly has in mind here—an author, when his writing is going smoothly, is totally committed to and absorbed in what he writes; he cannot think of it as just one of indefinitely many things he could write. But once it is published, he may well think of it in this way, approaching what he wrote with a distant critical eye, just as others do; he becomes universal selfhood rather than this particular Self. He may be disturbed, or amused, if others continue to link him indissolubly with his previous pronouncements. There is more to people than their acts and utterances; they are harder to pin down. 'My favourite book is my next one. I'm always hoping to make my next book my best one' (Mo Willems).
- ¶650. 1. What calls for recognition is not the external action, but the action together with the agent's conviction of it as his duty. Without this conviction it seems to express only the agent's preference. What ought to appear in public is the conviction itself, the agent's knowledge of his duty. But an action alone cannot express this.
- ¶651. 1. What now enters the public scene is not just the ephemeral, determinate action, but the very Self, self-consciousness, recognized by other self-consciousnesses. Action alone cannot achieve this. Action is ambiguous and does not express the Self as a whole in all its elusive indeterminacy.
- ¶652. 1. Ever since sensory certainty in ¶¶90ff., language has played a crucial role in PS, and especially in culture: see ¶¶508ff. Language presents the pure ego to itself and also to others, overcoming its isolation while preserving its unique individuality. It is only a Self in virtue of

hearing itself and being heard by others of its kind. (Like many philosophers of the time, Hegel paid little attention to the blind and to deaf mutes. One of the few exceptions was Diderot (1916).)

- ¶653. 1. Language here differs from its predecessors. It is not perverted and perverting, as in ¶520. It is not a language of law, command, and complaint, as in Greek tragedy. Nor is it mute, like the moral consciousness, which cannot express itself in public reality. Conscience comes entirely clean and assures everyone of its conviction and that its conviction is what matters. Hyppolite, II, p.184, n.84, refers to Rousseau's *Confessions*.
- ¶654. 1. The Self can now have no reason for concealing its real intention, since whatever its intention is counts as right. Dutifulness requires no particular intention, only that the agent should say what its intention is, and affirm its conviction of its rectitude. If he says he is acting conscientiously, then he is. In asserting this, he becomes a universal Self, one among many equally universal and mutually recognizing Selves. The content of his deed is specific, not universal. But this does not matter. What matters is his self-declared formal kinship with all other Selves as conscientious agents.
- ¶655. 1. Here conscience has become the 'beautiful soul', which preserves and contemplates its own unrestricted universality and resists doing anything that would limit it. Rousseau, Schiller, and Goethe contributed to the development of the idea, but Hegel has Novalis (1772–1801) mainly in mind. See Hegel (1948), pp.234–7 and PR ¶140, esp. its concluding reference to PS. On Hegel's dim view of genius, see also PS ¶¶51, 68, and 70.
- ¶656. 1. The community in question may be that of the Moravian Church, or the idea of a community later proposed by an associate of the romantics, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), who was early on associated with the Moravians but soon broke away. On Schleiermacher, see Hegel (1977), pp.151f. Conscience goes through two stages. In the first, there is still a difference between the Self and its abstract consciousness directed on the essence; the mediation of the relation between them by a third term guarantees their difference. In the second, this difference disappears in all-embracing self-consciousness, since the mediation has gone. The Self has become united with God. This clearly refers to Novalis. (Novalis's father was also a Moravian.)
- ¶657. 1. 'I=I' is a formula especially associated with Fichte, referring to the bare ego stripped of all determinate features. Novalis was a close student of Fichte and appropriated him for romanticism: see Novalis (2003).
- ¶658. 1. The beautiful soul is entirely self-absorbed. Its object, God, has become identical with itself and perfectly transparent to it: its consciousness of this object is just its knowledge of itself. The beautiful soul is similar to the unhappy consciousness: see ¶¶206ff. It too is in dialogue with itself, but now the dialogue is explicitly internal, not a dialogue with a supposedly external object. Moreover, the original unhappy consciousness was only *implicitly* reason and lacked the conceptual resources available to the beautiful soul. The beautiful soul is averse to all external reality and fears to sully its purity with any commitment to action: cf. ¶32 for an implicit reference to Novalis. In the course of spirit's development, the Self became increasingly important. But now the Self seems to have dwindled away, as symbolized by Novalis's early death. The beautiful soul looks like a dead-end.
- ¶659. 1. Hegel returns to an earlier point in the development of conscience before it branched off into the cul-de-sac of the beautiful soul: see e.g. ¶¶634ff, where conscience gets into action. In ¶648, we drew a distinction between the universal consciousness, the mutually recognizing conscientious Selves, and the single Self, but this had disappeared by ¶654, when all that mattered was the single Self. Now we have to reconsider the relationship between universality and singularity. The individual may well be contemptuous of the general view of where its duty lies, regarding pure duty as a sham and something one

does only to gain the respect of others. Why should he do what everyone else thinks he ought to do? Why not be a free rider? He is entirely free of any particular duty, and can decide for himself what to do, regardless of what other Selves think about it.

- ¶660. 1. In ¶659 the opposition between individual agent and the universality he flouts lay in his own mind, but it now emerges as his opposition to another individual, who represents universality. For the first individual, universality is a minor consideration in comparison with his own Self. For the second, duty or the universal far outweighs the individual. So he regards the first as evil, because he does not conform to the universal, and also as hypocritical, because he appeals to his conformity to himself ('to thine own Self be true'), equating this with duty and conscientiousness.
- ¶661. 1. The dissident agent claims to be good, but is internally evil. To unmask the hypocrisy, his universal opponent must bring his evil out into the open. As de La Rochefoucauld said, 'hypocrisy is the homage that vice renders to virtue'. This makes hypocrisy sound rather a good thing, suggesting that, internally, the dissident is not so evil after all. But that is not so. Hypocrisy is not simply paying homage to virtue. It does not believe its own tribute to virtue, but shows its contempt for virtue by using it only to fool others and, in fact, degrades virtue in the eyes of others by showing that it can be exploited in this way.
- ¶662. 1. The dispute cannot be resolved by a stubborn dissident. Suppose he insists that he is not evil and at odds with the universal, but conforming to his inner law; the other may not believe that he is acting in this spirit or that, even if he is, this removes the evil. Suppose, alternatively, that the dissident agrees that he is evil because he does follow his internal law, and inevitably an internal law of one's own can only be singular and wilful. Then there is no hypocrisy. But he is saying that he does mistreat others, by acting towards them in accordance with a law that they do not recognize. In fact, however, dissidents are rarely, if ever, so persistent in their opposition to standard morality. They aspire to operate within accepted moral discourse and to get others to recognize their case.
- ¶663. 1. Nor can the universal moralist settle the dispute. He appeals to *his* law, just as the dissident does. Since the two laws oppose each other, each is particular rather than universal. The dissident's law is as legitimate as his own. Neither of them is universally recognized, so each has an equal right. Things might have been different if the moralist had simply *followed* its own universal law. It is in *condemning* the dissident that it exposes its own weakness and the other's strength.
- ¶664. 1. The judging consciousness turns out to be as evil and hypocritical as the dissident. It talks instead of acting, and it interprets the dissident's action as evil, when it should try to unearth the universality that it also contains. The agent's intuition of itself in the judging consciousness looks ahead to ¶666.
- ¶665. 1. Judging is also an action of sorts and can be assessed as such. It cannot deny that the agent has done his duty, since almost anything can be a duty. But no one ever acts solely for the sake of duty. He always has self-interested motives as well. This must be so, since it is the act of an individual and an individual has interests, which must therefore figure among his motives for action. (This argument is questionable: it might be taken to imply that if I am hungry when I repay a debt, I must be motivated partly by a desire to satisfy my hunger.) The judging consciousness focuses exclusively on the self-interested motive, ambition, etc., and ignores the dutiful aspect. It wants to reduce dutiful acts to self-interested acts, which applies to its own act of judging as well. The dictum 'No man is a hero to his valet' is usually attributed to the Duke of Condé in the reign of Louis XIV. Hegel makes his addition for the first time here. Goethe repeated it ten years later, but Hegel reminds us, in PH, p.32, that he said it first.

- ¶666. 1. The two consciousnesses are now on an equal footing. The agent's confession is intended to be reciprocated and a first step to mutual recognition. Speech is not just a substitute for action. It is a significant action.
- ¶667. 1. The first occurrence of 'admission' translates *Geständnis*, and the second *Eingeständnis*, while 'confession' translates *Bekanntnis*. According to Jarczyk and Labarrière I, p.797, n.448, *Bekanntnis* has a religious flavour that the other two words lack. Hence Hegel's vocabulary becomes more religious as the ¶ proceeds. This culminates in the traditional Christian doctrine that the spirit can pardon any act and make a sinner reborn.
- ¶668. 1. There are now two directions in which the judging consciousness might go. In the first it becomes a beautiful soul, unable to bring itself to descend to the level of the dissident and engage with it on its own terms. It is driven mad by the unmediated opposition between its own moral purity and the need to enter into the public realm, loses its grip on itself, and dwindles away. This results in an equalization of the two parties, but not a very fruitful one.
- ¶669. 1. The second direction is more fruitful. The judging consciousness confesses and thereby abandons its particular position and rises to universality. The defects of its deed are annulled by spirit: cf. ¶667. The acting, dissident consciousness and the judging consciousness are both equally involved in action. The evil, acting consciousness confessed, because it could see the other's point of view, and now the judging consciousness must reciprocate. Action and the concept opposed to it, and for that reason determinate, both succumb to the all-embracing spirit.
- ¶670. 1. The judging consciousness renounces the thought that divides the two sides, because, like the dissident in ¶667, it recognizes itself in the other, who has now shed his singularity and withdrawn from his action. Each party renounces its previous oppositional stance and takes on board the other's position. The judging consciousness now regards its formerly evil opponent as good, or, rather, it abandons this distinction altogether. The two sides are reconciled in all-encompassing spirit, which embraces both knowledge of the universal essence and knowledge of the individual Self.
- ¶671. 1. Before passing on to religion, Hegel here sketches the prospect of a post-revolutionary State that will embody both objective institutions and subjective morality. (At the end of PR ¶140, he makes a transition from morality to ethical life, but not (as he notes) to religion. *Enc.* III, ¶512 makes a similar transition from morality to ethical life.) The reconciliation of the two sides is not easy, since they seem utterly opposed. The two sides, the insistence on the objective ethical order and the insistence on the primacy of the individual Self, have reached their highest pitch. In fact, each side involves a Self, the universal Self attached to the objective order and the individual Self appealing to its own conscience and self-interest. Each of these Selves seems entirely coherent and self-contained, in need of no supplement from the other. Thus each is in a way universal, determinate only in virtue of its opposition to the other. If people fell into two distinct impermeable types, universalist Selves and individualist Selves, then a reconciliation between them might be impossible. But as we have seen in ¶670, this is not the case. Each type of Self intuitively sees an aspect of itself in the other and appreciates the other's point of view. Fichte's formula, 'I=I', can be seen as expressing this divergence between two types of Self, one universal, the other singular, within each individual Self, albeit with different strengths. Thus in order to become fully self-conscious and unite these two strands of itself, the individual needs to dismount from its high horse and recognize that individuals who are predominantly, though not exclusively, of a different type from itself, also have a case. God Himself is such a union of universality and singularity. So He has a special role to play in a society of this sort. (As often, Hegel uses *Diskretion* and *indiskrete* in their original senses of 'discreteness, separation' and 'indiscrete, unseparated', rather than 'discreetness, circumspection' and 'indiscreet, imprudent'.)

(CC.) Religion

VII. Religion

- ¶672. 1. We have looked at spirit. Now we turn to the self-consciousness of spirit: religion. In the accounts of unhappy consciousness (see ¶211) and of faith (see ¶¶487 and 528), absolute essence was explicitly viewed through the eyes of a consciousness distinct from it, not as it is in and for itself. But religion proper is concerned with the absolute essence as the self-consciousness of spirit. Hyppolite, II, p.204, notes that Hegel himself seems rather to give a *phenomenology* of religion, an account of God or gods as seen through the eyes of the religious community. Hegel himself believes that God is not distinct from human beings, and that they are an essential aspect of Him. It is only human worshippers who make the absolute essence *for itself*, as well as *in itself*. Hence the mistake of the religions considered earlier, or perhaps of the accounts of them, was to separate God from humans.
- ¶673. 1. The understanding in chapter III delved beneath external reality to find its supersensible interior, but it found only a universal, not a Self, which is what is required for the self-consciousness of spirit, not just universal laws. The unhappy consciousness could not connect up itself and God. Reason sought itself in *immediate* reality, when religion requires a mediated approach to it.
- ¶674. 1. There was a religion in Greece (see ¶¶444ff.), involving impersonal fate and the Eumenides (i.e. Furies or Erinyes, the avenging goddesses of ¶462) of the dead Self, but the Self and fate were not united, resulting in an unsatisfactory Self and an unsatisfactory god. Hegel expands his account of Greek religion in ¶¶699ff., esp. 727ff., where this unity is gradually realized.
- ¶675. 1. In faith (¶¶527ff.) the Self did unite with universality in death, and the supersensible realm of chapter III was revived. But since faith's thought was unconceptual, it succumbed to the onslaught of enlightenment. The enlightenment found all the satisfaction it needed in this world and its god, insofar it acknowledged one, remained an empty cipher.
- ¶676. 1. In Kant's moral religion, God is given a positive content, but tempered by the scepticism of the enlightenment. The content is both taken back into the Self and continually escapes the Self, because it keeps being withdrawn, especially by being postponed to infinity. Nevertheless the result of this tergiversation is a Self that combines divinity with reality, giving a god who is present in this world, not in the Beyond: see ¶671.
- ¶677. 1. The shapes of spirit considered so far, those of Greece, culture, and morality, were only spirit's consciousness, not its self-consciousness: it was conscious of the world it faced, but did not recognize spirit itself in it. That changes, however, when spirit takes the form of conscience. As conscience it does not leave the objective world outside it, but incorporates it lock, stock, and barrel, so that its consciousness of the world amounts to its consciousness of itself. Spirit now has before it a model of itself as embracing all reality, though this reality is not conceived as independent, but as simply at its beck and call. Admittedly, this model of spirit is still only an object of spirit and an object in a specific shape. But as essentially self-consciousness, religion can see through this shape to the idea behind it. In the form of conscience, spirit embraces all actuality, but only in thought, only in the way in which the expression 'all actuality' contains all actuality: actuality is not yet 'in the form of free actuality or of nature appearing as independent'.
- ¶678. 1. Because of its origin in conscience, religion does not allow the world of which spirit is conscious to be free and independent. This world still exists independently, however, and since religion does not accommodate it, it falls outside religion. So spirit divides into two separate compartments, religion and worldly life. At bottom these are the same. So they must be harmonized with each other. This requires a move in two directions. Worldly actuality must be elevated so that religion can accommodate it, and religion must descend

into worldly actuality. Religion does make use of worldly actuality as a symbolic representation of itself. But this demeans both religion and actuality. Self-conscious spirit, religion, should appear as it really is, not in some specific sensory object and, conversely, worldly actuality should be acknowledged as independent, not just as trappings of religion. Paradoxically, when God and the world become independent of each other and are completed within themselves, they will be in harmony with each other under the aegis of a single spirit, all-encompassing absolute spirit.

- ¶679. 1. Worldly spirit involves all five ‘configurations’ (*Gestaltungen*) considered so far, from consciousness in chapters I–III to spirit (in a narrower sense) in chapter VI, not yet divided into ‘shapes’ (*Gestalten*) such as sensory certainty. These configurations are not successive in time, only in their logical order. But the whole spirit, i.e. spirit in chapter VI plus religion, is in time and its shapes are temporally successive. Moreover, although configurations are not successive in time, the specific shapes into which they divide, as consciousness divides into sensory certainty, perception, and understanding, *are* temporally successive. Thus, e.g., the first stage of natural religion, the religion of light, involves both sensory certainty and the master and slave (¶685f.), because they belong to different configurations and can thus appear contemporaneously, but it could not involve also perception or Stoicism, since they are different shapes within the same configurations. The universal, temporal spirit is one term of a syllogism linking it with the singular temporal shapes, by way of the particular atemporal configurations.
- ¶680. 1. Like the development of worldly spirit, the development of religion is articulated into stages and sub-stages. The three main stages of religion are natural religion (pre-Greek religion), the religion of art (Greek religion), and revealed or manifest religion (Christianity). These correspond respectively to the configurations of consciousness (Being-in-itself), self-consciousness (Being-for-itself), and reason (Being-in-and-for-itself). However, natural religion and the religion of art, though not revealed religion, are each divided into three temporally successive sub-stages. For example, natural religion divides into the religion of light, that of plants and animals, and that of the artisan. The configuration of consciousness conveniently divides into three shapes, to which these correspond: sensory certainty, perception, and understanding. However, the specific correlation of religious shapes with the earlier course of PS becomes more perfunctory as the development of religion proceeds. There are too many non-religious shapes and not enough religions for there to be an exact correlation, and Christianity is too complex to submit to any such clear-cut categorization. Hence within limits a specific religion can take its pick among non-religious shapes, choosing the one that suits it best, but using others as well. The requirements of the integration of religion with worldly spirit helps to account for the double organization of PS. In one of Hegel’s arrangements, consciousness is divided into three separate chapters; in the other it is entitled ‘A. Consciousness’ and constitutes the first of the three main sections of the work. In the first of these arrangements, reason, spirit, religion, and absolute knowledge are each assigned separate chapters, while in the other they are combined as the third main section, the second being ‘B. Self-consciousness’. The treatment of consciousness as a single section better suits the significance now given it as a single configuration. The treatment of reason, etc. as a single section fits better Hegel’s idea that there are only three main types of religion. The architectonic to which Hegel aspires also accounts for his *apparent* omission of Judaism: but see my note to ¶720.
- ¶681. 1. In the original occurrence of a shape it had to develop itself, then withdraw into its substance, spirit. So we proceeded in a unilinear fashion. But now that this substance has come to light, the shapes are not isolated any more but all involved in spirit together. Originally the series of shapes was punctuated by nodes, which marked ‘reversions’ (*Rückgänge*), retreats, withdrawals, or returns of moments into their ground and essence or into

the simple Self of spirit, the Self that is for-itself (§443). But after noting them, we proceeded on our linear course. Now we can see how a node lies not just on one straight line, but is the centre of many lines linking it with other, similar, stages in PS. This implies that the various shapes are not parts, but attributes of the substance of worldly spirit (cf. §440) and, in religion, predicates of the subject: cf. §§703, 748f., and 759. We have known all along that spirit implicitly involves all forms, but we had to present a particular spirit from its own point of view.

- ¶682. 1. In Christianity, spirit's consciousness and self-consciousness are harmonized, but not in religion as it first appears. Like sensory certainty in §90, it is immediate. Its aim is self-consciousness, but since it is conscious of spirit only immediately, it is conscious of it only in the shape of a natural entity. This natural entity is filled, in accordance with the concept of religion, with spirit, etc., but its natural shape expresses this inadequately. That is, the concept of religion, for which the essence is self-consciousness, is not actualized. The object's spiritual significance prevents it from becoming merely a natural entity. So it is still in the realm of religion. This defective *immediate* unity of spirit with itself is the basis on which consciousness splits into the two extremes of spiritual self-consciousness and a more or less inadequate expression of it. Spirit is here pure consciousness, so it does not create nature, but only various religious shapes in which spirit appears in its entirety, culminating in absolute spirit, where the two sides are finally harmonized.
- ¶683. 1. As often in Hegel, the concept of something is its incipient stage, containing the plan of its later development: cf. ¶682. The Greek artist represents the Self and its doing in the formerly natural shape, transposing the Self into the object. Christianity puts the Self on both sides, both as the immediate Self of the worshipper and as a Self immediately represented by him. Here the shape is true, but shape and representation must be replaced by the 'concept', in a different sense from that in the first sentence: see ¶788.

A. NATURAL RELIGION

- ¶684. 1. There are two aspects to a religion: first, its self-consciousness and, secondly, the determinate shape in which it is conscious of itself. We are here concerned only with this determinate shape. However, the difference between the two aspects depends on self-consciousness. For the shape is not raw, unthought nature nor pure thought. Its role in a religion and its spiritual significance depends entirely on self-conscious thought. Religions are differentiated by their different shapes. But a religion is not exhausted by its single determinacy. On the one hand, the different religions look like variations of one religion, since the representations distinctive of one religion occur in an inchoate form in every religion. (Cf. §2 on the way in which different philosophies can be viewed as different stages in the growth of a single philosophy: see also *Enc. I*, §13.) On the other hand, there is diversity of religion. The aim is to harmonize self-consciousness with consciousness, and we cannot suppose this to have been achieved simply because some religions happen to have incorporated in their shape the Self and God represented as self-consciousness, unless they were deliberately incorporated by self-consciousness and registered as essential by the elimination or demotion of lower determinations. For example, the occurrence of an incarnation in oriental religion is inconsequential, since oriental religion lacks the reconciliation signified by the incarnation. Revealed religion, viz. Christianity, does contain all the other shapes in it in a subordinate form, but that does not detract from its difference from them.

a. *The light-essence*

- ¶685. 1. Hegel presents the religion of ancient Persia, Zoroastrianism, as initially the sheer concept of religion, conscious of itself as all truth, etc., but shrouded in darkness, and needing to come out into the light by finding an adequate embodiment of itself. The

emergence from darkness into light is the lowest common denominator of all religions, hence the appropriate starting-point. It is comparable to the pure I of ¶¶166ff., in search of an adequate embodiment of its self-certainty. Cf. Hegel (1895), II, pp.79ff.

- ¶686. 1. In conformity with the architectonic explained in ¶¶679–82 the religion of light corresponds to sensory certainty, the first stage of spirit in the wide sense. It also involves mastery from the second configuration: spirit is a master urging self-consciousness to engage with its object. Hyppolite, II, p.215, n.8, suggests that this reflects Hegel's belief that in oriental religions the absolute is the negation of the Self and appears as a master over man as a slave: the servile character of oriental social relations is transposed into religion. The thinking of Zoroastrianism lacks the *understanding* that gives stability and clear definition both to thoughts and to things.
- ¶687. 1. 'Sideshow' (*Beiheerspielen*) is reminiscent of the 'by-play' (*Beispiel*) in sensory certainty: see ¶92. The sun only rises, it does not set. If it were to set, it would pull substance together into a subject and a Self, arranging the whole show into an orderly system. Some attempt is made to combine unity with plurality by assigning many names to the single substance as its attributes. But there is no coherent account of the emergence of these attributes in the world.
- ¶688. 1. Some central focus is needed to bring order into this chaos. This is already implicit in the religion itself. Light, as a negative power dissolving all the variations in it, is at bottom a sort of Self, that now stabilizes the different entities without annihilating them.

b. The plant and the animal

- ¶689. 1. This refers to the early religions of India: see also Hegel (1895), II, pp.1ff. They correspond to perception, and its things with many properties. Spirit splits up into many spirits, like the properties of a thing. At first they coexist peacefully as a religion of flowers, but later it becomes a religion of animals, which fight with each other, rather as the properties of one thing opposes the properties of other things. The spirits inflict death on each other, just as, in an abstract way, material things do. In the actual, worldly spirit there were many dispersed tribes, each with its own totemic animal, fighting each other to the death: cf. the life and death struggle in ¶187.
- ¶690. 1. This transition is from India to Egypt: see Hegel (1895), II, pp.101ff. Egyptian religion corresponds, in the configuration of consciousness, to the understanding (¶¶132ff.) and, in that of self-consciousness, to the labour by which the bondsman cultivates himself (¶196). Thus the Self is producing itself, as much as it is the Self producing. 'Immediate' Being-in-itself and 'abstract' Being-for-itself are, respectively, the essence of light and the religion of animals. But these are now transformed into the material object on which the artisan works and the representation he produces in it.

c. The artisan

- ¶691. 1. The artisan does not start out with a clear conception of himself, but produces himself as an object, as did the bondsman in forming a thing. That is why he is an artisan rather than an artist.
- ¶692. 1. Initially the artisan's products use the geometrical shapes congenial and intelligible to the understanding, straight lines rather than curves. Such structures have no intrinsic meaning. They can only accommodate the spiritual Self as a dead person, like the pyramids, or have an external relation to the Self, like the statue of Memnon at Luxor, which after being cracked by an earthquake in 27 BC, was reputed to 'sing', usually at dawn: see ¶695.
- ¶693. 1. The separation between the artisan's material and his work on it from outside is like a separation of his body from his soul. He must bring them together by putting himself into his artefact and not remaining outside it. He does this by making a statue (the soul,

- singularity), inside a temple (the body, universality). The statue and the temple are closer to each other than were the pyramid and the corpse. Moreover, the statue, even if it is a statue of a god, is somewhat like the artisan, and he sees himself in it. But it is still not the artisan himself. There is still a gulf between the active self-consciousness and its product.
- ¶694. 1. The columns of a temple are decorated with stylized plant-forms, introducing curves as well as straight lines.
- ¶695. 1. Previously the pyramid or other structure either contained only a corpse or, like the colossus of Memnon, pointed towards an external spirit: see ¶692. Now it contains a statue in the shape of an animal. The artisan is well aware that he is not just an animal. So the statue is like a hieroglyph, a pictorial symbol with a hidden meaning. To indicate this the artisan makes the statue half animal and half human. It still does not resemble a human Self. It does not speak a non-hieroglyphic language, and does not look as if it could. Hence even when it has no animality in it, like the colossus of Memnon, it needs the sunrise to make any sound at all, and then it is just noise, not language: 'And from her lips, as morn from Memnon, drew/Rivers of melodies' (Tennyson, 'The Palace of Art').
- ¶696. 1. The black stone is a cornerstone of the Kaaba, an ancient shrine in Mecca, venerated by Muslims, but also in pre-Islamic times. Hegel takes it to symbolize the human interior, which cannot be adequately expressed in sculpture.
- ¶697. 1. Both the statue and the black stone contain the inner and the outer Self, but disunited. To unite them the artisan combines natural and human shapes, as in the sphinx with a lion's body and a human head. The sphinx is associated with wisdom and, in Greek mythology, with riddles: cf. ¶737.
- ¶698. 1. The conflict of ¶697 results in a statue whose external form adequately expresses the human interior. The artisan sees in his product a replica of himself, and thereby acquires a unitary conception of himself, which turns him from an instinctive artisan into a self-conscious artist. The conflict and its reconciliation is reminiscent of the struggle for recognition in chapter IV. Hegel may also be thinking of Pygmalion and Galatea.

B. RELIGION OF ART

- ¶699. 1. Greek religion was closely associated with art. All Greek art before the death of Alexander in 323 BC had some connection with religion and, conversely, religion had no formal expression outside of art. The artisan has become properly self-conscious in virtue of the replica of himself he has produced.
- ¶700. 1. The religion of art corresponds to a society that embodies the ethical spirit. This spirit is the substance of all individuals, but it does not crush or absorb them. It has, in their art, the shape of the Self, and so it is regarded by them as their essence and product: see ¶¶439 and 444 on individualism in the ethical order. In this respect it is quite different from the oriental religions considered so far.
- ¶701. 1. In its religion the ethical spirit rises above its mundane reality and acquires self-knowledge. The ethical people is trustingly absorbed in its customs and everyone is content with their restricted duties and social position. It lacks the individual self-consciousness and the idea of an unbounded Self that religious self-consciousness requires. So religion perfects itself when individuals are detaching themselves from the ethical society and becoming self-certain individuals. The rights and duties distributed among them succumb to the same dialectic as did things and their properties in perception, culminating in the self-certain individual: cf. ¶446. Individualism runs riot. There are two sides to the ethical spirit. It begins as simple trust, but then expires in disorder. Two extremes, the substance and the Self, were held together by spirit. When the trust in substance declines, spirit emerges as the all-important Self which regrets the loss of its essence and, elevated above the fray, recreates it in art.

- ¶702. 1. Absolute art, art that adequately portrays the absolute spirit, arises during the decline of an ethical society. Before this the artisan instinctively manipulates concrete objects; he is not a free Self rooted in a free ethical order. Afterwards spirit transcends art. In Christianity what is presented is not just something produced by the Self, but humanity itself, represented by Christ. The Christian drama is thoroughly conceptual in a way that Greek art is not. Art, life, and the concept coincide.
- ¶703. 1. The artist's activity depends on the withdrawal of ethical substance from concrete reality. He has rid himself of the fixed preconceptions and unconscious entanglement with Being-there that plagued the artisan, even of his own attachment to the ethical substance. He is free to do as he likes with the material available to him, imposing form on it, but with a content of his own choosing. This form is the night in which substance was, like Christ in Gethsemane, betrayed and turned into a subject: cf. ¶17. But the ethical spirit is, like Christ, resurrected, recreated in art without the encumbrance of nature and its own concrete reality.
- ¶704. 1. Spirit has migrated from ethical life into a concept and this is now embodied in an artist. Spirit inspires him with a universal project and power, with a dominating pathos like that of a tragic hero: cf. ¶¶471ff. After a struggle, the artist brings all this under control. The essence that he has to represent is intrinsically shapeless and universal, but he succeeds in giving it an individualized representation.

a. The abstract work of art

- ¶705. 1. The first work, the statue of a god, is abstract because it does not involve language and self-consciousness. This will be followed by the hymn, which involves both. Finally, the cult unites the external statue and the interior self-consciousness of the hymn.
- ¶706. 1. The artist produces a shape remote from himself: see ¶708. It is divided into singularity, the statue of a god, and universality, the temple housing the god. The temple and its columns are quite different from those of Egypt. They do not use only straight lines and plane surfaces, nor do they imitate plant life. They eliminate most of the botanical elements (remnants of the tree trunks originally used for columns), and combine the straight and the incommensurable curve in a way that is congenial to the understanding and appropriate to the anthropomorphic form inside the temple.
- ¶707. 1. The statue inside the temple is the Greek equivalent of the black stone: see ¶696. It no longer has animal features, though gods sometimes disguise themselves as animals and may be symbolized by animals. The characteristics we share with animals, especially the male genitals, are represented, but only on the surface, with no hint of the organic purposes they serve. The god unifies nature and self-conscious spirit. E.g. Athena is a singular natural shape representing, for self-consciousness, Athens. Nature is subdued, leaving only remnants of the pre-Olympian gods, the twelve children of Uranus (heaven) and Gaia (earth), who ruled the world before Zeus overthrew them. Typhon was Gaia's last child, fathered by Tartarus, the god of the underworld, and even worse than the Titans. Zeus eventually defeated him and imprisoned him beneath Mt. Etna.
- ¶708. 1. The temple and the statue have brought all the chaotic singularity of the world into tranquil individuality. But confronting this is the individuality of the artist, who is left outside his product with only his restless activity. The work is incomplete unless it also embraces its production by him. The concept of a work of art is that it is consciously made by human hands and this concept exists just as a concept in the artist's activity. Everything else in the artist, he has transferred into the work, giving its specific details and their physical embodiment. But this concept remains outside it. We cannot forget the artist despite his best efforts to forget himself, and this goes for the spectator too. The two aspects of the artwork, the *doing* and the 'being-a-thing', must be brought together again. (The spectator is introduced surreptitiously, and goes beyond what Hegel's argument strictly licenses.)

- ¶709. 1. The artist does not achieve equality with his work. However much the audience admire him and revere his work as a god, neither the audience nor his work capture the pain of his activity. He does not rate himself below his artwork, even if they despise it. If they revere it as a god, he feels superior to it. But it is not his equal: he does not recognize his own spirit in it.
- ¶710. 1. The god has now sunk into the externality of an unselfconscious thing. So he needs another outlet, language: cf. ¶508, where the language of culture is described in similar terms. Now the god is ensouled and no longer just a thing; he is combined with the pure activity that previously contrasted with him. Self-consciousness is at home with itself in its essence, the god, and is thus pure thinking or, at least, ‘devotion’, *Andacht*, which is not thinking, but on the way to thinking, as its etymological connection with *denken* suggests: cf. ¶¶217 and 571.
- ¶711. 1. In contrast to the hymn, the oracle does not express truths that are generally accepted. Since the god is essentially involved in spirit as well as nature, he has to speak. But since this concept of god is not yet incorporated in religion, he speaks as an alien and singular self-consciousness, not as the universal Self of the community. What he says corresponds to the nature of the religion in question. The simple general claims he makes in the religion of light seem trivial to more developed self-consciousness.
- ¶712. 1. In the religion of art, universal truths are known without recourse to oracles, as are the unwritten laws mentioned by Antigone in Sophocles’s *Antigone*, lines 456f: cf. ¶437. Even here, however, people rely on their god for particular truths of use to the god’s community. Socrates derived universal truths by thinking, but relied on his *daimonion*, a ‘divine something’, for specific advice about what not to do: Plato, *Apology* 31c–d, 40a. Universal consciousness, less wise than Socrates, relied on birds, trees (esp. at Dodona), and the utterances of a priestess intoxicated by fumes rising from the earth (at Delphi). This is no worse than confidently relying on one’s own understanding and deliberation, since the results of this depend on one’s contingent character and capacity. In fact it is better to appeal to omens or toss a coin, since that doesn’t make so much of contingency. It is best to deliberate, while recognizing its fallibility.
- ¶713. 1. Spirit’s true expression in speech is the hymn, not the oracle. The statue is external, at rest, and selfless, while the hymn is internal to the Self and vanishing. They need to be combined to iron out their defects.
- ¶714. 1. It is the cult or worship that combines language and the statue. Each moves in the direction of the other. The Self emerges from its interior to become conscious of the god’s descent to it, and the god sheds his externality and objectivity, and actualizes himself in self-consciousness. On cult or worship, see also Hegel (1895), I, pp.65–73, 229–46.
- ¶715. 1. The soul is immediately one with the god. It does not distinguish itself from the god, as consciousness would. There is nothing in the soul apart from the god. It is just a blank space prepared for his arrival. It first purifies itself consciously, by washing and various other rituals. But it does not delve into its depths and become aware of its evil and sinfulness. That is a Christian rather than a Greek characteristic. The path of labours and the journey to bliss are only *represented* and do not take place in reality. Hyppolite, II, p.234, n.31, suggests that Hegel is thinking of Orphism and Pythagoreanism. He may also have in mind the ‘Eleusinian mysteries’, a rite held annually at Eleusis in honour of Demeter and Persephone: see ¶¶721–4.
- ¶716. 1. The journey to bliss described in ¶715 was only represented and did not actually occur. But some action must be performed. What happens is that the god descends from his remote universality and joins together with the singular worshipper. That is, consciousness becomes pure self-consciousness.
- ¶717. 1. The two sides are the worshipper and the god. The worshipper looks at things in two ways. As actual consciousness it sees the essence as nature, in the form of its own property (e.g. bread and wine) and of itself as a single individual. As pure consciousness it looks at

nature as a sign of the god, to which it sacrifices itself, just as it consumes the bread and wine. The god is thereby brought down to earth and, conversely, natural objects, including the worshipper, are given a universal significance.

- ¶718. 1. In the sacrifice, the Self surrenders his property, and his own action, to the god, and acquires a universal significance. Conversely, the remote, abstract god surrenders himself too, since the sacrificial animal is a sign of the god, and bread and wine symbolize the goddess of agriculture and the god of wine. The gods have already implicitly renounced themselves by becoming plants and animals. The Self makes this explicit and, in doing so, puts himself in the place of plants and animals. For the union with the god elevates the Self, rather than demoting it. So only a small part of the sacrificial victim is put in the ground for the gods of the nether world. After this first sacrifice, the best bits are used for a ritual feast to celebrate man's union with the god.
- ¶719. 1. This cult, with its devotion and feasting, is fleeting and leaves nothing objective behind. So the next step is to build a temple. Everyone can participate in this, just as they did in the cult, not just an individual artist. The labourers are *represented*, or imagined, as winning divine favour by thus honouring the god. But they also gain real benefits, not just their own estrangement and the god's honour. Their temples are packed with treasures for the glory and enjoyment both of the god and of the community.

b. The living work of art

- ¶720. 1. The religion of art gives their due both to the ethical State and to the Self. It contrasts with the religion of light, in which the Self is rejected, while only the substance is recognized and the god is revered as empty depth, unlike the friendly Greek deities. However, Greek religion lacks depth, both in its gods and in its knowledge. The religion of light is primarily Zoroastrianism: see ¶685. It seems probable, however, from Hegel's stress on its depth and his reference to a 'rejected people', that he also has Judaism in mind. The 'self-conscious people' referred to in the second sentence may well be the Jews rather than the Greeks. Light is also a prominent theme in Judaism: 'And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. And God saw the light, and it was good, and God divided the light from the darkness' (Genesis 1:3–4). If Zoroastrianism, about which Hegel knew little, is a metaphor for Judaism, about which he knew a great deal and wrote extensively in Hegel (1948), this would account for the unusual prominence given to the religion of light and also for the otherwise surprising omission of Judaism: cf. ¶680. See also ¶803, where the religion of light is associated with Spinoza.
- ¶721. 1. As in ¶687, the rising of the sun represents the ascent of substance, while its setting represents the transformation of substance into the subject. So in its night substance has become pure individuality. This individuality is no longer the artist, struggling with his product. It has seen the work and its elimination of objectivity, and so is satisfied. Like the artist, it too has a pathos (cf. ¶704), which intrinsically belongs to the rising sun, but since the sun has now set, it is now the pathos of contented self-consciousness. The essence has realized itself in nature. It supplies nourishment for the egoistic Self, whose consumption perfects and spiritualizes nature. The spirit of the Earth (cf. ¶360) has become both Demeter, the goddess of the harvest, and Dionysus (Bacchus), the god of wine.
- ¶722. 1. The mystery of the rising sun is revealed after it has set. Enjoyment of bread and wine in the mysteries of Demeter (Ceres) and Dionysus (Bacchus) unites the Self with the gods. There is nothing really mysterious about these mysteries: the Self is manifest to itself in its union with the essence. However, this revelation is still immediate and devoid of thought. Religion requires more than this: see ¶724.
- ¶723. 1. Demeter's daughter, Persephone, was abducted by Hades, the king of the underworld. It was eventually agreed that she would spend half the year on earth with her mother and

half in the underworld. In autumn and winter Demeter mourns the loss of her daughter. The light-essence is also personified in Dionysus, who first deals with the grape harvest, then runs riot with the maenads, as depicted in Euripides's play, *The Bacchic Women*. Life is not yet governed by the rational concept.

- ¶724. 1. 'Absolute' here means something like 'cut loose, detached' (from the Latin *absolvere*, 'to set free'), not, as it often does, 'all-embracing'. Demeter (Ceres) was one of the twelve Olympian gods, and Dionysus (Bacchus) was a late recruit to their ranks, but they were not the most important of them. Dionysus died and was reborn. So Hegel's friend, Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), likened Dionysus to Christ, especially in his poems *Bread and Wine* and *The Only One*. Hegel insists on distinguishing them.
- ¶725. 1. The Greeks held athletic competitions, especially at Olympia. Fire had been stolen from Zeus by the Titan Prometheus and given to man. A flame was kept burning at Olympia throughout the festival to celebrate this. Hence there were torch-bearers, though they did not run from city to city, as they do in the modern Olympics. Victorious athletes were honoured in their cities. So the festival was in honour of man. It is not, however, a celebration of spirit, in which the essence becomes a man, as it does in Christianity. It celebrates only one side of the essence, the beautiful human body, as distinct from the god. But it does prepare the ground for this revelation, by focusing on one aspect of it.
- ¶726. 1. The mysteries and the games each present the unity of self-consciousness and the essence, but each demotes one side, leaving it beside or outside itself: the Self in the case of the mysteries, the spiritual essence in that of the games. The wild internality of the mysteries must be combined with the lucid externality of the athletic body. Literary language is both internal and external in the required way. It is lucid and intelligible to everyone. It inherits the universality of the games, in which all Greek cities participated and the human body as such (unlike a statue) is attached to no particular city. Greek literature addresses all human beings.

c. *The spiritual work of art*

- ¶727. 1. The spirit of each people, represented by a totemic animal (such as the owl of Athens: cf. ¶¶689ff.) unites with others sharing the same language in a single pantheon of deities. This emerged from their cooperation in the war against Troy. (This seems at odds with the national spirit's intuition of itself as *universal* humanity, but the *Iliad* expresses considerable sympathy with the Trojans; four Olympian gods support Troy: see ¶728.) They do not form a single State, but the trust and the participatory democracy of the city-state are temporarily suspended in favour of an assembly of heroes, not a bureaucratic organization in which individuals could no longer participate.
- ¶728. 1. The war takes place on two planes, divine and human. The gods, representing the national spirits, are under the supreme command, not the dominion, of their leader, Zeus, just as the Greeks are under the supreme command of Agamemnon. (Hegel neglects the fact that, in the *Iliad*, four important gods—Artemis, Apollo, Ares, and Aphrodite—support the Trojans, while Zeus is neutral.) The gods are universal substances of the self-conscious human action but, conversely, the human action is the force and the pivot on which the divine action turns: gods can do nothing without humans. The correspondence between the divine and human worlds looks contingent. But in later literature the divine essence will return into human self-consciousness; the pivotal role of humans foreshadows this unity.
- ¶729. 1. The content of these events is a whole world. So the consciousness of them must also be universal, linking with the events through representation in language: 'epic', which comes from *epos*, 'word, song, poem'. The individual bard is not present at the events. His pathos is Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory and the mother of the Muses. The bard is simply a spokesman for his Muse, Calliope, the Muse of epic poetry. The epic is a syllogism: the

universal gods and the individual bard are linked together by the particular human heroes, who are individual men, but raised to universality by being represented.

- ¶730. 1. The epic presents on a grand scale the unity of gods and men implicit in the cult. The action of men stirs up the divine world and lets loose its powers so that they can manifest themselves in the human world: cf. ¶¶464ff. on the ethical action. The action is performed on two levels, by the peoples and their leaders, and by the gods, the singular and the universal in an artificial juxtaposition. It is only men who give the gods anything to do. After the action is over, the gods withdraw from human affairs, and dissolve the ‘punctuality’ they acquired when they supported some particular hero. As usual, ‘selfish’ (*selbstische*) and ‘punctuality’ (*Punktualität*) are used in accordance with their etymology and mean, respectively, ‘pertaining to the Self’ and ‘atomistic singularity’.
- ¶731. 1. A god has a universal significance, but is also a determinate, rounded personality and therefore comes into conflict with other gods, in a comic subversion of their universality. Since they are immortal these conflicts are never really serious. Unlike human beings, they cannot risk everything in a mortal combat. There is, however, one power that dominates gods as well as men: fate or destiny. This adds a tinge of sadness to the life of the gods. Even Zeus e.g. could hardly save his mortal son, Sarpedon, from his fated death at the hands of Patroclus (*Iliad*, XVI, 419–61).
- ¶732. 1. This necessity of fate will bring together the contradictory elements of the epic and mould them into a coherent whole. The middle term of this will be the hero lamenting his early death. This is Achilles, the protagonist of the *Iliad*, who mourns the death of his friend, Patroclus, and foresees his own death (*Iliad*, XVIII, 329ff.). The extremes will be necessity itself and the bard. These play no specific part in the content of the epic. Necessity governed the whole course of the story and the bard recited it. Universal necessity (somehow represented as singular, perhaps because it is often personified) must now acquire a definite content, while the bard will become an actor. The content itself must become more limited and well-defined.
- ¶733. 1. A tragic hero represents and defends a cause or a pathos in its ‘universal individuality’. He or she does not have irrelevant personal peculiarities. A Greek actor always wore a mask, representing the character he portrayed. The ‘actor is essential to his mask’, in that it is essential for the characters to be real human beings, not—as they are in epic—simply represented by a bard external to action itself. Hyppolite, II, p.247, n.68, suggests that, for Hegel, it is only in Christianity that the tragic Self is authentic and no longer merely represented.
- ¶734. 1. The drama takes place against the background of epic language spoken by no particular Self, but by the chorus. The chorus represents the general population rather than heroes, etc. Greek theology was still in some disarray, and the chorus does little to bring order into it. It is terrified of the higher powers, the divine law and the human law, that are the immediate ‘arms’, i.e. limbs, of the substance, and of their conflict with each other: cf. ¶¶446ff. All it can do is recommend submission to necessity, which it fails to understand in terms of the character of the hero or of the intrinsic activity of the divinity.
- ¶735. 1. In contrast to the chorus, the spectator sees spirit not as a dispersed jumble of elements, but as a conceptual division into divine law and human law, each represented by a hero(ine), who totally identify themselves with one of these powers. These hero(in)es are thus universal individuals (see ¶733), portrayed by an actor (‘authentic Being-there’), while the chorus convey their significance to the spectators.
- ¶736. 1. Ethical substance was considered in ¶¶444ff. Its religion is the consciousness of itself. The gods, who in epic fluctuated in their allegiances, now align themselves with one or other of the two powers into which the ethical substance is divided. They thereby become more like proper individuals, rather than aspects of the Self. We shall see another distinguishing feature of characters, besides masculinity and femininity, in ¶737.

¶737. 1. Because he adheres to only one of the divine powers, the hero is ignorant of the other power (usually that of the underworld), which will eventually come back to bite him. In Aeschylus's trilogy, the *Oresteia*, Orestes has been instigated by the Delphic oracle, under the tutelage of Phoebus Apollo, to kill his mother, Clytemnestra, to avenge her murder of his father, Agamemnon. When Orestes is in turn pursued by the avenging Furies, Apollo cannot help him, but sends him off to stand trial before an Athenian court, chaired by Athena. Orestes was acquitted. Hegel is attempting to interpret all tragedies, especially those of Aeschylus and Sophocles, in terms of the conflict between the two powers that he derived from Sophocles's *Antigone*.

2. After murdering his father, Oedipus solved the riddle of the sphinx: 'What walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three legs in the evening?' (Answer: 'man'). But his knowledge did not save him from the oracle's prediction.

3. Orestes.

4. The priestess at Delphi is as deceptive as the witches who deceived Macbeth.

5. Hamlet wisely distrusted his father's revelation that he had been murdered.

¶738. 1. In Aeschylus's *Eumenides*, Athena persuades the Furies to accept Orestes's acquittal. They are transformed into the Eumenides, the 'kindly ones', and from now on will be venerated in Athens. The world is an ambiguous mixture of good and evil, and evil must be taken on board. The god who is revealed and knows is presumably Apollo rather than Zeus, since the Furies do not have equal authority with Zeus: see ¶739.

¶739. 1. The three essences are the Furies, Apollo, and Zeus. Zeus combines the functions of the State and the family. The distinction between the family and the State is represented in the play, not by two deities, but by two human personages, especially Antigone and Creon. By contrast, the distinction between knowing and not knowing appears in each hero, and only behind the scenes are they represented, respectively, by Apollo and the Furies. Zeus unites these two powers, since he represents substance as a whole. In this substance, there is real knowledge, but it is simple, i.e. 'onefold' (*einfach*), not double-edged. Human consciousness, which always involves unknowing as well as knowing, is rooted in this substance, where there is no such distinction. The distinction is forgotten in this substance and replaced by lucid certainty. Zeus is on the way to becoming the Christian god. In Christianity, Hegel believes, everything is open and above board, and all sins are forgiven.

¶740. 1. The two powers and the characters championing them are both right and both wrong. The powers and their blinkered, one-sided protagonists meet their doom. Lethe, a mythical river in Hades that made those who drank from it forget their past, reconciles the opposition in one way. In another way, Lethe on earth absolves sinners. Nothing remains except the calm simplicity of Zeus, who incorporates all the former heavenly combatants.

¶741. 1. Tragedy undertook a conceptual purification of the Homeric pantheon, as philosophers, such as Socrates, required. It eliminated the deities uselessly assigned to different functions, leaving only those responsible for the main powers. Increasingly, especially in the plays of Euripides, only one god is recognized. All powers are being concentrated in Zeus. He alone is the power of the State or of the family. He knows everything, and he decides who knows what. As Zeus of the oath and of the Furies he has access to people's inner lives. Conversely, tragedies no longer present heroes with a pathos, but ordinary mortals with common passions.

¶742. 1. The personages of the pantheon, and the characters representing them, tend to fuse together into the unconscious force of necessity. This is the negative power, Zeus, that takes over the lesser deities. It absorbs the substantial essence and abstract necessity. However, this negative power is a sort of self-consciousness: it is the spiritual unity into which everything returns. As for actual self-consciousness, the chorus, or spectators, are helpless onlookers, filled with pity and fear, while the characters regard the divine unification as a poor substitute

for the true unification involving a Self, as well as fate and substance. The actor doffs his mask, separating into a persona and a Self. The word 'hypocrisy' comes from the Greek *hypokrisis*, 'acting a part'. The elevated quasi-Self of Zeus is about to become the spirit of comedy.

- ¶743. 1. Actors in Greek comedy did wear masks: see ¶744. So did the chorus in tragedies. For Hegel, the removal of the mask symbolizes the un hypocritical plain speaking of comedy about the gods and everything else.
- ¶744. 1. The comic Self has the gods in its power. It is elevated above them as if they were each just a property or attribute of a thing, pretending to be something in its own right. It plays with its mask to show that it is a Self, just like the actor and the spectator. There is some similarity to the resolution of the division between enlightenment and superstition, when heaven is transplanted to earth and the Self breaks free: see ¶581.
- ¶745. 1. The old gods took care of the natural and the ethical well-being of man. But now the divine order has broken down and man takes his fate into his own hands, with unhappy results. As for nature, the mystery of bread and wine has shown that it is there for the taking. Aristophanes makes fun of this in such plays as *Ploutos* ('Wealth'). As for ethics, the *demoi*, the people, in its popular assembly took complete control. Aristophanes pokes fun at its absurd pretensions and disregard of rationality. He particularly despised their demagogic leader, Cleon, whom he bitterly satirizes in, for example, the *Knights*.
- ¶746. 1. Now we turn to the 'rational thinking of the universal' mentioned in ¶745. Deprived of any divine support, the determinate laws, rights, and duties, accepted uncritically by the chorus of common men, succumb to the corrosive dialectic of the sophists and are refined into the airy-fairy concepts of the beautiful and the good. These can accommodate any content whatsoever. In Aristophanes's *Clouds*, the elderly Strepsiades and his youthful son Pheidippides both attend Socrates's school in order to acquire the art of specious argumentation. Strepsiades uses it to deceive his creditors, while Pheidippides uses it to justify beating his parents.
- ¶747. 1. Comedy presents, on the artistic plane, man's appropriation and manipulation of fate, gods, and values. It is the end of Greek art, since there is now nothing objective to be represented. The actor no longer portrays a character other than himself, but has removed his mask and become a sheer individual like everyone else. That men (or 'we') collectively have supreme power does not entail that each individual does; he may well find other men as much of a nuisance as the gods were. But Hegel repairs this by stressing that his concern is not the singular Self, but the universal Self, imbued with a rationality that all men share: see e.g. ¶785.

C. THE REVEALED RELIGION

- ¶748. 1. In the subtitle 'Revealed' here translates *offenbare*, which means 'manifest', rather than 'revealed', which would be *geoffenbarte*, the past participle of *offenbaren*, 'to reveal'. But this makes little difference, since Hegel also uses the verb and its past participle. What does matter is that for Hegel, a revealed or manifest religion is not a religion based on special divine revelation, but a religion that is accessible to everyone and not only to participants in particular mysteries or to the members of a particular culture. In Christianity everything is open and above board: cf. ¶739.

On the emergence of the subject, though not the complete loss of substance, see also ¶17. Previously the Self was merely an accident of the ethical substance, but now it is the absolute, i.e. all-embracing, essence, while the former essence, both human and divine, has been reduced to a predicate of it. This is a light-hearted result, both because it was effected by comedy and because the baby has been thrown out with the bathwater. Spirit is now self-conscious, but it has nothing to be conscious of, apart from itself. It is like the apocryphal bird that thought it could fly faster if the air were removed entirely.

- ¶749. 1. We should consider this proposition in its historical context and that, as ¶750 will reveal, is the ethical spirit of ¶¶444ff. Proposition (1) ‘The Self is the absolute essence’ reduces the essence to the Self: cf. ¶61 and note on reductive identity statements. But in the ethical spirit, this was inverted to become: (2) ‘The absolute essence is the Self’. This proposition seems to make the substance into the (grammatical or logical) subject, and the Self a mere predicate of it; it reduces the Self to the essence or substance. (Hegel’s failure to distinguish different senses of ‘subject’ obscures his account, but does not undermine it.) But neither proposition *intrinsically* reduces one of the terms to the other; each can be read as affirming some sort of parity between them. And if we were to switch from proposition (1) to proposition (2) in this reductive sense, we would be back at the beginning again, natural religion. But we cannot do that, since this inversion is performed for and by self-consciousness: it would be refuting itself if it accepted its own reduction to substance. Because of this, if self-consciousness does accept proposition (2), it abandons or estranges itself consciously and therefore remains the subject of substance. If proposition (2) demotes the subject, while proposition (1) demotes the substance, and self-consciousness accepts both, the result is not the sheer difference of Self and substance, as Cicero is different from Caesar, nor is it their sheer identity, as Cicero is identical to Tully. It must be their unity-in-difference, where both have equal value but neither could do without the other. Hegel has in mind the unity-in-difference of God and man. A secular example might be the relationship between a society, or State, and its self-conscious citizens, as long as this involves the reciprocal movement that Hegel requires: see ¶755.
- ¶750. 1. In the ethical spirit, to which Greek art belongs, the Self is submerged, as in proposition (2) of ¶749. It gives way to the state of right (¶¶477ff.), in which the Self, as an empty person, is the absolute essence, as in proposition (1) of ¶749. The gods of various peoples in the Roman pantheon are correspondingly empty. They are not the vivid, independent gods of epic, but figments of abstract thought, as spiritless as the persons.
- ¶751. 1. What is here referred to as ‘unhappy self-consciousness’ was in fact called ‘unhappy consciousness’ in ¶¶206ff. The unhappy consciousness is not self-conscious in the way that scepticism is. But the difference may not be significant, since Hegel reverts to ‘unhappy consciousness’ in ¶752.
- ¶752. 1. There are two consciousnesses, one unhappy and the other happy. The comic consciousness is happy: it has absorbed the divine essence, substance has estranged itself. It does not yet realize how unhappy it is. The unhappy consciousness feels that it has lost both the substance and its Self, transposing itself into an unattainable Beyond. It now expresses this as ‘God is dead’, a claim associated with Nietzsche. It was, however, a stock theme of Lutheran theology, and was used by Hegel (1977), p.190, as well as in ¶785.
- ¶753. 1. In the Roman Empire, the ethical world and its religion are just relics of the past, emptied of all the life they once had, just as they are for 19th-century Germans. The unhappy consciousness is aware of this loss, and its personality, both legal and rational, mean nothing to it. Everything from that world—oracles, statues, hymns, games, festivals—is present to us, as to the Romans, like fruit plucked from its trees and offered to us by a girl. The fruit is withdrawn from its natural context, but the self-conscious gleam in the girl’s eye suggests that she has elevated the fruit to a higher level. So too the spirit that preserves these artworks for us is higher than the ethical world in which they appeared in a dispersed and external form. It internalizes them and gathers them all together in a single pantheon. This pantheon is spirit conscious of itself as spirit.—‘Recollection’ translates *Erinnerung*, which Hegel then writes as *Er-Innerung*, ‘re-collection’, to indicate that it is to be taken in the sense of ‘internalization’, contrasting with their former externalization. Cf. ¶808, where the whole of PS is regarded as a *Er-Innerung*, recollection-cum-internalization.

- ¶754. 1. The conditions for the emergence of the spirit conscious of itself as spirit (see ¶753) constitute its concept which, like the plan embodied in a seed, will develop into this spirit. Artworks comprise the forms in which absolute substance (God) estranges itself into a sensory object: spoken language, attached to the Self and evanescent; unity with universal self-consciousness; the beautiful body of the Self; and the world of epic and tragedy, which eventually turns into a universal self-certainty. All of these forms will now be involved when the absolute substance estranges itself into Christ. In the outside world of right, Stoicism, scepticism, and unhappy consciousness are condensed into the simple concept that will develop into self-conscious spirit.
- ¶755. 1. According to proposition (1), 'The Self is the absolute essence', substance estranges itself into the Self, while according to proposition (2), 'The absolute essence is the Self', the Self estranges itself into thinghood or the universal Self (though, seemingly, not just back into substance again): see ¶749 and note. The first estrangement, that of substance into the Self, is an unconscious necessity: substance is in itself, or potentially, self-conscious, but that is not enough for it to conduct or be aware of its own estrangement. By contrast, while the second estrangement also expresses self-consciousness's implicit identity with its opposite, the universal essence, self-consciousness is aware of the transition and conducts it itself. Christ had an actual mother, but only the in-itself for a father. This symbolizes the union of self-consciousness and the substance.
- ¶756. 1. Spirit involves two estrangements, that of the essence into self-consciousness and that of self-consciousness into the essence. Some religions of the Roman Empire (such as neo-Platonism and the mystery religions of Isis and Mithras) acknowledged only the second of these, the Self's self-estrangement into substance, thereby regarding the whole world as imbued with spirit. But without the first estrangement, the genuine transition of the essence into self-consciousness, this is just an imaginative projection. It attributes to worldly reality a hidden sense that is not apparent to sober consciousness and that was far from the minds of the original adherents of the ancient religions that are now revived.
- ¶757. 1. The meaning of the objective world must be seen to emerge by conceptual necessity, not by the hyper-active imagination of self-consciousness. This process is structurally similar to the one we saw in chapters I–IV. We began not with self-consciousness, but with immediate consciousness of immediate sensory objects, and these eventually estranged themselves into the I of self-consciousness. The estrangement of substance into the Self is a sheer necessity, not something we can cognitively account for. But this is easily accommodated by the concept. The concept itself is immediate, but as it estranges itself or unfolds, it presents to us a necessity we can observe and understand. We cannot know why the incarnation occurred or, in less figurative terms, why at this time the world-spirit began to see itself in the objective nature of things. What we have done, in ¶754, is outlined the conditions of its occurrence.
- ¶758. 1. Absolute spirit has incarnated itself and has become conscious of this, i.e. it is widely believed that spirit has appeared as a man who is seen, felt, and heard: cf. 1 John 1:1. This faith is based not on imagination or a priori thought, but on sense-perception. The concept involves immediate Being (cf. ¶757) and this enables the *religious* spirit to become a simple positive Self, just as the *worldly* spirit became, in unhappy consciousness, a simple negative Self. Christ is immediate, and seen, heard, and felt. Otherwise he could not be self-consciousness.
- ¶759. 1. In Hegel (1895), II, pp.327ff., Christianity is called the 'absolute religion' in contrast to 'determinate religions'. It is not simply one religion among others, but somehow embraces all of them, and it is also self-contained in that spirit is manifest to spirit. It corresponds to 'absolute substance', the 'I that is We and We that is I' of ¶197, the unity of different independent self-consciousnesses. Spirit knows itself by estranging itself: I get to know myself, e.g., by writing down my own thoughts, and analogously God gets to know

Himself by expressing Himself in the immediacy of the incarnation. A substance has accidents or attributes: see *Enc. I*, ¶¶150f. A *mere* substance is indifferent to its accidents, but when it becomes a subject or Self, it expresses them externally and makes them known both to itself and to others. Consciousness does not know everything about its object if the object is other than itself. But when the object is the Self, it is entirely transparent to consciousness. This is the Self in the sense of the thinking Self, the inner core of the Self, which is manifest both to oneself and to others. (Otherwise, Hegel seems curiously oblivious to the opacity of the Self both to others and to itself.) When God is said to be the good, etc., these may not be accidents of a substance, but they are predicates of a subject: see ¶23. We may know all these predicates without knowing the subject on which they hang. But when the subject is a Self, it is revealed entirely, since its very nature is to become conscious of itself by revealing itself to others. Thus to know Himself God must become a man. Since God knows Himself in this man, it follows that God's nature is the same as human nature. Hegel (1895), I, pp.217f. quotes Meister Eckhart: 'The eye with which God sees me is the same eye by which I see him. My eye and his eye are one and the same. In righteousness I am weighed in God and he in me. If God did not exist, nor would I; if I did not exist, nor would he'. (I have modified the Speirs–Sanderson translation.)

- ¶760. 1. Christ is both an immediate sensory being and a thinking self-consciousness. This looks like a descent from God, but it is really an ascent. The absolute essence has realized its concept. It thereby emerges both as the abstraction of pure thinking and as immediate sensory Being. This reminds us of the beginning of PS, where sensory consciousness was really abstract thought, but is aware only of immediate Being. That the low is also high is a recurrent theme in Hegel: see e.g. ¶346 on the dual function of the genital organ and also ¶775 and *Enc. I*, ¶24 Addition 3, where the biblical Fall is really an ascent.
- ¶761. 1. Consciousness is not only immediate consciousness of Christ but the religious consciousness of the Christian community, which views Christ as the absolute essence, as well as a Self that just is. This is essentially the same as our own philosophical knowledge, that Being is essence, except that religious consciousness puts it in the form of representation. Speculative philosophy involves three stages, corresponding to the Trinity: it knows God as thinking or pure essence (in logic); it knows this thinking as Being-there (in philosophy of nature); and it knows Being-there as the Self, both singular and universal (in philosophy of spirit). This is what the world was waiting for: that spirit is known only in and by man.
- ¶762. 1. The first, immediate, revelation must be mediated by thought. Christ is so far only one individual man. To fulfil his concept he must become all men, the universal self-consciousness. Otherwise, he is not much help to other individuals, who do not know his self-consciousness as their own. This transformation is achieved initially not by conceptual thought, but in the representation of his death, resurrection, and ascension. This is similar to what happened in chapter II, when the sensory This passed into the thing of perception, not the universal of the understanding: humans are regarded as distinct perceptible things, not as participants in a shared rationality.
- ¶763. 1. The passage of Christ into the past (like the Now in ¶106) transforms the believer into spiritual consciousness. Christ is now resurrected in the spirit. The sensory presence of Christ, distinct from other Selves, was as much a hindrance as a help: cf. the unhappy consciousness in ¶212. Now that he has gone, spirit becomes the universal self-consciousness of the community of believers. What matters is not Christ alone, but what he is for this community.
- ¶764. 1. The immediacy of Christ's sensory presence is mediated and universalized by its removal to a remote time and place. But this is just a representation, an artificial mixture of sensory immediacy and thought.

- ¶765. 1. The content of this representation is true, but the representational form is defective. It splits the world in two, earth and heaven, with no intelligible connection between them. In itself, i.e. for us philosophers, the religious doctrine has been comprehended conceptually. Now the religion should make this a reality, and elevate its consciousness up to the level of its self-consciousness.
- ¶766. 1. The absolute spirit is the substance of the religious community. But that is not enough. Nor is it enough to project it into representations. The absolute spirit needs to become an actual Self, a subject. This is the significance of the incarnation, and it is found in the community. It is therefore misguided to want to return to the first primitive community or to Christ's own words. This confuses the origin of something with its concept. What matters is not what Christ was in the beginning, but what he is now.
- ¶767. 1. Spirit, as conceived by Christianity, involves three stages that correspond not only to the three persons of the Trinity, but to the three parts of Hegel's system. The pure substance, or God the Father, is thinking or logic: cf. Hegel, SL, p.29: 'It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit.' Logic descends into the singularity of Christ or into nature, the second part of the system. This involves representation especially, not only in religion, but also in Hegel's system, since the description of nature requires determinate empirical concepts, such as that of a plant, not only pure thoughts, such as those of Being or of substance. Christ is other than God and nature is other than pure thought. Finally, in the holy spirit and in Hegel's account of mind or spirit, spirit returns from otherness and representation into self-consciousness. Each of these stages is a sort of circle, which, in completing itself, moves on to the next stage: cf. *Enc. I*, ¶¶15 and 17. In religion, consciousness's representation is not only especially associated with one stage, but is the form in which all three stages are presented.
- ¶768. 1. Some of this was anticipated by the unhappy consciousness and by faith: see ¶¶206ff., and 527ff. But both located spirit beyond the conscious subject, whether subjectively, as in unhappy consciousness, or objectively, as in faith. In Lutheran Christianity spirit is the substance of the community.
- ¶769. 1. The incarnation is not simply an external addition to God, but a necessity intrinsic to his nature. If the eternal essence did not reveal itself as spirit, it would be spirit only in name. In fact, it would hardly make sense at all: it would be like an essence or force, such as electricity, that never manifested itself in any actual occurrence. God is just a pure abstraction unless he generates something other than Himself, with which he is contrasted. The fact that God is pure thinking supplies the mechanism for this, since thinking is essentially negative: it necessarily moves beyond any given thought to another thought that is implicated in it, if only by contrast. Even God Himself does not really know who or what He is, unless he manifests Himself; only in this way does He become a Self or a concept. He thus becomes different from Himself. But since this difference is necessitated by God Himself, it is not really a difference at all. Religion *represents* all this in pictorial terms, as a birth and as an ascension.
- ¶770. 1. There are three moments in God: the essence, which is in itself, then two types of Being-for-itself, one that is other than the essence and that recognizes the essence, and another, where the essence recognizes itself in this other. This knowledge of itself in the other can be illustrated by the utterance of a word: cf. John 1:1: 'In the beginning was the Word [*Logos*], and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.' An utterance is different from the speaker, but the speaker himself hears it and in that sense is reunited with it. The three moments are like this: the distinctions between them dissolve immediately and form a circular movement.
- ¶771. 1. The unconceptual representation of this content distorts it. The stages of Father, Son, and holy spirit become quite distinct from each other, linked by no conceptual necessity.

They are also seen as quite distinct from the believer: he relates to them externally and does not recognize his own self-consciousness in them. One response to this is to reject it all as an old wives' tale, and this is quite correct from a conceptual point of view. But because the response is only instinctive, it throws out the baby along with the bathwater. It rejects the content of faith as well as its representational form. The content can only be extracted and retained by hard conceptual thinking.

- ¶772. 1. This is the beginning of an account of God the Son. In Christian theology, the Trinity operates on two levels, distinguished as the economic Trinity (or the Trinity of history) and the immanent (or ontological) Trinity: see Powell (2001), pp.120–34. The economic Trinity is the triad as it appears in the world. The immanent Trinity is the intrinsic triadic nature of God which explains why He reveals Himself in the economic Trinity. These two types of triad also appear in Hegel's system. The triad Logic-nature-spirit/mind corresponds to the economic Trinity. But the Logic itself consists of three parts, the doctrines of Being, of Essence, and of the Concept. This triad corresponds to the immanent Trinity and is intended to explain why logic proliferates into nature and spirit. The absolute spirit is the whole Trinity, while the pure essence is only the first term of the Trinity. But according to the immanent Trinity God Himself, the essence, contains absolute spirit immanent in itself and is there only one moment within absolute spirit, i.e. the essence appears twice, once as the whole element in which absolute spirit resides and once as a moment within that whole. What needs to be explained is why the immanent Trinity develops into the economic Trinity, i.e. into God, Christ, and the holy spirit or, as Hegel regards it, logic, nature, and mind. The essence develops into the immanent Trinity within the realm of thought, because it is abstract and must therefore negate itself into an other, its Being-for-itself, i.e. the immanent Son: cf. ¶770 on the two levels of Being-for-itself. But this is a relationship within pure thinking, so the other is not really other and the difference is not real difference, but a loving relationship between the moments: on God and love, cf. ¶19. This is still the immanent Trinity. But the absolute spirit in pure thinking is a simple unity and has an intrinsic tendency to actualize itself as the economic Trinity, just as the essence had to develop into the immanent Trinity.
- ¶773. 1. Pure thinking necessarily passes over into representation, which is a genuine element because, unlike pure thinking, it allows the moments of the concept to become independent of each other. They are not only different from each other in the eyes of a third party. They are subjects, actively differentiating themselves from each other. Representation separates things from each other: cf. ¶771. But Hegel is no longer thinking of the narrative of Christ, but rather of the created world. His alignment of the Son with nature in his own system tends to equate the incarnation with the creation of the world.
- ¶774. 1. God creates the world. This is the way in which religious representation presents what is in fact a logical necessity, that pure thought or the concept should actualize itself in concrete reality or Being for another. Hegel is attempting to explain why there is anything at all rather than nothing. His argument is that God, or pure thought, could not be what it is, if it did not actualize itself, that God, abstract thought, etc. could not be, or be appropriately described as, God, abstract, etc. unless there were something concrete, etc. contrasting with them.
- ¶775. 1. Since what actualizes itself is spirit, it actualizes itself in a Self that is conscious and distinguishes itself from the environing world, but not yet aware of being spirit and hence not fully fledged spirit. It is innocent, like an animal, rather than good. So it must undergo a process similar to that by which God 'created' the world, i.e. become other than itself. It does this by withdrawing from its dispersed consciousness and into itself, becoming a self-conscious thinker. It is not yet intellectually advanced enough to have pure, logical thoughts. So the thought it has is that of good and evil; this gives it the possibility of becoming evil as

well as good, and hence introduces evil into the world. (Hegel's interpretation of the Fall commits him to rejecting the traditional doctrine of Augustine and Aquinas that evil is simply a privation or the absence of good, like a button missing off a shirt. If that were so, then innocence would be evil. But innocence is neutral, while evil is a positive force.)

¶776. 1. The concentration of the Self into itself involves a disparity with itself, and therefore evil, especially as the opposition between good and evil is unresolved. But consciousness is also good, since it is facing up to this opposition and trying to resolve it. Now that the Self is a thinker and has a clearer idea of how God became other than Himself, it projects the emergence of evil back into the heavenly realm, that of thought. It personifies evil as Lucifer, God's first son, who fell and was replaced by Christ, the personification of good. (Hegel is here influenced by Jakob Böhme (1575–1624), a Lutheran mystic and theologian: see Hegel (1895), II, pp.32ff.) We can look at this in two ways: concepts are brought down to representation (as a 'fall'), or representation is transferred, even elevated (as the 'son'), to thought. We can assign angels to the otherness in the divine essence, and transfer the self-concentration characteristic of humans to them. That is all right, as long as the diversity of the two sides is preserved. On one side is the son who regards himself as the essence, while on the other are the angels who adore God and have renounced their Being-for-Self; the latter side can accommodate the recovery of Being-for-Self and the self-concentration of evil. Now that the otherness is divided we have a quartet instead of a Trinity and, if we separate the good from the bad angels, a quintet. In fact, however, numbers are superfluous here. Otherness is only one thought, that of diversity in general. We might think of one side as a plurality, but it cannot be sliced up into discrete entities, each corresponding to an abstract unit. Number and quantity are unconceptual in general: ¶¶281, 286, 623, etc. Findlay (1977), p.587, said in his comment on this ¶: 'Note Hegel's incorporation of Evil into the Absolute'. Whatever else Hegel may have believed about the absolute, he did not believe that it was purely good to the exclusion of evil. Evil, and falsity, must be taken on board.

¶777. 1. Man is not tied to either good or evil, but is only the arena of their conflict. They are actualized, however, only in the Self. Hence, evil is man's self-concentration, while the good comes out into the open as a self-consciousness. This is a representation of God's self-abasement in Christ, a more vivid version of God's becoming-other prefigured in pure thought. Religious representation excludes evil from God. Böhme tried to find it in God's anger, but without sufficient conceptual equipment to make this plausible.

¶778. 1. Here Hegel speaks of 'alienation' (*Entfremdung*), rather than 'estrangement' (*Enttäusserung*) to indicate that good and evil are alien to each other and not reconciled. The alienation takes two forms. In Christ the divine essence is essential, and the Self inessential, while in sinful man the Self is essential and the divine essence inessential. Between them there is only a communality that cannot serve as a middle term linking them, a *Gemeinschaftlichkeit*, not a proper community (*Gemeinde*).

¶779. 1. In the religious representation Christ and man are independent of each other. It follows that each of them undertakes its own dissolution as a conceptual necessity. If there is any conflict, it is at the level of pure thought within each party, not where they are independent mixtures of thought and reality. But here Hegel focuses on their independent reality. The first move is made by Christ. He is the party that is in itself, since in him divine simplicity predominates over Selfhood and his earthly existence is therefore more precarious than man's. He goes to his death and reconciles God with himself. When God first became other, i.e. in the creation-cum-incarnation, God acquired sensory presence, natural reality, and a Self. This is now withdrawn by a second becoming-other, viz. Christ's death, and made universal. Worldly reality is no longer alien to God, but imbued with spirituality. Christ's death is the resurrection of the divine essence as spirit.

- ¶780. 1. In ¶779 we considered Christ's part in the reconciliation. Now we turn to man. The transformation of the self-conscious essence into universal self-consciousness signifies the establishment of a religious community, the third member of the Trinity. This has already been *represented* as the descent of the holy spirit, but now it leaves realm of representation to become human self-consciousness. Philosophical truths are expressed in religious representation. The creation declares that the god and human nature are not separate. That God's human products withdraw into themselves and become evil at the very start implies that evil is not alien to God, but essential to spirit. (As Goethe said: *Nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse*, 'No one against God but God Himself'.) The unity of God and the withdrawn Self is also expressed in the incarnation, but represented as a later event. The reconciliation between them is represented in Christ's death, resurrection, and ascension. In conceptual terms, this reconciliation can be expressed as 'Evil is in itself the same as the Good', or as 'God is the same as nature, especially human nature'. But we cannot stop there. It cannot be true unless Evil and Good cease to be what they were, and become, respectively, 'Being-for-itself that is within itself' and 'the selfless Simple'. Then it is obvious that they are the same. But even with this transformation, they are not the same, since the simple Being-for-Self, or pure knowledge, on which they both converge, again divides in two. So we must also say: 'Good and Evil are not the same'. Clear-cut terms like 'same' and 'not the same', and above all the copula 'is', cannot express the truth. This applies to the relationship between God and nature too. Both are transformed in their relationship, but the judgemental 'is' cannot express this. We might say that nature is nothing without God. But even nothingness *is*: without God, it would be pure Evil. So nature is not flatly identical with God: it could exist, as pure Evil, without Him. Representation cannot handle this complex movement of unity-in-difference. So self-consciousness must now leave the realm of representation. On unity in difference, see also ¶¶ 39 and 749, *Enc. I*, Preface to the 2nd edition (1827), and *Enc. III*, ¶573.
- ¶781. 1. The Christian community is the third member of the Trinity. Its task is to abandon pictorial representation and to bring out the significance of what is implicit in the representation. Implicitly the god-man is universal self-consciousness, a self-consciousness that has reconciled Good and Evil and is united with God. The problem is that the self-consciousness that has to make this explicit is as yet evil, attached to the world and the singular Self. So first it has to elevate itself to universal self-consciousness in order to fulfil its task.
- ¶782. 1. So far man is the natural spirit, opposed to the universal consciousness. So the Self has to retreat into itself away from natural spirit. By our previous account, this would mean that the Self becomes evil: see ¶775. But that cannot be the case here, since the natural spirit is already evil; so the retreat must just be a way of convincing oneself that nature is evil. This is already a case of the inversion of meaning that characterizes proper knowledge. For it is only in religious representation that the world is seen as becoming and being evil, and later reconciled with God. This retreat into oneself is really a retreat away from the naturalness of representation into proper knowledge. This also affects the content of knowledge, not just its non-representational form. It takes on board the implicit content of representation but transforms it from temporal events into transient moments of thought. In representation the world, including humanity, is first evil and then later redeemed. In thought this becomes the idea that the world is both evil and good, since Evil and Good are both the same and different. See also ¶157 on the inverted world.
- ¶783. 1. For representation consciousness's retreat-into-itself is Evil. For self-consciousness, by contrast, this retreat is the knowledge of Evil implicit in reality, and so a first step towards redemption. As St. Paul put it in Romans 6:11: 'Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord.' The inner withdrawal is a negation of a negation. It presupposes that nature has already withdrawn into itself and become evil, and so man must withdraw once more in order to escape Evil.

Yet it is this inner withdrawal that is Evil. The two withdrawals look like one and the same. The solution of this paradox requires more thought.

- ¶784. 1. Besides the immediate inner retreat away from nature, representation's mediation of this is needed. *In itself* the recognition of nature as an inadequate expression of spirit and the emergence of the universal Self, means that spirit is reconciled with itself. Religion does not see this as the conceptual reclamation of nature, but represents it as a sequence of events: creation, incarnation, and death. Now it goes further and represents the formation of a community as a spiritual resurrection. Christ's death is really just his dissolution into nature. But religion transfigures it into the universal spirit of the community.
- ¶785. 1. In representation, Christ was a particular spirit representing spirit in its embodied reality. He has now been transferred into the self-conscious community, into knowledge of one's own Self. This self-consciousness does not die, though Christ's particularity does acquire a universal significance in its knowledge. So the second sphere of the Trinity, that of representation, has been absorbed into the Self and become a subject. The first sphere too, the god of pure thinking, has undergone a similar fate, since He cannot be detached from the Trinity as a whole, but must be rejuvenated as a subject or universal self-consciousness along with Christ. On the other side, man has risen to meet God halfway. He has become self-conscious and started to think. The death of the mediator, Christ, is not just the death of a particular man, but of the abstract God Himself, since this god is one side of Christ's dual nature. God is dead: cf. ¶752. The Self has been whittled down to a bare self-conscious I=I: cf. ¶¶167, 233f., 652, 657, 671. But substance, rather than lost, has become a subject. The reign of representation is over, God has been brought down to earth, and humanity has become a universal self-consciousness.
- ¶786. 1. Spirit now knows itself, which is what religion, as the self-consciousness of spirit, aimed at all along: see ¶672. But spirit is not only the content or object of self-consciousness. It is also an actual and moving spirit in the form of the community. We have come across spirit as movement before, when in ¶670 it relaxed its immutability and pardoned sins, or when two opposed extremes recognized their mutual identity. Just so, consciousness now intuits the concept of spirit and erases the difference between the Self and what it intuits. There is now only one spirit, which is both substance and subject, engaging in a joint movement.
- ¶787. 1. However, the content of self-consciousness is still *represented*, and this introduces disharmony into the spirituality of the community, even though it has officially abandoned representation. Pure thinking was affected by representation too, since representation transmitted its static nature to thoughts. Moreover, the community is not conscious of its own nature. It lacks consciousness of its own self-consciousness; it cannot describe itself in the way we have done. 'Devotion' (*Andacht*, which is only on the way to thinking: cf. ¶710) cannot see that substance has become self-consciousness. It solves this problem of the disparity between its self-consciousness and its supposedly alien God by projecting its reconciliation with God into the distant future, just as previously it was thrown back into the remote past: see ¶¶763f. Christ, the singular divine man, had a real mother but only an implicit father. The community, the universal divine man, is similarly divided, between its own activity and knowing for its father, and eternal love as its projected mother, between its immediate consciousness and its dissatisfied religious consciousness.

(DD.) Absolute Knowledge

VIII. Absolute Knowledge

- ¶788. 1. Absolute knowledge will now pull everything together. Christianity presupposes an 'object' (*Gegenstand*) distinct from itself (God, Christ, etc.) and is therefore consciousness,

which is, for Hegel, essentially consciousness *of* . . . , consciousness of an object distinct from the consciousness itself. In fact, this object is the product of the ‘estrangement’ or externalization of consciousness, so that in being conscious of the object, consciousness is in effect conscious of itself, self-conscious. However, since it is not yet aware of this, it is not yet conscious of its self-consciousness, that is, it has not ‘overcome’ its consciousness. Its object is the result of ‘representation’ (*Vorstellen*), rather than thought, both because *Vorstellen*, literally ‘placing before [oneself]’, is closely connected with ‘objectivity’ (*Gegenständlichkeit*) in its root sense of ‘standing over against’, and because to conceive the object in terms of pure thought would ipso facto disclose its affinity to the Self. ‘Absolute spirit’ is spirit that is not dependent on, relative to, or restricted by anything else. The spirit of religion is not absolute in this sense, since it is apparently dependent on an object distinct from itself. However, its ‘content’ is absolute spirit. What needs to be sublated is the representational form. Since this form is essentially involved in all consciousness, the clue to its sublation must lie in the configurations that we considered earlier, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and historical spirit: see ¶¶679f. and notes. In these configurations the Self estranged itself in an object, just as it is doing now. The sublation is a two-way process. The object does disappear, but it only does so because self-consciousness produced it by its own self-estrangement and becomes aware of this in virtue of its overall tendency to estrange itself. Now it withdraws this self-estrangement; it still has an object of sorts, but it now sees it not as strange and alien but as an extension of itself in which it is entirely at home. Consciousness considers this object not only in religious terms but in terms of all the shapes of consciousness that it has passed through.

- ¶789. 1. Initially, the object is viewed in terms of the first configuration, Consciousness in chapters I–III. It is (I) immediate Being; (II) Being for another and for itself; and (III) a universal essence. As a whole it is a movement or syllogism from universality via determinacy to singularity, and back again: cf. ¶679. The object is not yet seen in the conceptual terms that are our ultimate goal. Conceptual knowledge, or logic, is indicated only in its slow emergence (as we indicated above in our abstract logical characterizations of the first three shapes of consciousness) and, for now, we must stick to its incipient form in the shapes of consciousness. Hence the object is not yet a spiritual essentiality for consciousness. Consciousness is still a shape of consciousness of its own, comprising the logical kernel of all the previous shapes, but also several shapes which we philosophers pick out, to show how consciousness estranges itself in an object and then recognizes itself in it.
- ¶790. 1. Hegel is explaining his omission of the configuration of self-consciousness in chapter IV, which does not involve self-estrangement in the same way as the others. He proceeds directly to observing reason, which failed to find its own active Self in its object. Its climax was the infinite judgement in ¶344, ‘The Self is a thing’, a bone, not an imperceptible thing like the soul. In itself this judgement dispenses with spirit altogether, but we also saw, in ¶346, how the inversion implicit in this judgement, ‘The thing is the Self’, rose to the height of spirit, as we shall see again in utility and moral self-consciousness.
- ¶791. 1. On utility, see ¶560. In ¶789 the thing appeared to perception as both Being-for-itself and Being for another, essentially related to other things. Now self-consciousness performs this operation itself, transforming a sensory independent thing into a thing that is only useful for something or someone else.
- ¶792. 1. A still deeper penetration of the thing is achieved in morality: ¶¶596ff. This passed through three stages. First moral self-consciousness is absolutely essential and nothing else matters, the moral world-view: ¶599. Then it resorts to shifting, giving something with one hand and taking it back with the other: ¶616. Finally, as conscience, it lives entirely in a world of its own.

- ¶793. 1. Gradually everything external to the Self is incorporated within it. All the stages of this process together constitute the reconciliation of spirit with its consciousness. The last stage, conscience, is the one that combines them all. Here the Self reigns supreme: its mere affirmation that it acted out of conviction of duty validates its action. Action opens up a gap between the Self and the world; it creates an objective state of affairs that may or may not correspond to the intention and assessment of the Self or, indeed, of others. But conscience brushes aside this gap by insisting that its conviction of duty is all that matters. This stance is ultimately unsatisfactory, but then the conscientious Self relents and receives forgiveness: see ¶670. We have here the three moments that we saw in ¶789: immediate Being-there, determinate Being-there or relationship, and the essence or universality, corresponding respectively to sensory certainty, perception, and understanding. Immediate Being-there is accommodated by acknowledging the importance of conscience. Determinate Being-there, which in ¶791 was represented as utility, is now accommodated as the oppositional relationship between the singular Self's dutiful action and the universal ethical order. This opposition is reconciled in the act of forgiveness, whereby the conscientious Self is reintegrated into the universal order, and the singular Self becomes identical with the universal Self: see ¶671 and note. The upshot is a society that gives their due both to the moral conscience and to the ethical order. This amounts to a reconciliation of self-consciousness, the singular Self, with consciousness, the universal Self, that we also find in Christianity.
- ¶794. 1. Religion effects this reconciliation in the form of Being-in-itself, or according to its absolute content. That is, it started out from God and eventually brought Him down to earth in the religious community, self-consciousness. Secular consciousness effected it in the form of Being-for-itself: it started at the other end, beginning with self-consciousness devoid of content and working its way upwards from there. In our exposition the secular reconciliation comes first, whereas in history religion effected the reconciliation much earlier. That is another respect in which its reconciliation is only *in itself*: it is only potential, only in representation, awaiting its full actualization in the secular world. What is needed is a combination of these two reconciliations, so that spirit knows itself as it is both in and for itself, i.e. so that the religious reconciliation is actualized in secular reality and, conversely, the secular reconciliation acquires an insight into its profound spiritual significance.
- ¶795. 1. The unification of the two reconciliations has already happened in religion, when, in ¶¶781f., it passed from representation to the self-conscious community. But religion is still burdened with a god distinct from self-consciousness. So the unification can only come from the secular side, which, as consciousness, is aware of religion as well. We have presented all the content of religion, as well as the other side, i.e. self-conscious spirit in its opposition to religion. All that is needed now is to put two and two together, to find the simple concept in which the two sequences are united. This is to be found in the beautiful soul, which remains enclosed in its concept, i.e. is averse to any action whatsoever. It is not only the intuition of God, as in religion, but God's intuition of Himself, since there can be no god outside the Self: cf. ¶655 and note. In ¶¶658ff. we saw the beautiful soul's reluctance to act, but also its positive self-estrangement and its realization of its concept in action. Then it actualizes its pure knowledge of itself in the world, not in the Beyond, as religion does. (The beautiful soul has some affinity to Hegel himself.)
- ¶796. 1. The secular conflict and reconciliation of ¶660 is now applied to the conflict between religion and the moral Self. The simple concept required both the action of spirit and the representational content of religion. In religion this content was other than consciousness, while in the acting spirit it is all within the Self. When the beautiful soul acts, it actualizes the life of absolute spirit, i.e. it does something similar to what God does when He descends into the religious community. In this process the beautiful soul ceases to be just a beautiful soul,

and so too does God. The beautiful soul begins as a simple concept, consisting of an eternal essence, the content of religion. But the beautiful soul has to abandon this essence and act, simply because that is what an abstract concept must do. What it actualizes is its pure knowledge, which is involved both in actual Being-there and in the eternal essence, the religious content. In acting, the beautiful soul also withdraws into itself and thus becomes evil. This withdrawal splits the concept in two. The essence's pure knowledge now enters the scene. This knowledge is intrinsically inactive, but simply in virtue of the oppositional split it becomes a combatant. There is a good side and a bad side to this division. It is evil in actualizing itself, but good when it is just in itself. All this happens in itself in the religious representation, but it is not until it is repeated as a conscious action and becomes known to consciousness that it is really fulfilled. There are now two parties in conflict with each other. Each party renounces its one-sidedness, but now in reality, not just in representation. The divine in-itself with which we began is really mediated by its opposition to the other party and now appears as one of the two self-renouncing parties. One party, the acting consciousness, is too individualistic and insufficiently universal, while the judging consciousness is too abstractly universal and out of accord with the Self. The first renounces its individualism and confesses: see ¶667. The second moderates its universality and acknowledges the living Self: see ¶670. The upshot of this is spirit, which unites the Self with universality. It presents the universal content of Christianity in the form of the worldly Self.

¶797. 1. The concept is the subject that combines the Self with the hitherto representational content. The Self now becomes the philosophical subject, who comes to know all reality, identifies itself with the substance, and treats this substance as the arena of its cognitive and practical activity. We extracted this concept from some of the previous shapes of consciousness and especially that of the beautiful soul. The *content* of this concept had already emerged in these shapes, but not the concept as such. The beautiful soul was initially only one shape among others, but now it has become the philosophical consciousness as a whole.

¶798. 1. Absolute knowledge is the shape of spirit that transcends all the preceding shapes. In conceptual knowledge the Self realizes its concept, while remaining within it. This is one reason why it is 'absolute': it is entirely self-contained. Hegel regularly contrasts subjective 'certainty' with objective 'truth'. But 'certainty' is not only, or even primarily, one's certainty that something is the case, and 'truth' is not the state of affairs to which one's certainty may or may not correspond. That of which one is certain is often something that one aims for, while the truth is what one actually gets, or the fulfilment of one's certainty. 'Truth' in this sense is always the truth *of* something; it does not contrast with falsity, since whatever one gets, or turns out to be, is the truth of one's certainty. Thus one might be certain of winning a race, but the truth of this certainty only comes about when one actually wins the race or, alternatively, loses it. Sensory certainty aims at apprehending singular entities, but its truth is the universal that it actually obtains: see ¶¶90ff. Again, spirit is the truth of reason's certainty of being all reality; it fulfils what reason was aiming for: see ¶¶231f. and 438. Generally, any shape of consciousness in PS is the truth of its immediate predecessor, which does not entail that it is plain true. Absolute spirit is unique in PS in that its truth corresponds exactly to its certainty, and manifestly so. There is no truth at which it is aiming, but has not yet reached: this is another reason why it is absolute. Absolute knowledge is science, since it appears in the element of the concept, unlike the varieties of untrue knowledge that it had to confront on its way: see ¶76. (*Wissen*, 'knowledge', is similar to its close relative *Gewissheit*, 'certainty': it aims at truth, but this does not entail its truth either in Hegel's sense or in the ordinary sense.)

¶799. 1. The individual I is transformed into a universal I, in respect of which individual Selves do not differ from each other. It is the arena in which knowledge develops. In PS, this

I divides in two and, as consciousness, has a content distinct from itself. In the Logic, the pure thoughts underlying the shapes in PS are unearthed and this content becomes the I itself, since the pure thoughts are the core of the I. The thoughts proceed from one to the next in accordance with the movement of the I. It is only in virtue of its embodiment of these thoughts that the spirit can survey itself in the way that it does in PS.

¶800. 1. Science, especially logic, does not appear in time until spirit has gone through the process recorded in PS and has thereby come to know what it is, raising its self-consciousness to the level of its consciousness. Before that spirit has a rough and ready comprehension of each stage as it comes along, but it has not yet grasped the substance as a whole, i.e. the whole course of PS, and so is not yet absolute knowledge.

¶801. 1. The substance is only fallible and inexplicit 'knowing', not systematic and explicit 'cognition'. The Self has to submit it to conceptual cognition and extract it from its representational form. Initially, then, the content of cognition is far thinner than substance and the pre-cognitive consciousness of it: cf. ¶91. But the revelation of substance to intuitive consciousness is really just concealment. It is only self-conscious science that reveals each stage and absorbs or, to put it more positively, generates every one of them. In conceptual science, therefore, the separate stages appear, one by one, earlier than the conceptually completed whole, whereas the consciously intuited, but unconceptualized whole appears before the stages of it.

2. On time as the concept that is there, see ¶46 and note. Logic itself is atemporal, as is pure mathematics. It makes no sense to ask e.g. when pure Being became pure Nothing (*Enc. I*, ¶87) or when $2+2$ became 4. Time is only necessary insofar as the Self has not yet conceptually incorporated the substance as it is for consciousness or, looking at it in another way, has not yet realized everything that the Self has in it. (The in-itself is regarded first as the conceptually undigested outer expression of substance, and then as the interior of substance that awaits outer expression.) Once it has done that the Self absorbs itself in atemporal logic. However, this escape from temporality is itself only temporary, since, as ¶808 suggests, science itself shows the necessity of spirit's estrangement in time or history, as well as in space or nature.

¶802. 1. Pure science can only arise after spirit has emerged in historical time. This is experience, in which the truth is grasped in a hazy, conceptually unarticulated way. In experience spirit, as substance, presents itself to consciousness. In its historical advance spirit gradually becomes for itself, for self-consciousness, what it already is in itself, and then it is *cognized* conceptually, not only *known*. Substance becomes subject: see ¶17. This process is circular; it presupposes its beginning and reaches it at the end. Only at the end can we fully understand the beginning, and why we began in that way. (In ¶18, by contrast, the circle 'presupposes its end as its goal, and has its end as its beginning', but that amounts to the same thing: if we can only understand the beginning at the end this is because the beginning was motivated by the end in view. A novelist or an educator chooses their beginning in view of their goal, and the reader or pupil can only understand the beginning on reaching the end.) Spirit first has to complete itself in time, as world-spirit, before we can make philosophical sense of it: cf. ¶29, where Hegel distinguishes the historical process from his own exposition of it in PS. There are really three processes in play: (1) The unfolding of spirit in history; (2) Hegel's exposition of it in PS; and (3) science proper. (2) And (3) presuppose (1). (2) More obviously presupposes its end, and reaches its beginning at the end, than (1) does; but Hegel tends to personify the world-spirit. (3) Presupposes (2) for Hegel's readers, since for them (2) is an introduction to (3), but for Hegel himself (2) presupposes (3), or they both go together, since Hegel could not have embarked on or completed (2) unless he had already entered into the science that emerges at the end of (2). PS is both science and an introduction to science. Hegel's use of 'we' and 'for us' tends to blur the difference between himself and his readers.

¶803. 1. Here Hegel shows how the historical world-spirit led the way to science, beginning with medieval Christianity and proceeding through various post-Renaissance philosophers—Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling—until it reaches his own absolute knowledge.

2. Cf. ¶¶240ff. on observing reason.

3. This sounds like Descartes.

4. This refers to Spinoza. It would be more accurate to say that he regarded substance as a unity of extension and *thought*, but the introduction of Being associates him more closely with the religion of light: cf. ¶686.

5. This refers to Leibniz, whose theory of monads restored the Self or subject, which, in Hegel's view, Spinoza had dissolved into substance: see ¶17.

6. With the enlightenment, individuality came down to earth as utility and in the glorification of the will began by Rousseau (and continued by Kant), and culminating in the French revolution. Fichte then plumbed its depths, regarding the essence as the pure I, I=I: on Fichte, see ¶¶17 and 23f.

7. Whereas Kant regarded time and space as two coordinate forms of sensibility, Spinoza regarded extension and thought as the two attributes of substance, but not time. He was commonly interpreted as having denied the reality of time, in favour of atemporal eternity: see Hegel (1977), pp.104–10. Spinoza's denial, or at least demotion, of time is facilitated by his demotion of the Self. Once the Self enters the picture, as it did in Fichte's principle of I=I, so too does time, since the Self can only experience things in a temporal succession and also as future, present, and past. However, the fact that the I can only experience things temporally does not entail that external things really do follow one another in a temporal succession, certainly not in the historical movement required by PS. Hence on this account time readily collapses into static space, which is simply the sluggish I and not the dynamic I=I: cf. ¶169 on the time of living things.

8. Fichte distinguished his own system sharply from Spinoza's. Schelling, by contrast, although he was initially a follower of Fichte, attempted to take Spinozism on board and postulated a neutral absolute that was as much a substance as a subject and bifurcated into spirit and nature. Hegel regards Schelling as his own immediate predecessor, but is anxious to differentiate himself from Schelling and here repeats the criticisms levelled at him in the Preface: see ¶¶15, 16, 17, and 50.

¶804. 1. Spirit does not retreat into itself like Fichte's I=I, nor submerge all difference into Schelling's substance. Rather, the Self moves from one position to the other. It dives down into the substance to see what is there, then resurfaces again, as subject, to contemplate what it has found. Its immersion in substance is the Self's immediacy, but it reflects itself out of this, distinguishes itself from the substance and becomes a pure I. What it found in the substance is Being-there, the differentiated concrete reality that exists independently of the Self. This Being-there comes to light when the Self resurfaces and contemplates it. But the Self is only able to do this because substance cooperates: substance also has a tendency to become subject and to eject its content in an articulated form. So the I must not withdraw, as in Fichte, nor cast everything into the melting pot of the absolute, as Schelling does. It should respect the intrinsic articulation of the substance and let it develop itself. Hence knowing is seemingly inactive. Hegel's idea is that in virtue of the 'concept', the conceptual system developed in the Logic, he is able to give an orderly account of the world, especially nature, but also of the shapes of consciousness in PS, while also explaining how the Self manages to do so. See also the Preface, esp. ¶¶3 and 32.

¶805. 1. In PS spirit is consciousness, i.e. it has an object distinct from itself. But now this process is complete and spirit has passed into the conceptual system of logic: the Self estranges itself into the content but remains immanent in it, since the content is the Self's own pure thoughts. Each determinate thought depends on its relationship to other thoughts

and this propels a movement from one thought to another. The movement is free as well as necessary, since it depends on nothing but the nature of thought itself. Logic operates in a different way from PS. In PS a shape of consciousness, a type of knowledge, contrasts with its truth, what it really amounts to. The sublation of this difference leads to another shape of consciousness. In logic, by contrast, each moment is a concept that combines both the truth and the knowing Self, and it passes into a different thought in virtue not of a disparity between knowing and truth, but simply of its own determinacy. Despite this difference, every concept in logic does have a shape of consciousness corresponding to it. (But this does not entail that there is an exact one-to-one correspondence between concepts of logic and shapes of consciousness.) In PS a simple logical concept bifurcates into a shape of consciousness.

- ¶806. 1. Logic cannot remain absorbed in the contemplation of pure thoughts, but necessarily passes into consciousness, i.e. into phenomenology. Since in logic the Self is immediately aware of itself, it reverts to the beginning of PS, immediate sensory consciousness: see ¶¶90ff. This transition is similar to, and as mysterious as, the transition from logic to nature in *Enc. I*, ¶244. See also ¶802 on the circularity of Hegel's system.
- ¶807. 1. In estranging itself into phenomenology, the Self or spirit has not estranged itself to its full extent. In PS the object is still closely tied to a subject. What is considered in sensory certainty, for example, is not raw nature, but nature as seen through the spectacles of a thinking human being. What is needed is the release of the object into complete independence, with all its contingencies. Spirit can do this, since it has knowledge, knowledge involves a knowledge of what it does not know or of its limit, and to know one's limit is to know what lies beyond that limit and how to transcend the limit: cf. ¶80. Since Hegel regards this as a sacrifice on spirit's part, the nature into which it passes is actual raw nature, not just Hegel's conceptual consideration of nature in *Enc. II*. Time is also an aspect of nature (see *Enc. II*, ¶¶257–9), but here time is associated with human history, since nature is equated with the Self's Being as space. Nature is estranged spirit, but as it develops it gives rise to the subject, i.e. spirit or mind, as considered in *Enc. III*. However, it becomes clear in ¶808 that Hegel here has in mind actual human history, with all its meandering contingency, not the potted version he gives in *Enc. III* or even PH.
- ¶808. 1. Nature, in Hegel's view, lacks a history; only human beings have a history. Here history does not emerge from nature, but directly from absolute knowledge or logic. Hence history is spirit's estrangement into time, analogous to its estrangement into the space of nature. But as history proceeds, spirit is gradually restored by passing through a succession of 'spirits', i.e. cultures, which need to be digested by individuals: see ¶28 on the connection between the education of the individual and the education of the human race. This process is recollection, *Erinnerung*, which Hegel interprets as 'internalization', often hyphenating the word to make this clear. *Erinnerung* is the converse of *Entäusserung*, 'estrangement' or externalization: cf. ¶753. In recollection-cum-internalization spirit takes a deep breath and withdraws into itself, but then generates a new shape, making use of everything it has recollected: cf. ¶80. This succession has a goal—to reveal the deep conceptual system that underlies its movement. In doing so, it both sublates its depth, and also expands it, by arraying it in worldly substance and in time. This is an estrangement of the conceptual system, but this estrangement is estranged in its turn, since the historical stages are recollected-cum-internalized by the Self and eventually result in the re-emergence of the conceptual system in its full atemporal glory. The succession and recollection of these spirits can be viewed in two ways, both as the contingent course of history and as our own science of knowledge as it appears on the scene: cf. ¶76. Together these constitute history comprehended or conceptualized. This is also a fulfilment of religion, the descent of God to earth: cf. ¶19. It is thus represented by Calvary, the 'place of a skull' (*Schädelstätte*), as in Matthew

27: 33–4: ‘And when they were come unto a place called Golgotha, that is to say, a place of a skull, they gave him vinegar to drink mingled with gall, and when he had tasted thereof, he would not drink.’ This is the death of the absolute spirit, the isolated god, but He now has mankind to keep him company, as Schiller says in his poem *Die Freundschaft* (‘Friendship’), of which Hegel adapts the last two lines.

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